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ЗМІСТ

Ярослав ОНИЩУК, Роман СЕРКІЗ ЗНАХІДКИ ДЕКОРАТИВНИХ ЕЛЕМЕНТІВ КІНСЬКОЇ ЗБРУЇ ДЛЯ ВЕРХОВОЇ ЇЗДИ РИМСЬКОГО ЧАСУ З ОКОЛИЦІ с. РИХТИЧІ НА ДРОГОБИЧЧИНІ.....	8
Ламія КАФАР-ЗАДА КОЛИ ЗАХІД ЗУСТРІЧАЄ СХІД: ПОДОРОЖ СЕРА ЕНТОНІ ДЖЕНКІНСОНА ДО СЕФЕВІДСЬКОЇ ІМПЕРІЇ	20
Олександр ЧУЧАЛІН ТИПОЛОГІЯ ТА СТРУКТУРА МОНАСТИРІВ КИЇВСЬКОЇ СПАРХІЇ СИНОДАЛЬНОГО ПЕРІОДУ (кінець XVIII – початок XX ст.).....	36
Володимир НАКОНЕЧНИЙ, Ольга БЕНЧ, Іван ЗИМОМРЯ “МАТІР ВСЬОГО УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ЖИТТЯ”: ОБРАЗИ “ПРОСВІТИ” ТА ПРОСВІТЯН НА СТОРІНКАХ “НАШОГО ЛЕМКА”	50
Роман МАСИК ФРАНЦУЗЬКІ КАПІТАЛИ В НАФТОВІЙ ПРОМИСЛОВОСТІ ГАЛИЧИНИ У МІЖВОЄННИЙ ПЕРІОД.....	61
Костянтин КУРИЛИШИН, Микола ГАЛІВ РЕЦЕПЦІЯ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ СОЮЗУ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ АДВОКАТІВ НА ШПАЛЬТАХ ГАЗЕТИ “ДІЛО” (1923 – 1934).....	75
Сергій КОРНОВЕНКО, Олексій КОМПАНІЄЦЬ ПОЛІТИКА “РОЗЗБРОСННЯ” ЯК ПЕРЕДУМОВА УПОКОРЕННЯ УКРАЇНСЬКОГО СЕЛА В УМОВАХ “ВЕЛИКОГО ПЕРЕЛОМУ” 1929 – 1933 pp.	89
Руслана ПОПП, Оксана МЕДВІДЬ СОЦІАЛЬНИЙ ПОРТРЕТ ПРЕДСТАВНИКІВ ПАРТІЙНО-РАДЯНСЬКОЇ НОМЕНКЛАТУРИ ЗАХІДНИХ ОБЛАСТЕЙ УКРАЇНИ У КІНЦІ 40-х pp. XX ст. (ЗА МАТЕРІАЛАМИ АРХІВНО-КРИМІНАЛЬНОЇ СПРАВИ).....	100
Олександр СИЧ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЙНИЙ РОЗВИТОК ЗАКОРДОННИХ ЧАСТИН ОРГАНІЗАЦІЇ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ НАЦІОНАЛІСТІВ В 1948 – 1951 pp.	111
Ганна СІРОМСЬКА, Руслан СІРОМСЬКИЙ ВІДДІЛЕННЯ “ІНТУРИСТ” У ЛЬВОВІ: ПРАВОВІ ЗАСАДИ ФУНКЦІОНУВАННЯ, ГОСПОДАРСЬКИЙ СТАН ТА ЕКСКУРСІЙНА ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ (середина 1960-х pp.).....	121
Олег МАЛЯРЧУК, Наталія ПЕТРЕЦЬКА ПРИРОДООХОРОННА ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ У ЗАХІДНОМУ РЕГІОНІ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ РСР: НА ПРИКЛАДІ ІВАНО-ФРАНКІВСЬКОЇ ОБЛАСТІ ОБЛАСТІ (1960 – 1980-ті pp.).....	130
Василь ЧУРА, Юрій КАГАНОВ РАЙОННА ТА БАГАТОТИРАЖНА ПРЕСА ЗАХІДНИХ ОБЛАСТЕЙ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ РСР ЯК ІЛЮСТРАТОР ПЕРЕРОСТАННЯ ЕКОНОМІЧНИХ НЕВДАЧ “ПЕРЕБУДОВИ” У ВИМОГИ ПОЛІТИЧНИХ РЕФОРМ У 1988 р.	144
Наталія КОВАЛЬЧУК ПАНСЛОВ’ЯНСЬКІ ІДЕЇ В СУЧАСНІЙ РОСІЙСЬКІЙ ПОЛІТИЧНІЙ УЯВІ І ВІЙНА СУПРОТИ УКРАЇНИ.....	159

Валентина БОДАК, Ігор БАРАН ВІДНОСИНИ ЦЕРКВИ І ДЕРЖАВИ В ПЕРІОД РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ (2014 – 2024).....	170
Валерій НОВОРОДОВСЬКИЙ, Надія КУЛЕСА УЧАСТЬ НАЦІОНАЛЬНИХ МЕНШИН У СУСПІЛЬНОМУ ЖИТТІ УКРАЇНИ В УМОВАХ РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ (2014 – 2024)	186
Роман ПУЙДА, Парасковія ДВОРЯНИН РЕФОРМУВАННЯ ВИЩОЇ ОСВІТИ УКРАЇНИ (2014 – 2022) У РЕЦЕПЦІЇ ВІТЧИЗНЯНИХ СОЦІАЛЬНИХ МЕДІА	203
Василь ІЛЬНИЦЬКИЙ, Віталій ТЕЛЬВАК УКРАЇНА В УМОВАХ ДРУГОГО РОКУ ЕКЗИСТЕНЦІЙНОЇ ВІЙНИ В АНАЛІТИЧНИХ РЕФЛЕКСІЯХ ВАРШАВСЬКОГО ЦЕНТРУ СХІДНИХ СТУДІЙ.....	218

CONTENTS

Yaroslav ONYSHCHUK, Roman SERKIZ FINDS OF DECORATIVE ELEMENTS OF HORSE HARNESS FOR RIDING OF THE ROMAN PERIOD FROM THE VICINITY OF RYKHTYCHI VILLAGE NEAR DROHOBYCH	8
Lamiya GAFAR-ZADA WHEN WEST MEETS EAST: SIR ANTHONY JENKINSON’S JOURNEY TO THE SAFAVID EMPIRE	20
Oleksandr CHUCHALIN TYPOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF MONASTERIES OF THE KYIV EPARCHY DURING THE SYNODAL PERIOD (THE END OF THE 18th – THE BEGINNING OF THE 20th CENTURY).....	36
Volodymyr NAKONECHNYI, Olga BENCH, Ivan ZYMOMRYA “MOTHER OF ALL UKRAINIAN LIFE”: IMAGES OF “PROSVITA” AND ITS MEMBERS ON THE PAGES OF “NASH LEMKO”	50
Roman MASYK THE FRENCH CAPITAL IN THE OIL INDUSTRY OF GALICIA DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD	61
Kostiantyn KURYLYSHYN, Mykola HALIV RECEPTION OF THE UNION OF UKRAINIAN LAWYERS’ ACTIVITIES IN THE COLUMNS OF THE NEWSPAPER “DILO” (1923 – 1934).....	75
Serhii KORNOVENKO, Oleksii KOMPANIETS THE POLICY OF “DISARMAMENT” AS THE PREMISE OF SUBJUGATION OF THE UKRAINIAN COUNTRYSIDE UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF THE “GREAT TURNING POINT” OF 1929 – 1933	89
Ruslana POPP, Oksana MEDVID SOCIAL PORTRAIT OF THE PARTY-SOVIET NOMENCLATURE REPRESENTATIVES IN THE WESTERN REGIONS OF UKRAINE AT THE END OF THE 40s OF THE XXth CENTURY (BASED ON ARCHIVE CRIMINAL CASE MATERIALS).....	100
Oleksandr SYCH DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN UNITS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS IN 1948 – 1951	111
Hanna SIROMSKA, Ruslan SIROMSKYI “INTOURIST” DEPARTMENT IN LVIV: LEGAL BASIS, ECONOMIC CONDITION AND EXCURSION ACTIVITY (the mid-1960s).....	121
Oleh MALIARCHUK, Nataliia PETRETSKA NATURE PROTECTION ACTIVITY IN THE WESTERN REGION OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR: ON THE EXAMPLE OF IVANO-FRANKIVSK REGION (the 1960s – 1980s).....	130
Vasyl CHURA, Yurii KAHANOV DISTRICT AND MULTI-CIRCULATION PRESS OF THE WESTERN REGIONS OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE “PERESTROIKA” ECONOMIC FAILURES TRANSFORMATION INTO POLITICAL REFORM DEMANDS IN 1988	144

Nataliia KOVALCHUK PAN-SLAVIC IDEAS IN MODERN RUSSIAN POLITICAL IMAGINATION AND THE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE.....	159
Valentyna BODAK, Ihor BARAN CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS DURING THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR (2014 – 2024).....	170
Valerii NOVORODOVSKYI, Nadiia KULESHA NATIONAL MINORITIES PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC LIFE OF UKRAINE UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR (2014 – 2024).....	186
Roman PUYDA, Paraskoviya DVORIANYN HIGHER EDUCATION REFORM IN UKRAINE (2014 – 2022) IN THE RECEPTION OF DOMESTIC SOCIAL MEDIA.....	203
Vasyl ILNYTSKYI, Vitalii TELVAK UKRAINE UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND YEAR OF EXISTENTIAL WAR IN ANALYSTS' REFLECTIONS OF THE WARSAW CENTRE FOR EASTERN STUDIES	218

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**FINDS OF DECORATIVE ELEMENTS OF HORSE HARNESS
FOR RIDING OF THE ROMAN PERIOD FROM THE VICINITY
OF RYKHTYCHI VILLAGE NEAR DROHOBYCH**

Abstract. *The purpose of the research is to study and introduce into scientific circulation a complex of finds of decorative elements of horse harness from the outskirts of the village of Rykhtychi near Drohobych in the context of cultural and historical processes that took place in the territory of Eastern Prykarpattia and Western Volyn during the Roman period. Their participants were a multi-ethnic barbarian population that came to these lands from the Middle Danube during or after the end of the Marcomannic Wars (last quarter of the 2nd century AD) and disappeared in the phase of migration of the Gothic tribes to the Northern Black Sea region (the 3rd century AD). The methodology of the research is based on various principles of scientific study: historicism, objectivity, systematicity, which determined the application of both general scientific (analytical, statistical, historical retrospective and perspective, synthesis and analysis) and special (comparative typological, stratigraphic, cartographic, material science analysis and etc.) methods. This enabled a versatile and critical approach to the study of the problems of emergence, nature and significance of the complex of finds from the vicinity of Rykhtychi and ensured the reliability*

of the obtained results and conclusions. **The scientific novelty** of the research work consists in the study and introduction into scientific circulation of a set of decorative elements of horse harness for riding from the outskirts of the village of Rykhtychi, unique in the lands of Ukraine, and determining its place among similar complexes in the territory of Central Europe. **The Conclusions.** It was determined that the find of decorative elements of horse harness for riding from the vicinity of Rykhtychi reflects the complex events of the last quarter of the 2d century AD, related to the Marcomannic Wars in the Middle Danube. Based on a number of analogies from the territory of Central and Northern Europe, it was determined that the complex can be a votive offering to the gods for success in solving certain cases, a positive result in achieving the set goal, etc. In barbarian societies, they were made in water environments (rivers, lakes, swamps), on the tops or gentle slopes of hills, in crevices of rocks. The find from the vicinity of Rykhtychi may mark one of the migration routes of a certain group of people from the Middle Danube region through the Carpathians to Western Pobuzhzhia.

Key words: Archeology of Ukraine, Roman times, migrations, Marcomannic wars, beliefs, votive offering, spectral analysis.

ЗНАХІДКИ ДЕКОРАТИВНИХ ЕЛЕМЕНТІВ КІНСЬКОЇ ЗБРУЇ ДЛЯ ВЕРХОВОЇ ЇЗДИ РИМСЬКОГО ЧАСУ З ОКОЛИЦІ С. РИХТИЧІ НА ДРОГОБИЧЧИНІ

Анотація. Мета дослідження полягає у вивченні та введенні до наукового обігу комплексу знахідок декоративних елементів кінської збруї з околиць села Рихтичі біля Дрогобича в контексті культурно-історичних процесів, які проходили на території Східного Прикарпаття і Західної Волині в римський період. Їхніми учасниками була різноетнічна варварська людність, яка приходила на ці землі з Середнього Подунав'я в час або після завершення Маркоманських війн (ост. чв. II ст. н. е.) і зникає у фазі міграції готських племен у Північне Причорномор'я (III ст. н. е.). **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на різноманітних принципах наукового дослідження: історизму, об'єктивності, системності, які визначили застосування як загальнонаукових (аналітичного, статистичного, історичної ретроспективи й перспективи, синтезу та аналізу), так і спеціальних (порівняльно-типологічного, стратиграфічного, картографічного, матеріалознавчого аналізу та ін.) методів вивчення. Це дало змогу різнобічно та критично підійти до вивчення проблем виникнення, характеру та значення комплексу знахідок з околиць Рихтич і забезпечило вірогідність отриманих результатів й висновків. **Наукова новизна роботи** полягає у дослідженні та введенні до наукового обігу унікального на землях України набору декоративних елементів кінської збруї для верхової їзди з Рихтич і визначенні його місця серед подібних комплексів на території Центральної Європи. **Висновки.** У результаті досліджень встановлено, що знахідка декоративних елементів кінської збруї для верхової їзди з Рихтич відображає складні події періоду останньої чверті II ст. н. е., пов'язані з Маркоманськими війнами у Середньому Подунав'ї. На основі низки аналогій з території Центральної та Північної Європи визначено, що комплекс може бути вотивним приношенням богам за успіх у вирішенні певних справ, позитивний результат у досягненні поставленої мети тощо. У варварських суспільствах їх робили у водних середовищах (ріки, озера, болота), на вершинах або пологіх схилах пагорбів, щілинах скель. Знахідка з Рихтич може маркувати один зі шляхів міграції певної групи людності з Середньодунайського регіону через Карпати у Західне Побужжя.

Ключові слова: Археологія України, римський час, міграції, Маркоманські війни, вірування, вотивне приношення, спектральний аналіз.

The Problem Statement. At the end of 2020, Oleksandr Fomin, a resident of Drohobych, discovered several objects made of non-ferrous metals in the forest between the villages of Rykhtychi and Khatky, Drohobych district, Lviv region (Fig. 1). The materials were deposited in the funds of Archaeological Museum of Ivan Franko National University of Lviv. Their analysis suggested the hypothesis that the objects belonged to a complex of decorations for horse riding equipment, in particular, were used to decorate the chest saddle strap. The author of the find showed the place of discovery, and also described the conditions of its location

in detail. According to him, the objects lay in one cluster at a depth of 0.4 – 0.5 m from the modern surface in a small hole measuring 0.5x0.5 m. In April of 2021, the archaeological expedition of Ivan Franko National University of Lviv (LNU named after I. Franko)¹ examined the find. It was determined that the items were found on a wooded, terraced hilltop 305 m above sea level. Traces of an old filled pit of an amorphous shape were visually observed at this place.

In order to establish the nature of the find, an exploratory trench measuring 8x2 m was laid on the site. The soil stratigraphy proved the complete absence of a cultural layer: under the layer of fallen leaves lay a layer of loam without any interspersions of an anthropogenic nature. At a depth of 0.5 m from the modern surface, it was possible to trace the bottom of the pit, in which, according to O. Fomin, the artifacts were lying. No other finds were found in the trench.

The Review of Recent Researches and Publications. The bibliography of the issue is represented by a large amount of publications on Illerup Ådal (Carnap-Bornheim & Illkær, 1996), Nydam Mose (Rau, Blankenfeldt, Lau, Matešić, & Westphal, 2009; Rau, 2010, 2013), Kragehul Mose (Iversen, 2010) in Denmark; Thorsberger Moor in Germany (Raddatz, 1957; Lau, 2009; Carnap-Bornheim, 2014 – 2015), Nidajno (Nowakiewicz & Rzeszotarska-Nowakiewicz, 2012; Kokowski, 1993), Lubanowo (Kontny, Nowakiewicz, Rzeszowska-Nowakiewicz, 2016; Kontny, 2016; Kontny, 2021) in Poland, burial monuments in Witaszewice (Tyszler, 2014), Zohor (Elschek, Rajtar & Varsik, 2011), Cífer (Bazovský, 2017) in Slovakia, the village of Kazanska in the Kuban (Sharov, 2017) and votive offerings in Kamięńczyk in Eastern Poland (Wilbers-Rost, 1994), in Borinka, Slovakia (Bazovský, Majerová, Szábóová & Arendt, 2020), Mödring (Friesinger, Tuzar & Pollak, 2000 – 2001) and Buckligen Welt/Oststeiermark (Guštin, 2019) in Austria related to the study of swamp deposits of ancient Germans. The most recent studies related to the rite of sacrifice of objects of material culture in ancient barbarian societies are published in the works by R. Blankenfeldt and C. von Carnap-Bornheim (Blankenfeldt & Carnap-Bornheim, 2018), N. Lau (Lau, 2018), A. Rau (Rau, 2016), T. Nowakiewicz (Nowakiewicz, 2015), L. Tyszler (Tyszler, 2019), B. Kontnego (Kontny, 2021), Ya. Onyshchuk (Onyshchuk, 2022b; Onyshchuk, 2022c) and the others. **The purpose of the research** consists in the study of a complex of finds of decorative elements of horse harness from the vicinity of the village of Rykhtychi in the context of cultural and historical processes that took place in the territory of Eastern Prykarpattia and Western Volyn during the Roman era. Their participants were a multi-ethnic barbarian population that appeared in these lands from the Middle Danube during or after the end of the Marcomannic Wars and disappeared during the migration phase of the Gothic tribes to the Northern Black Sea region.

The Research Results. The complex of finds from the outskirts of the village of Rykhtychi includes: a disc-shaped three-component ornament – phalera; a whole, as well as a fragment of another, smaller in size, openwork lamellar overlays; a square-shaped armature frame with figured trident projections in the corners; two drop-shaped two-component overlays; a fragment of a square buckle with a fragment of a tongue (Figs. 2–3). The found materials are made of silver, copper and tin bronze (Table 1).

¹ The expedition included employees of the Department of Archeology and Special Branches of Historical Science, the archaeological museum, and students of the History Faculty of I. Franko LNU: Yaroslav Onyshchuk, Yaroslav Pohoralskyi, Denys Sliusar, Vitaly Vdovychenko, Markiyan Koltak.

Table 1

Results of Elemental Analysis of Finds in the Vicinity of Rykhtychi²

№	Name of the find	Ag (%)	Cu (%)	Sn (%)
1	Phalera (front/back side)	98,3/98,4	1,7–4,1/1,5	0
2	Ring (armature) of phalera	0	99,9	0
	Connecting element of phalera (nail)	97,8/0	2,7/93.3	6.7
3	Openwork overlay (front/back side)	95,5/ 17,1	1,9/4,2	0/78.7
4.	Fragment of an openwork overlay (front/back side)	93,7/43,7	1,8/2,43	0/49,9
5.	Armature frame (front/back side)	2,24/0	13,9/50,9	71,5/36,5
6.	Drop-shaped overlays (face plate/back base)	96,2/0,4	3,8/98,3	0/1,3
7.	Buckle fragment	0	51,6	33,4

The most important element among the named items is a massive disk-shaped phalera. Its total size is 7 cm (Fig. 2: 1; 3: 1). The subject consists of three parts. The basis of the decoration is a round silver plate with a diameter of 6.5 cm and a thickness of 0.08 mm, made by using a press from a thinly rolled silver plate³ (Fig. 2: 1.1; 3: 1.1). Its surface is divided by concentric circles into 5 fields, of which the inner and outer are unornamented. The other three are decorated with a row of rosette rings 2 mm in diameter with a dot in the middle and two rows of short dashes slanting in different directions. It should be noted that during the application of the sockets, the master probably made inaccuracies in the calculation of the distances between them, which in some cases led to the overlapping of one ring on the other. All ornaments are voluminous, extruded outwards.

The edges of the plate are covered with a massive D-shaped ring 0.7 cm thick, made of thick copper wire and covered with thin silver foil (Fig. 2: 1.2). On the front side, it is decorated with a corrugated ornament in the form of a series of numerous transverse ridges (Fig. 2: 1; 3: 1). To fix the ring on a solid base, three notches were cut along the edge of the plate (Fig. 2: 1.1; 3: 1.1).

