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NORTH MOLDAVIAN VOLOSTS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PRINCE'S THRONE AT THE END OF THE 1530s – THE BEGINNING OF THE 1570s

Abstract. *The purpose of the research is to highlight the military and political situation of the northern territories of Moldavia (Chernivtsi and Khotyn Volosts) during the struggle for the prince's throne in the late 1530s – early 1570s, based on the analysis of sources and monographic literature. The research methodology is based on the principles of a concrete historical approach – historicism, objectivity, comprehensiveness, integrity and systematicity, as well as on the methods of analysis and synthesis, historical and comparative, problem-chronological methods. The scientific novelty consists in a comprehensive study of the course and consequences of the armed struggle of various claimants to the Moldavian prince's throne, which affected the territories of Chernivtsi and Khotyn Volosts of Moldavia, which has been carried out in Ukrainian historiography for the first time, and a new periodization of military and political processes on the territory of Bukovyna in 1538 – 1572 has been introduced. The Conclusions.* *In the first third of the 16th century, relations between Turkey and Poland in Central-Eastern Europe normalized. As a result, since 1538 Moldavia had fallen into a vassal dependency of Porta. However, the Polish kings tried to keep Moldavia in their sphere of influence, supporting their proteges on the Moldavian throne and using anti-Turkish sentiments in the state. The territory of Chernivtsi and Khotyn Volosts found itself in the vortex of this struggle, as it was located on the Polish-Moldavian border and was the first on the way to the capital Suceava. The Poles, the Cossacks, foreign mercenaries, on one hand, and Turkish-Tatar troops, on the other, inflicted significant damage, destruction and robbery on these lands from time to time. The Khotyn fortress again began to play an important strategic role as an outpost on the Polish-Moldavian border. Therefore, at that time the Northern Moldavian (Bukovynian) lands became the arena of struggle between claimants to the prince's throne from both the Ottoman Empire and the Commonwealth of Nations, since both countries during the years of 1538 – 1572 sought to extend their power to Moldavia, and later to the territory of Chernivtsi and Khotyn Volosts.*

Keywords: *Moldavia, Poland, the Ottoman Empire, Chernivtsi and Khotyn Volosts, prince's throne.*

ПІВНІЧНОМОЛДАВСЬКІ ВОЛОСТІ ТА БОРОТЬБА ЗА КНЯЖИЙ ПРЕСТОЛ НАПРИКІНЦІ 1530 – НА ПОЧАТКУ 1570-х рр.

Анотація. Мета розвідки – на основі аналізу джерел та монографічної літератури висвітлити військово-політичне становище північних територій Молдавії (Чернівецької та Хотинської волостей) під час боротьби за княжий престол наприкінці 1530 – на початку 1570-х рр. **Методологія дослідження** базується на принципах конкретно-історичного підходу – історизму, об'єктивності, всебічності, цілісності та системності, а також на методах аналізу та синтезу, історико-порівняльному, проблемно-хронологічному. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що вперше в українській історіографії здійснено комплексне дослідження перебігу та наслідків збройної боротьби різних претендентів на молдавський князівський престол, яка охопила території Чернівецької та Хотинської волостей Молдавії, а також запроваджено нову періодизацію військово-політичних процесів на території Буковини у 1538 – 1572 рр. **Висновки.** У першій третині XVI ст. відносини між Туреччиною і Польщею в Центрально-Східній Європі нормалізувалися. У результаті з 1538 р. Молдавія потрапляє у васальну залежність від Порту. Проте польські королі намагалися втримати її у сфері свого впливу, підтримуючи своїх ставленників на молдавському престолі та використовуючи антитурецькі настрої в державі. Територія Чернівецької та Хотинської волостей опинилася у вирі цієї боротьби, оскільки розміщувалася на польсько-молдавському кордоні і була першою на шляху до столиці – м. Сучава. Поляки, козаки, іноземні найманці, з одного боку, та турецько-татарські війська, з іншого, час від часу завдавали цим землям значної шкоди, руйнувань і пограбувань. І Хотинська фортеця знову почала відігравати важливу стратегічну роль як форпост на польсько-молдавському кордоні. Тому північномолдавські (буковинські) землі стали на той час ареною боротьби між претендентами на княжий престол з боку як Османської імперії, так і Речі Посполитої, оскільки обидві країни протягом 1538 – 1572 рр. прагнули поширити свою владу на Молдавію, а згодом на територію Чернівецької та Хотинської волостей.

Ключові слова: Молдавія, Польща, Османська імперія, Чернівецька та Хотинська волості, княжий престол.

The Problem Statement. During the first period of military and political processes on the territory of Chernivtsi and Khotyn Volosts, which lasted from 1538 to 1552, Poland did not challenge Turkish sovereignty over Moldavia and did not interfere in internal Moldavian affairs. The Jagiellons then sought to make peace with the Ottomans and even helped them. The change in Polish policy took place in 1552 – 1572. In particular, this was connected with the beginning of the new Habsburg-Ottoman war in Hungary, which enabled Poland to intensify its actions regarding Moldavia. It is interesting that Sigismund II Augustus himself continued to pursue a peaceful policy towards the Sultan. This was expressed both in the content of the renewed Polish-Turkish treaty of 1553 and in the subsequent refusal actions of the king to join the anti-Ottoman league. The Polish magnates seized the initiative in Moldavian affairs, putting on the throne in Iasi the hospodars who formally recognized the sovereignty of both Porta and Poland. These were risky actions that threatened the outbreak of war with Turkey. Fortunately, both the king and the sultan did not give in to their emotions and maintained a mutually beneficial peace. Awareness of the role of the Bukovynian lands in this case and processes which took place there during the specified period is very important for understanding the situation that developed.

The Review of Recent Research and Publications. In recent decades, researchers have increasingly turned to problems related to the military and political history of medieval Bukovyna. In particular, certain issues related to the struggle for the Moldavian prince's throne became the object of scientific research by the Polish researchers Z. Spieralski (1967; 1977), D. Milewski (2011; 2013; Milewski, 2022), B. Szutkiewicz (2009), I. Czamańska

(1999), A. Dziubiński (2005), P. Koziel (2021); by the Romanian researchers M. Berza (1957), K. Rezachevici (2001; 2006), V. Ciobanu (1985) and the others. However, for today, there is still no specific research on this issue. For an objective study of the course of this struggle, the role of the North Moldavian Volosts in it and their consequences for the region, the following sources were used: the Chronicle of the Land of Moldavia by G. Ureche (1990), collections of Moldavian documents (Veress, 1929; Corfus, 1983; Balan, 2005), diplomatic acts of that time (Dogiel, 1758; Jabłonowski, 1878), as well as materials of the Main Archive of Ancient Acts (Warsaw, Poland) and the Library of Princes Czartoryski (Kraków, Poland).

The purpose of the study: to elucidate the course and nature of the struggle for the prince's throne in Moldavia, which directly affected the territory of the northern lands of Moldavia (Chernivtsi and Khotyn Volosts) in 1538 – 1572, to show their negative consequences for the population and economy of the region.

The Results of the Research. After the conquest of the Moldavian state by the Ottomans, its borders became the outer frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. Nominally, the territory of the North Moldavian Volosts (Bukovyna and Khotynshchyna) came under the power of the Ottomans, although local elders (pirkelabs) who were subordinate to Moldavian hospodars continued to rule here (Masan, 2005, p. 76). In the Moldavian-Polish chronicle, it was noted that “the Turkish king (sultan – O. B.), having spent some time in Suceava, went back to Turkey, ordered not to spoil anything in the land (Moldavia – O. B.), but before that he took into his possession one Moldavian castle, Tighina” (Buganov, 1976, p. 122). Sultan Suleiman I (1520 – 1566) at the beginning of October 1538 announced decrees regarding Moldavia, which led to significant changes in the status of this state, because not only Petru Rareș (1527 – 1538) was removed from the throne, but also more brutal Ottoman control was introduced over the country and the southeastern part of the territory adjacent to the Kilia and Bilhorod fortresses, including the Tighina fortress, was annexed. The new territory inhabited by the Tatars was hence forth called Bujak and became directly adjacent to the North Moldavian Volosts. The sultan proclaimed the creation of the new Akerman sanjak, which included the newly annexed territory and a part of the Sylistrian sanjak (Milewski, 2022, p. 37).

Thus, the Turks annexed a significant part of the Moldavian lands, which began to be subordinated directly to the sultan. From the city of Tighina (a Moldavian customs post, first mentioned in 1408), which was renamed to Bendery, and 18 surrounding villages, the Ottomans formed the Bendery Raya, having built a new bastion-type fortress complex there (Krasnozhan, 2018, pp. 115–118). The garrison stationed in Bendery ensured the loyalty of the Moldavians and made it easier for the Tatars to cross the Dniester in their expeditions to the northwest along the Volosky way (Milewski, 2022, p. 37), which affected the position of the Chernivtsi and Khotyn Volosts negatively.

The sultan appoints Stephen V (1538 – 1540), nicknamed Lacusta or Locusta, who was the brother of Petru Rareș and the grandson of Stephen III the Great, as the new hospodar of Moldavia (Ohui, 2010, p. 36). At the same time, the Polish king Sigismund I (1507 – 1548) did not hide his concern about the dethronement of Petru Rareș and the appointment of a new hospodar, but he did not want to aggravate relations with Porta, since in 1533 peace was concluded for the ages and forever, i.e. for the lifetime of one of the contracting parties: the sultan or the Polish king (CAHRW, Libri Legationum, sign. 6, fol. 91a–93a; PCLK, ms. 271, pp. 616–618). He expected that Stephen V would not want to adhere to the peace treaty concluded with Poland by his predecessor, and that the Tatars, who were stationed in

Moldavia, would attack the border lands. However, Stephen Lacusta, in accordance with the sultan's intentions, supported friendly relations with Poland (Spieralski, 1967, p. 98). Therefore, in October of 1538, an envoy of Stephen V appeared in Kraków, some Abraham – most likely, Avram Banylivskiy (from Banyliv, nowadays – a village of the same name in Chernivtsi region), a multiple ambassador to Poland, as well as a pirkelab of Chernivtsi Parish (Corfus, 1983, pp. 9–11). The post of pirkelab was the equivalent of a Polish starosta, and a pirkelabship was a territorial unit in the Moldavian State headed by a pirkelab, similar to voivodeships in Poland. The hospodar stated his desire to restore friendship between Moldavia and Poland. As a result, on February 20, 1539, he concluded a friendship treaty with King Sigismund I, which renewed good-neighbourly relations between the countries (Dziubiński, 2005, pp. 121–123). The king was interested in the situation in Moldavia, the position of the hospodar himself and the attitude of the Ottomans towards him. Appropriate instructions for solving these issues were given to Tomasz Sobotsky, who went as an envoy to the sultan in December of 1539. Sigismund I advised him to plead for the hospodar before Suleiman I, and even seek the return of Bujak, which had been separated from Moldavia. The envoy received a favourable reception from the sultan, but he failed to return Bujak to Moldavia. He was forbidden to raise that issue at all (Corfus, 1983, pp. 20–21). For the development of the Bukovyna lands at that time, it was important that they were not attacked by either the Poles or the Ottomans, ensuring stability in the region and demographic growth of the population.

In order to stabilize the Polish-Moldavian relations, Stephen Lacusta confirmed the waiver of claims on Pokuttia, and in June of 1540, in Khotyn, he held a congress of the Polish and Moldavian commissioners to settle relations on the Polish-Moldavian border and establish peaceful relations (Spieralski, 1967, p. 98), obviously, the pirkelabs of Chernivtsi and Khotyn Volosts, located on the border of Moldavia and Poland, had to take an active part in this congress.

The beginning of military operations in Hungary in October of 1540 became a signal for an anti-Turkish uprising in Moldavia itself, where the public hoped for help of the Habsburgs. Patriotic Moldavian boyars organized a conspiracy and poisoned the hospodar Stephen V in December of 1540. The leader of the conspiracy, the Suceava Voivode Oleksandr nicknamed Kornia, the illegitimate son of the ex-hospodar Bohdan III, as well as the grandson of Stephenn III the Great, ascended the Moldavian throne. However, the sultan refused to approve him, supporting instead, the ex-hospodar Petru Rareș. Thus, the reign of Olexandr Kornia (1540 – 1541) lasted only two months, since already in February of 1541, Petru Rareș (1541 – 1546), who entered Moldavia at the head of the Ottoman troops (Spieralski, 1967, p. 98), occupied the Moldavian throne for the second time. By his order, O. Kornia was captured and executed (Dragnev, 1987, p. 132; Milewski, 2022, p. 42).

The Polish government accepted the appointment of Petru Rareș as the Moldavian hospodar quite discreetly (Masan, 2005, p. 78), who, by the way, began to pay Porta the tribute, increased to 12,000 zlotys (Berza, 1957, p. 10). Returning to the throne, he immediately executed the unfaithful boyars who betrayed him in 1538, undertook to preserve the Ottoman garrison in Suceava, send his son Iliyaș to Porta as a hostage, recognize the territorial changes in Moldavia and participate with his army in the Ottoman expeditions. Nevertheless, the hospodar dreamed of creating an anti-Ottoman coalition and was looking for new allies. For this purpose, he concluded an agreement with Brandenburg Duke Johann and Moscow Tsar Ivan IV (Ohui, 2010, p. 37).

The hospodar Petru Rareș also tried to restore relations with the Polish king. In a letter sent apparently at the beginning of 1541, he informed Sigismund I that he was restoring his power in Moldavia by the grace of the sultan and sought to maintain friendship with Poland and even gift the king with a sum of 10,000 zlotys. The appeal-request to the king in this letter is interesting: “I am asking you, as a lord and my close and great neighbour, to rejoice that the Lord God and my lord the sultan deigned to give me this country of mine (Moldavia – O. B.) and we, being in our country, will be friends with your highness and your country (Poland – O. B.), according to the oath that we took with your hetman near our city of Khotyn, and which I will gladly keep, without having any malice and treachery” (Corfus, 1983, pp. 40–41). He also wanted the king to hand over to him the boyars who fled with their treasures to Poland. The signing of the Polish-Moldavian agreement in Khotyn testified about the strategic importance of this territory in the politics of the Moldavian hospodars.

The culmination of the then-started exchange of ambassadors and lively correspondence was the sending of the pirkelab of Chernivtsi Avram Banylivskyi to Poland in 1542, in response to which the embassy of Matei Wlodek arrived (Ciobanu, 1985, pp. 181–188). At first, the hospodar was very friendly and sought Polish help, but when he was refused, he began to treat his northern neighbour more and more coldly. Thus, there is a gradual deterioration of the Polish-Moldavian relations, but it is worth noting the diplomatic activity of the Chernivtsi pirkelab in these relations. Suleiman I, fearing the rapprochement of Poland with the Habsburgs, ordered his hospodar to destroy the Polish borderlands. Therefore, the situation of the pre-Obertyn period was repeated, when the sultan used Petru Rareș to pressure King Sigismund the Old to divert him from relations with the Habsburgs. However, the border disputes were less dangerous, since the Turkish inspiration was not accompanied by the Moldavian claims to Pokuttia. Petru Rareș was now thinking about the lost Moldavian territories captured by the Turks in 1538, and not about secondary Pokuttia.

At the beginning of 1546, the Polish ambassador Jakub Wilamowski arrived in Moldavia, but the hospodar imprisoned him, which obviously was a consequence of strained Polish-Moldavian relations. Only after the unexpected death of Petru Rareș on October 4, 1546, his son and successor Ilyaș II Rareș (1546 – 1551), recognized by the sultan as the new hospodar, freed J. Wilamowski (Spieralski, 1967, p. 103). During his reign, the amounts of monetary and in-kind taxes in favour of Porta (bur, tribute) increased several times (Buganov, 1976, p. 96), which resulted money laundering from the Moldavian lands, in particular from Chernivtsi and Khotyn Volosts. On November 30, 1547, the Moldavian hospodar, without making any territorial claims, concluded a peace treaty with Poland, which once again regulated border relations (Spieralski, 1967, p. 112), apparently it was also about the establishment of relations on the Bukovyna-Podilskyi border.

In Moldavia itself, he resolutely suppressed boyar conspiracies and tried to increase state revenues by trying to tax church estates. This caused dissatisfaction among part of the Moldavian elite. Opponents of the hospodar found refuge in Poland and from there in 1549 made an expedition to Moldavia with the aim of dethroning the hospodar. However, Ilyaș II coped with this intervention, but still could not resist the growing opposition for long (Kozieł, 2021, p. 173; Milewski, 2013, p. 44). Obviously, the Bukovyna lands had to be devastated at that time, since they, being located on the Polish-Moldavian border, could become a bridgehead for intervention.

In response, the Moldavian hospodar organized an attack on Poland, apparently on Bar, in February of 1550. Evidence of that is the letter of the new Polish king Sigismund II Augustus

(1548 – 1572) to his hospodar Ilyaş II dated May 11, 1550. The king reported that he refused to receive his ambassadors, because the hospodar violated the terms of the peace treaty and sent his men to attack Poland. A commission was appointed to investigate the damage caused by this invasion. It is interesting that the Khotyn pirkelab Henhey Sheptylich and Avram, a priest from Khotyn, acted as the Moldavian ambassadors at that time. Some damage was done to the latter, which the Polish monarch regretted, promising to compensate him for the losses incurred, but only after the hospodar compensates for the damage caused to Poland (Corfus, 1983, pp. 151–153).

Despite all this, at the end of his reign, Ilyaş II Rareş converted to Islam, changing his name to Mehmed, and took a lot of treasures to the capital of Porta (Rezachevici, 2006, p. 117). In May of 1551, he renounced the title of hospodar in favour of his younger brother Stephen, and he himself transferred to the Turkish service and became the governor of Ochakiv eyalet, neighbouring Moldavia (Milewski, 2013, pp. 44–45). But soon, due to numerous military failures, he was executed by the Ottomans (Ohui, 2010, pp. 38). The Moldavian economic throne was occupied by the younger brother of Iliaş – Stephen VI (1551 – 1552), who established a brutal regime of terror against the higher boyars in Moldavia, as a result of which many representatives of the Moldavian aristocracy were forced to flee to Poland. Among them were the Khotyn pirkelab Negul and the logophet Ion Mohyla, who obviously owned significant land resources and had numerous supporters in the Khotyn region (Masan, 2005, p. 78). It is interesting that in 1550 H. Sheptylich was mentioned as the Khotyn pirkelab, and in 1551 this position was already held by Negul, which testified to the active anti-Ottoman position of government officials from Khotyn region, who were often changed.

The emigrant boyars appealed to the Polish king to accept Moldavia under their protectorate and place the hospodar they needed on the Moldavian throne, promising in return four Moldavian fortresses (apparently Suceava, Khotyn, Neamts and Soroky), an annual tribute and 20,000 cavalry to fight external enemies. However, the Polish monarch refused them (Dragnev, 1987, p. 136), not wanting to provoke the Turks. In our opinion, the Turkish sultan, concerned about the war with Persia, would not risk conflicting with Poland because of Moldavia.

However, Sigismund II Augustus had the imprudence to send the Moldavian boyars to Mykolay Senyavskiyi (Mikołaj Sieniawski), the Russian voivode and crown the Polish hetman, who not only advocated a joint war with the Habsburgs against Porta, but also sought to restore the Polish influence in Moldavia. Therefore, it is not surprising that M. Senyavskiyi accepted and supported Moldavian emigrants, realizing the possibility of provoking the Turks. Among them was the pretender to the Moldavian throne Ivonya, the 25-year-old son of the hospodar Stephen IV, the great-grandson of Stephen III the Great (Spieralski, 1967, p. 114). Hetman M. Senyavskiyi did not refuse Ivonya help and provided him with several cavalry banners. At the head of these troops in July of 1551, he crossed the Dniester and entered Moldavia, apparently on the territory of Chernivtsi or Khotyn Volosts. Stephen VI Rareş turned out to be ready for an invasion: he attacked and defeated the army of Ivonya, forcing him to retreat to the Polish borders. Wanting to take revenge on the Poles for their support of Ivonya, the Tatars already at the end of August – beginning of September of 1551 invaded Bratslav Region and Podillia, capturing and burning the town of Bratslav (Milewski, 2022, p. 60; Ciobanu, 1984, pp. 198–199). Therefore, the ambiguous actions on the part of Kraków showed the desire of the Poles to continue maintaining the opportunity

to interfere in internal political Moldavian affairs, and the Tatars to take revenge on them with their raids.

The Moldavian emigrants continued staying in Poland, using the protection of M. Seniavskiy, who even hired them into service for royal pay. We have a confirmed presence of the Moldavian boyars in the ranks of the Ivonya's banner together with other local units in the camp near Terebovla on November 30, 1551. The banner had 216 horses. Twenty-three Moldavian boyars served in it, among whom were the above-mentioned Khotyn pirkelab Negul and logophet Ion Mohyla, as well as hetman Negrylo, butler Petro, janitor Motsak, visternyk Dan, postelnic Lichul, and others (Spieralski, 1967, p. 115). It is worth noting among them the logophet I. Mohyla, whose son, Jeremiah Mohyla, sat on the Moldavian throne with the help of Poland less than half a century later. Therefore, almost all members of the prince's council left the hospodar Stephen VI and fled from him to Poland.

In 1552, Stephen VI actively supported Suleiman I, opposing the Habsburg army in Transylvania. This caused the natural reaction of Ferdinand Habsburg, who decided to negotiate with the boyar opposition through his envoy, who met with the butler Petro-Olexandr in Transylvania, promising him help. Having established cooperation with Ferdinand, Petro-Olexandr, as a contender for the prince's throne, won even greater support from hetmans M. Seniavskiy and Jan Tarnowski, who traditionally acted in the interests of the Habsburgs (Kozieł, 2021, p. 179).

On September 1, 1552, a party of the Moldavian boyars, in agreement with the boyars who had emigrated to Poland, organized the murder of the hospodar Stephen VI in a camp at the Prut River (Milewski, 2022, p. 66; Statti, 2002, pp. 137–138). The chronicler wrote that “the boyars killed Stephen Voivode Rareș in Tsetsor (a village at the Prut River – O. B.), electing Zholdya as their hospodar” (Ureche, 1990, p. 86). With the death of the latter, the rule of the Mushatyn dynasty ended in Moldavia, which formally allowed Porta to further strengthen the state's dependence (Dragnev, 1987, p. 137). And the Moldavian boyars, not waiting for a response from the emigrant boyars from Poland, appointed the unknown Ion Zholdia as the hospodar.

Therefore, armed actions against the Turkish proteges on the Moldavian throne began in the first years after the conquest of the state by Porta. As a result of these uprisings, the hospodars Stephen V Lacusta (1540) and Stephen VI Rareș (1552) were killed. At the same time, the local population was actively involved in the anti-Ottoman struggle, apparently including the Bukovynians, mercilessly destroying the janissaries who were in the suburbs of Suceava (Botushanskyi, 1998, p. 45) and, obviously, in other settlements of the region.

The author shares D. Milevskiy's opinion that the adherents of Stephen VI were supporters of Rareș in Moldavia, led by the mother of the murdered hospodar, Helena Brankovych. It was she who achieved the election of Ion I Zholdya (1552) as a Moldavian hospodar (Milewski, 2022, p. 67), seeking to connect him with the ruling dynasty through his marriage to Roxanda, the older sister of Stephen VI (Kozieł, 2021, p. 180; Ureche, 1990, p. 86). Z. Spieralskyi had a different opinion, asserting that in September of 1552, Maria Rareș was his wife at the time (Spieralski, 1967, p. 116). No matter which of the sisters became the wife of I. Zholdya, he was not able to establish himself on the Moldavian throne for a long time.

At the same time, the representatives of another Moldavian boyar party in Poland, after finding out about the events in Tsetsor, appointed their claimant to the magistrate's throne – a boyar Petro-Olexandr, a butler, who was also supported by the Russian voivode and Polish crown hetman M. Seniavskiy, the patron of emigrant boyars (Masan, 2005, p. 78;

Ureche, 1990, p. 86). Thus, the Poles, from time to time, tried to place their claimants on the Moldavian throne, using the discontent in Moldavia with the Turkish proteges.

Serving in the ranks of the Ivonya's banner, Petro the butler became known by the name of Oleksandr soon. The illegitimate son of the ex-hospodar Bohdan III, and therefore, the nephew of Petru Rareș and the uncle of Ivonya, he was nicknamed Lepushnyanu (Lopushanyin) in honour of his mother, who came from the Moldavian town of Lopushnia. Sharing the usual fate of members of the hospodar's family who traveled around the world, he arrived in Poland before 1535. As a 20-year-old young man, he left for Turkey with a letter of recommendation from Sigismund I the Elder to Sultan Suleiman I. Petro-Olexandr must have won the trust of the Turks, since he returned to Moldavia during the second reign of Petru Rareș and even entered the prince's council. His escape to Poland was not of a political nature, but was caused by a personal conflict with his Moldavian hospodar. Seeing that the Moldavian boyars were trying to overthrow Stephen VI from the throne, Petro-Olexandr decided to become a hospodar himself (Spieralski, 1967, p. 115). In our opinion, his position could have been influenced by the ceding of the throne by Ivonya, who was younger (in 1552, O. Lepushnyanu was about 35 years old, and Ivonya was only 25) and not experienced enough. Therefore, being also a descendant of a prince's family and a mature man, O. Lepushnyanu seemed a better candidate for the Moldavian throne than the young, inexperienced Ivonya.

Meanwhile, M. Seniavskiy, developing his success, quickly gathered almost all his troops: more than 3,000 cavalymen (along with the Ivonya's banner) and 150 infantrymen (Spieralski, 1967, p. 116). On September 5, 1552, they united with the Moldavian troops near Bakota, a Bukovynian town at the Dniester, located opposite the village of Komariv, in Khotyn region (nowadays – the village of the same name in the Dniester district of Chernivtsi region) (Spieralski, 1977, p. 369). Before crossing the Moldavian border, in the same place, in Bakota, a boyar Petro, under the name Oleksandr Lepushnyanu, as a sign of gratitude, issued a deed recognizing Moldavia as a patrimony of the Polish crown, i.e. signed an act of vassalage to Poland. This act was sealed with the seals of 23 Polish captains and 66 Moldavian boyars (Dogiel, 1758, pp. 618–619; Jabłonowski, 1878, p. 18). Among the captains were the commander-in-chief of the expedition, Maciej Vlodek, the starosta of Kamianets, Bernard Pretvych, the starosta of Terebovlya, and others (Spieralski, 1967, p. 116). The Romanian historian K. Rezachevici, questioning the date of September 5, convincingly proved that the day of taking the oath was September 2, 1552 (Rezachevici, 2001, pp. 621–622). Although it did not significantly affect the situation.

Soon, the Polish-Moldavian army crossed to Bukovyna bank of the Dniester River, apparently to Komariv or Kormanets, and from there moved to the Moldavian capital of Suceava (Masan, 2005, pp. 78–79). Detachments of emigrant boyars and their Polish allies, having found out that I. Zholdya, who had seized the country's prince's throne, was on his way to Suceava, set out to catch up with him, and when they fired near the town of Shypot, which is on the Zhyzhyia River (the right tributary of the Prut River), then defeated the army of supporters and captured I. Zholdya alive, cut off his nose and sent him to the monastery (Ureche, 1990, p. 86). The winners declared Oleksandr Lepushnyanu (1552 – 1561), the first ruler of Moldavia in many years, who had to thank for the leadership to the armed support of Poland.

The king of Poland was informed about the actions of M. Seniavskiy in Moldavia less than two weeks after the Polish hetman received the vassal oath from O. Lepushnyanu.

He immediately sent a general ordering a categorical withdrawal from Moldavia, and the oath itself was rejected by the king because of his relationship with Porta (Szutkiewicz, 2009, p. 14).

Having received the Moldavian throne, O. Lepushnyanu sent ambassadors to Sigismund II Augustus to sign a new Moldavian-Polish treaty. However, the Polish king declared that he did not give orders for the actions of the magnates and would withdraw them from Moldavia, and also assured Suleiman I that he was not going to interfere in Moldavian affairs and considered Moldavia to be a country subordinate to Porta. Not having received support from Poland, Oleksandr Lepushnyanu was forced to submit to the Turkish Sultan, who officially confirmed him on the prince's throne. The position of the new hospodar was unstable, since at that time he had rivals, in particular the brothers of Stephen VI Rareș, always ready to offer their services to the sultan (Dragnev, 1987, pp. 137–138).

That's when Ioan Jacob Heraclid, who having secured the support of the Habsburgs and the Polish magnate Olbracht Laski (Łaski), also appeared on the political scene, aimed to seize power and the throne in Suceava.

The newly elected hospodar was forced to send his son as a hostage to Istanbul, as well as to place a detachment of janissaries in the capital Suceava (Mehmed, 1976, pp. 58, 82). To gain the recognition of Porta, the amount of tribute paid by the hospodar of Moldavia was almost doubled to 30,000 zlotys (Corfus, 1983, pp. 178–180), although its scale was still impressive. This sum was first mentioned in 1553, “the Moldavians pay the sultan of Turkey 30,000 florins” (Berza, 1957, p. 11). According to some data, the “firman” (sultan's written decree on the throne) cost the Moldavian hospodar another 200,000 zlotys (Ohui, 2010, p. 40). In order to keep the Moldavian throne, in 1552 – 1553 Oleksandr Lepushnyanu provided active assistance in the sultan's war against the imperial troops of Ferdynand Habsburg in Semygorod. After that, he reconciled with the surviving members of the family of Petru Rareș and in 1553 married his eldest daughter Roxanda. Around the same time, the logophet I. Mohyla, one of the main perpetrators of the overthrow of Stephen VI Rareș, married his younger sister Maria, the widow of the ex-hospodar of Ioan I Zholdya (Spieralski, 1967, p. 117).

Stabilization of the internal political situation in Moldavia, which also corresponded to Turkish interests, greatly facilitated the task of the Lviv castellan S. Tenchynskyi, who in April of 1553 left with the embassy to Istanbul. He was accompanied to Suceava by the Belgian castellan P. Boratynskyi. On June 1 of the same year, the hospodar Oleksandr swore allegiance to the Polish crown in front of them. Compared to the oath in Bakota, it was supplemented by military obligations. However, this act did not affect Turkish interests at all, since Moldavia still remained subordinate to the sultan. If Suleiman I had some apprehensions, the clashes with the Habsburgs in Hungary, as well as the unfinished war with Persia, which had been going on since 1548, encouraged him to exercise restraint (Spieralski, 1967, p. 117). In any case, S. Tenchynskyi's mission was complete success.

Paradoxically, M. Seniavskyi's intervention in the Moldavian affairs helped the king to reach an agreement with Porta. On August 1, 1553, the Polish-Turkish peace treaty was renewed, which became the basis of good relations between the two states until the death of Sigismund II Augustus (CAHRW, Archiwum Koronne Warszawskie, Dz. tur., k. 68, t. 157, no. 302–304; PCLK, ms. 612, pp. 247–252). The treaty also contained a passage prohibiting the Moldavian raids on the Polish lands.

In 1556, under the order of the Turks, O. Lepushnyanu helped defeat the imperial troops from Semygorod and put on the throne of Transylvania Queen Isabella Bochkai and her

son, whom he helped to recapture Munkach (nowadays – Mukacheve in Transcarpathia) the following year.

Owing to brisk trade and the stabilization of the political situation, the economic life of Moldavia began to revive, as evidenced by the huge treasure that O. Lepushnyanu accumulated during the first 10 years of his rule (Ohui, 2010, p. 40). He also made peace and established trade relations with neighbouring states (Buganov, 1976, p. 126). Obviously, economic life on the territory of Bukovyna was also revived gradually.

According to A. Zhukovskiy, the Moldavian hospodar “established friendly relations with Western Ukraine, becoming the founder of the “Voloska Church” in Lviv and, together with his wife Roksanda, presented the Przemyśl cathedral a silver kyot (ark) with relics and a handmade cross, artistically carved in 1557” (Zhukovskiy, 1991, p. 66).

During the first management of O. Lepushnyanu, no one violated the Moldavian borders, and on his order chronicles were written in the state. However, gradually the hospodar began to pursue an internal authoritarian policy (Stati, 2002, p. 139), which, in our opinion, should have caused considerable dissatisfaction on the part of the great boyars of Moldavia, particularly in Bukovyna.

The beginning of the 60s of the 16th century was again marked by the intensification of the struggle for the Moldavian magistrate's throne. It was started by the international adventurer Ioan Jacob Heraclid, nicknamed the Despot, a native of the Greek island of Samos, crowned by Emperor Charles V as Count Palatine. Later, having learned several languages, including the local one, he pretended to be a relative of Roksanda Rareş and a descendant of the Heraclides family (Czamańska, 1999, pp. 133–138).

He was given military assistance by a young Polish tycoon, Sieradz voivode Olbracht Laski, whose expedition to Moldavia was tantamount to sticking a stick into an anthill, since the Moldavian hospodar O. Lepushnyanu had been a dual citizen of Poland and Turkey since 1553, and the political balance in this corner of Europe hung by a thread.

In the spring of 1558, claiming to be related to the hospodar's wife Roksanda, I. J. Heraclid went on a visit to the manor house of the hospodar of Moldavia. Obviously, at first he tried to convince the hospodar to oppose Turkey. However, under unknown circumstances, he was forced to leave Moldavia. And all the preparations for the Moldavian expedition were carried out by O. Laski with the money of his wife, who died in February of 1561. He gathered troops actively and trained them skillfully. The first expedition to Moldavia, organized by Heraclid and Laski, began in November of 1560 and included, in addition to 500 Yarotskiy cavalymen, 180 Spaniards, 200 Germans, 200 Hungarians, 150 Polish infantrymen, and they also had 10 cannons at their disposal (Zieliński & Żelewski, 1982, pp. 23–26). However, in order to attack Moldavia, these troops had to pass through well-defended Polish territories. Even before the troops reached Podillia, O. Laski handed over the command to J. Heraclid, and hurried to Poland. During O. Laski's absence, hetman M. Seniavskiy blocking the way of the army, defeated them near the village of Pomeranians. J. Heraclid, having accepted the demands of the hetman, gave all the artillery, and the nobility and foreigners dispersed on their own (Czamańska, 1999, p. 141). Thus, the first expedition, never reaching the borders of Moldavia, failed. The whole matter was saved by the energy and intelligence of O. Laski. With the support and financial assistance of Ferdynand Habsburg, in October of 1561 he set out again on an expedition with the same forces (about 2,000 soldiers), but on a different route (Zieliński & Żelewski, 1982, p. 27). From Munkach, along the southern slopes of the Carpathians, he and his troops entered the territory of Bukovyna via Snyatyn already

in November of 1561 (Masan, 2005, p. 79). Not even a few weeks had passed when they attacked Khotyn and recaptured it by making a surprise assault (Zieliński & Żelewski, 1982, p. 32). Since then, the Khotyn Castle and the territory of the whole Khotyn region became the place of frequent military collisions and conflicts between various states that competed for influence over Moldavia (Dobrzahnskyi, Makar & Masan, 2002, p. 86). The Moldavian chronicler confirms that their army consisted of foreign mercenaries, as well as some Cossacks (Ureche, 1990, p. 88). According to Chernivtsi researcher O. Masan, the city of Chernivtsi did not suffer any devastation at that time, as J. Heraclid had to take care of a personal support from local residents (Masan, 2009, p. 35). However, from that time the Cossacks, as a hired force, became an important factor in the political life of the Moldavian state.

The main military events of this expedition took place on the bank of the Siret River, where on November 18, 1561, near the modern city of Dorohoi, O. Laski, at the head of a detachment of 2,000 mercenaries, defeated the hastily assembled Moldavian troops of O. Lepushnyanu (who at one time took the throne also with the help of the Poles, but quickly refocused on the Turks – O. B.). He inflicted such a devastating defeat on the hospodar that he did not even try to resist, but simply fled to Turkey. Meanwhile, Ioan II Jacob Heraclid (1561 – 1563) declared himself the new hospodar, having entered the old capital of Moldavia, Suceava, in mid-November. He immediately appointed O. Laski “hetman of the Moldavian land” and gave him Khotyn and the surrounding territories as a pledge, since he could not immediately reimburse him for all the expenses of the expedition (Zieliński & Żelewski, 1982, pp. 27–28; Buganov, 1976, pp. 114, 123). Obviously, Khotyn eldership, as compensation for the debt obligation of the new hospodar, had to go to O. Laski.

Immediately after that, J. Heraclid sent his ambassadors to Istanbul with the aim of bribing the members of the sultan’s divan (the Imperial Council). He promised them as much as 20,000 ducats, which together with the gifts amounted to 50,000 zlotys (Ohui, 2010, p. 41). In the end, he got his way and was confirmed as the sultan on the Moldavian throne.

For some time, O. Laski himself was in Khotyn and the Khotyn Fortress. This can be evidenced by the letter he sent on May 20, 1562 to the Austrian Archduke Maxymilian Habsburg from the Moldavian fortress of Khotyn (“*ex Moldaviensi arce Chotino*”) (Veress, 1929, p. 215).

In the end, the Polish garrison was located in the Khotyn Castle, and the commandant of the fortress was appointed Jan Piasetskyi, who happened to be a relative of Dmytro Vyshnevetskyi, the organizer of the first Cossack Sich (Masan, 2005, p. 79; Uryvalkin & Uryvalkin, 2008, p. 64). Prince D. Vyshnevetskyi, a favorite of the Polish king Sigismund II Augustus and a “watchman on Khortytsia”, sister’s son on mother’s side of the hospodar Peter Rareș, was “the father of Ukrainian Moldavian politics” and an ardent enemy of Porta (Ohui, 2010, p. 41).

However, at the beginning of 1563, an enmity between J. Heraclid and O. Laski began. By order of the sultan, the hospodar of Moldavia was forced to take Khotyn from the latter. Carrying out the decision, on January 14, 1563, the Moldavian hospodar arrived in Khotyn and expelled O. Laski from the fortress, seizing the surrounding lands. The ambitious tycoon was deprived of any opportunity to quickly return the money invested for his help in obtaining the Moldavian throne, now with the same enthusiasm was preparing to deprive him of power in Moldavia (Czamańska, 1999, pp. 147–148).

During the above-mentioned events, the hospodar was accompanied by representatives of the Austrian Archduke Maxymilian led by Martin St Gotthard. In his message sent from

Khotyn (“ex Hotin”) to Austria on January 20, 1563, the latter described the strategic location of the fortress on the border of Moldavia and Podillia, and also pointed to its good condition (Veress, 1929, p. 236).

Seeking to take revenge on the Moldavian hospodar and compensate for the material losses he suffered, O. Laski decided to use the hatred of the church hierarchs and the entire population of the country against J. Heraclid, because he was a Protestant and mercilessly robbed Orthodox churches (Dobrzhanskyi, Makar, & Masan, 2002, p. 86). Dissatisfaction with the policy of the foreigner was also growing among the Moldavian boyars. Having found himself in a difficult situation, J. Heraclid began to look for a new ally and patron in Poland. First, he held negotiations with the Kyiv voivode, Prince Vasyl-Kostyantyn Ostrozki, and later – with the Kraków castellan Marcin Zborowski (Masan, 2005, p. 79). However, these actions did not lead to the desired results.

The unstable position of J. Heraclid in Moldavia was further worsened by the boyar conspiracy that broke out in the summer of 1563 against the power of the latter's, led by the Moldavian hetman Stephen Tomsha. In the end, J. Heraclid with his loyal troops surrounded the detachments of S. Tomsha in the Suchava fortress (Czamańska, 1999, p. 148; Ureche, 1990, pp. 96–97). Considering this, the Moldavian hospodar again asked Sieradz voivode O. Laski for help (Masan, 2009, p. 35). However, the latter, instead of helping, decided to come to an agreement with a longtime contender to the Moldavian throne, Prince D. Vyshnevetskyi (a well-known hero of Ukrainian thoughts about Bayda), since he was a descendant of the Despots and Mushatins, who ruled the country until 1552, on mother's Anastasia side (Ohui, 2010, p. 41). Hetman S. Tomsha also expressed his support for Dumitrashko (as he was called by the Moldavian chroniclers – O. B.), although he himself harbored plans to become a hospodar (Ureche, 1990, pp. 93–95).

In turn, D. Vyshnevetskyi, having heard about the uprising, agreed to take part in the Moldavian campaign, and having gathered the Cossack army, he marched to Moldavia (Uryvalkin & Uryvalkin, 2008, p. 65). Regarding the number of troops, the data differ. More likely, the Cossack detachment consisted of 4,000 people. It was also joined by the Polish unit located in the Khotyn fortress (Botushanskyi, 1998, p. 46). In the summer of 1563, D. Vyshnevetskyi with a 5,000-strong squad of the Cossacks and the Poles, led by J. Piasetskyi, approached the Dniester River and set up a camp, waiting for the army of O. Laski (Dobrzhanskyi, Makar & Masan, 2002, p. 87).

There are several versions of the unfolding of further events. According to one of them, D. Vyshnevetskyi unexpectedly retreated from O. Laski, hoping to assume the position of hospodar of Moldavia on his own. According to another, local boyars invited D. Vyshnevetskyi as one of the contenders for the throne, and O. Laski was forced to return to Poland (Uryvalkin & Uryvalkin, 2008, p. 65). Let's try to figure out how everything was in reality.

A part of the Moldavian boyars really turned to D. Vyshnevetskyi with a proposal to go to Suceava immediately, where an uprising broke out against J. Heraclid (Buganov, 1976, pp. 115, 123; Dragnev, 1987, p. 139). Despite his illness, the Ukrainian prince, nevertheless, went on a campaign without waiting for O. Laski. It is not known for certain whether he passed through Khotyn, since the chronicles and documents do not report anything about it (Dobrzhanskyi, Makar & Masan, 2002, p. 87). S. Komarnytskyi believed that “in 1563, the Ukrainian Cossacks led by Prince D. Vyshnevetskyi occupied the Khotyn fortress and began negotiations with the Moldavian hospodar about a joint action against Turkey” (Komarnytskyi, 2001, p. 16). However, this judgment contradicts the course of events,

because it does not correspond to reality. Most likely, “D. Vyshnevetskyi with the Cossacks and J. Piassetskyi with the Poles approached Suceava from the south, which meant that they were moving there from the direction of Soroky – the traditional place where the Cossacks crossed the Dniester” (Masan, 2005, p. 80). On the way of the Cossack units to Suceava, D. Vyshnevetskyi tried to find an understanding with S. Tomsha (Czamańska, 1999, p. 148). However, the latter, seeking to seize power in Moldavia, tricked the Cossacks into an ambush near Verchykan (Dobrzhanskyi, Makar, & Masan, 2002, p. 87). D. Vyshnevetskyi was wounded and, together with his closest associate J. Pyassetskyi, was captured. In October of 1563, S. Tomsha handed him over to Sultan Suleiman I the Magnificent (Kanuni), on whose order the prince was executed (Uryvalkin & Uryvalkin, 2008, p. 65). The Moldavian chronicler, describing those events, noted that “a battle took place near Verchykan, at the Siret River, and they were defeated at once (Cossacks. – O. B.), and they were cut out, and the field was filled with blood, and the ground was covered with corpses of the dead, and Dumitrashko himself was captured, and with him many alive, and bound and sent to Istanbul to Sultan Suleiman. And there Dmytro met a fierce death” (Buganov, 1976, pp. 130–131). It is known that the Turks threw D. Vyshnevetskyi and J. Piassetskyi from the fortress walls onto iron hooks (Dobrzhanskyi, Makar, & Masan, 2002, p. 87). These events clearly indicate the active involvement of a new military political force – the Ukrainian Cossacks – in the struggle against the Turkish oppression on the territory of Bukovyna and all of Moldavia.

Now let's return to the issue of help that J. Heraclid expected to receive from O. Laski. The latter decided to free the hospodar from the siege in the Suceava fortress. Having gathered an army, he captured the Khotyn fortress and went to Suceava, but he was late. Having reached the Seret River, on November 11, he found out that the Moldavian capital had capitulated and J. Heraclid had perished (Milewski, 2022, p. 95). In the Moldavian-Polish chronicle it was noted that “the Despot was besieged in Suceava, having mounted a horse, he rode out of the fortress to that Tomsha, begging to save his life. However, nothing helped, he was ordered to be executed instantly and he (S. Tomsha – O. B.) struck him first with amace” (Buganov, 1976, pp. 115, 123). O. Laski marched back through Bukovyna, successfully repulsing the attacks of Stephen Tomsha's army, and took care of the fortification of Khotyn, which remained the only trophy in his hands from the Moldavian campaign.

Stephen VII Tomsha (1563 – 1564), having seized the magistrate's throne, immediately informed O. Laski about the change of power in Moldavia, offering him truce. He asked the Polish magnate to withdraw his troops from the country (Masan, 2009, p. 35). Having nothing to do in Moldavia, the Poles began to cross the infamous Kozmin forests in Bukovyna with much caution, fearing a repeat of the events of 1497. However, that is what happened, O. Laski's army, suffering from hunger and disease, was attacked by the army of S. Tomsha and local peasant bands armed with flails and scythes (Ureche, 1990, pp. 97–98), apparently from Bukovyna. Having passed the Kozmin forest, the Polish troops probably had to pass through the city of Chernivtsi. Chronicles about the city in the context of these events do not mention anything. But some researchers suggest that Chernivtsi was burned by the demoralized soldiers of O. Laski (Masan, 2009, p. 35).

This is evidenced by a document dated July 9, 1569, in which the children of Bukovyna boyar Shcheful appealed to the next hospodar, Bohdan IV Lepushnyanu (1568 – 1572), regarding the privilege on Zastavna, which was lost when “the Despot locked him up in Suchavskyi Grad and when Laski came for the second time even to Chernivtsi” (Balan, 2005, p. 43). O. Masan believed that this document was obviously kept in one of Chernivtsi

churches and burned in the autumn of 1563 during O. Laski's campaign to Moldavia (Masan, 2009, p. 35). Thus, these were difficult times for Bukovyna, as the settlements of the region were devastated by foreign troops.

On the other hand, Z. Spieralski, on the contrary, noted that, pursued by S. Tomsha's army, O. Laski broke through Bukovyna forests without losing a single soldier. He hastily fortified the castle in Khotyn, having left a pledge there, and returned to Poland (Spieralski, 1967, p. 128).

Trying to regain the magistrate's throne, at the beginning of 1564 in Moldavia at the head of the Turkish troops, the ex-hospodar O. Lepushnianu reappeared. Having never managed to gain a foothold on the Moldavian throne, S. Tomsha and his supporters had to flee to Poland, where they were arrested and, at the request of Sultan Suleiman I, handed over to the Turks. However, the Poles left to themselves the ex-hospodar and three high-ranking boyars, who were accused of the events of 1563 and executed on May 5, 1564 in Lviv (Ureche, 1990, p. 99; Masan, 2005, p. 80). And O. Lepushnianu (1564 – 1568) became the hospodar for the second time.

The Khotyn fortress was under the control of the Poles at that time, but the Sultan sought to regain control over it. In May of 1564, an ambassador was sent to Kraków with a demand to return the Khotyn fortress, which was occupied by the Poles (“la fortezza di Cocimo occupata già da un Polono”) (Veress, 1929, p. 249). And King Sigismund II August was forced to hand over the Khotyn fortress to the Moldavian hospodar in July of the same year (Spieralski, 1967, pp. 133–134), for which he received gratitude from the Turkish sultan (Petriceicu-Hăjdeu, 1865, p. 62). Having returned Moldavia to O. Lepushnyanu, Sultan Suleiman I ordered him to destroy all the fortifications in the state, and the hospodar was forced to obey, “wanting to please the Turks”. However, he left the Khotyn Castle, which was located on the Polish-Moldavian border, as “the protection from the Liakhs” (Ureche, 1990, p. 100).

In 1565, by sultan's order, O. Lepushnyanu moved the capital of Moldavia from Suceava to the city of Iasi, away from the border with Poland (Ohui, 2010, pp. 43). After that, the importance of the North Moldavian Volosts in the life of the Moldavian state temporarily declined, and at the same time, the “Ukrainian appearance of the country” (Zhukovskiy, 1991, p. 66). As for the name of the region, there is no reason to believe that already in the 16th century the name “Bukovyna” spread to the entire territory of modern Chernivtsi region. Evidently, at that time only the area in the upper reaches of the Siret was called Bukovyna. At the same time, chronicles and documents of the second half of the 16th – 17th centuries testify to the use of the same name for those forests that covered the territory between the Prut and the Dniester rivers (Masan, 1992, p. 112).

O. Lepushnyanu, having come to power for the second time, was again unable to overcome the boyar opposition and was poisoned, apparently by oppositionists, in 1568. After him, his eldest son Bohdan IV (1568 – 1572), who seriously suffered from eye diseases, occupied the Iasi throne. In order to stay in power, he initially cooperated with the Turks and supported their campaign against Poland (Ohui, 2010, p. 43), but later changed the vector of foreign policy and began to focus on the Poles. Being in Red Rus, he concluded a defensive anti-Ottoman alliance with Poland in 1569, and also stationed the Polish soldiers led by M. Dobrosolovski in the Khotyn Castle (Masan, 2005, p. 81). The Italian chronicler Alessandro Hvanini rightly noted that Bohdan IV “loved the Poles more than the Moldavians and kept them at court, while he hated the Moldavians and simply disgusted them” (Hvanini, 2009, p. 185).

All this caused a wave of boyar conspiracies in February of 1572, as well as the corresponding reaction of Sultan Selim II (1566 – 1574) (Ohui, 2010, p. 43). Therefore, Bohdan IV was forced to flee across the Dniester River (Masan, 2005, p. 81). A. Hvanini described these events as follows: “The Sultan, seeing what Bohdan was doing, sent Ivonia to the Moldavian household, in Bohdan’s place. The latter, having twenty thousand Turks with him, came to Moldavia” (Hvanini, 2009, p. 185). In 1571, the Turkish fleet suffered a heavy defeat in the battle near Lepanto, so the sultan needed significant funds for its reconstruction. It is obvious that all these events became the impetus for the appointment of Ivonia as the Moldavian hospodar at the price of a large bribe (220 thousand zlotys) (Ohui, 2010, pp. 43–44), who entered history under the name of Ioan III the Fierce and with the help of the Turkish troops occupied the Moldavian capital – the city of Iasi.

However, the Polish king sought to reinstate his protege Bohdan IV on the magistrate’s throne and even sent his envoy to the sultan, as well as gave unofficial permission for Polish “volunteers” to go to Moldavia (Masan, 2005, p. 81). It was about military assistance from the Podil Voivode Mikołaj Mielecki and the village elder of Stryi Mikołaj Sieniawski (Spieralski, 1967, p. 131). “Bohdan came against him (Ioan III. – O. B.) with the small army he had from his friends from Poland (...). The senior of this army was Mikołaj Mielecki, under whom the Russian voivode Mikołaj Sieniawski served” (Hvanini, 2009, p. 185).

The Polish troops led by M. Mielecki entered Moldavia at the end of March of 1572. They numbered about 2,000 soldiers (Milewski, 2011, pp. 38–39). Apparently, the crossing over the Dniester River took place near Mosorivka (now the village of Musorivka, Chernivtsi district) (Masan, 2005, p. 81). Having crossed the Dniester River, they headed in the direction of Chernivtsi (Milewski, 2011, p. 39). On the territory of the Chernivtsi Parish, the Poles “began to take provisions by force, to do harm to people. When Mielecki found out about this, (...) he immediately reorganized the army, sent 700 souls of cavalry junk back home” (Hvanini, 2009, pp. 185–186).

From Chernivtsi, they moved along the banks of the Prut River to the Moldavian capital of Iasi and “came to Stepanovyts” (nowadays – the city of Ștefenest in Botoșani County, Romania. – O. B.) (Hvanini, 2009, p. 186). There they came across the Turkish-Moldavian army of the hospodar Ioan III and after several skirmishes, apparently on April 10, M. Mielecki ordered to retreat to Khotyn (Milewski, 2011, p. 40). In our opinion, the Poles, repelling the Turkish attacks, obviously had to retreat through the western part of the current Dniester district of Chernivtsi region.

On the night of April 12 to 13, the Polish-Cossack army approached Khotyn and camped near the fortress (Masan, 2005, pp. 81–82), “and the most important stayed in the castle with Bohdan” (Hvanini, 2009, p. 191). Thus, army officers were located inside the Khotyn Castle.

On the morning of April 13, 20,000 Turkish-Moldavian troops launched an attack, but the Poles and Cossacks repulsed the offensive of the troops of Ioan III, launching a counterattack, pushed the enemy back to the nearby forest, continuing the battle for some time. O. Masan noted rightly that this episode testifies to the fact that in the 16th century the forest range approached Khotyn itself (Dobrzhanskyi, Makar & Masan, 2002, p. 88).

The flood on the Dniester, as well as the lack of food and fodder, complicated the situation of the Polish-Cossack army (Masan, 2005, p. 82). The nobleman Radetskyi was sent to the hospodar Ioan III on behalf of Bohdan, “asking him not to take his own throne from him. This did not move Ivonya at all”, and Radetskyi himself was taken prisoner (Hvanini, 2009, p. 191).

The Poles, realizing that Bohdan IV would not reconquer the Moldavian throne, began to withdraw their troops. The situation was saved by appearance of the Crown Hetman of Poland Jerzy Jazłowiecki's units, which numbered 800 soldiers, on the opposite bank of the Dniester (Milewski, 2011, p. 41). As a result of the negotiations, the Moldavian-Turkish-Tatar army withdrew to a certain distance from the Dniester, which gave the Poles and Cossacks an opportunity for crossing. It lasted for five days (Dobrzahanskyi, Makar & Masan, 2002, p. 88; Masan, 2005, p. 82), but was accompanied by attacks of Moldavian soldiers "who wanted to harm the rest of us (the Poles. – O. B.) during the crossing, but their infantry, which had guns in the rearguard, drove them away with shots" (Hvanini, 2009, p. 191). Eventually, they managed to cross the river.

Finally, in his letter dated April 15, 1572, the ex-hospodar instructed M. Dobrosolovski "to lock himself up" in the Khotyn Castle "in front of the enemy" and defend it for "a quarter of a year", i.e. three months (Petriceicu-Hăjdeu, 1864, p. 76). "Ivonya stormed it for several weeks, but he could not do anything to it, even from the castle they made sorties several times" (Hvanini, 2009, p. 192). Therefore, the Polish garrison remained in the Khotyn castle and successfully defended it for several months.

After unsuccessful attempts to capture the Khotyn fortress, the hospodar Ioan III resorted to diplomatic negotiations with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, promising to take an oath of loyalty to the Polish king in exchange for the return of Khotyn to Moldavia (Masan, 2005, p. 83). These negotiations ended with the acceptance of the oath by the hospodar and the highest boyars already after the death of King Sigismund II Augustus (July 7, 1572), but this fact was hidden from the Moldavian delegation. As a result of these events, the Khotyn fortress was returned to the Moldavian hospodar. And the ex-hospodar Bohdan IV was forced to flee first to Poland, and later found refuge with the Habsburgs. In the end, suffering from an eye disease, he refused to continue the struggle for the throne and found refuge "in Muscovy", where he died (Ureche, 1990, pp. 102–103; Purich, 2000, p. 169). So, after returning the lost Moldavian lands and overcoming any encroachments on the throne, the hospodar in Moldavia became the protege of the Ottoman Empire, Ioan III the Fierce.

The Conclusions. The first period of military and political processes on the territory of Chernivtsi and Khotyn Volosts lasted from 1538 to 1552. This was the time of the absolute domination of the Ottoman Empire in Moldavia, with which Poland tried not to conflict. At the same time, minor border disputes continued, but until 1551 there were no decisive actions aimed at restoring Polish influence in the country, in particular during the renewal of the struggle between Porta and the Habsburgs in Hungary. Taking advantage of the situation, the Moldavian hospodars focused on the northern Moldavian Volosts, bordering on Poland, actively using the pirkelabs of Chernivtsi and Khotyn Volosts as diplomats. But a year later, the Polish troops succeeded in placing the pro-Polish hospodar O. Lepushnyanu (1552 – 1561, 1564 – 1568), and then his son Bohdan IV (1568 – 1572) on the Moldavian throne. Both hospodars paid tribute to Poland, although they were in no hurry to break with the Ottoman's protection. Their reign marks the second period in the history of the Polish-Moldavian relations in the context of the history of Bukovyna, which can be called the time of the Polish influence return (1552 – 1572). This situation was not changed either by the short and adventurous reign of Ioan Jacob Heraclid (1561 – 1563), or even a shorter reign of Stephen VII Tomsha (1563 – 1564).

In 1572, only the dethronement of Bohdan IV by the Ottomans and the failure of the Polish expedition carried out in his interests put an end to the Polish influence. Bukovyna

lands suffered considerable destruction and devastation at that time, and the Khotyn fortress began to play the role of an outpost on the Polish-Moldavian border.

