OREL OFFENSIVE OPERATION (12 July – 18 August, 1943): SUCCESS AND FAILURES OF THE RED ARMY COMMAND REGARDING THE ARMORED AND MECHANIZED TROOPS USE

Authors

  • Pavlo TKACHUK Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Rector-Commandant of Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi National Army Academy,
  • Leonid KRYVYZIUK Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor, Deputy Head of the Department of Military Training of Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi National Army Academy,

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24919/2519-058x.15.204972

Keywords:

Orel offensive operation, the Supreme Command Headquarters, front, tank army, tank corps, brigade, enemy

Abstract

The purpose of the study is to reveal the contribution to the development of the operational art of mass use during offensive operations of tank armies and corps as mobile groups of fronts and armies, respectively. The research methodology is to use a set of methods: dialectical, analytical, historical, biographical, comparative. This methodological approach made it possible to retrospectively analyze the use of large tank formations, units during the Red Army offensive operation, during the breakthrough of a strong deep-seated enemy defense, which has not been in any previous operation since the beginning of the German-Soviet war. The scientific novelty of the obtained results lies both in the formulation of the problem and in the complex approach to its solution, which is due to the absence in the domestic historiography of special historical generalizing works on the specified subject within the specified chronological limits. Conclusions. During World War II the armored troops were the main striking forces while conducting ground operations. The authors continue to explore the role of the armored troops in the delivery of front and army operations. The article focuses on the research of the large armored formations use during the Red Army offensive operation, as the only operation of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts, a crucial component of the Battle of Kursk at the breakthrough of the heavily defended enemy’s positions, that hadn't occurred yet in any operation since the beginning of the German-Soviet War. The approaches to strategic and operational planning, peculiarities of implementing ideas of the Supreme Command concerning employment of three tank armies and seven separate tank brigades in one offensive operation as well as the errors committed in the decision making process of Orel offensive operation have been analyzed. In the research, the war art of the Supreme Command has been examined on the background of Orel offensive operation that was preplanned, unlike Moscow and Stalingrad strategic attack campaigns, which were planned during the defensive operations, even before the start of the Battle of Kursk. Consequently, Orel offensive operation has been studied in the frame of the whole Battle of Kursk. It was not perfect due to the structure of the field staff (headquarters) as well as its preparation and cohesion. The study focuses on the investigation of the armored troops operations during the combat, the use of the separate armored and mechanized corps, which were firstly used as mobile armies and armored armies leading front formations, which gave impact to the development of martial arts. That was the first operation of the Red Army since the beginning of the German-Soviet War, when three tank armies were involved into one attack campaign operation. The first experience of efficient exploitation of the self-propelled artillery regiments in order to support the advance of tanks and infantry has been also emphasized.

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How to Cite

TKACHUK, P., & KRYVYZIUK, L. (2020). OREL OFFENSIVE OPERATION (12 July – 18 August, 1943): SUCCESS AND FAILURES OF THE RED ARMY COMMAND REGARDING THE ARMORED AND MECHANIZED TROOPS USE. EAST EUROPEAN HISTORICAL BULLETIN, (15), 166–185. https://doi.org/10.24919/2519-058x.15.204972

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