In the centre of the decoration there is a connecting element in the form of a copper-tin alloy nail, also wrapped in silver foil. Its convex head is decorated with a cross-shaped ornament in the centre, on the edges – an overlay ring 1 mm thick with oblique recessed lines. The diameter of the part is 1.5 cm, the height is 0.6 cm. The rod is broken and has a thickness of 0.3 cm. (Fig. 2: 1.3). With the help of the latter phalera was additionally attached to some stronger base.

Exact analogies to the described phalera are still unknown, however, from the territories closest to Ukraine, similar finds come from barrow No. 16 of the Sarmatian burial ground in the village of Kazanska in the Kuban (Sharov, 2017, fig. 4,7: 5) (Fig. 4: 5–6). We can assume that the detail played the main role in the decoration of the chest saddle belt, decorating its central part.

The openwork plate cover has a rectangular shape and is made of very thin silver foil with

² X-ray spectral analysis of the metal was performed by Roman Serkis in the laboratory of the Department of Physics of Solid State, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv using a REMMA-102-02 scanning electron microscope.

³ The composition of the chemical elements of silver parts contains a proportion of copper in the range of 1.7–4.1%, which may be an impurity of natural origin (Biletskyi, Omelchenko & Horvanko, 2016, p. 337).

a thickness of 0.06 mm. Its total size is 6.7x4.2 cm. The decoration is divided into 3 parts: the middle one has a shape close to a square and measures 4x3.4 cm, the two side ones are rectangular, measuring 4.2x2 cm. The central part of the find is made in the shape of a four-petaled flower with longitudinally separated petals. The side fields are decorated with rows of carved semi-ovals and rhombuses (Fig. 2: 2; 3: 2). The front surface of the pad is smooth, the back one – with the remains of tin, with which it was soldered to the rigid base (Fig. 1).

Similar materials are known among finds from cluster No. 190/142 (SARK) in swamp deposit in Illerup Ådal, Denmark (Carnap-Bornheim & Illkær, 1996, Bd. 7, Taf. 231) (Fig. 4: 11–12), a rich burial No. 22 in Witaszewice, Central Poland (Tyszler, 2019, s. 42, ryc. 5: 2), partly similar – from the burial ground in the village of Kazanska (barrow No. 16) in the Kuban (Sharov, 2017, p. 358, fig. 3) (Fig. 4: 9–10). Fields with semi-oval and rhombic cut-outs are similar to part of an openwork plate from object 15/2008 of an elite German burial ground in Zohor, Slovakia, which dates back to the end of the 2d – the beginning of the 3rd century AD (Elschek, Rajtar & Varsik, 2011, ss. 141–142, obr. 11: 2).

In the complex of finds from Rykhtychi there is a fragment of another similar overlay made of silver foil. Only a fragment of a 4 cm long frame with the remains of flower petals in two corners remained from it (Fig. 2: 3; 3: 3). Analogies to this type of decorative elements are known in horse harness complexes from Mödring in Austria (Friesinger, Tuzar & Pollak, 2000 – 2001, s. 265, Abb. 11) (Fig. 4:1) and Borinka in Slovakia (Bazovský, Majerová, Szábóová & Arendt, 2020, SS. 253, 256, Abb. 4: 1–2) (Fig. 4: 2–3), where they decorated the latches of the belt turrets at the ends of the chain reins of the Vimose type.

One side of the square frame is damaged. It is made of an alloy of copper and tin. There are four protrusions in the form of tridents in the corners (Fig. 2: 4; 3: 4). The size of the find is 4x3.4 cm, the width of the sides is 0.6–0.7 cm, and the thickness is 0.2 cm. There are four through holes with a diameter of 2 mm on the surface, with the help of which it was attached to the leather base. It is obvious that such objects were used as fittings for fixing the above-described openwork overlays with the image of four-petaled flowers. This, in particular, is indicated by both the identical dimensions and the remains of tin solder on one of the sides of the frame. A fragment of a similar armature comes from a complex of finds of horse harness from Borinka in Slovakia (Bazovský, Majerová, Szábóová & Arendt, 2020, ss. 254–255, Abb. 4: 5) (Fig. 4: 4).

The two teardrop-shaped ornaments consist of two parts: a partially preserved copper plate, which played the role of an armature, and an overlay made of silver foil (Fig. 2:5–6; 3:5–6). The latter are attached using tin solder. The size of the findings is: preserved copper plates measuring 3.4x1.8 cm, silver elements – 4x2.2 cm. The first ones have two round holes with a diameter of 3 mm, with the help of which the part was connected to the base. Similar finds are known as from the Germanic sacred Lake Illerup Ådal (Carnap-Bornheim & Illkær, 1996, Taf. 233:ABE–ABLF) (Fig. 4: 13–14), as well as the burial ground in the village of Kazanska (Sharov, 2017, fig. 4,7:5) (Fig. 4: 7–8).

The fragment of the bronze buckle is not very informative for the reconstruction of its appearance. It is frame-type, elongated-rectangular in shape and made by casting method from an alloy of copper and tin. One of the long sides of the case in the central part has a thinning for fixing the tongue (Fig. 2: 7; 3: 7). Since the size of the largest fragment is 3.0x1.9 cm (the thickness of the frame is 0.3–0.4 cm), the approximate dimensions of the buckle could be 5x2 cm. Like the objects described above, the find could also be part of a complex of horse harnesses, used to connect leather bridle straps.

As mentioned above, the studies carried out by expedition of scholars of Ivan Franko

Lviv National University did not reveal any traces of a cultural layer or signs of a burial monument at the site of the find. Although all the items lay in one cluster in a small pit, their small number casts doubt on the hoard origin of the objects. On the other hand, in the complex the presence of only a part of the decorative elements of horse harness, as well as the intentional damage of the majority of them, may indicate the cult character of the object. We assume that they could have been buried with a sacrificial purpose to propitiate the gods. Similar material votives are known not only in the north of Europe, where they are represented in the sacred bog complexes of Illerup Ådal, Thorsberg Moor, Nydam Mose and the others, but also in its central regions. In particular, donations in the form of separate items of horse riding harness were found in the localities in Kamieńczyk in Eastern Poland (Wilbers-Rost, 1994, s. 189), Borinka in South-Western Slovakia (Bazovský, Majerová, Szábóová & Arendt, 2020), Mödring (Friesinger, Tuzar & Pollak, 2000 – 2001), Buckligen Welt/Eastern Styria (Guštin 2019, s. 488, Abb. 1) in Lower Austria, etc. For example, an almost completely preserved bridle with chain reins of the Vimose type from Kamieńczyk, Masovian Voivodeship, was found in the Zahidny Buh River, and according to Bartosz Kontny could get there as a result of ritual actions (Kontny, 2019, ss. 87–88). Artifacts from Borinka, Malatsky District, were discovered in a mountainous area on the gentle slope of a high hill. The complex included a bridle with the Vimose reins and separate parts of a horse riding harness with elements of a decorative set (Bazovský, Majerová, Szábóová & Arendt, 2020). The authors of the article believe that they were buried for ritual purposes on an ancient road and may be synchronous with the Roman station of the period of the Marcomannic Wars in the town of Stupava (Bazovský, Majerová, Szábóová & Arendt, 2020, s. 262). Well-preserved horse bridles in the Müdring and Bukligen Welt/Eastern Styria were hidden in rock crevices for the same purpose (Guštin, 2019, ss. 489, 492).

Thus, found in the vicinity of the village of Rykhtychi materials represent the incoming cultural group, conditionally named Karivska (Onyshchuk, 2022b, p. 69). Its eponymous landmark is Kariv-I burial ground in Western Pobuzhzhia. As a result of excavations, 12 cremation burials with the remains of 13 people were discovered there: 7 men, 5 women and 1 child (an adolescent group *infantilis II*) (Onyshchuk, 2022b, p. 67). The found items of burial equipment (bronze and glass vessels, Terra sigillata ceramics, fragments of the Roman amphorae, gold jewelry, etc.) testify to the elitist nature of the find. In Burial No. 2 the use as an urn of a bronze cauldron with attachments in the form of male chests with hairstyles of the “*nodus suebicus*” type (“Suebian knot”) testifies not only to a high social status of the person buried in it, but also an ethnic affiliation to the Germanic tribes of the Suebian origin. The most famous of them (Marcomani, Quads, Boers) lived in the Pannonian Limes at that time (Onyshchuk, 2019, ss. 368–369, 372). At the same time, the burial rites of Kariv cemetery show signs of the multiculturalism of population there. They are traced in various ways of arranging graves, ritual actions related to the process of placing the remains, as well as in the composition and nature of the accompanying inventory (Onyshchuk, 2022a, pp. 151–152; 2022b, pp. 79–81).

A new group of people appears in the western regions of Ukraine in the last quarter of the 2d century AD during or after the end of the Marcomannic Wars (Onyshchuk, 2022b, pp. 79–81). In addition to Kariv and Rykhtychi in the region of Eastern Prykarpattia and South-Western Volyn, it is represented by burials and accidental material finds in a number of other settlements (Toboliv, Zhovkva, Rechychany, Stinka (?), Slovitva, etc.) (Onyshchuk 2022c, ss. 84–89, fig. 1). The eastern border of its distribution is fixed within Zhytomyr region according to the finds

that, unfortunately, were obtained as a result of illegal activities of “black diggers”. According to published information, at least three objects are known on this territory, which we can theoretically associate with Kariv group. This is a random find of a part of the Vimose type chain with a plate lock of the crank belt, decorated with a four-petal flower similar to Rykhtychi finds (Schuster, in print, Abb. 23) (Fig. 5: 1) and items from two cremation military graves with weapons destroyed by detectorists (Fig. 5: 2–3). Among the burial goods of the latter there are large square buckles with a double tongue along with wide ends of belts with openwork geometric ornamentation of the opus interrasile type in one case (Schuster, in print, Abb. 47: 3a–3b) and with linear and spiral cutouts in the second (Levada, 2020).

The openwork ornamentation of the metal elements of the belts has analogies on the Germanic monuments of the early Roman period of the Middle Danube region, in the Western Baltic Bogachev and Dollkaim-Kovrovo cultures, as well as in Northern European marsh deposits, where, however, they date to the C1b phase (the second half of the 3d century AD). In Przeworsk culture, this type of decoration occurs much less often. However, if among the Western Balts this ornament mostly has the form of triangles, then in Przeworsk culture it is supplemented with rows of rhombuses, semi-ovals and a quatrefoil motif (Madyda Legutko, 2009, p. 778). The origins of the openwork technique are associated with the provincial Roman world, in particular with the spread of Norico-Pannonian women's belts richly decorated in the style of opus interrasile in the Dollkai-carpet culture. During the B2/C1a period (the second half of the 2nd century AD), such an ornament appears on the elements of a man's belt (Madyda Legutko, 2009, p. 780).

According to typology of Renata Madyda-Legutko wide lamellar ends with edges concave to the middle belong to Type 9, Variety 5, Group IV (Type JIV.1 according to Klaus Raddatz) (Raddatz, 1957, ss. 101–103). They functioned during a long period of time from the last quarter of the 1st (phase B2) to the beginning of the 3rd century AD (phase C1a). We assume that such products could have entered the territory of Ukraine in the last quarter of the 1st century AD together with carriers of Kariv group. It is also possible that they may mark the direction of movement of this people together with the Goths to the Northern Black Sea region at the final stage of their existence.

The Conclusions. Thus, elements of horse harness from the vicinity of Rykhtychi were buried for sacrificial purposes by migrants from the territory of the Middle Danube. This may be a reflection of the custom of sacrifices to the gods, which in the territory of Central and Northern Europe were made in water environments, crevices of rocks, on the tops or gentle slopes of hills. Also, the complex of finds from the vicinity of Rykhtychi may mark one of the migration routes of a group of barbarian people from the Middle Danube region through the Carpathians to Western Pobuzhzia, where they left the eponymous of Kariv-I.

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Illustrations



Fig. 1. Map of the place where decorative elements of horse harness were found (topobase from the Internet resource <https://mistaua.com>)



Fig. 2. Finds from the outskirts of the village of Rykhtychi (photo by Ya. Onyshchuk)




Fig. 3. Finds from the outskirts of the village of Rykhtychi (drawing by H. Bashta)



Fig. 4. Analogies to the finds from the outskirts of the village of Rykhtychi:
 1 – metal elements of a horse bridle with reins of the Vimose type from Müdring (Friesinger, Tuzar & Pollak, 2000 – 2001. Taf. 5); 2–4 – turret fasteners and a fragment of the frame-armature from Vimose type chain reins from Borinka (Bazovský, Majerová, Szábóová & Arendt, 2020, Abb. 4); 5–10 – finds from burial No. 16 of the cemetery in Kazanska village (Sharov, 2017, fig. 3–4); 11–14 – materials from accumulation No. 190/142 (SARK) of Illerup Ådal marsh deposit (Carnap-Bornheim & Illkær, 1996, Taf. 231,233)




Fig. 5. Finds in Zhytomyr Region:

- 1 – details of a horse bridle with reins of the Vimose type (Schuster, in print, Abb. 23),
2–3 – belt ends with an openwork ornament
(2 – Schuster, in print, Abb. 4:3a; 3 – Levada, 2020) (Fig. H. Bashta)

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**WHEN WEST MEETS EAST: SIR ANTHONY JENKINSON'S JOURNEY
TO THE SAFAVID EMPIRE**

Abstract. *The purpose of the article is to present a comprehensive study of Sir Anthony Jenkinson's role in introducing the British a Safavid culture as a part of Eastern/Muslim world. The methodology of the research is based on the application of the principles of historicism, objectivity and comprehensiveness. In the research there have been used general scientific methods such as analysis, synthesis, comparison, and generalization. The scientific novelty of the article is that although there is a significant body of works on Safavid-English relations, this article represents the first attempt to study comprehensively Anthony Jenkinson's role in introducing Safavid culture to the English. The Conclusion.* The “Declaration...” of the journey to the Safavid Empire of a famous English traveller, mercer and diplomat Sir Anthony Jenkinson in 1561 – 1563, who was regarded as one of “the great pioneers of Elizabethan travel”, is a valuable source not only on the history and culture of the Safavid Empire, but also Safavid-English relations. Jenkinson's “Declaration” is the first English attempt to describe Safavids' diplomatic and military history, socio-economical, cultural, theological life, as well as lifestyle and even local mythology. The study of Jenkinson's detailed description proves that England's interaction with the Safavid Empire wasn't English colonization, as the majority of Western and Soviet historians used to present mistakenly, but discovery by the English of a new, previously unknown Eastern/Islamic world, i.e. Safavid Empire. As the first Eastern/Muslim country that Elizabethan England sought to ally, Jenkinson's “Declaration” of the Safavid Empire is one of the first mentions both in English and European contemporary sources about the religious distinction between Sunnis and Shiites. Jenkinson's unique map of 1562 as the result of his journeys is the oldest and first visual representation of the Safavid Empire in English sources that contain ethnographic information. Jenkinson's journey to the Safavid Empire in 1561 – 1563 opened a new chapter in the history of both Anglo-Islamic and East-West relations and cultural exchange on the basis of Islam-Christianity dialogue that revealed inadequacy of such Eurocentric concepts as predominance of Europe over the East, “cultural polarizing” of the continent, dispelled the myth of monolithic culture.

Keywords: Anthony Jenkinson, Safavid Empire, Elizabethan England, Safavid-English relations, culture, 1562, journey.

КОЛИ ЗАХІД ЗУСТРІЧАЄ СХІД: ПОДОРОЖ СЕРА ЕНТОНІ ДЖЕНКІНСОНА ДО СЕФЕВІДСЬКОЇ ІМПЕРІЇ

Анотація. *Мета статті* – представити результати дослідження ролі сера Ентоні Дженкінсона у ознайомленні британців із культурою Сефевідів як з частиною східного / мусульманського світу. **Методика дослідження** заснована на застосуванні принципів історизму, об'єктивності та всебічності. У дослідженні використовувалися загальнонаукові методи, такі як аналіз, синтез, порівняння та узагальнення. **Наукова новизна** статті полягає у тому, що, незважаючи на значний обсяг робіт із сефевідсько-англійських відносин, пропонується розвідка є першою місцевою всебічного вивчення ролі Ентоні Дженкінсона в ознайомленні англійців із сефевідською культурою. **Висновок.** “Опис...” подорожі до Сефевідської імперії відомого англійського мандрівника, торговця та дипломата сера Ентоні Дженкінсона у 1561 – 1563 роках, який вважався одним з “великих піонерів елізаветинських подорожей”, є цінним джерелом не тільки про історію та культуру імперії Сефевідів, а також про сефевідсько-англійські відносини. “Опис” Дженкінсона – перша спроба англійців описати дипломатичну та військову історію, соціально-економічне, культурне, теологічне життя, а також спосіб життя і навіть місцеву міфологію Сефевідів. Вивчення докладного опису Дженкінсона доводить, що взаємодія Англії з імперією Сефевідів була не англійською колонізацією, як помилково уявляли більшість західних та радянських істориків, а навпаки – відкриттям англійцями нового, раніше незнаного східно-ісламського світу, тобто Сефевідської імперії. Як перша східна, мусульманська країна, з якою елізаветинська Англія прагнула стати союзником, “Опис” Дженкінсона про імперію Сефевідів є однією з перших згадок як в англійських, так і в сучасних європейських джерелах про релігійні відмінності між сунітами і шиїтами. Унікальна карта Дженкінсона 1562 р., складена у результаті його подорожей, є найстарішим та першим візуальним зображенням імперії Сефевідів у англійських джерелах, що містять етнографічну інформацію. Подорож Дженкінсона до Сефевідської імперії у 1561 – 1563 рр. відкрила новий розділ в історії як англо-ісламських, так і Східно-Західних відносин, а також культурного обміну на основі діалогу ісламу та християнства, виявивши тим самим неадекватність таких європоцентристських концепцій, як перевага Європи над Сходом “культурно поляризованого” континенту та розвіяла міф про монолітну культуру.

Ключові слова: Ентоні Дженкінсон, імперія Сефевідів, елізаветинська Англія, сефевідсько-англійські відносини, культура, 1562 р., подорож.

The Problem Statement. Safavid-English relations were an important part both of the history of international relations, the diplomatic, economic and cultural ties of the “West – East” and “Christian world – Muslim world” systems. With the accession of Queen Elizabeth I Tudor to the throne in 1558, a radical change was outlined in the history of England’s diplomatic relations, resulting in today’s rich history of Britain’s relations with the Muslim world.

The “*clash of civilizations*” was not always defined by conflict. England, like a sponge, quickly began to absorb previously unknown elements of the culture of the Islamic world, and the Safavid Empire was no exception in this regard. As Brotton notes, “for reasons unique to Elizabeth’s 45-year reign, including her dramatic excommunication from the Roman Catholic Church by Pope Pius V in 1570, Protestant England established relationships with a variety of Islamic kingdoms that played a decisive role in how English men and women came to understand their place in the 16th-century world. These connections influenced how the Elizabethans travelled and did business, what they ate, how they dressed and decorated their homes, how they understood religion, and how they played on a stage adorned by the world’s finest playwrights, including Shakespeare and Marlowe” (Brotton, 2016).

In her letter addressed to the Safavid Shah Tahmasp I dated April 25, 1561, the English Queen Elizabeth I Tudor expressed her hope that “...the Almighty God will bring it to passe,

that of these small beginnings, greater moments of things shall hereafter spring...”. Indeed, a new page was opened in the history of relations between the British and the new civilization represented by the Safavids – Islamic (!), which, as Matar notes, “caused mixed emotions in them [the British]: fear, impotence and ‘imperial envy’” (Matar, 2009, p. 213). Thus, Safavid-English relationship, which began with the first envoy of Queen Elizabeth Anthony Jenkinson, not only became an integral part of the global economy, but at the same time the global Renaissance, once again proving the inconsistency of the concepts of antagonism between the concepts “West – East”, “Christendom – Muslim world”.

Although there is a significant body of works on Safavid-English relations, this article represents the first attempt to explore Anthony Jenkinson’s role in introducing Safavid culture to the English.