The result of the long struggle for the Moldavian magistrate's throne was an increase in economic demands, frequent stops of foreign troops, and demographic losses. During this period, the Cossack element in the Polish-Moldavian-Turkish relations became more and more noticeable. And after the death of Sigismund II Augustus, the Ukrainian Cossacks themselves showed the greatest activity in the Moldavian affairs.

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**THE T. SHEVCHENKO SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY
AND ITS SERIAL PUBLICATIONS IN THE RECEPTION
OF THE CZECH SCIENTIFIC PRESS IN 1896 – 1918**

Abstract. *The purpose of the study is to analyse the corpus of publications by the Czech scholars about achievements of the T. Shevchenko Scientific Society, its serial editions and studies of the Ukrainian scholars, published on the pages of the Czech scientific press in 1896 – 1918, i.e. before Galicia was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. **The Scientific Novelty:** for the first time, the evaluation of activities of the T. Shevchenko Scientific Society by the famous Czech scholars (Jiří Polívka, Jiří Horák, Josef Páta and František Vladimír Vykoukal) has been understood; its serial publications and studies of the Ukrainian scholars (Mykhailo Drahomanov, Ivan Franko, Volodymyr Hnatiuk, Zenon Kuzeli) in the context of the then European historical and ethnographic research. **The research methodology** is based on a combination of historical, biographical, comparative methods, as well as content analysis and critical analysis of the text. **The Conclusions.** Based on the twenty publications on the pages of the Czech scientific journals “Národopisný Věstník Československý”,*

“Národopisný Sborník Československý” and “Český Časopis Historický”, it has been determined that the activities of the T. Shevchenko Scientific Society, a number of its serial publications (“Notes of the T. Shevchenko Scientific Society”, “Ethnographic Collection”, “Collection of Philological Section” and “Materials on Ukrainian-Ruthenian Ethnology”) and studies of the Ukrainian scholars were in the focus of famous Czech scholars and received justified high evaluation. The Czech reviewers analysed the works of Ukrainian scholars objectively in the context of the then European historical science and ethnography, noted their high scientific level, and often considered them the best in their fields and a worthy example for other nations to follow, but at the same time pointed out certain shortcomings.

Keywords: the T. Shevchenko Scientific Society, serial publications, Czech scholars, Ukrainian scholars, review.

НАУКОВЕ ТОВАРИСТВО ІМЕНІ ШЕВЧЕНКА ТА ЙОГО СЕРІЙНІ ВИДАННЯ У РЕЦЕПЦІІ ЧЕСЬКОЇ НАУКОВОЇ ПРЕСИ 1896 – 1918 рр.

Анотація. Мета дослідження: проаналізувати корпус публікацій чеських науковців про здобутки Наукового товариства імені Шевченка, його серійні видання та окремі праці українських вчених, вміщені на сторінках чеської наукової преси впродовж 1896 – 1918 рр., тобто до перебування Галичини у складі Австро-Угорської імперії. **Наукова новизна:** вперше осмислюється оцінка відомих чеських учених (Йржі Полівки (Jiří Polívka), Йржі Горака (Jiří Horák), Йосефа Пата (Josef Páta) і Франтішека Викоукала (František Vladimír Vukoukal) діяльності Наукового товариства ім. Шевченка, його серійних видань та окремих праць українських науковців (Михайла Драгоманова, Івана Франка, Володимира Гнатюка, Зенона Кузеля) у контексті тогочасних європейських історичних та етнографічних досліджень. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на сукупності історичного, біографічного, порівняльного методів, а також контент-аналізу та критичного аналізу тексту. **Висновки.** На основі виявлених двадцяти публікацій на сторінках чеських наукових часописів “Národopisný Věstník Československý”, “Národopisný Sborník Československý” та “Český Časopis Historický” з’ясовано, що діяльність Наукового товариства ім. Шевченка, низка його серійних видань (“Записки Наукового Товариства імені Шевченка”, “Етнографічний Збірник”, “Збірник фільологічної секції” та “Матеріяли до українсько-руської етнології”) й окремі праці українських вчених були в центрі уваги відомих чеських науковців та отримали їхню обґрунтовану високу оцінку. Чеські рецензенти об’єктивно аналізували праці українських вчених у контексті тогочасної європейської історичної науки й етнографії, відзначали їх високий науковий рівень, а нерідко вважали найкращими у своїх галузях та гідним взірцем для наслідування іншими народами, але водночас коректно вказували на певні їхні недоліки.

Ключові слова: Наукове товариство імені Шевченка, серійні видання, чеські науковці, українські вчені, рецензія.

The Problem Statement. In 2023, the Ukrainian public widely celebrated the 150th anniversary of the T. Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh), and the Ukrainian scholars interpreted achievements and influence on the development of national science in a new way. However, the publications of prominent European scholars, in particular the Czech ones, about the NTSh and its serial publications, the understanding of which would allow a wider and more objective evaluation of the achievements of the Ukrainian scientific institution and Ukrainian scholars in the pan-European context, remain an understudied area. Therefore, it is extremely relevant to study the publications of leading Czech scholars, published in the Czech press, about the achievements of the T. Shevchenko Scientific Society, its serial publications and works of Ukrainian scholars.

The Review of Recent Research. At the beginning of its activity, the T. Shevchenko Scientific Society proved so powerfully with thorough works that outstanding European scholars saw in it the future Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. This fact was noted, in

particular, by Volodymyr Doroshenko in the article “Ukrainian Academy of Sciences” and it was advised to read academician Vatroslav Yahych’s review on this issue in the journal “Archiv für slavische Philologie”, XX, 1898 (Doroshenko, 1912, p. 25). For the first time, Volodymyr Hnatiuk covered the activities of the NTSh comprehensively and described its serial publications in detail in a separate publication “The T. Shevchenko Scientific Society. On Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of its Founding” (Hnatiuk, 1923), and later – in the lengthy article “The T. Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv. On Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of its Founding (1873 – 1923)” (Hnatiuk, 1925). Achievements of the T. Shevchenko Scientific Society, the historiosophy of national revival and the beginnings of its scientific and publishing activity, reviews on it in French criticism of the 19th–21st centuries were considered by the Ukrainian scholars during the celebration of the 100th and 150th anniversaries of the Ukrainian scientific institution, in particular by such authors as Bohdan Stebelskyi (Stebelskyi, 1977), Oresta Losyk (Losyk, 2023), Yarema Kravets (Kravets, 2023). Periodical and serial editions of the NTSh are outlined in the publications by V. Doroshenko (Doroshenko, 1912, 26–29), V. Hnatiuk (Hnatiuk, 1925, Vol. 88 (10), pp. 183–185; (11), pp. 272–273) and are reflected as fully as possible in the annotated index compiled by Tetiana Kulchytska (Kulchytska, 1991), and were analysed by Viktor Savenko (Savenko, 2012).

The Research Results. Before World War I, when Galicia was part of Austria-Hungary, the activities of the T. Shevchenko Scientific Society and its publications were widely reviewed in the German- and Czech-language professional journals. Among the important serial publications of the NTSh there were “Notes of the T. Shevchenko Scientific Society”, “Collection of Historical and Philosophical Section”, “Collection of Philological Section”, “Collection of Mathematical Naturalistic Medical Section”, “Ethnographic Collection”, “Sources on History of Ukraine-Rus”, “Materials on Ukrainian Bibliography”, “Materials on Ukrainian-Ruthenian Ethnology”, “Researches on the Ukrainian-Ruthenian Language and Literature”, “Researches of Classical Philology Commission”, “Studies in the Field of Social Sciences and Statistics”, “Ukrainian-Ruthenian Archive”, “Chronicle of the T. Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv”, (“Chronik der ukrainischen Ševchenko-Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften in Lemberg”), “Journal of Law and Economics” and the others. V. Hnatiuk believed that the scientific value of serial publications of the NTSh is evidenced by favourable reviews in various scientific journals, such as: “Kievskaya Staryna”, “Journal of Ministry of National Education”, “Archiv für slavische Philologie”, “Zeitschrift für österreichische Volkskunde” (Vienna), “Zeitschrift für Volkskunde” (Berlin), “Národopisný Sborník (and “Věstník”) Československý”, “Listy filologické”, “Wisła”, “Lud” and the others (Hnatiuk, 1925, vol. 88 (11), p. 277). It was in this publication that for the first time V. Hnatiuk mentioned the Czech-language publications “Národopisný Sborník (and “Věstník”) Československý” and “Listy Filologické”, in which systematically and thoroughly there were analysed the works of Ukrainian scholars.

On the pages of the Czech magazines “Národopisný Věstník Československý” (further – “NVČ”) and “Národopisný Sborník Československý” (further – “NSČ”), which were published in Prague, we managed to find 19 publications about serial publications of the NTSh, reprints from “Notes of the NTSh” and several articles by the Ukrainian scholars. In particular, in 1896 – 1918, 8 reviews were published on the pages of the magazine “NSČ”, and 11 – in “NVČ”. We found another publication about the NTSh and its serials in the columns of the scientific journal “Český Časopis Historický” (further – “ČČH”). In the chapter

“Zpárvy” [“Notice”] this edition contained extensive information without a title that began with a sentence “R. 1893 přetvořilo se maloruské vydavatelské a nakladatelské “Tovarystvo imeny Ševčěnka” ve Lvově, založené r. 1873, ve spolek vědecký “Naukove tovarystvo im. Ševčěnka” (ČČH. 1896, annual 2, 132). [In 1893, the Maloruska publishing company “The T. Shevchenko Society” in Lviv, founded in 1873, turned into “The T. Shevchenko Scientific Society”]. This post, published under the pseudonym J.P., was written by Jiří Polívka, because in the same annual issue of the magazine he published the article under his own name.

The reviewers of the Society’s serial publications, and sometimes reprints of the “Notes of the NTSh” and some publications, were well-known Czech scholars – a philologist-Slavist, one of the founders of Slavic comparative folkloristics, Professor of Slavic philology at Charles University (Universita Karlova) in Prague, Jiří Polívka (Jiří Polívka) (he was published both under his own name and under the pseudonyms jpa, J. P., J. P–a, P–a); Jiří Horák, a folklorist, ethnographer and literary critic; Josef Páta, a Slavologist, a literary historian, a translator, Professor of the Lusatian languages and literature at Charles University; František Vladimír Vykoukal, an ethnographer, a writer, a literary critic, gymnasium Professor in Prague.

In the field of view of Czech critics there were publications such as “Notes of the T. Shevchenko Scientific Society” – they contained five reviews; “Ethnographic Collection” – eight reviews; “Materials on Ukrainian-Ruthenian Ethnology” – four reviews; “Collection of Philological Section” – two reviews and one publication about the Society and its serial publications. First of all, we observe a great interest of the Czech critics in the ethnographic works of the Ukrainian scholars. In particular, they analysed the fundamental editions of V. Hnatiuk: Volumes 1–5 of “Ethnographic Materials on Hungarian Rus” (Polívka, 1898, 1899, 1901, 1910, 1912), Vol. 1–2 “Carols and Shchedrivky” (Horák, 1916) and Vol. 1–2 of “Ukrainian Folk Tales (Animal Epic)” (Polívka, 1918), Vol. 1–2 “Research by Mykhailo Drahomanov on Ukrainian Folk Literature and Writing” (Polívka, 1900, 1901a), two works by Ivan Franko “Studies on Ukrainian Folk Songs” (Horák, 1908, 1911) and V. 1 “Galician-Ruthenian Folk Tales” (Polívka, 1905), the work by Zenon Kyzeli “A Child in the Customs and Beliefs of the Ukrainian People” (Vykoukal, 1908) and Vol. 1–2 of “Materials on Ukrainian Ethnology” (Polívka, 1900, 1913).

In addition to serial editions, the Czech scholars also analysed some reprints of V. Hnatiuk’s publications from “Materials on Ukrainian-Ruthenian Ethnology” “Wedding in Krestur” (Páta, 1909) and “Notes of NTSh” “A Poetic Legend about a Knight and Death” (Páta, 1909a), as well as several articles published on the pages of “Notes of NTSh”, namely: “Legends from the Hitar Collection (the 1st half of the 18th century)” (Polívka, 1898a) and “The Slovaks or the Ruthenians? Reasons for Clarifying the Dispute about the Nationality of the Western Ruthenians” (Polívka, 1902).

In almost all reviews, the Czech critics noted a high scientific level of the Ukrainian researches, sincerely admired the achievements of the Ukrainian scholars and even considered their works as models for imitation. In particular, Jiří Polívka, reviewing “Ukrainian Folk Fables”, collected and published by V. Hnatiuk, noted that the Ukrainian scholar presented the widest and most luxurious collection of fables, which no other Slavic literature can boast of and which would hardly have anything equal among the folk creativity of other nations (Polívka, 1918, p. 105), and in the review of Vol. 1 “Research by Mykhailo Drahomanov on Ukrainian Folk Literature and Writing” Jiří Polívka called M. Drahomanov a deep connoisseur of not only Slavic but also world folk literature (Polívka, 1900, p. 205).

Another Czech scholar, Jiří Horák, highly praised I. Franko's research "Studies on Ukrainian Folk Songs", characterizing this work as a thorough study, and called the author a great connoisseur of the life of his people and its history (Horák, 1908, p. 60). According to Jiří Horák, in his study I. Franko sought to explain the nature of the Ukrainian songs in relation to the folk poetry of neighbouring peoples, and the value of the research consists in the fact that in the analysis of Ukrainian songs, he focused on their reception by West Slavic and German scholars (Horák, 1911, pp. 173, 176).

However, the Czech scholars analysed five volumes of V. Hnatiuk's fundamental edition "Ethnographic Materials on Hungarian Rus" in a particularly thorough manner. In his review of "Legends and Novels" of V. 1 of "Ethnographic Materials from Hungarian Rus", Jiří Polívka claimed that this was a very important and rare book both for an ethnographer, especially a folklorist, and a linguist. At the same time, the Czech scholar noted the difficulties that V. Hnatiuk had to overcome in order to collect from the mouths of the people a very rich ("přebohatý") material, and he added – wonderful and rich ("znamenitý a bohatý") (Polívka, 1898, p. 107): he walked along the majority of the Marmara, Bereg and Ungvar counties, as well as part of the Ugochan and Zemply counties of Hungarian Rus. The reviewer also drew attention of scientific community to difficult conditions under which V. Hnatiuk lived and worked. In particular, in the review of "Tales, Legends, Short Stories, Historical Memories from Banat" of Vol. 4 "Ethnographic Materials on Hungarian Rus", he noted that although part of the Hungarian intelligentsia treated V. Hnatiuk kindly, the "all-powerful" village notaries and the police almost prevented his direct contact with people (Polívka, 1910, p. 85).

Jiří Polívka also noted the auxiliary scientific apparatus to the works of V. Hnatiuk, in particular, Dictionary of Hungarian-Russian Expressions added to the publication "Tales, Fables, Stories about Historical Persons, Anecdotes" (Vol. 2 "Ethnographic Materials on Hungarian Rus"), without which there was much that would remain unclear (Polívka, 1899, p. 130). Thus, characterizing V. Hnatiuk's "Tales from Bachky" in Vol. 5 "Ethnographic Materials on Hungarian Rus", Jiří Polívka concluded that the Ukrainian researcher tirelessly "pours" us with a huge amount of material, with which science would have many more years of hard work (Polívka, 1912, p. 87).

Another Czech scholar, Jiří Horák, analysing V. 1 and V. 2 of V. Hnatiuk's "Carols and Shchedrivky" edition, expresses the opinion that this work occupies an honourable place among publications and owing to the amazing persistence of a wonderful ethnographer, preserved the real treasures of folk traditions to the Ukrainians (Horák, 1916, p. 346). Josef Páta, interpreting V. Hnatiuk's work "Wedding in Krestur" (printed from "Materials on Ukrainian-Ruthenian Ethnology"), emphasized that the Ukrainian researcher tried to accurately phonetically record the word heard everywhere, which means that this publication (as well as all the previous ones, in particular "Boiky Wedding in Mshanets") is of value not only to an ethnographer, but also to a linguist (Páta, 1909, 139).

The Czech scholars also spoke positively about the works of other Ukrainian scholars. Thus, František Vykoukal, analyzing Zenon Kuzeli's work "A Child in the Customs and Beliefs of the Ukrainian People", emphasized that it was an important study of Ukrainian ethnology, which can serve as a model elsewhere – for example, "in our country", i.e. in the Czech Republic (Vykoukal, 1908, p. 220).

In the Czech-language scientific publications an interesting feature of reviews was that they became a kind of continuation of the work of the reviewers. Thus, in his review of "Tales, Fables, Stories about Historical Figures, Anecdotes" in V. 2 "Ethnographic Materials

on Hungarian Rus”, Jiří Polívka included more important versions and parallel plots of tales, fables and anecdotes of other nations, which were not mentioned by V. Hnatiuk. These versions and parallels took up eight pages in his review (Polívka, 1899, pp. 131–138), and the versions and parallels to “Legends and Novels” in V. 1 “Ethnographic Materials on Hungarian Rus” – six pages (Polívka, 1898, pp. 108–113).

It should be emphasized that in the characteristics of the Ukrainian ethnos, its language, and oral folk art, the Czech scholars used different definitions, but never equated them with Russian folklore or the Russian language. For example, Jiří Polívka in his review of “Materials on Ukrainian-Russian Ethnology” noted, that the scientific Ruthenian community in Galicia (“učená společnost ruská v Haliči”) published a collection dedicated to a deeper scientific knowledge of the Malorusky Ukrainian people (“maloruského ukrainského lidu”) (Polívka, 1900, 194). In his analysis of “Studies on Ukrainian folk Songs” by I. Franko, Jiří Horák called the Ukrainian songs “maloruské písní” (Horák, 1911, pp. 173, 178). Jiří Polívka, in his review of Mykhailo Drahomanov’s Researches on Ukrainian Folk Literature and Writing, noted that M. Drahomanov wrote in the Velykoruska language (“jazykem (velko)ruským”) (Polívka, 1900a, p. 205).

Analyzing serial publications of the NTSh and works of the Ukrainian scholars, the Czech scholars also expressed critical remarks, but usually they were very friendly. Thus, František Vykoukal believed that Zenon Kuzela could have omitted a chapter in his work, for example, about anecdotes about nuns, a peasant and a thief, and instead added another – about a child at school, a child in a fairy tale, but at the same time he rated the entire work of the Ukrainian scholar very highly (Vykoukal, 1908, p. 220).

Jiří Polívka also delicately remarked certain shortcomings in the “Legends and Novels” edition of V. 1 “Ethnographic Materials from Hungarian Rus” collected by V. Hnatiuk. The Czech scholar made some parallels to individual legends and fairy tales in order to point out similar variants in other peoples, if they were not mentioned by the publisher himself, i.e. V. Hnatiuk (Polívka, 1898, p. 107). In a review on V. 1 of Mykhailo Drahomanov’s Research on Ukrainian Folk Literature and Writing, the Czech scholar expressed surprise as to why M. Drahomanov’s works, which he wrote in the Velykorusky (great) Russian language, i.e. in Russian (“jazykem (velko)ruským”), and which were published in Russian periodicals, the publishing house submitted in Malorusky translation, leaving only quotations in Velykorusky sources without any translation. “The reasons for this are not entirely clear to us, and, to be honest, we don’t like it very much”, – noted Jiří Polívka, and further expressed the opinion that it would be much better to publish the main folklore works of M. Drahomanov in a world language, so that Western European scholars could use the works of this deep connoisseur not only of Slavic, but also of world folk literature (Polívka, 1900a, p. 205). Which world language the researcher had in mind – we can only guess, probably German.

The Czech reviewers highly rated the scientific value of the works of Ukrainian scholars published in the serial editions of the NTSh, and expressed certain critical remarks testified to their attentive and benevolent attitude and efforts to support a further development of Ukrainian science.

The Conclusions. The analysis of publications on the pages of the Czech scientific journals “Národopisný Věstník Československý”, “Národopisný Sborník Československý” and “Český Časopis Historický” in 1896 – 1918 allows us to draw the following conclusions: 1) the activity of the T. Shevchenko Scientific Society, a number of its serial publications (“Notes of the NTSh”, “Ethnographic Collection”, “Collection of Philological Section”,

“Materials on Ukrainian-Rusky Ethnology”) and works of the Ukrainian scholars were the focus of famous Czech scholars and received their high praise; 2) the interest of the Czech scholars – prominent Slavic philologists and ethnographers, Professors of Prague University and Gymnasium Jiří Polivka, Jiří Horak, Josef Páta and František Vykoukal – was first of all Ukrainian ethnography and ethnology; 3) thoroughly and objectively the Czech scholars analysed the works of Ukrainian scholars (V. Hnatiuk, I. Franko, M. Drahomanov, Z. Kuzely) in the context of contemporary European research, noted their high scientific level, and often considered them the best in their fields and a worthy example to other nations to follow, but at the same time they correctly pointed out certain of their shortcomings; 4) twenty Czech-language publications were introduced into scientific circulation, which allows a more complete and objective evaluation of the activities of the NTSh, its serial and individual publications of Ukrainian scholars during the period of statelessness of the Ukrainian nation, which, together with the fraternal Czech people, was part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy during the specified period, as well as to express gratitude to outstanding Czech scholars for their analysis of the works of Ukrainian scholars in the European context.

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**RIGHTS AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE CZECHS IN UKRAINE
DURING THE UKRAINIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1917 – 1921)**

Abstract. *The purpose of the research is the need to carry out a thorough analysis on the legal status of the Czech ethnic minority in Ukraine and the Czech military during the Ukrainian War of Independence and its impact on their public, socio-economic and cultural educational life. The research methodology is based on the following principles: objectivity, historicism, consistency, problematic. There have been applied the methods of analysis and synthesis, problem chronological, comparative. The scientific novelty consists in the study and comparison of the legal position of the Czechs in Ukraine on the eve and during the Ukrainian War of Independence of 1917 – 1921. Due to the introduction of archival materials into scientific circulation, it was possible to find out the impact of the frequent change of governments in Ukraine on the situation of the Czech minority. The Conclusions. At the end of World War I, the Czech element in Ukraine has been very significant. The Czechs received equal rights along with other ethnic groups of Ukraine due to the revolution, which broke out in 1917. However, there were not established any political parties by them. The Czech minority received legal protection and the right to develop its own cultural heritage, despite the Ukrainization, which was initiated by the Ukrainian Central Council (UCC). The importance of the law “On National Personal Autonomy” from a legal and social standpoint cannot be overstated. This law guaranteed the Czechs of Ukraine such prospects that their compatriots in Austria-Hungary did not have. Significant financial support was provided by P. Skoropadskyi’s Hetmanate to the fields of education and culture. The restoration of the laws of the UCC by the Directorate of the Ukrainian People’s Republic could have contributed to the further favourable position of the Czechs, but the gradual loss of Ukrainian statehood did not allow the ideals of the Ukrainian Revolution regarding freedom and equality of all peoples and the norms of the law “On National Personal Autonomy” to be implemented. In 1920 – 1921 the position of the Czechs in Ukraine was under difficult conditions. Due to the lack of legal guarantees, social protection and the policy of war communism implemented by the Soviet government, the majority of the Czech population of Ukraine left its territory.*

Key words: *ethnic minorities, the Czechs, Ukrainian War of Independence, rights, Ukrainian Central Council, Hetmanate, Directorate of Ukraine.*

ПРАВА І ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ ЧЕХІВ В УКРАЇНІ В ПЕРІОД УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ РЕВОЛЮЦІЇ (1917 – 1921)

Анотація. *Мета дослідження* полягає в необхідності здійснити комплексне дослідження правового становища чеської етнічної меншини України та чеських військових у добу Української революції та його впливу на їхнє громадське, соціально-економічне і культурно-освітнє життя. **Методологія дослідження** включає такі принципи: об'єктивності, історизму, послідовності, проблемності. У роботі використано методи: аналізу і синтезу, проблемно-хронологічний, порівняльний. **Наукова новизна** полягає у дослідженні та порівнянні правового становища чехів України напередодні та протягом Української революції 1917 – 1921 рр. Завдяки введенню до наукового обігу архівних матеріалів вдалося з'ясувати вплив на становище чеської меншини часту зміну урядів в Україні. **Висновки.** Наприкінці Першої світової війни чеський елемент в Україні був дуже значним. З початком революції 1917 р. чехам хоча й надали рівні права з іншими етносами України, проте вони так і не створили власних політичних партій. Чеська меншина отримала юридичний захист та право розвивати власні духовні надбання, незважаючи на українізацію, розпочату Українською Центральною Радою (УЦР). Немоżliво переоцінити юридичне та суспільне значення закону “Про національно-персональну автономію”, адже він гарантував чехам України такі перспективи, яких не мали їхні співвітчизники в Австро-Угорщині. Освіта та культура користувалася чималою фінансовою підтримкою гетьманату П. Скоропадського. Відродження законів УЦР Директорією УНР могло б посприяти подальшому поліпшенню становища чехів, але поступова втрата української державності не дозволила втілити у життя ідеали Української революції щодо свободи та рівності усіх народів і норми закону “Про національно-персональну автономію”. Становище чехів України у 1920 – 1921 рр. було складним. Відсутність юридичних гарантій, соціального захисту та політика воєнного комунізму, яку реалізовувала радянська влада, стали причинами для більшості чеського населення України щоб покинути її територію.

Ключові слова: етнічні меншини, чехи, Українська революція, права, Українська Центральна Рада, гетьманат, Директорія.

The Problem Statement. The Ukrainian territory has always been multi-ethnic. Due to the development of a democratic system in Ukraine and European integration, it is essential to study the national characteristics of the nations living on its territory. All linguistic, cultural and mental differences are important for a peaceful coexistence of the ethnic minorities. Ethnic features should not become a barrier to coexistence among the nations, but on the contrary, complement each other and enrich the cultural heritage of Ukraine.

It is considered that the Ukrainian-Czech relations developed during the period of the end of World War I and the beginning of the struggle of both nations for their own state independence, which was successful for the Czechs, and ended in defeat for the Ukrainians. The ideas that the Ukrainian authorities tried to implement were very progressive and good examples in lawmaking for the imitation during the first half of the 20th century. It was during the Ukrainian War of Independence of 1917 – 1921 that the ethno-national issues, including those about the Czechs, found their legislative consolidation in normative legal acts of the Ukrainian Central Council and the Directorate, which were systematized and affected the provision of self-determination of the Ukrainians and the national minorities directly. The legislative consolidation of the institution of the national personal autonomy is considered to be one of the greatest achievements of the Ukrainian Central Council activity.

The Analysis of Sources and Recent Research. The study of the situation of the Czechs in Ukraine began in the second half of the 20th century. In 1974, Zh. Kovba defended her PhD thesis “The Czech Emigration to Ukraine in the Second Half of the 19th – at the Beginning of the 20th Century” (Kovba, 1998). This study covered only separate pages of

the Czech colonization of the western hubernia of the Russian Empire (in particular, Volyn) in the second half of the 19th century and there was not any analysis of the reasons for the colonization and resettlement of the Czechs in Kyiv, Podilia and Volyn hubernia.

O. Voinalovych covered the aspect of school education for the national minorities (Voinalovych, 2002). I. Zaslavskiy focused on the history of the Volyn Czechs (Zaslavskiy, 1998), and O. Volovyk – on the history of the Czech minority of Eastern Podillia (Volovyk). Yu. Lutskyi traced the impact on the social structure and interests of the Czech ethnic group in Ukraine of the revolutionary and military events of 1917 – 1918 during the period of activity of the Central Council (Lutskyi, 1999). A. Khorenkov's publication, dedicated to the Czech colonists of Volyn, covered the period of 1862 – 1947 (Khorenkov, 2002). The scientific collection "Great Volyn" is considered to be a particularly valuable contribution to the study on the Volyn Czechs (Chekhy na Volyni, 2001). O. Boriak did the research on the history of the Czechs in Volyn and he introduced a reader to one of the main Czech industries – hop-making (Boriak, 2006).

In 2014, S. Uminskiy defended his candidate's thesis under the title "Establishment and Development of Educational Institutions for Children of the Czech Origin in Right Bank Ukraine (at the end of the 19th – the 30s of the 20th century)" (Uminskiy, 2014). The scholar proved that the process of education at the Czech schools was not hindered and was marked by a high level in 1917 – 1919. Owing to the made efforts by L. Aza, the ethnic directory "The Czechs" was published (Aza, 1996). There is no separate study dedicated to the Czech community of Ukraine during the Ukrainian War of Independence in 1917 – 1921.

The purpose of the research is the need to carry out a comprehensive study of the legal status of the Czech ethnic minority in Ukraine and Czech military during the Ukrainian War of Independence and its impact on their public, socio-economic and cultural educational life.

The Research Results. The settlement of the first Czech colonists on the territory of Volyn dates back to 1859 – 1861. The number of the Czech settlements increased after the adoption of the resolution of the Committee of Ministers "On the Settlement of the Czechs in Volyn" in 1870. After that, there were about 20,000 Czechs, who moved to Volyn until 1914. The Czech Protestants immigrated, as well as the politicians and public figures, who were the opponents of the Habsburg monarchy. They formed fairly compact settlements in Dubno, Lutsk, Rivne, Zhytomyr, Novohrad-Volynskiy, Ovruch poviat (Polishchuk, 2012, p. 124).

According to the data of the Russian Empire census of 1897, the largest number of the Czechs lived in Volyn hubernia, in particular in its southern districts – 27,670 people (0,9% of the population of the region), much less in Podilia (886) and Kyiv (3,294), which is explained by the insignificant by the amount of free land suitable for agriculture in the last two provinces. The majority of new arrivals settled in rural areas, receiving benefits from the Russian government. Only 3% of the Volyn Czechs settled in cities and towns, 18% – among the Podilia Czechs, and 33% – among the Kyiv Czechs. At the beginning of the 20th century the resettlement of the Czechs to Ukraine slowed down (Polishchuk, 2012, p. 125).

Four Czech volosts were created in Volyn, in the places of the greatest concentration of the Czech population: Hlynska (Rivnensky poviat), Dubenska (Dubensky poviat), Lutska (Lutskyi and Rivnenskyi poviats), Kupichevska (Volodymyr-Volynsky poviat). The composition of these volosts included not only those settlements where only the Czechs lived but also settlements where the population was mixed, usually the Ukrainian-Czech one (Khorenkov, 2002, p. 7). In general, before World War I, about 50 thousand Czechs lived in the Russian Empire within the state (Lutskyi, 1994, p. 123).

The Czechs had unlimited rights to develop their own industry. The breweries of I. Makhachek and L. Yansa operated in Zhytomyr, and in the village of Kroshnia I. Albrecht. Small breweries Klich in Olshanka and Weber in Vysoko-Cheske were established. The Czechs built brick factories, oil refineries, and mills (Gerasymov, & Romaniuk, 2024, p. 75).

Unlimited rights allowed the Czechs to succeed in farming. On 32,849 hectares of arable land, the Czech farmers mainly grew such grain crops as: rye (21.3%), wheat (18.5%) and oats (18.6%). Then potatoes (10.5%) and legumes. The focus was also on cultivation of barley (7.7%) and hops. Among the cereals, new elite varieties were introduced (Golchevskyi, 2010, pp. 477–478).

Venceslav Shvygovskyi was among the most famous Czech entrepreneurs of Kyiv region. He was also the founder of the newspaper “Chehoslovan” in 1911. Owing to him, the Greter and Kryvanek, Filvert and Dedina, Ungermann and Neyedlyh, Graf and Co., F. Paul machine-building factories emerged in Kyiv, as well as the workshops of the Laurin and Klement automobile firm and other enterprises (Koliukh, 1997, pp. 29–30).

Unlike the Germans, the Czech colonists were not deprived of their landholdings by the Russian authorities at the beginning of 1917. However, they inhabited the infertile territories of Lutskiyi, Volodymyr-Volynskiyi, Novohrad-Volynskiyi, Zhytomyrskiyi and Ovrutskiyi poviat mostly (Shpytalenko, 2003, p. 19).

The “Union of Czechoslovak Societies in Russia” played an important role in the socio-economic life of the Czechs in Ukraine. It became a priority for the Union to strengthen the legal position of the Czechs, who lived on the territory of Russia, and the need to obtain self-government for the Czechs in Volyn was emphasized. The Union’s agitation for the unification of the Czech colonists within land organizations led to the formation of 15 new societies in Ukraine between May and August of 1917. The Union was also involved in solving the economic issues. Due to his assistance, credit bureaus were established, which allowed the Czechs to take loans for the development of economy. The Union worked on the creation of project plans to establish trade relations with the homeland after the war along with the Czech companies (Chyrko, 1995, p. 2015).

The Czechs had the right to lease land, but they were reluctant to use it. By the middle of 1917, the share of leased territories among all Czech land holdings did not exceed 3%. At the same time, there were settlements where farming was done on leased land exclusively, for example in the villages of Hrushvysia and Novynia of Dubensky District (Cherokee, 1995, p. 36).

In Volyn the majority of the Czech colonists understood the threat of the Bolshevik power. Among the Czech villages that did not recognize the self-proclaimed Soviet government in 1919 were the following: Czech Kroshnia and Czech Smihy. The reduction of public, social and cultural rights by the Bolsheviks forced the Czechs to leave their ethnic homeland. Part of the Czech minority remained where the Bolsheviks carried out effective propaganda activities (CSAPAU, f. 1, d. 20, c. 100, pp. 2–6).

At the beginning, the Czechs resisted the Bolsheviks successfully and kept more than forty thousand hectares of land in their ownership in Volyn, of which more than a third was cultivated. The Czechs owned: 16 breweries; 32 dairies; 113 mills; 37 large workshops; 5 sugar mills; 19 brickworks and craft workshops (Chekhy na Volyni, 2001, p. 25).

As a result of the Bolshevik occupation, the number of the Czechs in Ukraine decreased at the beginning of the 1920s. The density of the Czech colonies in Volyn also decreased. In some areas, the percentage of the Czech population reached 4% (Hofman, 1998, p. 76).

Based on the decrees of the Soviet authorities on the national village councils, the Czechs managed to organize 12 village councils in Eastern Volyn (Skotnikova, 2000, pp. 116–117).

It is important that hops played the main role in the prosperity of the Czech farms at the beginning of the 1920s. Before World War I, hop plantations – a strategic crop – grew steadily. The richer a Czech village was, the more land there was given over to hop cultivation (Boriak, 2006, pp. 217–218).

Despite the prosperity of the hop industry, the economic situation of the Czech minority worsened after the Bolsheviks came to power. The Czech group of the CP(b)U, having started its activities with campaigning work, became convinced that in Volyn, Kyiv and Podillia the first priority is still the solution of urgent practical tasks and refocused mainly on the solution of such issues as illegal contributions, requisitions, arrests colonists (Serhiichuk, 1993, pp. 60–61).

There were practically no Committees of Poor Peasants (kombeds) in the Czech colonies. The commune did not attract the Czechs in the beginning. The conflicts and armed clashes often occurred between the colonists and the Bolsheviks. The dekulakization of 1920–1921 dealt a devastating blow to the economic situation of the Czech colonies. Redistribution of land in favour of the Ukrainian peasants contributed to additional tension in the international relations (CSAPAU, f. 1, d. 20, c. 321, p. 6).

Next, we will analyse the legal perspectives of the Ukrainian Czechs in their social and political movement. The civil movement of the Czechs was formed on the basis of the liberalization of the Russian imperial government policy in relation to the Czech minority, the strengthening of the Slavophiles influence, the desire of tsarism to create a force in the western region of the empire that would oppose the Poles, as well as the Ukrainians, whose national aspirations were suppressed in every way.

A prominent role in the Czech public life of Ukraine on the eve of the Ukrainian Revolution was played by the People's Czech Council (hereafter PCC) – a free supra-party association of the Czech patriotic forces, whose task was to resist the German influence on the Czech lands. The activities of the foreign department of the PCC were directed, in particular, to communication with Kraiyans* and Kraiyan circles abroad, as well as theoretical and practical solutions to the immigrants issues (Hofman, 1998, pp. 33–34).

In particular, at the beginning of World War I, at a meeting of the public organization of the Czechs of Kyiv – the Jan Amos Komensky Society, a decision was made to convene a large meeting of the Czechs of Volyn, Kyiv, and Podillia poviat to accept a petition to Emperor Nikolai II expressing their support for the war and asking for a transition to the Russian citizenship. At the same time, in August of 1914, the Moscow “Czech Committee” turned to the Russian Ministry for Defense with a project to organize the Czech legions in Russia (Kravchuk, & Kuzminets, 2022, p. 94).

On August 8 of 1914, in Kyiv, at the same meeting of representatives of the Czech communities and the society named after J. A. Komensky, the Czech Committee for Aid to War Victims (CCAWV) was formed, which was headed by an entrepreneur and active public figure Jindrich Jindrishek – the organizer of the anti-Habsburg movement among the Czech national minority of the Russian Empire. On August 9, the Committee addressed the Czechs living in Ukraine with a call to create the Czech military units (CSHAUK, f. 274, d. 1, c. 3260, p. 91).

Such Czech organizations had the support of the imperial authorities. Before the Ukrainian Revolution, the Czech minority cooperated with the Russian government, receiving economic

and political privileges, and actively opposed the German and the Polish resistance to the Russian power during World War I. The social and political movement of the Czechs was national in nature mostly, with the aim of preserving the national and political interests of the minority.

The social and political life of the Czech colonists during the period of change of governments was marked by a low activity during the rule of the Ukrainian People's Republic, but active defense of their rights during the rule of Pavlo Skoropadskyi. An important legal and diplomatic factor in the development of the Czechoslovak-Ukrainian relations was the fact that during World War I, Ukraine played, perhaps, the most significant role in the history of the Czechoslovak national liberation movement. The board of the "Union of Czechoslovak Societies in Russia" had been meeting in Kyiv since 1916. The Congresses of its delegates were held there, the main branch of the Czechoslovak National Council (CSNC) was located there – the highest representative authority of the nation, the foundations of the future Czechoslovak government, as well as the headquarters of the Czechoslovak army and its reserve battalions, which were partially staffed by the Volyn Czechs (Hofman, 1998, pp. 45–46). The Czech legions were also stationed near Kyiv, which inflicted a decisive defeat on the Austrian troops under Zboriv. The day of the Battle of Zboriv (June 17–18, 1917) was considered Army Day in Czechoslovakia (Hofman, 1998, pp. 61–63).

The relocation of the CSNC branch from Petrohrad to Kyiv took place in connection with the rapid spread of the Bolshevik popularity, where, after the proclamation of the Third Universal on November 7, 1917, all power was transferred to the Ukrainian Central Council, which did not limit the rights and freedoms of the Czech minority.

The Czechs in Ukraine understood that the February Revolution could expand their prospects for development significantly, therefore, after the first news about this event, they declared their support for the revolution. Different political groups began to compete in expressing respect for the new government in Petrograd. And after the Ukrainian Central Council was recognized by the Russian Provisional Government as a regional authority in Ukraine, the Czechs signed an agreement on the status of the Czechoslovak military formations in Russia with the authorities not only in Petrograd, but also in Kyiv. Tomas Masaryk (the first President of Czechoslovakia in 1918 – 1935) signed an agreement with the Secretary (Minister) for International Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic Oleksandr Shulhin (period in office – December of 1917 – January of 1918) on the conditions for the deployment and supply of the Czechoslovak troops. The right of self-determination of all peoples, as one of the components of their political ideology, was demanded by the Czech leaders as the main (Venherska, 2018, pp. 54–55).

During its activity, the Ukrainian Central Rada defended the idea of equality of all nations firmly and proved it by adopting the law "On National Personal Autonomy" on January 22, 1918. This law became the seventh chapter of the Constitution of the Ukrainian People's Republic of April 29 of 1918 on the "National Unions". The Czechs received the right to independent development of their national life within the territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic through the authorities of their National Union.

In order to form their own National Union, the Czech minority had to send to the General Court a statement signed by more than 10,000 citizens of the Ukrainian People's Republic, who have reached the age of 20 about their affiliation to the Czech nationality. There were no gender and religious restrictions. The General Court had to consider publicly such a statement within 6 months and notify the Council of People's Ministers with a resolution

(Konstytutsiia, 1918). A list was formed of the members of the National Union – the national cadastre. Also, every Czech had the right to request their exclusion from this cadastre.

If the Czech minority had formed its own National Union, it would have received the right to legislate within its own national and personal autonomy. It would be a legal and effective representative authority of the Czech nation in Ukraine. The Law “On National Personal Autonomy” provided for state financing of the activities of the National Unions. The Union had the right to tax its members on state-wide terms, as well as to make loans under its own responsibility.

The authorities of the Czech National Union would have state status. The highest representative power would belong to the National Assembly, and the executive power would belong to the National Council. The resolution of disputes between the National Union and the authorities of the Ukrainian People’s Republic was entrusted to the Administrative Court (Konstytutsiia, 1918).

In 1917, at the beginning of the revolutionary events, the political views of the Czech community were divided into two parts. The minority supported the Czech national democratic movement. The majority sympathized with the views of “fans of the Russian reaction in Kyiv”, i.e. the board of the “Union of Czechoslovak Societies in Russia”. But gradually the Union lost popularity in 1918 – 1919. The Board and all its initiatives, with the beginning of the revolution in Ukraine, lost support from both countrymen and government departments. In such a situation, they were before the third Congress of the Union of the Czech-Slovak Societies, which was held from April 23 to May 1 at Kyiv St. Volodymyr University and Commercial Institute.

The initiative in the work of the congress was taken by the Czech military and prisoners of war (from which the Czechoslovak corps was formed). The delegation of colonists was in minority – 55 members. The delegates from prisoners of war represented 335 associations in which 22,890 the Czechs and the Slovaks were enrolled. There were 20 societies representing the colonists (Venherska, 2018, p. 59).

At the end of December of 1917, an agreement was concluded between the CSNC and the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, according to which the Czechoslovak army, which had previously been part of the Russian army, was subordinated to the Ukrainian army. Such agreements were dictated by the fact that the Central Council declared a course for the continuation of the war with Austria-Hungary. Undoubtedly, such determination allowed the Czechs and the Slovaks to resume their struggle against the Habsburg dynasty. The agreement also considered the option of “withdrawal of the Ukrainian People’s Republic from the position of a belligerent party with the Central Powers”. Under such circumstances, the Czechoslovak army was given the right to leave the borders of Ukraine unimpeded (Venherska, 2018, p. 60).

The activities of the Czech societies were suspended until October after the departure of the Czech corps from the territory of Ukraine in March of 1918. The number of the Czechs and the Slovaks decreased significantly. Some of the soldiers returned home to Volyn. The Czech political figures also left for the Czech Republic in March, and only those of them who did not approve of the course of the CSNC or were in conflict with its active members remained in Kyiv. Vaclav Vondrak, the most famous of the Volyn Czechs, who was arrested soon after, also remained. Venceslav Shvigovsky, the editor of the only Czech newspaper published in Ukraine – the “Cechoslovan” was also in Kyiv. He had quite friendly relations with the Ukrainians (Lutskyi, 1999, pp. 275–277).

The Czech politicians had reason to fear the consequences of the Brest Peace Treaty for the Czech community in Ukraine. The first repressions against the Czechs began in March. The Czech political activists, among whom there were many entrepreneurs, found themselves outside the law. For example, V. Shvets, the owner of shops on Khreschatyk, was deprived of his property. His complaint was not only not considered, but also caused the businessman himself to be accused of Bolshevism. V. Shvets managed to avoid imprisonment. Dr. Vaclav Vondrak, a leading figure of the Czech socio-political movement in Ukraine, was imprisoned for two months. The reason for his arrest was his active participation in the organization of the Czech army of former prisoners of war. The Czech officials were lucky that Kyiv was subject to the German, not Austrian, administration. The Germans were not very willing to hand over the former inhabitants of the Czech lands to the Austrian police (Hrytsenko, 1993, pp. 82–84).

The possibility of establishing the Czechoslovak consulate in Kyiv was considered by the Czech officials in the second half of October of 1918 (Yakubova, 2006, p. 85). In 1918 – 1919, new military units were established, which consisted of the Czechs in Ukraine. They campaigned for the formation of the Czech military units with the aim of overthrowing the Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadsky. There was formed a secret Czech group “Union for Liberation of Russia” in Room 24 of the Hotel “Prague” on November 1 of 1918. Subsequently, the members of the group came to the conclusion that it was better to create the Czech military unit in Ukraine to help the Entente, and not the Russians (Khorenkov, 2002, pp. 7–8).

In general, it was in the ethnic structure of Volyn that the Czech ethnic group was formed, which was active in a political activity. The Czech political movement was supported by the governments of the Ukrainian People’s Republic at the legislative level, which became the basis for the formation of future international relations between Ukraine and the Czech Republic (Pohuliaiev et al, 2024, p. 423).

The power of the Bolsheviks complicated the social movement of the Czech minority in Ukraine. In the Czech villages, there were traditional organizations that were very religious and functioned exclusively within the territorial boundaries of a single settlement and did not have any centralized management. After 1919, the Czechs were forced to publish their own magazines and other literature at the expense of the Czech societies, which became very few. The “Czechoslovak People’s Association” and “Czech Mother School” carried on their activities (Kovba, 1998, p. 55). The main idea of public organizations was to maintain economic and cultural connections of the representatives of the Czech ethnic minority. Such organizations were recognized by the Soviet leadership as hostile, consisting of the Kurkul-clerical element and illegal (Stadnyk, & Kuzminets, 2023, p. 242).

Despite everything, the Czech ethnic minority fought for its rights. On August 1 of 1921, on the initiative of the Czechoslovak branch of the Volyn Provincial Committee, the First Congress of the Czech Colonists of Volyn was convened. The Congress was held in the Peasant House in Zhytomyr. The delegates were representatives from villages (1 delegate from 200 residents) and members of the Committee of the Poor.

The majority of the Czech colonists of Ukraine did not recognize the new Bolshevik government as legal. This is proved by the reports of the Central Committee of the Czech Communist Group. For example, in the message dated June 24 of 1919, it is stated that the “Czech Smikhy” colony is completely opposed to the Soviet government. It is also stated that most of the “bourgeois elements” who did not leave for the Czech Republic remained in Kroshnia and Zhytomyr (CSAPAU, f. 1, d. 20, c. 100, pp. 2–6).

The Czech education achieved significant development on the territory of the region, but the policy of Russification did not bypass it either. This process intensified especially actively at the beginning of the 90s of the 19th century and continued with varying intensity until the beginning of World War I (Polishchuk, 2012, p. 270). On the eve of the revolution in Ukraine, the cultural and educational development and religious life of the Czechs in Ukraine were decisive factors in preserving their the national identity.

However, the process of religious self-determination of the Czech colonists was complex and ambiguous. It was explained by the hopes of the Czechs to obtain the right to freedom of religion from Russia and the desire of the then government to use the Czech emigration to fight against Catholicism in Ukraine by creating a separate Hussite church. Based on practical considerations, some Czechs had a rather favourable attitude towards Orthodoxy and were ready to accept it (Mokrytskyi, 1998, pp. 120–121). At the beginning of the 20th century out of 27,670 Czech colonists in Volyn 18,323 were Orthodox, 7,916 were Catholics, and 1,424 were Protestants (Tsynkalovskyi, 1984, p. 561).

On October 15 of 1913, a meeting of superiors of the Czech parishes and the Czech priests was held in Pochayiv to discuss issues of the church and religious life of the Czech parishes in Volyn, under the Chairmanship of Volyn Diocesan Missionary Archimandrite Mytrofan. In the “Decree of the abbots of the Czech parishes and priests of Czechs – on issues of the church-parochial life of the Czech parishes in Volyn” it was stated that “...in parishes with an exclusively Czech population, the church services should be conducted in the Czech language, while not avoiding the Church Slavonic language, singing songs in discretion of the abbot. In parishes, where the population is mixed, to serve in Church Slavonic, some exclamations, prayers and chants, at the discretion of the superior, to be performed in Czech; The Gospel must be read in two languages: Church Slavonic and Czech. Try to practice joint singing at religious gatherings in schools and homes in Czech, and in church in Church Slavonic, the content of the songs at the discretion of the abbots” (Postanovlenie, 1913, pp. 874–875).

The Czech education in Ukraine on the eve of the revolution developed unhindered and legally. The national schools network in their settlements was quite dense, there were reading rooms and libraries. At first, the Czechs maintained schools at their own expense and educational process in national languages using foreign books (Volovyk, 1998, pp. 35–36).

The Russian government limited the study of the Czech language gradually, replacing it with the Russian. This process continued until the February Revolution of 1917. Only people of the Orthodox faith of the Russian origin were appointed as teachers. However, this did not prevent the Czechs from having the highest level of literacy among other ethnic minorities and the Ukrainians (Mokrytskyi, 1998, p. 123).

On the eve of the crisis of the Russian autocracy, the Czech publishing house became more active. The newspapers “Ruský Čech” (1906 – 1908, editor V. Vondrak) and later the “Čechoslovan” (1911 – 1914, 1916 – 1918, editors B. Shvigorskyi and V. Horvath) were published in Kyiv, which promoted the liberation programme during the war years Czechia and Slovakia from Austria-Hungary. The “Československý Denník” and the “Československý Voják” were published in Kyiv for a short time. Freedom of speech and press among the Czech minority in Ukraine developed independently of the Russian propaganda, because they did not contradict it (Loiko, 2005, pp. 133–135).

The freedoms proclaimed by the Ukrainian Revolution expanded the rights of the Czech ethnic minority in Ukraine. These rights broadened the prospects of cultural development

and made it possible to de-Russify the national Czech education. It was noted that getting an education in one's native language was the basis of a person's prosperous existence, a necessary condition for his further development at a Congress of representatives of the Czech colonists in Volyn on September 10 of 1917 (Gromov et al, 2018, p. 514).

The legislative support of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) for the activities of educational institutions for children of the Czech ethnic minority aimed at their unification on the Ukrainian model. Educational regulations determined that children aged 6–10 years old were enrolled in the 1st-4th grades of lower-level primary schools, and 10–14-year-olds were enrolled in the 5th-8th grades of upper-level primary schools. The Czech applicants had free access to secondary and higher educational institutions.

Lower primary schools were maintained by the Czech communities. At the same time, the UPR governments provided a financial support to lower-level primary schools and funded upper-level primary schools and college departments completely. In March of 1917 – June 1919, educational institutions were organized to eliminate illiteracy among the working Czech youth (Uminskyi, 2014, p. 116).

The language aspect played a significant role in the activity of the Czech educational institutions. At primary schools of a lower level, all subjects were taught in the Czech language, while at primary schools of a higher level and the department of colleges, the Czech language was taught only as a subject (Uminskyi, 2014, p. 120).

In 1918, the Czech primary school was established in Kovel, financed by the poviat administration. The school had one class, in which 20 children aged from 10 to 14 studied. The salary of teachers was 350 rubles per month. At the Kroshnia two-class school there were 149 children, of whom 65 were the Czechs aged 7 to 14. The Czech school in Zhytomyr was financed by Zhytomyr poviat administration and received 1,000 rubles per year. The teachers' salary was 150 rubles per month. There was no library, and the building needed repair (CSAPAU, f. 1, d. 20, c. 100, p. 14).

The Ukrainian Central Council initiated Ukrainization, helped the ethnic minorities obtain the legal protection and the right to develop their own cultural assets. Despite the abolition of democratic freedoms by Hetman P. Skoropadskyi, the education and culture of the national minorities of Ukraine continued to exist and enjoyed a considerable financial support. Funds were also allocated for the retraining of teachers with the mandatory requirement of Ukrainian as the language of instruction. The arrival of the Directory and the restoration of the laws of the Ukrainian Central Council could contribute to a further educational growth of minorities, but a gradual loss of the Ukrainian statehood did not allow the ideals of the Ukrainian Revolution to be put into practice regarding the freedom and equality of all peoples. At the legislative level this kind of tolerance became widespread in Western countries only in the 21st century and guaranteed an active social concern for the situation of ethnic minorities, which proves the progressiveness of the Ukrainian Revolution ideals in the first half of the 20th century (Liashko, 2023, p. 108).

Due to a favourable development of education when the Ukrainian government was at head, with the coming to power of the Bolsheviks, the Czech minority maintained the highest level of education among the representatives of other peoples of Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s (Chuan, 2019, p. 107). The Czech education was oppressed when the Bolsheviks came to power. In 1920, there were still 25 Czech schools in Podillia, which is much more than in Volyn, where the Czech population was represented the most. However, there were also learning difficulties: a chronic shortage of textbooks and qualified teachers. The

Czech teachers, who did not satisfy the Bolsheviks ideologically, were subject to repression (Lutskyi, 1994, p. 24).

The reorganization of the national Czech schools by the Bolshevik authorities began in 1920 on the basis of the decrees of the Soviet authorities, but this educational construction was not implemented immediately, because there were neither teachers nor textbooks. The Czech schools were functioning in Kroshnia, Vysoke, Okolky, Ivanovychi, Kruchyntsi, Alinovka, Vilshanka and in Selianshchyna (Lutskyi, 1994, pp. 122–123).

In 1920–1921, the newspapers of the communist direction the “Kronika”, “Volynska Pravda”, “Revoluke” were published in Czech in Volyn. They campaigned against the policies of the Czech President Tomas Masaryk, and the legionnaires of the Czech Corps were presented as deceived and offended. In these publications 80% of the information was devoted to the situation in the Volyn Czech colonies. Emphasis was placed on cases of unfair distribution of land, the refusal of wealthy owners to finance the official Czech school. The national and democratic Czech press was banned by the Soviet legislation (Zaslavskyi, 1998, p. 152).

The Soviet authorities spread a network of cultural and educational institutions, schools, secondary institutions at which teaching was conducted in their native language, the growth of the number of the Czech students in Ukraine created the impression of positive changes in the sphere of cultural and educational life of the minority. However, these achievements were accompanied by the destruction of the national culture, which is closely related to religion, and the elimination of traditional forms of educational institutions. There remained the following important issues on the development of the Czech education in Ukraine, in 1920 – 1921:

- absence of the principle of continuity in the education system of the national minorities;
- a low quality of education;
- an insufficient number of teaching staff and educational literature;
- a low level of the teachers’ professional training and activities of preschool institutions of the national minorities of Ukraine.

The Conclusions. The population of Ukraine has always been characterized by a multi-ethnic composition. The representatives of many other nationalities lived among the Ukrainians. Their legal status was different and depended on the conditions of different periods and the policies that different governments tried to implement. In order to improve the economic situation and reduce the influence of the Poles in Ukraine, the Russian government contributed to the Czech colonists resettlement to our lands, who settled mainly in Volyn poviat at the end of the 19th century. They were exempt from paying taxes when buying real estate. Banks provided them with preferential loans. These and many other political, legal and economic reasons contributed to the growth of the Czech population of the region.

On the eve of the Ukrainian War of Independence, the Czech ethnic minority cooperated with the tsarist government in a political life actively. The regulatory and legal support of the Russian Empire controlled all Czech political organizations in order to oppose the Habsburg policy of Austria-Hungary. In Kyiv, since 1916, the Czechs had the right to organize Congresses of delegates from the Union of Czechoslovak Societies in Russia. A branch of the Czechoslovak National Council was also located in Kyiv – the highest representative authority of the nation, the foundation of the future Czechoslovak government, as well as the headquarters of the Czechoslovak army and its reserve battalions. The Czech element in Ukraine was very significant at the end of World War I.

The Czechs received equal rights with other ethnic groups of Ukraine when the Revolution broke out in 1917. However, there was not formed any political parties by them. The branch of the Czechoslovak People's Council in Kyiv played a leading role in the public life of the Czechs. There was also the Czech division on the territory of Ukraine in 1917 – 1918, which expressed a desire to swear an oath to the Ukrainian Central Council for protection in the fight against the Bolsheviks.

The Czech minority received the legal protection and the right to develop its own cultural heritage, despite the Ukrainization initiated by the Ukrainian Central Council (UCC). The importance of the law “On National Personal Autonomy” from a legal and social standpoint cannot be overstated. This law guaranteed the Czechs of Ukraine such prospects that their compatriots in Austria-Hungary did not have. A significant financial support was provided by P. Skoropadskyi's Hetmanate to the fields of education and culture. The restoration of the laws of the UCC by the Directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic could have contributed to the further favourable position of the Czechs, but a gradual loss of the Ukrainian statehood did not allow the ideals of the Ukrainian Revolution regarding the freedom and equality of all peoples and the norms of the law “On National Personal Autonomy” to be implemented. In 1920 – 1921 the position of the Czechs in Ukraine was under difficult conditions. Due to the lack of legal guarantees, social protection and the policy of war communism implemented by the Soviet government, the majority of the Czech population of Ukraine left its territory.

