OPERATIONAL AND MOBILIZATION MEASURES OF THE SOVIET STATE SECURITY BODIES IN 1939 – JUNE OF 1941

Abstract

The purpose of the study is to elucidate, through the prism of declassified documents, the real state of implementation of mobilization measures in Ukraine and operational mobilization plans of the Soviet special services on the eve of World War II and Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. The research methodology is based on the principles of objectivity, systematics and dialectical combination of cause-effect relationships, the use of general scientific methods – historical and logical, abstraction, analysis, synthesis, generalization, and specific scientific methods – historical genetic and historical comparative. The scientific novelty of the article consists in elucidating the role of the USSR state security agencies in the elaboration of mobilization plans in 1939 – June of 1941, control over their implementation and development of specific operational and mobilization tasks. The shortcomings and misjudgments in the measures taken have been elucidated and the real state of combat readiness of the USSR has been clarified. The publication is prepared on the basis of previously inaccessible to researchers archival documents. The Conclusions. The documents do not show the intention of the USSR to be the first to strike at Nazi Germany in the summer of 1941, but in the event of aggression, the plan was clear – to relocate hostilities outside the territory of the state quickly and defeat the enemy at its territory. In this aspect, the communist leaders likened their plans, albeit in a different sequence, to the Nazi plans for a “Blitzkrieg”. According to the imaginary scenario of the coming war, intelligence and operational measures of the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence were envisaged in the west of the USSR, in particular in Ukraine, and abroad. Organizationally and materially unsupported strategy of defeating the enemy even on the far frontiers and the frontal transition to the offensive resulted in weak defense and mobilization training of the Soviet troops and civilians. Despite attempts made by the state security authorities to exercise a total control over the activities of the mobilization services, a single mobilization plan was not developed in the country. The incessant informing of the higher party and state bodies about the disruption of the disparate mobilization tasks by the Soviet Union and republican departments, and defense enterprises testified that the reaction to the intelligence services' reports was belated and ineffective. To verify the conclusions, it is perspective to study the peculiarities of the air defense system formation during this period and the network formation of command posts and fortified areas.

Key words: Ukraine, World War II, state security agencies, mobilization, operational measures.