The Review of Recent Researches. The only and basic source for conducting the research is Hakluyt’s very first edition of “The Principal Navigations, Voiages, and Discoveries of the English Nation...” (Hakluyt, 1589), which provides us Jenkinson’s *Declaration* of his journey to the Safavid Empire. Although there is a significant array of scientific literature which deals with the study of Safavid-English relations, just few of them cover issues of intercultural relations between the two states. Due to the prevailing misconception in historiography according to which the Safavid Empire was of interest to Tudor England only as a source of cheap raw materials and profitable markets for English goods, i.e. was the object of its colonial policy, and most importantly, as a transit route to the markets of India and other states of the Far East, issues of intercultural influence and intercultural dialogue were not given due scientific focus. One of the first researchers to study Safavid-English relations were Shakhmaliev (Shakhmaliev, 1958), Akhmedov (Akhmedov, 1967), Ferrier (Ferrier, 1986), and K peli (K peli, 2012). However, the chief focus in their works was on the English trade policy on the territory of the Safavid Empire. Mahmudov is one of the first who did the research on the history of the Safavid Empire with the European states, including England (Makhmudov, 1991). Mahmudov’s scientific article “English traveller in Azerbaijan” (Mahmudov, 1977a) is the very first work that highlights specifically Sir Anthony Jenkinson’s diplomatic mission to the Safavid Empire in 1561 – 1563. Nevertheless, as in a series of his other works that covers to some extent Jenkinson’s intelligence on the Safavids’ customs and traditions, city life and lifestyle and in one of which Jenkinson was mentioned as “the first ‘harbinger’ of England’s colonial policy” in the Safavid Empire (Mahmudov, 1977b, 1980, 2012), this article covers superficially issues of cross-cultural interaction in Jenkinson’s *Declaration*. Following Mahmudov, Muga nlin’skiy in his article makes an attempt to highlight the Safavids’ religious affiliation (Muga nlin’skiy, 2013).

As well as Kambay-zade (Kambay-zade, 1991) and Nacafli (Nacafli, 2020), Gasan-zade, whose book “Anglo-Safavid relations in the late of the 16th – early 17th centuries (based on the English sources)” (Gasan-zade, 2007) is the first monographic work on Anglo-Safavid relations, also characterizes England’s policy as “...one of the characteristic pages of the early colonial politics of European powers in eastern countries” (Gasan-zade, 2007, p. 166). As a consequence, it is not surprising that issues of cross-cultural interaction were not covered by the author.

Although, unlike the above-mentioned researchers, Efendiev, whose work “The Azerbaijani State of the Safavids” (Efendiev, 1981) is one of the first fundamental works on the political and socio-economic history, state structure of the Safavids, denies the colonial

nature of the trade and economic policy of England in the Safavid Empire, nevertheless, Jenkinson's journey to the Safavid Empire was superficially covered in his work.

Although Meshkat's thesis "The journey of Master Anthony Jenkinson to Persia (1562)" (Meshkat, 2005) and article "The Journey of Master Anthony Jenkinson to Persia, 1562 – 1563" (Meshkat, 2009) are the first attempt in western historiography to do the research on Jenkinson's mission to the Safavid Empire in 1561 – 1563 as an object of a special study, intercultural interaction between England and the Safavids is covered in a fragmentary way, which does not allow a comprehensive consideration of the problem.

Mayers's book "The First English Explorer" (Mayers, 2016) can rightfully be considered the first comprehensive research that covers not only Jenkinson's journey to the Safavid Empire in detail, but also introduces his readers with the cultural differences between the West and the world of Islam, reflects Jenkinson's impressions of the encounter with an Eastern potentate and a local culture.

The purpose of the research is to highlight the role of Sir Anthony Jenkinson in introducing the British a Safavid culture as a part of Eastern/Muslim world.

The Results of the Research. On May 14, 1561, the departure of Anthony Jenkinson on the ship "Swallow" from Gravesend marked the beginning of an enterprise that not only marked the beginning of Safavid-English relations, but also left a significant mark on the history of the East – West and Christian world – Muslim world relations as one of the Elizabethans' first encounters with the Islamic world. It was Jenkinson, as Dulles points out, who "expanded the boundaries of the Western world..." (Dulles, 1931, p. 53).

"*A compendious and briefe declaration of the journey of M. Anthonie Jenkinson, from the famous citie of London into the land of Persia...*", the author of which is Anthony Jenkinson himself and in which he sets out in detail all his activities, everything new he saw and the difficulties that he had to face during his mission to the Safavid Empire in 1561–1563, is a valuable historical source both on Safavid-English relations and on the Safavid Empire in particular. Jenkinson's *Declaration* is the first attempt by the British to describe the military-political history, socio-economic, as well as spiritual life and even the local mythology of the Safavids.

From the description of the long-awaited meeting of Anthony Jenkinson with Shah Tahmasp I, which took place on November 20, 1562 in Qazvin, it becomes clear that for the Safavids England was *terra incognita*, i.e. unknown land. The Shah had not even heard of such a country as England, and he called the British, like all Europeans, by the general term "Franks." However, for the British themselves, the Safavid Empire was also the discovery of a completely new, unique world.

Despite all the difficulties of the journey that Jenkinson had to face, in early August 1561 he managed to reach the lands of Shirvan. The first city that Jenkinson visited was Derbent. Describing the city, Jenkinson draws an analogy between the architecture of Derbent and English buildings: "This citie of Derbent is an ancient towne having an olde castle therein, being situated upon an hill called Castowe, builded all of free stone much after our building, the walles very high and thicke..." (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 367).

From Derbent, Jenkinson with his retinue headed to Shabran, where he arrived on August 6, 1562. Jenkinson's *Declaration*, provides information about the economic structure of the local population, namely nomadic way of life, although he characterizes it in a negative way: "Where my barke discharged: the goods layd on shore, and there being in my tent keeping great watch for feare of rovers, wherof there is great plenty, being field

people... Here my ship was unloaded and goods were placed on the shore, and strong guards were placed in my tent for fear of robbers, of whom there are a lot here – all of them are nomads” (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 367).

On August 18, Jenkinson arrived in the “beautiful royal city” of Shemakha, but he failed to find the ruler of Shirvan Abdullah Khan here. The reason was the traditional way of life of the local population – the practice of *yaylak/gishlag*, which is still relevant today in Azerbaijan, due to local climatic conditions. The summer months were characterized by unbearable hot weather and the only way out of the situation was temporary relocation to higher and cooler places, which was reflected in Jenkinson’s information: “...The next day being the 19 day, I was sent for to come to the king, named Obdolowcan, who kept his court at that time in the high mountaines in tents, distant from the said Shamakye twentie miles, to avoyd the injury of the heat...” (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 367). The peculiarities of the lifestyle of the local population are also described when describing the further journey to the great Sufi. Thus, on the way from Javat to Qazvin, Jenkinson reports that he and his companions “...passing thorow a fruitfull cuntry, inhabited with pasturing people, which dwell in the Summer season upon mountaines, and in Winter they remoove into the valleyes without resorting to townes or any other habitation: and when they remoove, they doe journey in carravans or troops of people and cattell, carrying all their wives, children and baggage upon bullocks” (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 369). It is noteworthy that for the British the way of life of the local population of the Safavid Empire seemed “wild”: “...Passing this wilde people ten dayes journey, comming into no towne or house, the sixteenth day of October we arrived at a citie called Ordowill...” (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 369).

On August 20, 1561, Jenkinson was given a kind welcome. By order of the Shirvan ruler Abdullah Khan, Jenkinson took part in dinner with the ruler himself (**Fig. 1**). The richness of the decoration and food, the interior of the tent, as well as the attire of Abdullah Khan himself greatly impressed Jenkinson. His *Declaration* contains rich ethnographic information. Jenkinson attests to the great hospitality in the Safavid Empire (for Safavids’ hospitality see: Guliyev, 2022, pp. 36–39). From his report it follows: “This king did sit in a very rich pavillion, wrought with silke and golde ... he being a prince of a meane stature, and of a fierce countenance, richly apparelled with long garments of silke, and cloth of golde, imbrodered with pearles and stone: upon his head was a tolipane with a sharpe ende standing upwards halfe a yard long, of rich cloth of golde, wrapped about with a piece of India silke of twentie yards long, wrought with golde, and on the left side of his tolipane stood a plume of fethers, set in a trunke of golde richly inameled, and set with precious stones: his earrings had pendants of golde a handfull long, with two great rubies of great value, set in the ends thereof: all the ground within his pavilion was covered with rich carpets, and under himselfe was spred a square carpet wrought with silver and golde, and therupon was layd two sutable cushions. Thus the king with his nobility sitting in his pavilion with his legs a crosse, and perceiving that it was painfull for me so to sit, his highnesse caused a stoole to be brought in, & did will me to sit thereupon, after my fashion. Dinner time then approaching, divers clothes were spred upon the ground, and sundry dishes served, and set in a ranke with divers kindes of meats, to the number of 140 dishes, as I numbred them, which being taken away with the table clothes, and others spred, a banket of fruits of sundry kindes, with other banketting meates, to the number of 150 dishes, were brought in: so that two services occupied 290 dishes...” (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 367).



Fig. 1. Reception of the English envoy Anthony Jenkinson by the ruler of Shirvan Abdulla Khan. Artist O. Sadiqzadeh, the Azerbaijan National History Museum

The exotic appearance of the ruler of Shirvan caused amazement in Jenkinson. During his second meeting with Abdullah Khan, which took place on August 24, 1562, Jenkinson's gaze was again drawn to the features of the Safavid vestments: "...Approching nigh to the entring in of his tent, and being in his sight, two gentlemen incountered me with two garments of that cuntry fashion, side, downe to the ground, the one of silke, and the other of silke and golde, sent unto me from the king, and after that they caused me to put off my upper garment, being a gowne of blacke velvet furred with Sables, they put the sayd two garments upon my backe, and so conducted me unto the king..." (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 368). At the next meeting with Abdullah Khan in Javat in April 1563, Jenkinson was again generously gifted by the ruler of Shirvan: "His highnesse [Abdullah Khan] did give mee two garments of silke, and so dismissed me with great favour..." (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 372). It should be noted that, despite the disastrous reception at Shah Tahmasp I's court on November 20, 1562, which ended with the latter's refusal to establish any kind of relations with England due to the fact that the Safavids did not need friendship with the "infidels", the shah "...the 20 day of March, 1562, he sent to me a rich garment of cloth of gold, and so dismissed me without any harme" (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 372).

This information is of great scientific interest to us not only because it testifies to the luxury, wealth and elegance of Safavid attire, but because it also demonstrates the customs and traditions of Safavid culture. Giving clothes to a guest had a hidden symbolic meaning. The tradition of presenting national clothing as a gift to a guest not only in the Safavid, but in many cultures of the Islamic world, was a visual manifestation of great respect, goodwill and honor to the host, symbolizing the value of the guest before the hosts. In clothing, every element mattered: from the material from which it was made, to the color and motifs of the patterns embroidered on it. The robe was intended to demonstrate the power and authority of its wearers. As Gratta notes, "the clothes worn at court, in addition to functionality and visual appeal, carried a political message. ...In the Safavid court the emphasis was on display rather than function, and clothing was worn as part of identity, it was their function" (Gratta, 2016).

It is noteworthy that Jenkinson, as an astute diplomat, did not remain a passive observer, but quickly adapted to Safavid traditions, as evidenced by the fact that he adopted the Safavid tradition of donating clothes of honor and presented the khilat given to him by Shah Tahmasp I himself to Ivan the Terrible at a meeting after in which Jenkinson achieved new trading privileges for English merchants in the territory of the Moscow principality.

Jenkinson's description of the traditional clothing of the ruling class of the Safavid Empire is of great scientific interest, because their attire performed not only a practical role, but at the same time served as a demonstration of social status, and most importantly, they were a manifestation of the political power of the sovereign and often served as an instrument of diplomacy, "*soft power*" in politics, as well as self-presentation (*impression management*) (Munroe, 2023, p. 47). As can be seen from the report, Jenkinson's particular attention was drawn to the Safavid headdress – a pointed *turban*, which, according to Prof. Matar, emerged as a preeminent symbol of Muslim power and hegemony (Matar, 1996, p. 39).

The *turban* functioned as a transmitter of social information and ideas about Safavid cultural identity, political and religious beliefs. The distinctive form of headdress in the form of a pointed turban was introduced by Sheikh Heydar, the head of the Safavid order, one of the spiritual leaders of the Safavid tariqa, the father of the founder of the Safavid state, Shah Ismail I, receiving the corresponding name *Taj Heydari* (i.e. Heydar's crown). Due to the fact that the Turkic-speaking followers of Sheikh Heydar wore a bright red turban, they began to be called *qizilbash* (literally "red-headed") (Baker, 1986, p. 301; Munroe, 2013; Shenasa, 2007, pp. 50–52). The twelve folds of the turban wrapped around the *taj* symbolized the Safavid adherence to the doctrine of *Twelver Shi'ism*, introduced in 1501 as the official religion in the Safavid Empire.

Besides, Jenkinson's *Declaration* is one of the first written sources to document the tradition of gifting a robe of honor to a foreigner by a local ruler as a sign of respect and honor, as well as one of the rare written sources to describe the Safavid robes of the ruling class and, in particular, the distinctive Safavid headdress – the *taj* (crown). Before Jenkinson's *Declaration* the readers could learn about this tradition only from foreign representatives in the Safavid court – Chardin and Tavernier. The courtly fashion of the early Safavids and the history of the modification of the *taj* could only be traced through Safavid works of fine art, in particular the illustrations of Tahmasp's *Shahnameh*, as well as other illustrated imperial manuscripts. Jenkinson became the second foreigner after the Venetian ambassador Michele Membré to describe in his notes the attire of the Safavid Shah.

Jenkinson's *Declaration* also helps to trace the history of evolution of the Safavid headgear. As Baker notes, "the early form [*taj*] was in the form of a pumpkin with thick quilted flutes ending in a small thick wand. It was worn without a turban, snugly attached to the head, passing to the forehead" (Baker, 1986, p. 302). Comparison of this information with Jenkinson's description shows that the *taj* has undergone stylistic changes over time.

Of great interest in Jenkinson's *Declaration* is the latter's attitude towards the specificity of Safavid court protocol. As Meshkat notes, during a reception with the ruler of Shirvan Abdullah Khan, Jenkinson, "was stunned" (Meshkat, 2005, p. 68), when at the end of the dinner feast the king "...called for a cup of water to be drawn at a fountaine, and tasting thereof, did deliver me [Jenkinson] the rest, demanding how I did like the same, and whether there were so good in our countrey [England] or not..." (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 368). For the British, not familiar with the peculiarities of the Eastern world, in particular with court etiquette, drinking from a cup that had already been drunk by someone might seem

unacceptable, however, it is well known that in many states of the Islamic world, including the Safavid Empire, this gesture of the ruler was a symbolic manifestation of his respect, honor for the guest, as well as readiness and openness to his proposals. More than half a century later, in 1615, the English diplomat Thomas Roe had to face a similar *faux pas* in the Mughal Empire, when the latter, not knowing all the rules of the Mughal court ceremony, refused Emperor Jahangir's offer to drink from a golden cup, answering, that "all he desires is that his countrymen, the English, may have free, safe and peaceful trade in his dominions", although before this Emperor Jahangir had already given Roe his khilat as a sign of agreement to grant trading privileges to the English (Ivermee, 2020). Thus, drinking from the cup of the ruler and donating khilat to the latter had a metonymic meaning in Safavid diplomacy.

Jenkinson also reports about the leisure and entertainment of the Safavids in detail. On August 24, Abdullah Khan invited him to hunt: "...He sent for me againe: unto whom I repaired in the morning, and the king not being risen out of his bedde (for his maner is, that watching in the night, and then banketting with his women, being an hundred and forty in number, he sleepeth most in the day) did give one commandement that I should ride on hawking with many Gentlemen of his Court, and that they should shew me so much game and pastime as might be: which was done, and many cranes killed" (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 368). As is known, falconry, or *bāzdarī*, which has retained its relevance today, was the oldest form of entertainment and sports for the privileged strata of society in the Islamic world, including the Safavid Empire. Hunting scenes, including falconry, were among the most common subjects in fine art, ceramics, and among patterns on silk textiles. The reverence for falcons in the Safavid Empire was so great that in 1592 – 1593 Shah Abbas I, in tribute to his only falcon Lavand, who died in a hunt, "...ordered the construction of a small, but an impressive mausoleum on the top of the mountain facing the city of Natanz" (A'lam, 1989).

Regarding polygamy, which Jenkinson testifies to, it should be noted that the practice of polygamy and keeping numerous concubines was characteristic of the entire Muslim world. It is well known that a Muslim is allowed to have up to four wives based on the religious laws themselves. A German traveller, who visited the Safavid Empire, Adam Olearius, reports that Sheikh Safi had three permanent wives and 3 thousand concubines and slave-girls in his harem (cited in: Rahbari, 2021, p. 22).

In October of 1562, on the way from Shamakhi to Qazvin, stopping temporarily in Ardabil, Jenkinson and his retinue witnessed Safavid hospitality at the state level: "...The 16 day of October we arrived at a citie called Ordowill, where we were lodged in an hospitall builded with faire stone, and erected by this Sophies father named Ismael, onely for the succour and lodging of strangers and other travellers, wherein all men have victuals and feeding for man and horse, for three dayes and no longe" (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 369). As is known, the caravanserai as an institution of hospitality had an ancient tradition in the Eastern world, and in the Safavid Empire itself there was an extensive network of caravanserais (O'Gorman & Prentice, 2008). By the way, in the administrative system of the Safavid Empire, one of the most significant was the position of *mehmandar-bashi*, whose main duties included welcoming, accommodating and providing all the necessary things to foreign official guests who arrived in the empire, for which he received a salary from the treasury (Ansari, 2007, pp. 83–84).

Policy of gift-giving also attracted Jenkinson's particular attention during his stay in the Safavid Empire. Jenkinson speaks enthusiastically about the gifts of the ambassador of the Ottoman Sultan, who arrived to Shah Tahmasp I's court four days before his arrival in

Qazvin: "...[He] brought with him a present in gold, and faire horses with rich furnitures, and other gifts, esteemed to be woorth forty thousand pound" (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 369). Among the possible reasons for such a cold reception by the Shah, the dismissive attitude and the unsuccessful outcome of Anthony Jenkinson's mission could be the scarcity of English gifts intended for the Shah, because Jenkinson does not mention a word about what exactly was granted to the Shah. Mayers suggests that "they [Jenkinson's gifts] must have looked small and stingy compared with the generous gifts of the Turkish [Ottoman] ambassador" (Mayers, 2016, p. 169). In the eastern countries, including the Safavid state, great importance was also attached to gift diplomacy in establishing bilateral relations. According to Prof. Matthee, "at the political and diplomatic level, the perception of Europe was represented more by pragmatism than by religious powers, namely, a combination of military power and its perceived usefulness, and the degree to which this power was presented in the form of external luxury and the quality and quantity of gifts offered by visiting embassies. Since visiting Europeans acted as official representatives of countries and commercial enterprises, the status of the latter, as well as their actual power and the splendor of their missions generally determined the quality of the welcome they received on the spot" (Matthee, 1998, p. 232). As the French traveller Abbe Carré reports, in 1673, French envoys managed to achieve an audience with Shah Suleiman, ahead of their English colleagues, because the value of the gifts of the former was much higher than the English ones, and in the future, it was precisely because of the less luxurious gifts to the Shah that the French lost the favor of the former (Abbe Care, 1947, p. 88, 810). In general, the process of gift-giving in the Safavid state was clearly institutionalized.

Despite a large number of scientific studies proving the Turkic origin of the Safavid dynasty, the question of the origin of the ruling dynasty remains one of the controversial in historiography to this day. In this regard, Anthony Jenkinson's *Declaration* can serve as a valuable source in determining the ethnolinguistic origins of the Safavid dynasty, since it provides direct evidence that the Turkic language was widely used in the administration of the Safavid Empire. Jenkinson, describing his reception with the ruler of Shirvan, points out that "at the end of the said dinner and banquet, the king said unto me, *Quoshe quelde*, that is to say, welcome..." (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 367). The Turkic word *basmackes* (bashmaks), which Jenkinson mistakenly characterizes as the Persian, can serve another significant proof of the Turkic-linguality of the Safavids.

Jenkinson's *Declaration* is also of great scientific interest because it is one of the first written evidence from the British about the peculiarities of the religious worldview of the Safavids. As is known, Jenkinson was unable to establish either friendly or trade relations between the two states. The "reason" why the Shah refused was the religious affiliation of the British. Nevertheless, the real reason was not religious fanaticism, but a political factor – Shah Tahmasp I's unwillingness to ruin relations with the Ottoman Empire (Kafar-zade, 2022). Just 4 years later, in 1566, the Shah was not hindered by religious differences between the two peoples and England was granted trade privileges. In his letter to the leadership of the Moscow Company, which describes the warm reception of Shah Tahmasp I on May 29, 1566, Arthur Edwards notes that it was strange for shah's crew to watch their long conversation, knowing differences in faith.