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**SECRET PROGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS FORMATION
IN THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC, APRIL OF 1918**

Abstract. *The purpose of the research is to find out how the network of secret armed cells was formed, designed to protect the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR) from the attempts to overthrow it (April of 1918). The methodology of the research is based on the principles of historicism, systematicity, verification, general scientific and special scientific methods (historical genetic, etc.). The scientific novelty of the research consists in the fact that the issue on the formation of underground military organizations network by the officials of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in the spring of 1918 has been analysed in historical science for the first time.*

The Conclusions. *The position of the leadership of the Ukrainian People’s Republic deteriorated rapidly in March – April of 1918. The government’s authority was falling apart, the political opponents were preparing to overthrow it by force. Taking into account the above-mentioned conditions, the formation of secret armed organizations network began on the initiative of numerous prominent figures of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (the leaders of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party and the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party), aimed at protecting the state leadership from rebellions and conspiracies. There were established Ukraine Salvation Committee in Kyiv and the Committee of the “Moloda Ukrayina” (Young Ukraine) society in Zvenyhorod poviat, as part of the network. The civil servants of the Ukrainian People’s Republic were responsible for the formation of secret command centres, equipping and arming underground armed cells. The members of the Council of People’s Ministers of the Ukrainian People’s Republic were the part of Ukraine Salvation Committee. The members of the fighting underground, along with the military units of the UPR, were to prevent or suppress the anti-government demonstrations or, if this failed and the government was overthrown, to launch an insurgent movement, aimed at returning this government to power. The plan of action would be the following: the government troops and secret armed forces would be the first to act, and the broad masses of people would join them. In addition, according to the plan, probable leaders were to be detained and imprisoned in order to prevent the anti-government uprisings. The civil servants of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the activists of the ruling parties, initiated into this secret plan, were sure that they did the right thing. According to their conviction, the Ukrainian*

people supported the policy of the Ukrainian People's Republic leadership fully and should have come to its defense certainly.

Key words: the Ukrainian People's Republic, German and Austro-Hungarian troops in Ukraine (1918), uprising, armed underground, armed struggle.

СТВОРЕННЯ ПРОУРЯДОВИХ ТАЄМНИХ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЙ В УКРАЇНСЬКІЙ НАРОДНІЙ РЕСПУБЛІЦІ, КВІТЕНЬ 1918 Р.

Анотація. Мета дослідження – з'ясувати, як відбувалося формування мережі таємних збройних осередків, призначених захистити уряд Української Народної Республіки (УНР) від спроб повалення (квітень 1918 р.). **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на принципах історизму, системності, верифікації, на загальнонаукових і спеціально-наукових методах (історико-генетичний та ін.). **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що вперше в історичній науці поставлено й розглянуто питання про створення посадовцями УНР навесні 1918 р. мережі підпільних бойових організацій.

Висновки. У березні-квітні 1918 р. становище керівництва УНР швидко погіршувалось. Авторитет уряду падав, політичні противники готувалися силою усунути його від влади. В цих умовах за ініціативи низки чільних діячів УНР (керівників Української соціал-демократичної робітничої партії та Української партії соціалістів-революціонерів) розпочалося формування мережі таємних збройних організацій, покликаних захистити державний провід від заколотів і змов. У складі мережі було створено Комітет порятунку України в Києві та Комітет товариства "Молода Україна" у Звенигородському повіті. Утворення таємних керівних центрів та комплектування й озброєння підпільних збройних осередків було покладене на державних службовців УНР. До Комітету порятунку України належали члени Ради народних міністрів УНР. Члени бойового підпілля разом із військовими підрозділами УНР мали попередити або придушити антиурядові виступи або, якщо б це не вдалося і уряд був би повалений, розгорнути повстанський рух із метою повернути його до влади. План дії передбачав, що першими виступлять урядові війська й таємні збройні загони, а до них приєднаються широкі народні маси. Також згідно з планом для попередження антиурядових заколотів мали бути затримані й ув'язнені їхні вірогідні лідери. Державні службовці УНР та активісти правлячих партій, посвячені в цей секретний план, були певні, що вчиняють правильно. На їх переконання, український народ цілком підтримував політику керівництва УНР й неодмінно мав стати на його захист.

Ключові слова: Українська Народна Республіка, німецькі та австро-угорські війська в Україні (1918), повстання, збройне підпілля, збройна боротьба.

The Problem Statement. It was the period of a fierce armed struggle between the supporters and opponents of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi in Ukraine, in the middle of 1918. There were several uprisings, which took place against his authority – in Zvenyhorod, Tarashcha, and others. There were the historians, who studied the above-mentioned uprisings, the prevailing opinion was that they arose as a protest of the rural masses against the agrarian policy of the Hetmanate, aimed at the restoration of a large land ownership, contrary to the desire of peasants to take possession of the estates lands (Luschnat-Ziegler, 2021, pp. 12–17; Sherbatyuk, 2012, pp. 256–271). However, due to a detailed analysis of the events, we came to the conclusion that it was not a mass popular movement, but the speeches of organized political groups that aimed at gaining power in Ukraine (Lobodaev, 2017, pp. 59–99; Malynovsky & Malynovska, 2020; Malynovsky, 2023), and that the preparation of these speeches began even before the establishment of the Hetmanate, during the period of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR).

The Review of Publications. The secret armed cells formation was aimed at protecting the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic from the attempts to remove it from

power is covered in the studies on its activities, in particular measures to prevent a coup d'état (Hai-Nyzhnyk, 2014, pp. 213, 215; Hai-Nyzhnyk, 2019, p. 46; Havrylenko & Lohvynenko, 1998, pp. 18–22). The above-mentioned issue is also discussed in the studies that deal with the insurgent movement of the summer of 1918 (Halushko, Tereschenko, Hyrych, Papakin, Ostashko, Lobodaev, Hromenko, Pinak, Kharuk, 2018, p. 217; Lobodaev, 2010, p. 206; Zaharchenko, 1997, p. 52), as the soldiers of the underground units formed in the spring prevailed among the participants of this movement. However, the issue of the underground network formation in the capital and regions at the initiative of the UPR government officials has not been studied yet, which makes the study of this issue an urgent scientific objective.

The purpose of the research is to shed light on the process of a network formation of the secret armed organizations aimed at protecting the UPR government from attempts to remove it from power (April of 1918).

The Results of the Research. As is it known, in the UPR the highest government positions were held by the leaders of two socialist parties mainly – the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party (USDLP) and the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR) at the beginning of 1918. The Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries played a leading role in state administration. Its members held the majority in the Mala Rada (Minor Council) (the legislative body of the UPR, which consisted of a part of the deputies of the Ukrainian Central Rada and had the authority to act on its behalf) and in the Council of People's Ministers (the UPR government formed by the Mala Rada). The members of the political organization Ukrainian (or All-Ukrainian) Peasants Union had also a significant influence on the decision regarding the state affairs.

Due to the taken measures by the ruling parties, aimed at building the socialist state in Ukraine, especially socialization and an equal distribution of land, a deep political crisis was caused (Lebedeva, 2006, pp. 25–33). The ruling group of the UPR found itself in isolation: it was criticized not only by other political forces of Ukraine, but also by external partners – Germany and Austria-Hungary, which in February of 1918, at the request of the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, entered its territory to help repel the Bolshevik attack and expel them back to Russia. The Central Powers hoped to receive food supplies from Ukraine in exchange for a military aid. The transformations introduced by the leadership of the Ukrainian National People's Republic in the agrarian sphere – land socialization and parcelization – meant the destruction of a large-scale commercial food production in Ukraine, i.e. they crossed out these export plans (Borowsky, 1970, pp. 85–116; Kuraiev, 2009, pp. 267–303).

Despite criticism from all sides, the UPR leadership refused to change its political course or share power with its opponents. The part of the state leadership of the UPR foresaw they would try to seize power by force and that made attempts would be supported by the Central Powers, hence, the UPR leadership came up with a plan to counter it, in particular they decided to establish a pro-government armed underground.

It is impossible to say exactly who of the UPR leaders made the above-mentioned decision. Its discussion was secret and, probably, was not documented, and the mentions of it in the memories left by the leaders of the UPR are brief and unclear. It is only certain that the circle of those involved included the representatives of the UPSR, USDLP and the Ukrainian Peasant Union, and this circle was very limited. According to the testimony of the writer Volodymyr Vynnychenko, one of the leaders of the USDLP, it was “a small group of people, three or four” (Vynnychenko, 1980, p. 296). The majority of leaders and rank-

and-file members of the government parties (including V. Vynnychenko) had nothing to do with the case (Vynnychenko, 1980, p. 296). It can be assumed that even among the initiates, only a few knew the plan in its entirety. Most likely, the plan creators, who were aware of all its details, included the Head of the government Vsevolod Holubovych (UPSR), as well as Ministers Mykola Kovalevskyi (UPSR) and Mykhailo Tkachenko (USDLP). It is possible, to one degree or another, that other high-ranking officials were also involved in the development and implementation of the plan – the representatives of the UPSR and the USDLP, in particular government members Pavlo Khrystiuk, Mykola Liubynsky, and Oleksandr Zhukovsky. It is unknown what kind of role Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, the Chairman of the Central Rada, who is connected to the UPSR, played in these events, whether he took part in it or not.

The plan was to organize secret command centres, as well as recruit and arm several underground units and use them to prevent the mutiny, or, if it fails, to suppress the mutiny together with the UPR government troops, or if it fails, to commit a counter-insurgency in some period of time. According to his memoirs, Kovalevsky explained the essence of the plan the following way: “These [aimed at overthrowing the UPR government] preparations [of political opponents] were also known to us, and therefore during March and April, our political parties and organizations got ready for this decisive struggle and reorganized so that in the event of the coup to go immediately into an illegal situation and continue the struggle for the Ukrainian liberation ideals implementation. The so-called Reserve Committees were established in our organizations, [...] in the “All-Ukrainian Peasants Union”, in the party of socialist revolutionaries and in the [party] of social democrats in advance, which went through the entire organizational network in case of a coup. The armed struggle against the occupying power in the event of a coup was supposed to remove the form of partisanship, which happened later” (Kovalevsky, 1960, pp. 476, 477).

The commandant hundreds, along with the secret cells, were to be publicly operating armed formations functioning as support structures under the district commandants of the Ukrainian People's Republic as a component of the resistance forces. According to Pavlo Khrystiuk, in order to carry out the armed struggle, “the Military Ministry was in a rush regarding the plan implementation for the organization of the revolutionary military units in poviats that could defend the Central Council and the Republic in the event of a coup attempt by the German-Ukrainian bourgeoisie” (Khrystiuk, 1921, p. 166).

The commandants were to become the organizers and leaders of mass public demonstrations. Oleksandr Zhukovsky, Military Minister of the UPR noted in his memoirs that it was necessary to “give that unorganized mass harmony and unity, as an organized mass, which in a critical moment can be called to arms to defend its rights. The poviat commandants' mission was to play the role of such connecting centres, under which, according to the instructions, security hundreds were to be formed to protect order in the poviats” (Zhukovsky, 2018, p. 191).

In addition to the preparation of a secret armed network, detention and imprisonment of its potential participants was supposed to be another area of activity to prevent a rebellion against the UPR government. Khrystiuk noted the following: “At the same time, the government decided to arrest a number of people, who were at the head of the counter-revolutionary movement” (Khrystiuk, 1921, p. 166).

The UPR officials and activists of the ruling parties, initiated into this secret plan, were convinced that they were doing the right thing. After all, the Ukrainian people, in their

opinion, supported the policy of the Central Rada fully and in the event of an attempt to overthrow it, they had to come to its defense. The leading figures thought that the opposition would be launched by the Ukrainian government troops and formed the secret armed cells previously, and the broad masses would join them, and the attempt to overthrow the Central Rada and cancel its reforms would be put to an end.

Hence, numerous secret armed organizations emerged in the capital and in the regions of the UPR. The most massive element of the pro-government underground was the organization in Zvenyhorod poviat. It was established on the basis of Zvenyhorod Kish of free Cossacks. The organizers and leaders of the armed cell in Zvenyhorod were the local military officials of the UPR – Mykola Shynkar, Kyiv Provincial Commandant, Mykhailo Pavlovsky, Zvenyhorod Poviat Commandant, Yuriy Tiutiunnyk Commissioner for Demobilization of District 7 of the South-Western Front (a former Chieftain of Zvenyhorod Kish of Free Cossacks) and Ivan Kapulovsky, Zvenyhorod Poviat Military Chief. The main role was played by the two latter figures (Kapulovsky, 1923, pp. 96, 97; Yurtik, 2014, p. 363).

In addition to their positions, the membership in the public organization “Moloda Ukrayina” also served as a cover for their activities. The “Moloda Ukrayina” society was managed by the Committee, which was the headquarters of Zvenyhorod underground armed group. The Committee of the “Moloda Ukrayina” society was headed by Ivan Kapulovsky. There were 15 local activists of the UPSR and USDLP in the society initially. According to Kapulovsky’s memoirs, at the two founding meetings there were present the representatives of other socialist parties, including the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, who refused to join the society (and the secret organization). Later on, Shynkar, Tiutiunnyk, a member of the Central Rada Pavlo Demerlii and other people signed up as members of the “Moloda Ukrayina”. The society had its own printed organ – the newspaper “Zvenyhorodska Dumka”. I. Kapulovsky wrote in his memoirs the following: “Officially, the “Moloda Ukrayina” society was engaged in publishing a newspaper and cultural and educational work, but in fact all its members were in charge of the organization of combat peasant insurgent units” (Kapulovsky, 1923, p. 97).

The main goal of the Committee of the “Moloda Ukrayina” society was to equip and arm underground units. The members of the Committee used their official powers to provide the underground with the weapons. According to the orders published by the German command and the Ukrainian authorities, the population had to surrender UPR registered weapons under threat of punishment. Yu. Tiutiunnyk and I. Kapulovsky not only left the weapons to the soldiers, but also gave the additional ones secretly. Yu. Tiutiunnyk handed over the weapons that ended up in his hands as a result of demobilization measures. It was about 10 or 11 thousand rifles, up to 50 machine guns, two cannons and an armored car. I. Kapulovsky, on the other hand, hid and then distributed among the insurgents 5,000 rifles, which he received from the residents of the poviat, who complied with the official order to surrender UPR registered weapons. So that the German authorities did not carry out searches and, therefore, did not find the weapons hidden by the underground, I. Kapulovsky issued certificates to all residents of the villages that they had fulfilled this order (Bozhko, 1998, p. 35; Kapulovsky, 1923, p. 98; Yurtik, 2014, p. 365).

Significant success to underground officials was the fact that they managed to maintain complete secrecy for a long time. The German officers (as well as undisclosed UPR government officials) did not know about the dual activities of Zvenyhorod poviat military leadership until the end of April of 1918. Yu. Tiutiunnyk admitted that Zvenyhorod conspirators were “on good terms” with the Commander of the German garrison (Bozhko, 1998, p. 35),

later he recalled this “friendship” with disdain: “Every day, Pavlovsky used to make drunk a representative of the great German nation, some wretched Ober-Lieutenant, who was the oldest among the Germans in Zvenyhorod, by pouring “schnapps”” (Yurtik, 2014, p. 363).

The efforts of the Committee of the “Molda Ukrayina” society gave the expected result: a powerful armed group emerged in Zvenyhorod. According to Kapulovsky, at the beginning of May of 1918, there were formed 18 battalions with a total number of 25,000 soldiers in Zvenyhorod poviat and in the adjacent parishes of Uman, Tarascha, and Kaniv poviats. It should be also added the personnel of the command under the poviat military chief: 200 infantrymen and 45 cavalrymen (Kapulovsky, 1923, pp. 98, 99).

Another element of the underground pro-government network was Ukraine Salvation Committee (or Union), formed by the conspiratorial ministers in Kyiv. According to the German intelligence, the Committee included Minister for Internal Affairs Mykhailo Tkachenko, Military Minister Oleksandr Zhukovsky, Head of the Administrative Political Department of the Ministry for Internal Affairs Yuriy Haievsky, and Chief of Kyiv Police Petro Bohatsky (as for the latter, an agent who at the end of April of 1918 reported these data to intelligence officers, “especially warned and advised to neutralize him as soon as possible”) (SächsHStA, f. 11358, c. 54, p. 092). Other officials were probably also involved in the activities of the Committee, in particular other members of the government and its Chairman Vsevolod Holubovych (Hai-Nyzhnyk, 2014, p. 222). According to the German intelligence, Nataliya Romanovych-Tkachenko, a Ukrainian writer, a wife of Mykhailo Tkachenko, and a student Petrenko presided over the meetings of the Committee (Baumgart, 1971, p. 354).

The executors of the Committee’s decisions were several employees of the Ministry for Internal Affairs, such as, for example, the official for special assignments Oleksandr Osypov (Hai-Nyzhnyk, 2014, p. 225). In addition, according to the information of the German command, the Committee had armed forces at its disposal – several military units of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. Mayor Walter Yarosh, on behalf of the main command of the German troops in Ukraine, informed the command of Reserve Corps 27 that the Union for the Salvation of Ukraine had “a special influence on the Ukrainian volunteer soldiers – the “chorni Haidamaky””. This unit (kurin, Kurjen), numbering about 400 fighters, was supposed to be transferred from Poltava to Kyiv to play the role of “as reliable people say, a special shock force against the Germans” (SächsHStA f. 11358, c. 54, p. 004).

The first case of Ukraine Salvation Committee was to arrest the financier Abram Dobryi, whom the UPR government considered a key figure of the opposition. It was rumored in Kyiv that Dobryi also belonged to a secret organization, but an anti-government one – “he was one of a group of 5 people that was preparing a coup” (Vernadsky, 1994, p. 81), and was to become the new head of the government, “formed from the business circles of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie” (Karpenko, 1931, p. 90).

Prominent figures of the UPR were convinced that Dobryi’s activities posed a great threat to them. Later Holubovych noted the following: “A banker Dobryi [...] conducted direct negotiations on the one hand with Berlin, on the other hand – with the Russian chornosotenni circles, and in particular with one of the metropolitans about the monarchical rule restoration” (Ostashko & Kokin, 2013, p. 287). Khrystiuk emphasized that Dobryi was “the right hand of the Germans in their anti-state plans” (Khrystiuk, 1921, p. 166).

Dobryi’s isolation should decapitate and, thus disorganize the anti-government movement. Kovalevsky wrote about this the following: “As you know, Dobryi was [...] the instigator

of various German charges, which turned against the Ukrainian state centre and against the Ukrainian issue in general. It was not without reason that Dobryi was also considered the inspirer and organizer of the April coup, which was fully prepared fully at the time. Under these circumstances, our Minister for Internal Affairs, Mykhailo Tkachenko, decided [...] to remove Dobryi from Kyiv for a while and thereby deprive the coup organizers of one of the most active conspirators” (Kovalevsky, 1960, p. 481).

In addition to Dobryi, other people were also to be arrested. According to information received by the German intelligence on April 27 of 1918, these people included the police Chiefs Kvasnykov and Mykola Krasovsky, as well as Leonid Mykhailov, acting Minister of Labour of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (SächHStA f. 11358, c. 54, p. 092). As for Krasovsky, later the German intelligence found out that he, on the contrary, cooperated with Ukraine Salvation Committee.

Perhaps, in addition to carrying out secret arrests, Ukraine Salvation Committee had broader plans. Hence, in the Ukrainian political circles there were rumors about the intention of the UPR government officials to exterminate the officers of the German group of troops in Ukraine in order to make it ineffective (Doroshenko, 2002, p. 25). Academician Volodymyr Vernadsky, one of the leading figures of the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party in Ukraine, made the following notes in his diary: “On the very day, the German officers were to be killed and the soldiers left on their own [without the commanders] were put in a hopeless situation” (Vernadsky, 1994, p. 81).

These rumors about the sinister intentions of the UPR government seem to be an exaggeration, because Dobryi (and possibly the others) were planned to be imprisoned, not killed. However, the very assumption about the ability of extremists in power to resort to terror and bloody revenge was indicative. Yevhen Chykalenko, a Ukrainian public figure, explaining in a private conversation, why he refused the offer of opponents of the UPR government to assume the post of the Hetman, said that he was unable to create a powerful team because his “political friends, although they considered the policy of the Central Rada very pessimistically, refused ministerial portfolios”, declaring: “The Hetman and [his] Ministry will not resist the agitation of the “leftists”, and then we will be hanged” (Starovoitenko, 2022, p. 310).

If Kapulovsky, the Head of the “Moloda Ukrayina” society, frankly told his story in his memoirs, there were controversial testimonies about Ukraine Salvation Committee. It should be mentioned that Zhukovsky and other high-ranking officials of the Ukrainian People’s Republic – alleged members of Ukraine Salvation Committee – denied their involvement in its activities later (Zhukovsky, 2018, pp. 192–211; Kovalevsky, 1960, p. 481, Ostashko & Kokin, 2013, p. 287). Taking into account their words, it appeared that this secret organization did not really exist at all. Everything came down, if we believe them, to the initiative of the Minister for Internal Affairs Tkachenko, who acted, according to Kovalevsky, “on his own initiative” and had the only intention to isolate Dobryi (481). Khrystiuk noted the following in this regard: “It was intended [...] to arrest several prominent counter-revolutionaries quite openly”, but Tkachenko, “for an unknown reason”, decided to detain only Dobryi, “and that in an unusual way (secret arrest under the name of some private organization), which gave the case an arrest of an adventurous nature, putting the entire government and especially the Chairman of the P[eople’s] C[ouncil] of M[inisters] Holubovych in an unnatural position” (Khrystiuk, 1921, p. 166).

However, despite the objections of the leaders of the UPR, a secret organized group was a reality, which consisted of at least Tkachenko and several of his subordinates from the People's Ministry for Internal Affairs of the UPR. As it was found out later by the German intelligence and Ukrainian (Hetman) investigative bodies, its members declared directly that they belonged "to a society which [in the Ukrainian People's Republic] was more important than any ministries at the end of April of 1918 (CSAHAAU, f. 2207, d. 1, c. 657, p. 4; Gor'ky, 1936, p. 53).

When did these secret organizations – Committees emerge in the capital and in Zvenyhorodka? The above-mentioned were formed at the second half of April of 1918, the period after the political crisis caused by the issuing of an order to the German troops to "insist vigorously" on that all land in Ukraine should be sown (Kornovenko, Zemzyulina, Kovaleva, Malynovsky, Masnenko, Morozov, Mykhailiuk & Pasichna 2020, p. 203). The German command agreed previously on this order with the Head of the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic of Ukraine Holubovych and the Minister for Land Affairs Kovalevsky, however, after the publication of the order, the leadership of the UPR condemned it as a violation of the sovereign rights of the Ukrainian state – on April 13 of 1918, the Mala Rada (Minor Council) adopted the corresponding resolution (Verstiuk, 1997, p. 273). The German side, for its part, expressed a sharp protest, reprimanding the Ukrainian Ministers that they destroyed agriculture with their socialist utopias and were generally incapable of managing the country (Kornovenko, Zemzyulina, Kovaleva, Malynovsky, Masnenko, Morozov, Mykhailiuk & Pasichna, 2020, pp. 186–188).

The offended Ministers of the Ukrainian People's Republic were in a bellicose mood. Petro Chykalenko, a son of Yevhen Chykalenko, an employee of the UPR government at the beginning of 1918, told his father that Holubovych "after [...] an order [...] threatened to raise an uprising against the Germans". The Chykalenkos did not pay attention to this, "considering these words to be a usual chattering of Holubovych", but in fact the Prime Minister's statement was quite serious (Chykalenko, 2004, p. 96).

A historian H. Karpenko, one of the first researchers of the uprising in Ukraine in 1918, noted the following: "The Mala Rada (Minor Council) adopts [April 13, 1918] a resolution according to which the Minister for Land Affairs is asked to protest to the German government against the illegal actions of the German command in Ukraine and to address calling on the population not to comply with the order [...]. Along with these official actions of the Central Rada, the members of the Ukrainian Party Socialist Revolutionary and Ukrainian Esdecs [= the members of the UPSR and USDLP] organize a secret committee "Spasinnia Ukrayiny" (Saving Ukraine), which includes several Ministers [...] and several military personnel; this Committee is entrusted with the task of preparing forces for an uprising just in case. A similar Committee was formed at the same time in Zvenyhorod, which was called: "Moloda Ukrayina" (Karpenko, 1931, pp. 89, 90).

There were formed other pro-government underground organizations in various regions of the UPR simultaneously with the Committee of the "Moloda Ukrayina" society and Ukrainian Salvation Committee. In particular, according to the information of the German command, such a cell functioned near Radomyśl. On April 29 of 1918, the German intelligence service reported to the command about the existence of "an organization headed by the Head of the [Central] Council Hrushevsky, who has a large number of supporters, primarily in Radomyśl poviat". This organization possessed a large stockpile of weapons allegedly ("for example, 2,000 rifles were distributed among the supporters of this party, which at

one time were captured by the Ukrainian troops at Irsha train [station]). – If intelligence about it was true, Radomyśl underground centre as well as in Zvenyhorod was headed by local civil servants: the Head of the Povit Administration and the Head of the Poviats Land Committee Mykyta Mandryka and the Heads of the Radomyśl City Administration Hryhoriy Karbovskiy and Serhiy (Mykhailo?) Marchenko (SächsHStA f. 11358, c. 54, p. 005; about the Radomyśl district leadership of the Ukrainian People's Republic in 1918 in the memoirs of M. Mandryka: Mandryka, 1977, p. 87).

At that time, a large underground cell also appeared in Mohyliv-Podilskyi poviat. On April 18 of 1918, the acting Chief of the police of the 2nd precinct of this poviat reported to the leadership the following: "... the peasantry took up the formation of free Cossack units vigorously and, in general, armaments. I don't know by what order certain individuals from the free Cossacks call upon the peasants not to surrender their weapons to anyone, but on the contrary to acquire them in various ways and to arm themselves in order, if necessary, to get rid of the Austrians and the Germans by the force of weapon. In the town of Mohyliv free Cossacks are helping in the matter of supplying the weapons" (Lobodaev, 2010, p. 208).

The village of Kukavka became the centre of the armed organization in Mohyliv-Podilskyi poviat. The members of the secret organization included employees of Mohyliv-Podilskyi poviat commandant's hundred and the poviat Commandant Andriy Vovk along with the soldiers of secret combat units, representatives of the free Cossacks mainly (Malynovsky, Malynovska, 2020, p. 125). A total amount of fighters was at least 2000 in the organization (Malynovsky, 2023, p. 125).

The peculiarity of the underground network established by the UPR officials was that it did not include armed units everywhere. There were only headquarters and weapons warehouses (secret and those that were officially under the protection of the UPR army). In this regard, Zhukovsky noted the following: "well-known information departments should have been organized at the [poviat] commandants to provide information about the mood of population, which had the main task of organizing the local forces and on the order [= order] "to arms" the doors of ready-made warehouses [] with weapons] were opened and in this way the whole army of the armed people appeared at once" (Zhukovsky, 2018, p. 191).

On April 27 of 1918 the German intelligence officer reported the following: "The main principle is to attract the population to the side of the coup participants at the last moment with the help of provocateurs and give them weapons". In confirmation, he cited a specific fact: Minakovskiy, Fastiv Commandant, while having a conversation with another Ukrainian officer, stated that "he can put forward 2,000 bayonets in the fight against the Germans at any moment" and that he does not need to distribute the weapons in advance, he keeps them in storage in order to be ready (SächsHStA f. 11358, c. 54, p. 004).

In addition to the combat groups formed by the UPR officials in accordance with the general plan for the preparation of resistance bases, there were also secret pro-government armed formations that emerged at the initiative of the local figures independently. Hence, formally the unit of the Free Cossacks was disbanded in the village of Hlodosy, Yelyzavhrad poviat, by their own decision, kept composition and organizational structure and hid their weapons (Mykhailyk, 1934, p. 14).

In turn, the leaders of the Ukrainian Party of Independent Socialists (UPSS) tried to establish their own secret network, another party represented in the Central Rada and the UPR government, simultaneously with the above-mentioned underground organizations, formed by representatives of the UPSR, UPSD and the Ukrainian Peasants'

Union. In particular, the “Batktivshchyna” society was founded in April of 1918 on the initiative of the Ukrainian Socialist Workers’ Party. This society had the same features as the underground organizations formed by members of the UPSR and UPSD: it was connected to the Cossack movement (cooperated with the General Cossack Council of the Free Cossacks), combined legal and illegal activities. The legal one consisted in the organization of cultural, educational and political actions. The illegal one, which was the main one, got ready to take measures for the defense of the Ukrainian statehood (Herashchenko, 2006, pp. 39–41).

In the spring of 1918, independent socialists had difficult relations with the leadership of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, which was dominated by the members of the UPSR and the UPSD. On the one hand, independent socialists themselves belonged to the leadership of the UPR – they held several ministerial positions (Verstiuk, 1997, p. 227). On the other hand, the leaders of the UPSS criticized the government policy of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and even developed a plan for anti-government armed action, nominating their own candidates for the Hetman post (Herashchenko, 2006, p. 37). Probably, having started to build their underground network, independent socialists were ready to use it both to protect and to overthrow the UPR government – depending on what, according to the members of this party, would be more in the interests of the Ukrainian state.

The Bolsheviks also formed their own armed network in the UPR in the spring of 1918. In particular, there was one of the centres, which was formed and functioned in the village of Vilshana, Zvenyhorod poviat. According Isaak Chyzhov, a member of the communist underground, claimed in his memoirs, in Vilshana “the first revolutionary partisan unit in the poviat was organized”, which “became the main armed force on which the Zvenyhorod Bolshevik organization relied” (Chizhov, 1970, p. 235).

According to Ivan Kapulovsky’s memoirs, it is known that he maintained contacts with the Bolsheviks in Zvenyhorod poviat and even invited them to join the armed underground led by the Committee of the “Moloda Ukrayina” society (Kapulovsky, 1923, p. 97). That is, while preparing to repulse the “onset of the counter-revolution” in Ukraine, the UPR officials not only failed at preventing the Bolsheviks (with whom, let’s recall, the UPR fought a war with the support of the Central Powers) to establish underground fighting groups, but also assumed the possibility of joint actions with them.

The Conclusions. The position of the ruling political parties of the UPR – the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party and the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries deteriorated during March and April of 1918 rapidly. Their authority in society fell apart, political opponents prepared to overthrow it by force. The overthrow of the government formed by these parties could have been prevented by changes in its policy, first of all, by the rejection of the socialist agrarian reform. However, some of the leaders of the UPR chose a different path – they decided to establish a network of secret armed organizations aimed at protecting the government from attempts, or, if these attempts could not be prevented, to return power to it later. This network, formed mainly in April of 1918, included Ukraine Salvation Committee in Kyiv and the Committee of the “Moloda Ukrayina” society in Zvenyhorod poviat. The founders of underground armed cells were civil servants of the People’s Republic of Ukraine, Ukraine Salvation Committee included members of the government. The underground network included a significant fighting force. Its most powerful element – Zvenyhorod cell – consisted of 18 battalions and numbered about 25,000 soldiers. Along with troops loyal to the government and with the help of masses,

who, according to the leaders of the Ukrainian People's Republic, shared their political programme, the secret armed organizations were supposed to ensure that the People's Republic of Ukraine remained in power.

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**DAILY LIFE OF THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ARMY SERVICEMEN
AT INTERNED CAMPS ON THE TERRITORY OF POLAND (1920 – 1924)**

Abstract. The Purpose of the Research. In every large-scale armed conflict there is capture of prisoners by opposing sides or their internment at specially established camps. Obviously, there is some difference between prisoners and internees. It consists in their different status, which entails not only legal consequences, but also everyday living conditions. Captivity means a severe restriction of a serviceman's personal freedom by an enemy state in order to deprive him of the opportunity to continue the struggle. Internment is carried out by a state that does not take a direct part in an armed conflict between warring parties. It provides for better conditions of servicemen's detention at specially established internment camps, although they are often far from those that could satisfy servicemen's daily life needs. Therefore, the **purpose** of the article is to highlight an everyday life of interned soldiers of the Ukrainian People's Republic Army, which at the end of autumn of 1920, after the defeat of the UPR in the war with Soviet Russia, retreated to the territory of the Republic of Poland. **The research methodology** is based on the principles of historicism, scientific objectivity in analysis of the past, a critical approach to available sources, studies of participants and eyewitnesses. The author has used problem-chronological, logical, deductive and inductive methods. **The scientific novelty** of the article consists in the fact that at the beginning of the 1920s the issue of functioning of the interned servicemen camps of the UPR Army on the territory of the Polish Republic, although occupied a very important place in the activities of the UPR government-in-exile, its relations with the Polish authorities, however, concerned military political aspects mainly. It was about the prospects of using the camps to preserve the Army structure and continue the fight against the Russian occupiers of Ukraine. Instead, a daily life of the camp residents was highlighted mainly against a background of the military and political activities of the UPR government-in-exile. Meanwhile, actual living conditions and everyday life of the internees significantly influenced realization of the goals set by the government, because it was about mobilizing human resources that remained at its disposal. **The Conclusions.** The status of the interned UPR Army as the Army of the allied state granted certain privileges to the Ukrainian military, which made better their moral condition after the retreat from Ukraine, and also contributed to the establishment of public, cultural and educational activities at the camps. However, due to a difficult

financial situation of the UPR government-in-exile, as well as limited financial capabilities of Poland, it was often impossible to provide daily household needs of the internees at a minimal level at least. As a result, this situation caused the effect of worsening not only the life of camp residents, but also their physical moral and psychological exhaustion, which prompted the Polish authorities, and subsequently the Ukrainian government-in-exile, to agree to their final disbandment in 1924.

Key words: Ukraine, the UPR Army, the Russian-Ukrainian war, internment camps, the Republic of Poland, servicemen, everyday life.

ПОВСЯКДЕННЕ ЖИТТЯ І ПОБУТ ВІЙСЬКОВИКІВ АРМІЇ УНР У ТАБОРАХ ІНТЕРНОВАНИХ НА ТЕРИТОРІЇ ПОЛЬЩІ (1920 – 1924)

Анотація. Мета дослідження. Кожен широкомасштабний збройний конфлікт не обходиться без захоплення ворогуючими сторонами полонених або ж їх інтернування у спеціально створених для цього таборах. Очевидно, що між полоненими й інтернованими є різниця. Вона полягає у відмінному статусі, що тягне за собою не лише правові наслідки але й побутові умови перебування. Полон означає суворе обмеження свободи особи військовослужбовця ворожою державою, аби позбавити його можливості продовжувати боротьбу. Інтернування ж проводить держава, що не бере безпосередньої участі у збройному конфлікті між воюючими сторонами. Воно передбачає м'якші умови утримання військовослужбовців у спеціально створених для цього таборах інтернованих, хоча часто далеко від тих, які могли б задовольняти їхні повсякденні побутові потреби. Тому метою статті є висвітлення повсякденного життя і побуту інтернованих військовиків Армії УНР, що наприкінці осені 1920 р. після поразки УНР у війні з радянською Росією відступила на територію Польської Республіки. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на засадах історизму, наукової об'єктивності в оцінках минулого, критичного підходу до наявних джерел, праць учасників та очевидців подій. Автор використав проблемно-хронологічний, логічний, дедуктивний та індуктивний методи викладу матеріалу. **Наукова новизна статті** полягає у тому, що питання функціонування таборів інтернованих військовослужбовців Армії УНР на території Польської Республіки на початку 1920-х рр. хоча й посідали дуже важливе місце у діяльності еміграційного уряду УНР, його взаєминах із відповідними польськими органами влади, проте переважно стосувалися військово-політичних аспектів. Йшлося про перспективи їх використання для збереження армійської структури та продовження боротьби проти російських окупантів України. Натомість щоденне життя таборян висвітлювалось переважно як тло військово-політичної діяльності еміграційного уряду УНР. Між тим власне побутові умови й буденне життя інтернованих суттєво впливали на реалізацію поставлених урядом цілей, адже йшлося про мобілізацію того людського ресурсу, який залишався ще у його розпорядженні. **Висновки.** Статус інтернованої Армії УНР як армії союзної держави надавав певні привілеї українським військовикам, що пом'якшувало їхній моральний стан після відступу з України, а також сприяло налагодженню громадської і культурно-освітньої діяльності у таборах. Однак через скрутне фінансове становище еміграційного уряду УНР, а також обмежені фінансові спроможності самої Польщі, часто не вдавалося забезпечити повсякденні побутові потреби інтернованих бодай на мінімальному рівні. Своїм наслідком це мало погіршення не лише побуту таборян, але і їх фізичного та морально-психологічного виснаження, що й спонукало польську владу, а услід за цим і український еміграційний уряд погодитись із їх остаточним розформуванням всередині 1924 р.

Ключові слова: Україна, Армія УНР, російсько-українська війна, табори інтернованих, Польська Республіка, військовослужбовці, побут.

The Problem Statement. Every military conflict is accompanied by physical and mental suffering of servicemen: injuries, wounds, and mutilations. Obviously, this suffering is reflected on their personalities and is visible to the environment. However, there is another, no less tragic side, although it is not so noticeable at first sight – a moral suffering experienced by them, during their stay in captivity, spending time in places where freedom is restricted. Such places include military internment camps. After the hostilities cessation

at the Russian-Ukrainian front in November of 1920 and the retreat of the UPR Army to the territory of Poland, the servicemen were interned and located at several camps designated for this purpose. The Ukrainian military political leadership tried to preserve the military structure, and therefore considered the internment camps as a temporary location for the army, its reorganization, and retraining for the continuation of the fight against the Russian occupiers. On November 18, 1920, at one of the last meetings of the UPR government, it was noted that the army internment would preserve it and “give the opportunity to continue the liberation struggle under favourable conditions” (Petliura, 1999, p. 311). In addition, the goal was to take urgent measures to ensure the most favourable conditions for the servicemen stay on the territory of Poland. As S. Petliura explained in the letter to senior officials of the UPR, “the period of internment should be used for the army organization” (Petliura, 1999, p. 314). Although the issues related to the functioning of the interned servicemen camps of the UPR Army were covered in historiography, they remain to some extent insufficiently elucidated, as they mostly concern their organization, public and cultural and educational work among the camp residents, while their everyday life, material and household conditions mostly remained only the background against which this activity took place. At the same time, the everyday life of the interned servicemen had a significant impact on their moral and psychological state, and therefore on the prospects for the preservation of the UPR Army and its involvement in the hostilities. The full-scale armed aggression of Russia against Ukraine, which began in February of 2022, made these issues especially relevant.

The Review of Sources and Recent Researches. The source base of the research is published and unpublished archival materials related to the stay of the UPR Army servicemen at internment camps on the territory of Poland, memoirs of participants of the events under analysis, which highlight an inner life and daily life, a moral state of the interned Ukrainian servicemen. In the periodicals, including camp publications, there were submitted a lot of materials on the above-mentioned issues. However, they focused on the public cultural and educational life of the internees. The most complete materials related to the researched issue and little known to the general public were collected by V. Morynets and published in the collection of documents “Army behind Wires” (Morynets, 2018). The originals are kept in the Central State Archive of the higher authorities of Ukraine. The documents of a similar content are also kept in the Archive of New Acts in Poland. The value is represented by the published materials related to the activities of S. Petliura, the chief commander of the UPR Army. They shed light on his attitude to the needs of the interned Ukrainian Army, measures taken to improve its material and moral condition (Petliura, 1999).

In Ukrainian historiography, the issue under analysis was raised by emigrant and diaspora historians of the mid-20s – the second half of the 30s of the 20th century. The publications were of a memoir-publicistic nature. In modern historiography, the above mentioned is much more studied. However, the authors focused on the military and political aspects of the functioning of internment camps mainly. Relatively few of them turned to the description of a daily life of inhabitants, and were limited to stating difficult conditions of a camp life, instead the authors focused on cultural and social activities of various kinds of societies of interned servicemen of the UPR Army, which cannot be interpreted as an everyday life in a narrow sense. In modern Ukrainian historiography, this issue is the most fully presented in the works by Ihor Sribniak (Sribniak, 1997; Sribniak, 2017; Sribniak, 2018a; Sribniak, 2018b; Sribniak & Paliienko, 2021), and in the monograph by M. Pavlenko (Pavlenko, 1999). Certain aspects of the life of interned servicemen at the initial stage of their stay at the camps are covered in

articles by Viktor Holubko and Vitaliy Kosovych (Holubko & Kosovych, 2021), as well as by Vitaliy Vyzdryk and Kostiantyn Kurylyshyn (Vyzdryk & Kurylyshyn, 2021). Tetiana Dobko and Oleksandr Dudnik conducted the analysis of the publications of combatant periodicals published in the diaspora regarding the presence of materials on the history of the armed struggle of the Ukrainian servicemen in 1917 – 1921 and their subsequent fate (Dobko & Dudnik, 2019). Mykola Lytvyn, Oleksandr Rubliov (Lytvyn & Rubliov, 2019), Viacheslav Vasylenko and Mychailo Vikhliaiev analysed the fate of emigrants who participated in the liberation struggles in their publications (Vasylenko & Vikhliaiev, 2019).

The Polish historians succeeded in this regard. Among them, the researcher of the Ukrainian origin Oleksandr Kolianchuk should be singled out (Коляничук, 2000), as well as Zbigniew Karpus (Karpus, 1997), Jan Jacek Bruski (Bruski, 2000). However, they focus (except for O. Kolianchuk) on military and political issues, and not on an everyday life of the camp residents.

The Purpose of the Research. Relying on the historiographic work of predecessors and available source material, the author set the goal of highlighting a daily life of interned servicemen of the UPR Army on the territory of Poland during their stay at the camps (1920 – 1924). In particular, this concerns their daily life, material situation, moral and psychological aspects, stay at internment camps, their influence on interpersonal relationships.

The Research Results. In the autumn of 1920, the hostilities at the front of the Ukrainian-Polish-Soviet war ended. On October 18, the separate armistice with Soviet Russia concluded by the Polish side in Riga put the UPR Army in a hopeless situation. The Ukrainian Army lacked both human and material resources. However, the higher military political leadership of the Republic decided to continue military operations against the Russian Red Army. By mid-November of 1920, the Ukrainian Army controlled part of south-western Podillia and occupied a 130-kilometer front line from Mohylev-Podilskyi through Yaltushkiv to the west of Lityn. Its total number was approximately 35,000 rank-and-file and 3,888 officers, and in combat formations even less: 2,100 officers, 9,323 rank-and-file riflemen, 2,560 cavalry (Salskyi, 1933, p. 330). At the same time, the number of Russian forces was 10,000 infantry, 1,300 cavalry in the first front line, in the second front line, respectively, 9,000 soldiers and 800 cavalry, in the army reserves, about 6,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. A total of 25,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry (the total number of the Red Army was approximately 3 million at that time) (Holubko, Hrytsiuk, Kryvyziuk & Lysenko, 2019, p. 258). Therefore, the rival had a huge advantage in weapons and military resources in general. Despite this, the Ukrainian command set an offensive along the entire front line on November 11. However, it was overtaken by the Red Army, who launched offensive actions along the entire front on November 10. In fact, a counter-battle began, which, due to the loss of the offensive initiative by the Ukrainian side, and most importantly, very limited resources, could not be successful. The enemy broke through the Ukrainian front at the right wing near the village of Obukhiv. Attempts by the commander, General-Khorunzhy M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko, to reduce it in order to increase firepower did not yield tangible results. Therefore, on November 12, he issued an order for a general retreat. It was about the cover of the last larger towns – Proskuriv and Kamianets-Podilskyi, where the UPR government was located. As a participant of the events, then the chief of staff of Kyiv (Insurgent) Rifle Division 4, Lt. Col. Oleksiy Lushnenko, notes in his memoirs, “although attempts were still made to go on the offensive, no one believed in success anymore, and everyone began to look west, beyond the Zbruch River, and look for shelter there” (Lushnenko, 2020, p. 138). On November 14 – 18, the enemy

broke through the Ukrainian defenses line, occupied Kamianets-Podilskyi and Proskuriv. Government formations moved to Volochysk. From then on, the issue of internment of the Army and its further maintenance came into the practical plane. On November 18, at the meeting of the Council of People's Ministers of the UPR, held in the village of Fridrikhivka near Volochysk, at the Ukrainian-Polish border, after a lively discussion, a decision was made to transfer the army to the territory of Poland, which meant its internment (Petliura, 1999, p. 311). There were discussed conditions that the Ukrainian side had to present to the Poles in the event that the government and the army crossed the Zbruch River. The leadership of the UPR realized that in order to maintain the interned army, it was necessary to have the financial and material means, and immediately sought to ensure to the Polish side as much as possible the preservation of the integrity of the army units, its property, weapons, and to obtain a loan from the Polish government (Petliura, 1999, p. 312). It was supposed to create a commission to hand over weapons and property after crossing the border (Verstiuk, 2006, p. 315). They were to be transferred to the deposit of the Polish government, which the Ukrainian side hoped to use as a source of its financing.

On the night of November 21, 1920, the Polish authorities gave permission for the Ukrainian units to cross the border – to cross the Zbruch River. The Army crossed the border between Volochysk and the village of Ozhyhivtsi. The crossing was finished in the evening. The Army was determined the area of location: the Army headquarters with the commander General M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko arrived in the village of Klymkivtsi, and the majority of the troops in the vicinity of the villages of Nove Selo – Klymkivtsi (Salskyi, 1933, p. 360). Nearby, near the village of Toky, it was disarmed. A little later, Department II of the Polish General Staff issued an instruction outlining the treatment of Ukrainian servicemen who crossed the Zbruch River. First of all, it was emphasized that they were internees, not prisoners, and belonged to the allied army. In addition to a number of organizational points related to preservation of the interned army, creation of camps, there were also separate instructions for arranging a daily life and lifestyle of the interned servicemen. They were to be located at specially adapted houses and barracks, which would meet “the needs of hygiene and be arranged accordingly” (Morynets, 2018, pp. 5–6). The interned units had to take care of their own food, i.e. equip kitchens, their own cooks, but were supposed to receive food supplies from the Polish army camp. Interned servicemen were prohibited to be outside the camp. Instead, officers were given the opportunity to receive passes to leave the camp once a week within a radius of up to seven kilometers. At the same time, they were deprived of the right to wear insignia on their uniforms. The senior command staff were given permanent passes and were allowed to live outside the camp as private individuals (Morynets, 2018, pp. 5–6). The instructions of Department II also contained certain specific wishes, which, according to their authors, were supposed to maintain discipline among the internees and diversify their everyday life. It was about holding sports exercises, competitions, founding schools, reading rooms, theatres, other circles, workshops, chapels.

According to the Polish data, approximately 30,000 people crossed the Zbruch River on November 21 (Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), Sygn. 296/1-39, k. 5), in particular, 20,000 Ukrainian troops (including 2,000 the Don Cossacks under command of Ataman O. Yakovliev) (Karpus, 1997, p. 89). Since, according to the terms of the preliminary peace treaty in Riga dated October 12, 1920, a 15-kilometer demilitarized territory was established along the Soviet-Polish border, the internees were moved to Ternopil area. There, temporary “points of deportation” were established in Lunyntsi, Romanove Selo and Klebanivtsi. From there

they were to be transported to designated camps scattered across twenty locations throughout Poland (Kolianchuk, 2000, p. 54). The majority of the camps had been established since World War I for prisoners of the Russian army, or before that they had been used as barracks of the Austro-Hungarian army. These were the camps in Aleksandrów Kujawski, Kalisz, Łañcut, Pykulyczy, Piotrków, Wadowice. Their living conditions varied from completely uninhabitable to more or less tolerable.

Interned Ukrainian servicemen encountered the first everyday troubles in Galicia while waiting to be sent to camps. All of these troubles were the most evident during the Army's crossing the Zbruch River and its stay at the border. The Polish soldiers, taking advantage of the chaos, looted private belongings of servicemen, officers and their families. The Kamianets-Podilskyi Youth School belongings were looted, as it was reported to the head of the Ukrainian military liquidation mission in Warsaw, by its chief, General Mykola Shapoval (Morynets, 2018, pp. 23–26). Lieutenant-Colonel Dmytro Krasnovskyi, head of the arms transfer commission, reported to the Minister of Defense a similar situation. He complained not only about non-compliance with the terms of handing over weapons, the lack of registration and protection by the Polish side, but also about the Poles' open looting and robbery of the Ukrainian servicemen – both rank-and-file and officers. “Under the guise of handing over weapons”, he reported, “everything that was of a market value was looted, and when the Polish soldiers took money (marks), they added that they were doing it in accordance with the order to take back the money of the Polish Republic...” (Morynets, 2018, p. 72). The reality of the internees' stay among the Ukrainian population, who was generally sympathetic to them, was a little brightened. Characteristic is the entry in the operational unit chief's diary of Rifle Brigade 11 headquarters, Khorunzhyi O. Holenko, who, after crossing the Zbruch River, was in the village of Koshliaky and asked to stay at a local Ukrainian family house during the night. “It made me very happy that even though my fate is bad, there are good people who can cheer up my soul. They treated me well. I was treated to some coffee and milk. Got up early. The hostess prepared a very tasty breakfast. Dumplings with lard, fried meat and coffee” (Morynets, 2018, p. 184). During the first days of internment, officers were allocated certain sums of money to be maintained at a satisfactory level at least. Monetary and material support and some food products were given from reserves which were preserved during the crossing of the Zbruch River. The rest goods could be bought among the local population by selling cloth and leather from army supplies. In general, the internees tried to get rid of their military and personal property as much as possible because, convinced by their recent experience, they feared that the Poles would take it from them. The situation became unbearable when the internees left for their destinations. While waiting for transport, they were housed in overcrowded houses or former Austrian barracks without heating. In addition, they ran out of money and food supply. O. Holenko, being among the internees in Ivachiv Horishny near Ternopil, made a note under the date of December 15, 1920: “We got up early. The only concern is how to get food. Potatoes are on the table, we have nothing else to ... I had some tea and saccharin, no sugar” (Morynets, 2018, p. 193). Due to the unpreparedness for taking in lodgers at the camps, as well as the lack of railway cars, the terms of transportation into the interior part of Poland were delayed. As late as mid-December of 1920, many servicemen remained in Ternopil area. In the report to S. Petliura the army commander M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko noted that “people are under extremely difficult conditions: they are located at overcrowded houses – thirty people in a house, infectious diseases broke out, in particular typhus; in terms of food, Ternopil area

is completely exhausted, it is impossible to buy any food and fodder, and the Cossacks are starving, as a result scurvy broke out as well" (Petliura, 1999, pp. 338–339). As the way out, it was suggested moving the army divisions in small units to the area south of Lviv, where the situation with food and fodder supplies was better. However, this suggestion was not realized. In order to prevent the outbreak of a typhus epidemic, the Polish military authorities vaccinated the internees, which stopped its spread.

However, as it often happens in crisis situations, not only the noble sides of a person's character manifest themselves, but immoral acts manifest themselves as well surface. Under the conditions of the disaster of the military administrative apparatus and the chaos caused by this, many servicemen succumbed to panic, committed unworthy acts, the most common of which were theft of military and state property, speculation of the stolen. Employees of various rear units who had access to exported army supplies overindulged.

Finally, at the end of December of 1920 – the beginning of January of 1921, the internees were located at camps. According to calculations carried out by the Polish Military Ministry, from February of 1921, about 15,500 Ukrainian servicemen were at the camps (Karpus, 1997, p. 27). The Polish command tried to satisfy the request of the Ukrainian side and settle the Ukrainian military separately from the Russian Red Army internees and prisoners. The Ukrainians were located at camps in Wadowice, Łańcut, Pikulyczy, Kalisz, Aleksandrów Kujawski, Częstochowa (mainly civilian government officials), Piotrków. Due to devastation of the majority Polish lands during World War I, their difficult economic condition, the first year of the internees' stay at some of the camps was extremely difficult. The situation became catastrophic as early as January of 1921, when the financial reserves that some parts of the interned Ukrainian army still had ran out practically. The government of the UPR, being in exile, was helpless to do anything. In the correspondence with the leading government and army formations, in the memoirs of the internees, there were complaints about terrible living conditions. Pidkhorunzhy Petro Korsun described the conditions of his stay at Piotrków camp: "When you take a good look at our life, it's a very bad impression: a large hall with bunk beds, on which there are old mattresses torn from sacks stuffed with straw, there are no blankets or sheets, it's cold... Two dirty tables for two halls and two or three bowls for washing – that's the whole interior of our abode" (Morynets, 2018, p. 237). The report of the sanitary department of February 13, 1921 provides the idea concerning the stay conditions of interned servicemen. It concerns the camps in Częstochowa, Pikulyczy, Aleksandrów Kujawski, Kalisz, Wadowice and Łańcut. Pikulyczy camp near Przemyśl was the first one on the way to relocate interned servicemen. There were the Austrian barracks, which were part of the Przemyśl fortress complex, and nearby there were built wooden barracks for prisoners of war. In December of 1920 – January of 1921, interned servicemen of the UPR Army came there. The living conditions turned out to be terrible: the windows on the roofs of the buildings were bent, which caused rainwater to flow into the premises, and there was terrible dampness. In January of 1921, 3,013 Ukrainian servicemen, including 99 women and children, were stationed in Pikulyczy camp (Kolianchuk, 2000, p. 58). Due to the lack of fuel, it was not possible to cook food and heat a huge room 30 m long. In the rooms, the internees slept on bunk beds. Due to the overcrowding, unsanitary conditions prevailed, parasites spread, and even infectious diseases broke out, but were extinguished successfully. A major role in this was played by the Ukrainian medical personnel who were in the camp and worked according to the permission of the Polish administration. The situation was similar in Wadowice camp (south-west of Krakow). There was a camp for prisoners of war

which had been built by the Austrians. The internees lived in abandoned brick barracks. In the report of the Sanitary Administration, it was noted that the ceiling and walls of the barracks were leaky, due to which people caught cold caused by draft and cold, and “the sanitary condition of the barracks is very bad. Dampness and dirt in the barracks. For rank-and-file, as well as for the Cossacks, there are only bunks, there are no beds at all, mattress covers and blankets are given to a few only. There is a terrible bathhouse” (Morynets, 2018, p. 43). The internees did not have enough underwear, they ran out of medicines that had been brought during the troops retreat from Ukraine. Living conditions in the Szczypiorno camp near Kalisz were even worse. At the end of 1921, part of the servicemen from Kalisz camp and Aleksandrów Kujawski camp were relocated there. The internees were housed in dilapidated cold wooden barracks and dugouts. The camp in Aleksandrów Kujawski was also overcrowded. The internees lived in wooden barracks covered with tar. Designed for 2,000 people, it accommodated 3,200 people (Morynets, 2018, p. 40). Due to the lack of beds, bunk beds were arranged. However, officers, rank-and-file, women and children lived separately. The camp had its own bathhouse, laundry, dispensary, and was electrified. Perhaps this “comfort” was explained by the fact that the commander of the Sich Division 6, Colonel-General Marko Bezruchko – a famous defender of Zamość from the Bolsheviks in August of 1920 – was appointed as its commandant. He enjoyed special respect among Polish military circles. The situation was similar in Kalisz camp, whose chief was General Oleksandr Udovychenko. In Wadowice camp there were relatively satisfactory conditions for internees. There were brick and wooden barracks with electricity supply and necessary technical and sanitary equipment. However, it often happened that its inhabitants suffered from the cold because the Polish side did not comply with the norms provisions for supplying the camps with fuel, and servicemen had to use everything that could burn: benches, tables and even elements of the very barracks buildings.

In the camps food supply differed and depended on the location, administration, and internal structure. In general, food supply was handled by the relevant services of the Polish Military Ministry. However, in reality, they did not always follow the prescriptions of food standards and its quality. For example, if in Aleksandrów Kujawski food was provided properly – officers had a two-course lunch, dinner and, moreover, a small daily allowance, then things were bad for others. Thus, in the message of the Ukrainian sanitary administration of January 21, 1921, which checked the camps condition, it was noted that in Wadowice camp interned officers and rank-and-file of the Ukrainian Army received $\frac{3}{4}$ pound of bread, 125 gr. meat, which “often turns out to be smelly, and the bread is covered with mold and bitter, which makes people sick, especially their stomachs” (Morynets, 2018, p. 43). Pidkhorunzhy Petro Korsun, staying at Piotrków camp, made entries in his diary about the lack of food. Under the date of April 3, 1921, he wrote: “The stomach is almost empty; I want to eat and I want to cry like a child. Hunger leads to the point that you look to see if there is anywhere on the window or table, even a crumb of bread you would eat anyway, but unfortunately no one leaves it; because everyone is also hungry” (Morynets, 2018, p. 255). Cash given to officers and rank-and-file was often delayed. In addition, it was meager and under the conditions of galloping inflation it was absolutely not enough.

Since the internment camps were designed by the Ukrainian government-in-exile to preserve the army structure for the continuation of the armed struggle, it was forbidden to release soldiers from service. All camps were fenced with barbed wire, the Polish guards stood at the gates. Of course, all this had a depressing effect on the morale of their inhabitants. “You

sit and grieve or dream, but actually you don't want to do that for some reason since you got into these barracks. A kind of dullness, a kind of stagnation even of the brain activity, it seems that someone hit your head with a dope, some dope got into it...”, noted Petro Korsun in his diary (Morynets, 2018, p. 237). A small, isolated, overpopulated space gave birth to all kinds of excesses. However, the command tried to counteract this by resuming drills and military training, including teaching at a youth school, which was supposed to train officers. But the army, imprisoned by wires, found itself in a pitiful situation, and began to show signs of decay. This became especially noticeable in the winter – spring of 1921, after the first months of internment. In the report of the accounting department of the Polish General Staff for March 1, 1921, it was noted: “It should be emphasized that the mood of the military masses is unsatisfactory at the camps. The ideological level decreased significantly... People are thirsty for information... Desertion is getting bigger and bigger...” (AAN, sygn. 296/1-39, k. 28). Isolation from the outside world, lack of money, and the most important feeling of hopelessness oppressed the camp residents greatly, especially the rank-and-file, who were imposed strict restrictions on their freedom to leave the camp. In the end, the officers who had better opportunities in this regard due to lack of money were unable to rent accommodation outside the camp and fell into apathy. Playing cards, drinking alcohol, narcotic substances (morphine and cocaine), which were bought when there was money, became the usual pastime of the campers' free time. Against this background, quarrels often broke out in the camp, there were thefts, and immoral behaviour. This fact, in particular, is reflected in the report of the head of the counter-intelligence department of the active army rear, lieutenant colonel H. Khomiak, regarding the internment camp in Łańcut. It reported glaring facts of disreputable behaviour of some officers, who discredited the army. For example, Colonel Mykola Smuhliv, who was assigned to the senior chota at the Rear Headquarters of the UPR Army (Tynchenko, 2007, p. 413) “a drunken man amid quarrel, as if he were a tree was thrown on the upper bunks”, a drunk centurion Kyrylchuk begins to quarrel with his comrades, and when, amid the last Russian quarrel, the senior officer asks him “Who are you?”, he replies: “I am the UPR”, the centurion Shulayiv “undresses naked, shouts out “Attention!” and when the public gathered around him, he pulled out his penis and showed it to senior officers, women and children” (Morynets, 2018, pp. 32–33). There are mentioned many similar cases in the report.

Despite the material troubles that caused tension in the internees environment, conflicts often erupted against the background of the use of the Russian language. Communicating in Russian by a part of officers in everyday life caused special disgust among rank-and-file, for whom it was equated with national renegade. On linguistic grounds, there were quarrels and even fights between the patriotic Ukrainian military and those who adhered to pro-Russian sentiments, and the latter openly demonstrated them. Thus, General Hryhoriy Yanushevskiy, who was appointed head of the Joint Youth School in Kalisz, in a letter to S. Petliura dated June 30, 1922, reported on the measures he had taken regarding its Ukrainization. “The Russian language was dominant in this school, including official relations, not to mention a private life. The Russian songs were mostly used by sergeants in the office... In the Cavalry Division, the Russian songs had to be brought out almost by repression” (Morynets, 2018, p. 135). The problem was so acute that S. Petliura drew attention to it. In this regard, he issued appropriate orders to the Inspector General and Military Minister. In a letter dated September 17, 1922 the Chief Ataman noted that “the one who allows a foreign language in a family life is also not trusted by us and we must keep a watchful eye on him. In any case, this

evil must be fought: oblige them (officers – *Author*) to avoid such a habit and remember that in the eyes of the higher military authorities, such behaviour will be considered a negative attestation” (Morynets, 2018, p. 159).

Since at the internment camps there were mostly young men and much less women, problems often arose against the background of an intimate life. About 200 women and 50 children lived in Łañcut camp permanently. Among women there were wives of officers and rank-and-file. privates. Due to a lack of money, they were forced to live in barracks with their children and adapt to camp conditions (Sribniak, 2018, p. 48). At the same time, there was a group of women who were not in a formal marriage relationship. Therefore, as noted in the above-mentioned report of the head of the Rear of the Active Army, “living in a civil marriage which often changed, is a common phenomenon” (Morynets, 2018, p. 32). And “the moral state of the majority of women in our country is also hereditary (scandalous – *Author*) and they are in no way inferior to men... The majority of them are “lovers and seekers of strong feelings”, a moral rot, driven to us by a political wave. During the whole day, in our barracks, only the Russian language is heard, screams, squeals, noises and passionate whispers of love” (Morynets, 2018, p. 33). A moral behaviour of men was not better either. The consequence of this moral behaviour was the spread of venereal diseases among internees.

Senior military commanders even tried to control a young officer’s choice of a life partner. It was about the fact that she had an appropriate moral reputation and did not disgrace officer corps. It was not something unique. At that time, similar procedures were practiced in the Polish army, which obviously could serve as an example for the Ukrainian command as well (Kusiak, 1992, pp. 55–64). In order to somehow neutralize such things and prevent a moral deterioration of interned servicemen, the command tried to preserve military discipline, continuing drills, literacy training, cultural and educational work. As the most radical measure, malicious violators (including women) were sent to the camp in Dombie specially established for such elements. In April of 1921, S. Petliura visited the internment camps. This visit eased the situation a little, but it could not help matters. The ban on discharge from the army, a difficult financial situation, and strengthening of the Bolshevik propaganda regarding the return to homeland undoubtedly had a demoralizing effect on the internees. Against this background, conflicts arose between those who decided to return home and those who stayed.

According to the decree of the Polish government dated October 9, 1921, the camps of prisoners of war and internees were to be liquidated, and those who remained were transferred from the Military Ministry to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Among them, the Ukrainian camps remained in Strzalków, Kalisz and Szczypiorn (Karpus, 1997, p. 153). A formal change in the camps re-subordination did not affect living conditions of their inhabitants: Poland could not provide the funds for their maintenance. Because of that, it became a practice for campers to leave for temporary work outside the camp borders. At the end of 1922, the authorities gave permission for registration of internees to go to work in France. At the camps, agitation began in search of mediators who would arrange this matter. In December of 1923, the Polish government decided on the final liquidation of the camps. For this purpose, as early as January 1, 1924, the maximum reduction in the number of internees was foreseen. Former internees who, due to their health, age and certain family circumstances, could not leave during the winter could still stay in Kalisz and Szczypiorn for some time. Handicraft workshops, which had previously been established with the permission of the Polish authorities and were to become a source of support for the internees, were handed over to them. After an actual liquidation of the camps, the internees acquired the status of political

emigrants with the right of unlimited movement in the country. On the basis of the Ministry of Internal Affairs decision of August 11, 1924, all the internment camps still existing on the territory of Poland were liquidated. From then on, the Ukrainian village in Kalisz, which was located in part of the former camp No. 10, became the coordination centre for former interned military personnel, organized specifically for this purpose. 800 – 1200 residents lived permanently there and there was an appropriate infrastructure as well (Kolańczuk, 1995, p. 51). In turn, on a national scale it was subordinated to the Ukrainian Central Committee in Warsaw, which had its departments in other regions.

The Conclusions. By the mid-1920s, the internment period of the UPR Army servicemen was over. Hopes that the internment camps would preserve the Army structure and it could be used to transfer to the territory of Ukraine and continue the fight against the Russian occupiers did not come true. First of all, it could not be done due to lack of finances. Deplorable living conditions undermined a moral and physical condition of the internees. The status of the allied army could also do little good, since the possibilities of Poland were limited to support it by its own sources. In the end, the political situation developed in such a way that the task of continuing to openly support the restoration of the UPR also became burdensome.

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**THE SLOVAK LEAGUE AND NATIONAL ISSUE:
THE RUTHENIAN DISCOURSE (1934 – 1938)**

Abstract. *The purpose of the research is to analyse the peculiarities of the attitude of the Slovak League to the Ukrainian (Ruthenian, Rusyn) issue in 1934 – 1938. The research methodology is based on the use of general scientific methods (induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis). The scientific novelty consists in the fact that the Ruthenian issue on the activities of the Slovak League has been analysed by the authors on the basis of the unpublished archival documents. The Conclusions. The Ruthenian issue has been relevant both for Subcarpathian Rus and Slovakia, and especially for its eastern part. The Ruthenian political life activation has been extremely negatively received by the Slovaks in the mid-1930s. In Eastern Slovakia, the local administrations have been headed by people from the nationalist circles of the Slovak political elite, so naturally they have resorted to administrative abuses, the purpose of which was to “facilitate” the Slovakization of the Ruthenian population of the*

region in various ways. The official authorities representatives interacted with the relevant unions and societies closely, which tried to implement their ideas in practice. The Slovak League activity regarding resolving the Ruthenian issue has been a vivid example of such interaction. The impetus for this activity of the Slovak League has been the demands of the Ruthenians to replace the Slovak language in some Eastern Slovak schools with the Ruthenian and at the same time ensure that it is taught by the Ruthenian teachers. It has been determined that in connection with the intensification of a socio-political life of the Ruthenians in Eastern Slovakia and their defense of their own national rights, the Slovak authorities observed the Ruthenian issue with its subsequent resolution. In this context, the Slovak League took some practical steps in solving it. In 1934 – 1938, the Ruthenian issue was considered by the Slovak League at Congresses and meetings. There were diverse options for solving the Ruthenian issue on the part of the Slovak League, which led to the implementation of its ideas by the Slovak authorities, in particular, strengthening of total Slovakization in the educational network, banning of the Ruthenian societies and unions, persecution of the Ruthenian figures and even Slovakization of a religious sphere.

Key words: Ruthenian issue, Slovak League, Czechoslovak Republic, Eastern Slovakia.

СЛОВАЦЬКА ЛІГА І НАЦІОНАЛЬНЕ ПИТАННЯ: УКРАЇНСЬКИЙ / РУСИНСЬКИЙ ДИСКУРС (1934 – 1938)

Анотація. Мета дослідження полягає у з'ясуванні особливостей ставлення Словацької Ліги до українського питання у 1934 – 1938 рр. **Методологія** дослідження ґрунтується на використанні загальнонаукових методів (індукції та дедукції, аналізу та синтезу). **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що автори на основі неопублікованих архівних документів проаналізували українське / русинське питання у діяльності Словацької Ліги. **Висновки.** Українське / русинське питання було актуальним як для Підкарпатської Русі, так і Словаччини, а особливо її східної частини. Словаки активізацію русинського політичного життя у середині 1930-х рр. сприйняли вкрай негативно. У Східній Словаччині місцеві адміністрації очолювали вихідці з націоналістично налаштованих кіл словацької політичної еліти, тому, природно, вони вдавалися до адміністративних зловживань, метою яких було різними способами “сприяти” словакізації українського / русинського населення краю. Представники офіційної влади тісно взаємодіяли з відповідними спілками та товариствами, які на практиці намагалися втілювати їх ідеї в життя. Прикладом такої взаємодії стала діяльність Словацької Ліги у розв'язанні українського / русинського питання. Поштовхом для цієї діяльності Словацької Ліги стали вимоги українців / русинів замінити словацьку мову в деяких східнославацьких школах російською і водночас забезпечити її викладання русинськими вчителями. Встановлено, що у зв'язку з активізацією суспільно-політичного життя українців / русинів Східної Словаччини та їх відстоювання власних національних прав, словацька влада активно обсерувала українське / русинське питання з подальшим його вирішенням. У цьому контексті практичні кроки у його розв'язанні зробила Словацька Ліга. У 1934 – 1938 рр. українське / русинське питання розглядалося Словацькою Лігою на конгресах та зібраннях. Варіанти вирішення українського / русинського питання з боку Словацької Ліги призвели до втілення її ідей словацькою владою, зокрема, посилення тотальної словакізації освітньої мережі, заборони українських / русинських товариств та спілок, переслідування українських / русинських діячів та навіть словакізація конфесійної сфери.

Ключові слова: українське / русинське питання, Словацька Ліга, Чехословацька Республіка, Східна Словаччина.

The Problem Statement. The postwar transformations in Central and Eastern Europe and creation of new states in the region did not resolve the national issue and ethnopolitical contradictions. Furthermore, during the interwar period, the above-mentioned transformations intensified and deepened against the background of assimilationist and integrationist ethnopolitics of the newly formed states.

The Czechoslovak Republic was one of these newly formed states. Although it consisted of the majority of the Czechs and the Slovaks and had a democratic constitution. In the country, the issue on the real status of the national minorities always remained unresolved.

The Ruthenian issue was also on agenda along with the German and the Hungarian issues, the main ones in the ethnopolitics of the Czechoslovak Republic.

The Analysis Recent Research and Publications. The attitude of the Slovak League in the 1930s regarding the solution of the Ukrainian issue as a research problem was not the subject of historical studies. There are several studies in Slovak historiography that focus on the development of this issue. The monumental research of R. Letz on the activities of the Slovak League during the interwar period stands out among them, at the same time, it rather briefly shows how it addressed the issue on the future of the national minorities (Letz, 2000). The monograph by P. Švorc should be singled out, in which the author outlined the socio-political background of the period of the 1930s, when the Slovak League developed its activities in relation to the ethnics in Slovakia (Švorc, 1996). One cannot ignore the publication by P. Kova, in which he analysed J. Ruman's views, as one of the associates of the Slovak League at the time, on the Slovak-Ruthenian relations in the 30s of the 20th century (Ruman, 1935). At the same time, the Ukrainian scholars mentioned the existence of the Slovak League partially, without resorting to the analysis of its direct ethnopolitical activities (publications by I. Sirky, A. Panov, I. Liubchuk) (Sirka, 1980, Panov, 2010, Liubchuk, 2009). In general, there are no professional developments on this issue in the Ukrainian historiography.

The purpose of the research is to analyse options for solving the Ukrainian issue by the Slovak League leaders at their annual Congresses in the 1930s.

The Results of the Research. First of all, the issue on the territorial definition and ethnonymic terminology should be elucidated. After joining the Czechoslovak Republic, part of the Ruthenian population of Priashivshchyna was within the boundaries of the Slovak administrative control (Klečacký, 2024, Švorc, 2020a, 2020b, 2022). Furthermore, the Ruthenian-Slovak border of the ethnic demarcation was ignored by the participants in the post-war arrangement of the new political map. As a result, the Ruthenian communities were located in Spiš, Šariš and western Zemplín, which came under Slovak rule. The name of the local population was among the definitive issues on the ethnonymy that lived in the north-east of Slovakia during the interwar period. It is obvious that the Ruthenians lived on the territory of the region. Methodologically, we proceed from the fact that the Ruthenians are part of the Ukrainian nation, according to the evidence, provided by the ethnographic materials of the Ukrainian folk historians V. Hnatiuk, I. Verkhatsky, I. Pankevych, S. Tomashevsky, and the study by the Slovaks (S. Czambel, J. Húsek, V. Latty), the Czech (L. Niederle) ethnographers. At the same time, we state that the Ruthenians were characterized by a blurred and imperfect national identity due to various circumstances. The Ruthenian population was in search of its own national self-reflection. At the same time, it should be mentioned that only some local intellectuals, the clergymen mainly (for example, a priest Omelian Nevytskyi), considered themselves to be the Ukrainians in the 1920s. The others (i.e. the majority) declared themselves either the Russians (Velykorossy/Great Russians) or the Ruthenians, while fundamentally rejecting the Ukrainian ethnicity. The situation began to change in the 1930s with the formation of the enlightened cultural and educational centres, the struggle for the school, the language of instruction in it, and the active activities of individual Greek Catholic priests. Actually, under the influence of these circumstances, part of the local population began to assert their Ukrainian identity.

At the same time, the complex Slovak-Ruthenian relations on the ground of the Greek

Catholic Church were dealt with outside the church ground (Borza, 2017). The slogan “every Greek Catholic is a Ruthenian”, which spread from the clergy, clearly reveals the reason for Slovakia’s restrictive measures against the Ruthenians. In the Slovak environment, Hungary’s historical experience with the assimilation of the Slovaks still resonated, and it looked from the Slovak side as an attempt to create a similar threatening image of the Greek-Catholic clergy, which was still largely oriented towards Hungary.

In general, the Ruthenian issue naturally became quite relevant both for Subcarpathian Rus’ and for Slovakia, and especially for its eastern part (Švorc, 1996). If in Subcarpathian Rus’ Ruthenians made up the majority and naturally had opportunities for the national development, then on the territory of Slovakia they lived in the northeastern regions and were subjected to total Slovakization.

The impetus for the activation of the Ruthenians in Eastern Slovakia was the population census in the Czechoslovak Republic in 1930. The Slovak authorities were taken aback that the Ruthenians showed resistance to its intention to register them as the Slovaks. For this purpose, the Ruthenians took part in a corresponding action, which was aimed at raising the level of Ruthenian national consciousness among villagers and fight for the defense of their own national identity. The front of the struggle for the national Ruthenian identity was led by the local intelligentsia, represented in the majority of cases by the local Greek-Catholic priests and partly by teachers and government officials. In this situation, the local Slovak authorities began to observe the Ruthenian national movement actively.

Since 1930, the Slovak authorities had taken an active interest in the Ruthenian issue. On August 19, 1930, the Presidium of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic considered the Ruthenian issue in Slovakia at its meeting secretly. As a result, the police commissariat in Prešov prepared a 33-page document on this issue (The Archive of the Office of the President of the Czech Republic, *Předsednictvo ministerské rady, 1918 – 1945*, in.č. 294, k.150). The authors of the document believed that “The Ruthenians were nomadic pastoral people, who moved with their herd from place to place and never lived a state life”. Furthermore, “there are written sources that the Ruthenians reached the former Šariš župa and Eastern Slovakia, in general, only in the first half of the 14th century” (AOPCR, *Předsednictvo ministerské rady, 1918 – 1945*, in.č. 294, k.150).

At the same time, the authors of the document analysed political processes within the Ruthenian community of Eastern Slovakia. According to them, “the Ruthenian people are divided into various opposing directions, which are fighting furiously among themselves and are not ashamed of any means. The attack “above all reached the hearts of the Ruthenian people”. The leaders of the hostile directions have awakened their slumbering consciousness and are getting away with it by placing the blame on the opposite camp. They indicated that Subcarpathian Rus’ had “an unusual influence on the political processes of Eastern Slovakia” (AOPCR, *Předsednictvo ministerské rady, 1918 – 1945*, in.č. 294, k. 150).

During the first half of the 1930s the Slovak authorities monitored the Ruthenian national movement closely and tried to find “recipes” for resolving the Ruthenian issue. Thus, on February 9 of 1934, the country’s government in Bratislava issued an order to conduct questionnaires regarding the Ruthenian issue in Slovakia. The reason for this was the introduction of the Ruthenian language at the Slovak schools in Eastern Slovakia. As an argument, the example of a priest from Telgart was given, who “beat up 10 children because they did not know the decathedral sermon in Ruthenian, but only in Slovak” (Slovak National

Archives, Krajiný úrad v Bratislave (1920, 1928 – 1939), k. 90, p. 26).

In its order, the Slovak administration indicated that “recently, there has been a growing agitation for the replacement of the teaching language in all Slovak schools in Eastern Slovakia in communities, whose residents are of the Greek Catholic faith. That agitation and the harmful consequences for Slovakia and the republic derived from it must be countered” (SNA, Krajiný úrad v Bratislave (1920, 1928 – 1939), k. 90, p. 26).

The Slovak authorities of the first half of the 1930s reported on the strengthening of the Ruthenian movement repeatedly. Thus, they argued that the most effective Ruthenian propaganda is carried out by the Ruthenian or the Ukrainian emigrants: “the priest in Hodemarek is a Ukrainian by birth, the priest Špilka, the priest Jankievych, the priest Kreiter is a Ukrainian by birth” (SNA, Krajiný úrad v Bratislave (1920, 1928 – 1939), k. 90, p. 26).

On May 30, 1934 and on June 12 of the same year, the Minister for the Interior addressed the police leadership in Košice and Prešov, as well as the district commanders in Bardejov (Bardejov), Giraltovtsi (Giraltovce), Humenné, Stará Ľubovňa, Mezhylobortsy (Medzilaborce), Mikhalivtsi (Michalovce), Preshiv (Prešov), Sabinov, Snina, Stropkov, Spišská Stará Ves and Vranov regarding the national propaganda, “moving towards the national awareness and the known movement “Lemkivshchyna”. The leader of this movement was D. Vyslotskyi, who was the editor of the newspaper “The Ruthenian Voice” in Prešov in 1919 – 1921. According to the Slovaks, it was he who “organized the Lemkos in communities and towns from the so-called Lemkivshchyna, also lying on the Polish side, on the Czechoslovak side in Eastern Slovakia and partly in Subcarpathian Rus” (SNA, KÚ, k. 33, p. 1).

“Vyslotskyi ceased to be a Russophile and became an outspoken separatist, who seeks for the independence of the “Lemko” people, does not recognize the state borders and declares the need for complete independence for his population. He “is not drawn to Russia, nor to Ukraine, and conversely, neither to Poland nor to Czechoslovakia” (SNA, KÚ, k. 33, p. 3). The Minister noted that “the Poles are following that movement with interest” (SNA, KÚ, k. 33, p. 3).

On July 31 of 1934, on the “Lemko case” the Slovak administration in Bratislava provided the Minister for the Interior in Prague with a corresponding report. It ran about the characteristics of Vyslotskyi and his inspiration. In particular, he believed that “all Ruthenians, without regard to linguistic dialects, should unite and create one great Rus’ against the united Germans, so that they could preserve all the other Slavic states in the west that could not join Russia”. At the same time, “all the Ruthenians there should supposedly use one literary language and the language of Pushkin, Lermontov and other glorious Russian writers” (SNA, KÚ, k. 33, p. 9–10).

According to the Slovak authorities, “the Lemkos are residents of the Ruthenian nationality in Poland in the political counties: Nowy Sącz, Grzybów, Jasło, Krosno and Sanok in the amount of 400 thousand people”. “Before the coup, the residents of the Ruthenian nationality in Uzhhorod, who call themselves “Rusnaky”, were also called Lemkos. They also noted that the ethnonym “Lemko” comes from the word “only” (“len”), instead of which the word “lem” is used (SNA, KÚ, k. 33, p. 10).

According to them, “the Lemko people differ from other Ruthenians, the so-called the Ukrainians, in their pronunciation is pure “Old Ruthenian”; they are the Ruthenians in body and soul. They are called “solid Rusniaky” in contrast to other Ruthenians, who had already partially been subjected to the so-called Ukrainian movement”. At the same time, in Poland, “the Lemkivsky movement... supposedly has a number of supporters among the

young intelligentsia, who is more aggressive as the older generation to which Dr. Sobin, Dr. Hahatko and the others belong, who settled in Subcarpathian Rus” (SNA, KÚ, k. 33, p. 10). Analyzing the situation in the northern Lemko region, the Slovak authorities stated that “the authorities support the Lemkivsky movement, so that the limit of the Ukrainian expansion to the west would be drawn” (SNA, KÚ, k. 33, p. 10).

The Slovaks rejected the activation of the Ruthenian political life in the mid-1930s very negatively. The supporters of the Ruthenian political life were contemptuously called the “autonomist chauvinists” trying to awaken the Ruthenian consciousness (SNA, KÚ, k. 185, pp. 227–228). The newspaper “Slovák” ran that the Ruthenians in Eastern Slovakia were awakening. There is time for the Slovaks to treat the Ruthenian issue with the same attitude and not allow various Fentsikovtsy and Zhydovskovtsy to incite our fellow Ruthenian citizens in Slovakia – against the Slovaks” (Agrárnici, 1935, p. 134).

The local administrations were headed by people, who were from the nationalist minded circles of the Slovak political elite in Eastern Slovakia, so naturally they resorted to various administrative abuses, the purpose of which was to “promote” the Slovakization of the Ruthenian population of the region in various ways. It should be noted that the representatives of the official authorities interacted with the relevant unions and societies closely, which tried to implement their ideas in practice. An example of such interaction was the activity of the Slovak League in resolving the Ruthenian issue. It should be noted that the impetus for this activity of the Slovak League was the demands of Ruthenians to replace the Slovak language at some Eastern Slovak schools with the Ruthenian and at the same time ensure that it was taught by the Ruthenian teachers.

The Slovak League was founded on the initiative of I. Gessay on October 22 of 1920 in Bratislava. It was the successor to the Slovak League in the USA, established back in Cleveland in 1907. The goal of the Slovak League was to support the Slovak people mentally, socially and financially; work towards the complete cleansing of Slovakia from everything that interferes with the national development of Slovakia and the Czechoslovak Republic as a whole; expanding knowledge of the Slovak language as the state language on the foreign ethnic territory of Slovakia and strengthening the Slovak spirit not only among the Slovaks, but also among the foreign speaking population in Slovakia (Koval', 2007, p. 80; Letz, 2000; Witt, 2015).

The Slovak League focused on the national, cultural, educational and economic issues (SNA, SL, k. 1). On a practical level, the goals of the Slovak League were to take care of cultural as well as material needs of the Slovaks, especially where they lived together with the national minorities, often in terms of numbers as a minority, and, hence, to counteract their denationalization. Therefore, the Slovak League sought to provide assistance to the Greek-Catholic Slovaks, who lived in the territory of northeastern Slovakia (Koval', 2007, p. 80). The Slovak League also dealt with the issues of the Germans in Spiš, the Hungarians in the southern territories. There were the following issues on which the main focus was: schooling and the establishment of the Slovak schools in mixed ethnic areas (SNA, SL, k. 1).

Each candidate had to record that “I certify that I am familiar with the Charter of the Slovak League in Slovakia and that I agree with its actions and ideas” in order to obtain membership in the League (SNA, SL, k. 1).

At the same time, the activities of the Slovak League were not properly organized in the territory of Eastern Slovakia at the beginning of the 1930s. On May 12, 1931, the propaganda department of the League noted that the majority of local cells were small in number, partly

inactive, and evaded paying membership fees. In particular, the cell in Stropkov numbered 63 members, dues were paid only by the end of 1929, and did not provide reports on its activities. In Bardejov the number of members was 58 people; since the end of 1927 membership fees were not paid, the activities of the cell were limited. In Snina, the circle of the organization included 33 people; the dues had not paid since 1928; it is characterized by “careless leadership, very poor work”.

There were 35 and 28 members in Sabinov and Lipany respectively, the dues were not paid for two years, and they were characterized by limited activity. The cell in Humenné stood out among them, there were 88 people, working very well, belonging to the best departments (SNA, SL, k. 1).

In fact, eastern Slovakia was characterized by the unresolved territorial delineation of the Ruthenian-Slovak ethnic division, the growth and politicization of the Ruthenian movement in the electoral, educational, and religious spheres at the beginning of the 1930s.

That is why, the Slovak League facilitated its activities in ethnically mixed territories, one of which was Eastern Slovakia in the 1930s. On June 8, 1931, at the meeting in Bratislava, the issue on “focusing on the eastern territories” arose (SNA, SL, k. 71). Moreover, during the period of 1935 – 1938, the Slovak League tried to resolve the Ruthenian issue at its meetings actively.

It should be noted that the Ruthenian issue was raised by the Slovak League at the Congress in Lučenec. However, due to lack of information, it was postponed until the next Congress. There was the strong opposition regarding the revision of the borders with Subcarpathian Rus’ by the Slovak League (*K rusínskej otázke*, 1934, p. 11).

One of the important factors in the resistance to the “threat in the Slovak east” and the Greek-Catholic inspirations regarding “who is a Greek-Catholic is a Ruthenian” was the religious assimilation. In 1935, the idea of creating a separate Greek-Catholic bishopric and naming a bishop for the Slovaks with the liturgical Slovak language was announced (SNA, KÚ, k. 297, p. 157). As a result, the translation of liturgical books from Ruthenian to Slovak started, which had to be “tried to be published and tested”, and in the plan of the national distribution it was planned that “the Slovak and mixed parishes will be included in one, mainly the Slovak diocese” (SNA, KÚ, k. 297, pp. 136–137).

For the first time, the Ruthenian issue as the subject of a professional discussion was raised at Congress X of the Slovak League, which was held on June 8–10, 1934 in Spišská Nova Ves. The main report was made by the Secretary of the League, J. Ruman. He analysed the statistical data, linguistic and religious situation in detail. The politician believed that the reason for the politicization of the Ruthenians was the politicization of the Slovak internal political life and, accordingly, the preparation for the parliamentary elections of 1935. As regional secretary of the Slovak League in Kosice, J. Ruman wrote that “it would be very naive if we did not want to admit, that the Ruthenian issue has reached such large and dangerous proportions due to our own fault”. He considered the reason for this “in the politicisation of our public life” (Ruman, 1935, p. 37). In his opinion, the “Ruthenian issue” “is one of the most pressing issues not only of the east, but of Slovakia as a whole” (SNA, SL, k. 71). He stated that “Russophile harassment” is quite widespread in Eastern Slovakia (SNA, SL, k. 71). J. Ruman also offered his own recipe for solving the Ruthenian issue.

At Congress of 1934, the issue of the danger of “the Ruthenian propaganda in Eastern Slovakia, which has spread greatly not only among the Ruthenians, but also among the Slovak Greek-Catholics hatred of the Slovaks and at the same time creates Magyar

irredentism, threatens the integration of our Slovakia, was lively discussed". There was also talk on "dangerous agitation for the porysinnia (to become a Ruthenian) of Eastern Slovakia". The participants stated that "the Ruthenian propaganda does not affect only the cultural rapprochement of East Slovak and Subcarpathian the Ruthenians, but on the contrary, in the spirit of the slogan "from Poprad to the Tysa", it speaks of the union of Eastern Slovakia with Subcarpathian Rus' into one large autonomous political entity" (SNA, SL, k. 71).

The issues dedicated to the territorial definition were raised. The CRNR and RNR "demand the annexation of 16 eastern Slovak environs...Sobrance, Veľký Kapušany, Kráľovský Chlmec, Michalovce, Trebišov, Vranov, Humenné, Medzilaborce, Snina, Giraltovce, Prešov, Bardejov, Sabinov, Stará Ľubovňa, Spišská Stará Ves" (SNA, SL, k. 71).

The Congress members noted that "the tendency of the Ruthenian movement is undoubtedly political instead of the Slavic solidarity and cultural Slovak-Ruthenian rapprochement, mutual hatred and corresponding national frictions have been created" (SNA, SL, k. 71). Therefore, "the history of all those issues was one and the same; the population was told that if the school is not Ruthenian, their children will not know how to pray from Ruthenian books, which will lose their Ruthenian faith. Therefore, they signed only out of fear that his Slovak school would eventually convert him to their faith". The reason for this was that "the Ruthenian issue has acquired such large and growing dimensions through our fault, the great fault of our Czechoslovak political parties".

One of the participants of the Congress, Grnčar from Prešov, noted that "the campaign that started in the east is already progressing further, closer to us... The population today is so determined that the answer to any question is "I am a Ruthenian" (SNA, SL, k. 71).

It should be noted that in the field of political preferences of the Ruthenians of Eastern Slovakia, serious changes occurred in the mid-1930s. They began to participate in the electoral processes actively. Thus, Bardiyivskiyi Chief claimed that Fentsyk "gained many admirers in this district" (SNA, KÚ, k. 237, p. 25).

On February 21, 1935, another meeting of the members of the Slovak League was held in Bratislava, at which the Ruthenian issue was resolved. The members of the League agreed that "the language issue should be depoliticized, and that's because not such a large number of voters would be of particular importance to individual Czechoslovak political parties". At the same time, the delegates stated that "people, who define themselves as the Ruthenians do not have the national consciousness until now and that the problem of 90 000 Ruthenians in Slovakia could be gradually eliminated in a short time with silent cultural work and economic promotion" (SNA, KÚ, k. 90, p. 26).

The Slovak politicians launched an action against the thesis that "whatever is a Greek-Catholic is a Ruthenian" in opposition to the Ruthenian Greek-Catholic clergy and a significant reduction of its role in Eastern Slovakia. On a practical level, they suggested establishing a separate Greek-Catholic bishopric for the Slovaks in Michalovce.

On July 19, 1935, the Ukrainian government in Bratislava sent an order to the district Chiefs of Eastern Slovakia to identify Russification activities on the part of the Greek Catholic clergy (SNA, KÚ, k. 297, pp. 86–87). In turn, on June 1, 1935, Sabinov Chief reported on the relationship between people "who is a Ruthenian, then a Bolshevik is", as well as the increase in the number of votes for the Communist Party at the parliamentary elections (SNA, KÚ, k. 297, p. 98).

As a result, a corresponding programme of denationalization of the Ruthenians was

developed. It was offered that the Greek Catholic Diocese in Slovakia in Prešov “pass into the Slovak hands” as a practical measure to speed up this process. Also, among the steps to paralyze the Ruthenians, it was necessary to prevent “the Ruthenian propaganda” by the people from the Greek-Catholic Teachers’ Institute in Prešov and from some folk Greek-Catholic schools. It was also suggested publishing religious and other school books for the Greek-Catholic Slovaks and the Greek-Catholic schools and “finally to bring the Ruthenians living in Slovakia closer to the Czechoslovak culture by the fact that a language close to the Czechoslovak language was introduced in the Ruthenian folk schools in Slovakia” (SNA, KÚ, k. 90, p. 26).

In this regard, the Ruthenians put forward the “Memorandum of the Ruthenian population of Prešov Ruthenian oblast”, which included 16 points of demand on August 17, 1936. Among them, the main demand was to join the autonomous Subcarpathian movement “the 250 000 Ruthenian population is degraded to the minority of the Ruthenian region of the former Zemplynskyyi, Abauyskyi, Sharyshskyyi, Spishskyyi poviats” because “the Ruthenian population of Prešov Rus is exposed to all kinds of the national oppression, denationalization, constant attacks against the Ruthenian cultural institutions and economic wrongs”. It was required to be carried out through a “plebiscite under the supervision of disinterested controllers”, “so that the authorities would grant us our rights”. The Memorandum also talked about the existence of the Ruthenian institutions, the introduction of the Ruthenian teaching language at national schools and the appointment of the Ruthenian teachers there, the creation of the Ruthenian bourgeois schools in the districts of Sobrance, V. Svidník, Bardejov, Sabinov, Giraltovce, St. Lubovňa, Spišská St. Ves, Trebišov, Vranov, Humenné, Michalovce, Prešov; the appointment of the Ruthenian school inspectors for all Ruthenian districts, the approval of the Ruthenian books for teaching “in the language of Duchnovič”, the teaching of the Ruthenian alphabet and the Ruthenian Catechism in all communities where worship was held in the Old Slavic language, the allocation of subsidies to libraries in Ruthenian communities, the publication of laws in Ruthenian language, establishment of the Ruthenian seals, inscriptions in all government structures located in the Ruthenian communities, state support for the Ruthenian gymnasium in Prešov, the Ruthenian text on tickets, admission of the Ruthenian to government, appointment of a Ruthenian referent and a school referent for the Ruthenian schools, as well as a Ruthenian referent for church affairs, the introduction of the Ruthenian officials into the exposition of the country’s government. The authors of the Memorandum opposed the replacement of the Greek Catholic Bishop in Prešov and the Ruthenian schools (SNA, KÚ, k. 237, p. 2).

The Slovak authorities began to study the “unhealthy situation in the Greek Catholic Church” (SNA, KÚ, k. 297, pp. 197–201). In August of 1936, the district Chief from St. Lubovňa reported on the growth of the political activity on the part of the Greek-Catholic priests of Jakubany, Šambron, and Krompachy, who conduct “their Ruthenian politics” among the population. They tried to show their civil position and in practice supported the Fentsikivtsi. Thus, on October 28, 1935, during the celebration of the national holiday in Jakubany, a local priest “left the church provocatively at the time when the teachers began to sing the national anthem” (SNA, KÚ, k. 297, pp. 175, 189). In Giraltovce, priests “stop speaking Hungarian in public” (SNA, KÚ, k. 297, p. 177). In reports, the Slovak officials stated that in the majority of districts the Greek Catholic fathers support the Autonomous Agricultural Union politically (SNA, KÚ, k. 297, p. 199). At the parishes in Sobrance, Michalovce, Trebišov and Snina districts, which belonged to Uzhhorod Diocese, Uzhhorod

Bishop did not appoint priests from Slovakia (SNA, KÚ, k. 297, pp. 199–200).

At the same time, in solving the Ruthenian issue, the Slovak authorities resorted to persecuting the Greek Catholic priests. Thus, a case was opened against the priest Dudinskyi from Hodemark of Kežmarok district regarding the “Ruthenization of his Slovak believers” on October 22, 1936 (SNA, KÚ, k. 237, p. 2). On April 20, 1937, in Olšavica of Levoča district, a local district Chief noted that “the church is the Greek-Catholic with a Ruthenian service” (SNA, KÚ, k. 237, p. 2).

The activity of the local Slovak authorities, representatives of the Slovak League, and as a result the accelerated Slovakization led to a decrease in the area of use of the Ruthenian language, especially on the Slovak-Ukrainian ethnic border. Thus, on June 22, 1937, Giraltovce district government official reported that in Benediktovce “the majority speak the Ruthenian dialect”, but the school in this village was the Slovak one. The same situation was observed in Rusky Kručov and Ruska Voľa. At the same time, the Slovak and the Ruthenian languages were partly used in Soboš, Šapinec, Štiavnik, Štefurov, although, as the official noted, the Slovak is used “in life”. At that time, the local population in Ďurd’oš, Fijaš, Chmeľov, Kobylnice, Kožany spoke Slovak (SNA, KÚ, k. 237, p. 2).

On August 23, 1937, Sabinov district Chief singled out 12 settlements with the Ruthenian majority (Bajerovce, Čirč, Hanigovce, Jakubany, Jastrabie, Kyjov, Ľutina, Olejníkov, Orlov, Renčišov, Újak, Vislanka). At the same time, he noted that in Ľutina, Olejníkov and Vyslanka, “a strong campaign is being conducted for the introduction of the Ruthenian teaching language” (SNA, KÚ, k. 237, p. 2).

On October 7, 1937, the district Chief in Michalovce noted that the campaign aims “to have the border of Subcarpathian Rus end as far as Poprad” and “to have all Slovaks of the Greek-Catholic faith declare themselves as the Ruthenian nationals” (SNA, KÚ, k. 237, p. 2).

On April 29, 1937, another meeting of the Slovak League was held in Bratislava regarding the Ruthenian issue and the situation of the Ruthenians in Slovakia. It was decided to demand the adoption of Constitutional Law on defining the borders of the Slovak and Subcarpathian lands, the creation of the Slovak Greek-Catholic bishopric, the construction of the Slovak public schools on the Ruthenian-Slovak border, as well as to develop a programme of economic, social and cultural work, to emphasize the need for reliable national public representation in the Eastern Slovak language, as well as requirements for political parties and magazines so that they did not excessively force the language requirements of the Ruthenian minority, publishers of the Slovak Greek-Catholic magazines, a detailed linguistic study of Eastern Slovakia and to focus on the importance of the future census (SNA, KÚ, k. 297, pp. 18–20).

The events were held to honour famous Slovaks on the initiative of the Slovak League. One of them was the action of the Council of Young Slovaks in Eastern Slovakia and Zemplín, Šariš and Košice Academic Unions on February 25, 1938 regarding the installation of monuments to famous Slovak figures in Košice, Michalovce, Prešov and Trebišov to the 20th anniversary of the creation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (AOPCR, in. č. 691, D 4296, k. 57).

The Conclusions. Thus, in connection with the intensification of the socio-political life of the Ruthenians in Eastern Slovakia and their defense of their own national rights, the Slovak authorities, fearing irredentist tendencies in the east, resorted to active observation of the Ruthenian issue with its subsequent resolution. In this context, the Slovak League took practical steps in solving it. Actually, in 1934 – 1938, the Ruthenian issue became the subject

of consideration at its Congresses and meetings. The actual development of recipes for solving the Ruthenian issue by the Slovak League led to the implementation of its ideas by the Slovak authorities, namely the strengthening of the total Slovakization of the educational network, banning of the Ruthenian associations and unions, persecution of Ruthenian figures and even the Slovakization of a religious sphere. Another fact is that the Slovak defensive reflex was not adequate and in fact caused damage to the Ruthenian community in Eastern Slovakia, and therefore on the Slovak-Ruthenian relations. In fact, the Slovak League also played an important role. This issue has a significant potential for a new perspective on the Slovak-Ruthenian relations in north-eastern Slovakia.

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**KHRUSHCHEV'S "DE-STALINIZATION"
IN ROBERT CONQUEST'S INTERPRETATION**

Abstract. *The purpose of the article is to clarify the scientific and historical interpretation of M. Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" by the American scholar Robert Conquest. The methodology is based on an interdisciplinary combination of historical and historiographical approaches. Chronological, comparative historical, linguistic textological analysis of social events and phenomena are core components. The scientific novelty is caused by the lack of articles and monographs on the historiographical contribution of R. Conquest to the coverage of the so-called "Khrushchev thaw". For the first time, the terminology that the scholar used to reveal the political and ideological components of the process of "de-Stalinization" during the years of "Khrushchev's rule" was elucidated. His author's interpretation of concepts and phenomena appears, the difference between them in the context of the era itself. The Conclusions. R. Conquest does not idealize the historical figure of M. Khrushchev and his political activity, it emphasizes his "uncompromising extremism" in the implementation of the USSR foreign policy doctrine. R. Conquest believed that Khrushchev's "anti-Stalinism" had political gains in the struggle for one-man leadership. Criticism of Stalin's "personality cult", the*

beginning of rehabilitation, recognition of the fact of mass terror – had a positive impact on the society. The concepts and phenomena of "thaw" and relative "liberalization" made sense when compared to the terrible consequences of Stalin's political terror. The scholar notes that the "young Stalinist" Khrushchev debunked the "cult of personality", but avoided reforming the authoritarian political system. In 1953 – 1963, the political struggle for power in the Kremlin continued, and the tactics chosen by M. Khrushchev proved to be the most effective. He chose moderate criticism of Stalinism as the main factor in overcoming the resistance of fanatical Stalinists. Rehabilitation freed political prisoners from the camps, and also deterred direct participants in the repressions from attacks. Under such circumstances, it was "illogical and partial", and "liberalization" turned out to be managed and controlled by M. Khrushchev.

Key words: Khrushchev, Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization", rehabilitation, Stalinism, repression, R. Conquest, mass terror, Holodomor.

ХРУЩОВСЬКА "ДЕСТАЛІНІЗАЦІЯ" В ІНТЕРПРЕТАЦІЇ РОБЕРТА КОНКВЕСТА

Анотація. Мета статті полягає у з'ясуванні науково-історичної інтерпретації хрущовської "десталінізації" американським ученим Робертом Конквестом. **Методологія** опирається на міждисциплінарне поєднання історичного й історіографічного підходів. Ключовими є хронологічний, порівняльно-історичний, лінгвістично-текстологічний аналіз суспільних подій і явищ. **Наукова новизна** зумовлена відсутністю статей і монографій про історіографічний внесок Конквеста у висвітлення так званої "хрущовської відлиги". Уперше виявлено термінологію, яку учений використовував для розкриття політично-ідеологічних складових процесу "десталінізації" у час "правління Хрущова". Постає його авторська інтерпретація понять і явищ, відмінність між ними закладена в контексті самої епохи.

Висновки. Конквест не ідеалізує історичну постать Хрущова і його політичну діяльність, підкреслює його "безкомпромісний екстремізм" у реалізації зовнішньополітичної доктрини СРСР. На переконання Конквеста, "антисталінізм" Хрущова мав політичні здобутки у боротьбі за одноосібне лідерство. Критика "культу особи" Сталіна, початок реабілітації, визнання факту масового терору – позитивно впливали на суспільство. Поняття і явища "відлиги" та відносно "лібералізації" мали сенс у порівнянні з жахливими наслідками сталінського політичного терору. Учений зазначає, що "молодий сталінець" Хрущов розвінчував "культ особи", але уникав реформування політичної системи авторитарного типу. У 1953 – 1963 рр. тривала політична боротьба за владу у Кремлі, а обрана Хрущовим тактика виявилася найефективнішою. Він обрав помірковану критику сталінізму головним фактором подолання опору фанатичних сталіністів. Реабілітація звільняла з таборів політичних в'язнів, а також стримувала від нападків безпосередніх учасників репресій. За таких обставин вона була "нелогічною і частковою", а "лібералізація" виявилася керованою і контрольованою самим Хрущовим.

Ключові слова: Хрущов, хрущовська "десталінізація", реабілітація, сталінізм, репресії, Конквест, масовий терор, Голодомор.

The Problem Statement. The concept of "de-Stalinization" was used by Robert Conquest in the monograph "The Great Terror" (1968), and the historical figure of M. S. Khrushchev is mentioned by scholars dozens of times. R. Conquest, a historian, political scholar and professional American sovietologist used the terminology that was formulated by him personally, or borrowed from other sources: "Stalin era", "stalinist Khrushchev", "Khrushchev era", "stalinism", "liberalization", "anti-Stalinism", "rehabilitation", "young stalinist", "essence of stalinism". His evaluative judgments, which related to the general context and M. Khrushchev personally, took their intellectual place in historiography, and proved the theoretical and methodological concept of the researcher of the Soviet political system.

The Review of Sources and Recent Publications. The issue under analysis has not been covered in historical literature widely. Exceptions are several articles that have been published recently. Thus, in particular, the issues of historiographical legacy of Robert Conquest were considered in the studies by Serhii Borzov (Borzov, 2022; Borzov, 2024), and by Oleh Melnychuk, Olha Koliastruk and Pavlo Kravchenko (Melnychuk, Koliastruk & Kravchenko, 2024). Among the recent studies on the era of Mykyta (Nikita) Khrushchev, the following ones should be named: the studies by Oleh Melnychuk and Anna Dolynna (Melnychuk & Dolynna, 2023); Viktor Dokashenko and Viktoriya Kontsur (Dokashenko & Kontsur, 2022); Viacheslav Olitskyi (Olitskyi, 2022); Nadia Kindrachuk and Volodymyr Vasylchuk (Kindrachuk & Vasylchuk, 2022). Some epistemological aspects of Ukrainian historiography in the Soviet era are revealed in the work of Mykola Haliv and Vasyl Ilnytskyi (Haliv & Ilnytskyi, 2023).

The purpose of the research is to clarify the scientific and historical interpretation of M. Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" by the American scholar Robert Conquest.

The Research Results. Scientific historical interpretations of the events and phenomena of the "Stalin era" and "Khrushchev's rule" testify to the scholar's factual priorities. R. Conquest does not demonize Stalin or idealize the period of the so-called "Khrushchev thaw". The verbal and semantic mosaic that R. Conquest resorted to had a cold undertone of academic analysis during the Cold War. Each of the terms he used was adapted to specific political processes historically, accepted and assimilated personally. The terrorist essence of Stalinism and aggressive foreign policy of the Kremlin became a worldview challenge to R. Conquest, because in the 1930s he was fascinated by communist ideas, he visited the USSR even at the height of political terror, i.e. in 1937. The course of World War II, in which he was an active participant, changed his views and spiritual values radically.

The former allies of the anti-Hitler coalition plunged into the vortex of the Cold War. In 1948, R. Conquest worked in the information and propaganda department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the UK. The UK's intellectual circles evaluated the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, the essence of the ruling regime, in different ways. A writer George Orwell turned out to be a ruthless critic of Stalin, who in August of 1945 published the allegorical novel "Collective Animal Farm". In the preface to the Ukrainian edition of 1947, he showed his own way of rethinking socialist theory and practice, because "nothing contributed to distortion of true ideas of socialism as much as conviction that Russia is a socialist country" (Orvell, 2022, p. 10). At that time a famous writer devoted his work to "debunking the Soviet myth", and G. Orwell's journalistic articles were published in the pages of the newspaper "The Tribune", the printed organ of the Labour Party. It should be noted that Etnney government was formed by the Labour Party, and R. Conquest worked in the information and analytical department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the time. His assistant Celia Kirwan turned to G. Orwell for information about active supporters of the USSR in England. Thus, there was an indirect influence of G. Orwell on the professional activities of R. Conquest, a sovietologist. G. Orwell demanded from him analytical abilities, a refined artistic and figurative style in the ideological confrontation of the two political systems.

In 1953, i.e. the year of the dictator Stalin's death, R. Conquest was engaged in poetic and literary work (Conquest, 1953). His interest in the works of the banned B. Pasternak was determined not only by his artistic tastes, but also by the scientific historical and political priorities of the British sovietologist. The novel "Doctor Zhyvaho" was banned by political

ensorship during the years of “Khrushchev’s rule”, the author was dismissed from the Union of Writers of the USSR, the writer was forced to refuse the Nobel Prize (1958) (Herasyмова, 2011). In 1961, when the so-called Caribbean crisis arose, which proved Khrushchev’s fanatical devotion to the aggressive foreign policy doctrine of the USSR, R. Conquest published a documentary collection about B. Pasternak (Conquest, 1961). Therefore, R. Conquest’s intellectual discourse regarding the “Khrushchev era” is not an accident, but a completely logical and natural choice of scientific priorities. The study of F. Dostoyevsky’s work can be explained by the suggestion of Western literary fashion, and the interest in O. Solzhenitsyn’s work corresponded to the worldview preferences of a Western intellectual and a purely professional interest.

R. Conquest’s scientific legacy is mainly associated with his world bestsellers – the monographs “Great Terror” (1968) and “Harvest of Sorrow” (1986) (Conquest, 1968; Conquest, 1986). The rest of the works of the Anglo-American scholar, which related to the interaction of power and politics, the Soviet nomenclature dynasty (Conquest, 1961), features of the Khrushchev era, were overlooked by researchers. They were published in the first half of the 60s, i.e. before the appearance of the book “The Great Terror”, which brought its author historiographical recognition. The monograph “Russia under Khrushchev” reveals the totalitarian essence of the Soviet political system, the follower and heir of which was M. Khrushchev (Conquest, 1965). At the beginning of the 1960s, when M. Khrushchev was still in power, R. Conquest worked as a literary editor of “The Spectator” magazine, skillfully combining journalistic activities with scientific and historical studies.

M. Khrushchev’s “thaw”, even despite the debunking of Stalin’s “personality cult”, did not melt the ice of the Cold War. Spiritual liberalization of a cultural life, selective rehabilitation and condemnation of Stalinist repressions in the 1930s diverted attention from the authoritarian style of government during the “Khrushchev era”. A new ruler adhered to the traditionally tough course of the USSR’s foreign policy, which ignored the norms of international law (the “Nazi-Soviet Pact” of 1939 and the seizure of Poland, the aggression against Finland in the autumn of 1939, the occupation of the Baltic states in 1940, the invasion of Hungary in 1956). The list of these actions appeared in R. Conquest’s article in 1968 (Conquest, 1968, pp. 733–742), i.e. a few months before the events in Czechoslovakia. During the Caribbean crisis, according to R. Conquest, the “uncompromising extremism” of M. Khrushchev and his nomenclature entourage was revealed.

Western analysts focused on theoretical, ideological and nomenclature aspects of the Soviet political system functioning. R. Conquest, although he belonged to the founders of the totalitarianism theory, focused on historical discourse mainly. He was interested in the issue of a dynastic inheritance of the party nomenclature, starting from its founder Lenin and his “faithful disciple” Stalin. Taking into account the content and number of published author’s books, one can fully agree with L. Samuelson’s opinion about R. Conquest, the “pioneer”, among sovietologists of the Cold War period (Samuelson, 2009). R. Conquest’s scientific style was characterized by consistency and systematic analysis of the Soviet political system. The scholar “split” it into structural and functional atoms, considered events and phenomena critically.

Systematicity, as a conceptual and theoretical tool, was used by R. Conquest to reveal a complex phenomenon – M. Khrushchev’s “de-Stalinization” policy. Its complexity is due to the presence of a humanitarian factor, i.e. public reception of rehabilitation, condemnation of Stalin’s “personality cult” and sprouts of artistic creativity. The definition “Khrushchev’s

“de-Stalinization” used by us constitutes a single linguistic historical whole. No one will deny M. Khrushchev’s personal involvement in the so-called debunking of Stalin’s criminal acts. During his lifetime and for several years, no one dared to criticize the deceased leader. M. Khrushchev was the first one. At the 20th party congress, in March-July of 1953, He was courageous to defeat L. Beria. There was a long struggle between them for power, and not for the establishment of principles of social justice and overcoming the system of authoritarianism. In 1957 elimination of a personal influence of V. Molotov, L. Kaganovich, and H. Malenkov, i.e. double stalinists, strengthened M. Khrushchev’s political and nomenclature positions. “De-Stalinization” took place “during the reign of M. Khrushchev”, therefore it was of a completely “Khrushchev” nature (Konkvest, 2009, p. 82). It is connected not only with his name, but also with the political style of government, worldview and ideological beliefs.

According to R. Conquest, the “rule of Khrushchev” is limited to the chronological framework of 1961 – 1964, but in fact the party leadership began with the overthrow of Beria in 1953. At the party congress M. Khrushchev’s speech established a one-man leadership with authoritarian powers that lasted for almost 10 years. At the beginning of the 1960s, a relative liberalization of a spiritual life was observed, which seemed to be a certain marker of “de-Stalinization”. The rehabilitation and condemnation of mass political terror of the 1930s strengthened its humanistic essence, although “there was no complete and consistent explanation of the causes of terror” (Konkvest, 2003). Situational criticism of Stalin, which M. Khrushchev resorted to from time to time, fueled his personal authority and restrained the hot-headed stalinists who were lurking in various positions.

M. Khrushchev’s “de-Stalinization” had several tactical and strategic objectives: to shift all the blame for the repressions to Stalin, to use the exposure of “personality cult” for the internal struggle for power after the death of the leader, to compromise Stalin’s closest circle publicly by covering the circumstances of the terror under the conditions of controlled rehabilitation, to make impossible any involvement of the initiator of the leader’s criticism in the repressions, to calm the society after the exhausting war, mass famine and social depression of the post-war years. R. Conquest expressed his own opinion on each of them. Based on the materials of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M. Khrushchev’s speech at a closed session, and the participants’ memories, the American analyst carefully tracks the sharp accents in the speech of the “young stalinist” regarding the “capricious tyrant”. M. Khrushchev did not consider Stalin a “crazy despot”, he even tried to find signs of a motivated rationalism in his actions “in the name of protecting the gains of the revolution”. In this he saw the tragedy of the situation, the functional apogee of which was terror. R. Conquest denies such an interpretation, since the tragedy had another social dimension – millions of victims. M. Khrushchev sought to show a negative image of Stalin, emphasizing his “morbid suspicion” and “distrust of people”, even anthropological vagueness and worthlessness. He enjoyed Stalin’s personal intervention in the writing of the “Short Biography”, in the formulation of sentences about his own genius (Conquest, 1999, p. 120). Stalin edited the works of the Soviet writers, film scripts of directors, adjusted them to the Bolshevik ideology and mental representation of the leader. The sophisticated “Stalin school of falsifications” was emphasized by L. Trotsky, the unsurpassed Bolshevik orator of the time (Trotskyi, 1989).

In M. Khrushchev’s statements and accents regarding the repressions, Stalin’s personal involvement in them appears. He did not call the former patron a criminal, but cautiously hinted at “a lot of incomprehensible and mysterious” concerning the circumstances of

S. Kirov's death. For the first time, at the party congress, it was announced, albeit secretly. R. Conquest indicates a gradual nature of M. Khrushchev's judgments: in February of 1956, he mentioned the circumstances of S. Kirov's unexpected death, and in 1961, at the 22nd Party Congress, he demanded a public investigation of the assassination attempt. It is no coincidence that on February 7, 1964, the newspaper "Pravda" wrote about a planned and carefully "thought out crime". M. Khrushchev chose a very successful tactic in covering the circumstances of S. Kirov's murder: to maintain a degree of tension, to shift the blame to Stalin. For R. Conquest, who wrote a monograph on the political assassination of S. Kirov (Conquest, 1990), a personal involvement of Stalin did not cause any doubt. Dosing the truth, M. Khrushchev's careful statements regarding the assassination of S. Kirov seemed to be a kind of preventive measure under the conditions of intra-party struggle and dissatisfaction with his rule. M. Khrushchev inherited the forms and methods of political intrigues, and the most importantly the power apparatus of the state security services, but he did not use them in a traditional way of terror against opponents and even conspirators. They were afraid of repression, that is why, Kaganovich appealed to M. Khrushchev not to use Stalin's methods. R. Conquest points at this circumstance, characterizing the peculiarity of "Khrushchev's rule", which suffered from excessive demagoguery and demonstrative determination, but in the fight against collective conspiracy in 1964 he did not use repression against representatives of another political dynasty.