The difference between the two worlds can be seen from the following description by Jenkinson: "...In lighting from my horse at the court gate, before my feet touched the ground, a paire of the Sophies owne shoes termed in the Persian tongue (*Basmackes*) [in

Turkic! Jenkinson erroneously characterizes the word “shoes” as Persian], such as hee himselfe weareth when he ariseth in the night to pray (as his maner is) were put upon my feet, for without the same shoes I might not be suffred to tread upon his holy ground, being a Christian, and called amongst them Gower, that is, unbeleever, and uncleane: esteeming all to be infidels and Pagans which do not beleeve as they do, in their false filthie prophets, Mahomet and Murtezalli. ...None of my companie or servants might be suffered to enter into the court with me, my interpreter onely excepted” (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 370). Jenkinson further reports that shah “...reasoned with mee much of Religion, demaunding whether I were a Gower, that is to say, an unbeleever, or a Muselman, that is, of Mahomets lawe. Unto whom I answered, that I was neither unbeleever nor Mahometan, but a Christian. What is that, said he unto the king of the Georgians sonne, who being a Christian was fled unto the said Sophie, and he answered that a Christian was he that beleeveeth in Jesus Christus, affirming him to be the Sonne of God, and the greatest Prophet. Doest thou beleeve so, said the Sophie unto me? Yea that I do, said I: Oh thou unbeleever, said he...” Thus, categorically declaring that the Safavids did not need friendship with the “unbelievers”, Shah Tahmasp I kicked Jenkinson out of his palace. Until Anthony completely left the Shah’s palace, the Shah’s servant covered the path he had been through with sand, following him, thus removing traces of the presence of a non-Muslim on Muslim land (Hakluyt, 1589, pp. 370–371).

Savory attributes the reason for this behaviour of the Safavid Shah to the Safavids’ undeniable cultural superiority, of which religion was an integral part. Although the Safavids accepted Europeans as Christians, i.e. as the People of the Book (*Ahl-i Kitab*), who as such enjoyed a higher status than the pagans, but less prestigious than the Muslims, they still periodically encountered religious prejudice based on the *doctrines of najas and taharat* (Shiite concepts of pollution and purity). In the reports of a number of foreign observers one can find information that, being non-Muslims, they were considered unclean (*najis*), and pious Muslims even refused to eat with Christians or from the dishes that the latter used (Savory, 2003, pp. 441–442).

By the way, the arrogance of the Safavids was emphasized by Jenkinson himself: “These persons are comely and of good complexion, proude and of good courage, esteeming themselves to bee best of all nations, both for their religion and holines, which is most erroneous, and also for all other their fashions” (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 373).

Moreover, unlike the ruler of Shirvan, whose hand Jenkinson kissed when greeting him, Jenkinson apparently failed to do the same to the Shah himself. As Jenkinson himself notes, “...comming before his Majestie with such reverence as I thought meete to be used, I delivered the Queenes Majesties letters with my present...” (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 370). According to sources, the attitude towards non-Muslims in the Safavid Empire softened during the reign of Shah Abbas I. Thus, according to the Carmelite missionary Paul Simon in 1608, if earlier Christians were hated here and were considered a dirty race, then already under Shah Abbas the local population treated them on an equal basis with Muslims, because Shah himself spent time with them and even sat at the same table (Matthee, 1998, pp. 227–228). Europeans were even already allowed to kiss the Shah’s hand during an audience, while high-ranking officials themselves were allowed to kiss either the floor or the Shah’s leg. According to the Spanish Ambassador Don Garcia de Silva y Figueroa, when he met Shah Abbas I in 1618, he was the first to kneel and kiss the ruler’s hand, after which the Shah raised him, embraced him and greeted him (Chick, 1939, pp. 123, 238).

Moreover, the Safavids never accepted Europeans as equal to representatives of the surrounding Muslim countries. As a result, in the official historiography the history of

relations between the Safavid Empire and the states of Europe is given superficial attention. Even if certain Europeans are mentioned in some Safavid source, they are generally referred to as “*Franks*” without being specific.

In addition, Jenkinson’s *Declaration* also pays some attention to local mythology. Thus, Jenkinson notes: “...In the sayd cuntry there is an high hill called Quiquifs, upon the toppe whereof (as it is commonly reported) did dwell a great Giant, named Arneoste, having upon his head two great hornes, and eares, and eyes like a Horse, and a taile like a Cow. It is further sayd, that this monster kept a passage thereby, untill there came an holy man, termed Haucoir Hamshe, a kinseman to one of the Sophies, who mounted the sayd hill, and combating with the sayd Giant, did binde not onely him in chaines, but also his woman called Lamisache with his sonne named After: for which victory they of that cuntry have this holy man in great reputation, and the hill at this day (as it is bruted) savoureth so ill, that no person may come nigh unto it...” (Hakluyt, 1589, pp. 368–369).

Heading from Shamakhi to Qazvin, Jenkinson, stopping in Javat, was amazed at the beauty of the gardens in the royal palace: “...Came to a towne called Yavate, wherein the king hath a faire house, with orchards and gardens well replenished with fruits of all sorts” (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 369). However, due to the lack of deep knowledge about the cultural and spiritual life of the local population, Jenkinson limited himself to only a visual description of the gardens, without delving into the deeper political and religious significance of the gardens for the Safavids. Gardens in the Islamic world, including the Safavid Empire, had a semiotic significance along with their traditional practical significance. Through the symbolic language of magnificent gardens and grand buildings, not only were political expressions of territoriality and imperial self-representation manifested, but also the religious beliefs of Muslims. As Walcher notes, “The Koranic concept of paradise was understood as the guiding motive and principle for the creation of the Safavid gardens, which were identified as an Islamic dynasty, both religiously and politically” (Walcher, 1998, p. 332). The gardens were the epitome of Islamic architecture.

Jenkinson’s *Declaration* is also one of the first English written evidence not only of the two main directions in Islam in general – Shiism and Sunnism, but also of the religious peculiarity of the Safavids – adherence to Shiism, which, according to Jenkinson, was the main reason for the military and political conflict of the Safavids with the Ottomans and khans of Central Asia.

Being in Bukhara in 1558, Jenkinson witnessed a military confrontation between the Safavids and the Turkestan khans, to which he gave a religious colour. Thus, according to Jenkinson, one of the reasons for the wars between them is that the Safavids do not cut their hair on their upper lip, as the Bukharans and other Tatars do, who consider this behavior of the Safavids a great sin and call the Safavids *Kafars*, i.e. infidels. Later, having already visited the Safavid Empire in 1562, Jenkinson in his *Declaration* characterizes the religious denomination of the Safavids as follows: “He [Tahmasp I] professeth a kinde of holynesse, and saith that hee is descended of the blood of Mahomet and Murtezalli: and although these Persians [Safavids] bee Mahometans, as the Turkes and Tartars bee, yet honour they this false fained Murtezalli, saying that hee was the chiefest disciple that Mahomet had, cursing and chiding dayly three other disciples that Mahomet had called Ovear, Usiran, and Abebeck, and these three did slay the saide Murtezalli, for which cause and other differences of holy men and lawes, they have had and have with the Turkes and Tartars mortall warres” (Hakluyt, 1589, p. 373).

As Houston notes, “the contrasts between the Safavid and Ottoman Empires, and specifically Persia’s [the Safavid Empire] Shi’ite status, were used by the English travel writers during this period in order to create an image of Persia [the Safavid Empire] as a nation open to English trade and travel” (Houston, 2009, p. 149).

One of the main results of Sir Anthony Jenkinson’s mission to the Safavid Empire was his wall map called “*Nova absolutaque Russiae, Moscoviae, et Tartariae descriptio*” (**Fig. 2**) published in London in 1562 (for more see: Gafar-zada, 2022). The uniqueness of Jenkinson’s original map consists in the fact that it is not only the oldest and first visual representation of the Safavid Empire in English sources, but also influenced the further development of European cartography. It was an integral part of the world’s first modern geographical atlas “*Theatrum Orbis Terrarum*” by Abraham Ortelius (1570) and Gerardus Mercator’s *World map* (1572).

This map is a visual reflection of Jenkinson’s observations during his stay at the Safavid Empire and helps to shed light on how Elizabethan England imagined the Safavid Empire. Jenkinson’s map contains not only geographical data, but also interesting information about the cultural and religious life of the Safavid Empire. One of the few physiographic elements of the Safavid Empire, given on the map, is one-humped camels (*Camelus Dromedarius*) and a leopard (**Fig. 2**), both exotic for England, but widespread in the Safavid Empire, which were depicted on rock images in Gobustan and was not only a part of the hunt, but also one of the most common motifs of Safavid textiles, miniatures, as well as copper bowls, carrying a symbolic meaning. Rahimi, based on Shiite rituals of camel sacrifice, suggests that camels, especially during the reign of Shah Abbas I, were an integral part of the political ceremonies dedicated to the creation of a “theatre” state (Rahimi, 2004, p. 452).




Fig. 2. Fragments of Jenkinson’s map
“*Nova absolutaque Russiae, Moscoviae, et Tartariae descriptio*” (1562)

One of the inscriptions on the map gives us information of a religious nature, namely, about Shiite Islam professed by the Safavids:

“Medi, Perfaeque Mahumetani sunt, aſidueque cum Turcis Tartariſque pugna conſigunt. Fdq [?] maxime propter differentes caremonias, quodque ſuperius labrum rasiare nolunt, ut Turca Tartarique factitant” (Fig. 2).

Translation:

“Medes and Persians [under the “Persians” Jenkinson meant subjects of the Safavid Empire] are Muslims. Constantly conducted hostilities with the Turcic Tartars [under the “Tartars” Jenkinson assumed the Turkmens of Central Asia]. Particularly great differences in ceremonies, they do not shave [the mustache] over the upper lip, as the Turks and Tartars do.”

In addition to the inscriptions that firmly indicate the Islamic religion of the population of the Safavid Empire, the silhouette of the founder of the Safavid state, the seated Shah Ismail I, is also depicted on the original map of Jenkinson. Jenkinson, having depicted the Shah with a long mustache and in the traditional Safavid attire – a long robe, belted on a slope, and in a special headdress worn by Muslims – a *turban*, managed to visually convey information about Islamic beliefs and partly about ethnographic features, traditional male clothes of the population of the Safavid Empire.

This map was not intended for compass navigation, but pursued the goal of visual transmission of what Anthony Jenkinson saw when traveling to new countries, including the Safavid Empire. According to Osipov, “...the purpose of the map was rather informative. This is a map-report rich in colorful palette, a large-scale, visual demonstration of new knowledge, ...it was a challenge map, a statement of achievements” (Osipov, 2008).

Although the information on the Safavid Empire presented on the map was not extensive and was of an encyclopedic nature, Jenkinson expanded the political geography for the English elite. His map strongly influenced the formation of the geographical, religious, geopolitical, cultural, social reception by the English elite of the East, the Muslim world, in particular the Safavid Empire, unknown to them.

The Conclusion. Safavid-English relations opened a new chapter in the history of international relations, not only Anglo-Islamic relations, but also the Christian states of Europe with the Islamic world. The interaction of the English with the Safavids not only enriched the local markets of Elizabethan England with exotic goods, decorated the homes of the English with exquisite silks and expensive carpets, introduced borrowed words into the English language, but also affected the worldview of the people. The strengthening of relations between the two states was not only limited to interaction on the political and economic spheres, but also left a significant mark on a cultural life of England: literature, art, theatre, everyday life, religious worldview, court fashion, and even sports.

Safavid-English relations became a precedent for further relations of Tudor England with the states of the Muslim world. If several decades earlier many, if not most, scholars ignored the significant role of Islamic states in the diplomatic and, moreover, cultural life of medieval England, today a number of researchers not only recognize, but also affirm this. As MacLean and Matar emphasize, “...the Islamic world played a special and important role in the formation of Britain” (MacLean & Matar, 2011, p. 2).

Although Jenkinson failed to achieve the goals set by the queen and the leadership of the Moscow Company, his mission to the Safavid state was considered a grandiose event, even by Queen Elizabeth herself, 17 years after Anthony’s reception by Shah Tahmasp I, in her letter to Shah Muhammad Khudabنده in 1579, characterized his mission as a “honorable

embassy". As Brotton emphasizes, "thanks to Jenkinson, the Islamic world became a little closer to England" (Brotton, 2016). It was owing to Jenkinson's merits that the Safavid Empire took its important place in the Elizabethan picture of the world.

Moreover, it is owing to Anthony Jenkinson that today modern Azerbaijan has a rich history of relations with Great Britain both in the political, economic, cultural and humanitarian spheres. Therefore, we consider Mathee's statement that "...his mission had no tangible results other than the first English description of Iran [the Safavid Empire], published in 1598 [1589!] in Hakluyt's popular collection of travel literature" (Mathee, 2013, p. 18) to be irrelevant.

Thus, the Safavid Empire, as a part of the Turkic-Islamic world, played a significant role not only in the system of international relations of the early modern period and the economic life of European states, including England, but also contributed to the development of European culture, leaving its mark on the European Renaissance.

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TPOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF MONASTERIES OF THE KYIV EPARCHY DURING THE SYNODAL PERIOD (THE END OF THE 18th – THE BEGINNING OF THE 20th CENTURY)

Abstract. *The purpose of the study is to deepen the knowledge of history of Orthodox monasteries of the Kyiv eparchy, to clarify their typology and structure during the synodal period, as well as the conditions that influenced their formation. The research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, objectivity and systematicity. In the article there have been also used general scientific (analysis, synthesis, descriptive, classification), and special historical (historical genetic, problem thematic) research methods. The scientific novelty is determined by the author's statement of the researched issue, its comprehensive study and analysis. The Conclusions. The synodal period of the Russian Orthodox Church is characterized by the structural typology formation of monasteries, which was carried out as a result of changes under social and economic conditions and related reforms of a monastic and church life. The change in the number of Orthodox monasteries of the Kyiv eparchy occurred as a result of closure, reorganization, change of their status, transformation from male to female.*

It has been determined that the monasteries of the Kyiv eparchy during the synodal period can be classified as follows: according to the system of subordination and status (lavra, stauropygial, eparchial), according to the gender of monks (male, female), territorial and geographical factor (urban, rural), system of subordination, maintenance, management and size (full-time, part-time), according to the statute, which regulated the arrangement and way of life of the monastery (communal, non-communal), according to the type of monastic settlements (monasteries, hermitages), according to a functional specialization (hospital, school, work).

Key words: *Kyiv eparchy, synodal period, Orthodox monastery, typology, structure, lavra, hermitage.*

ТИПОЛОГІЯ ТА СТРУКТУРА МОНАСТІРІВ КИЇВСЬКОЇ ЄПАРХІЇ СІНОДАЛЬНОГО ПЕРІОДУ (кінець XVIII – початок XX ст.)

Анотація. *Мета дослідження полягає у поглибленні знань з історії православних монастирів Київської єпархії, з'ясуванні їх типології та структури у синодальний період,*

а також умов, що впливали на їх формування. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на базових принципах: історизму, об'єктивності та системності. У роботі використано також загальнонаукові (аналіз, синтез, описовий, класифікація) та спеціально-історичні (історико-генетичний, проблемно-тематичний) методи дослідження. **Наукова новизна** визначається авторською постановкою досліджуваної проблеми, комплексним її вивченням і аналізом. Досліджено питання типології та структур монастирів Київської єпархії синодального періоду, які не знайшли відображення у попередніх працях істориків. **Висновки.** Синодальний період Російської православної церкви характеризується формуванням структурної типології монастирів, що здійснювалася у результаті змін суспільно-економічних умов та пов'язаних з ними реформ монастирського й церковного життя. Зміна чисельності православних монастирів Київської єпархії відбувалася внаслідок закриття, реорганізації, зміни їх статусу, перетворення із чоловічих на жіночі.

Встановлено, що монастирі Київської єпархії синодального періоду можна класифікувати за: системою підпорядкування і статусу (лавра, ставропігійні, єпархіальні); складом ченців (чоловічі, жіночі); територіально-географічним чинником (міські, сільські); системою підпорядкованості, утримання, управління і розмірами (штатні, заштатні); статутом, що регламентував облаштування і уклад життя обителі (спільножительні, неспільножительні); типом монастирських поселень (монастирі, пустині, скити); функціональною спеціалізацією (лікарняні, училищні, робочі).

Ключові слова: Київська єпархія, синодальний період, православний монастир, типологія, структура, лавра, пустинь, скит, чернецтво.

The Problem Statement. The formation of normal relations between the state and religious organizations is one of the key factors that has a serious impact on a public life. The Kyiv Eparchy of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine has a long history and occupies a special place in its socio-cultural processes. Founded during the baptism of Kyivan Rus, having experienced all the vicissitudes of its glorious and tragic history together with the Ukrainian people, the past of the monasteries of the Kyiv Eparchy still has a significant number of issues that require a detailed study. In this connection, the issue of typology and structure of Orthodox monasteries of the Kyiv Eparchy during the synodal period is insufficiently studied.

The Review of Recent Researches and Publications. The study of the history of Orthodox monasteries and monasticism of the synodal period began as early as the 19th century. The first researches in this direction were mainly various types of statistical descriptions of the monasteries in the Russian Empire (Ratshyn, 1852; Stroev, 1877). Systematization of information about monasteries led, in the future, to the need to supplement and clarify certain data related to the history of a specific monastery (Zverinskii, 1890 – 1897). Researchers of other direction in the study of this issue analysed the legislation and key directions of the state policy of the time regarding monasteries and monasticism (Zverinskii, 1887; Horchakov, 1868; Kedrov, 1886; Titlinov, 1905; Chystovich, 1868; Ivanovskyi, 1905).

After the reforms of the 1860s and 1870s in the Russian Empire, interest in the issue of monastic income increased (Rostislavov, 1876). Many researchers of this period were impressed by the problems of economic and social history. In particular, the issues of secularization of monastic lands were discussed quite extensively (Zavialov, 1900).

In the Soviet historiography with its atheistic and anti-clerical context, the main issues of the history of monasteries were the following ones: the ownership system formation of monasteries, the secularization policy of the state, the duties of monastery peasants, and social conflicts in monastery estates (Vdovina, 1988).

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Ukrainian historians have raised the issues on the study of the positive social role of monasticism, the contribution of monasteries to the

development of a public education system, and the charitable and social care activities of Orthodox monasteries (Vecherskii, 2008). The researchers reinterpreted the socio-cultural phenomenon of Orthodox monasteries as a fundamental link of the church organization, their development and economic situation (Lomachynska, 2016).

At the beginning of the 2000s, the regional aspect of studying the issues of Orthodox monasteries also became widespread (Kryzhanovska, 2001; Kileso, 2002; Lavrinenko, 2005, 2006, 2009). The issue of establishment and socio-economic situation of Orthodox monasteries in the Middle Dnieper region of the 19th century was updated (Horenko, 1992; Pashkovskiy, 2004), as well as the history of some monasteries of the Kyiv Eparchy (Kileso, 1999; Popelnytska, 2005). There was also carried out the analysis of development and state of historiography of researching the history of Orthodox monasteries and monasticism in certain regions (Lastovska, 2013). However, as evidenced by the historiographical analysis, there are practically no comprehensive studies on the history of the Kyiv Eparchy of the synodal period in general, as well as on the scientific issue.

Therefore, the **purpose of the study** is to deepen the knowledge of history of Orthodox monasteries of the Kyiv Eparchy, to clarify their typology and structure during the synodal period, as well as the conditions that influenced their formation.

The Research Results. The typological characteristics of the Kyiv Eparchy monasteries presented in this article are quite formal, but at the same time they accurately determine the peculiarities of monasteries, the specifics of their spiritual, socio-cultural and economic functions. Despite the existence of church rules, canons, statutes, which were always decisive for the spiritual life of the monastery, the nature of its construction and architecture, each monastery had its own unique features, traditions and peculiarities of life organization and management.

Before elucidating the issue under research, it is worth dwelling on the justification of the chosen territorial (the Kyiv Eparchy) and chronological (synodal period) boundaries. From the second half of the 18th century the Russian Empire set a course for unification and a final absorption of the Ukrainian lands. In connection with the three divisions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Russo-Turkish wars, a large part of the territory of the Ukrainian lands became part of the Russian Empire. In particular, on November 10, 1764, a royal decree was issued on the liquidation of the Hetman's power in Ukraine, there was carried out liquidation of the Ukrainian state institutions and their replacement by the Russian ones. As a result of the second partition of Poland (1793), a large part of Right Bank Ukraine (Kyiv region, Bratslav region, Eastern Volyn) came under the rule of the Russian Empire. The subjugation of a large part of the territory of Ukraine by the Russian Empire also affected the situation of the Orthodox Church and its monasteries.

The territorial boundaries of the Kyiv Eparchy were formed already at the end of the 18th century. In connection with significant territorial changes, the issue of redistribution of parishes between the newly created Orthodox Eparchy arose in the empire. In May of 1788, the imperial decree "On Distribution of Eparchy in Accordance with Distribution of Provinces", given to the Holy Synod, suggested that the Eparchy boundaries of the Russian Orthodox Church be correlated with the territorial boundaries of the provinces (Polnoe sobranie zakonov, 1830c, №16658). In the second half of the 80s – the first half of the 90s of the 18th century there were also changes in the administrative and territorial affiliation of a number of poviats. In 1796, Kyiv province was created, the territory of which was entirely located on the right bank of the Dnieper. By decree of September 7, 1797, the

Kyiv Eparchy was ordered to be formed from administrative units on the right bank of the Dnieper, which included 12 poviats. During the following 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries the number of poviats of the Kyiv metropolitan area remained practically unchanged. According to the resolution of the Holy Synod adopted in October of 1799, the names of Eparchy coincided with the names of provinces (Polnoe sobranie zakonov, 1830d, №19156). According to the states of 1799, the Kyiv Eparchy was classified as a diocese of Class 1 (Istoriya rossiyskoi ierarkhyy, 1807).