Back in 1968, R. Conquest reached an important scientific conclusion: the "stalinist" Khrushchev seized power through political intrigues and condemnation of Stalin's "cult of personality", but he did not reform the totalitarian system of power, he did not get rid of warlordism. The epithets "stalinist", "a prominent young stalinist" addressed to M. Khrushchev by an American researcher contradicted the self-proclaimed title of "anti-stalinist". The scholar recognizes positive effects of rehabilitation, the release of thousands of political prisoners, but it turned out to be "illogical and partial", "inconsistent and random" (Konkvest, 2009, p. 799). Selective rehabilitation in 1956 – 1967 looked strange: the "shot stalinists" Postyshev, Kosior and the others "received honour", while the party's "favourite" M. Bukharin continued to be considered convicted justly (Konkvest, 2009, p. 788). M. Khrushchev did not deny the use of torture to obtain "confessions", which the victims later refused later. For some reason, the image of unconquered stalinists appears in the political "confessions" of M. Khrushchev. The repressed, who returned, did not condemn Stalin, and Commander Ya. Yakir even shouted before the execution: "Long live Stalin!". Why did M. Khrushchev pay attention to similar phenomena of the tragic fate of the doomed? The initiator of the all-Union amnesty cried for his "friend" S. Ordzhonikidze, who died of a heart attack in 1937 under strange circumstances, but he cursed the "fascist agent". P. Postyshev and the "despicable Trotskyist" H. Piatakov. And the very "Khrushchev version" of Sergo's death surprises with an undisguised cynicism: suicide out of despair. Declaring it, M. Khrushchev, according to R. Conquest's conviction, psychologically put pressure on the former stalinist entourage, kept them in awe. The preservation of loyalty to the leader by the prisoners of Stalin's camps seemed an absurd interpretation, which seeped into M. Khrushchev's speeches. Life in Stalin's camps, is covered by R. Conquest in the book "Kolyma" comprehensively (Conquest, 1978), refutes the "Khrushchev version" about the fanatical devotion of the repressed, although there were exceptions.

The merit of R. Conquest, which demonstrated a critical interpretation of the "Khrushchev era", consists in its systematic assessment. He was the first to draw attention to the "political

dividends” received by M. Khrushchev from “his anti-stalinism”, because he “pushed away many potential competitors from power” (Konkvest, 2009, p. 799). The conclusion is quite original, which combines the skills of an experienced political scholar and a professional historian. The reformer M. Khrushchev, as noted by R. Conquest, carefully monitored the “liberalization” of a spiritual life and public space, especially the preparation for publication of archival documents about the party purges, in which he may have been involved. Stalin punished some people, pardoned the others. M. Khrushchev’s rehabilitation justified the outspoken stalinists who participated in the organization of terror, but left thousands of innocent victims, even dead, in the camps. In October of 1964, when M. Khrushchev’s “fall” took place, to R. Conquest’s deep conviction, the “rehabilitation process” started by him actually stopped, and discussions about “delicate problems of the stalinist past” were also curtailed (Konkvest, 2009, p. 800). The Holodomor should have belonged to them, but M. Khrushchev did not mention it in his report at the 20th Congress.

In the monograph “The Great Terror” M. Khrushchev’s surname is mentioned about seventy times, but never once in the context of the causes, circumstances and consequences of the Holodomor. The mysterious silence of the fact of Stalin’s personal participation in the organization of the mass murder of Ukrainian peasants by artificial starvation, which could really expose his involvement in the genocide of the Ukrainians. The “young stalinist” in the embroidered coat and wide-brimmed hat, in which M. Khrushchev appeared in public, did not dare to take this bold step. In “Harvest of Sorrows”, R. Conquest returned to this problem, emphasizing that “in the time of Khrushchev” they began to mention the “famine” of 1932 – 1933, but not the politician. At the same time, there was an intellectual emancipation of individual writers and historians who tried to look at the tragic past critically. R. Conquest mentioned the Soviet historian V. Danilov, who was the first one to recognize forced collectivization, but was oppressed during the “post-Khrushchev period” (Konkvest, 2007, p. 199). In fact, M. Khrushchev avoided public recognition of the historical fact of the Holodomor, i.e. a strong argument for the real accusation of Stalin. In the 1950s, when Western analysts came to the conclusion about the genocidal component of the Holodomor, M. Khrushchev reflected on the agrotechnical reasons for the decline in grain production, on the fallacy of the “biological” yield method.

In the “Death Register” section, R. Conquest used a quote by M. Khrushchev from his memoirs regarding the number of victims: “No one counted them” (Konkvest, 2007, p. 343). Personally he knew that “people were dying in huge numbers”, but he remained silent at the critical moment of Stalin’s condemnation, because he himself participated in the organization of grain procurement in the 1930s and the 1940s. R. Conquest, as a great humanist, assumed that M. Khrushchev intended to “declassify this issue”, but during the “thaw” the circumstances of the Holodomor had been never “entered into the history books” (Konkvest, 2007, p. 393). It’s a pity, because otherwise History teachers could quote M. Khrushchev’s testimony about “a train at Kyiv station loaded with corpses” of famine victims (Konkvest, 2007, p. 370). M. Khrushchev avoided highlighting the causes of the postwar famine of 1946 – 1947, because he was personally involved in its organization personally, as evidenced by published archival documents (Smolii, 1996). He constantly consulted with Stalin about the methods and volumes of seizure of Ukrainian bread, informed him about the tragic consequences.

The Conclusions. Therefore, it should be noted that the interpretations expressed by R. Conquest (“de-Stalinization”, “stalinist Khrushchev”, “political dividends”) became the property of a new historiographical discourse. There is a contradictory syllogism

between a theoretical concept and a historical fact (event, phenomenon). We do not doubt the origin of the expression "Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization", because M. Khrushchev was its initiator and representative. It corresponded to his ideological beliefs and mental preferences, political thinking and nomenclature reception of stalinism. M. Khrushchev's personal participation in debunking Stalin's "personality cult", R. Conquest believed, helped to strengthen the political positions of the new party leader. He managed to discredit Stalin relatively and temporarily, but not to overcome the phenomenon of the "cult of personality" in the political system of the USSR, which was based on authoritarian leadership. It lasted for 10 years of "Khrushchev's rule", partially limited by the principles of collegiality and intra-party democracy. The announced and selectively implemented rehabilitation of the repressed inhibited the possibility of a new wave of political terror. It did not disappear, but only acquired other forms of implementation. Political censorship, which limited the activities of creative intelligentsia, which felt the breath of the "thaw" did not go anywhere. The dramatic fate of B. Pasternak, who suffered moral, psychological and administrative oppression, is an additional proof of ideological pressure. R. Conquest, who deeply studied the political system of the USSR, knew the totalitarian origin of the communist regime perfectly, was right when he wrote that "in the era of Khrushchev, "de-Stalinization" did not go beyond clear boundaries and was limited to the condemnation of certain manifestations of Stalinism". Stalin was carried out of the mausoleum with due honours, but no further than the Kremlin wall to watch the rest.

Terminologically and chronologically, the "Stalin era" and "Khrushchev's rule" differed, but they were parts of a single structural and functional whole, i.e. the Soviet political system. In fact, the Stalinist institutions of power were preserved, and instead of fanatically loyal stalinists, their trustworthy disciples, mentioned by an American scholar (D. Korotchenko, A. Suslov, L. Brezhnev), appeared. They worked in the party bodies of the 1930s, so they were well trained in the methods of coercion and terror. The essence of Stalinism, to R. Conquest's deep conviction, is not in its external manifestations – the number of victims, but in the functioning of a totalitarian "political system" of a dictatorial type. It consisted in an organic combination of specific institutions: "a totalitarian party is a totalitarian state". The functional twins are inseparable, deeply twisted by the doctrinal foundations of the Bolshevik ideology, which absorbed society at that time. It was Russia, to R. Conquest's deep conviction, that gave "the model of modern totalitarianism". The conclusion, expressed 25 years ago, has not lost its scientific and theoretical relevance and worldview insight of an outstanding Western analyst, who R. Conquest was and remains.

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PRIVATIZATION IN UKRAINE (1991 – 2004): FEATURES AND RESULTS

Abstract. *The purpose of the research is to determine the features and results of privatization in Ukraine during the first decade of independence. The research methodology involves using various tools to achieve the purpose. The use of comparative time (vertical section) research made it possible to identify the peculiarities of privatization at each of its stages. The principle of dynamics contributed to the identification of changes in quantitative and qualitative parameters in the process of privatization during each historical period. The scientific novelty consists in the fact that for the first time in the scientific discourse, the privatization process with its features and results in Ukraine during the decade of independence is defined, taking into account the political component of the corresponding stage of state formation. The Conclusions. During the first period (1992 – 1994) the process of privatization was rather complicated and controversial, which reflected the indecision of the political elite and the president himself to act in the direction of such changes. Although privatization began in 1992, the authorities have not yet decided how massive it should become on a national scale. Therefore, during this period, it was allowed to rent state-owned enterprises and carry out their activities there, primarily*

by the former management and their labour teams. After the change of power in 1994, the new president and his government began to implement mass privatization for the entire people by providing them with certificates (vouchers) actively. During the second term of office, especially during the period of 2000 – 2004, the president facilitated the privatization of large strategic state-owned enterprises by the young bourgeoisie, mainly those that were particularly close to him. In this way, the formation and final crystallization of financial and industrial circles in Ukraine took place, which later exerted a significant influence on political and economic processes in the state.

Keywords: privatization, enterprises, certificates, rent, power.

ПРИВАТИЗАЦІЯ В УКРАЇНІ (1991 – 2004): ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ТА РЕЗУЛЬТАТИ

Анотація. Метою статті є визначення особливостей та результатів проведення приватизації в Україні протягом першого великого періоду незалежності (1991 – 2004). **Методологія** дослідження полягає у використанні різного інструментарію для досягнення мети. Використання компаративного у часі (вертикальний зріз) дослідження уможливило виявити особливості здійснення приватизації на кожному з її етапів. Принцип динаміки сприяв виявленню зміни кількісних та якісних параметрів у процесі приватизації в зазначеному історичному періоді. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що вперше в науковому дискурсі визначено приватизаційний процес з його особливостями і результатами в Україні протягом десятиліття незалежності з урахуванням політичної складової відповідного етапу державотворення. **Висновки.** Процес приватизації у перший період (1992 – 1994) був досить складним і суперечливим, що відображало нерішучість політичної еліти та безпосередньо президента діяти у напрямку таких змін. Приватизація хоч і почалася у 1992 р., проте влада ще остаточно не визначилася, якою масовою вона мала стати на рівні загальнодержавного масштабу. Тому у цей період була дозволена оренда державних підприємств і здійснення там діяльності – передусім колишнім менеджментом та їх трудовими колективами. Після зміни влади у 1994 р. новий президент і його уряд активно почали впроваджувати масову приватизацію для всього народу шляхом надання йому сертифікатів (ваучерів). Під час другої каденції, особливо у період 2000 – 2004 рр., президент сприяв тому, щоб великі стратегічні державні підприємства також були приватизовані молоддю буржуазією, переважно тією, котра була до нього особливо наближеною. У такий спосіб в Україні відбулося формування і остаточно кристалізація фінансово-промислових кіл, які надалі здійснювали значний вплив на політичні й економічні процеси в державі.

Ключові слова: приватизація, підприємства, сертифікати, оренда, влада.

The Problem Statement. Ukraine's declaration of independence in August of 1991 opened a new stage in its nation-building. The country began to build its own institutions of power, and also defined the basic rules of the game, which were enshrined in laws, and later in its Constitution. At the same time, Ukraine had a significant legacy from the previous Soviet regime. Such a legacy was both material and technical base, as well as the entire complex of mental and worldview principles and methods of people's life, which was rooted during the decades of the Soviet occupation.

For a complete understanding of the privatization peculiarities in the 1990s, it is worth making a correction concerning the historical peculiarities of that period. Thus, during the Soviet rule in Ukraine, collective farms were forcibly established in which people worked under the so-called "working days", there were famines (with millions of victims), there was a period of "shot revival" and mass "purges" of 1936 – 1938, in which both creative and entrepreneurial elite of the nation was liquidated. Only during the interwar period, according to various sources, about 10 million Ukrainians and their market and democratic values were destroyed by the occupation authorities and replaced by the communist experiment – the construction of a worker-peasant state with a planned economy in the form of the Soviet

five-year plans. The Ukrainians were not allowed to manage their country, neither in the political nor in economic sense. At the time of the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine controlled only 5 % of its own gross national product (Ukraina, 2007, p. 948). Despite this, as early as 1990, the German Bank provided an assessment of the situation in Ukraine, in which it was noted that the country with its economic and human potential had the best chances for a quick and relatively easy transition to the market and democracy (Hrytsak, 2022, p. 558). After the declaration of independence and final de-occupation from Moscow in August of 1991, Ukraine tried to get on the market rails, which is not possible without private property and free enterprise and their protection by the state. Therefore, the political elite further took a course to build democracy in Ukraine with the transition to a market economy, which began to be based on the denationalization of property in the form of a widespread privatization.

The Review of Recent Research and Publications. The process of privatization in Ukraine has repeatedly been the research focus by domestic researchers. Among them, it is worth highlighting the research co-authored by O. Koshyk, N. Leginkova, and I. Fabryka (Koshyk, 2011), in which the authors considered privatization from the point of view of problems that arose during a certain period of Ukraine's independence, as well as through the ideology of progress in this direction. A thorough study of privatization processes in countries with a transition economy (especially in Ukraine) by O. Havrylyshyn and D. McGettigen (Havrylyshyn, 2000) should also be highlighted. The authors compare the features of privatization processes in a number of post-Soviet countries and other "social camp" countries. From economic factors, N. Nohinova describes the process of privatization in Ukraine, focusing on achievements and omissions (Nohinova, 2014). A. Halchynskiy, economic adviser to President L. Kuchma, presented in his memoirs A. Halchynskiy (Halchynskiy, 2013) as an important testimony of how the process of privatization in Ukraine took place from within the high-ranking government offices. A number of other scholars also studied this direction, but their focus was more on the economic parameters of privatization than political ones. The latter has a certain niche to be filled with scientific developments. The process of privatization in Ukraine can be considered in terms of deindustrialization. The latter found its scientific coverage in the publication A. Zadoya (Zadoya, 2012). The analysis of privatization processes under the conditions of post-Soviet transit is reflected in the joint publication of G. Kramarenko and O. Chorna (Kramarenko, 2013). A scholar A. Palladin (Palladin, 2017) analysed the privatization process in Ukraine using the institutional component and singled out the relevant results for the state. The issue of privatization at the village level was reflected in the publication by S. Padalka (Padalka, 2013). In addition, the scholar S. Padalka (Padalka, 2011) carried out a comprehensive analysis of privatization processes in Ukraine during the first two decades of independence from the standpoint of society, government and man. V. Danylenko and V. Kotsur (Danylenko, 2021) analysed the political dimension of privatization during the years of Ukraine's independence.

The purpose of the research is to determine the features and results of privatization in Ukraine during the period of 1991 – 2004, in particular with an amendment to the political component of this period of state formation.

The Research Results. After the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine inherited a huge production base, especially the industrial base, which necessitated its further transit from state to private ownership. However, taking into account the unprofitability of the majority of enterprises, which inertially continued operating under the new capitalist conditions, counting on support from the state, in the form of a subsidy, they became more of a problem,

which rather resembled a “suitcase without a handle”. Galloping inflation and the economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s prompted the authorities to act quickly, but the latter’s lack of determination and experience under market conditions was evident, especially in the first years of independence.

It is worth noting that together with the popular recognition of the Verkhovna Rada decision regarding the independence of Ukraine during the referendum on December 1, 1991, the first presidential elections were held, in which the former speaker of Parliament L. Kravchuk won. Parliament remained in the same composition as it was elected during the March 1990 elections, in which the communist “group 239” made up the majority. That is, Ukraine entered the year 1992 with a post-Soviet speaker of Parliament as president and continued to have the communist majority in the Verkhovna Rada.

Accordingly, neither the deputies nor the head of state understood either how to move to the market, or how to carry out the privatization process under the new conditions properly. Therefore, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, at the initial stage, began (in fact – continued) to be carried out inertially precisely by the Soviet managers (the so-called “red directors”) in a more closed format. It was more like a hidden redistribution of state property under conditions of initial accumulation of capital by those who were already involved in its administration. Subsequently, this led to the appearance of closed “joint-stock companies” (Koshyk, 2011, p. 74), which became more like private firms than, in fact, companies.

The institutional process of privatization itself began in 1992. As stated in the historical reference of the State Property Fund of Ukraine: “The main guidelines for privatization in Ukraine were laid at the end of 1991, when Parliament approved the Concept of Denationalization and Privatization of Property of State Enterprises, Housing Fund and Land. In 1992, the main privatization laws were adopted and the State Privatization Programme for 1992 was approved. This year can be considered the beginning of privatization...” (Istorychna, 2021). It was in 1992 that the Law of Ukraine “On Privatization of the State Housing Fund” was adopted regarding the transfer of residential premises to the private ownership of citizens, and on March 4, 1992, the President signed the Law of Ukraine “On Privatization of State Property” (Kulchytskyi, 2011).

To understand the assets, it is worth noting that with the declaration of independence, Ukraine had property in the state ownership for an estimated amount of 6.5 trillion hryvnias, and property worth about 4 trillion was subject to privatization. (Ledomska, 2001, p. 14), i.e. it should have been 61 % of all objects. It would be practically impossible to implement privatization on a monetary basis, since the savings of all citizens were only UAH 100 billion (Ibid), i.e. 2.5 % of the value of what was planned to be sold. In addition, the monetary reform, which should have encouraged this process to become more active, had not taken place yet.

Before privatization (1992), there were 46,000 state-owned enterprises, of which 40,000 were medium and 6,000 large, which provided about 75 % of all production in Ukraine (Derzhavotvorchyi, 2007, p. 292).

According to the state concept, 70 % of the objects were to be privatized using certificates (vouchers) distributed by the government through the State Property Fund to all citizens in accordance with the principle of equality and ownership of all property by the people, and the rest (30 %) were to be sold for money to new owners (Ibid). At the same time, it should be noted that at the very beginning of the privatization process (1992), Parliament blocked any monetary privatization until the introduction of a new unit, the hryvnia (Derzhavotvorchyi,

2007, p. 297), which entered into circulation as early as September of 1996. That is, during the first five years of independence, the purchase of state and communal enterprises in cash was not supposed to take place.

Therefore, during the first privatization period in Ukraine (1992 – 1994), the most common was the leasing of the relevant state-owned enterprises to their collectives (actually – managers) with the possibility of further repurchase of the property. It was on May 20, 1993 that the government adopted Decree “On Privatization of Integral Property Complexes of State-owned Enterprises and their Leased Structural Units”, according to which the state sold shares of open joint-stock companies that were established by state privatization authorities and tenants, first the latter (the value of which exceeds 20 million krb.), and then to all others (Dekret, 1993). Most often, the companies were hired by their management and continued to carry out their management activities until they were completely bought out. Privatization of such facilities took place far below the market price. Initially, such managers (the so-called “red directors”) managed the respective enterprise during the Soviet times, and continued to do so in the future, and also received subsidies from the state for their (although legally still state-owned) enterprises. For the final purchase of such a leased enterprise, it was initially brought to the point of unprofitability and complete bankruptcy, and was subsequently bought out by the management by purchasing the corresponding shares for nothing. Such “schemes” were used until 1997. Already after such privatization, the new (old) owners became much more interested in the results of their enterprise, in particular, not only in the quantity, but also in the quality of the final product, and its successful implementation at the market under conditions of relative competition.

Under the conditions of such a “primary” privatization (lease with subsequent purchase), during the period of 1992 – 1993, 3,599 enterprises (1,976 communal and 1,623 state) were transferred to a private ownership (Kulchytskyi, 2011). The following year (1994), the pace of privatization became more rapid, mainly at the expense of utility companies. A total of 8,348 enterprises were privatized (Ibid). During the period of 1992 – 1999, the buyout of their enterprises by labour collectives accounted for 42.07 % of the total number of privatized objects, and the buyout (mainly by the so-called external “outsiders” for funds, which took place since 1996) of leased property – 19.73 % (Derzhavotvorchyi, 2007, p. 300).

It is worth noting the political component of this period. Thus, in 1994, in independent Ukraine, for the first time, there was a change of government from one that had uncertainty regarding the course of privatization to one that more actively generated a course in this direction. In March of 1994, the Verkhovna Rada of the second convocation was elected under the majority system (the majority of mandates were won by left parties, primarily the Communist Party); in July, L. Kuchma became the new President of Ukraine, who replaced the first Head of State – L. Kravchuk in this position. As for the first president, as the famous economist Professor A. Galchynskyi notes: “Economy... was not the subject of President Kravchuk’s immediate interest. His policy in this area was reduced to postponing the solution of the most difficult tasks “for later”. This turned out to be a tragic mistake, as the euphoria associated with independence quickly faded and the economy went into free fall” (Halchynskyi, 2013, pp. 18–19).

The second president, however, considered it necessary to carry out broad and rapid privatization. Thus, L. Kuchma issued a decree according to which by the end of 1995, privatization was to take place in respect of 90 % of small enterprises (Hrytsak, 2022, p. 572). The most massive privatization of enterprises in Ukraine began with the use of property

certificates (vouchers), which was carried out during the period of 1995 – 1999 (Koshyk, 2011, p. 76). According to it, the government distributed appropriate privatization certificates to the people, as the owner of all state-owned enterprises, which gave each citizen the right to own part of the property and co-own such property with others. This certificate, as a kind of share, could be sold, exchanged, etc. In total, the State Property Fund of Ukraine issued about 50 million such privatization certificates and created more than 1,000 auctions at which they were to be distributed free of charge to all citizens (Kulchytskyi, 2011). Citizens received almost 92 % of them, i.e. 46 million pieces, as well as 30 % of compensation certificates in the amount of over UAH 1 billion (Derzhavotvorchyi, 2007, p. 298). Almost 20,000 shares of various enterprises were sold through the network of certificate auctions created throughout Ukraine, the value of which amounted to UAH 4.6 billion. (Paskhaver, Verkhovoda, Voronkova & Tereshchenko, 2003, p. 13).

The “voucher” model of privatization was developed by a government group under the leadership of the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine V. Lanovoy, who, to a certain extent, borrowed the experience of Czechoslovakia in the implementation of privatization certificates (vouchers) (Koshyk, 2011, p. 75). At the same time, the government did not allow such privatization options as: return of property to former owners (restitution), since the nationalization of property took place in a rather earlier (interwar) period, as well as – sale to foreigners, because it was not popular among the people.

Thus, the voucher model became a “secondary” option for privatization in Ukraine and looked fairer at first glance, because the entire nation owned all the state’s property, which had to be evenly and proportionally divided in the transition to the market conditions. This type of privatization allows it to be carried out relatively quickly and quite flexibly, which was implemented in Ukraine in the mid-1990s. However, this type of privatization has also a number of disadvantages, in particular such as: lack of access of owners to capital and property management skills; small profits for shareholders as well as for the government; it does not contribute to the modernization and improvement of the management of such enterprises by the collective owner, etc. (Havrylyshyn, 2000). However, despite these shortcomings, which are evaluated later, it was almost the only option that the then government and the president could take. Despite this, the people regarded such massive and rapid privatization of state-owned enterprises as a kind of deception, because the certificates distributed by the government almost immediately lost their value many times over and citizens tried to sell them for nothing to interested people (mostly those involved in the management of such enterprises, i.e. the so-called “insiders”).

According to the 1994 survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine regarding the privatization process, 38.4 % of respondents gave a negative answer, and 34.2 % said it was “difficult to say” (Vorona, 2005). That is, there was no public consensus regarding the privatization process at its initial stage in Ukraine, and accordingly, this undermined its entire legitimacy. Looking ahead for comparison, it is worth noting that at the end of L. Kuchma’s rule in 2004, the situation with citizens’ distrust of a private property halved and was already 19 % (Halchynskyi, 2013, p. 184).

As for the political component, it is worth noting that if the second President of Ukraine L. Kuchma pedaled and accelerated the privatization process, then the left parties (primarily the Communist Party of Ukraine) in the Verkhovna Rada of the second convocation, which had the majority of mandates in Parliament, were against such torpedoing of this process by the head of state. In July of 1994, the Communist Party of Ukraine and other left-wing

political forces voted for a moratorium on privatization, which lasted until May of 1995, and constantly increased the number of objects that were not subject to this process (as of 1996, there were 6,000 of them) (Derzhavotvorchyi, 2007, p. 297).

In general, at the beginning of 1997, the authorities distributed about 80 % of privatization certificates, of which 2.5 million remained unused by their owners, and 5.3 million citizens never applied for them (Kulchytskyi, 2011). 19 million, although they legally became co-owners of certain enterprises, they did not receive real ownership, because the actual managers deprived them of real participation in the activities of these objects and the distribution of profits. Because of this, the latter bought their privatization certificates from the owners of the shares, in fact, for cash and at a much lower price than their market value, i.e. for nothing, and received a controlling stake in the respective enterprise.

The only benefit for the owners of such privatization certificates was the opportunity to sell them to interested parties, as long as these “papers” had at least some value. That is, citizens under the conditions of crisis and actual survival in the middle of the 1990s did not appreciate the true value of the relevant certificates that they had in their hands and were not ready to “play the long game” and exchanged them to meet their current needs, most often for everything, essentials. The “red” managers, realizing the real value of these vouchers, significantly dumped (understated) the prices in order to massively buy them from citizens at a low cost in order to acquire full ownership of the respective enterprises. Subsequently, this state of affairs led to a significant property stratification of society into an impoverished majority and a wealthy minority.

During the period from 1995 to 1998, the following non-competitive methods of privatization were common in the country: purchase of property by the labour team or tenants for certificates, property certificate auctions, non-commercial competitions, etc. (Derzhavotvorchyi, 2007, p. 295), as well as commercial contests and auctions held with the aim of privatizing non-production facilities.

The “tertiary” stage of privatization in Ukraine fell on 2000 – 2004, when the sale/purchase on the market of large, strategically important state-owned enterprises began. Thus, in 2000, the Law of Ukraine “On the State Privatization Programme” was adopted, and the Program was focused on the years 2000 – 2002 (Derzhavna, 2000), according to which privatization of strategic industries became possible. The mass purchase of such enterprises by “their own” contributed to an even greater integration of business with the government and led to the emergence of large financial and industrial circles known as “oligarchy”. Thus, in 2004, 20 out of 38 privatized objects were strategic enterprises and monopolistic enterprises (Nohinova, 2014). During the specified period, 18 objects of Group “G” (large, strategic enterprises) were sold, 13 of which were purchased by large business groups, in particular such as: “System Capital Management” company – 7 objects; Interpipe Corporation – 2 objects (Paskhaver, Verkhovodova & Aheieva, 2006, p. 12) and the others. At the same time, President L. Kuchma’s economic adviser at the time, A. Galchynskyi, notes in his memoirs that: “...privatization was never directed by us and could not be directed at solving purely fiscal problems. The goals of privatization were different... privatization is not only the budget, it is much more than the budget. In the process of privatization, it is necessary to take care first of all about the effective owner and his competitiveness” (Halchynskyi, 2013, pp. 184–185).

In general, during the ten years of independence, in particular, during the period of 1992 – 2002, only UAH 5.4 billion was received from the privatization of property to the

state budget. (\$1.1 billion) (Kulchytskyi, 2011), which indicates large-scale “schemes” in this process. At the same time, during the period from 1992 to 1998, the state budget received only UAH 646.22 million from privatization from the planned 1,540 million hryvnias (Derzhavotvorchyi, 2007, p. 302). Almost 85 % of the value of state property was privatized on a non-monetary basis, of which: 47 % by certificates and 38 % by working privatization mechanisms (Halchynskyi, 2013, p. 185). Almost 30 million hectares of agricultural land and 5.7 million apartments were also privatized on a cashless basis (Ibid). Deductions to the state budget from privatization increased from 50 % in 1993 to 90 % in 1999 and went to repay social benefits (i.e. to “eat out”) (Derzhavotvorchyi, 2007, p. 297).

Thus, during the period from 1992 to 1994, more than 11,000 enterprises and organizations were officially privatized, and during the period of 1995 – 1998 another 40,400 small ones, and about 10,000 medium and large ones. Of all these 61,591 privatized objects during the period of 1992 – 1998, 80 % (49,519) were small enterprises; 17.6 % (10,840) – medium and large; about 2 % (1,232) are objects of unfinished construction (Derzhavotvorchyi, 2007, p. 299). In total, 96,400 objects (of communal and state ownership) were privatized between 1994 and 2004 (Halchynskyi, 2013, p. 184). Among these objects, 71.4 thousand were as follows: industrial enterprises – 8,564 (only in 1999 were privatized enterprises: metallurgy – 26 %; electric power – 25 %; chemical and petrochemical – 19 % (Derzhavotvorchyi, 2007, p. 302)), construction – 3,750, commercial and freight transport facilities – 38,371, hotels and restaurants – 7,085, transport and communications – 1,997, financial sector – 363 (Kulchytskyi, 2011), etc. If in 1994 there were 79.8 thousand small enterprises (of all types of ownership), then ten years later (2004) there were 283.4 thousand of them (Halchynskyi, 2013, p. 186).

According to the state privatization programme for 2000 – 2002, it was to be carried out exclusively for money (Derzhavotvorchyi, 2007, p. 302). This programme established a three-year period during which the state could own the shares of a certain enterprise, and in case of deterioration of its situation, it was put up for auction and subject to mandatory privatization (Ibid).

In 2004, 75.8 % of all employees in the country worked in non-state enterprises; was 95.8 % of wholesale turnover and 91.2 % of export products; produced – 85.3 % of industrial goods, in particular: 98.5 % in light industry, 97 % – in food industry, 88.6 % – in machine building, 85.7 % – in metallurgy (Halchynskyi, 2013, p. 184). A year later (2005), 78.3 % of objects were privately owned; in the state – 4.1 %; in communal – 7.4 % in associations of citizens without specifying ownership – 10.1 % (Derzhavotvorchyi, 2007, p. 305).

The Conclusions. Thus, privatization in Ukraine from 1992 to 1996 was the so-called “primary” with the future purchase by tenants of enterprises of state and communal ownership. If the first (post-Soviet) government in Ukraine did not quite understand how to carry out this process during the period of 1992 – 1994, then due to such inaction in this direction, privatization took place more chaotically, primarily at the initiative of the so-called “red directors”. In 1994, when the second government was formed, in particular President L. Kuchma and his subsequent governments, privatization became more systematic and massive. From 1995 to 1999, the so-called “secondary” (“voucher”) privatization, in which enterprises began to be transferred to private ownership en masse through the purchase of certificates by interested parties. Most often, as during the “primary” period, such enterprises went mainly to managers and people affiliated with them. During the period of 2000 – 2004, during the second term of President L. Kuchma, the “third” privatization took place.

Wealthy people, primarily connected to the government circles, acquired large strategic state enterprises on a “competition” basis at lower prices, which contributed to the emergence of financial and industrial circles in Ukraine, known as “oligarchy”.

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THE FIGHT AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME IN POST-SOVIET UKRAINE: REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, HISTORY, RESULTS (the 1990s)

Abstract. *The purpose of the article is to study the concept and manifestation of organized crime in Ukraine in the 1990s. The Research Methodology.* General scientific and special methods have been applied, in particular owing to the historical legal method, the conceptual basis of “organized crime” has been elucidated, its historiographical characteristics have been presented, legislation has been analysed; applied systemic structural and formal logical methods made it possible to analyse the socio-political prerequisites that influenced emergence and actualization of organized crime during the 1990s, and also identified the peculiarities of organized criminal groups. **The Scientific Novelty.** Organized crime is one of the most dangerous illegal acts. Understanding the peculiarities of Ukrainian organized crime in a broader theoretical context is important for the development of qualitative criminological science. Therefore, under the conditions of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the level of crime is increasing, and therefore a theoretical and practical retrospective study of organized crime during the 1990s is important.

The Conclusions. *On the basis of materials systematization of Ukrainian and foreign historiography, a normative and legal framework of Ukraine, a comprehensive description of the process of combating organized crime in the 1990s has been presented. The concept of organized crime, transnational organized crime has been conceptualized. Organized crime and corruption were among the most threatening problems for the Ukrainian statehood in the 1990s. After all, after gaining independence, Ukraine was at the transitional stage of establishing the institutions of a democratic system. It has been*

determined that the post-Soviet organization in Ukraine is a continuation of the Soviet system, however, the Ukrainian crime is characterized by the primacy of a certain organization in a specific territory. Analyzing the legal acts of the 1990s, we can conclude that the activities of special police units in the fight against organized crime were regulated by a large number of legal acts, but specific law-making activities required a more systematic approach.

Key words: transnational crime, organized crime, fight against crime, war, martial law, criminological policy.

БОРОТЬБА З ОРГАНІЗОВАНОЮ ЗЛОЧИННІСТЮ В ПОСТРАДЯНСЬКІЙ УКРАЇНІ: НОРМАТИВНО-ПРАВОВІ ЗАСАДИ, ІСТОРІЯ, РЕЗУЛЬТАТИ (1990-ті рр.)

Мета дослідження – розкрити поняття та з'ясувати форми діяльності організованої злочинності (ОЗ) в Україні у 1990-х рр. *Методологія дослідження.* У роботі використані загальнонаукові та спеціальні методи, зокрема, завдяки історико-правовому методу розкрито концептуальні засади поняття ОЗ, подано його історіографічну характеристику, проаналізовано законодавство; застосовані системно-структурний та формально-логічні методи дали змогу здійснити аналіз суспільно-політичних передумов, які вплинули на появу та актуалізацію ОЗ протягом 1990-х рр., а також виокремлено особливості організованих злочинних організацій. *Наукова новизна.* Розуміння особливостей української ОЗ в ширшому теоретичному зрізі є важливим для розробки якісної кримінологічної науки. Позаяк в умовах війни Росії проти України відбувається зростання рівня злочинності, важливим є теоретичне та практичне дослідження ретроспективи ОЗ протягом 1990-х рр. *Висновки.* На основі проведеної систематизації матеріалів української та зарубіжної історіографії, нормативно-правової бази України подана комплексна характеристика процесу боротьби з ОЗ у 1990-х рр. Здійснено концептуалізацію понять “організована злочинність”, “транснаціональна організована злочинність”. ОЗ та корупція були одними із найбільш загрозливими проблемами для української державності 1990-х рр. Адже після здобуття незалежності Україна перебувала на транзитному етапі встановлення інститутів демократичного ладу. Констатовано, що пострадянська ОЗ в Україні виступає продовженням радянської системи, однак українську злочинність характеризує першійсть певної організації на конкретній території. Проаналізувавши нормативно-правові акти 1990-х рр., можна зробити висновки, що діяльність спеціальних підрозділів міліції у боротьбі із ОЗ унормовувалася великою кількістю нормативно-правових актів, однак конкретна правотворча діяльність потребувала більш системного підходу.

Ключові слова: транснаціональна злочинність, організована злочинність, боротьба зі злочинністю, війна, воєнний стан, кримінологічна політика.

The Problem Statement. Organized crime is a complex phenomenon, a form of illegal activity. The issue of organized crime has a wide interpretation among Ukrainian and foreign researchers. There is a significant problem with developing a unified approach to the concept interpretation. In the definition of organized crime, according to Viktor Konopelsky, a lawyer-researcher, one should start from the understanding of this concept as “a whole complex system of various types of a criminal activity of organized groups of criminals” (Konopelskyi, 2023, p. 51). The issues of organized crime are studied by various branches of jurisprudence, political science, and international relations studies. One of the most common aspects of studying this issue is its transnational dimension. It is worth noting that transnational organized crime (TOZ) is a complex phenomenon that arose as a result of the globalized world system development (Sylistyo & Wiranata, Lestari, 2021, p. 43). On an international scale crime is essentially a continuation of the activities of organized crime, which went beyond the boundaries of one state and gained an international scope gradually (Skulysh & Hlushkov, 2012, p. 109). According to Klaus von Lampe, a lawyer in international law and

criminology, an activist of the “Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime”, the concept of TOZ can be outlined in three planes: “an illegal activity related to the crossing of international borders; transnational mobile criminal organizations, i.e. criminal organizations that operate in more than one country; the spread of illegal governance across international borders” (Lampe, 2014, pp. 75–76).

The Review of Recent Publications and Research. The most significant publications on the study of organized crime in Europe include the studies by K. von Lampe (Lampe, 2014), L. Paoli (Paoli, 2002), C. Fijnaut (Fijnaut & Paoli, 2004), F. Armao (Armao, 2003). In many studies there are covered the activities of organized crime in the Russian Federation and the countries of the former social camp. A. Kupatadze’s monograph focuses on the connection of organized crime in post-Soviet Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan to the period of colour revolutions in the 2000s (Kupatadze, 2012); L. Shelley’s publications focus on a comprehensive review of the Soviet and post-Soviet politics, economy and organized crime (Shelley, 1994; Shelley, 1998; Shelley, 1999; Shelley, 2005). Among the Ukrainian scholars there should be singled out the studies by O. Shamara, O. Dzhuzha, L. Arkusha who do research on the issue of legislation development in the field of combating an organized crime and corruption (Shamara, 2021; Shamara, 2024; Dzhuzha, 2007; Arkusha, 2010). A number of authors gave a description, outlined the typology of organized crime, in particular P. Yepryntsev (Yepryntsev, 2022; Yepryntsev, 2023), T. Melnychuk (Melnychuk, 2023), V. Dremin (Dremin, 2010a; Dremin 2010b), O. Busol (Busol, 2010; Busol, 2019), V. Vasylevych (Vasylevych, 2020). This work uses some aspects of theoretical argumentation in the context of scientific research, which were proposed by scientists V. Ilnytskyi and M. Haliv (Ilnytskyi & Haliv, 2022).

The purpose of the article: a theoretical generalization of the concept of organized crime, a retrospective historical and legal analysis of the fight against organized forms of crime in Ukraine in the 1990s.

The Research Results. In science, politics, and the public sector in the USA, Europe, and Ukraine, in particular, there is an ongoing debate about the interpretation of the concept of organized crime. The concept arose at the end of the 19th century in the USA and in the 1970s spread on the European continent quickly. At the current stage, the term is mainly interpreted “as a set of criminal acts, or an organization of people engaged in crime” (Fijnaut & Paoli, 2006, p. 308).

Conceptualization of the organized crime is carried out at two levels: the legal approach studies concepts in specialized legislation with “formal signs of demarcation and/or consolidation of the crime composition related to organized crime in acts of criminal legislation”; the academic approach reflects a system of scientific views that provide “a special way of presenting, understanding and interpreting” this type of crime (Melnychuk, 2023, pp. 11–12).

Significantly organized forms of crime became widespread in the world after the end of the “Cold War”, mainly in the post-communist countries and those that were under unstable, systemic crisis conditions (Busol, 2019, p. 60). In the USSR, the issue of organized crime was hushed up, because the very fact of it contradicted the foundations of communism (Yepryntsev, 2022, pp. 194–195). A lawyer P. Yepryntsev noted that at the beginning of the 1970s, the “general criminal system” was revived in the USSR, which manifested itself in such criminal acts as “racketeering, kidnapping, control of the income of businessmen, etc.” P. Yepryntsev, following the Ukrainian scholars, connected the manifestations of organized

crime with large-scale illegal activities of the so-called “traders”, who were engaged in the production and distribution of goods and services in the 1970s (Yepryntsev, 2023, pp. 39–40). The formation of the “mafia type of crime” was during the period of the end of the 1970s to the mid-1980s. During this period, it merged with various spheres of a public life and socio-political changes of the so-called “perestroika” (Yepryntsev, 2022, p. 196). The Canadian legal researchers P. H. Solomon and T. Vogelsong noted that until the end of the 1970s, in the Ukrainian SSR, like the rest of the Union republics, there was a fairly low level of crime for such an industrialized and urbanized country, and only in 1977 there was a significant increase in the level of crime mainly due to “the cessation of various forms of crime suppression and the impact of a growing shadow economy that began to produce and distribute large volumes of illegal consumer goods” (Solomon & Foglesong, 2000, p. 72). During the 1980s, a large-scale development of criminal communities took place, a system was formed, the so-called “elite” was singled out (“thieves in law” mainly). Responding to these changes, the state issues the Congress Resolution of the People’s Deputies of the USSR dated December 23, 1989 No. 976-1 “On Strengthening the Fight against Organized Crime”. The next step in countermeasures was the Decree of the President of the USSR “On Measures to Strengthen the Fight against the Most Dangerous Crimes and their Forms” dated February 4, 1991. In accordance with this legislative act, interregional offices for the fight against organized crime were established (Yepryntsev, 2022, p. 196).

It is worth noting that some researchers, especially foreign lawyers, believe that organized crime in Ukraine, in the 1990s arose after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This thesis is consistently refuted by a well-known American scholar L. Shelley, emphasizing that the “Soviet heritage” is one of the most important factors in the spread of organized crime, but it should be considered as a complex phenomenon, which should not be reduced only to the influence of shadow economy or attraction to authoritarian management methods. Instead, one should take into account “a targeted social policy on internal immigration, the failure [of the authorities] to integrate ethnic groups into the national leadership, the development of a large apparatus of social control, and conscious government decisions in recent years” (Shelley, 1998, p. 651). L. Shelley attributes M. Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol company to such important measures in the fight against organized crime, which, on the contrary, contributed to its growth. For example, in Ukraine, in her opinion, the ban contributed to increasing the level of professionalization of smuggling, and in general reduced the level of respect for law enforcement agencies significantly. However, the suppression of ethnic conflicts, which flared up with a new force after the collapse of the USSR, particularly in Azerbaijan and Georgia, and unresolved problems in Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldova, had a more significant impact. These unresolved inter-ethnic conflicts created a market for weapons, while the demobilized large numbers of soldiers had access to equipment, machinery and weapons (Shelley, 1998, p. 652).

In 1989 and 1990 the collapse of the Soviet economy led to a record increase in impoverishment of population, emergence of a considerable social differentiation that existed between a small layer of rich entrepreneurs who were involved in illegal enrichment. This model of business introduction became especially attractive to young men who sought to overcome poverty. At the same time, the state apparatus was weakened significantly (Solomon & Foglesong, 2000, p. 72), a large-scale reforming of the society led to a “generalized institutionalized crisis” (Dremin, 2010a, p. 105). The Ukrainian lawyer Viktor Dremin studied the phenomenon of the crime increase in Ukraine in the 1990s through the prism of

institutional theories, i.e. “crime is analysed through the prism of economic and sociological institutionalism”. V. Dremin described the development of Ukrainian society since the 1990s as being in a transit, i.e. transitional state. Under such conditions, there was a rapid increase in criminalization of the society, which the researcher explained by the peculiarities of the political, legal and economic situation, which he also outlined as the concept of an “institutional crisis” (Dremin, 2010b, pp. 15–16).

An accelerated rate of crime growth was evidenced by the data of official statistics of the period under analysis, which were analysed by the researchers O. Kulyk and B. Bobyr. According to their calculations, during the period of 1988 – 1997, there was a significant increase in the total number of crimes by two and a half times. Among them, “property crimes (a theft, robbery, fraud, and extortion), economic crimes (receiving bribes, drug production and drug trafficking) were the most recorded” (Solomon & Foglesong, 2000, p. 72). From 1986 to 1997, “in Ukraine the coefficient of crime intensity per 100,000 population was: in 1986 – 488 crimes; in 1987 – 484; in 1988 – 473 crimes; in 1989 – 623; in 1990 – 718; in 1991 – 921; in 1993 – 1,033; in 1994 – 1096; in 1995 – 1,241; in 1996 – 1,202; in 1997 – 1159” (Dremin, 2010, p. 107a). However, it should be emphasized that despite high rates of criminalization of Ukrainian society during the last years of the Ukrainian SSR and the first years of independence, Ukraine had lower rates than in the Russian Federation during the same period. In particular, “in 1993, when 1,032 crimes were registered in Ukraine per 100,000 population (a crime rate), in the Russian Federation – 1,890. The difference in indicators per 100,000 for the population over the age of fourteen was even greater: 1,287 versus 2,344. These data reflect long-standing differences between the two republics: in 1972, the coefficient for Ukraine was 283, and in 1971 for Russia – 536” (Solomon & Foglesong, 2000, p. 73).

Sharing the view that organized crime reflects the peculiarities of social relations development within the state, a researcher T. Melnychuk concluded that the post-Soviet state is a continuation of the Soviet system, but it should not be equated in different countries. In Ukraine, there were close ties with criminal groups of other former Soviet republics, however, “organized crime in Ukraine was never a single organization with common goals and ideas of a criminal behaviour. Numerous criminal gangs were usually named by location or by the name of their leader. For the Ukrainian organized crime, the formula “dominance of a certain organization in a certain territory during a certain period of time” was applied (Melnychuk, 2023, pp. 41–42).

Thus, the Ukrainian state was not ready for radical changes: a break in economic ties, hyperinflation and the so-called “wild privatization”. As the researcher P. Yepryntsev noted, privatization of the state property was carried out in such a way that criminal groups received large objects in industrial sector, real estate, and thus gained the opportunity to influence even entire sectors of economy. Therefore, organized crime accumulated a significant financial and property basis in order to influence the activities of state structures, while at the same time acting on a legal basis in a new economic situation (Yepryntsev, 2022, p. 196). As a result, at the end of the 1990s, there appeared “politico-economic groups of the criminal oligarchic type” in Ukraine, which played a significant role. At the same time, there was a tendency to strengthen control over the most profitable sectors of the economy, the growth of their financial and credit sphere, and involvement in privatization. There was also a regrouping of the organization and its separate formations into more influential criminal oligarchic formations (clans) (Dulskyi, 1999, p. 63). The Canadian-British analyst Taras

Kuzio noted that in Ukraine during the period under analysis, crime was one of the most influential groups in the society and blurred the line between criminal structures and the state significantly (Kuzio, 2015, p. 332). During the 1990s, a high level of violence was observed on the Crimean peninsula mainly, and later in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In Donbas the peak of violence was considered to be in 1995 – 1996, when the sensational murders of some of the richest oligarchs and bosses of organized crime happened (Kuzio, 2014, p. 195).

The concept of organized crime is presented in Part 1, Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine of the Law of Ukraine “On Organizational and Legal Basis of Combating Organized Crime” dated June 30, 1993 – it is “a set of crimes committed in connection with creation and activity of organized criminal groups”. In Part 2 of this Criminal Code “the types and signs of these criminal offenses, as well as criminal legal measures against people who have committed such criminal offenses, are determined by the Criminal Code of Ukraine” (Chaplynskyi, 2004, p. 16).

The definition of the concept of “organized crime” was also formulated in Article 28 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine from 2001 “Commitment of a criminal offense by a group of people, a group of people with a prior conspiracy, an organized group or a criminal organization”. In particular, a “criminal offense” is defined as “committed by a group of people (two or more people); according to a prior conspiracy by a group of people”, who were also previously “organized into a group of people to commit this and other (other) criminal offenses, united by a single plan with the division of functions among group members, aimed at achieving this plan, known to all group members”. Typical features are a hierarchical structure and mutual relations of participants, a certain distribution of functions (Kryminalnyi Kodeks Ukrainy, 2001).

The Law “On Organizational and Legal Basis of Combating Organized Crime” contained a number of additions and clarifications that were approved by the Verkhovna Rada. Section 1 of Article 3 defines that the task of this legislative act is to create general legal and organizational principles in the field of combating organized crime, promoting its prevention and elimination; definition of the system of state bodies fighting organized crime and their interrelationships”. Therefore, in Article 4 as of May 15, 2004 it was stated that “1. Legislation on the fight against organized crime is based on the Constitution of Ukraine and includes this Law, the Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine, the laws of Ukraine “On Operational and Investigative Activities”, “On the Police”, “On the Security Service of Ukraine”, “On the Prosecutor’s Office”, other laws, international legal agreements to which Ukraine is a party. 2. By-laws regulating relations in the field of combating organized crime cannot determine the powers of state bodies or the duties of individuals and legal entities that do not follow from the laws of Ukraine (Zakon Ukrainy, 2003).

In Article 5 of Section 1 of the Law of Ukraine “On Organizational and Legal Basis of Fighting Organized Crime” there is defined the system of bodies that fight organized crime: these are “state bodies specially created to fight organized crime; state bodies participating in the fight against organized crime within the scope of the performance of other main functions assigned to them”. The first group of state bodies includes the Coordination Committee for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime under the President of Ukraine; special units for fighting against the Ministry for Internal Affairs of Ukraine; special anti-corruption units and the Security Service of Ukraine. As for the state bodies that are also involved in the fight against illegal immigration, these are also the bodies of the Prosecutor’s Office and customs bodies, and the State Border Service bodies in Ukraine (Zakon Ukrainy, 2003).

The norms of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure occupy an important place in the system of combating organized crime. In the context of this research, it is also worth mentioning the following legal acts. The Law of Ukraine “On Operational Investigative Activities” dated February 18, 1992, which outlined the list of entities authorized to conduct investigative activities. In 2001, amendments were made to this law, in particular, the range of entities that received the right to conduct operational and investigative activities was more clearly determined. In particular, Article 5 it is stated that “operational investigative activities are carried out by operational units of internal affairs bodies – criminal, transport and special police, special units for fighting organized crime to ensure courts employees, law enforcement agencies and participants in criminal proceedings” (Rozum, 2018, p. 14).

In countering organized crime, a significant role is played by the structures of bodies whose activities are directly aimed at countering various manifestations of crime. In particular, these are police bodies whose powers and role were determined by the Law “On Militia” of 1990, in which special units for combating organized crime were also determined, and in 1991, an interregional Office for Combating Organized Crime was established within the Ministry for Internal Affairs. During the first years of independence, the Main Directorate for Combating Organized Crime of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of Ukraine was reorganized (HUBOZ, Ministry for Internal Affairs, Ukraine). The main areas of activity of this body were: detection of crimes in banking, credit and financial spheres, fight against corruption, bribery and illegal transactions with currency, detection of crimes during privatization processes, fight against gang formations and international crime. On February 24, 1994, the Law of Ukraine “On Amendments and Additions to the Law of Ukraine “On Organizational and Legal Basis of Combating Organized Crime” was adopted, according to which changes were made to the structures of HUBOZ. In particular, independent departments were formed similar to those that already existed in the structures of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of the Republic of Crimea and the State Security Service in the city of Kyiv and Kyiv region, the Security Service of other regions and the city of Sevastopol, Department for Internal Affairs on Transport of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of Ukraine (UVST (VVST)) and units for investigation of organized crime within investigative departments of personnel and operative cover units for combating organized crime (Rozum, 2018, p. 14).

The Decree of the President of Ukraine dated June 21, 1994 “On Urgent Measures to Strengthen the Fight against Crime” played a key role in the normative legal acts related to the activities of the State Security Service of Ukraine, in particular “Ministry for Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the State Customs Service of Ukraine, Administration of the State Border Service of Ukraine, Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, local state administrations with participation of General Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine to implement coordinated measures systematically, aimed at strengthening the fight against banditry, corruption, and other serious crimes decisively. To focus on neutralizing armed criminal groups that are interregional and international in nature” (Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy, 1994). In the following years, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine supplemented the legal framework significantly, in particular, there were adopted the laws “On Preventive Detention of Persons”, “On Preventing and Combating Legalization (Laundering) of Proceeds Obtained through Crime or Financing of Terrorism”, “On Measures to Combat Illegal Drugs Trafficking, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors and their Use”. On October 5, 1995 the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law of Ukraine “On the Fight against Corruption”, in which there were outlined the legal principles for combating

corruption. This law was important for the intensification of the HUBOZ structural parts activity (Rozum, 2018, p. 15).

An important role in the formation of international legislation on the transnational criminal law development is played by the UN, which implements its law-making activities through the activities of the General Assembly, the Security Council, and UN congresses on crime prevention and criminal justice (Popko, 2019, p. 78).

In 1997, after the merger of the Centre for International Crime Prevention and the United Nations Programme on International Drug Control, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) was established. One of the main areas of activity of the UNO is “the fight against transnational organized crime and illegal drug trafficking: implementation of the UN Convention provisions against Transnational Organized Crime, fight against drug production, consumption and trade; border management; control of precursors; combating human trafficking; fight against illegal trade in firearms; illegal migration”. Ukraine ratified 3 main conventions on the control of drugs and precursors, implements the UN Convention provisions against Transnational Organized Crime and the UN Convention against Corruption (Upravlinnia OON, 2012).

Since the 1990s, a numerical increase in the level of crime committed by organized groups and the level of crime in general has been recorded in Ukraine. The year of 1995 was a peak year, in particular, “a total level of crime amounted to almost 642 thousand crimes (1246 per 100 thousand population) or increased by 158% compared to 1991”. Analyzing the statistics, the researcher T. Melnychuk came to the conclusion that such a level of growth had not only certain objective reasons, but such figures could be the result of the following process: in 1991, on the basis of already existing specialized structures of the Ministry for Internal Affairs, a special service of the internal affairs bodies to combat organized crime was established, headed by HUBOZ, therefore, it can be assumed that it was aimed at the most maximum effectiveness (Melnychuk, 2023, p. 50). In 1990 and 1994, under the leadership of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of Ukraine, new special units began to operate, which contributed to the fight against organized crime comprehensively, this includes, in particular, the National Bureau of Interpol of Ukraine, the International Relations Service, etc. Another important step that contributed to the implementation of the Law “On Organizational and Legal Basis of Combating Organized Crime” was the creation of a single database on the accounting and activities of organized criminal groups on the basis of the automated information and search system of the AIPS “Scorpion” (Busol, 2012, pp. 160–161). Since 2000, statistics has shown a downward trend in the detection of organized crime, while at the same time there is a “fading of large-scale organized crime and criminal terrorism characteristic of the mid-1990s” (Melnychuk, 2023, p. 50).

The Conclusions. Organized crime is a complex phenomenon, a form of illegal activity. This phenomenon is the research subject in various fields of science, so this concept has a number of interpretations. Conceptualization of organized crime is carried out in two planes: the legal approach studies the concept in the relevant legislation; the academic approach reflects a system of scientific views that provide “a special way of presenting, understanding and interpreting” this type of crime.

Organized forms of crime became widespread in the world after the end of the “Cold War” significantly, in post-communist countries mainly and those ones that were under unstable, systemic crisis conditions. In 1989 and 1990, the collapse of the Soviet economy led to a record increase in impoverishment of population, emergence of a considerable

social differentiation and, at the same time, an increase in organized crime. At the same time, although organized forms of crime were a continuation of the Soviet system, Ukraine had its own peculiarities of this phenomenon, in particular, its territorial spread. After analyzing the legal framework of the 1990s, we can conclude that a number of legislative acts were adopted that normalized the activity of the law enforcement system, but this law-making activity required a more systematic approach, which was applied more clearly in the following years.

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**SOUTHEAST ANATOLIA PROJECT (GÜNEYDOĞU ANADOLU PROJESİ)
AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE MESOPOTAMIA
REGION (the end of the 20th – the beginning of the 21st century)**

Abstract. *The article focuses on clarification of the main reasons for the formation and development of the Turkish-Syrian-Iraqi contradictions regarding the joint use of the rivers of Mesopotamia. The degree of effectiveness of the agreements concluded during the period of the 1940s – the 2010s and other interstate normative legal acts related to the use of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers have been elucidated. The purpose of our research is to analyse the results of Turkey's implementation of the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) – a multi-sectoral integrated regional development project based on the concept of a sustainable development of the south-eastern region of Turkey, the main*

component of which was aimed at expanding the opportunities and scale of economic use of water resources. Its consequences for water supply and water use in the Tigris and Euphrates river basins have been clarified. An attempt is made to explain the role of GAP in the “water conflict” between Turkey, Iraq and Syria. **The scientific novelty** of the study consists in the following: based on the processing of documentary sources, statistical materials, numerous analytical publications, both national and provincial, as well as relying on the authors’ own field research, there has been made one of the first attempts in Ukrainian historiography to show the depth and magnitude of the GAP’s impact on interstate relations in the Mesopotamia region. **The methodological basis of the research** is the principles of historicism, scientificity, interdisciplinarity, a value approach and the use of general scientific (analysis, synthesis and generalization) methods.

As a result of the scientific analysis carried out with the involvement of numerous original sources, the following **conclusions** have been made: GAP is one of the largest regional development projects ever implemented in the Middle East and one of the nine largest engineering projects in the world nowadays. During the period of the 1990s – the 2010s, the GAP completely transformed the region of Southeast Anatolia, reducing the disparity between regions and creating favourable conditions for socio-economic development. On the other hand, the GAP has caused great alarm in Syria and Iraq, since its launch at full capacity will deprive Syria of 50% and Iraq of 90% of their water flow from the Euphrates, so the authors note that in order to prevent new conflicts, Turkey, Syria and Iraq should develop and actually implement a compromise long-term strategic plan for the management and exploitation of water resources.

Key words: Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Southeast Anatolia, Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP), international relations, Middle East, Mesopotamia, water supply.

ПРОЄКТ ПІВДЕННО-СХІДНОЇ АНАТОЛІЇ (GÜNEYDOĞU ANADOLU PROJESİ) ТА ЙОГО ВПЛИВ НА МІЖНАРОДНІ ВІДНОСИНИ У РЕГІОНІ МЕСОПОТАМІЇ (кінець XX – початок XXI ст.)

Анотація. У статті з’ясовано основні причини формування і розвитку турецько-сирійсько-іракських суперечностей щодо спільного використання річок Месопотамії. Виявлено ступінь ефективності угод, укладених впродовж 1940 – 2010-х рр. та інших міждержавних нормативно-правових актів, які стосуються використання вод річок Євфрат і Тигр. **Метою наших пошуків** є проаналізувати результати впровадження Туреччиною Проєкту Південно-Східної Анатолії (GAP) – багатогалузевого інтегрованого регіонального проєкту розвитку на основі концепції сталого розвитку південно-східного регіону Туреччини, головний компонент якого було спрямовано на розширення можливостей і масштабу економічного використання водних ресурсів. З’ясовано його наслідки для водозабезпечення і водокористування у басейні річок Тигр та Євфрат. Зроблено спробу пояснити роль GAP у “водному конфлікті” між Туреччиною, Іраком та Сирією. **Науковою новизною** дослідження є те, що на основі опрацювання документальних джерел, статистичних матеріалів, численних аналітичних публікацій як загальнотурецьких, так і провінційних, а також, спираючись на проведенні автором польові дослідження, у статті зроблено одну з перших в українській історіографії спроб показати глибину і масштабність впливу GAP на міждержавні відносини в регіоні Месопотамії.

Методологічною основою дослідження є принципи історизму, науковості, міждисциплінарності, ціннісний підхід та використання загальнонаукових (аналізу, синтезу й узагальнення) методів.

У результаті проведення наукового аналізу, здійсненого із залученням численних оригінальних джерел було сформульовано такі **висновки:** GAP є одним із найбільших проєктів регіонального розвитку, коли-небудь реалізованих на Близькому Сході, та одним із дев’яти найбільших інженерних проєктів у сучасному світі. Упродовж 1990 – 2010-х рр. GAP повністю трансформував регіон Південно-Східної Анатолії, скоротивши диспропорцію між регіонами та створивши сприятливі умови для соціально-економічного розвитку. З іншого боку, GAP викликав велику тривогу в Сирії та Іраку, оскільки його запуск на повну потужність позбавить Сирію 50 %, а Ірак – 90 % їх потоку води з Євфрату, тому авторки відзначають, що з метою

запобігання новим конфліктам Туреччина, Сирія та Ірак мають розробити та реально виконувати компромісний довгостроковий стратегічний план управління й експлуатації водних ресурсів.

Ключові слова: Туреччина, Сирія, Ірак, Південно-Східна Анатолія, Проєкт Південно-Східної Анатолії (GAP), міжнародні відносини, Близький Схід, Месопотамія, водопостачання.

The Problem Statement. More than 6,000 years ago, an active use of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers' waters in Mesopotamia ensured the emergence of one of the world's oldest civilizations and the origin of agriculture. To this day, remnants of ancient irrigation networks can be found in the desert plains of Syria and Iraq, many of which are still in use. For centuries, the peoples who nowadays inhabit Southeastern Turkey, Syria, and Iraq used the Euphrates and Tigris for economic and domestic needs, on the basis of which they claim that historically they have the right to an unhindered use of the rivers, regardless of the change in the hydropolitical scenario in their upper reaches.

Against the background of a significant revitalization of a socio-economic life in the countries of the Middle East during the second half of the 20th – at the beginning of the 21st century the region experiences a shortage of fresh water increasingly. In addition to purely ecological consequences, this shortage leads to the reduction of suitable agricultural land and requires constant irrigation of infertile lands.

Mesopotamia's main river, the Euphrates, is the longest river in the Middle East, originating in the eastern highlands of Turkey, between Lake Van and the Black Sea, its length is 2,700 km, and it flows into the Persian Gulf. Approximately 40% of the Euphrates flows through Turkey, with the rest – through Syria (25%) and Iraq (35%). The average annual flow of the Euphrates is approximately 37 billion m³, of which Turkey uses about 32 billion m³, i.e. 85% of water. In the case of the Tigris River, 25% of which flows through the territory of Turkey, and the total annual flow is 57 billion m³, Turkey uses 24 billion m³ (40%) of the river's water (Kankal, Nacar, Uzlu, 2016, pp. 123–124). These facts indicate that Syria and, to a lesser extent, Iraq, are dependent on Turkey's water policy.

During the period of the 1970s – 2010s implementation of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, GAP) by the Turkish government became a serious challenge for international relations in this region, as it significantly changed the volume of available water resources and the nature of their use in Syria and Iraq.

The Review of Sources and Recent Research. Actualization of water resources issue in the world, and especially in the water-deficiency region of the Middle East, has led to the appearance of a significant number of studies on this issue. The analysis of the latest publications, the subject of which is the GAP Project and its impact on Mesopotamia's water supply and the course of the “water conflict” in the region, allows us to distinguish the Turkish, Arab, and Western historiography of the issue. There should be mentioned publications by A. Akanda, S. Freeman, and M. Placht (Akanda, Freeman, Placht, 2007), D. Altınbilek (Altınbilek, 2004), A. Bagis (Bagis, 1997), M. Balat (Balat, 2003), A. Bilgen (Bilgen, 2020), A. Biswas (Biswas, 1994), O. Boyarkina (Boyarkina, 2017), L. Harris (Harris, 2002), M. Kankal, S. Nacar, E. Uzlu (Kankal, Nacar & Uzlu, 2016), A. Kirschner, K. Tiroch (Kirschner, Tiroch, 2012), N. Kliot (Kliot, 1994), F. Lorenz, E. Erickson (Lorenz, Erickson, 1999), K. Ozkahrama, M. Gunter (Ozkahraman & Gunter, 2016), O. Ünver (Ünver, 1997), D. al Khasun (Khasun Dzhasim Al' Obaydi Khalid, 2019), O. Khlopov (Khlopov, 2019), M. Schulz (Schulz, 1995), I. Yuksel (Yuksel, 2006).

The purpose of our research is to find out the results of the GAP implementation by Turkey, to analyse its consequences for water supply and water use in Mesopotamia, and therefore to explain the conflict-genicity of the project in the relations among Turkey, Iraq and Syria.

The Research Results. In the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq began implementing national programmes for more rational use of the water resources of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which included the construction of reservoirs cascades, networks of hydroelectric power plants, and implementation of large-scale agricultural work. Among them, the largest project was the Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi or Southeastern Anatolia Project – a multi-sectoral integrated regional project for the development of the southeastern region of Turkey based on the concept of a sustainable development. The chief goal of GAP was to eliminate disparity in the socio-economic development of the regions of Turkey by increasing the income and living standards of people. The chief goals of the project were set and implemented in 1977 – 2010, however, the construction of individual objects and implementation of some components continues even today. Thus, in 2019, the construction of 76% of all planned hydroelectric power stations was completed, and with the start of operation of the Ilis dam in 2020, this indicator reached 90%. The main component of the project was aimed at expanding the possibilities and scale of economic use of water resources. The means of achieving this goal was the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric power plants in 1987 – 2019 with the aim of irrigating 17 thousand km² of agricultural land. The total budget exceeded 32 billion US dollars (GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı).

It should be noted that the total gross hydropower potential of Turkey is 433 GWh/year, but at the beginning of the 2000s, only 125 GWh/year were developed for economic purposes. Due to the commissioning of new hydroelectric power plants within the GAP, it became possible to use 40% of economically useful hydropower potential of the country, which in absolute terms equals 27 billion kWh of electricity (Yuksel, 2006, p. 361). At the same time, the Euphrates and Tigris rivers account for more than 30% of Turkey's gross hydropower potential (Kankal, Nacar & Uzlu, 2016, p. 128).

During the implementation of the GAP, a cascade of 19 hydroelectric power plants was built – one of the largest hydroelectric complexes in the world, capable of generating 8,900 gigawatt-hours. As of 2010, it provided 22% of the national electricity consumption. Owing to the GAP implementation, the area of irrigated agricultural land in Turkey doubled, and within the Southeastern Anatolia region – from 2.9 to 22.8% (Balat, 2003, p. 391). Cotton production increased from 150,000 to 400,000 metric tons, making the southeastern regions of Turkey one of the largest cotton producers in the world. Owing to the GAP, the role of Southeast Anatolia in the structure of the country's exports increased significantly. If in 2002 the total volume of exports from the region amounted to 689 million US dollars, then in 2010 this indicator reached 4.166 billion US dollars. Long summer droughts typical of the GAP zone previously forced farmers to cultivate traditional crops that require little water, including winter crops, barley, lentils, and sesame. However, on the soil where irrigation became widespread owing to the GAP, farmers switched to the cultivation of cotton, tobacco and other more commercially profitable crops (GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı).

Along with enormous economic and social benefits that the GAP brought to Turkey and Southeast Anatolia in particular, its implementation aggravated international relations in the region significantly. The future launch of all GAP capacities will deprive Syria of 50% and Iraq of 90% of water from the Euphrates, and also threatens to pollute the lower reaches of

the river with fertilizers and pesticides. Thus, as of 2012, water flows to Syria have already decreased by 40%, and to Iraq – by 80% (Khlopov, 2019, p. 78). In addition, Syria also plans to divert a significant amount of water for the development of agriculture in the Euphrates valley. The approximate percentage of water that, according to forecasts, will be needed to meet water management needs of each country is the following: Iraq – 65%, Turkey – 52%, Syria – 32% (Akanda, Freeman & Placht, 2007, pp. 1–2). This percentage makes up an impossible 149% of a total demand for water of the Euphrates. Although disputes over fresh water distribution are likely to intensify in the future, tensions among the three countries have existed for a long time. Twice, in 1975 and 1998, it was possible to avoid a war based on the water conflict only owing to foreign mediation. At the end of the 20th – at the beginning of the 21st century the governments of Turkey, Syria and Iraq made several attempts to exchange data and discuss the problem collectively, however, so far the countries continue implementing their uncoordinated water management development projects.

The essence of the water conflict consists in the accusations of Arab countries against Turkey regarding the violation of international water laws regarding the Euphrates River. Iraq and Syria consider the river to be an international watercourse that should be treated as a unit by all riparian users. Ankara's position is that the Turkish law defines the Euphrates as a transboundary river that is under Turkey's exclusive sovereignty as long as it does not flow across the border. According to the Turkish side, the Euphrates becomes an international river only after it joins the Tigris in lower Iraq, forming the Shatt al-Arab, which serves as the border between Iraq and Iran until it reaches the Persian Gulf. Turkey argues its position by the fact that, unlike Syria and Iraq, it is not a party to the UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (Akanda, Freeman & Placht, 2007, p. 2).

On the other hand, the arguments of F. Lorenz and E. Erickson, who noted an uneven annual flow of the Tigris and Euphrates, deserve attention. If in the dry season their flow is 150 – 200 m³/s, then in the spring months this indicator can reach 5000 m³/s, which threatens devastating consequences for the lands in the lower reaches of the rivers, primarily in Iraq and Syria. Thus, hydrotechnical structures, primarily dams built during the implementation of the GAP, equipped with modern water management facilities and efficient reservoirs with low evaporation losses, can bring relief to countries located downstream, ensuring a more uniform and stable flow of water (Lorenz & Erickson, 1999, pp. 7–8).

Since the 1960s, differences of varying degrees of severity have arisen among Turkey, Iraq, and Syria over the shared use of the Euphrates. A steady growth of population in the region and desire for agricultural and food self-sufficiency have led to an increase in the demand for fresh water, and, in turn, to an increase in the number of projects aimed at water supply. A significant catalyst for the tension was the beginning of a practical implementation by the parties of large-scale water management development projects. Turkey constructed the first major dam in the basin, commissioning the Keban Dam in 1973 – 1974, and soon Syria constructed the Tabka Dam in 1975.

At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, the Turkish-Syrian-Iraqi relations over the use of water resources intensified. The contradictions were caused by the filling of the Atatürk Dam by Turkey, which led to a temporary suspension of water supply to Syria. Although the Turkish government made efforts to minimize the damage, Syria saw the move as an attempt to deliberately deprive it of access to the Euphrates waters. The problem of a joint use of Mesopotamia's water resources is complicated by the differences among Turkey, Iraq and Syria over the "Kurdish issue". For example, in 1989, due to the above-mentioned filling of

the Atatürk Dam and the lowering of the water level in the Euphrates valley, Iraq refused to conclude a security agreement with Turkey, according to which the latter's authorities were supposed to be able to bring to justice the Kurdish militants hiding in the territory of Iraq (Boyarkina, 2017, p. 59). Likewise, the "water conflict" between Turkey and Syria became political in 1998, when the Turkish government threatened Syria to block the Euphrates watercourse if it continued to support the Kurdistan Workers' Party. The outcome of the incident was the compromise Seikhan Treaty (Boyarkina, 2017, p. 59).

The national plans of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq for the development of the Euphrates waters during the past half century led to a significant reduction in the volume of the drain and a violation of the river's regime. Nowadays, the growth of demand for water resources, the uncoordinated plans of neighbouring countries regarding the implementation of infrastructure projects on the transboundary river, climate changes and other factors caused the drainage reduction of the main artery of Mesopotamia by 40 – 45% compared to the beginning of the 1970s.

According to L. Harris, the easing of international tension against the background of the "water conflict" in the Mesopotamia region is possible under the conditions of finding parity between Turkey's interests in South-Eastern Anatolia and the effective exploitation of GAP capacities on the one hand, and guarantees of water resources security, food security and a balanced development of agriculture in Syria and Iraq on the other hand (Harris, 2002, pp. 746–747).

A retrospective analysis of the Turkish-Syrian-Iraqi relations proved the presence of a positive experience and constructive steps in the settlement of mutual claims around the use of Euphrates water resources.

In 1946, Iraq and Turkey signed the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations, covering a wide range of issues defined in six additional protocols. In particular, Protocol No. 1 concerns the regulation of the use of the Tigris and Euphrates waters and their tributaries. Under the terms of the agreement, both parties recognized the importance of building environmental protection structures on the rivers to regulate water flow and prevent catastrophic floods. In addition, the need for operation of permanent observation posts was recognized. The agreement provided for a large-scale construction of hydrotechnical structures in the upper reaches of the Euphrates (on the territory of Turkey), which was supposed to contribute to the improvement of irrigation and ensure the production of more electricity in both countries. Mechanisms for joint analysis, monitoring and information exchange were developed to achieve the goals defined by the Protocol. Under such conditions, Iraq received the right to send technical experts to Turkey to conduct research, gather information, and prepare plans for possible construction works on various rivers. In addition, the protocol contained a number of obligations for Turkey. Firstly, Turkey was to provide the Iraqi experts with all the necessary information, access to hydrotechnical facilities, assistance and facilities, as well as to ensure cooperation with the Turkish experts. It was also required to establish permanent monitoring stations to ensure their operation and maintenance, and regularly report measurement results to the competent Iraqi authorities. Finally, Turkey was required to consult with Iraq regarding any Turkish construction plans on the Euphrates and to adapt the construction plans to the interests of both sides as far as possible. In practice, the implementation of hydrotechnical projects defined by the Treaty of 1946 started to slip and drag on, not the least due to the fears of the Turkish government about a possible encroachment on the country's sovereignty (Kirschner & Tiroch, 2012, pp. 369–370).

In 1984, Turkey suggested Syria and Iraq the “Three-Stage Plan for Optimum, Equitable and Reasonable Use of the Transboundary Watercourses of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin”, which provided for: 1) compilation of water resources cadastre; 2) compilation of land resources cadastre; 3) determining the optimal total water needs of each country for domestic, industrial and agricultural needs. However, the suggestion was rejected by Syria and Iraq, because Turkey’s three-stage plan was unable to ensure a fair and rational distribution of water resources (Altınbilek, 2004, p. 16).

In 1987, the Protocol on Economic Cooperation was signed between Turkey and Syria, which aimed at strengthening cooperation and a mutual benefit of both states in various fields, in particular in the oil and gas industry, electricity, banking, transport, telecommunications and trade. Paragraphs 6 – 10 of the Protocol related to water issues. In view of the future commissioning of the Atatürk Dam, a component of the South-Eastern Anatolia Project, the parties agreed on the joint use of the Euphrates resources. Turkey agreed to maintain the average annual flow of the Euphrates to Syria at a level of more than 500 m³/s. If the monthly flow fell below the agreed level, Turkey had to make up the difference during the following months (Kirschner & Tiroch, 2012, pp. 371–372). In addition, Turkey, similar to the aforementioned the 1946 Treaty with Iraq, agreed to jointly construct and operate irrigation and hydropower projects with Syria. However, the 1987 agreement was considered provisional until Turkey and Syria reached a final agreement with Iraq on distribution of the Euphrates waters among the three riparian countries. To date, the final agreement on distribution of the Euphrates waters has not been concluded yet.

In 1989, Iraq and Syria adopted the Joint Protocol on the preliminary distribution of the Euphrates River waters, according to which Syria undertook to use 42% for its own needs and to ensure the transit of 58% of the Euphrates water flow to Iraq.

In the 1990s, with the exception of the Joint Communique on Cooperation concluded between Syria and Turkey in January of 1993, which only indirectly concerned the water issue, no water agreements were reached among Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, the riparian states.

In the 21st century diplomatic efforts to resolve the water conflict around the Euphrates received a new impetus, leading to the signing of a number of memorandums of understanding, joint communiqués and other agreements related to water issues. The first significant breakthrough was the joint communique between Turkey and Syria in 2001. The agreement provides for technical cooperation between the parties, including training programmes, joint water management development projects, as well as exchange and partnership programmes. It should be noted that the agreement concerned the GAP for the first time. In particular, Turkey declared its readiness to manage certain GAP sectors in the field of irrigation with Syria. In addition, the exchange programme provided for the visits of Syrian engineers to Turkey to participate in the implementation of projects “Management, Operation and Maintenance of Irrigation Systems in the Region of South-Eastern Anatolia”, “Joint Development of Rural Areas” and “Improvement of Soil and Restoration of Soil Quality by the Use of Agricultural Waste and Biofertilizers”. In 2002 and 2009, the Syrian-Iraqi and Syrian-Turkish agreements were concluded, respectively, on the installation of pumping stations for taking water from the Tigris River. Both agreements regulate the amount of water that Syria can pump from the river. In turn, Syria is obliged to report on all stages of project implementation, as well as on the volume of water pumped. In the agreement, the parties agreed on a joint monitoring of the river flows by establishing appropriate monitoring stations. The 2002 Agreement also provides for the establishment of a joint technical committee to determine the amount of

water pumped from the pumping station regularly. In addition, Iraq and Syria emphasize their obligations to the UN Watercourses Convention. The 2009 Syrian-Turkish agreement does not contain such far-reaching provisions regarding a joint monitoring. However, it emphasizes a regular exchange of data and information (Kirschner & Tiroch, 2012, pp. 373–374).

The 2008 drought that hit Mesopotamia forced Turkey, Syria, and Iraq to seek compromises over water use. In this regard, the parties reached an agreement on restarting the work of the Joint Technical Committee. Also, with the aim of improving cooperation on the Euphrates River, Syria and Turkey adopted a Memorandum of Understanding in water management in 2009 (Boyarkina, 2017, p. 60). In addition, the parties once again declared their desire to conclude a final agreement on the distribution of the Euphrates and Tigris waters among all three riparian states. In 2009, the Turkish-Syrian memoranda were also signed in the field of effective use of water resources and combating drought, as well as in the field of restoring water quality (Kirschner & Tiroch, 2012, pp. 374–375). In the same year, at the World Water Summit, Turkey and Iraq concluded the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations, according to which Turkey was supposed to ensure the drainage of the Euphrates to the territory of Iraq at the level of 400 m³/s, but due to a significant decrease in the amount of precipitation, the agreement implementation was suspended (Khlopov, 2010, p. 79).

In the Mesopotamia region the “water conflict” requires outside interference to push Turkey, Iraq and Syria into constructive tripartite talks. Such a mediator can offer them a reliable, mutually beneficial alternative solution. Three potential mediators with the necessary legitimacy, technical and financial resources are, in our view, Saudi Arabia, Egypt or the World Bank.

A long history of diplomatic attempts to resolve the water conflict among Turkey, Syria and Iraq proves that the parties recognize the importance of cooperation, implementation of a joint irrigation and hydropower projects, exchange of information and the need for consultations, but the majority of agreements, memoranda and communiqués, adopted during the period of the 1940s – 2010s, are marked by declarativeness and do not regulate clear algorithms of such cooperation.

From the point of view of modern international law, a compromise option for solving the “water conflict” in Mesopotamia is the implementation of “joint jurisdiction” and “equitable use” principles, based on the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty and integrity in individual river basins. The principle of “joint jurisdiction” consists in the need for cooperation in the distribution of water resources of all countries of the international river basin, which, in fact, means a “collective ownership” of water resources. The principle of “fair use” means the possibility of using water resources by any country through which the river flows in a way that does not harm other countries of the same river basin. In this case, the requirements of the parties should be sufficiently flexible and based on an analysis of the needs of the population, taking into account socio-economic needs.

The Conclusions. Based on the analysis of the origins and development of the Turkish-Syrian-Iraqi contradictions regarding the joint use of the Mesopotamia rivers, as well as the influence of the GAP on the course of the “water conflict”, the authors made a number of conclusions and generalizations.

The GAP is one of the largest regional development projects ever undertaken in the Middle East and one of the nine largest engineering projects in the world nowadays. During period of the 1990s – 2010s, the GAP transformed the region of Southeast Anatolia completely, reducing the disparity among the regions creating favourable conditions for a socio-economic

development. On the other hand, the GAP has caused great alarm in Syria and Iraq, as its launch at full capacity would deprive Syria of 50% and Iraq of 90% of their water flow from the Euphrates. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that Turkey, which owns 40% of the Euphrates and 25% of the Tigris, uses 85% and 40% of their water flow, respectively.

The river systems of the Middle East are international in nature, and the use of their resources is not regulated by international agreements, since they have not been ratified by all parties. Thus, the user countries have a special responsibility for the exploitation of water resources, their preservation and prevention of pollution. The joint use of water resources in the region should be based on transparent, clear and competent agreements, which contain quantitative and qualitative characteristics of water resources. These agreements should determine principles and regulate practical mechanisms for the use of water resources of the Euphrates and Tigris, control of water quality, volumes of its consumption, as well as determine measures to protect the environment.

The weakening of international tension against the background of the “water conflict” in the Mesopotamia region is possible under the conditions of finding parity between Turkey’s interests in Southeast Anatolia, an effective exploitation of the GAP capacities, and at the same time – guaranteeing the safety of water resources, food security and balanced development of agriculture in Syria and Iraq, which lie in the lower reaches of the Euphrates.

A retrospective analysis of the Turkish-Syrian-Iraqi relations proved the presence of a positive experience and constructive steps in the settlement of mutual claims around the use of Mesopotamia’s water resources.

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**FORMATION PECULIARITIES
OF THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL RADICALISM (2012 – 2024)**

Abstract. *The purpose of the research* is to identify the peculiarities of the Russian political radicalism through the prism of its affiliation and formation under the presidency of Vladimir Putin (2012 – 2024). *The methodology of the research* is based on an integrated approach, as well as the

use of a special computer method of complex analysis (CNA), as well as special historical methods (historical typological and historical systemic), with the help of which the authors managed to elucidate the peculiarities of the Russian political radicalism formation during the specified period. **The scientific novelty** consists in the identification of the ideological component of the Russian political radicalism through the use of an innovative computer methodology. **The Conclusions.** The Russian political radicalism is a multi-layered phenomenon that has been shaped by historical, social, economic and political factors. During the period of 2012 – 2024, V. Putin's ideological discourse has been undergoing a "conservative turn", defined as "Russia's special path". The results of the study have shown that this ideology during this period is not an exclusively internal phenomenon of this country. The Russian right-wing radicalism has been formed not simply by borrowing ideas from the West, but on the basis of the existing connection between Russia and Western countries. The connection could be traced not only by means of organisations that had influence but also due to the influence of thinkers, theorists, ideologues, and adherents of various movements of the extreme right-wing radicalism and religious political radicalism. The most influential have been a group of extreme right-wing thinkers among them. It should be noted that Aleksandr Dugin and Russian billionaire Konstantin Malofeev have been among the active promoters of Western ideas of the right-wing radicalism in Russia. Therefore, the myth should be debunked regarding the statement of the Russian government and the Russian elite that the Russian right-wing radicalism has been exclusively Russian. In this case, it is more decent to appeal to the claim made by Putin and some Western representatives of the far right that Russia is the West – but the West that they believe has been lost due to the overwhelming influence of the liberal and leftist values. Putin's ideology (2012 – 2024) has been a distorted, Russified model of political radicalism based on a combination of authoritarianism, patriotism, anti-Western sentiment, conservatism, state capitalism and military force. This ideology has allowed V. Putin and his entourage to ensure control over the country and pursue an aggressive foreign policy, posing a serious threat to the integrity of the international relations system. A striking example is the Russo-Ukrainian War, which broke out in 2014 and continues to this day. This war has posed a serious threat to the collapse of the European project and the emergence of the Kremlin's Eurasian anti-liberal project in its place.

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Key words: Russian political radicalism, Putin's ideology, Russia, the West, America.

ОСОБЛИВОСТІ СТАНОВЛЕННЯ РОСІЙСЬКОГО ПОЛІТИЧНОГО РАДИКАЛІЗМУ (2012 – 2024)

Анотація. **Мета дослідження** – визначити особливості російського політичного радикалізму через призму його приналежності та формування за президентства Владіміра Путіна (2012 – 2024). **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на комплексному підході, в основі якого лежить використання спеціального комп'ютерного методу комплексного аналізу (CNA), а також спеціально-історичних методів (історико-типологічний та історико-системний), за допомогою яких авторам вдалося з'ясувати особливості формування російського політичного радикалізму упродовж вказаного періоду. **Наукова новизна** полягає у визначенні ідеологічної складової російського політичного радикалізму шляхом застосування новаторської комп'ютерної методики. **Висновки.** Російський політичний радикалізм є багатопларовим явищем, яке сформувалося під впливом історичних, соціальних, економічних та політичних факторів. Упродовж 2012 – 2024 рр. в ідеологічному дискурсі В. Путіна відбувається "консервативний поворот", який визначається як "особливий шлях Росії". Результати проведеного дослідження свідчать, що ця ідеологія упродовж вказаного періоду не є винятково внутрішнім явищем цієї країни. Російський правий радикалізм формувалася не просто із запозиченням ідей Заходу, а на основі усталеного зв'язку між Росією та країнами Заходу. Цей зв'язок простежується через вплив не скільки організацій, скільки мислителів, теоретиків, ідеологів, адентів різних течій вкрай правого радикалізму та релігійного політичного радикалізму, з-поміж яких найбільш впливовими виявилися група вкрай правих мислителів. Варто зауважити, що серед активних популяризаторів західних ідей правого радикалізму в Росії є Александр Дугін та російський

мільярдер Костянтин Малофеев. Російський правий радикалізм не є винятково російським, як про це заявляють представники російського уряду та, російської еліти. Правильнішим у цьому випадку є твердження самого В. Путіна та деяких західних представників вкрай правих, що Росія це і є Захід, але такий Захід, який був, на їхню думку, втрачений через надто сильний вплив ліберальних і лівих цінностей.

Ідеологія Путіна (2012 – 2024) – це спотворена, доопрацьована “по-російськи” модель політичного радикалізму, яка базується на поєднанні авторитаризму, патріотизму, антизахідних настроїв, консерватизму, державного капіталізму та військової сили. Ця ідеологія дає змогу В. Путіну та його оточенню забезпечити контроль над країною та проводити агресивну зовнішню політику, становлячи серйозну небезпеку цілісності системи міжнародних відносин. Яскравим прикладом є російсько-українська війна, яка почалася у 2014 р. і триває донині. Ця війна є серйозною загрозою розвалу європейського проєкту і приходу на його місце Євразійського антиліберального проєкту Кремля.

Фінансування. Робота виконана за підтримки Національного наукового центру (Польща) в рамках дослідницького проєкту “Історичні наративи в Web 2.0 як функціональний елемент національних ідентичностей у Центральній та Східній Європі”, № УМО-2020/39/В/HS3/01237.

Ключові слова: російський політичний радикалізм, путінська ідеологія, Росія, Захід, Америка.

The Problem Statement. The political radicalism has always been an ideological component of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and nowadays the Russian Federation, and it has been clearly visible since Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia at the early 21st century. The Russian political radicalism is a multi-layered phenomenon that was formed under the influence of historical, social, economic and political factors. It not only affects Russia’s domestic politics, but also has a significant impact on the international security and stability. In turn, Putin’s ideology, well known as the “Russkiy mir” (Russian World) doctrine, is authoritarian, nationalistic, anti-Western, and military. Russia’s ruling circles emphasise the autonomy of the Russian political tradition constantly, although the reality is the opposite. Russia usually does not generate new ideas – it borrows them from others and then brings them to ad absurdum (Hovorun, 2023).

Therefore, **the purpose of the research** is to elucidate the structure and connections of the Russian political radicalism through the prism of its belonging and formation as an exclusively Russian phenomenon or ideology based on Western ideologemes.

The Review of Recent Research and Publications. Putin’s aggressive policy is increasingly attracting the attention of the international community. The scholars were not left out. There were different studies published on the interpretation and understanding of the Russian ideological component (Charles Clover (Clover, 2022), Nicola Guerra (Guerra, 2024), Ralf Havertz (Havertz, 2021), Robert Horvath (Horvath, 2021), Mikhail Suslov (Suslov, 2024) and the others) during the last 10 years. There were debates regarding the definition of the Russian political system, opinions differed on the “hybrid regime”, authoritarianism and totalitarianism.

According to the Ukrainian scholar S. Hromenko, the political crisis in Russia in 2011 – 2012 ended the “hybrid regime” and facilitated the introduction of the “true” authoritarianism. Russia’s occupation of the Crimea in 2014 paved the way for totalitarianism. The manifestations on the political radicalism in Russia began to be actively observed in 2013. Thus, in his address to the Federal Assembly, Putin declared himself a conservative and signed a law against “propaganda of homosexuality” in Russia, hence, launching state homophobia. The Kremlin introduced the first laws against the “rehabilitation of the Nazism” in 2014. Russia rapidly turned into an authoritarian states

with some totalitarian elements (militarisation of kindergartens, a single history textbook at school, and “the foundations of the Russian statehood” in universities) at the beginning of 2022 (Hromenko, 2024).

Nowadays Putin’s rhetoric is entirely anti-Western. The so-called ideology of the “Russkiy mir” (Russian World) is an ideological undercurrent of xenophobia based on both the Old Russian nationalism and Western fascism. That is, it is not a coherent system of views formed exclusively by the Russian political elite. It is the liberals, who are the greatest global evil for Putinists, just as the communists were for the fascists and the communists and the Jews were for the Nazis (Hovorun, 2023).

However, there are also those, who reject the very possibility of ideology in modern Russia. S. Guriev, Head of the London Business School is among them, who emphasised that: “today there is no ideology in the Russian Constitution. In 2020, they added God and marriage as a union between a man and a woman, but it still says that there is no ideology in Russia. Putin has no internally agreed ideological principles and beliefs. You can find any set of words in Putin’s speeches – left, right, liberal, conservative, obscurantist, modern, pro-Western, anti-Western. These are just different versions of the propaganda he needs to stay in power” (Hromenko, 2024). However, the fact that contemporary the Russian ideology does not resemble the universally recognised ideologies of communism and conservatism does not mean that it does not exist at all. It exists, but it is a transformed ideology based on a military approach.

Despite the existing amount of scientific work on the topic we offered and the methodology of its research, there are practically no studies available today. A similar research methodology was applied in scientific articles written by: V. Ilnytskyi, V. Starka and M. Haliv (Ilnytskyi, Starka & Haliv, 2022), V. Telvak and W. Werner (Telvak & Werner, 2023), W. Werner and L. Vovchuk (Werner & Vovchuk, 2023; Vovchuk & Werner, 2024).

The Results of the Research. The question is whether the Russian political radicalism is really exclusively Russian, as the Russians themselves emphasise, or whether it is a myth. Or was this ideology formed on the basis of the introduction of certain Western ideologemes with the addition of Russia’s own vision? The authors conducted a thorough research using CAN in order to answer these questions.

As the classics once noted: “Russia cannot be understood with the mind” (Tyutchev, 2003, p. 165). His thesis has become a challenge for the scientific world, especially since the beginning of the 21st century, when Putin, a personality, who will try to “take apart and put together a single puzzle”, came to power in Russia for a long time. There are different approaches to explaining and understanding the behaviour and actions of Russia and its leader in 2012 – 2024 prompted the authors of this paper to try to provide their own vision of this aspect through a study of the scientific literature on this topic.

First of all, we selected foreign and Russian studies (monographs, scientific articles, Internet sources) on the coverage of the Russian ideology or related to this topic. The total number of references was 145. The next step in the research was the formation of a database based on the selected scientific works. The main criteria for this database were: 1) the influence group, which includes the most influential Russian and foreign theorists, adherents, and ideologues as disseminators of ideology (Table 1); 2) the Russian and foreign organisations as a source of influence (organisations, media, publishing houses) (Table 2); 3) the country of influence (source_Country) and the country being influenced (Country).

Table 1

Table of the most present in analysed sources Russian and foreign theoreticians, adepts, ideologists as spreaders of ideology

| № | Country | Group of influence |
|---|---------|--|
| 1 | Belgium | Jean-François Thiriart |
| 2 | France | Alain de Benoist Christian Bouchet |
| 3 | Italy | Claudio Mutti |
| 4 | Russia | Aleksandr Dugin Konstantin Malofeev Vladimir Putin |
| 5 | Spain | Ignacio Arsuaga |
| 6 | the USA | Allan C. Carlson |

Table 2

Table of the most present in analysed sources Russian and foreign organizations as a source of influence

| № | Country | Organizations as a source of influence |
|---|--------------------|---|
| 1 | France | GRECE National Front/National Rally |
| 2 | German | AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) German Imperial Party |
| 3 | Italy | Italian Social Movement New Order World Congress of Families XIII Verona |
| 4 | Russia | Elements FamilyPolicy.ru Hyperborea (Russia) International Russian Conservative Forum (2015) National Bolshevik Party, Patriarchal Commission on protection of motherhood and childhood Russkii Obraz |
| 5 | Spain | CitizenGO Hyperborea |
| 6 | the United Kingdom | Arktos Media British National Party |
| 7 | the USA | National Vanguard World Congress of Families (WCF) |

It is important that the agents of influence are the representatives of the second half of the 20th century and the 21st century. The same issue concerns organisations. Some of them no longer exist, but are mentioned in the researches we have studied as having influenced the formation of a global far right movement including the Russian ideology. These Tables (Figs. 1, 2) were created using the Degree centrality parameter (Werner & Vovchuk, 2023, p. 250).

The next step was to find out to what extent the Russian ideology is exclusively Russian, as the Russians claim. The scholars decided to do this by identifying the existing connection in terms of ideology between Russia and Western countries. Using the CNA approach to data analysis, a graph was constructed based on a comparison of the connections between states and

organisations (Table 3). According to this graph, Russia has ideological ties with Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Spain and the United States, with the two former having the strongest ties.

Analysing this graph with the help of the Betweenness centrality parameter (Fig. 1), the highest result is observed for the vertices ‘source_Russia’ and ‘Russia’, ‘National Bolshevik Party’, ‘Russkii Obraz’, which indicates that the Russian organisations had the greatest influence on the formation of the Russian discourse of political radicalism.




Fig. 1. Graph 1 on relations between States and organizations (State – Organization – State)

Table 3

Table of the most central vertices (parameter of betweenness: localisation of vertex in shortest way between other vertices)

| № | Node | betweenness |
|----|--|-------------|
| 1 | source_Russia | 0.295333 |
| 2 | World Congress of Families (WCF) | 0.236630 |
| 3 | National Party of Europe | 0.230482 |
| 4 | Russia | 0.226904 |
| 5 | Italy | 0.226758 |
| 6 | European Liberation Front | 0.213273 |
| 7 | National Bolshevik Party | 0.203685 |
| 8 | World Congress of Families XIII Verona | 0.190872 |
| 9 | Young Europe | 0.189867 |
| 10 | Russkii Obraz | 0.126844 |
| 11 | Patriarchal Commission on protection of motherhood and childhood | 0.113778 |
| 12 | CEDADE | 0.109472 |
| 13 | United Kingdom | 0.102722 |
| 14 | Italian Social Movement | 0.098406 |
| 15 | German Imperial Party | 0.096203 |
| 16 | France | 0.079284 |
| 17 | Golden Dawn | 0.073674 |
| 18 | British National Party | 0.073259 |
| 19 | source_Germany | 0.073101 |
| 20 | Hyperborea (Spain) | 0.061686 |
| 21 | Hyperborea (Russia) | 0.060949 |
| 22 | source_Italy | 0.059107 |
| 23 | New Order | 0.058941 |
| 24 | FamilyPolicy.ru | 0.054636 |
| 25 | National Vanguard | 0.051590 |
| 26 | International Russian Conservative Forum (2015) | 0.049367 |
| 27 | AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) | 0.049367 |
| 28 | GRECE | 0.049041 |
| 29 | Third Position | 0.040406 |
| 30 | source_Spain | 0.039326 |

However, we can see the links between Russian organisations and Western ones in the following clusters. In the cluster with the Russian far right organisation Russkii Obraz at the top (created by Ilya Goryachev (Horvath, 2021, p. 40)), we can see its connection with the Serbian far right organisation the organisation Obraz, which was the ideological inspiration for the founders of the Russkii Obraz. The second Western organisation that had an ideological influence was the Irish Republican Army (IRA).

An interesting feature of the Russkii Obraz cluster is that it is separate from the main “Russia” cluster. It suggests that despite the existing ties between this organisation and organisations in “Russia” cluster, they are not as strong as the ties with the Russian nationalist organisations that existed in the 2000s. It can be safely said that the Russian nationalist organisations in the 2000s formed a world of their own, a special world. This structure of

communication is a prerequisite that confirms the thesis of Robert Horvath, the author of the book on the history of the *Russkij Obraz*, that the peculiarity of the Russian nationalism was that it was subjected to a policy of “management” (menaged nationalism) by the Kremlin (Horvath, 2021, p. 40).

Another cluster in which the Russian organisations have links with Western organisations was the ‘USA’ cluster, in which the main organisation is the World Congress of Families (WCF). The WCF was an American Christian right-wing organisation that was formed by Allan C. Carlson, an American scholar and Reagan appointee to the National Commission on Children, as a result of his meeting with the Russian sociologist Anatolij Antonov and others intellectuals in Moscow in 1995. The WCF’s activities were focused on supporting the anti-LGBT movement (limiting the rights of LGBT people under the pretext of protecting the “natural family” – defined as heterosexual married couples with their biological children) (Wepukhulu, 2023) and organising conferences. There were the following participants in WCF conferences: the representatives of both the Christian Right and other extreme right-wing movements. The WCF’s cooperation with the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian far right, especially with billionaire Konstantin Malofeev, is particularly important (Tip of the Iceberg, 2021).

The WCF is linked in this cluster to the Spanish Christian right organisation CitizenGO and to the Russian organisation FamilyPolitycy.ru, created by Alexey Komov, who was a member of the WCF in the 2010s. It is interesting that the American media outlet ‘InfoWars’, owned by Alex Jones, one of the main media activists of the Alt-Right, is linked to the Russian media outlet ‘Tsargrad’, owned by Konstantin Malofeev, a Russian billionaire and one of the main proponents of promoting the ideas of traditional values and decommunisation.

Malofeev supports the Russian Orthodox Church and Putin’s ideas actively. He was among the supporters of Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and the war with Ukraine. He financed Strelkov’s (Girkin’s) unit at the very beginning of the war. Strelkov himself used to work as a security guard for Malofeev’s company (Marshall Malofeev..., 2014). Malofeev’s influence can be traced through the activities of his various organisations such as: Tsargrad TV channel (Malofeev letom zapuskaet, 2015), Katehon portal (Shekhovtsov, 2023, p. 175), NGOs Safe Internet League and St. Basil the Great Foundation on the Russian territory.

K. Malofeev sponsored the nationalist student movement “Brotherhood of Academics”. This organisation has branches in various Russian universities and holds militant imperialist views”. Shortly before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, “the Brotherhood” grew from a local community at the Tsargorod Society to a structure with branches in at least 20 cities in Russia and on the territories of Ukraine, including Kherson region and the Crimea.

This organisation held lectures on the Russian nationalism for its members, meetings with the regional politicians far right and conservative speakers. There were among them, for example, the daughter of the far right philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, who Daria and Pyotr Tolstoy, a member of Putin’s United Russia party. The members of the brotherhood see Russia’s “mission” as defeating “global evil” and “standing guard over the Christian Faith and traditional values”. At the same time, the Russian Orthodox Church should “acquire universal status and become the first in world Orthodoxy”. In their view, the existence of Ukraine is a constant threat to the Russian civilisation (Rosiiskyi oliharkh, 2024).

The third top in parameter of betweenness is the National Party of Europe, a British organisation founded in 1962 by the British prewar-fascist leader Oswald Moseley, which

aimed at uniting supporters of pan-European nationalism. The members of this organisation were: Union Movement (UK), German Imperial Party, Italian Social Movement and Young Europe (Belgium) (Goddrick-Clarke, 2002, p. 30).

The idea of pan-European nationalism also unites the Belgian-Spanish cluster, which is based on the Belgian organisation Young Europe, which was created by Jean-François Thiriart, a representative of Belgian political radicalism. He was a theorist of pan-European nationalism which objective was to create a single pan-European state. He considered the idea of creating a Euro-Soviet Empire (Shekhovtsov, 2018, pp. 30–31). In 1992, a few months before his death, he travelled to Russia, where he met with A. Dugin.

The National Bolshevik Party, a political party founded by A. Dugin and Eduard Limonov in 1993, also holds a dominant position in the graph (Laruelle, 2015, p. 12). Although the name of the party and its ideology contain the word bolshevism, the formation of this organisation was the result of reception not of Lenin's ideas, but of the western extreme right-wing current of the National Bolshevism, which was formed at the beginning of the 1920s in Germany (Shekhovtsov, 2018, p. 4). A. Dugin became familiar with the ideas of the National Bolshevism during his travels in Western Europe. In 1994, the National Bolshevik Party joined the European Liberation Front, which was established in 1991 (Laruelle, 2015, p. 46).

The Patriarchal Commission on the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood, an organisation of the Russian Orthodox Church established in 2011, whose members included Patriarch Kiril, K. Malofeev (Obrazovan Patriarshiy sovet, 2011) and sociologist Anatoliy Antonov (Spisok ekspertov Patriarshey komissii, 2022), also plays a significant role. The commission cooperated with FamilyPolicy.ru, an organisation of A. Komov, and with the Western Christian right, especially the WCF (Stoeckl & Uzlaner, 2022, pp. 1–2, 109).

Based on the results of Graph 1, we can talk about Russia's existing ties with Western countries, dominated by Italy and France, and the influence of Western organisations on the Russian ones in terms of ideology through both cooperation and borrowing ideas. However, these ties are rather dispersed.


We constructed Graph 2 based on the Louvain Community Detection Algorithm (Fig. 2) in order to verify the validity of these results, which surprised us. According to this Graph, Russia has closer ties with the United States, Ireland, Bulgaria and Serbia, while its ties with the previously identified countries do not have such kind of influence. The dominant position in this case is occupied by the United States, which has become a 'donor' of the nationalist ideas, anti-globalisation and religious fundamentalism to Russia.

It is well known that philosophers, thinkers, and theorists play an important role in the formation of any political ideology, as they are the originators of the basic ideas and concepts of the ideology. It is them, who create the philosophical basis that explains and justifies specific political views and goals.

Therefore, we tried to find out which connection and influence is stronger in the formation of the Russian political radicalism: the country, the organisation, or theorists, adherents, and ideologues. We constructed graphs 3 and 4 (Fig. 2, 3) in order to do it, which were based on these three categories. The results showed that Russia has closer ties not with countries or organisations, but rather with the help of the individuals. The dominant positions in this case are occupied by the Italian, the French, and the Belgian theorists and ideologues.

The betweenness parameter in Graph 4 (Table 4) again confirms the significance of the vertices in the person category. There are occupied 10 positions out of the 30 top positions

by the philosophers, theorists and ideologues. The highest ranking belongs to the Russian philosopher, politician, political scholar, fascist publicist, an ideologue of neo-Eurasianism and Traditionalism A. Dugin among them. It can be explained, firstly, by the strong syncretism of his thought, which was influenced by the Traditionalism, Conservative Revolution, the New Right, Eurasianism, geopolitics, pan-European nationalism, the national Bolshevism and Alt-Right.



**Fig. 2. Graph 2: communities in Graph 1
(Groups of vertices linked with each other stronger than with others)**




Fig. 3. Graph 3: Relation between States – organizations and peoples (State – organization – personage)

Not only A. Dugin was a key figure in the Russian adoption of the ideologies of the Western far-right political radicals, but he also had influence on the Western far-right political radicalism. Dugin’s numerous ties to the Western far right and his particularly syncretic nature indicate that, although he positions himself as the creator of a “special path” in philosophy, which he called the Fourth Political Theory and which supports

Russia's particular anti-Western path, nevertheless, he is a successor of many Western currents concerning the political radicalism and an active participant in the Western discourse of far-right political radicalism, rather than the creator of a "special path" of the Russian far-right thought.

In the 1990s, A. Dugin established the Russian journals: "Milyi Angel" and "Elements" (Shekhovtsov, 2015, pp. 39–40), which published the Russian translations of articles by the Western representatives of far right radicalism. Chief focus was on the works by the representatives of the French New Right and Italian Traditionalism (Laruelle, 2019, p. 156, 159).

As it is shown in Graph 4, Dugin's influence can be traced primarily within the discourse of the Russian and Western extreme right-wing thought. Some Western journalists claimed that A. Dugin is not Putin's "brain". Today, there are no reliable sources indicating Dugin's influence on Putin or Putin's support for Dugin. Dugin supports Vladimir Putin, especially his actions regarding Russia's war against Ukraine (Dugin, 2024a).

Dugin was particularly linked to the Russian billionaire Konstantin Malofeev as he was involved in projects such as Tsargrad TV in the Russian far-right discourse during the 2010s and 2020s. This connection further highlights that while Malofeev is a particular Russian Christian right-winger, who worked closely with the Western Christian right in the 2010s, he is far more radical than many on the Western Christian right.

The second position in terms of influence is occupied by the ideas of Roberto Fiore, a representative of the Italian fascism. His concept was influenced by the ideas of Julius Evola – the Italian Philosopher of fascism and Traditionalism. At the end of 1980s, he collaborated with the British fascist party National Front (Godrick-Clarke, 2002, p. 68). In the 1990s Fiore created the New Force Party (Guerra, 2024, p. 141). The third place goes to Vladimir Yakunin, the Russian billionaire and former Head of Russian Railways. A strong supporter of traditional values, Yakunin financed the events connected with the WCF like the conference: the "Large Families – the Future of Humanity" International Forum in 2014.

Fourth to sixth places were given to the Western representatives of far right political radicalism Jean-François Thiriart, Alain de Benoist, Claudio Mutti.

The influence of A. Komov, the Russian supporter of traditional values, who was Malofeev's collaborator and a member of the WCF and CitizenGO is also noticeable (Tip of the Iceberg, 2021). He also worked with the Italian Lega Nord Party (Congresso Federale Lega Nord, 2013). His views were influenced by the Russian Orthodox Church Archpriest Dmitry Smirnov (who ranks 8th in column 4 in terms of influence) (Stoeckl & Uzlaner, 2022, p. 108). Smirnov was one of the creators of the International Forum 'Large Family and the Future of Humanity' which took place in Moscow in 2014 (On September, 2014).

Thus, Graphs 3 and 4 confirm that individuals, rather than organisations, had a greater influence on the formation of the Russian political radicalism. This influence can be traced back to the Russian theorists, ideologues, and adherents who derived their ideas from the Italian, the French, the Spanish, the German, the British, and the American philosophers, theorists, and thinkers. It should be noted that such Russian representatives as A. Dugin, K. Malofeev, V. Yakunin, A. Komov, and D. Smirnov were among the organisers of the above-mentioned organisations, as well as among the members of radical foreign organisations.

Table 4

Table of the most central vertices in Graph 3

| № | Node | betweenness |
|----|--|-------------|
| 1 | Russia | 0.232135 |
| 2 | Aleksandr Dugin | 0.183792 |
| 3 | source_Russia | 0.169282 |
| 4 | Italy | 0.123960 |
| 5 | World Congress of Families (WCF) | 0.102982 |
| 6 | Arktos Media | 0.090745 |
| 7 | World Congress of Families XIII Verona | 0.090048 |
| 8 | source_USA | 0.089781 |
| 9 | source_Italy | 0.083468 |
| 10 | United Kingdom | 0.079578 |
| 11 | International Russian Conservative Forum (2015 r.). | 0.075286 |
| 12 | USA | 0.063147 |
| 13 | Roberto Fiore | 0.061589 |
| 14 | Vladimir Yakunin | 0.057090 |
| 15 | World Congress of Families XI The Budapest Family Summit | 0.052972 |
| 16 | Jean-François Thiriart | 0.050124 |
| 17 | Milyi Angel | 0.049299 |
| 18 | Orion | 0.045092 |
| 19 | source_Germany | 0.044690 |
| 20 | Russkii Obraz | 0.043425 |
| 21 | Alain de Benoist | 0.043354 |
| 22 | GRECE | 0.042719 |
| 23 | Claudio Mutti | 0.041657 |
| 24 | Alexey Komov | 0.039940 |
| 25 | CitizenGO | 0.035368 |
| 26 | Archpriest Dmitry Smirnov | 0.033929 |
| 27 | Brian S. Brown | 0.033891 |
| 28 | Elements (Russia) | 0.032977 |
| 29 | Germany | 0.032377 |
| 30 | Society of the Thule Group (Spain) | 0.031896 |

Discussion. Putin’s ideological discourse was not always the part of the Russian far-right political radicalism discourse. At the beginning of his first presidential term in 2000, in an interview in the first person, the Russian President emphasised Russia’s belonging to the Western European culture and the country’s democratic development. “Wherever our people live – in the Far East or the South – we are Europeans” (Gevorkyan, Kolesnikov & Timakova, 2000, pp. 155–156). However, this trend did not last long. Under the influence of the anti-Westernism ideas (traced in Putin’s Munich speech in 2007 (Vyistuplenie i diskussiya, 2007) and Putin’s organisation of the funeral of the white general Anton Denikin and the Russian Philosopher of fascism Ivan Ilyin in Moscow in 2005 (Verina, 2013)), the declared direction is gradually being veered off course.

At the beginning of of V. Putin’s second presidential term (in 2012), his ideology saw a so-called “conservative turn” based on new ideas of traditional values (Stoeckl & Uzlaner,

2022, pp. 76–77, 87–88). Putin emphasised a return to the Russian traditional values that had been formed over centuries. However, the very idea of the “traditional values” is of the Western origin. This idea was created among the American Christian Right in the second half of the 20th century (Solodovnikova, 2021). The American cultural wars started to become more globalised in the late 1980s, and it was within this framework that they started to influence the Russian Orthodox Church discourse in the 1990s.

During the 1990s, American figures of the Christian Right began to visit Russia, bringing with them the ideas of the anti-abortion movement and the traditional family (Stoeckl & Uzlaner, 2022, p. 126). Among them was the American demographer Allan C. Carlson, a follower of the Russian sociologist Pitirim Sorokin, who immigrated to the United States after the October Revolution and established a Sociology Department at Harvard. In 1995, Allan Carlson met with the Russian demographer Anatoliy Antonov in Moscow. The result of this meeting was Carlson’s decision to create an organisation in the United States to defend the traditional family – the World Congress of Families (Solodovnikova, 2021).

On December 12, 2012, in his Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, Putin named a number of ideas that would become important components of his ideology of political radicalism: spiritual bonds, traditional values, the cult of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, and the idea of Russia’s special civilisational path (Putin nazval Rossiyu, 2020).

And in 2013, on Putin’s initiative, a law on “foreign agents” was passed, which provided for punishment for insulting the religious feelings of believers and the so-called law banning LGBT propaganda. This period was a turning point in Putin’s ideology. Putin’s idea of Russian world began to be realised due to the annexation of the Crimea and the occupation of eastern Ukraine. Putin was aware of the Western support for Ukraine as an attempt to turn Ukraine into an “anti-Russia” (Statya Vladimira Putina, 2021). This idea was one of the manifestations of the growing radicalisation of the anti-Westernism in Russia.

The conservative turn in Putin’s ideology was supported by the representatives of the Western far-right radicalism. For example, there are the representatives of the American Alt-Right among them: Richard B. Spencer (Feuer & Higgins, 2016), Matthew Heimbach, Sam Dickson and Jared Taylor (Hankes, 2015), the member of the French New Right Guillaume Faye (François & Nonjon, 2022) and the Italian fascist activist Roberto Fiore (Chizhova & Shimov, 2015).

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, 2022 intensified the radicalisation of the idea of Russia’s special path. The Russian authorities declared that the war with Ukraine was allegedly a war between the Russian world and the West over the defence of traditional values (Patrushev, 2024). Later on, there was a reception of the ideas of the Western far-right radicalism, which appeared in the speeches of the representatives of various trends on the Russian radicalism – according to Putin’s speech, there appeared the idea of political correctness (Plenarnoe zasedanie, 2023), and according to Dugin’s speech during an interview with Tucker Carlson, the idea of “woke” (Dugin, 2024b). This once again emphasises that Russia is not on a special path. The Russian ideological discourse (2012 – 2024) is part of the Western far-right discourse.

The Conclusion. The Russian political radicalism is a multi-layered phenomenon that has been shaped by historical, social, economic and political factors. In the period of 2012 – 2024, V. Putin’s ideological discourse was undergoing a “conservative turn”, defined as “Russia’s special path”. The results of the study have shown that this ideology during this period is not an exclusively internal phenomenon of this country. The Russian right-wing

radicalism has been formed not simply by borrowing ideas from the West, but on the basis of the existing connection between Russia and Western countries. The connection could be traced not only by means of organisations that had influence but also due to the influence of thinkers, theorists, ideologues, and adherents of various movements of the extreme right-wing radicalism and religious political radicalism. The most influential have been a group of extreme right-wing thinkers among them. It should be noted that A. Dugin and the Russian billionaire K. Malofeev have been among the active promoters of Western ideas of the right-wing radicalism in Russia.

Therefore, the myth should be debunked regarding the statement of the Russian government and the Russian elite that the Russian right-wing radicalism has been exclusively Russian. In this case, it is more decent to appeal to the claim made by Putin and some Western representatives of the far right that Russia is the West – but the West that they believe has been lost due to the overwhelming influence of the liberal and leftist values.

Putin's ideology (2012 – 2024) has been a distorted, Russianised model of political radicalism based on a combination of authoritarianism, patriotism, anti-Western sentiment, conservatism, state capitalism and military force. This ideology has allowed Vladimir Putin and his entourage to ensure control over the country and pursue an aggressive foreign policy, posing a serious threat to the integrity of the international relations system. A striking example is the Russo-Ukrainian War, which broke out in 2014 and continues to this day. This war has posed a serious threat to the collapse of the European project and the emergence of the Kremlin's Eurasian anti-liberal project in its place.