It is worth noting that the management system of Orthodox monasteries was quite complex in the Russian Empire. In 1721, the patriarchy was abolished. The Imperial Manifesto of Peter I dated January 25, 1721 put into effect the "Regulations or Statutes of Spiritual Collegium" (Polnoe sobranie zakonov, 1830a, №3718). This document actually determined the legal position of the Orthodox Church in the Russian Empire for the next two centuries. It approved the activity of the Spiritual College as the highest body of church power and state department. From February 14, 1721, the clerical collegium was renamed the Holy Ruling Synod, under whose jurisdiction all Orthodox monasteries and their monks were subject (Barsov, 1896, p. 194). This event marked the beginning of a new period in the history of the Orthodox Church, which was called the synodal period and lasted from the 18th century until 1917.

The synodal period of the Russian Orthodox Church is characterized by the formation of a structural typology of monasteries, which was carried out as a result of changes under social and economic conditions and related reforms of a monastic and church life. The secularization policy of the Tsar led to the loss of almost all of their patrimonial estates by the monasteries. According to the system of subordination, maintenance, management and size, the monasteries of the Russian Orthodox Church during the synodal period were divided into several groups. The application of the typology of monasteries allows us to reveal the peculiarities of the social organization of Orthodox monasteries, the importance of each abode, their role and place in society.

Using the territorial principle, the monasteries of the Kyiv Eparchy of the synodal period can be classified according to: the system of subordination and status (lavra, stauropygial, eparchial), the gender composition of monks (male, female), territorial and geographical factors (urban, rural), the system of subordination, maintenance, management and sizes (full-time, part-time, prescribed), the statute that regulated the arrangement and way of life of the abode (shared, non-shared), the type of monastic settlements (monasteries, hermitages), a functional specialization (hospital, school, work).

The conflict between the state and the Orthodox Church since the end of the 15th century, in the second half of the 18th century ended with the victory of a secular power. On February 26, 1764, the Russian Empress Catherine II signed a manifesto on the secularization of a spiritual land ownership (Polnoe sobranie zakonov, 1830b, №12060). According to this document, land and peasants, which belonged to the state treasury and were transferred to the management of the Economy Collegium, were confiscated from the Orthodox Church in favour of the state. In 1786, its influence spread to the territory of Left Bank Ukraine, and in 1795 to Right Bank Ukraine. As evidenced by statistical data, implementation of this manifesto dealt a heavy and irreparable blow to the Orthodox monasteries and monasticism. For example, as of the beginning of 1762, there were 954 monasteries and 11,153 monks in the Russian Empire. As a result of the secularization reform, 418 monasteries were completely liquidated by the Holy Synod, 226 monasteries acquired the state status and were transferred

to state funding. For their maintenance, the state assigned annual monetary payments in accordance with their economic status, significance of the monastery. The remaining 310 monasteries were excluded from the state status and could continue their existence at the expense of voluntary donations and self-sufficiency (Chupys, 2013, p. 36).

The Holy Synod determined the staff, i.e. the number of monks in monasteries. According to the system of subordination, management and size, abodes of the Russian Orthodox Church were divided into several groups. During the synodal period, in the Russian Empire the largest spiritual centres and monasteries, included into the state status, became the lavras, which enjoyed a special patronage of the monarchs. The number of monks in their staff could be up to 101 people. All other monasteries were eparchial and were divided into three classes. This made it possible for monasteries to receive payments from the state treasury for distribution to monks and maintenance of monastery servants. The allowed number of full-time monks and nuns was determined by belonging to one or another class. The number of monks in monasteries of Class 1 could be up to 33 people, Class 2 – up to 17, Class 3 – up to 12 people. The structure of monasteries of the Russian Orthodox Church remained unchanged almost until the end of the synodal period. The following annual salaries were determined for regular monasteries: lavras – 10,070 rubles each, men's monasteries of Class 1 – 2,017.5 rubles each, Class 2 – 1,311.9 rubles, Class 3 – 806.3 rub.; for women – Class 1 – 2,009 rubles, Class 2 – 475.8 rubles, Class 3 – 375.6 rubles (Fedorov, 2003, 212). In monasteries of the first and second class, abbots had the rank of archimandrite with a salary of 550 and 300 rubles, respectively, and in monasteries of Class 3 – abbots – with a salary of 150 rubles (Kuznets, 2021, 10). The abbesses of women's monasteries had the rank of an abbess. In the monasteries of Class 1, their salary was 100 rubles, in Class 2 – 60 rubles, and Class 3 – 40 rubles (Barsov, 1885, p. 292).

By Decree of March 31, 1764, which were excluded from the state status were also divided into three classes depending on the number of monks. These monasteries were supported by donations, as well as income from the lands of the monastery (Polnoe sobranie zakonov, 1830b, №12121). However, the period of the Great Reforms of the 1860s and 1870s in the Russian Empire also brought changes to the organization of a monastic life. By Decree on the State Council of December 27, 1867, the division of dioceses into classes was abolished, instead new staff and salaries were introduced. Thus, in the Kyiv Eparchy, the Metropolitan's salary was 4,000 rubles, 5,000 rubles were allocated for the payment of the retinue of the bishop (economist, priest, cross hieromonks, sacristan), and 175 rubles for the repair of the bishop's house (Barsov, 1885, p. 288).

The existence of monasteries of the Kyiv Eparchy during the synodal period was not stable. Their fate was determined by the realities of a contemporary religious policy of the Russian Empire, which was characterized by periods of ups and downs in a monastery construction. As of 1764, there were 2 stauropygial and 38 eparchial monasteries on the territory of the Kyiv Eparchy (Pokrovskiy, 1913, p. 925), of which two monasteries of the Kyiv Eparchy had the status of stauropygial. This status was assigned to the Orthodox monasteries, which made them independent of local Eparchy authorities. The stauropygial monasteries were subordinated directly to the Patriarch of Moscow or the Holy Synod directly. The remaining 38 monasteries were eparchial, which implied their subordination to the eparchial bishop.

Table 1

Monasteries of the Kyiv Eparchy in 1764¹

N	Men's monasteries	N	Women's monasteries
			Eparchy monasteries
	<i>Stavropygian monasteries</i>	1.	Kyiv-Voznesenskyi Fedorovskyi
1.	Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra	2.	Kyiv-Bohoslovskyi
2.	Kyiv-Mezhahirskyi	3.	Kyiv-Iordanskyi
	<i>Eparchy monasteries</i>	4.	Kozeletskyi Bohoslovskyi
1.	Kafedralnyi Sofiiskyi	5.	Nizhynskyi Vvedenskyi
2.	Pustynno-Mykolaivskyi	6.	Novomyiskyi Uspenskyi
3.	Zolotoverkhyi-Mykhailivskyi	7.	Pustynnomutynskyi
4.	Bratskyi Uchylshchnyi	8.	Hlukhovskyi Uspenskyi
5.	Vydubyskyi Mykhailivskyi	9.	Vladynskyi Pokrovskyi
6.	Kyrylivskyi Mykhailivskyi	10.	Velykobudytskyi Preobrazhenskyi
7.	Petropavlivskyi Podolskyi	11.	Pushkarovskyi Pokrovskyi
8.	Hretskyi Podolskyi	12.	Bostrytskyi Voznesenskyi
9.	Kozelskyi Heorhiivskyi	13.	Piatnytskyi Chernihivskyi
10.	Nizhynskyi Blahovishchenskyi	14.	Pokrovskyi Mokoshynskyi
11.	Maksakovskyi Preobrazhenskyi	15.	Uspenskyi Pechenytskyi
12.	Baturynskyi Mykolaivskyi	16.	Pokrovskyi Shumorskyi
13.	Hamaliivskyi Kharlampiivskyi	17.	Bohoslovskyi Myronivskyi
14.	Hlukhivskyi Petropavlivskyi		
15.	Mharskyi Lubenskyi		
16.	Hustynskyi Troitskyi		
17.	Sorochynskyi Mykhailivskyi		
18.	Neforashchanskyi Uspenskyi		
19.	Poltavskyi Khrestovozdvyzhenskyi		
20.	Pustynnomelekskyi Preobrazhenskyi		
21.	Krasnohorskyi Hodiatskyi		

During the synodal period, in the Russian Empire, among the 4 existing lavras the leading place was occupied by the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, which at the time belonged to monasteries of Class 1 (Barsov, 1885, p. 285). It was one of the first men's monasteries, founded in the 11th century, back in the days of Kyivan Rus. The monastery received the status of a lavra in 1688² The self-government of the Kyiv-Pechersk Monastery was recognized by the certificate of the Moscow Patriarch Ioakim. The internal affairs of the Lavra were decided by its abbot, who held the rank of Archimandrite, together with the Spiritual Council and were formalized by the appropriate protocol (Barsov, 1885, p. 286).

From April 10, 1786, the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra was subordinated to the Metropolitan of Kyiv (Stroev, 1877, p. 14), who became its sacred archimandrite (abbot). From that time and during the

¹ Pokrovskyi, Y.M. (1913). Russkye eparkhyiy v XVI–XIX vv., ikh otkrytie, sostav i predely. Opyt tserkovno-istorycheskogo, statysticheskogo i geograficheskogo issledovaniya [Russian dioceses in the 16th – 19th centuries, their discovery, composition and borders. Experience in church historical, statistical and geographical research]. Kazan: Tsentralnaia tipografia, 1913. Tom vtoroj (XVIII vek). P. 925.

² Lavra (Greek – lane, cave) is the currently established official name of the most influential Orthodox and unofficial name of some Greek-Catholic men's monasteries. Orthodox lavras are headed by abbots in rank no lower than an archimandrite.

synodal period, the people who took the position of the metropolitan of Kyiv and Halytskyi were at the same time abbots of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra. In the Lavra the first person after the abbot was the vicar, usually a hieromonk or abbot. Later he became known as Archimandrite. All affairs of the monastery were managed by the Spiritual Council headed by the vicar.

Hermitages ('pustyn') were a special type of monastic cohabitation. The Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra also had two hermitages³ – Holosiyivska and Kytayivska. These hermitages arose on the basis of previously created hermitages ('skyt')⁴. The Holosiyiv Hermitage is considered to have been founded in 1621, when the archimandrite of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, and later Metropolitan of Kyiv Petro Mohyla, built a church on the site of the hermitage. Since 1793, this territory had been attributed to the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, and from the second half of the 19th century the Holosiyiv Hermitage became the summer residence of the Metropolitans of Kyiv (Denisov, 1908, p. 307).

The history of the Kytayivska Hermitage began in 1716. Very soon it turned into a place of mass pilgrimage. Since 1786, the Kytayivska Hermitage had been secured by monastic states under the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra. By the end of the 19th century the architectural ensemble of its monastery yard was formed, which included several churches, a 45-meter-high bell tower, a refectory, the abbot's house, buildings for the monks to live in, and a two-story shelter for old and infirm monks. From the end of the 19th century the Lavra candle factory also operated there (Denisov, 1908, p. 307). All other monasteries that were within the boundaries of the Kyiv Eparchy were subordinate to the Metropolitan of Kyiv and Halytskyi and had the status of diocesan ones. Their superiors were appointed by the Kyiv Eparchy bishop and approved by the Holy Synod.

From April 10, 1786, the Kyiv Eparchy also fell under the secularization of monastic possessions (Polnoe sobranie zakonov, 1830c, №16375). Secularization dealt a blow to the monasteries of the diocese as well as spiritual and architectural historical monuments. As a result of secularization, the number of the Kyiv Eparchy monasteries decreased significantly. In 1787, two men's monasteries of Class 1 were among the first ones in the Kyiv eparchy to be closed – the Kyiv Bratsky Epiphany and the Mezhyhirsky Preobrazhensky Spasky (Zverinskii, 1890 – 1897, p. 150). The spiritual academy of the Kyiv Bratsky Monastery with all its institutions was ordered to be transferred to the bishop's house and the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, and the monastery was reorganized into the main military hospital. The Stavropigial Kyiv-Mezhyhirsky monastery was ordered to be transferred to the Tavria province with the status of Class 1 monastery. The premises and property of this monastery were transferred to the balance of the department of the Order of Public Care. Over time, a faience factory was located on the territory of the monastery (Zverinskii, 1890 – 1897, p. 181). The Kyiv Spaso-Sofia Men's Cathedral Monastery was ordered to be repurposed into the Kyiv Sophia Cathedral with the establishment of the main national school in Kyiv (Zverinskii, 1890 – 1897, p. 234).

The women's convents of the Kyiv Eparchy were not left behind by secularization. Thus, for example, the Theological Mykhailivskyi Convent, founded in 1621 by Metropolitan Iov

³ Pustyn is a special type of Orthodox men's monastery, established in a sparsely populated desert ('pustynne') place, away from people. Pustyn, as a rule, arose on the basis of skites (hermitage).

⁴ A hermitage is a small settlement of hermit monks at a distance from the monastery to which they were subordinated. Hermitages were usually closed to outside visitors.

Boretsky of Kyiv, in 1786 was included in Class 2 monasteries, and in 1789 it was transferred to the neighbouring Poltava province. The state policy of the Russian Empire implemented in this way led to a rapid decrease in the number of monasteries in the Kyiv Eparchy. As of the beginning of the 19th century there were only 19 monasteries (Zverinskii, 1890 – 1897, pp. 94–95). Later, during the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th centuries the total number of monasteries of the Kyiv Eparchy did not change.

The Kyiv eparchial monasteries also had hermitages in their structure. Thus, in 1861, near the city of Kyiv, in the Feofania tract, a men's hermitage belonging to the Kyiv-Mikhaylivsky Zolotoverkhy Monastery arose. Over time, the Feofania hermitage turned into a powerful monastery complex with three churches, bishop's rooms, a cemetery for the monks of the Kyiv-Mikhailivsky monastery, hotels for pilgrims. To ensure economic needs, the monastery owned 143 acres of land. Also, the Bohorodytsky Hermitage, which arose in 1900 on the site of the ancient cave monastery of Hlynets, belonged to the Kyiv Bratsky Monastery. On the territory of the hermitage, a temple and a house for the accommodation of pilgrims were built (Denisov, 1908, pp. 308–309).

In addition, all diocesan monasteries were divided into full-time and part-time. As mentioned above, this division of monasteries was introduced in the 18th century. Full-time monasteries received help from the state, independent ones existed entirely at the expense of their own income. State monasteries, in turn, were divided into three classes. The difference between them was the amount of funds received and the prestige of the monastery. In the 19th century the class of a monastery indicated its nobility, as some monasteries reached the salaries of special estates, while the others were placed a class above without additional salary. Thus, at the end of the 19th century, in the Kyiv eparchy there were 21 monasteries – 17 for men and 4 for women. Of them, 9 men's and 1 women's monasteries were full-time (Denisov, 1908, pp. 288–310).

All Orthodox monasteries could be communal or non-communal. A feature of cohabiting monasteries was that, at the order of the abbot, they provided the monks with everything they needed. Accordingly, the results of the monks' work in such monasteries were common. The income received from the activity of the monastery and the monks was the property of the monastery and the monks. In full-time communal monasteries, funds allocated from the state treasury went to the treasury of the monastery and were used for the common needs of the abode (Razieiasnitelnye postanovleniia, 1899, p. 65).

A number of objective and subjective circumstances sometimes hindered a proper development of communal monasteries. Abbots from other monasteries were often sent to such monasteries. Sometimes these were people who had recently become monks, who had no experience of monastic life at all, did not understand the peculiarities of the organization of communal monasteries, and were not familiar with the peculiarities and rules of life in a particular monastery. It was difficult for such newly appointed abbots to get along with the local monks and maintain order in the monastery.

There were also frequent cases of actual "usurpation" of power by abbots in monasteries, complete concentration of management in their hands. Such monastic authoritarianism had a negative impact on the internal climate in the monastery, prevented the formation of a

circle of people who would participate in decision-making, help organize the activities of the monastery and be a substitute for the abbot in case of his illness or death. These negative trends only intensified over time and prompted the management of the dioceses to raise the issue before the Holy Governing Synod about the legal settlement of the specified problem.

In order to further prevent such cases in the future, the Synod issued a decree dated March 20, 1862 regarding the procedure for electing abbots and abbesses of communal Orthodox monasteries (*Razieiasnitelnye postanovleniia*, 1899, p. 82), which extended to both men's and women's monasteries. According to this document, the abbots or abbesses of cohabiting monasteries were elected mainly from among the brothers of the same monastery or from another but the same cohabiting monastery. The procedure for the election of the abbot of the monastery was carried out in the presence of the deacon of the monasteries or a representative of the higher diocesan administration. In the absence of the consent of the majority of the members of the brotherhood during open voting, the document provided for a secret voting procedure. Information about the chosen candidate for the position of abbot of the monastery was submitted for review and approval by the Holy Synod.

To manage the monastery, the abbot was allowed to have an assistant who helped him in organizing the life of the monastery, preserving its property, and temporarily performed the duties of the abbot in the latter's absence. It became the duty of each head and brother of the monastery to comply with the statute already existing in the monastery, and in the absence of such, to develop together with monks and document the rules and customs of their monastery. Such rules were to be drawn up in a relevant document and submitted to the head of the diocese for approval.

Non-communal monasteries had a somewhat different internal organization and property status. For monks brothers in a non-communal monastery, shared meals were organized at the expense of the monastery. Monks provided themselves with clothes and other necessary things.

Researchers of the history of Orthodox monasteries use the principle of functional specialization as a classification principle for monasteries during the synodal period. Based on the data available in the second half of the 19th century conditions, monasteries began to be divided into multi-functional and mono-functional (hospital, school, work).

Practically all monasteries of the Kyiv Eparchy of the synodal period were multifunctional. However, a certain differentiation is observed among the monasteries, caused by the needs of the contemporary society. The category of hospital monasteries includes the Mykilsky (Trinity) Hospital and Holy Trinity Kyrylivskyi men's monasteries, as well as the Kyiv-Pokrovsky women's monastery. Thus, during the period under research, the Mykilsky Hospital Monastery existed on the territory of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra. The development of Ukrainian monastic medicine and the founding of one of the first hospitals on the territory of Kyivan Rus are connected with it. In the 19th century certain steps were made in an effort to integrate ancient Ukrainian medicine with official practical and scientific medicine. Thus, since 1822, the position of doctor appeared in the staff of this monastery, and the Spiritual Cathedral of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra was offered to organize a medical school and start training relevant specialists. The Lavra pharmacy was founded there, which quickly became famous and popular in the entire Kyiv region, and in 1846, a two-story hospital for the poor

with 32 beds was built. In 1913, an almshouse for retired bishops and elders from the Lavra brotherhood was also established at the monastery (Dzeman, 2015, p. 68).

After the Kyrylivskyi Monastery in Kyiv was closed in 1786, its premises were used as a shelter for the disabled. Later, “the Kyrylivsky God-pleasing institutions” were formed around the former monastery territory, which were under the authority of the Kyiv provincial government. Numerous hospital buildings began to be constructed there. Since 1806, a hospital for mentally ill people was established. Kyrylivska Church remained a hospital church, and a pharmacy was placed in the belfry.

In 1889, on the initiative and at the expense of the native aunt of the Russian Emperor Nicholas II, the hospital Kyiv-Pokrovsky Monastery was established in the city of Kyiv. A 40-bed hospital with free dispensing of medicines, as well as a shelter for the blind and terminally ill, was located there. A parochial school with a dormitory for students was also built at the monastery (Rasporiazheniia, 1902b, p. 4).

In addition, school monasteries existed on the territory of the Kyiv Eparchy of the synodal period. The Kyiv-Bratsky Monastery was among them. In 1632, the Kyiv-Mohyla collegium was established at the monastery, which over time received the status of an academy (Denisov, 1908, 297). From the end of the 18th century in Chyhyrnsky district of Kyiv province, there was the Lebedynsky Mykolayivsky Convent. In 1858, a women’s school for orphans of the clergy was established at the monastery. Through the efforts of the superiors, this educational institution was reorganized into a two-class women’s vocational school, in which 150 girls studied (Denisov, 1908, p. 307).