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**NATIONAL POLICE OF UKRAINE ACTIVITIES UNDER THE CONDITIONS
OF THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR (2014 – 2024):
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES, SECURITY CHALLENGES AND TASKS**

Abstract. *The purpose of the research* is to analyse the National Police of Ukraine activity as one of the key bodies of the law enforcement system. *The methodology of the research* is based on the modern general and special methods of knowledge, in particular, the historical legal method allowed to analyse the key areas of activity of law enforcement agencies in Ukraine, the comparative legal method has been used to study the legislation of Ukraine. *The scientific novelty of the research* consists in the fact that the normative and legal acts have been systematized and analysed, changes in the activities of law enforcement agencies have been outlined, their involvement in the administrative procedures of accompanying military operations under the conditions of the Anti-terrorist operation, the Operation of the Combined Joint Forces and under the conditions of the legal regime of the Martial Law, brought in after the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation to Ukraine. The key areas of law enforcement of the National Police of Ukraine activities under the Martial Law conditions have also been elucidated comprehensively. **The Conclusions.** It has been determined that the National Police activities are aimed at fulfilling the powers related to law enforcement and preventing and solving the issues on the military threats under the conditions of the legal regime of the Martial Law. It includes, in particular ensuring law and order and public safety, countering crimes against the national security of Ukraine,

and preventive activities regarding crimes against the legal regime of the Martial Law. Having analysed the current innovations, which came into effect when the armed invasion was launched in 2014 and from the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022, it was stated that the National Police of Ukraine was entrusted with a number of new powers. The majority of the above-mentioned functional changes were implemented after 2022, in particular, in accordance with the Law “On Amendments to the Laws of Ukraine “On the National Police”, “On the Disciplinary Statute of the National Police of Ukraine” aimed at optimizing police activities, including during the Martial Law of March 15, 2022.

Key words: armed conflict, war, martial law, national security, National Police of Ukraine, criminal offenses, war crimes, countermeasures, operative investigative activity, pretrial investigation, investigative (detective) actions, undercover (investigative) investigative actions.

ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ ПОЛІЦІЇ УКРАЇНИ В УМОВАХ РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ (2014 – 2024): ОРГАНІЗАЦІЙНІ ЗМІНИ, БЕЗПЕКОВІ ВИКЛИКИ І ЗАВДАННЯ

Мета дослідження – з’ясувати зміст діяльності Національної поліції України як одного із ключових органів правоохоронної системи у роки сучасної російсько-української війни. **Методологію дослідження** становлять сучасні загальні та спеціальні методи пізнання, зокрема історико-правовий уможливив провести аналіз ключових напрямів діяльності правоохоронних органів України, порівняльно-правовий метод використано для вивчення законодавства України. **Наукова новизна:** систематизовано та проаналізовано нормативно-правові акти й окреслено зміни у діяльності правоохоронних органів, їх залучення до адміністративних процедур супроводження воєнних дій в умовах Антитерористичної операції, Операції об’єднаних сил та в умовах правового режиму воєнного стану, запровадженого після повномасштабного вторгнення РФ в Україну. Також комплексно визначені ключові напрями правоохоронної діяльності Національної поліції України в умовах воєнного стану. **Висновки.** Констатовано, що в умовах правового режиму воєнного стану діяльність Національної поліції спрямована на виконання повноважень, пов’язаних із правоохоронною діяльністю, а також попередження і розв’язання проблем воєнних загроз. Це зокрема, – забезпечення правопорядку та громадської безпеки, протидія злочинам проти національної безпеки України, превентивна діяльність щодо злочинів, спрямованих проти правового режиму воєнного стану. Аналізуючи нововведення, що вступили у дію з початком збройного вторгнення у 2014 р. та від початку повномасштабного вторгнення у 2022 р., стверджено, що на Національну поліцію Україну покладено низку нових повноважень. Більшість цих функціональних змін вступили в дію після 2022 р., зокрема, відповідно до Закону “Про внесення змін до законів України “Про Національну поліцію” та “Про Дисциплінарний статут Національної поліції України” з метою оптимізації діяльності поліції, особливо під час дії режиму воєнного стану від 15 березня 2022 р.

Ключові слова: збройний конфлікт, війна, воєнний стан, національна безпека, Національна поліція України, кримінальні правопорушення, воєнні злочини, протидія, оперативно-розшукова діяльність, досудове розслідування, слідчі (розшукові) дії, негласні (слідчі) розшукові дії.

The Problem Statement. Due to the events of the Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity that led to democratization of social relations; there is a drastic need for changes in government institutions at all levels, as the social pressure on the political processes in the state intensified (Sviatokum, Serdyuk & Duyne, 2020, p. 341). As a result, the European norms and practices were approved, as well as partial reform of legislation in Ukraine and its law enforcement system in particular. In December of 2014, the Ministry for Internal Affairs of Ukraine sent a draft law on the formation of the National Police of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The above-mentioned step was preceded by the adoption of the Strategy for the Development of Internal Affairs Bodies of Ukraine in October of 2014. In this document, the requirements and offers were developed based on the experience of other

states that were to be implemented by the police in Ukraine. First of all, it dealt with the effective public control introduction, a democratic system of accountability to society, and the establishment of partnership relations with population. In 2015, the “Law on the National Police” was adopted, according to which the National Police were defined as “a central body of the executive power that serves society by ensuring the protection of human rights and freedoms” (Vlasenko, 2017, p. 148).

The Review of Recent Publications and Research. There were numerous foreign scholars, who studied democratic transformations in Ukraine after the events of the Revolution of Dignity and subsequent reforms, in particular, the law enforcement system: I. Käihkö (Käihkö, 2023), P. van Duyne, K. von Lampe (Duyne, Serdyuk, Antonopoulos, Harvey & Lampe, 2023) and the others. There should be singled out the scholars, who studied the National Police of Ukraine activities, regulatory and legal changes and challenges under the conditions of the Russian aggression and, above all, a full-scale invasion, among them the studies by M. Kovaliv, V. Ivakha (Kovaliv & Ivakha, 2016), O. Bezpalova, K. Chyshko, A. Bakhaieva, V. Makarenko (Bezpalova, Chyshko, Bakhaieva & Makarenko, 2022), V. Ilnytskyi, V. Starka and M. Haliv (Ilnytskyi, Starka & Haliv, 2022), H. Muliar (Muliar, 2023), O. Kobzar, M. Romanov (Kobzar & Romanov, 2024).

The purpose of the research is to carry out a comprehensive analysis of changes in the activities of the National Police in Ukraine since the Russo-Ukrainian War broke out, in particular the regulatory and legal foundations, practical challenges.

The Research Results. The review on the aspects of the activities of law enforcement agencies was carried out when the armed invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine happened in February-March of 2014. The legal regime of the Anti-Terrorist Operation was introduced, as a result of the respond to the threats to the national security and sovereignty of the Ukrainian state. The National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine considered the possibility of introducing the Martial Law at the end of February of 2014, but due to a lack of votes, the above-mentioned decision was not adopted, instead – a legal mode of the Anti-terrorist operation was brought in, according to the Decree of the acting President of Ukraine issued on April 14 of 2014 No. 405/2014 (Pro rishennia Rady natsionalnoi bezpeky i oborony Ukrainy, 2014). In addition, there were adopted subsequently: the Law of Ukraine “On Temporary Measures for the Period of the Anti-Terrorist Operation” issued on September 2, 2014 No. 1669VII; Law of Ukraine “On Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine” issued on April 15, 2014 No. 1207VII (Terekhov, 2023, p. 353). The scholar, lawyer V. Terekhov noted that these legislative acts were actually aimed at protecting only the civil rights of the individuals and legal entities, it was supplemented by the Law of Ukraine “On Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine” issued on April 15 of 2014 No. 1207VII. However, it should be highlighted that the key provisions on defense, intelligence and counterintelligence measures were adopted only in 2022, after the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine (Terekhov, 2023, p. 353).

On February 24, 2022, the President of Ukraine imposed the legal regime of the Martial Law, adopted by the Law of Ukraine issued on May 12, 2015 No. 389-VIII “On Legal Regime of Martial Law” in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine and the Decree of the President of Ukraine on the introduction of the Martial Law in Ukraine. According to Article 1 of Part 1, the Martial Law is defined as a special legal regime that is introduced

in Ukraine or in certain localities “in the event of the armed aggression or threat of attack, danger to the state independence of Ukraine, its territorial integrity, and provides for the provision of relevant state authorities, military command, military administrations and local self-government bodies, powers necessary to avert the threat, repulse armed aggression and ensure national security, eliminate the threat of danger to the state independence of Ukraine, its territorial integrity, as well as a temporary restriction of the constitutional rights and freedoms of a person and citizen due to the threat, and rights and legitimate interests of legal entities with an indication of the period of validity of these restrictions” (Pro pravovyi rezhym voiennoho stanu, 2015).

Law enforcement agencies exercise their powers under the conditions of the Martial Law, in particular by priority means of protecting human rights and freedoms, but also act to preserve state sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state (Kobzar & Romanova, 2024, p. 108). One of the most important law enforcement agencies is the National Police of Ukraine, which during the Martial Law also exercises its powers to protect human rights and freedoms, at the same time, the full-scale invasion made numerous adjustments to the police officers work, who also began to be involved in the national security protection (Polyvaniuk, Zavistovskyi & Aslamov, 2024, p. 345).

The work of state authorities and law enforcement is determined in particular by the following normative legal acts under the conditions of the Martial Law: the Constitution of Ukraine, the Law of Ukraine “On Defense of Ukraine”, the Law of Ukraine “On National Security of Ukraine”, the Law of Ukraine “On Legal Regime of Martial Law”, the Law of Ukraine “On Approval of Decree of the President of Ukraine “On the Introduction of the Martial Law in Ukraine””, Decree of the President of Ukraine “On the Introduction of the Martial Law in Ukraine”, Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine “Regarding Emergency Measures to Ensure the State Sovereignty and Independence of Ukraine and the Introduction of the Martial Law in of Ukraine” issued on 26.11.2018 No. 0012525-18, the procedure for involving able-bodied people in socially useful work under the conditions of the Martial Law was approved by the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine issued on 13.07.2011 No. 753, the procedure for implementing measures during the introduction of a curfew and establishing a special light masking regime in certain localities where the Martial Law was imposed, approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Resolution No. 573 of 07/08/2020 (Bezpalova, Chyshko, Bakhaieva & Makarenko, 2022, pp. 5–6).

Due to the introduction of the Martial Law, there were determined certain features of the work of law enforcement agencies and the police in particular. It mainly concerns the maintenance of law and order, in fact, its protection is regulated by current legislation and specified in the existing situation, the state of the operational situation (Kovaliv & Ivakha, 2016, pp. 65–70). Hence, in addition to the areas of activity that are characteristic of peacetime, new ones are added that formulate countermeasures against the “internal threats of the Martial Law”: countermeasures against crimes aimed at undermining the foundations of the national security; combating terrorist manifestations, crime and offenses aimed at violating the legal regime of the Martial Law; ensuring law and order and public safety. At the same time, it should be noted that under the conditions of the legal regime of the Martial Law, the following areas of activity became priorities: “a) prevention and countermeasures against the internal threats of the Martial Law; b) assistance and joint implementation of the tasks assigned to the Security and Defense Forces within the defined powers; c) ensuring

law and order; d) maintenance of public order at an appropriate level” (Druchek, Voluiko & Vakarov, 2024, p. 44). At the same time, the key powers of the National Police of Ukraine to ensure security and law and order carried on to be implemented (presented in Article 23 of the Law of Ukraine “On the National Police of Ukraine”) (Bezpalova, Chyshko, Bakhaieva & Makarenko, 2022, p. 21).

The main organizational directions of the National Police of Ukraine under the conditions of the Martial Law are preventive activities, service at checkpoints. In addition, a significant part of the activity is related to work in the de-occupied territories. According to the Law of Ukraine “On National Police”, preventive measures include checking documents, surface inspection, stopping a vehicle and demanding to leave a certain place, or restricting access to a certain territory, breaking into a person’s home or other property, checking compliance with the conditions of the permit system, checking whether the person complies with the restrictions established by law. It also includes preventive measures, in particular under the conditions of the Martial Law, such measures are carried out to a greater extent than in other regions of Ukraine (according to the amendments and clarifications of the Law of Ukraine “On National Police of Ukraine” (Bezpalova, Chyshko, Bakhaieva & Makarenko, 2022, pp. 26–27).

New powers and functions of the National Police of Ukraine are regulated in accordance with the Law “On Amendments to the Laws of Ukraine “On National Police” and “On Disciplinary Statute of the National Police of Ukraine” in order to optimize the police’s activities, including during the period of the Martial Law from March 15, 2022. The new, expanded powers of the National Police are the following: “to receive emergency calls using the abbreviated number 102”; obtaining, upon written request, from the state bodies, local self-government bodies, state-owned legal entities, information “necessary for the performance of the tasks and powers of the police, including and regarding prisoners of war, in the form indicated in such a request. The subjects to whom a corresponding request is addressed are obliged to provide relevant information or inform about the reasons preventing its provision within three days, and in case of impossibility no later than ten days from the date of receipt of the request”; detained persons’ escort and detention; and in “cases provided for by law, to keep persons detained for committing criminal or administrative offenses in temporary detention centers”; carry out demining that is “operational in nature”, identify and defuse explosive objects; to organize admission to conduct, “special explosive works; carry out technical and forensic support for inspection of the scene of the incident” (Bezpalova, Chyshko, Bakhaieva & Makarenko, 2022).

The police officers performing official duties in civilian clothes, under the conditions of the Martial Law, “are allowed to act without a badge, when their presence does not prevent the implementation of operational and investigative measures”. The same authority applies to the identification number on personal protective equipment, i.e. a police officer may not place it during the official duties performance (Bezpalova, Chyshko, Bakhaieva & Makarenko, 2022, pp. 22–23).

An important area of activity of the National Police of Ukraine under the conditions of the Martial Law is involvement in the performance of tasks to support public safety and order, in particular during curfew hours, or under the conditions of hostilities and during liberation of occupied territories; at checkpoints; detection and liquidation of sabotage and reconnaissance groups during cooperation with units of the National Guard of Ukraine and the voluntary formations of the territorial communities (Afonin & Bokshorn, 2022, p. 226).

This activity was carried out in accordance with the Procedure for the implementation of measures during the introduction of a curfew and the establishment of a special light masking regime in certain areas where the Martial Law was imposed, approved by the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine issued on July 8 of 2020 No. 573. According to it, the post of the Commandant was introduced – “an authorized person of the military administration body, who is appointed by order of military command or military administration (in the case of its formation) and who is given the authority to take and ensure measures during the introduction of curfew and establishment of a special light masking regime on the territory, where a curfew was introduced and/or a special light masking regime was established”. It included employees of the “Armed Forces, the State Special Transport Service, the National Guard, the State Border Service, the policemen of the National Police, the servicemen and employees of the Security Service of Ukraine, the employees of the Federal Security Service, State Security Service, State Emergency Service, military administrations (if they are formed)” (Postanova Kabinetu Ministriv Ukrainy, 2020).

In accordance with this normative legal document, the employees of the National Police of Ukraine were part of the Commandant’s office, were involved in the interaction with other law enforcement agencies and were given the right to: detain and deliver to the National Police bodies persons, who have committed or are committing offenses; to check identity cards and documents confirming identity; to take away the objects with the help of which the offenses are committed from persons; temporarily restrict or completely prohibit movement on streets and roads, or in certain areas; to enter the territory and premises of institutions, organizations, enterprises or housing stock “belonging to persons, during the termination of a criminal offense and in the case of prosecution of persons suspected of committing a crime”; use of means of communication and transport for official purposes, which belong to persons (with their consent), enterprises, institutions; in accordance with the law, use physical measures of influence, the weapons” (Postanova Kabinetu Ministriv Ukrainy, 2020)

There are other important spheres of the National Police of Ukraine activity, which are also carried out under the conditions of the Martial Law, in particular, – continuation of representation and cooperation in Interpol and Europol (by the European Police Office); and at the same time continuing to collect biometric data (in accordance with Part 42, 43, 45 of Article 23 of the Law “On the National Police”) (Bezpalo, Chyshko, Bakhaieva & Makarenko, 2022, p. 23).

It should be noted that under the conditions of the Martial Law in Ukraine, the police officers, in accordance with Article 42 of the Law “On the National Police,” could apply coercive measures against persons “who participate in armed aggression against Ukraine without taking into account the established requirements and prohibitions on the use of the physical forces, weapons, etc.” (Muliar, 2023, p. 131).

The issue on the service organizing at checkpoints should be considered as outlining the range of new tasks to which employees of the National Police of Ukraine are involved. A scholar O. Zlahoda noted that the purpose of forming a checkpoint is not only to control the movement of vehicles and people, but most importantly – “an external isolation of the area of operations of illegal armed formations, detection of their movement on time, ways of the militants’ exit from the areas of their concentration, isolation and deprivation of access to sources of supply; prohibiting inflow of supplies, supply of ammunition and weapons, and preventing a breakthrough through the checkpoint” (Zlahoda, 2022, pp. 45–46). There were several scholars – V. Yevtushok, R. Smola, who substantiated the need to use checkpoints

by controlling the movement of weapons, smuggled goods, pursuing criminals, people, who were involved in illegal gang formations instead (Zlahoda, 2022, p. 46).

Modern security challenges, which arose as a result of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine, actualized the issue on the partnership activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the National Police of Ukraine (Zhbanchyk, 2023, pp. 421–422). The scholars T. Drakokhrust and V. Harasymiv outlined the prospects for improving the National Police of Ukraine under the conditions of the Martial Law, in particular establishing more efficient cooperation with the military, further improvement of the police officers, a greater involvement in the investigation of war crimes on the territory of Ukraine, even more intensive provision of the citizen safety, further establishing cooperation with the international partners, etc. (Drakokhrust & Harasymiv, 2023, p. 67). It should be also emphasized that the interaction between the National Police of Ukraine and municipal authorities and local population, especially in the de-occupied territories is vital. The system of complex interaction with the population, in particular the Community Policing strategy, began to be implemented in Ukraine even before the full-scale invasion, however, as scholars O. Alieksieieva and O. Kozhukhar emphasized, the very response to security challenges under the conditions of war became “a fundamental need of communities, which actualized the development of partner cooperation practices police and community” (Alieksieieva & Kozhukhar, 2023, p. 22). The strategy of Community Policing – “partnership for the sake of peace” had a new push for development, in particular the projects “The Community Police Officer”, “Susidska Varta (Neighbourhood Watch)”, or the opening of new police stations. For instance, the “Susidska Varta (Neighbourhood Watch)” project in the Tatarbuniar community of Odesa region had good results: a number of preventive measures regarding crimes were carried out, reporting them, and the groups of this project took care of shelters, adjusted the operation of notification systems, etc. (Alieksieieva & Kozhukhar, 2023, pp. 26–27).

In addition, an important direction of the state activity is the development of the concept of a safe community, which helps to overcome not only the security challenges of the Martial Law (enemy shelling, civilian casualties, destruction of the housing stock and critical infrastructure, man-made threats) and post-war reconstruction. Such a project at the national level, which is called “Safe Community”, is a priority for the National Police of Ukraine, as well as for the local community, because it involves the establishment of a high-quality warning system and shelters, safety of educational institutions and other public places (Novichenko, 2024, p. 14). The issues related to the circulation of weapons and explosive devices, demining, and domestic violence will require priority solutions during the post-war period. Provided further support by the local self-government bodies to police bodies, the development of various programmes within the framework of the Community Policing approach will also take place. A lawyer A. Novichenko outlined systemic measures and steps that would promote cooperation between the local self-government and the National Police of Ukraine: further improvement of the “Safe Community” concept and other specific targeted strategies and programmes; introduction of normative acts that will take into account the balance between security and freedom; implementation of a clear separation of powers of military and civil administration bodies; local monitoring of security threats; taking into account the needs of vulnerable groups of society when implementing civil security measures; development of all-Ukrainian and local demining programmes; further consideration of civil protection requirements in spatial planning (Novichenko, 2024, p. 15).

The Conclusions. The National Police of Ukraine employees serve in accordance with the requirements of the Martial Law in Ukraine. Since the beginning of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation in 2014 and even more so – after 2022 – the activities of the state apparatus and the law enforcement sector in particular have undergone significant changes. There were made amendments to the legal acts: the Law of Ukraine “On the National Police” was supplemented with a part stating that under the conditions of the Martial Law, police activities take into account the specifics of the period, restrictions and freedoms of citizens, which are determined by the Constitution of Ukraine and the Law “On Legal Martial Law Regime”. There was also adopted the Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Laws of Ukraine “On the National Police”” and “On the Disciplinary Statute of the National Police of Ukraine” in order to optimize police activities, including under the conditions of the Martial Law”; The Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On the Legal Status of Missing Persons” and other legislative acts of Ukraine on improving the legal regulation of social relations related to the acquisition of the status of persons missing under special circumstances”; The Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Assignment of Special Police Ranks under the Conditions of the Martial Law”. In accordance with legal acts, mainly amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On the National Police”, new powers of the National Police of Ukraine were added, reflecting a range of new functions taking into account security challenges. The main functions remain the provision of law and order and public safety, while the new ones are combating crimes against the national security of Ukraine, preventive activities regarding crimes directed against the legal regime of the Martial Law. The functionality and priorities of the National Police underwent significant changes, at the same time, the issue of establishing effective communication with local self-government bodies, especially in the de-occupied territories, remains relevant; deepening of various levels of cooperation with units of the Armed Forces, development of strategic plans for the development and further implementation of civil security measures.

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**TRADITIONALIST BRACES OF THE IMPERIAL SPACE:
“HISTORICAL RUSSIA” AS A VARIETY OF EURASIAN COLONIALISM**

Abstract. *The purpose of the research is to prove the unscientific nature of the thesis of “historical Russia” within the borders of the Russian Empire as a means of actualizing the colonial nature and traditionalist essence of management policy in the Russian Empire in the second half of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th centuries, a component of which was the introduction of a rural self-government on a pan-imperial scale. The methodology of the research is based on the principles of objectivity, historicism, systematicity, scientificity. The following methods have been used: general scientific (logic, analysis, synthesis, generalization, etc.) and special historical (synchronous, diachronic, structural-functional analysis). The scientific novelty consists in substantiating the colonial nature and traditionalist essence of the pan-imperial innovations in the management of the countryside in 1861 – 1917, the purpose of which was to unify the management of all regions incorporated into the Russian Empire as a result of the conquest of the Eurasian territories by the Romanovs and their*

predecessors – the homelands of the indigenous peoples of the continent. **The Conclusion.** In 1861 – 1917 in the Russian Empire, which in the "long" 19th century increased significantly due to the conquests of the Romanovs and their predecessors on the Eurasian continent, the axis of administrative modernization became the unification of administrative space as a means of spreading a rural self-government on a pan-imperial scale based on the model of a public village management introduced in the European part of the country by the rural reform of 1861 – 1871. As a result of the reformation, the pan-imperial reform of a rural self-government was implemented in 1861 – 1917, which was based on the synthesis of the rural self-governing traditions of the aborigines with the corresponding practices of the *russky mir* (traditional communities of the Great Russian provinces). The migration of peasants from European regions contributed to the administrative invasion of local villages. By manipulating their interests, the policy of Orthodoxy and Russification of native inhabitants was carried out against the background of measures to increase the efficiency of taxation of autochthons, their performance of duties for the benefit of the empire, exploitation of local resources, promotion of the loyal attitude of the population to the authorities as a means of preserving local traditions. Such a pseudo-renewal of a village contradicted the goals of modernization, as it was based on the traditional practice of social self-regulation, the primacy of collectivism with a complete subjugation of the individual to the interests of the community. Therefore, the reform of 1861 – 1917 became an attempt to unite the imperial space into a single whole with the help of traditionalist scraps and a manifestation of colonialist policy in regions with a non-Russian indigenous population. Evidence of the failure of this policy was the powerful anti-imperial demonstrations of the peasants at the beginning of the 20th century, which contributed to the country's disintegration and actualized the issue of traditional identity in its regions. In view of this, the thesis of "historical Russia" within the borders of the Russian Empire, which is currently widespread in journalism and political discourse of the Russian federation, is inherently anti-scientific, and "historical Russia" is, in fact, a type of Eurasian colonialism.

Key words: Russian Empire, "historical Russia", *russky mir*, rural self-government, colonialism, traditionalism.

ТРАДИЦІОНАЛІСТСЬКІ СКРІПИ ІМПЕРСЬКОГО ПРОСТОРУ: "ІСТОРИЧНА РОСІЯ" ЯК РІЗНОВИД ЄВРАЗІЙСЬКОГО КОЛОНІАЛІЗМУ

Анотація. Метою роботи є доведення антинауковості тези «історичної Росії» в кордонах Російської імперії засобом актуалізації колоніального характеру й традиціоналістської суті управлінської політики в Російській імперії другої половини XIX – початку XX ст., складником чого стало запровадження у панімперському масштабі сільського самоврядування. **Методологію** складають принципи об'єктивності, історизму, системності, науковості, методи загальнонаукові (логіки, аналізу, синтезу, узагальнення тощо) та спеціально-історичні (синхронний, діахронний, структурно-функціонального аналізу). **Наукова новизна** полягає в обгрунтуванні колоніального характеру й традиціоналістської суті панімперських новацій в управлінні селом 1861 – 1917 рр., метою яких було уніфікувати управління всіма регіонами, інкорпорованими до складу Російської імперії внаслідок загарбання Романовими та їх попередниками євразійських територій – батьківщин корінних народів континенту. **Висновки.** Упродовж 1861 – 1917 рр. у Російській імперії, котра в "довгому" XIX ст. суттєво збільшилася за рахунок завоювань Романових та їх попередниками на євразійському континенті, всією управлінською модернізацією стала уніфікація адміністративного простору засобом поширення в панімперському масштабі сільського самоврядування за взірцем громадського управління селом, запровадженого в європейській частині країни сільською реформою 1861 – 1871 рр. Унаслідок реформаторства було реалізовано панімперську реформу сільського самоврядування 1861 – 1917 рр., що базувалася на синтезі сільських самоврядних традицій аборигенів із відповідними практиками руського миру (традиційних громад великоруських губерній). Управлінській інвазії у місцеві села сприяло переселення селян з європейських регіонів. Маніпулюванням їх інтересами провадилася політика оправославлення та русифікації корінних жителів на тлі заходів із піднесення ефективності оподаткування автохтонів, виконання ними повинностей на користь імперії, експлуатації місцевих ресурсів, сприяння лояльному ставленню населення до влади засобом збереження місцевих традицій. Таке псевдооновлення

села суперечило завданням модернізації, оскільки в основі мало традиційні практики соціальної саморегуляції, примат колективізму з повним підкоренням особистості інтересам спільноти. А отже, реформа 1861 – 1917 рр. стала спробою об'єднати в єдине ціле імперський простір за допомогою своєрідних традиціоналістських скріп та виявом колонізаторської політики в регіонах з неруським корінним населенням. Свідченням провалу цієї політики стали потужні антиімперські виступи селян на початку ХХ ст., що спричинили розпад країни й актуалізували в її регіонах питання традиційної самобутності. З огляду на це поширена нині в публіцистиці й політичному дискурсі російської федерації теза “історичної Росії” в кордонах Російської імперії є антинауковою за своєю суттю, а “історична Росія”, по суті, – різновидом євразійського колоніалізму.

Ключові слова: Російська імперія, “історична Росія”, руський мир, сільське самоврядування, колоніалізм, традиціоналізм.

The Problem Statement. During the period of the 2000s, the leadership of the russian federation lobbied for the idea of “russky mir” (“russian world”) actively in the context of expanding Russia’s ties with its compatriots in the post-Soviet and far-away countries. In this context, an aggressive strategy for the protection of the russians living outside the russian federation was formed actively, and an open military invasion to protect compatriots in other countries was not ruled out, which is recorded in the main documents for ensuring the foreign policy of the russian federation (Kondratenko, 2017, p. 11). At the same time, in the journalism and political discourse of the aggressor country, the thesis about “historical Russia”, that allegedly includes the homelands of many indigenous peoples of the Eurasian continent, who during the “long” 19th century were part of the Russian Empire, is promoted actively (Otkuda est’ poshla, 2021; Kto y zachem yzobrel, 2022). On February 24, 2022, with the beginning of the russian federation’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the criminal military actions of the bloody Putin regime proved that these narratives became the ideological basis of russia’s aggressive foreign policy. This fact actualizes the anti-historicity proof of the specified thesis about “historical Russia”. A strong argument for this issue can be the substantiation of a power organization colonial nature in the regions of the Russian Empire, the indigenous population of which was non-russky. The need for this is exacerbated by the fact that in the “long” 19th century, on the basis of the administrative modernization of rural areas of the Russian Empire self-governing practices of the russky mir were adopted – traditional communities of the northwestern (velykorussky) provinces (Verkhovtseva, 2019, p. 126). Although the name of these practices of the 19th century is only consistent with a modern construct of “russky mir”, debunking in this context the thesis about “historical Russia” within the borders of the Russian Empire will certainly serve as a task of resisting the informational aggression of the russian federation.

The Review of Publications and Recent Research. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries many researchers focused on colonial issues within the framework of studying the regions of the Russian Empire in an economic or historical cultural plane, acting as apologists for colonialism of this empire and superficially equating the latter with the development of virgin territories (Kostenko, 1887, p. 146; Hyns, 1910, pp. 140–143; Lohanov, 1909, pp. 75–76; Dranytsyn, 1913, pp. 100, 144–145; Voschynyn, 1914, pp. 14, 17, 77). On the other hand, through the prism of this apology, one can quite clearly see the preoccupation with filling the imperial coffers and the colonialist essence of all measures for the economic development of regions with a non-russky indigenous population, along with the awareness of the velykorosiyans’ culture-tragery mission towards them. In the 1920s, following M. Pokrovsky (Khalfyn, 1965, p. 37), historians emphasized the predatory

nature of Russian colonialism, administrative and cultural enslavement of population in the regions, in particular, Turkestan (Haluzo, 1929, p. 118). A further inhibition of the study of Russian colonialism, as N. Nurulla-Khodzhaeva points out, was influenced by the instruction of the Stalinist leadership to exclude "bourgeois colonialist concepts" from scientific studies in 1934 (Nurulla-Khodzhaeva, 2015, p. 57). With the beginning of the "thaw", during the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet scholars drew attention to the tsarist policy colonial nature in the Asian regions, emphasizing the tax affairs or economic aspects of the issue (Kovaliov, 1955, p. 43; Khal'fyn, 1965, p. 37; Amynov & Babakhodzhaev, 1966, p. 3). In the mid-1980s, postcolonial studies stood out in the field of humanitarian studies with their interdisciplinary nature and the objective of analyzing the relationship among empire / colony, centre / periphery (Sinchenko & Havrylovs'ka, 2014, p. 109). In the mid-90s of the 19th century the methodology of postcolonialism penetrates the historiography of the Russian Empire (Morrison, 2015, p. 69). The researchers from the Russian Federation (Pravylova, 2006; Remnev & Suvorova, 2011; Fursov, 2014; Brezhneva, 2018; Mamaev, 2019; Bobrovnykov, 2020; Abashyn, 2021; Vasylev, 2022) and other countries whose past is connected with being part of this empire (Iskhakov, 1997; Tyllaboev, 2009; Alymdzhanov, 2015; Tokmurzaev, 2015; Solodova, 2019; Verkhovtseva, 2023), actively address issues that are to one degree or another related to the colonial essence of imperial power in the regions whose indigenous population became subjects of the Romanovs as a result of the latter's conquests on the continent. In the studies of Western historians, despite the difference in a detailed analysis, a colonial nature of rule in these parts of the Russian Empire is doubtless, it is emphasized that this colonialism was one of the varieties of the Eurasian continental one, respectively (Khalid, 2010; Morrison, 2015; Morrison, 2021; Hofmeister, 2016; Veracini, & Cavanagh, 2017; Shorkovyts, 2021, p. 94). However, according to O. Morrison, many provisions of the post-colonial theory do not cover the complex realities of the time (Morrison, 2015, p. 78). In this context, the issue of the imperial power organization in peripheral regions, in the "long" 19th century, in particular, rural self-government, which covered 90% of the population of this country, remains poorly studied.

The purpose of the research is the proof of an unscientific nature of the thesis of "historical Russia" within the borders of the Russian Empire as a means of actualizing the colonial nature and traditionalist essence of the management policy of the Russian Empire in the second half of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th centuries, a component of which was the introduction of a rural self-government on a pan-imperial scale.

The Research Results. During the "long" 19th century, being urgently in need of raising taxation and agricultural production efficiency, the leadership of the agrarian Russian Empire focused on a village management, where 9/10 of the population lived. At the same time, only in the first half of the 19th century having increased for 1.5 million sq. m. km at the expense of Georgia, Finland, Bessarabia, Primorie, northeastern Kazakhstan, the specific weight of ethnic-Polish lands, etc., a socio-culturally and ethnically motley country had to organize itself socially and administratively, realizing the urgent tasks of empire building, the most relevant of which was the introduction of effective fiscal administration. Since the 1830s, the formation process of four estates (nobles, clergy, urban and rural commoners) with the same rights and responsibilities had continued. However, it was extremely difficult to spread this process throughout the country – closed traditional worlds ("free communities"), in which illiterate farmers lived, were very difficult to "open" and comprehend in the categories of economics, statistics, tax affairs, etc. Inspired by European ideas of a natural law and idealizing

these communities, in the spirit of modernization measures, imperial reformers (educated bureaucracy) determined the introduction of a rural self-government according to the model that had been tested since the 1770s in various regions based on the traditions of russky mir. At the end of the 18th century officials applied the traditions situationally for the purpose of taxing communities of aborigines and immigrants from Siberia. Later, by the middle of the 19th century, in the central provinces this model underwent some transformations during the unification of villages management of state peasants, foreign colonists and local agrarians of the Black Sea regions and Right Bank Ukraine. The ideological context was Western European agromania, Alexis de Tocqueville's recognition of the immanence of democratic self-governing practices in traditional communities, and L. Stein's calls to build a fair social organization and policy of state socialism by involving in management of territorial structures elected representatives of local societies based on property principles, as well as European projects in the field of modern local self-government, which provided for introduction of bourgeois and democratic principles of social organization, formation of local democracy, involvement of population in the country management on the basis of representation (Verkhovtseva, 2018, pp. 113–116).

In addition, the reform strategy was greatly influenced by the messianic beliefs of the creative class (nobility) in the special purpose of the Romanov empire in the destinies of the peoples of the world: idealizing velykorussky traditional communities (russky mir). In particular, distinguished reformers believed that owing to a rural self-government based on the russky mir, their country would avoid social upheavals and gradually, due to stability, move to a stateless society, implementing advanced projects of a social arrangement of the countries in the world. In the 1860s – 1870s, during the development of reforms, against the background of an extreme aggravation of financial crisis after the defeat of the Russian Empire in the Eastern War of 1853 – 1856, the collective reformist mind, seeking to ensure that the peasants fulfill all duties for the benefit of the state, adopted the collectivist practices of russky mir in collecting taxes, performing duties, organizing rural society, and incorporated a rural self-government into a local government in almost all “European” provinces. The new / old rural self-government was called a public management of a village and, together with the abolition of serfdom in a landowner's village, it was extended to the latter and to villages of state, palace, district, foreign colonists, Cossacks of the Ukrainian Left Bank. Slavophiles, who had a considerable influence on the reform process, emphasized that it corresponded to the latest European “forms” and was a “world-historical sermon”, a “flag” that Russia raised over all “various tribal peoples”, leaving behind Western Europe with its higher culture, “French democracy and socialism”. However, according to the estimates of S. Witte and K. Arsenyev, reformers demonstrated socio-romantic beliefs, relying on the development of cooperative principles, allegedly laid down in velykorussky mir (Verkhovtseva, 2018, pp. 116–133).

A new impetus to the use of these rural innovations for the purpose of administrative modernization of the country was given by the suppression of the anti-imperial uprising in Poland under Russian rule in 1863. In the search of ways to consolidate and overcome the separatist attitudes of local elites, in the context of understanding the project of the “great russky nation”, a “full and unconditional” consistency of the peripheral regions with the regions of the “inner core” was emphasized. A new programme for the settlement of non-russky (suburban) peoples appeared. They should have been “re-educated” in the spirit of “russky nationhood”, turned into a conscious educated force, “equally solving a peasant issue throughout Russia”. This issue, in particular, manifested itself in the artificial creation of a

peasant state where it did not exist (for example, this is how this state was constructed in the Polish provinces), the construction of new self-governing rural communities, and practices hybridization of the russky mir with the corresponding local traditional ones. As a result, in 1864 – 1878, in the European part of the country, villages management was unified according to the model of a public village management, albeit with some local features: the Polish, Tiflis, Ostsee, and communal Ismaili models were introduced. Their differences were primarily determined by social traditions of the regions and uniqueness of a natural environment. For example, the specifics of the Polish and Ostsee provinces were individual land ownership and social relations. These local features led to differences in aspects of peasant land ownership and taxation of rural communities, performance of duties within the framework of a rural self-government (Verkhovtseva, 2018, pp. 142–150; ; Zemskyi & Trygub, 2021; Zemskyi & Trygub, 2022, pp. 41–42).

However, in general, a rural self-government organization, despite its inclusion in a local government, contradicted the European principles of a local self-government significantly. First of all, an individual peasant was “lost” in a peasant community, his interests were subordinated to collective interests of a community. This situation inhibited the development of bourgeois relations, which provided for the economic freedom of an individual producer and protection of his personal rights. Customary practices were legalized in an internal life of communities, irrationalism of which separated a village from the processes of rationalization and abandoned an individual to archaic traditions of an agrarian society, subordinating an individual to a collective will and devaluing entrepreneurship and initiative. According to zemstvos, volost courts established by reformers rather “legitimized lawlessness”, cementing a peasant corporatism, preserving patriarchy and traditionality of a village in general (Verkhovtseva, 2018, pp. 132–134; Svyaschenko & Kornovenko, 2019, p. 37).

At the end of the 1860s, seeking a means of forcing the periphery to pay imperial expenses, a higher establishment began to integrate the Asian countryside into the overall imperial administration. According to the Governor of the Caucasus I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, elected representatives of the people everywhere had to decide everything “in the spirit of the people”, preserving traditional family ties and establishing order, as in a velykorussky village. Until the beginning of the 20th century practically in all of Asian Russia – in Siberia, Central Asian regions, in the Far East, a new management of villages at a lower, rural, level was practically unified according to the patterns of the russky mir, which primarily contributed, in addition to fiscal, military functions, since military affairs became the duty of agrarians in these regions. This innovation and the introduction of a rural self-government in the Asian part of the country based on the template of the “European” village had their influence on the goal of imperial expansion, for which these outskirts were considered as a springboard. For example, the strategic goals of “paving the way” for a further expansion in the direction of India required solving the issues of organizing the main commodity producer – a farmer, who was supposed to supply grain, fodder, and food for these needs and would himself be the physical force for equipping the army. In a similar vein, the necessity of economic development of the regions bordering on China was considered: so that this neighbour would not be tempted by them due to the lack of resources for their cultivation. Instead, officials were unable to introduce more effective taxation of farmers in the Asian regions, in addition to the one based on self-restraint in communities and their collective responsibility for the performance of duties, due to unfamiliar social traditions of the periphery regions (Lohanov, 1909, p. 26; Dranytsyn, 1913, p. 100; Pravylova, 2006, pp. 272–273; Mamaev, 2019, p. 398;

Bobrovnykov, 2020, pp. 137–141; Abashyn, 2021; Mashevskiy, & Kondratenko, 2022, pp. 79–80; Vasylev, 2022, p. 61; Verkhovtseva, 2023, pp. 171–173).

However, the inclusion of local agrarians in the state of rural dwellers with all their status privileges (owning land, participating in poviats and provinces management through their self-governing bodies, etc.) required considerable resources and involvement of many legal and bureaucratic procedures, which lacked. The collective management imposed by the imperial reformers in rural communities, as time showed, led to a significant decrease in the efficiency of agricultural production and a significant decrease in revenues to the imperial treasury (this is exactly what happened, for example, with cotton manufacturing in Turkestan) (Hyns, 1910, pp. 140–143; Fleksor, 1910, pp. 408–410; Brusyna, 1992, p. 70; Alymdzhanov, 2015, pp. 27, 31; Alymdzhanov, 2017, p. 19; Verkhovtseva, 2023, pp. 173–175). In this context, the neglect of issues related to the development of local industry and trade, together with the detailed regulation of the use of irrigation systems, the maintenance of which involved rural communities, testified to the empire's colonial exploitation of the natural and physical resources of the periphery regions, the instrument of which was a rural self-government actually (Voschynyn, 1914, pp. 14, 17; Tyllaboev, 2009, p. 498; Fursov, 2014, p. 68).

The administrative invasion of Asian villages was facilitated by the resettlement of peasants from the “European” regions, due to a small amount of land in which the country's agrarian problem became very acute (Shkapskyj, 1907, p. 19). Since the newcomers already had the experience of a social organization within the framework of “russky mir” rural communities, the placement and organization of the lives of immigrants in new places was facilitated by “vodvorenia” in rural communities of the same russky mir type (over time, they even began to settle immigrants with natives in one community). This process of the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries was called “reproduction of a community on the outskirts” by historians. By manipulating their interests, the policy of Orthodoxy and Russification of the natives was carried out against the background of measures to increase effectiveness of taxation of aborigines, their performance of duties for the benefit of the empire, exploitation of local resources and promotion of a loyal attitude of the population to the authorities as a means of preserving local traditions (Dranytsyn, 1913, pp. 100, 144–145; Remnev & Suvorova, 2011, pp. 153, 215; Solodova, 2019, p. 163; Mieliekiestsev & Temirova, 2022, p. 47).

The settlers needed land, and it could be obtained by redistributing the lands of the autochthons, which, naturally, led to dissatisfaction of the latter. Along with the cultural expansion towards them (Russification, Orthodoxy), against the background of arbitrariness and lawlessness in self-governing rural communities, which was made possible not least by the support of corrupt imperial administrators, the rights of indigenous population in using local resources in general, were suppressed significantly. The government's redistribution of land in favour of settlers was a gross interference in the self-governing activities of communities. This land redistribution led to a large-scale resistance of the indigenous population of the Asian regions. In the 1890s and 1900s, the uprisings intensified. In 1902 – 1907, the peasant revolution broke out in the whole country, the impetus for which was given by aggravation of food problems and the government's measures to redistribute the resources of rural communities in all parts of the country. A village resistance to the state became systematic owing to the territorial-organizing role of a rural self-government, which functioned on a pan-imperial scale. Under the conditions of World War I, peasant uprisings flared up with new force. The most powerful of them occurred in Turkestan, in 1916, and

were of a vivid anti-imperial nature (Voschynyn, 1914, p. 77; Dodonov, 1947, pp. 10, 16–17; Myronov, 1947, p. 61; Mukanbetova, 2016, p. 74; Mamaev, 2019, p. 400; Tatsiyenko, 2019, pp. 56–64; Verkhovtseva, 2018, pp. 196, 200, 330–359; Verkhovtseva, 2023, pp. 174–176).

A significant role in preserving traditionality of the imperial village was played by village courts, which operated, as it was mentioned, on the basis of oral customary law. The titanic work of lawyers studying the judicial traditions of the regions, attempts to codify them, in addition to declarative statements about respect for the “primordial traditions” of peoples, did not yield significant results: until the fatal end of the Russian Empire, a village was outside the law, outside the norms of social justice. The customary principles of the organization of justice cemented the corporatism of the agrarians and, in the aspect of socio-cultural modernization, caused a legal nihilism of the peasants. However, at the same time, preservation of customary and legal traditions of the regions contributed to awareness of a local population of their identity and individuality, and this strengthened centrifugal tendencies within the country (Kozlov, 1882; Tsyriapkyna, 2015, pp. 280–283; Solodova, 2019, p. 163; Verkhovtseva, 2018, pp. 177, 304–329; Abashyn, 2021).

Summing up, it should be emphasized: as a result of the pseudo-renewal of a village in 1861 – 1917, the lives of 90% of inhabitants of the Russian Empire underwent socio-cultural conservation in a traditional environment, which contradicted the goal of modernizing the country, since there were few traditional practices of a social self-regulation, primacy of collectivism with a complete submission of an individual to the interests of a community. Modernization is connected with the values of rationalism and individualism, and transforms particularism into universalism. Instead, rural self-government served empire-building: it united the expanses of this huge country with a kind of traditionalist staples. At the same time, owing to traditional values, each regional component remained unique, and this made the country vulnerable to the point of disintegration due to social upheavals, which was actually proven by the powerful anti-imperialist demonstrations of the agrarians at the beginning of the 20th century. Everything testified to the failure of the administrative unification policy of the country based on traditionalism of a rural self-government. Taking into consideration the fact that the goals of empire formation also included an increase in tax payments to the regions, a policy of neglecting industry and trade development, a systematically declared “civilizing mission” of the russians in the outskirts among a non-russian indigenous population, exploitation of human and natural resources in the regions, their use as a bridgehead for the further expansion of the Russian Empire on the continent, it is worth stating: a pan-imperial village self-government was rather a tool of colonialism on the outskirts than it contributed to the self-defense of local communities united by the will of the imperial governors into village self-governing communities. This self-government testified to artificiality of imperial space constructed by the conquests of the Romanovs and their predecessors. Taking into consideration the above mentioned, the thesis of “historical Russia” within the borders of the Russian Empire, which is currently widespread in journalism and political discourse of the russian federation, is inherently anti-scientific, and “historical Russia” is, in fact, a type of Eurasian colonialism.

The Conclusion. In 1861 – 1917, in the Russian Empire, which in the “long” 19th century increased significantly due to the conquests of the Romanovs on the Eurasian continent, the axis of administrative modernization became the unification of an administrative space as a means of spreading rural self-government on a pan-imperial scale according to the model of a public village management, introduced in the European part of the country by

the reform of 1861 – 1871. As a result of the reformation, the pan-imperial reform of a rural self-government was implemented in 1861 – 1917, which was based on the synthesis of rural self-governing traditions of the aborigines with the corresponding practices of the russky mir (traditional communities of velykorussky provinces). The migration of peasants from European regions contributed to the administrative invasion of local villages. By manipulating their interests, the policy of Orthodoxy and Russification of native inhabitants was carried out against the background of measures to increase the efficiency of taxation of autochthons, their performance of duties for the benefit of the empire, exploitation of local resources, promotion of a loyal attitude of the population to the authorities as a means of preserving local traditions. Such a pseudo-renewal of a village contradicted the goal of modernization, as it was based on the traditional practice of social self-regulation, the primacy of collectivism with a complete subjugation of an individual to the interests of the community. Therefore, the reform of 1861 – 1917 became an attempt to unite the imperial space into a single whole with the help of traditionalist scraps and manifestation of a colonialist policy in the regions with a non-Russian indigenous population. Evidence of this policy failure was the powerful anti-imperial demonstrations of peasants at the beginning of the 20th century, which contributed to the country's disintegration and actualized the issue of a traditional identity in its regions. The thesis of "historical Russia" within the borders of the Russian Empire, which is currently widespread in journalism and political discourse of the Russian federation, is inherently anti-scientific, and "historical Russia" is, in fact, a type of Eurasian colonialism.

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**POTENTIAL OF VIDEO TESTIMONIES FROM THE INSTITUTE
FOR VISUAL HISTORY AND EDUCATION OF THE SHOAH FOUNDATION
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ON THE STUDY
OF THE HOLOCAUST AT THE REICHSKOMMISSARIAT “UKRAINE”**

Abstract. The purpose of the article: on the basis of the analysis of more than 400 interviews from the collection of the Shoa Foundation, to identify and describe layers of information regarding implementation of the Holocaust policy on the territory of the Reichskommissariat “Ukraine” on

the example of cases from “Volyn-Podillia” and “Dnipropetrovsk” general districts. **The research methodology** is based on the principle of historicism, methods of oral history, as well as general scientific methods of analysis, synthesis and generalization. **The scientific novelty** consists in the use of oral video testimonies to reveal various aspects of the Holocaust on the territory of the Reichskommissariat “Ukraine”. Based on the analysis of video evidence, it was possible to identify various layers of information that have an important potential for introduction into scientific circulation. For the first time in historiography, interviews about the Holocaust from the territories of Volyn-Podillia and Dnipropetrovsk general districts have been analysed for the purpose of comparison, which makes it possible to reveal the specifics and identify common and distinctive features of the Holocaust in these administrative entities. **The Conclusion.** Video evidence is important for the study of the Holocaust policy on the territory of Ukraine. The team of the Shoah Foundation processed a huge number of memories from almost all areas of Ukraine where genocide against the Jewish population took place. The collection of the Shoah Foundation mainly presents the testimonies of people who survived the years of the Holocaust, but there are also testimonies of eyewitnesses. All interviews are quite well structured, because three main blocks stand out: the interwar life of Jewish communities in Ukraine; the events of the period of the Nazi occupation and the postwar life of the Jews in the USSR. Under such conditions, after analysing almost 400 interviews, we identified the main layers of information from the first two blocks. Thus, from the evidence about the interwar period, you can learn about: material and household situation of their families at that time; leisure time, education, relationships with fellows; interethnic relations; important events experienced by their families at that time, etc. This information is important for understanding the reasons for the phenomena that occurred in Ukraine during the years of the Nazi occupation. For all interviews, information about the Nazi occupation of Ukraine is a basic part of these sources. Almost all witnesses recall the beginning of the Nazi occupation and the possibility or not of evacuation to the East. Later, the witnesses described the discrimination and humiliation of the Jews during the first days, weeks, and months of the Nazi occupation. An important part of the interviews with the Holocaust survivors was the story of mass killings of the Jews, as well as their survival strategies. In addition, in the memories of many people, there are stories about their stay in ghettos and forced labour camps. Therefore, video interviews from the collection of the Shoah Foundation often contain unique information about various aspects of the Holocaust in Ukraine. The introduction of these sources into scientific circulation deepens and concretizes the study of the genocide of the Jewish population, especially at the regional level.

Keywords: Holocaust, video testimony, oral history, the Institute for Visual History and Education of the Shoah of Southern California University.

ПОТЕНЦІАЛ ВІДЕОСВІДЧЕНЬ З ІНСТИТУТУ ВІЗУАЛЬНОЇ ІСТОРІЇ ТА ОСВІТИ ФОНДУ ШОА УНІВЕРСИТЕТУ ПІВДЕННОЇ КАЛІФОРНІЇ ЩОДО ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ ГОЛОКОСТУ В РАЙХСКОМІСАРИАТІ “УКРАЇНА”

Анотація. Мета статті – на основі аналізу приблизно 400 інтерв'ю з колекції Інституту візуальної історії та освіти фонду ШОА університету Південної Каліфорнії дослідити реалізацію політики Голокосту на території Райхскомісаріату “Україна” на прикладі генеральних округ “Волинь-Поділля” та “Дніпропетровськ”. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на принципах історизму, методах усної історії, а також на загальнонаукових методах аналізу, синтезу та узагальнення. **Наукова новизна** полягає у використанні усних відеосвідчень для розкриття різних аспектів Голокосту на території Райхскомісаріату “Україна”. На основі аналізу відеосвідчень вдалося виділити різні тематичні блоки інформації, які мають важливий потенціал для введення до наукового обігу. Вперше в історіографії було проаналізовано в контексті порівняння інтерв'ю про Голокост з теренів генеральних округ “Волинь-Поділля” та “Дніпропетровськ”, що уможливило виявлення специфіки та спільних і відмінних рис Голокосту в означених адміністративних утвореннях.

Висновки. Відеосвідчення мають важливе значення для дослідження політики реалізації Голокосту на території України. Команда фонду ШОА в цьому контексті опрацювала величезну кількість спогадів. У колекції фонду ШОА представлені переважно свідчення людей, які вижили в роки Голокосту, але також є і свідчення очевидців. Усі інтерв'ю

досить добре структуровані, адже виділяються три основні блоки: міжвоєнне життя єврейських спільнот в Україні; події періоду нацистської окупації та повоєнне життя євреїв в УРСР. За таких умов ми, проаналізувавши майже 400 інтерв'ю, виділили основні пласти інформації з перших двох блоків. Отже, зі свідчень про міжвоєнний час можна дізнатись про: матеріальне та побутове становище своїх родин у цей час; дозвілля, освіту, стосунки з однолітками; міжетнічні відносини; важливі події, які переживали їх родини у цей час, тощо. Ці відомості є важливими для розуміння причин тих явищ, які будуть відбуватись в Україні в роки нацистської окупації. Для всіх інтерв'ю інформація про нацистську окупацію України є базовою частиною. Майже всі свідки згадують про початок нацистської окупації та про можливість або неможливість евакуації на Схід. Далі – свідки описували дискримінацію та приниження євреїв у перші дні, тижні, місяці нацистської окупації. Важливою частиною інтерв'ю людей, які вижили під час Голокосту, була розповідь про масові вбивства євреїв, а також про стратегії їх виживання. Крім того, у спогадах багатьох людей є сюжети про перебування у гетто та таборах примусової праці. Отже, відеоінтерв'ю з колекції фонду ШОА містять часто унікальну інформацію про різні аспекти Голокосту в Україні. Введення цих джерел до наукового обігу, поглиблює та конкретизує дослідження геноциду єврейського населення, особливо, на регіональному рівні.

Ключові слова: Голокост, відеосвідчення, усна історія, Інститут візуальної історії та освіти фонду ШОА університету Південної Каліфорнії.

The Problem Statement. More than eighty years ago, in the majority of Ukrainian cities and villages, a real tragedy took place, which nowadays is known as the Holocaust. During several years of the Nazi occupation, numerous Jewish communities on the Ukrainian lands were liquidated. The Jews added a peculiar colour to population of cities and towns of Western Ukraine and Right Bank Ukraine, they were a fairly large community on Left Bank of Ukraine. During the Nazi occupation, this world was destroyed. In order to cover those tragic events objectively, in addition to official sources, it is necessary to use the testimonies of eyewitnesses and victims of these crimes. One of the largest such collections of video evidence is the materials from the Institute for Visual History and Education of the University of Southern California Shoa Foundation (hereafter – Shoah Foundation). The testimonies recorded by the foundation's employees show the history of the Holocaust “from inside”, i.e. through the eyes of direct participants in those events. Identifying the scientific potential of such testimonies is an important factor in a more comprehensive and, therefore, more objective study of the Holocaust.

The Review of Sources and Publications. Nowadays, oral history is one of the promising directions of studying the events of the 20th century, including World War II and the Holocaust. In the studies of modern Ukrainian researchers of the Holocaust, materials from the Shoah foundation are used increasingly (Kaparulin, 2023; Ivchuk, 2022; Mykhalchuk, 2021b; Mykhalchuk, 2022; Mykhalchuk & Dolhanov, 2023; Mykhalchuk, 2023c), and several studies focus on the stories told by the interviewees (Mykhalchuk, 2021a, Mykhalchuk, 2017), which allows us to reveal various aspects of the Holocaust that could not be analysed using official sources only. Two interviews of the collection from Mizoch (Rivne region) in full (Mykhalchuk, 2011) and partially (Mykhalchuk, 2023d) transcribed and published. In our research there were important the studies on the oral historical context of research, the methodology of conducting and processing interviews (Bodnar, 2021; Boriak, 2020; Hrinchenko, Rebrova & Romanova, 2012; Hrinchenko, 2007; Usach, 2021, Lenchovska, 2009; Mykhalchuk, 2023a; Mykhalchuk, 2023b). No less important is awareness of modern methodological approaches to understanding the concept of “collective trauma” (Makliuk

& Bessonova, 2023), as well as the way of survival of the Jewish population under difficult social and political circumstances (Savchuk & Ihnatusha, 2022).

One of the definitions of oral history is the recording of personal testimonies transmitted orally (Boriak, 2020, p. 279). A researcher Helinada Hrinchenko notes that a modern understanding of oral history goes through three main components: the process of transmitting information and recording (with the help of audio or video technology) memories, newly created historical sources obtained as a result of this process, as well as their further analysis (primarily reconstructive, narrative) (Hrinchenko, 2007, p. 7). The method of collecting information by researchers is primarily focused on the minimal (as far as possible) influence of the interviewer on the nature of information from the respondent. This technique was also used in interviews of the Shoa Foundation.

This collection has been formed since the mid-1990s in the context of the project of the Shoa Foundation Institute in the USA (“People who survived Shoa”), founded by the American film director Steven Spielberg. To date, it has accumulated more than 52,000 testimonies of the Holocaust survivors, as well as those who saved victims of Nazism, homosexuals, gypsies, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. 3,446 video testimonies were recorded in Ukrainian. These sources are stored at the Institute for Visual History and Education of the Shoa Foundation of the University of Southern California in the USA (Mykhalchuk, 2021, p. 44; (Mykhalchuk, 2023b, p. 5). Among others, many testimonies contain information about life in the towns and villages that were part of “Volyn-Podillia” and “Dnipropetrovsk” general districts during the Nazi occupation.

The interviews from the video archive of the Shoa Foundation are Jewish testimonies mostly. A significant number of them were filmed during the 90s of the 20th century and the respondents were at the age of 10 – 18 years old at the time of the Soviet-German war outbreak. They remembered those events very well, because they were direct participants in them. Their stories contain information about the pre-war life of Jewish communities, their wanderings during the Holocaust, and their post-war life.

The interview collection has a fairly clear structure. All of them begin with a detailed description of the life of respondent’s family before the Nazi occupation. This is a very important layer of information that gives an opportunity to see the pre-war Jewish world in towns and villages. Respondents mention Jewish traditions and the language they used to communicate, the Holodomor and ways of survival during it, relationships with local residents, their neighbours, classmates and acquaintances.

In video evidence an important layer of information is about the period of the Nazi occupation. Actually, this is the main part of the video. Respondents recall how they escaped in detail, where they were during the occupation, with whom they communicated, they recall local policemen and their attitude towards them, talk about labour camps, ghettos, places of murder and detention of the Jews in the towns and countryside. They often recall the names and surnames of their relatives and friends who died during the Catastrophe.

The final part of the interview is information about the respondents’ post-war life. In this part, they tell about what they saw in a post-war town or village, how the attitude of local residents changed towards them, and sometimes their pre-war neighbours and acquaintances (if before the Soviet-German war, the majority of residents of Dnipropetrovsk region say that they did not feel any anti-Semitism, then after the Nazi occupation the situation changed and state anti-Semitism was added to household anti-Semitism. In Volyn and Rivne regions in particular, the situation was different, because local Jews were part of the Polish state until

1939 and manifestations of anti-Semitism took place at various levels). It is important that all interviews recorded by the Shoa Foundation team end with family photos and documents that prove the story.

In general, in the large cities of the geographical region under analysis, the distribution of the number of video testimonies is as follows: Rivne – 296 interviews, Dnipro – 240 interviews, Kamianets-Podilsky – 131 interviews, Kryvyi Rih – 69 interviews, etc. Thus, the interviews we analysed provided an opportunity to reveal important information for the analysis of the Holocaust events.

The purpose of the article: based on the analysis of more than 400 interviews from the collection of the Shoa Foundation, to do the research on the implementation of the Holocaust policy on the territory of the Reichskommissariat “Ukraine” using the example of “Volyn-Podillia” and “Dnipropetrovsk” general districts.

The Research Results. In the mid-1990s, when the formation of the video evidence collection from the Shoa foundation began, many respondents were 70-80 years old, i.e. their childhood and youth took place in the 20s-30s of the 20th century. Therefore, the interwar situation in Dnipro and Western Ukraine is the first layer of information that can be extracted from these oral testimonies. The vast majority of interviewees, based on the evidence we have analysed, begin their stories from this period. Usually, they talk about: a material and household situation of their families at the time; leisure time, education, relationships with fellows; interethnic relations; important events experienced by their families at that time, etc.

The material situation of Jews in different parts of Ukraine corresponded to the socio-economic circumstances in which they lived. For example, for the Western Ukrainian Jews who were under the rule of Poland, the changes in their lives were not radical. They continued to engage in various trades and crafts, worked in agriculture, were owners of various businesses, shops, etc. However, there was a stratum of fairly poor Jewish families who were forced, in fact, to fight for survival. Thus, Dora Gun, a resident of the town of Radyvyliv in Rivne region, recalled that before the beginning of World War II, her parents had a good life and even built a house in the town (Gun, 1998, s. 5). Another witness, Matvii Kolman, recalling life in interwar Rivne, emphasized that the majority of the trade establishments were owned by the Jewish families (Kol'man, 1998, s. 4).

On the other hand, the situation was different in the UkrSSR. The majority of the witnesses who lived in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s recalled that during the short period of the NEP, the Jews, like other residents, had the opportunity to establish and develop their own small businesses and shops. In the countryside, especially in the Jewish agrarian colonies of the South of Ukraine, prosperous farms were formed at the same time. Petro Nakhutin mentioned one of these farms. He lived in Inhulets colony (south of Dnipropetrovsk region – *Author*) and in the 20s his parents were quite rich according to the standards of that time. They even had a hired worker from the neighbouring village of Zelene (Nakhutin, 1998, s. 3-4). That is, at that time in the UkrSSR, the Jews continued engaging in their traditional occupations, just as in Western Ukraine, but only within the limits that were allowed by the Soviet authorities.

It's common knowledge that since the mid-1920s, the Stalinist totalitarian regime began to take shape in the USSR, which led to the deterioration of the material and household situation, including that of the Jewish community. Industrialization and collectivization excluded the possibility for the development of private initiatives, both in town and countryside. For many Jewish families, it was the period of decline. In particular, many respondents mention survival

strategies during the Holodomor. The majority of witnesses who lived in Jewish agrarian colonies recall that in their villages there were no such severe consequences of the Holodomor as in Ukrainian settlements. However, they remember that at that time they had to survive harder than in other years. Thus, Klaudia Roizina said that in her village named after Kotovsky during the Holodomor there was nothing to eat and his father was forced to leave for Kryvyi Rih. There he used horse-drawn vehicle to transport soil for the construction of a metallurgical plant. The horses were given corn for food, part of which the father sent to his family in the village and so they were able to survive. As K. Roizina recalls, no one died in the village because residents helped each other (Roizina, 1998, segment (seg.) 24). But the family of Yosif Gelerov, who lived in the village of Veseli Terny in the north of Dnipropetrovsk region, was under rather difficult conditions at that time. Yo. Gelerov recalled that many residents of the village died of starvation, and he and his mother were saved only by the fact that Yosif's older brother, Lev, worked and shared his ration with them, as well as the help of other Jews, who also gave them food sometimes (Gelerov, 1997, seg. 16).

In general, we can state with confidence that the Soviet genocidal practices of the 1930s influenced the local Jewish population. It was forced to survive, sometimes against the difficult circumstances created by the government (Savchuk & Ihnatusha, 2022, p. 206). During the Holodomor, the vast majority of victims and dead were the Ukrainians, but representatives of other nationalities also suffered from it.

There was no Holodomor in Western Ukraine, but local Jews interviewed by the Shoa Foundation team mentioned another important story that could influence the dynamics of the Nazi genocide. Those were manifestations of anti-Semitism. It should be noted that some of the witnesses mentioned that there were no such manifestations in their environment. For example, Dmytro Vasevich from the village of Holovyn, Rivne region, testified that the word "Jew" was not used in his circle. After all, everyone worked hard on the land and there was no difference in the nationality of peasants (Vasevich, 1998, seg. 18). This was only D. Vasevich's personal experience, which was an exception from the surrounding socio-political situation. After all, other local Ukrainians talked about the fact that since the mid-1930s, anti-Semitic posters and caricatures began to appear in the press and simply in the streets, even children played games with anti-Semitic connotations: "One, two, three – the Jews are dogs, and the Pole with the gold birds – get out". This, in particular, was mentioned by a Ukrainian Sofia Demchuk from the village of Machulianky, Rivne region (Demchuk, 1998). Another witness, Basia Ioffe from Dubno, remembers very well that in the 1930s she saw the appeal many times: "Don't buy from a Jew". Also, according to her words it is known about the attacks on the Jews and about the anti-Semitic views of her fellows, the Ukrainians and the Poles (Ioffe, 1998, seg. 14). Thus, in the mid-1930s, especially after the death of Jo. Piłsudski, the Jewish population in the western Ukrainian lands began to suffer from manifestations of undisguised anti-Semitism. When this region was occupied by the German troops in the summer of 1941, anti-Semitism became an excuse for many local residents to who either watched the murders of Jews and were indifferent or they participated in various stages of the Holocaust.

Information about domestic anti-Semitism is also available in interviews from post-Soviet Ukraine. Thus, in the testimonies of people from the territory of the future general district "Dnipropetrovsk" there are references to manifestations of anti-Semitism, at the interpersonal level mainly. Klavdia Mirzoian had a similar experience, who in the 1930s went to one of the schools in Kryvyi Rih. She recalled that there were two girls in her class who constantly called her "zhydivka" (a Jew). Once, she was even beaten by them (Mirzoian,

1998, seg. 14–15). Thus, it was a fairly typical conflict situation between the Jews and non-Jews. After all, the branding of other people, who were believed to be somehow not like others, had a long history and was rooted in human consciousness deeply. The Jewish communities were always different from other local residents, so the attitude towards them was quite hostile. Especially in children's environment.

But adults also encountered a similar attitude, even within their own family. Thus, in 1936, a Jew Tetiana Reznik married the Russian Mykhailo Shuklin in Kryvyi Rih. But his mother and three sisters hated her because she was of a different origin. Together with her husband she had to live with his relatives in the same apartment and she suffered from their abuse constantly (Reznik, 1998, seg. 28). Such stories demonstrate anti-Semitic ideas of ordinary Soviet people at a micro level. We cannot claim that there were many such people, but they were. In contrast to the Western Ukrainian society, anti-Semitism in South-Eastern Ukraine was not an important factor in collaboration of local population with the Nazis.

Thus, the first part of the interview, as a rule, contains information about the pre-war life of the Jewish communities in different regions of Ukraine. This information varies depending on the socio-economic and socio-political realities of the interwar period in these regions. However, this part of the interview is important for understanding the events that took place during the years of the Nazi occupation.

In all interviews recorded by the Shoa Foundation team, the stories are about the period of the Nazi occupation. It was the period of tragic events to the Jewish community and they laid the foundations for the formation of a collective trauma. One of the manifestations of collective trauma is historical trauma. Modern researchers single out the following elements of historical trauma: a traumatic event; shared trauma experience by a group of people; the impact of such trauma on several generations (Makliuk & Bessonova, 2023, p. 275). Therefore, the oral history evidence from the archive of the Shoa Foundation records the historical trauma of the Jewish people precisely.

Among the interviews analysed by us, there are at least three groups of people who talked about their experiences at that time. The first group is people who survived the Holocaust and were at that time on the territory of Ukraine. They talk about their survival strategies as well as other aspects of the Holocaust. It is this group of interviews that we will analyse below. The second group includes the Jews who were in the active army or underground and partisan units. And, finally, the third group includes interviews about the experience of evacuation to the East.

People who survived the years of the Holocaust or witnessed this tragedy reveal approximately the same themes in their stories. First, they talked about the situation of the Jewish community during the first days, weeks and months of the Nazi occupation. Hopes, expectations and, in the end, acceptance/rejection of the terrible reality they saw around them. This is something that can be detected at a cognitive level when watching interviews. After all, the witnesses often spoke about what they had experienced quite emotionally. The context of the event, when the respondents mentioned the events they saw or experienced themselves, is also important. In addition, from some interviews it is possible to learn the names of victims and criminals, as well as to analyse the motives of the latter's actions (for example: Fuks, 1997; Shchetinkova, 1998; Gun, 1998).

The Jews who were in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR in the summer of 1941 were the first ones to feel a new reality brought by the Wehrmacht troops, and especially the punitive units that appeared shortly after them. But many Jews, especially the older

generation, did not believe that something bad could happen to them under the rule of the Germans. Thus, Mykhailo Rozenfeld, a resident of the village of Yaltushkiv, Vinnytsia region, recalled that none of the local Jews believed in the atrocities of the Germans and all expected to see “the order as it was in 1918” (Rozenfeld, 1998). In Dnipropetrovsk region some residents of agrarian Jewish colonies did not expect anything bad from the Germans. For example, there were many old Jews left in the village of Kamianka who did not believe that the Germans would kill them (Reznik, 1998, seg. 41). In this context, one can agree with K. Berkhoff’s opinion that part of the Jewish population did not evacuate due to the expectation of a better life. After all, anti-Soviet views were present among some Jews, and the Germans were accepted as leaders of capitalism. That is why, such people expected that their financial situation under the Germans if did not improve, it would not worsen (Berkhoff, 2011, seg. 71).

Another plot that can be traced in the interview is the description of mass executions of the Jewish population. True, the majority of the interviewed victims managed to avoid execution and in different ways survived in a mostly hostile local environment. But there were also those who survived the mass execution and their testimony is a valuable source for the analysis of this crime. Such witnesses, as a rule, remember the direct perpetrators of the shooting, but mostly depersonalized. For example, from the memoirs of Ilia Boltiansky, we learn that in the winter of 1942, in the area of the village of Liubymivka of Dnipropetrovsk region, he and other Jews were shot by a group of Germans and local policemen (Boltianskii, 1997, seg. 67). It is clear that the witness could not know who exactly carried out this shooting, but identified them as a group of criminals based on their external characteristics. Rarely, there are memories in which victims or witnesses knew performers, especially local ones (див. наприклад: Tkachenko, 1997).

However, the majority of those who survived remembered all the circumstances of the shooting well. It was a psychological trauma that left a mark on their minds for the rest of their lives. Thus, Mariia Berzon from Rivne recalled that an accident helped her and her sister survive, because the killers ran out of ammunition and, taking advantage of this situation, the girls managed to escape. But the time while they were in the group of the doomed, she remembered for the rest of her life. She remembers the pits that were dug by the Jews themselves, one pit was for children and the others were for adults. People in nice clothes were stripped before execution, while others were shot while dressed. Before the execution, the Jews were divided into groups of 50 people each. She also did not know who exactly shot them, but the group of criminals “were Germans who were dressed in military green uniforms” (Berzon, 1997, seg. 33; Mykhalchuk, 2017).

The circumstances of the shootings differed in different regions of Ukraine, but we identified common layers of information that can be found in the relevant interviews: preparation for the shooting; German and local executioners; manipulation with the property of executed Jews, etc. But there were some differences. They concerned, first of all, preparation for execution. Nowadays, it is known that in many cases, before the execution, the Jews were divided into those who had a necessary specialty for the Germans and those who were not needed by them. At first, those who were of no use to the Germans were shot, and later it could be the turn of specialists. Ilia Kelmanovych saw a similar situation before the shooting of Jews in Kamianets-Podilskyi. He recalled that when the Jews were brought to the place of execution, the Ukrainian commandant ordered the specialists of a relevant field to step aside. These people were left alive, and the others were shot. I. Kelmanovych managed to avoid being

shot, because he hid his identity. He told the local policeman that he was a Ukrainian and got to the scene of shooting by accident (Kelmanovich, 1996, seg. 39–43). It was almost a typical picture in the majority of Western Ukrainian towns and villages. On the other hand, in the territory of “Dnipropetrovsk” general district, the segregation of the Jewish population before the mass shooting was either not carried out at all, as in Kryvyi Rih or Dnipropetrovsk, or all those who could work and they were forced to follow the instructions of German officials. Many such stories can be found in interviews with former residents of Jewish colonies. For example, in January of 1942, in the village of Novy Shliakh of Dnipropetrovsk region, elderly people, children, and those who could not work were driven to the local school. They were soon shot, and all other Jews from the village were sent to a forced labour camp in the village of Shyroke (Boroda, 1997, seg. 40). In another Jewish village Kotovske, the segregation of the local Jewish population took place at the end of March of 1942. From the testimony of Raisa Maidanska, we learn that the local police ordered all Jews who could work to come the office of the collective farm and take warm clothes and dishes with them. They were sent to the camp, and all Jews who remained in the village were shot (Maidanskaia, 1996, seg. 48). Therefore, often before execution, the Jews were divided into groups according to the needs of the occupation authorities.

Sometimes such needs involved segregating the Jews from other local residents and resettling them in closed or open ghettos, as well as using their labour in labour camps. Such stories also occur quite often in the memories of eyewitnesses and victims from the Shoa Foundation. There were many closed ghettos in “Volyn-Podillia” general district, but in “Dnipropetrovsk” general district, especially in rural areas, there were open ghettos. They could not be fenced, and the Jews were usually concentrated at several houses on the outskirts of the village. They were forbidden to go outside this territory, and they were constantly monitored and involved in various works. Nevertheless, people who described their lives in those ghettos talked about survival strategies, relations with non-Jews outside the ghetto, and the jobs they were assigned to. From the memories of the ghetto residents in the village of Liudvypol (nowadays the village of Sosnivka – *Authors*) of Rivne region, we learn that 3-4 families lived in one room, in order to survive they had to exchange jewelry for products, as well as do various jobs. Raids were conducted every day in the ghetto and people were forced to hide in various places. However, the Synagogue operated in the ghetto and the Jews tried to observe traditions and customs (Kostrichenko, 1997, seg. 29–30). Khedva Palchikova describes her life in the ghetto in Dubno in more detail. She recalled that the ghetto residents were taken out to work every day. In the ghetto, order was maintained by the Jewish policemen, but they performed this work forcibly and many people were saved owing to them (Pal’chikova, 1996, seg. 37–38).

Similar stories were told by residents of open ghettos in Dnipropetrovsk region. As Raisa Ulman, a resident of the village of Hlib and Pratsia, Stalindorf district, recalled, as soon as the Germans arrived in the village, all Jews were immediately evicted to several houses on the outskirts of the village. There were 6 more families in the house where the R. Ullman family was located. These houses were not fenced off, but the Jews were forced to wear the “Star of David” identification mark on their hands. All the time they were robbed and abused by the local police. At the end of September of 1941, all Jews who could work were taken to the camp in the village of Shyroke (Ul’man, 1997, seg. 35–37). In some local Jewish settlements, such as in Nai Leben, an open ghetto operated for almost six months, and representatives of the local authorities killed, robbed and abused its inhabitants all the time. Anna Tkachenko

witnessed it, who after the murder of her father had to flee first in Kryvyi Rih, and then in Nikopol and Marhanets (Tkachenko, 1997, seg. 46–47).

The further fate of Jews who were segregated varied in different regions. For example, in the territory of the general district “Volyn-Podillia” the Jews were forced to work free of charge mainly for the needs of German functionaries of various levels, at enterprises, as well as at other jobs. Thus, the Jews of the town of Mizoch in Rivne region were used as workers not only at the local sugar factory (Goldbarten, 1995, s. 35), and in Zdolbuniv as well (Mykhalchuk, 2022, seg. 242). There are also many testimonies of the Jews about forced labour in the ghetto. The evidence we have analyzed proves that a job the ghetto was not only physically exhausted, but also quite humiliating. For example, Rakhel Zaidman mentioned that when she was in the ghetto, she and other residents were forced to carry stones from the bridge to another place. This was done without any necessity (Zaidman, 2000, seg. 26–28). The Jews from the ghetto in Annapolis were forced to remove snow and wash windows at the local distillery (Malinskaia, 1998, seg. 59). This was one of the elements of the “dehumanization of the victim” carried out by the Nazis in the occupied territories. At the expense of such a policy, local residents were “convinced” of the antisocial nature of Jews and the need to exterminate them.

On the territory of “Dnipropetrovsk” general district there were the so-called forced labour camps for the Jews, which were located in villages along Route Dg IV. Nowadays, it is known about at least 10 villages in which these labour camps were located (Kruhlov, Umanskyi & Shchupak, 2016, seg. 163–165). In all interviews in which such camps are mentioned, there is a story about the living conditions of prisoners. For example, Maria Katsap mentioned that in the camp in the village of Shyroke prisoners were woken up at 4 a.m. and they worked on the route until 6 p.m. without any break. After work, if there was such an opportunity, they went to the river and washed, and if not, they went to the camp. For breakfast they were given from 100 to 300 grams of bread with bran and “coffee”, and in the evening millet stew and frozen vegetables (Katsap, 1997, seg. 91). Under such conditions, there was a high mortality rate in the camps. In addition, prisoners were periodically abused by guards and could be killed. The analysis of the former prisoners’ memories proves that the majority cases of violence occurred during labour on the route or in other areas where the Jews were forced to work. As a rule, the Jews were beaten for supposedly bad work. One of the prisoners mentioned that the Jews from the camp in the village of Novoyuliyivka were beaten with a rubber hose while working (Reznik, 1998, seg. 84). Also, from the memories of former prisoners, it is possible to identify the guards who abused the prisoners. Thus, in the camp of Vilny Posad village there were two locals, Zaruba and Deineko among the guards. The latter was a former teacher and treated prisoners fairly loyally. But Zaruba was cruel, he always had a rifle and a nahaika (a club – *Author*) ready, which he did not hesitate to use. Once Zaruba saw that the mother of the witness was being helped by a local worker. For this she was beaten with his nahaika (Maidanskaia, 1996, seg. 65–68). Therefore, similar testimonies of prisoners of camps and ghettos should reveal little-known aspects of the functioning of these punitive and repressive institutions. Therefore, nowadays, for an objective coverage of all the components of the Nazis genocidal policy towards the Jews, it is necessary to use information from video evidence, in particular, and those that are in the Shoah Foundation collection.

The Conclusions. Thus, the video evidence of the collection of the Institute for Visual History and Education of the University of Southern California’s Shoah Foundation is important for researching the policy of the Holocaust realization. The team of the Shoah

Foundation processed a large number of memories from almost all areas of Ukraine where there was the genocide of the Jewish population. The collection of the Shoa Foundation mainly presents the testimonies of people who survived the Holocaust years, but there are also testimonies of eyewitnesses. All interviews are structured quite well, three main blocks are singled out: an interwar life of the Jewish communities in Ukraine; the events of the period of the Nazi occupation and the postwar life of the Jews in the Ukrainian SSR. After analysing almost 400 interviews, we highlighted the main blocks of information. From the evidence about the interwar period, you can learn about: a material and household situation of their families at that time; leisure time, education, relationships with fellows; interethnic relations; important events experienced by their families at that time, etc. This information is important for understanding the reasons for the phenomena that occurred in Ukraine during the years of the Nazi occupation. Information about the Nazi occupation of Ukraine is basic. Almost all witnesses mention the beginning of the Nazi occupation and the possibility, or not, of evacuation to the East. Witnesses described discrimination and humiliation of the Jews during the first days, weeks, and months of the Nazi occupation. An important part of the interviews with the Holocaust survivors was the story of the mass killings of the Jews, as well as their survival strategies. In addition, in the memories of many people, there are stories about their stay in ghettos and forced labour camps. The final part is post-war memories, arranging life often abroad, where the Jews moved after the Holocaust.

Therefore, video interviews from the collection of the Shoa Foundation often contain unique information about various aspects of the Holocaust in Ukraine. The introduction of such sources into scientific circulation provides an opportunity to deepen and specify the research of the Jews genocide.

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РЕЦЕНЗІЇ / REVIEWS

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A NEW RESEARCH ON ANIMAL SACRIFICE IN THE GRAECO-ROMAN WORLD

(peer-review on the monograph: Rives, J. B. (2024). *Animal Sacrifice in the Roman Empire (31 BCE-395 CE): Power, Communication, and Cultural Transformation.*

New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2024. xvi+400.

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197648919.001.0001)

НОВЕ ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ ЩОДО ЖЕРТВОПРИНОШЕНЬ ТВАРИН

У ГРЕКО-РИМСЬКОМУ СВІТІ (рецензія на монографію: Rives, J. B. (2024). *Animal Sacrifice in the Roman Empire (31 BCE-395 CE): Power, Communication, and Cultural Transformation.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2024. xvi+400.

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This year there was published the monograph, written by Professor James Rives from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, dedicated to important aspects of a social and cultural role of animal sacrifices as an efficient tool for communication and a strengthening

of certain structures and institutions that played a key role in the effective functioning of the Roman Empire. The author noted that the first results of the above-mentioned research project were presented back in January of 2008 (Rives, 2024, p. ix). Consequently, the monograph under peer-review is considered to be the result of the perennial work by an American researcher of ancient history, whose sphere of scientific interests largely encompasses the issues of a religious development in the Roman Empire in general, and animal sacrifice in particular. The purpose of the monograph is to highlight specific aspects of the social function and cultural significance of animal sacrifices in the first four centuries of our era. The author outlined the parameters of the above-mentioned project and explained key terms in Foreword. In this context, the author considered “animal sacrifice” as “a ritualized practice involving the slaughter of an animal, of which the whole or parts were offered to perceived superhuman powers for the sake of winning their favor”. The author emphasized that “animal sacrifice was not a *sui generis* phenomenon but rather a particular type of social and cultural practice” (Rives, 2024, p. 4). By using the phrase “perceived superhuman powers” the author meant “the beings that the peoples of the ancient Graeco-Roman world believed to be present and active in their world and to have power over their lives that was greater than that which they could exercise themselves” (Rives, 2024, p. 5). The term “religion” is absent in the title of the monograph, which the author also justified. The author points out that there are numerous connotations of the word “religion”, which are quite popular in modern society – are misleading/false when we talk about the ancient Graeco-Roman world. Hence, when it was appropriate, the author tried to use more precise terms. At the same time, James Rives notes quite decently, it is more appropriate to use the terms “religion” and “religious” in the realities of the cultural environment of late antiquity. According to the author, it was precisely the dynamics of transformation from the culture in which there was no “religion” to the culture in which religion was present, that he highlighted in his research (Rives, 2024, pp. 15–17).

The structure of the monograph seems to be thought out well, it allows to reveal the issue properly. The author analysed the connections between wealth, status and construction of socio-political hierarchies in the context of strengthening key social structures, focused on the practice of animal sacrifice from Julius-Claudius to Severus in the first Part of the monograph “The Practice of Animal Sacrifice in the Roman Empire” (Rives, 2024, pp. 21–149). Considering the economic aspect of animal sacrifices, the author concludes that “animal sacrifice, as an expression of piety toward the gods, was a social practice that was inherently geared toward the wealthy and served in many ways to mark elite status” (Rives, 2024, p. 38). The author focused on sacrificial euergetism, analysing numerous epigraphic monuments from the Greek cities of the Roman Empire (Rives, 2024, pp. 45–60). Based on the indirect evidence of the sources, D. Rives suggested that selling the meat of sacrificial animals at the market was a common practice in the Roman Empire, more widespread in its western part than in the eastern (Rives, 2024, pp. 70–71). According to the author: “the link between public animal sacrifice and euergetism, while not normally as immediate and direct in the cities of the Latin west as in those of the Greek east, was nevertheless just as strong” (Rives, 2024, p. 79). D. Rives believes that the practice of public animal sacrifices helped structure a social and political role of local elites in the Graeco-Roman cities and surrounding territories, and, thus contributed to the structure of the Roman Empire in general (Rives, 2024, p. 80). There were slight differences in details regarding the animal sacrifices of the Greeks and the Romans, but in general, it could be seen as part of a common practice and a sign of

belonging to the Graeco-Roman civilization. The author's opinion that the representatives of the elite considered significant deviations from the norms of the Graeco-Roman practice, such as human sacrifices, as markers of deviation from civilized behaviour seems quite correct (Rives, 2024, p. 87). The author substantiates his thesis that animal sacrifice contributed to the integration of other peoples into the Graeco-Roman mainstream: some – more, like the Gauls, the others – less, like the Jews (Rives, 2024, pp. 89–105). Analysing animal sacrifices in the context of defining the relationship between the Emperor and his subjects, the author emphasizes their potential for flexibility and indeterminacy (Rives, 2024, p. 124). In turn, the above-mentioned flexibility and adaptability, resulted from the fact that it was a practice, not a doctrine, or a dogma, or any other type of verbally articulated discourse (Rives, 2024, pp. 124, 148). According to the author, there were numerous images of the Emperor as a sacrificant, which reflected the process of transformation of the empire ruled by Rome into the Empire of the Romans: “the Empire was increasingly integrated, becoming less an Empire ruled by Rome and more an Empire of Romans; the spread of Roman citizenship is one index of that change” (Rives, 2024, p. 141). The author made conclusion that animal sacrifice was transformed from a practice into a symbol – the vast majority of subjects got to know the Roman Emperor not as real, but as a virtual sacrificant, depicted as the paradigmatic officiant on coins and reliefs throughout the Empire (Rives, 2024, p. 142). Animal sacrifice in various ways contributed to the structuring of relationship between the Emperor and his subjects, and, therefore, played an important role in the formation of the Empire, defining and strengthening both local hierarchies and those formed in the empire in general, especially the overarching hierarchy between the Emperor and his subjects (Rives, 2024, pp. 146–148).

The Second Part of the book “Discourses of Animal Sacrifice in Graeco-Roman Culture and Early Christianity” deals with the issue on reflecting the practice of animal sacrifice in Graeco-Roman culture and early Christianity (Rives, 2024, pp. 153–244). There were two circumstances that contributed to changes in approaches to the practice of animal sacrifices in the Graeco-Roman world to which the author draws attention. The first circumstance is the spread of the idea of refusing to consume animal meat among intellectuals. The second circumstance is the idea of *δαίμονες* as mediators between gods and people in the cult (Rives, 2024, pp. 184–185). As for the Christians, the author believes that the only followers of Christ for whom the practice of animal sacrifice could be important were the Jews, who lived in the vicinity of Jerusalem and, accordingly, could participate in the temple cult, and even then only until the time of destruction of the Jerusalem Temple in September 70 AD (Rives, 2024, pp. 194–195). Commemoration of Christ's sacrificial death could also take place through animal sacrifices. However, this did not happen, also due to the fact that meat, as a product was too expensive for the lower strata of population, was excluded from the menu of joint Christian meals. In addition, some early Christian thinkers tried to distance themselves from the Jewish tradition (Rives, 2024, pp. 207–212). Analysing the discourses of the 2nd – 3rd centuries BC regarding animal sacrifices, the author made a conclusion that their integral part was claims to social power by those who formulated them. The above-mentioned power would be based on an understanding of the true nature of the world and the ability to bring to the ignorant majority an understanding of how best to live their lives (Rives, 2024, p. 240). The theorization of animal sacrifice practice meant that the practice itself became less important than the verbal discourses about it (Rives, 2024, p. 244).

In the Third and final Part of the monograph “Transformations of Animal Sacrifice in Late Antiquity”, James Rives studied the imperial policy on animal sacrifice from the mid-3rd

to the end of the 4th century (Rives, 2024, pp. 247–351). The author made an assumption about the weakening of the role of animal sacrifices in the structuring of the socio-economic hierarchy in the Graeco-Roman cities. According to James Rives, an organic combination of animal sacrifice with the imperial society and culture was weakened greatly. The attempts made by the Roman Emperors of the 3rd century to impose the practice of animal sacrifice from above failed and contributed to the strengthening of Christian rejection of the practice (Rives, 2024, pp. 288–289). Since the time of Constantine, the Emperors' attitude towards the practice of animal sacrifice becomes negative, with the exception of the short reign of Julian. All of Constantine's successors recognized animal sacrifice as a sign of self-identification not with Rome but with a certain religion, regardless of how they felt about that religion. The uncertain legal status of animal sacrifice lasted for about thirty years, until Theodosius I banned it completely (Rives, 2024, pp. 291–331).

The Third Part, and accordingly the monograph, ends with the chapter "The End of Animal Sacrifice?", in which the author traces some of the Christian transformations of animal sacrifice (Rives, 2024, pp. 336–351). In particular, James Rives notes that "Starting in the early fourth century CE and continuing into the present day, some Christian groups have engaged in ritualized practices that involve the slaughter of animals" (Rives, 2024, p. 339). Analysing the present days, the author provided examples of this kind of practice in the villages of modern Greece and in the Armenian Church, although he does not consider it possible to call them animal sacrifices, since these sacrifices are not offered to superhuman forces (Rives, 2024, pp. 340–342). The author believes that in the Christian tradition "the Eucharist became the only true form of ritual sacrifice, one that reproduced in ritual form the paradigmatic sacrifice of Christ" (Rives, 2024, p. 345). In the penultimate paragraph of the monograph, the author claims that there is nothing special about animal sacrifice: it does not give us a unique insight into the human condition or a unique key to understanding the ancient Mediterranean world. However, it is noteworthy for its interaction with many aspects of the Roman imperial society and culture (Rives, 2024, p. 350).

It is natural that the monograph is written on the basis of a wide source base, because James Rives is known for his translations and commentaries of the ancient texts (Tacitus, 1999; Tacitus 2009). The author's deep knowledge of the historiography of the problem is impressive. Still, in our opinion, at least one research by William Warde Fowler is missing from the list of sources (Fowler, 1899). The monograph was written at the end of the 19th century and was dedicated to an earlier era, it largely retained relevance in our time and deserves attention in the context of this project. Quite decently the author justified the need to sometimes go beyond the defined research period (Rives, 2024, pp. 9–10).

Speaking about the chronological framework of the research, the author defined the lower limit not by the establishment of the principate system, but by the beginning of the sole rule of Augustus, which he dates to 31 BC (Rives, 2024, p. 9). Speaking of the events of 29 BC, the author also uses the name "Augustus" (Rives, 2024, p. 116). However, by 27 BC the use of the name or title "Augustus" in relation to the founder of the principate system seems incorrect.

The selection of illustrations by the author, which helps the reader understand the content better, seems to be thought out well. The illustrations are marked with the letter *f* in the general index. In our opinion, working with the illustrations would be more convenient for a reader if the author compiled a separate index for them. The conclusions drawn by the author are properly substantiated and follow from the text of the study. A positive point of

the monograph is the very informative page-by-page footnotes, which at the same time are not overloaded with unnecessary details and help in working with the main text significantly.

In general, the monograph by James Rives is a deep scientific study of an important and complex issue, written on a thorough source basis, with deep knowledge of the historiography issue, in which a number of specific historical issues are analysed and results obtained that are important for the further study of ancient history in general and the history of Ancient Rome, in particular.

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**POLISH PRISONS ON UKRAINIAN LANDS DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD:
A NEW STUDY (peer-review of the book: Razyhrayev O. V. The World behind Bars.
Penitentiary System in Volyn and Galicia in 1918 – 1939: monograph.
Drohobych: Kolo, 2023. 688 p.)**

**ПОЛЬСЬКІ В'ЯЗНИЦІ НА УКРАЇНСЬКИХ ЗЕМЛЯХ У МІЖВОЄННИЙ
ПЕРІОД: НОВЕ ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ (рецензія на книгу: Разиграєв О. В.
Світ за ґратами. Пенітенціарна система на Волині та в Галичині
у 1918 – 1939 роках: монографія. Дрогобич: Коло, 2023. 688 с.)**

In the autumn of 2023, Drohobych publishing house “Kolo” with the assistance of the Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Lutsk published the monograph by Oleh Razyhrayev, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor of Lesia Ukrainka Volyn National University Oleh Razyhrayev “The World Behind Bars. Penitentiary System in Volyn and Galicia in 1918 – 1939”.

The peer-reviewed monograph focuses on the current issues of domestic and foreign historical science – the past of the penitentiary system in the lands of Volyn and Galicia within the borders of interwar Poland. The structure of the monograph is logical and well-founded. The study consists of a list of abbreviations, extensive introductory notes, four

chapters, conclusions, bibliography, lists of tables and illustrations, name index, as well as an extended summary in Polish.

In the introductory remarks, the author notes that his main research focus was on such aspects as “covering the genesis and organization of the penitentiary system in the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; characteristics of penal institutions, their personnel, as well as the stay of prisoners in penitentiary institutions of the Second Commonwealth of Nations; study of the problems of the formation of the criminal enforcement system in Volyn and Galicia; elucidation of the organization and personnel of the penitentiary system in these areas; tracking the dynamics of the number of prisoners in Volyn and Halychyna, as well as their conditions of detention, the level of nutrition and medical care, work activities, opportunities to fulfill cultural, educational and religious needs; consideration of protest forms by prisoners – hunger strikes, riots and escapes; analysis of the informal environments of prisoners, as well as the stay of prisoners from Volyn and Halychyna in prisons in other regions of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; clarifying the activities of public and political organizations regarding the support of prisoners in Volyn and Galicia and protection of their rights” (p. 12).

Oleh Razyhraiev’s monograph is of an interdisciplinary nature and is written on the margins of regional history, social history, and legal history. In introductory Introduction, the author also refers to the conceptual and categorical apparatus of the monograph and details the terms “penitentiary system”, “prison” and “prisoner” (pp. 20–25). In the same part of the book, the issues of historiography (pp. 25–47) and source base (pp. 47–55) are discussed.

When doing the research, Oleh Razygrayev analysed manuscript sources from the funds of a number of archives and libraries in Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus. The archival institutions of Ukraine, where sources from the history of the interwar penitentiary system of Volyn and Galicia, discovered and analysed by the author of this monograph, are stored, include the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv, Central State Archive of Higher Authorities and Administration of Ukraine, Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine and Ukrainian Women, Central State Audio-Visual and Electronic Archive, Branch State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine, the state archives of Volyn, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, and Ternopil regions. The author also used materials from the archive of the State Institution “Lviv Penitentiary No. 19” (pp. 47–49). O. Razyhryayev also involved materials from archival institutions in Poland, Lithuania and Belarus, which highlight both national processes related to the functioning of the penitentiary system, as well as certain regional features of it. In particular, the Volyn historian processed the collections contained in the Archive of New Acts in Warsaw, Central Military Archive, National Archive in Kraków, National Digital Archive, as well as in the state archives in Warsaw, Rzeszów, Zamość, Kalisz, Katowice, Kielce, Lublin, Przemyśl and Częstochowa, materials from the manuscripts departments of the libraries of the University of Warsaw, the Catholic University of Ivan Paul II in Lublin, the scientific library of the Polish Academy of Arts and the Polish Academy of Sciences in Kraków, as well as documents of the Sejm Library in Warsaw. O. Razyhryayev discovered and analysed an extremely valuable corpus of sources in the funds of the state archives of Brest and Grodno regions of the Republic of Belarus, as well as in the collections of the Central State Archives of Lithuania (pp. 50–52).

The first part of the monograph – “From Wronki to Ostroh: Penitentiary System in the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth” – sheds light on the genesis and organization of penitentiary system in interwar Poland, characterizes the penal institutions and their

personnel, reveals the general aspects of the stay of prisoners in penitentiary institutions. The author notes that in the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth the penitentiary system formation took place with state-building processes in the country and formation of its borders simultaneously (p. 59). Difficult material conditions and disparity of a legislative framework, which functioned in the lands that belonged to the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and German empires until November of 1918, and later became part of Poland, were an obstacle to a proper functioning of the criminal enforcement service (p. 71).

From the monograph by O. Razyhryayev, we learn that in interwar Poland the prisons were divided into three classes. The largest prisons included the “Holy Cross” prison in Kielce, the “Lukishky” prison in Vilnius, the “Mokotów” and “Paviak” prisons in Warsaw, prisons in the cities of Koronowo, Wronki, Rawycz, etc. Many penitentiary institutions were located in humid rooms unsuitable for such needs and in need of repair. The staff of the penitentiary system consisted of both relevant employees of the Ministry of Justice and other governing institutions, as well as prison personnel. The prison staff also included medical workers, teachers and clergy (p. 101). In the same part of the book, the author highlights the general aspects of the stay of persons in prisons in Poland (pp. 137–189).

In the second part of the monograph – “In the new state. Prisons in Volyn and Galicia” – Oleg Razigraev analyzes the formation of the penitentiary system in the above-mentioned areas, highlights the structure and organization of prisons, and also presents a collective portrait of prison workers. During 1918 – 1923, the formation of the penitentiary system continued in Volyn and Galicia. The author notes that this process had its own regional features associated with unsuccessful attempts to unify the regulatory and legal bases of prison operations, a difficult financial situation, complex (re)evacuation processes and problems with the exchange of prisoners.

From Oleg Razygraev’s book, we learn that there were prisons of various classes in Volyn and Galicia, which mostly had a criminal-investigative nature. Volyn prisons, given the different structure of the penitentiary system in the region, were numerically significantly inferior to Galician prisons. An architectural feature of most Galician prisons was their location in the same complex as court premises. Prisons were often housed in former sacral or other unsuitable premises in need of repair. Among the largest prisons of the first class in the region, the author singles out prisons in Drohobych, Lviv (“Bryhydky”) and Lutsk. Class II included prisons in Zolochiv, Kovel, Kremenets, Kolomyia, Przemyśl, Rivne, Sambor, Syanok, Stanislavov, Stryi, Ternopil, and Chortkiv. Volodymyrsk, Dubnensk and Ostrozk prisons belonged to the III class and were the smallest penitentiary institutions in the region (p. 211).

Oleg Razigraev rightly notes that the absolute majority of employees of the penitentiary system in Volyn and Halychyna were Roman Catholic Poles (p. 264). Employees of penitentiary institutions had experience of military and law enforcement service. Throughout the interwar period, they complained about the difficult material situation. Prison officers were obliged to improve their professional qualifications. During the performance of their professional duties, they often violated discipline, which led to the imposition of appropriate sanctions (p. 294).

In the third part – “Ideological” and “common”: the regulated daily life of prisoners” – the author turns to the history of everyday life and reveals individual elements of the daily life of persons deprived of their liberty. Oleg Razigraev classifies prisoners according to various criteria: gender, age, according to articles of the criminal code, etc. The world economic crisis

of 1929 – 1935 (which provoked an increase in criminality), increased pressure on political opponents and the strengthening of the authoritarian regime in Poland further exacerbated the issue of overcrowding in penitentiaries. In the 1930s, almost all prisons in the study region were overcrowded, and most prisoners expressed dissatisfaction with housing and food conditions (p. 362).

In the same part of the book, the author raises the issue of medical care and work activities of prisoners. Usually sick prisoners were treated in the prison hospital or outpatient clinic. Typhus, tuberculosis, venereal and other infectious diseases posed a serious threat to the lives and health of prisoners of penitentiary institutions in Volyn and Halychyna (pp. 370–373). Convicts actively worked in various production workshops, and were also involved in agricultural work. Oleg Razigraev notes that staying in penitentiary institutions gave prisoners the opportunity to master literacy and acquire basic knowledge in prison educational institutions (p. 388). Oleg Razigraev notes that staying in penitentiary institutions gave prisoners the opportunity to master literacy and acquire basic knowledge in prison educational institutions (p. 388). Usually each prison had a chapel or place of worship (p. 403).

The pages of the reviewed monograph also highlight the issue of violation of discipline by prisoners, in particular, the author singles out hunger strikes, riots and escapes of convicts. Starvation was characteristic mostly of political prisoners and was a frequent phenomenon in Galician and Volyn prisons. Riots and escapes were characteristic of all categories of prisoners. Such actions led to the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on prisoners (pp. 408–409).

An extremely important element of the book under review is the analysis of informal communities of prisoners. Oleg Razigraev notes that while in penitentiary institutions, criminal and political prisoners created their own groups (“communities”, “communes”, “communities”) that had their own rules and hierarchy. The leaders of these structures acted as mediators between the prisoners and the prison administration. Political prisoners (communists and Ukrainian nationalists dominated among them in Volyn and Galicia) tried to continue their activities and maintain contacts with organizational centers on the loose in various ways (pp. 439–440). Prisoners who came from different areas of Volyn and Halychyna, for various reasons, often served their sentences outside their native region (p. 476).

In the last, fourth part – “Not to be left without help: support of prisoners and protection of their rights by public and political organizations” – Oleg Razigraev analyzed the activity of the public and political sectors regarding the care of prisoners. Here, the reader will find information about the activities of numerous prisoner aid organizations “Patronat”, which provided moral and material support to prisoners and members of their families. The author notes that the assistance provided by these organizations was important and necessary for persons deprived of their liberty. However, it provided a small part of the prisoners’ needs (p. 521).

In the same part of the book, the activities of the “International Organization for Aid to Fighters of the Revolution” – a Bolshevik structure that looked after communist political prisoners – are covered (p. 521). The author did not ignore the “Inter-Party Secretariat of the Struggle for the Amnesty of Political Prisoners”. This political organization was created in the Polish parliament by communist political groups and carried out activities aimed at freeing political prisoners (p. 554). O. Razigraev devoted a lot of space to researching the activities of the state-wide human rights organization “League for the Protection of Human

and Citizen Rights” in Volyn and Galicia, the functioning of the Galician “Committee for Assistance to Ukrainian Political Prisoners”, the pro-communist “Committee for Assistance to Political Prisoners in Eastern Galicia” (later – the “Regional Committee for Assistance to the Revolutionary Movement in Eastern Galicia”), as well as other manifestations of the public sector’s care over prisoners. From the pages of the last part of O. Razygraev’s monograph, we learn that help for political prisoners also came from some politicians, lawyers, and individual caring persons (pp. 590–591).

The reviewed monograph is completed by thorough conclusions. The author convincingly proves that “the functioning of the penitentiary system in the territories of interwar Volyn and Halychyna is an inseparable part and an important phenomenon of domestic and foreign history, and its research – a component of such modern sub-disciplinary areas of socio-humanitarian studies as regional history, social history and history of law. The solution of the scientific problem to which this book is devoted is also important in a theoretical and practical sense, since, on the one hand, it equips modern researchers of the modern history of Volyn and Halychyna with new archival material, and on the other hand, it can be useful in the modern activity of criminal executive service of Ukraine” (p. 598).

It should be added that the presented work is well illustrated, which significantly facilitates its perception. At the end of the book, the reader will find lists of tables and illustrations, an index, and, of course, a detailed bibliography.

Concluding the review of O. Razygraev’s monograph, we note that the reviewed book expands the worldview horizons of the historical study of the interwar development of Volyn and Halychyna in the regional and national context, and we hope it will certainly find its reader in Ukraine and beyond.

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TRUTH IS WHAT SCIENCE EXISTS FOR (peer-review on the scientific publication: Path from Primitiveness to Civilization. Ukrainian Ethnogenesis in the Middle Ages / NAS of Ukraine, Institute of History of Ukraine. Kyiv: Akademperiodyka, 2023. 658 p., 136 p. ill. (Ukraine. Essays on History))

ІСТИНА – ЦЕ ТЕ, В ІМ'Я ЧОГО ІСНУЄ НАУКА (рецензія на наукове видання: Шлях з первісності у цивілізацію. Українські шати середньовіччя / НАН України, Ін-т історії України. Київ: Академперіодика, 2023. 658 с., 136 с. іл. (Україна. Нариси історії))

“Know the truth, and it will set you free” is a slogan that, without exaggeration, may be the epigraph, leitmotif, and epilogue of the scientific publication “Path from Primitiveness to Civilization. Ukrainian Ethnogenesis in the Middle Ages”. A group of well-known authors – Vasyl Balushok, Oleksandr Halenko, Dmytro Haskevych, Oleksandr Diachenko, Oleksandr Motsia, Valentyn Pankovsky, Illia Parshyn, Volodymyr Rychka, Olena Rusyna and Vitaly Smoliy, the editor-in-chief, Academician of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine – ensured the book not only a scientific recognition, but also significant success among a wide readership.

Having chosen the essay as the main form of material presentation, the researchers set an important goal – to introduce the past of the Ukrainian people “into the common historical river” (p. 17), to demonstrate “the chronological sequence of changes in historically established civilizational forms of a social organization, political cultural and spiritual spaces, the formation and destruction of which depend on the anthropological factor directly, in a special way socialized in collective and individual activity practices” (Ibid.).

In Foreword, it is quite reasonable to state that “the further into the centuries the cognitive interest of a scholar is projected, the more difficult it becomes for him to synthesize <...> extra-source knowledge with the mass of information he gleaned from sources, <...> and, accordingly, the choice of research tools aimed at forming a complete, filled with events and results of a human activity framework of the past eras” (Ibid.). Therefore, “Beginnings of Historical and Cultural Landscape Formation of Ukraine” (Dmytro Haskevych) is framed by the issues of origin, evolution and spread of hominids (pp. 31–46); homo sapiens on the territory of Ukraine at the end of the Ice Age (pp. 47–62); crises of hunting industry and “a broad-spectrum revolution” (pp. 63–77); the Neolithic revolution and Neolithic colonization (Dmytro Haskevych, Oleksandr Diachenko, pp. 78–124).

The second part of the book “Transition to Early History: Period of Primitiveness and Civilization Coexistence” is permeated with a description of the process of “transition from prehistory to history of humanity of the Old World” (“Bronze Age”, Oleksandr Diachenko, Valentyn Pankovsky, pp. 127–157); aimed at studying of not only archaeological, but also written (from the 7th century BC), even foreign-language, sources (“The beginning of the historical logo of the Northern Black Sea Region”, Valentyn Pankovsky, pp. 158–174); recreated by understanding the path travelled by the Veneds, through a scientific discussion about whether “the Antis and Sklavins were later tribal formations that arose as a result of division of the Veneds into two parts under new names” (p. 176) before the so-called Great Migration of Peoples, “Temporal Years Novella” and the formation of “a new ethnic group, which from the middle of the 1st millennium AD began to influence European historical processes at that time and spread over large areas and was divided into three branches – eastern, western and southern” (p. 175) (“Slavs are a new ethnic group in the south of Eastern Europe and adjacent territories”, Oleksandr Motsia, pp. 175–186).

The third part of the book “Kyiv Rus in Political and Sociocultural Challenges of the Middle Ages” (Volodymyr Rychka) begins with a very symbolic section “Acquiring a Name and “Land”” (Volodymyr Rychka) (pp. 189–204). First of all, the name of the “early state that arose on the banks of the middle course of the Dnipro river at the turn of the 9th – 10th centuries” is interpreted in the section (p. 189); the so-called “Rurik Legend” is characterized; milestones in the life of Oleh “the man wise and brave”, nicknamed Vishchy, are traced; the significance of the Dnipro river campaign was revealed and it was proved that “the beginnings of Kyiv-Rus statehood are lost not in Novgorod or Ladoga, from where unifying impulses allegedly spread to the south of Kyiv” (p. 204), quite the opposite.

Section “Rooting” (pp. 205–221) is the study on “Oleh’s town” and the “military and munitions industry” of that era; the march to Byzantium; overcoming the Dnipro rapids; the shield on the gate of Constantinople; Ihor’s reign and the bloody drama under the walls of Iskorosten (p. 221).

“A decisive break in the organization of the system of state administration and rule in Kyivan Rus was manifested by the energetic activity of Princess Olha” (p. 222) – the section “Fundamentals of the State System” (Volodymyr Rychka, pp. 221–238) begins with this

thesis. The scholar claims: despite the fact that “the application of the concept of ‘statehood’ or ‘state’ to the realities of an archaic society, which were ancient Russky communities during the reign of Princess Olha, her son Sviatoslav and grandchildren, is to some extent conditional” (p. 227), the princess’s restoration of order in administrative management, state finances, and the judiciary strengthened the power of the Kyivan princely family and contributed to the empowerment of tribal princesses, and thus to overcoming political and cultural isolation of Kyivan Rus, its establishment “among the countries that formed the then European (Christian) world” (p. 228). Therefore, from the point of view of a current reader, Chapter “Civilizational Choice” is quite expected (pp. 239–255). However, this period was tense and full of fateful events to contemporaries – from the “seven-year break between the tragic death of Prince Sviatoslav on the Dnieper Rapids and the establishment of Volodymyr Sviatoslavych on the Kyivan throne” (p. 239) to the first religious reform, a difficult and often tragic “choice of faith”, the formation of the court hierarchy and traditions of the princely court and, finally, baptism!

Chapter “Time of Trials and Achievements” (pp. 256–276) initiated by an objective vision of the “dynastic discord” grounds (p. 256), strengthened by firm intentions to move “from strife to order” (p. 265) and unconditionally framed by the ideas of “spread of a new faith and Byzantine cultural influences” (p. 269).

The third part of the book is completed by Chapters “Shaky Equilibrium” (pp. 277–294) and “Split Line” (pp. 295–310). In the first chapter there is described the “golden age” of Kyivan Rus – the era of Yaroslav the Wise; “triumvirate” of the Yaroslavychi; the nature of the political system of Kyivan Rus at the turn of the 11th–12th centuries, and in the second one – the rift drawn by the sword of Andriy Boholiubsky between the Kyiv south and the Volodymyr-Suzdal north.

The fourth part of the peer-reviewed edition “Mongolian Breakthrough. Transition of the Black Sea Region under the Rule of the Ottomans” (Oleksandr Halenko) – consists of six chapters: “Civilizational Landscape of the Southern Steppe of Ukraine in the Pre-Mongol Era” (pp. 313–327); “Imperial Ambitions of the Mongols” (pp. 328–340); “Territorial and Administrative Organization of Juchi Ulus” (pp. 341–356); “Mongolian Practices of Economic Administration” (pp. 357–368); “The Genoese Colony of Kafa under the Supremacy of the Mongols” (pp. 369–378); “Subjugation of the Black Sea by the Ottomans” (pp. 379–390). The problems of the Northern Black Sea region at the beginning of the Middle Ages are presented with deep conviction; the consequences of Northern European intervention; the existence of the Hun Empire and the Khazar Khaganate; vicissitudes of the nomadic world under the conditions of Byzantine-Russky positions strengthening in Prymorie; the existence of the Mongol Empire at the end of the 12th – mid-14th centuries as one of the turning points in human history and the consequences of the Mongol conquests for Eastern Europe. After updating the model of a family rule and revealing the related threats to the state integrity of the empire, the historians analysed the territorial and political structure of the Juchi ulus, under whose authority the Ukrainian southern steppe area came at that time; the system of ulus administration and features of district organization; the scheme of military civilian administration and economic exploitation of the population. They characterize the specificity of state duties; the role of Kapha in the Golden Horde trade; the development of sugar production as a factor in the slave trade activation; the influence of the Genoese trading factory on the genesis of colonial practices, and ultimately, the Ottoman conquest of Kafa. “For more than three hundred years, from the end of the 15th to the beginning of the 19th

century, the Ukrainian south was part of the Ottoman Empire” (p. 379). The description of this period is completed with an analysis of the administrative and management system and economic structure of the northern Black Sea provinces.

By the will of history, the fifth part ends in “Galician-Volyn State: at the Crossroads of Worlds” (Illia Parshyn). The essay format of the book made it possible to name the sections of this part of the publication in a somewhat journalistic way (“Dynasty and power”, pp. 393–421; “Social mechanism”, pp. 422–444) and the phenomenon in the author’s scientific presentation of the term “concept”. “At the end of 1198 or during the year of 1199, Prince Roman Mstyslavovych made a campaign to Halych and annexed Halych land to his Volodymyr possessions. This step became the basis for the formation of a political entity, which later in historiography will be called the Galicia-Volyn Principality or the Galicia-Volyn State for a long time. The convention of such a name is generally accepted, because it has never been used in historical sources. However, it will continue to function as a certain phenomenon, a kind of *concept* (emphasis in italics is ours – V.K., P.M.), which is easily associated in the mind with a number of important events of the Ukrainian past of the 12th – 14th centuries. First of all, this concept is associated with Prince Roman Mstyslavovych...” (p. 393). *The concept kingdom* is highlighted (pp. 424, 426) in combination with the name of Danylo Halyskyi primarily; then – attested in the sources of the 14th century *Little Rus’ concept* (p. 425); the hierarchy, ethnos, and religiosity of the contemporary society are described, and finally the focus is on *the concept of war* (p. 435), which made it possible to show the activities of the Romanovych family through the prism of military conflicts.

The sixth part of the book “Meeting of Ukraine and Lithuania” (Olena Rusyna) is formed by the chapters “Beginnings of Lithuanian Rule” (pp. 447–463); “The Stormy 15th Century” (pp. 464–481); “Ukrainian Lands between Vilno and Moscow” (pp. 482–497); “The Age of Sigismund-Augustus” (pp. 498–508); “Economy and Society” (pp. 509–515); “Culture: Trends and Paradoxes” (pp. 516–529). In this chapter there is the question: *quid est veritas – what is the truth?* The author gives the answer by tracing the formation process of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; analysis of the Union of Krewo and its consequences, the reign of Vytautas; the battles on the Vorskla banks; Svidrigailov Wars; ways of overcoming crisis phenomena during the time of Kazimir Jagiellończyk. The researcher explains relations with the Crimea; problems of the metropolis unity; all-Russian claims of Ivan III; the war for Severshchyna and other Muscovite-Lithuanian wars of the first half of the 16th century. The hetmanship of Konstantyn Ostrozky is also characterized; the reforms of Sigismund-Augustus; the significance of the Union of Lublin and the actions of Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetsky. In the separate essays there is described the economy (traditional crafts and husbandry, domestic and international trade) and spiritual climate of that time – works of literature and art.

In the part “Between the Hungarian and Polish Crowns: Ukrainian Lands during the Period of Unions and Struggle” (Illia Parshyn) and the sections “Political and Social Transformations” (pp. 533–551), “Culture of Education and Intellectuals: Searching of one’s Own against the Background of Transformations” (pp. 552–574) the focus is on the issues of the Transcarpathian territories becoming part of Hungary and the rest of the Ukrainian lands – to the Polish Crown and, accordingly, on the specifics of a social, spiritual, cultural and public life of the Ukrainians at that time.

The eighth part of the scientific edition concluded with “Ethnogenesis of the Ukrainians” (Vasyl Balushok): “Cognitive Practices and Cultural Characteristics of Ethnogenesis” (pp. 577–600), “Formation of Ethnic Identity” (pp. 601–623), in which the approaches to the

study of Ukrainian ethnogenesis are formulated, the methodology, methods, and source base of the research are crystallized.

Thus, the peer-reviewed scientific publication “The Path from Primitiveness to Civilization. Ukrainian Ethnogenesis in the Middle Ages” demonstrates that history is the ground on which national consciousness is formed; the essay format of the book facilitates the understanding of “historical and generally socio-humanitarian knowledge about the past of Ukraine from the earliest times” (p. 13) to the era of the late Middle Ages greatly; the publication, without any doubt, will find its admirers both among historians and truth-seeking readers.

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NOTES

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