From the second half of the 19th century socio-cultural activity became the main activity in Orthodox women’s monasteries and was much wider than in men’s monasteries. The establishment of educational and charitable complexes, which usually consisted of schools, asylums, almshouses, and hospitals, was a characteristic feature of women’s monasteries. Monasteries took on the role of social stabilizers, taking care and education of vulnerable sections of society. In fact, the state and the church used a hidden resource, using the growth of self-awareness and a social activity of women during the post-reform period for the development of a network of social institutions. Thus, by the decree of the Holy Synod of April 25, 1866, the state obliged the creation of new monasteries to open educational institutions. Since December 1868, the relevant decree had already provided for the arrangement of educational institutions for girls of the spiritual rank at women’s monasteries, and from 1870 – maintenance and development of almshouses, schools, hospitals and other social institutions existing at women’s monasteries (Kalashnikov, 1896, p. 147). An example can be given of the opening of women’s monasteries on the territory of the Kyiv Eparchy, provided that they organize a system of institutions of a social direction. This direction was typical of women’s monasteries of the Kyiv Eparchy in the second half of the 19th century.

The type of working monastery finally developed at the end of the 19th century. The term “working monastery” arose shortly after the reforms of the 1860s, when learned, educated monasticism began to disappear, and the monastery cells were filled with peasants freed from serfdom. Monasteries acquired the features of agricultural artillery quickly. On the territory of the Kyiv eparchy, monasteries, which were mainly located on the periphery, became such a kind of artillery.

Table 2

Monasteries of the Kyiv Eparchy at the beginning of the 20th century⁵

N	The name of the monastery	The status of the monastery	
		– class of the monastery	– way of life of monks
Kyiv city			
Men's monasteries			
1.	Kyiv-Pechersk lavra (with the hermitage: Holosiivska, Kytaievska ta Preobrazhenska)	lavra	not cohabitation
2.	Kyiv-Mykhailivskiy Zolotoverkhyi (with the assigned monastery of Feofania)	1st class	not cohabitation
	- Feofanivskiy Sviato-Panteleimonivskiy (St. Panteleimon)	2 class	cohabitation
	- Mykilskiy Troitskyy (Trinity)	hospital	
3.	Kyiv-Bratskyy Bohoiavlenskyy (with the ascribed hermitage "Tserkovshchyna", where the Prechystyi, Hnylets'kyy, Hlushens'kyy i Bohorodyts'kyy hermitages are located)	1st class, school	not cohabitation
	– Prechysta hermitage in "Tserkovshchyna"		cohabitation
	– St. Heorhiivskiy hermitage near Uman		cohabitation
4.	Kyiv Pustynno-Mykolaivskyy	1st class	not cohabitation
5.	Kyiv-Vydubys'kyy Mykhailivskyy (with the ascribed hermitage "Kruhlyk")	1st class	not cohabitation
6.	Kyiv Sviato-Troitskyy (Holy Trinity)	1st class	cohabitation
7.	Kyiv-Hrets'kyy Katerynens'kyy Synaiskyy	2 class	cohabitation
Women's monasteries			
8.	Kyiv-Florivskyy Voznesens'kyy	1st class	not cohabitation
9.	Kyiv-Pokrovskyy (with the associated Mezhyhirskyy monastery)	1st class	cohabitation
10.	Kyiv-Vvedens'kyy		cohabitation
County monasteries			
11.	Rzhys'chivskyy Preobrazhens'kyy (Rzhys'chiv, Transfiguration of the Lord)	women's, 2 class	cohabitation
12.	Korsunskyy Onufriivskyy (Korsun, St. Onufriy)	women's	cohabitation
13.	Motronynskyy Sviato-Troitskyy (Motrona's Holy Trinity)	women's	cohabitation

⁵ The table was created by the author based on materials from the funds of the monasteries of the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv and the book "Pravoslavnye monastyri Rossyiskoi imperiy. Polnyi spisok vsekhn 1105 nyne sushchestvuiushchykh v 75 hubernyakh y oblastiakh Rossiy (i 2 inostrannykh hosudarstvakh) muzhskikh i zhenskikh monastyrei, arkhieieiskikh domov i zhenskikh obshchyn" [Orthodox monasteries of the Russian Empire. The full list of all 1,105 male and female monasteries, bishop's houses and women's communities currently existing in 75 provinces and regions of Russia (and 2 foreign countries)] / comp. L. I. Denisov. Moskva, 1908. XII, 984 p.: ill., table.

14.	Bohuslavskiy Mykolaivskiy (Bohuslav, St. Nikolas)	women's	cohabitation
15.	Lebedynskiy Mykolaivskiy (Lebedyn, St. Nikolas)	women's, 2 class	cohabitation
16.	Chyhyrnskiy Sviato-Troitskiy (Chyhyryn, Holy Trinity)	women's	cohabitation
17.	Vynohradskiy Uspenskiy (Irdyn, Dormition of the Virgin)	men's	cohabitation
18.	Zhabotynskiy Onufriivskiy (Zhabotyn, St. Onufriy)	men's	cohabitation
19.	Medvedivskiy Sviato-Mykolaivskiy (Medvedivka, Holy Trinity)	men's	cohabitation
20.	Moshnohirskiy Voznesenskiy (Moshny, Ascension of the Lord)	men's	cohabitation

The Conclusions. Thus, from the end of the 18th century the territorial boundaries of the Kyiv Eparchy were determined, which coincided with the administrative boundaries of the Kyiv province. The secularization reform of the Russian Empire, which at that time also spread to the Ukrainian lands, had a significant impact on the number and position of monasteries in the Eparchy. The number of the Orthodox monasteries was not stable there. If before secularization there were 40 Orthodox monasteries (2 stauropygial, 21 male and 17 female) on the territory of the Kyiv Eparchy, then at the beginning of the 20th century there were 21 of them – 1 lavra and 20 Eparchy ones (16 male and 4 female). The change in the number of monasteries was carried out as a result of closing, reorganization, change of status, transformation from male to female.

The synodal period, which in Ukraine falls on the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, determined the typology and structure of the Orthodox monasteries there. All of them were divided according to the territorial and geographical factor (urban, rural), the system of subordination, maintenance, management and size (full-time, part-time), according to the statute, which regulated the arrangement and way of life of the abode (communal, non-communal), by type of monastic settlements (monasteries, hermitages). All monasteries of the Kyiv Eparchy were multi-functional, although some of them were called hospital, school, or working monasteries according to their functional specialization. During the post-reform period, the majority of Orthodox monasteries of the Kyiv Eparchy functioned as social stabilizers, and became centres of charity, education and upbringing, providing assistance to socially vulnerable sections of society.

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**“MOTHER OF ALL UKRAINIAN LIFE”: IMAGES OF “PROSVITA”
AND ITS MEMBERS ON THE PAGES OF “NASH LEMKO”**

Abstract. *The purpose of the article consists in understanding the peculiarities of the reception the “Prosvita” society members’ multifaceted work in the columns of “Nash Lemko”. The research methodology is an interdisciplinary approach. In the article there have been used such methods and*

approaches as systematic, comparative and critical analysis of the source base represented by large text arrays. The use of the content analysis method made it possible to interpret various newspaper information correctly. **The scientific novelty** of the article consists in the attempt to analyse the reception of educational issues in the newspaper “Nash Lemko” comprehensively. **The Conclusions.** In conclusion, we should note that the urgency of educational issue for the Ruthenians during the interwar period determined a special focus of the editorial board of “Nash Lemko” to the activities of “Prosvita”. Actively popularizing its cultural mission, the newspaper persistently advised the reader to become proactive members of the institution and to work in solidarity with fellow citizens on educational and, therefore, national awareness of the Ruthenian community. The pragmatic consequence of this work, it was emphasized in the newspaper, was supposed to be an increase in the well-being of the inhabitants of the Eastern Beskyds, tired of economic troubles. The “Nash Lemko” combined such popularization activity with consultative and methodical activities, suggesting to the Ruthenians optimal models of organizing educational work in mountain villages and effective methods of protection against persecution by the Polish officials. At the same time, having established a close communication with its subscribers and well understanding the specifics of cultural challenges before it, the newspaper itself turned into an initiative agent of educational changes and a full-fledged partner of “Prosvita”. Despite a discriminatory nature of the Ukrainian policy of the governments of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, they managed to modernize a cultural and national landscape of the Eastern Beskyds through their joint efforts radically. This had the consequence of existentially important cohesion to the Lemkos on the eve of difficult trials brought by World War II and the subsequent mass deportations from their native lands.

Key words: “Nash Lemko”, “Prosvita”, the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, cultural and educational activity, reception.

“МАТІР ВСЬОГО УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ЖИТТЯ”: ОБРАЗИ “ПРОСВІТИ” ТА ПРОСВІТЯН НА СТОРІНКАХ “НАШОГО ЛЕМКА”

Анотація. *Мета* дослідження полягає у з’ясуванні особливостей осмислення авторами “Нашого лемка” діяльності товариства “Просвіта” на теренах Східних Бескидів у міжвоєнний час. **Методологічне підґрунтя** роботи становить міждисциплінарний підхід. У статті використано такі методику **та** підходи, як систематичний, порівняльний і критичний аналіз джерельної бази, представленої великими текстовими масивами. Здійснити коректну інтерпретацію різножанрової газетної інформації уможливило застосування методики контент-аналізу. **Наукова новизна** статті полягає у спробі комплексного аналізу реценції “Нашим лемком” просвітницької проблематики. **Висновки.** У підсумку відзначено, що злободенність для русинів міжвоєнного часу освітнього питання визначила особливу увагу редколегії “Нашого лемка” до діяльності “Просвіти”. Активно популяризуючи її культурну місію, часопис наполегливо радив читачеві ставати ініціативними членами інституції та солідарно із земляками працювати над освітнім, а отже, і національним освідомленням русинської громади. Прагматичним наслідком цієї роботи, наголошувалося в пресодружці, мало стати зростання добробуту втомлених економічними негараздами мешканців Східних Бескидів. Таку популяризаційну працю “Наш лемко” поєднував із консультативно-методичною діяльністю, підказуючи русинам оптимальні моделі організації просвітницької роботи в гірських селах та ефективні методи захисту від переслідувань польських чиновників. Водночас, налагодивши тісну комунікацію зі своїм передплатником і добре розуміючи специфіку посталих перед ним культурних викликів, часопис сам перетворився на ініціативного агента освітянських змін та повноцінного партнера “Просвіти”. Незважаючи на дискримінаційний характер української політики урядів Другої Речі Посполитої, солідарними зусиллями їм вдалося радикально модернізувати культурно-національний ландшафт Східних Бескидів. Це мало наслідком екзистенційно важливу для лемків згуртованість напередодні важких випробувань, що їх принесли Друга світова війна та подальші масові депортації з рідних земель.

Ключові слова: “Наш лемко”, “Просвіта”, Друга Річ Посполита, культурно-освітня діяльність, реценція.

The Problem Statement. In modern Lemko studies, there is observed the belief that the educational issue was of a special importance to the Ruthenians during the period of the second half of the 19th – the first third of the 20th centuries. It is about the fact that among the generally poorly educated mass of the Ukrainian people of that time, the representatives of its most western ethnographic branch had an unprecedentedly high level of analphabetism as compared to other European regions. This social disease led to archaic economic practices and, what was especially threatening, vagueness of ethnic self-identification. This was usually used by the political elites dominating the region in order to exploit the Lemkos economically and manipulate their national choice. A large volume of historiography is devoted to the above mentioned issue, in which the multifaceted persistent efforts of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to educate and nationalize the autochthonous inhabitants of the Eastern Beskyds.

But in the studies, the focus is on a personal dimension of the issue, i.e. a specific contribution of this or that public intellectual to the cultural education of his compatriots. Instead, the institutional aspect of the “Prosvita” movement in the Lemkos region continues to be on the margins of research interest. However, it is the very institutional aspect of the Prosvita movement that allows us to trace the duration and systematicity of educational work among the Ukrainian highlanders. Drawing the attention of colleagues to the significance of an institutional dimension of culturally aware work, below we will elucidate the place of “Prosvita” and the public rank of its employees in the spiritual life of the Ruthenian community during the interwar period through the receptive prism of the newspaper “Nash Lemko”. In addition to satisfying a purely Lemko studies interest, this will allow researchers of the most authoritative educational society among the Ukrainians to draw attention to its regional history.

The Review of Recent Researches. The newspaper “Nash Lemko” was the most requested periodical for pro-Ukrainian Ruthenians in interwar Poland. In view of this, a lot of researches were done on it, in which comprehensively there was clarified a publishing phenomenon (Telvak, Nakonechnyi, Telvak, 2022) and the editorial policy of this periodical (Nakonechnyi, 2019), as well as the peculiarities of reception of numerous problems on its pages that posed considerable challenges to the Ruthenians during the last five years before the war. Therefore, we are well informed about the struggle of the Lemkos with bad habits (Telvak, Nakonechnyi, 2021), illiteracy (Telvak, Nakonechnyi, Telvak, 2022), uncontrolled mass emigration (Telvak, Nakonechnyi, 2020), violent actions of the Polish administration (Nakonechnyi, 2017; Nakonechnyi, 2018), etc. On the other hand, the interest of the authors of “Nash Lemko” in the work of “Prosvita” activists on the territory of the Eastern Beskids has not received coverage of this issue to this day. This fact determines the relevance of our research.

The purpose of the article consists in understanding the peculiarities of the reception the “Prosvita” society members’ multifaceted work in the columns of “Nash Lemko”.

The Results of the Research. First of all, it should be noted that meticulous attention of the editors of “Nash Lemko” to the activities of “Prosvita” in the territories of the Eastern Beskyds during the interwar period was determined not only by the importance of this problem to the Ruthenians. We should also remember the significant educational traditions of the Galician and Ruthenian intelligentsia, whose representatives, since the beginning of the Society’s formation in 1868, had directed their efforts to comprehensive cultural awareness of the population of the westernmost Ukrainian region. They wanted to, through the spread of mass literacy in the Ukrainian language, neutralize a powerful influence of muscophile figures among the Lemkos who, manipulating the similarity of the ethnonyms “a Ruthenian”

and “russky”, preached the idea of Ruthenism as an organic part of the Russian Orthodox culture. At that time, the Greek-Catholic clergy was at the forefront of this struggle, the prominent representative of which was the well-known Ruthenian intellectual priest Anton Beskyd – the grandfather of the editor-in-chief of “Nash Lemko” Julian Tarnovych. Thus, during the interwar period, actually the grandson became the successor of a cultural and national mission of his famous ancestor, popularizing the work of “Prosvita” on the pages of the newspaper edited by him.

Actually, the contributors of “Nash Lemko” focused on the above mentioned aspects of the historical presence of “Prosvita” in the towns and villages of the Eastern Beskyds. Opposing the theses of the Muscovite and Polish press about the aggressive nature of the latest Ukrainian cultural expansion into the territories allegedly historically occupied by Muscovitism, they pointed out the duration of the struggle for the Ukrainian educational choice of the Ruthenians. On the basis of these posts, we can reconstruct the still unknown history of the activity of “Prosvita” in the Lemkos region. Thus, the mass establishment of “Prosvita” reading rooms by Greek-Catholic priests in the Lemkos territories during the last decades of the 19th century resulted in the formation of the first regional branch of the society in the then cultural centre of the Ruthenians, the town of Nowy Sącz in 1902. It was the branch and reading room of “Prosvita” in the town that became a platform for the spread of the Ukrainian cultural influences in the region. The author of “Nash Lemko” noted: “With their establishment, Nowy Sącz gathers around itself people who are aware of their origin and goals, firm people who spread calls to awareness and open their eyes to the sad reality: Muscovites who are conducting their anti-Ukrainian work” (Stii na storozhi, 1937, p. 3).

Effectiveness of this cultural and educational activity increased in September of 1902 after the “Prosvita” members established the first purely Lemkos educational institution – bursa, which was initially located in a rented premises, and from June of 1904 in their own home. This first Ruthenian secondary special educational institution became an educational centre for nurturing the cadres of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the Lemkos region. Vasyl Yavorsky, a prominent Lemko intellectual, became the spiritual guide of this difficult cultural work, as the authors of the Ruthenian periodical emphasized (V odyndatsiati rokovyny, 1937, p. 2). In the columns of “Nash Lemko” the public status of this figure was depicted with a considerable respect on more than one occasion: “His honest name is closely associated with the bright times of Nowy Sącz and all-Lemkos movements, because he was a real artist-organizer, and at the same time, the head and the founder” (V odyndatsiati rokovyny, 1937, p. 2).

Unfortunately, the horrors of World War I practically destroyed the cultural work of the Lemkos Prosvita-pioneers. Therefore, the hard work of awareness of the Ruthenians during the interwar twenty years had to be started practically from the beginning. Its urgency is evidenced by the statistics given in the “Nash Lemko”, according to which the level of illiteracy reached a frightening figure of 41.7% in the Eastern Beskyds (Ukraintsi!, 1938). In view of this, on the pages of the periodical the most space was almost devoted to the conviction of the Ruthenians in the importance of “Prosvita” in their lives and the need to establish community reading rooms in the villages. At the same time, the publicists of “Nash Lemko” emphasized the pragmatic aspect understandable for their readers, portraying illiteracy as the worst social defect. On the contrary, they stated that, together with the eradication of illiteracy, public consciousness would spread in the village, which, together with knowledge, would bring the Ruthenians the dream of well-being (Prohaniaimo, 1935, p. 2). “The Prosvita reading room is the hearth of a cultural life in the community, the second

shrine next to the church”, Yu. Tarnovych emphasized. – [...] We call for the following: pound the rock! Buy books, organize your own library. Read and teach others to read books. And the rock will crack: the fulfillment of this most important task will benefit us and bring new, bright days to our entire nation... ” (YuT., 1934, p. 1).

Cultivating the high authority of “Prosvita” and its activists in the minds of its readers, the “Nash Lemko” appealed to the creative heritage of the poet Taras Shevchenko, who is a symbol to every Ukrainian. Justifiably certifying Kobzar as one of the first “Prosvita” members, the contributors to the newspaper cited excerpts from his famous works, which encouraged to active cultural work. Moreover, Shevchenko Days in March were declared by the authors of the Ruthenian newspaper to be the time of intense self-education. On this occasion, the pages of the newspaper ran: “Study, my brothers, think, read” – our greatest poet Taras Shevchenko wrote to us in his will. These words are a signpost to us, and “Prosvita” stands guard over them. It has a clear, holy goal in front of itself, to spread education among people, to teach them how to live, to point and lead them along the path of truth and science to a better tomorrow. “Prosvita” fulfills a great task, we must cooperate with it, help it” (De shukaty, 1934, p. 3).

The consequence of such glorification of the society was a consistent formation of the cult of “Mother-Prosvita” – the most authoritative Sobornytska cultural institution – on the pages of “Nash Lemko”. Following the rhetoric of Lviv Prosvita members, the Ruthenian periodical presented “Prosvita” as the seat of all cultural endeavors of the Ukrainians divided by borders. With an undisguised pathos, the newspaper’s authors emphasized: “Prosvita” was the first to awaken us to a new life, to lay a lasting foundation for our cultural and economic development. “Prosvita” is our victory! It is our immortal, free Spirit! It is our conscience, pride, honour and glory! It was born from the spirit of the people, It nurtured spiritual values for decades” (Ukrainskyi Narode!, 1935, p. 1).

In the opinion of “Nash Lemko”, the cultural leadership of “Prosvita” among the Ukrainians deserves an exceptionally respectful attitude towards the oldest national institution. Its manifestation, the newspaper authors insisted, should be a mass membership as the main prerequisite for the effectiveness of educational work. “Our Prosvita must develop, we must all cooperate with it”, explained Yu. Tarnovych, “then it will fulfill its tasks” (YuT., 1934, p. 1). Undermining the social atomism traditional for the Ukrainians-highlanders, the Ruthenian periodical encouraged them to become proactive activists of “Prosvita” and unite for the implementation of numerous cultural initiatives. Overcoming centuries of self-doubt, the editor of “Nash Lemko” wrote the following: “Who can be an educator in Lemkivshchyna? Each and every one, a conscious boy and a conscious girl, a householder, a spiritual and secular intellectual, in a word, all those who worry about the current state of their native Lemkivshchyna” (“Nash lemko”, 1934, p. 4).

Convincing its readers of the need for cultural work led by “Prosvita”, in the newspaper “Nash Lemko” the focus was on the logistical, legal and methodical aspects of establishing branches and reading rooms in the Ruthenian towns and villages. In the periodical, it was emphasized that the establishment of “Prosvita” centres was organizationally simple and materially accessible to the Lemkos. Facilitating the work of rural “Prosvita” members, in the periodical there was a list of popular literature of various genres recommended for reading in “Prosvita” reading rooms. Moreover, at the request of the Ruthenians, the newspaper editors often bought and delivered this literature to the Lemkos villages, thus forming the first “Prosvita” library there (Podiaka, 1937, p. 1). Encouraging fellow countrymen

to organizational work, Klym Berezhivskyi explained: “In a village a powerful engine and seedbed of “Prosvita” and a cultural life is a skillfully organized and well-run reading room” (Berezhivskyi, 1938, p. 3). If the number of people willing to establish educational centres in a certain village was not enough, the “Nash Lemko” offered to hold reading parties at houses of the Lemkos conscious of a national choice alternately. At the same time the focus was on special effectiveness of a collective reading practice, which made it possible to involve currently illiterate fellow villagers in educational work. In the newspaper it was advised to start diving into the world of the Ukrainian word with easy-to-understand humorous texts, then move on to historical fiction, and then read popular science books.

The “Nash Lemko” also popularized a number of cultural initiatives of “Prosvita” actively. Thus, at the request of Lviv central office, in the newspaper it was announced the winter period of the year, when the Lemkos had a longer rest from agricultural chores, the time of a mass active reading. Every year, the newspaper displayed the slogan: “The whole December is the month of “Prosvita”!”. Another effective cultural initiative was the obligation of each member of “Prosvita” to teach literacy to at least one illiterate. For this, the authorities of the society promised a reward in the form of valuable books. Explaining the importance of this initiative, the “Nash Lemko” insisted that “every literate person should teach at least one illiterate person to read and write, giving him the basis of national consciousness” (Vyiavim, 1938, p. 2). But among the Lemkos “Prosvita” members, the most popular were the informative local history excursions to the Galician capital organized by Lviv headquarters. Their goal was to show the Lemkos, who are far from the centre of the Ukrainian life, considerable results of national solidarity work. Readers shared their impressions on these trips in their favourite newspaper, thus fostering Sobornyy values among the Ruthenian community (Vrazhinnia, 1937, p. 5).

Such well-thought-out popularization and consultative methodical work of the Ruthenian periodical quite quickly produced the expected results in the form of an increase in the number of “Prosvita” centres in mountain villages. On the pages of “Nash Lemko” there was information on the opening of new reading rooms and the increase in the number of visitors. The newspaper did not spare its columns for self-reflection of the peasants. Thus, Yakiv Volianskyi, the head of the “Prosvita” centre in Surovychni Poliany, wrote in the newspaper: “Owing to the “Prosvita” reading room, the Ukrainian national consciousness and the Ukrainian organized cultural and educational life of the village rose high” (Volianskyi, 1937, p. 8). It should be noted that on the pages of “Nash Lemko” we see a lot of similarly stylized posts from various Ruthenian villages.

Over time, such information became so much that from the sixth issue of 1936, a permanent column “Educational Page” was started in the newspaper, aiming specifically at popularizing the activities of “Prosvita” centres in the Lemkos region. Justifying the need for a new section, the editors noted: “Until now, the newspaper “Nash Lemko” did not contain detailed reports on the life and activities of the “Prosvita” reading rooms in the Lemkos region. [...] Therefore, with the beginning of March 1936, the month of Shevchenko Days, we are starting an Educational page in the “Nash Lemko”. Here we will post detailed and truthful reports on the activities of cultural, educational societies in the Lemkos region” (Osvitno-vykhovna storinka, 1936, p. 6). Consistently covering the past and current work of the “Prosvita” centres in the Eastern Beskyds in this column for a long time, the “Nash Lemko” created a kind of encyclopedia of the “Prosvita” movement among the Ruthenians. An important part of it were the obituaries of prominent Lemkos educators (V. Chaikivskyi,

A. Shevchyk, B.-I. Antonych, etc.), which enable us to personify the Ukrainian cultural life in the Eastern Beskyds. An organic addition to this book of knowledge were numerous photos of institutions, events and activists, which quite fully visualize the “Prosvita” life in the Lemkos region. It should be noted that this unique local history information is still little known to modern researchers of the “Prosvita” society.

It is important that while popularizing the “Prosvita” movement in the Lemkos region, the Ruthenian newspaper showed its development against the background of all-Ukrainian and even world cultural processes. Thus, emphasizing the synodical influence of “Prosvita”, “Nash Lemko” informed the reader about a fruitful activity of the members of the society in all Zazbruchansky territories that were under the rule of Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia at that time (Prosvitne zhyttia, 1934, p. 1). Also, it was not uncommon to talk about the fate of prominent intellectuals in the Bolshevik-occupied Dnipro region (Pomer M. Hrushevskiy, 2934); Telvak, 2008, pp. 356–405; Telvak & Telvak, 2022). Moreover, the newspaper also focused on the establishment of “Prosvita” in the diaspora Lemkos centres, pointing at an important unifying, cultural and educational mission of the society in the new countries where the Ruthenians lived (Kulturno-osvitne zhyttia 1934; Prosvita v Arhentyni, 1935). After all, the “Nash Lemko” popularized a foreign educational experience, and the fruitful work of the Bulgarian “Prosvita” was often mentioned (Konhres, 1934). All these posts had the primary task of instilling faith in the Ruthenians in the importance of their consciousness-raising activity.

According to the plan of the Ukrainian “Prosvita” members, the establishment of reading rooms and branches of the society in the Lemkos towns and villages was only the first step in the Ukrainization of their public space. “Prosvita”, they rightly assumed, was supposed to create cultural prerequisites for the Lemkos’ interest in the activities of other specialized societies and associations. “Nash Lemko” covered this process of Ukrainization of the Ruthenian village quite well through the establishment by “Prosvita” members of such authoritative institutions at the time as “Narodna torhovlia”, “Lemkos Union Cooperative”, “Sian”, “Silsky Hospodar”, “Renaissance Anti-Alcohol Society”, “Brotherhood of Sobriety” and the others. Along with the mentioned public institutions, “Prosvita” members also founded educational institutions at which Lemkos were taught modern economic practices. The economic and horticultural school “Prosvita” in Mylovan gained special authority among the Ruthenians (Hospodarsko-sadivnycha shkola, 1936). Highlighting such institutional initiative of “Prosvita” members, the “Nash Lemko” metaphorically called the society the “Mother” of all other Ukrainian institutions. The editor-in-chief wrote the following: “With Prosvita, our economic institutions, native schooling, physical education associations will be born – in a word, our entire national development” (Ukrainskyi Narode!, 1937, p. 1).

It is expected that the nationally conscious work of “Prosvita” was not liked by the officials of the revived Polish state, who at any cost tried to divert the Lemkos from the Ukrainian choice. From historiography it is known that they resorted to obsessive ideological propaganda, violent polonization of the educational process, violent administrative and even criminal persecution of activists, etc. On its pages “Nash Lemko” quite fully covered this unequal struggle of the Ruthenians with the state machine for their national choice and the right to have “Prosvita” centres in the villages. From the newspaper, we learn that the government officials first of all tried to decapitate the “Prosvita” movement, insisting on the incompatibility of the pastoral duties of Greek-Catholic priests with their traditional involvement in “Prosvita” activity. Responding to this challenge, in the “Nash Lemko” there were published several articles in

which, citing arguments of a canonical, legal and moral nature, naturalness of the involvement of the Ukrainian clergy in “Prosvita” activity was proved. Encouraging popular preachers to engage in a cultural service, it was written the following in “Nash Lemko”: “Each active Ukrainian priest in the Lemkos territories is by nature and should be a leader of the educational movement in the village” (Berezivskyi, 1938, p. 3).

Having lost the fight on a canonical field, the Polish officials tried to revive the once popular Russophilism in the Lemkos territories, which during interwar period took on the features of anti-Ukrainian dogmatic muscophilism, whose adherents popularized the idea of “Rus from the Carpathians to Kamchatka”. To this end, the relevant state bodies contributed in every possible way to the takeover of Greek-Catholic parishes by Orthodox priests, the introduction of the Lemkos dialect instead of the Ukrainian language into the educational process, the distribution of the muscovite primer by Methodius Trokhanovsky, etc., in public schools. On the institutional level, the influence of “Prosvita” had to be undermined by M. Kachkovsky Society, which since its establishment in 1874 had been positioned as an ideological counterweight to the Ukrainian institution. The “Nash Lemko” not only depicted in detail the struggle of “Prosvita” members with muscophile influences in the Lemkos villages, but also became an active participant in this confrontation.

Analyzing the relevant thematic posts, one notices a consistent alienation of the activities of M. Kachkovsky Society members on the pages of the newspaper. The editor-in-chief and other authors of the press did not spare sharply critical, and often sarcastic ironic words addressed to ideological opponents. The latter were depicted as fierce enemies of the Greek-Catholic Church, immoral personalities and intriguers, destroyers of the Lemkos traditions and even sympathizers of Bolshevism. The article by Klym Beskydskyi helps us have an idea of the rhetoric of these posts: “[...] In Kachkovsky reading rooms, there are groups of different communitarian, disorganized elements in our Lemkos parishes. For this reason, a Lemko, who values the Greek-Catholic faith and healthy morality of his parents, turns away from the harmful influence of Kachkovsky reading rooms, and rushes to his Ukrainian “Prosvita” and to its religiously morally nurturing reading rooms. [...]. The Kachkovsky Society is a typical Moscow exposition, created to break the national unity of the Ukrainian people and for the national confusion [...] of our Ukrainian Lemkivshchyna” (Beskydskyi, 1937, p. 2). In the end, owing to a solidary resistance of the Lemkos community, muscophilism did not gain the influence desired by the Polish officials.

Thus, in this situation of failure to confront the influence of “Prosvita” on the Lemkos territories with the help of competitive projects, state officials took the path of bureaucratic arbitrariness. And in this case, the “Nash Lemko” is almost the most informative source for researchers of the Polish governments national policy. From its columns, we learn about the governmental hampering of the process of establishing reading rooms; groundless constant checks of the document flow of branches with a programmed desire to find any inaccuracies and impose heavy fines for it; revocation of permits for various public actions; sending provocateurs who were supposed to commit riots, which allowed to stop the work of educational centers, etc. In turn, the “Nash Lemko” provided a constant legal support for the activity of reading rooms, explained the logic of opposition to officials, helped to file appeals, and suggested ways of bypassing bans. Thus, in the newspaper it was advised reading gatherings in the houses of activists after closing of the reading rooms. The “Nash Lemko” offered to compensate the losses by sending individual funds, which was not regulated by law. However, the results of this struggle were determined in advance and the Ruthenian

periodical informed its readers with undisguised anxiety about a regular closure of branches and reading rooms in the Lemkos towns and villages. As expected, this information was subjected to merciless censorship interventions, as evidenced by the abundant white spots in the chronicle columns of the “Nash Lemko”.

The behaviour of Polish officials in relation to “Prosvita” centres became especially brutal in 1938, when “Prosvita” planned to celebrate its 70th anniversary. The heads of the institution formulated the ideological message of the holiday as follows: “This is the great national Jubilee of cultural work – the Jubilee of a long and difficult struggle against the unenlightened darkness that killed Your national and human dignity, blocked the path of progress and knowledge in front of You with granite rocks, You – the owner of a fertile land, the great treasures of Your ancestral land – turned You into a hired hand and a beggar” (Ukrainskyi Narode!, 1937, p. 1). But the Polish government, frightened by the prospects of modern Ukrainianism manifestation achievements, instead of supporting a cultural institution that was authoritative among the largest national minority, banned a number of completely innocent actions, such as the mass dedication of the “Prosvita” flag, performances of singing groups and orchestras or a scientific congress. It was also forbidden to visit Lviv by representatives of regional, even Lemkos branches, who were supposed to walk in a column along the streets of their princely capital. Only religious services and a concert with a small number of attendees were allowed. All these bans gave reason to the publicists of “Nash Lemko” to call the 70th anniversary of “Prosvita” as a “silent anniversary” eloquently (Vsenarodnyi movchaznyi poklin, 1938, p. 1). In general, we can only speculate as to how long the Polish authorities would have finally destroyed the institutional foundations of the “Prosvita” movement on the territory of the Eastern Beskyds. This destructive work was hindered by the outbreak of World War, when the demonstrative disregard of the authorities of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for the humanitarian rights of the largest minority repeatedly became a reason for the Polish-Ukrainian armed clashes.

Along with the above-mentioned analytical, journalistic and local history articles, the authors of “Prosvita” also addressed educational issues with the help of artistic word. In the newspaper, we read about talented literary images of “Prosvita” members who successfully overcome the inertia of their countrymen on the way to knowledge and national self-awareness (Sfinks, 1935) Along with this, the column of the newspaper was full of motivational slogans such as: “Our Future is in “Prosvita!””, “Let’s join the members of Mother “Prosvita” en masse!””, “Let’s Create one Powerful “Prosvita” Front!””, “Through “Prosvita” to Resurrection !””, “Prosvita” as Mother”, “Through “Prosvita” to Great Tomorrow!” and, etc. on. After all, the “Nash Lemko” awakened the enlightening fervor in its reader also by the power of a visual image, publishing appropriate thematic drawings in which the image of “Prosvita” was combined with symbols of a spiritual elevation and material well-being.

Finally, a few words should be said about the enlightened self-reflection of the editors of “Nash Lemko”. For more than five years, persistently popularizing the society’s activities and participating in the implementation of its numerous cultural projects, the newspaper itself turned into an educational institution that was authoritative among the Lemkos. Having a well-established feedback relationship with its subscriber with the help of the “Tribune of our Readers” column, the editorial board received a direct insight into the success and difficulties of its educational mission. Thus, on the occasion of the publication of the hundredth issue of “Nash Lemko”, Yu. Tarnovych had every reason to be proud of the results of the editorial team work headed by him: “With strong hands, we broke through this heavy dam, which was

blocked by the Khin wall, the path of the Ukrainian word to Lemkivshchyna” (Sotnie chyslo, 1938, p. 4).

The Conclusions. In conclusion, we should note that the urgency of educational issue for the Ruthenians during the interwar period determined a special focus of the editorial board of “Nash Lemko” to the activities of “Prosvita”. Actively popularizing its cultural mission, the newspaper persistently advised the reader to become proactive members of the institution and to work in solidarity with fellow citizens on educational and, therefore, national awareness of the Ruthenian community. The pragmatic consequence of this work, it was emphasized in the newspaper, was supposed to be an increase in the well-being of the inhabitants of the Eastern Beskyds, tired of economic troubles. The “Nash Lemko” combined such popularization activity with consultative and methodical activities, suggesting to the Ruthenians optimal models of organizing educational work in mountain villages and effective methods of protection against persecution by the Polish officials. At the same time, having established a close communication with its subscribers and well understanding the specifics of cultural challenges before it, the newspaper itself turned into an initiative agent of educational changes and a full-fledged partner of “Prosvita”. Despite a discriminatory nature of the Ukrainian policy of the governments of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, they managed to modernize a cultural and national landscape of the Eastern Beskyds through their joint efforts radically. This had the consequence of existentially important cohesion to the Lemkos on the eve of difficult trials brought by World War II and the subsequent mass deportations from their native lands.

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THE FRENCH CAPITAL IN THE OIL INDUSTRY OF GALICIA DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD

Abstract. *The purpose of the research* is to elucidate the French capital involvement in the oil industry of Galicia during the interwar period, to highlight the activities of the French oil companies. **The methodology of the research** is based on the principles of historicism, logic, scientific objectivity in analysis of the past, a critical attitude to available sources, in particular reports and minutes of meetings of the French oil companies, notes placed in the columns of specialized magazines. General scientific (analysis, abstraction, synthesis, generalization) and special historical methods (historical genetic, historical typological, historical systemic, comparative historical, methods of statistical analysis) have been used. **The scientific novelty of the research** consists in the fact that the French capital impact on the oil industry development in the interwar Galicia has not been considered until nowadays comprehensively. Mostly, the scholars on the history of the oil business only mentioned the dominance of the French in the industry, listed their oil companies. Piotr Franaszek was the one and the only scholar, who did more research into the history of “Dąbrowa” and “Małopolska” concerns. **Conclusions.** The French capitals gained an advantage in the industry, as a result of the ownership rights settlement to oil facilities in Eastern Galicia after World War I. The French bankers took over most of the oil companies owned by the Austrians and the Germans before the war. The policy of the Polish government helped them in this. The French created a series of firms that grew by buying up oil wells, warehouses, and oil refineries. As a result, the French took over half of the entire oil industry of Galicia. The French oil companies were particularly interested in making quick profits in the 1920s, hence, they were poorly managed, and invested little in modernizing their enterprises. Consequently, some of the companies were on the brink of bankruptcy at the end of the 1920s. At the same time, they tried to ensure the entire production cycle – oil extraction, its processing and sale. Owing to the Polish government support and the French firms unification into large concerns, it was possible to get out of the crisis. As a result, the French capital in the oil industry of Galicia was concentrated in two companies, which were called “Halychyna” and “Małopolska”. They influenced significantly the state of affairs in the industry before World War II broke out.

Key words: Galicia, French capital, oil industry, interwar Poland.

ФРАНЦУЗЬКІ КАПІТАЛИ В НАФТОВІЙ ПРОМИСЛОВОСТІ ГАЛИЧИНИ У МІЖВОЄННИЙ ПЕРІОД

Анотація. Мета дослідження – показати залученість французьких капіталів у нафтову промисловість Галичини в міжвоєнний період, висвітлити діяльність французьких нафтових фірм. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на принципах історизму, логічності, наукової об'єктивності в оцінках минулого, критичного ставлення до наявних джерел, зокрема, звітів й протоколів засідань французьких нафтових фірм, заміток, опублікованих на шпальтах спеціалізованих часописів. Застосовувалися загальнонаукові (аналізу, абстрагування, синтезу, узагальнення) й спеціально-історичні методи (історико-генетичний, історико-типологічний, історико-системний, порівняльно-історичний, методи статистичного аналізу). **Наукова новизна статті** полягає у тому, що досі комплексно не розглядали вплив французьких капіталів на розвиток нафтової промисловості міжвоєнної Галичини. Дослідники історії нафтової справи здебільшого лише згадували про домінування у ній французів, перераховували їх нафтові фірми. Лише Пйотр Франашек більше дослідив історію концернів “Домборова” і “Малопольца”. **Висновки.** Внаслідок врегулювання після Першої світової війни права власності на нафтові об'єкти у Східній Галичині перевагу в галузі здобули французькі капітали. Французькі банкіри перейняли більшість нафтових фірм, якими до війни володіли австрійці й німці. В цьому їм посприяла політика польського уряду. Французи створили низку фірм, які зростали, скуповуючи нафтові свердловини, склади й нафтопереробні заводи. У такий спосіб вони заволоділи понад половиною всієї нафтової промисловості Галичини. В 1920-х рр. французькі нафтові фірми дбали більше, щоб отримати швидкі прибутки, невміло управлялися, мало вкладали в модернізацію своїх підприємств. Це призвело до того, що наприкінці 1920-х рр. деякі з них опинилися на межі банкрутства. Водночас намагалися забезпечити собі весь цикл виробництва – видобуток нафти, її переробку й продаж. Завдяки підтримці польського уряду і об'єднанню французьких фірм у великі концерни вдалося вийти з кризи. В результаті французькі капітали в нафтовій промисловості Галичини зосередилися у двох фірмах – “Галичині” і “Малопольці”. Вони істотно впливали на стан справ у галузі до початку Другої світової війни.

Ключові слова: Галичина, французькі капітали, нафтова промисловість, міжвоєнна Польща.

The Problem Statement. The issue of attracting foreign capital to one of the most important sectors of the country's economy is always complicated for a number of reasons. On the one hand, the foreign investments contribute to the economic development of the state, and on the other hand, the government cannot allow the entrepreneurs from abroad to regulate the state of affairs in crucial sectors of the economy without restrictions, and is, therefore, obliged to monitor their economic activities constantly. The authorities of the revived Poland did not have sufficient domestic capital to restore and develop the oil industry after World War I. That is why, Poland started thinking about involving the foreigners in the industry immediately. As a result of the post-war settlement, the majority in the oil industry of Galicia was acquired by the French industrialists and bankers, who bought oil companies from the Austrians and the Germans, and small mining enterprises from local oilmen. Consequently, the French gained influence over an important component of the energy sector in interwar Poland. The French owners of oil companies were only interested in maximising their profits, they almost did not modernize their enterprises. As a result of the above-mentioned economic activities, they were on the verge of bankruptcy at the end of the 1920s. The Polish government was forced to allocate considerable funds from the state budget in order to prevent bankruptcy as the French oil companies were of an utmost importance for such a crucial industry in interwar Poland. The above-mentioned negative experience could be used in order to avert forced state spending nowadays, caused by an inadequate control

over the activities of companies established created by foreigners in strategic industries. Owing to subsidies from the government of interwar Poland, it was possible to establish the management of the French oil companies. The unification took place after that, which made it possible to reduce administrative costs and competition significantly, to optimize production. Hence, the French oil companies developed successfully. The above-mentioned steps could be a good example for the modern management of big industrial firms.

The Review of Sources and Recent Researches. The documents from the funds of the French oil companies (“Dąbrowa”, “Małopolska”, “Halychyna”, etc.) and other industrial companies, which are stored in the Central State Historical Archive in Lviv, the state archives of Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv regions became the source base of the research. The publications in magazines of interwar Poland, which concerned the affairs of the oil industry were also used.

The role of the French capital in the Galician oil industry during the interwar period has not been studied comprehensively. Individual issues on the development of this field were studied by Norman Davies (Davies, 1970), Alison Frank (Frank, 2005; 2011), Mariusz Majewski (Majewski, 2009), Roman Masyk (Masyk, 2017a, Idem, 2017b, Idem, 2022), Wojciech Morawski (Morawski, 2017), Oksana Pasitska (Pasitska, 2019). There were several articles published, in which there was reviewed the history of the oil business in Prykarpattia comprehensively (Cząstka, 1972; Klapchuk, 2013; Wołwicz, 1994; Wołwicz, 1995; Boryń, Chodubski, & Duraj, 2014; Wołkowicz, Graniczny, Wołkowicz, & Urban, 2017; Nafta, 2004). The scholars only mentioned the French capital in the oil industry of Galicia among other things in the studies. Only Piotr Franaszek analysed the activities of two French oil concerns – “Dąbrowa” and “Małopolska” specifically (Franaszek, 1986).

The purpose of the research is to elucidate the role of the French capital in the oil industry of Galicia during the interwar period, to trace the history of the development of their industrial companies having analysed the historical research and the source materials.

The Research Results. Foreign capital began to penetrate into the Galician oil industry actively after a significant increase in oil production at the end of the 19th century. The French started to invest in this industry not the latest from other foreign entrepreneurs. In 1906, they founded the first company that was engaged in the development of Galician deposits – the oil company “Limanowa” (Société de Naphte “Limanowa”) with its centre in Paris (Majewski, 2009, p. 132).

The Galician oil became the subject of interest to the French capital before World War I break out. A group of the French capitalists led by Muju bought from the Sapicha princes 42% of their production of raw materials in Tustanovychi initially, which belonged to the Krajowe Towarzystwo Karpackie and established the French Carpathian Society (Société Française des Carpathes) (Kachlik, 1995, p. 182). Other oil companies were founded in 1911 – 1914, which were financed by the French bankers led by the Motte family: “Dąbrowa” (Société de Pétroles de “Dąbrowa”), “Potok” (Société de Pétroles de “Potok), “Wańkowa” (Société de Pétroles de “Wańkowa”), “Silva Plana” (“Silva Plana”), etc. Their shares were first listed on the stock exchange in Lille and immediately became the subject of successful speculation, the development of which was stopped by World War I (Wyszyński, 1931, p. 277).

The Motte family no longer played a significant role in the Galician oil industry during the interwar period. Only the oil company “Granownica” (“Granownica”) operated owing to with their funds (Wyszyński, 1931, p. 284). In general, in 1914, there operated working 11 French oil companies in Galicia, in which 155 million francs were invested at the time (Majewski, 2009, p. 133).

The French became especially interested in the Galician oil industry after the war. They wanted to create an oil base in Europe in order to become independent from the supply of oil products by sea (Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw, f. 100, c. 1486, pp. 15–17). As a result of the post-war settlement of oil affairs, the French took over the ownership of the majority of Austrian and German firms and prevailed in the oil industry of Galicia. The Polish government supported them in issue (Zaks, 1969, p. 47). In the middle of 1921, among all the capital invested in the Galician oil industry, 53.03% were the French ones (Sprawy..., 1921, p. 192), at the beginning of 1931 – 50,3% (C. P., 1932, p. 181), in 1933 – 58,4% (CAMRW, f. 12, c. 157, pp. 4–5), in 1937 – 54,2% (Chabrzyk, 1995, p. 135; Franaszek, 2000, pp. 315–316).

Galicia became one of the centres of the Polish-French industrial cooperation. According to various calculations by the French scholars, since 1938 the total amount of money invested in the Polish economy amounted to 2,25 billion francs, or approximately 3,2 billion zlotyh in 1927. It meant that Poland accounted for 10% of all the capital that France invested during the interwar period abroad. Credits and loans that the French gave to the Poles are included into 10%. In 1933 approximately 1 billion francs or 1,4 billion zł were directly invested in the Polish enterprises. 44% of all French capital was in the oil industry, 21% – in other mining industries (mainly coal) (Łazor, 2000, pp. 199–200).

The “**Dąbrowa**” company had the greatest influence on the Galician oil industry in the first post-war years. It was founded by the Frenchmen Louis Leon René Landrin and Fernand Joffray on February 7, 1913. It was predicted that “Dąbrowa” would exploit the oil fields of Galicia for thirty years. The founders soon sold this firm to the bankers from Lille (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv, f. 235, d. 1, c. 81, p. 6; f. 278, d. 1, c. 1, pp. 1–3v, 17–19v, 55v; Franaszek, 1986, p. 234; Wyszynski, 1931, p. 277).

The Dąbrowa management decided to buy shares of the oil companies in Poland, Gdańsk, Czechoslovakia and Hungary after the war. For example, in October of 1919, this company bought the property of the Hungarian-Galician joint-stock company for the oil industry with its centre in Budapest (CSHAUL, f. 227, d. 1, c. 1, pp. 45–46). As a result, in November of 1920, the Dąbrowa Oil Concern (Koncern Naftowy “Dąbrowa”) was registered, which consisted of: the oil companies “Dąbrowa”, “Wańkowa” (Société de Pétales de “Wańkowa”), “Potok” (Société de Pétales de “Potok”), the French-Carpathian Oil Company (Francusko-Karpackie Towarzystwo Naftowe), the Tustan Oil Union “George Clairin” (Tustanowicka Spółka Naftowa “George Clairin”) (CSHAUL, f. 235, d. 1, c. 81, p. 10).

The concern extended its influence to other oil companies. It was especially aimed at the oil facilities under the control of “Deutsche Erdoel AG”. “Dąbrowa” bought them with the help of the “International Petroleum Union” trust, which was specially founded in Zurich, in 1921 (CAMRW, f. 100, c. 1486, p. 14). The “Dziedzice” oil company in Czechowice became part of the concern. The above-mentioned institution was important for “Dąbrowa”, this is because in 1922, according to agreement with the authorities of Poland and Austria, it took over the ownership of the powerful Austrian company “Schodnica”, including its oil refinery (OR) (CSHAUL, f. 259, d. 1, c. 5, p. 4v). In November of 1922, “Dąbrowa” bought the Dutch Oil Syndicate (Holenderski syndykat naftowy) (CSHAUL, f. 235, d. 1, c. 12, p. 27v), and in March of 1923, on the basis active oil refinery since 1902, the “Jedlicze” Refinery joint-stock union in Krosno powiat was founded (Rafineria Nafty “Jedlicze”) (CSHAUL, f. 261, d. 1, c. 2, pp. 1–3v, 11–15v; Skorowidz..., 1921, p. 2).

The “Dąbrowa” concern was managed by the General Directorate, which was located in Lviv in the building at Mariyska Square, 8 (nowadays – Mickiewicz Square). Each of the

concern's unions had separate Directorates until 1924, which were liquidated during the reorganization (Frasaszek, 1986, p. 235). The "Dąbrowa" concern was in charge of holding union in relation to the companies that created it. Despite the growth of the authorized capital, the concern suffered more and more losses year-to-year. In 1913, the union's capital was 2 million francs, in 1914 – 13 million, in 1920 – 50 million, in 1924 – 200 million. Instead, the profit of the concern decreased constantly. The concern earned 1,5 million francs from 1914 to 1919 (Frasaszek, 1986, p. 236). First of all, there were used the profits, which were earned before 1914 in order to cover up the losses from the war. For example, the concern earned the profit of 89 237,91 kron in 1918; then in 1919 the following amount of money was made – 280,715,399.50, in 1920 – 649,258,123.03. These deficiencies were transferred to a separate account. At the same time, two reserve funds were formed: 105,000 Polish marks in order to cover the cost reduction and restoration of enterprises; 1,875,000 Polish marks – for the tax reserve (CSHAUL, f. 235, d. 1, c. 81, pp. 5–5v). Due to the merger with other companies, it was possible for "Dąbrowa" to make profit of 11,8 million francs at the end of 1922, in 1923 – 11,5 million francs (Frasaszek, 1986, p. 236).

When the French founded "Dąbrowa", they bought the majority of the oil companies after World War I. Such a fate befell the *Galician Carpathian Oil Joint Stock Company* (Galicyjskie Karpackie Naftowe Towarzystwo Akcyjne, dawniej Bergheim i Mac Garvey) in Glinik Maryampolski, founded in 1895 (later it moved its centre to Lviv). The following capitals were involved in it: the Austrian, the English and the German until the beginning of the 1920s (Skorowidz..., 1921, pp. 1–2; Znaczniejsze..., 1920, p. 21). Their property began to be taken over by the French entrepreneurs gradually, although they had to solve problems with the Austrian management of this company for a long time. Although the representative office of the company in Vienna was liquidated on September 5, 1920, (CSHAUL, f. 225, d.3 , c.108 , p. 82), still in May of 1922, the management had almost not resolved matters with the Austrian shareholders (CSHAUL, f. 225, d. 3, c. 108, pp. 206–207v; f. 242, d. 1, c. 9, pp. 1–9).

The Galician Carpathian Oil Joint Stock Company developed more and more actively, spreading its influence on other companies. It was managed by one of the best Polish oilmen, Stanisław Pilat from May 1, 1922 (CSHAUL, f. 225, d. 3, c. 108, pp. 206–207v; f. 242, d. 1, c. 9, pp. 1–9). The company began to cooperate with the Polish-French oil-producing company "Dąbrowa" closely at the turn of 1921 – 1922 (Polsko-Francuskie Gwarectwo Naftowe "Dąbrowa") in Krosno (founded in 1890). This cooperation improved the supply of raw materials to the Galician Carpathian Oil Company (CSHAUL, f. 225, d. 1, c. 27, p. 5). It also cooperated with the "Dąbrowa" concern, which sold petroleum products with the help of the Galician Carpathian Oil Joint Stock Company – "Karpaty" company ("Karpaty" Sprzedaż Produktów Naftowych). At the same time, they had common points of petroleum products sale throughout Central and Eastern Europe (CSHAUL, f. 242, d. 1, c. 44, p. 3v; Franaszek, 1986, p. 234).

The financial circles of Paris, like Lille, began to engage in the Galician oil industry after the war. The oil company "Premier" ("The Premier Oil and Pipe Line Company Limited") became the target for them primarily. Mostly, there were the English and the German capitals in this institution before the war. The state management was established over the "Premier" industrial facilities in order to prevent the German speculation on September 29 of 1919 (State Archives of Ivano-Frankivsk region, f. 47, d. 1, c. 45, pp. 1–2.). The company was first subject to the military authorities, and later to the Ministry for Finance (SAIR, f. 47, d. 1, c. 45, p. 4). The German shares were transferred to the Public Trustee in the central office of the firm in London

on January 27, 1920. They were planned to be sold to one of the groups of the industrialists from continental Europe (Kronika, 1920, p. 148). However, the case with the German property was resolved in a different way in Poland. On May 4 of 1920, a law was passed on the registration and provision of the German property (Ustawa..., 1920, pp. 414–416). In accordance with its norms, the Main Liquidation Administration introduced compulsory state management over the property of companies belonging to the “Premier” concern on May 31 of 1920 (Kronika, 1920, p. 457; Rozporządzenie, 1920, p. 1; SAIR, f. 47, d. 1, c. 45, p. 5).

The British decided to sell it to the Paris Oil Financial Company on June 17 of 1920 (Société Financière des Pétroles) (Kronika, 1920, pp. 343, 457). A new company was founded by the French, which was called the French Premier Oil Company (Société Française des Pétroles “Premier”) in order to complete this transaction. The concern became the French-German for a while after the acquisition of the British shares (CAMRW, f. 100, c. 1486, p. 14). The Paris financiers began to control the “Premier” after purchasing the shares of the “German Oil” in 1920. They held 18% of preferred shares, which gave them 90% ownership in the concern and votes at the General Meeting (Koncern, 1931, p. 1). The Charter of the French company “Premier” was adopted with a capital of 20 million French francs on October 4 of 1920 (CSHAUL, f. 255, d. 1, c. 563, pp. 1–26). It took a long time for the Parisian bankers to get rid of the participation in the concern of all German shareholders. In fact, the centre of “Premier” was moved only on December 3 of 1921, from Vienna to Tustanovychi (and soon to Lviv). (CSHAUL, f. 255, d. 1, c. 723, pp. 2v–3). The Ministry for Industry and Trade and the Ministry for Finance finally allowed the French company “Premier” to operate in Poland on December 9. The authorized capital of the concern was increased by the Parisian bankers to 90 million francs (CSHAUL, f. 255, d. 1, c. 595, pp. 1–4; Postanowienie..., 1921, p. 4). The “Premier” was finally registered as the French company on November 26 of 1923 (CSHAUL, f. 225, d. 1, c. 27, p. 22; d. 3, c. 296, p. 16).

Since then, the management of the “Premier” company began to buy other oil companies (CSHAUL, f. 225, d. 3, c. 296, p. 16). In the mid-1920s, it included eight mining enterprises; eight companies engaged in oil storage and transportation; four refineries; five trading companies. The complex of enterprises of the firm “Harkłowa” joined the “Premier” (CSHAUL, f. 255, d. 1, c. 400, pp. 20–21).

In 1920, Dewilder’s Parisian financial group founded the General Oil Credit Company (Crédit Général des Pétroles). It had a relatively small capital – 1 million francs initially. The main task of the company was to study the possibilities of exploiting oil fields in Poland. The company began to buy out the shares of other French companies in the Polish oil industry gradually. The society organized the association “Małopolska” (Société Française des Pétroles de “Małopolska”) during the next years with Charter capital of 30 million francs, securing 60% of its shares (Franaszek, 1986, p. 237; Wyszynski, 1931, p. 281). Dewilder’s group saw the unification of all French capitals in Poland as the ultimate goal (Wyszynski, 1931, p. 277).

The monetary reform of 1924 exposed the risky management of diverse French enterprises in the oil industry of Galicia for the first time. The revenues of the “Dąbrowa” concern began to fall. As a result there was a profit of 11.5 million francs at the end of the 1923 whereas in 1924 – 1925 budget year – only 3 million 400 thousand (Franaszek, 1986, p. 236.) A similar fate befell the oil production company of the same name in Krosno. While the institution was constantly profitable until 1923, it ended the year of 1924 with a deficit (215,770,891,503 Polish marks) (CSHAUL, f. 227, d. 1, c. 1, p. 46; c. 2, pp. 2v, 11v, 31–32, 62–67).

As a result, on January 23, 1925, eight oil companies merged into the reformed Galician Carpathian Oil Joint Stock Company: “Dąbrowa”, Dutch Oil Syndicate, “Wańkowa”, “Potok”, French-Carpathian Oil Company, Tustan Oil Union “George Clairin”, Oil Refinery “Jedlicze” and “Dziedzice”. Such an association was supposed to reduce the administration costs of the above-mentioned enterprises significantly (CSHAUL, f. 242, d. 1, c. 47, p. 1v). The greatest success was achieved in the management of the western oil field, where the Directorate of Mines was formed in Krosno. In 1928, this allowed the Galician Carpathian Oil Joint Stock Company to buy a lot of oil-bearing land there. At the same time, the profits of the united oil companies decreased. For example, “Dąbrowa” earned only 1,6 million francs in 1926 – 1927, and 580 thousand in 1927 – 1928 (Franaszek, 1986, pp. 235–236).

In the mid-1920s, the “Dąbrowa” concern / the Galician Carpathian Oil Joint Stock Company managed almost 13,000 hectares of oil-bearing land (approximately 400 mines). The enterprises produced approximately 25% of all crude oil in Poland (of which 3/4 outside Boryslaw field). The concern had three oil refineries in Galicia (Jedlicze, Glinik Maryampolski, Dziedzice) and three abroad (“Apollo” in Bratislava, “Hazaj” in Budapest and “Drösig” near Vienna). They could process almost 30,000 tanks of raw materials per year. The oil refinery in Jedlicze processed almost 90,000 tons of crude oil per year, and the enterprises in Glinik Maryampolski and Dziedzice processed almost 60,000 tons each. The length of the concern’s gas pipelines was 400 km. The oil refinery was the owner of machines factory and drilling equipment factory in Glinik Maryampolski, branches of the enterprise in Boryslaw and Tustanowychi (Franaszek, 1986, pp. 235–236; Idem, 2000, pp. 314–315). The concern sold its petroleum products with the help of the “Karpaty” company, which was founded in 1922 (CSHAUL, f. 250, d. 1, c. 1, p. 1; Franaszek, 1986, p. 236). The company had branches in Warsaw, Łódź, Częstochowa, Kraków, Silesia, Poznań and Białystok, in addition to the Lviv centre and the technical branch in Dziedzice until 1926 (CSHAUL, f. 250, d. 1, c. 17, p. 1). There were founded separate trade enterprises in order to sell the oil products in Vienna, Gdańsk and Prague (Franaszek, 1986, p. 236).

The “Premier” concern also experienced financial problems after the monetary reform of 1924. Due to risky operations with shares of oil companies, the value of concern’s assets began to plummet constantly. The “Premier” was deleted from the trade register on January 18 of 1925 (CSHAUL, f. 255, d. 1, c. 725, pp. 2v–3, 5). As a result, most of the concern’s shares were bought by the Dewilder’s group. It meant the integration of the “Premier” into the General Oil Credit company. The new owners unified the management of the concern (CSHAUL, f. 207, d. 1, c. 850, p. 2; *Koncern...*, 1931, p. 2). At first, the Dewilder’s group managed the “Premier” skillfully, spending the profits on the depreciation and increasing the property, investing in the industrial facilities (for example, the “Premier” built a power plant in Brzeżywka). However, the financiers began to speculate in the shares of their oil companies in 1926, which at the turn of the 1920s and the 1930s led to complex consequences (Schaezel, 1928, p. 355; Wyszynski, 1931, pp. 281–282).

The structure of the French ownership in the Polish oil industry was established at the end of the 1920s, when the merger of their companies led to the organization of two powerful concerns – “Małopolska” and “Galicja” (Bohdanowicz, 1938, p. 242). In the summer of 1928 a great unification of the French companies began when the “Premier” bought from the Galician Carpathian Oil Joint-Stock Company its companies that were under the influence of the Viennese capital: “Fanto”, “Nafta” and “Karpaty”. The concern extended the influence to “Dąbrowa” soon, which was threatened with collapse due to unsuccessful speculations on

the stock exchanges. In this situation, its shareholders sold all their assets in Poland, Gdańsk, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary to the General Oil Credit Company (Brzozowski, 1928, p. 92; Franaszek, 1986, p. 236).

There were eight large refineries and two Polish trade organizations, which were called “Oleum” and “Karpaty” in the hands of the “Premier”. Hence, the concern was able to rationalize the production of petroleum products by limiting the work of the weakest refineries, which at the same time made it possible to reduce administrative costs. It was a positive phenomenon for the entire oil industry in Poland, where there was a significant shortage of crude oil (Brzozowski, 1928, p. 92). The concern “Premier” acquired companies that had oil mines, refineries, enterprises that stored and transported crude oil and oil products, workshops of drilling machines and equipment, trade organizations. Since then, the “Premier” could produce almost 24,000 tons of crude oil every month (over 40% of all Polish oil production). Its refinery could process up to 36,000 tons of raw materials per month. The “Premier” received two refineries outside of Poland and an oil mine in Czechoslovakia, refineries in Austria and Hungary (Schatzel, 1928, pp. 353–355). “Karpaty” had its trading organization “Nova” in Vienna. It played an important role in land exports to Austria and neighbouring countries. Having received this company, the “Premier” actually took over the markets of the Polish oil products in Central-Eastern and partly in Western Europe (Brzozowski, 1928, p. 93).

In 1928, the Paris company General Oil Credit increased its authorized capital from 80 million to 250 million francs (Franaszek, 1986, p. 241; Kachlik, 1995, p. 187; Wyszynski, 1931, p. 277) and in mid-summer organized the most powerful oil concern in Poland on the basis of the “Małopolska” company. In the 1928 – 1929 budget year its profit was 32 million francs. However, in 1929, despite the resolution of the shareholders and management, due to the approaching crisis, the authorized capital of “Małopolska” was not increased. A crisis broke out at the French stock exchange soon. The price of “Małopolska” shares began to fall rapidly. It turned out that the activities of the Dewilder’s group were based on speculation and fraud on its shareholders. The French financiers inflated the value of companies’ shares artificially together with the Viennese banks that were part of “Małopolska” (Franaszek, 1986, p. 242; Wyszynski, 1931, pp. 278, 283).

The above-mentioned situation caused fears concerning the future fate of the concern in the Polish oil industry. The management began to be accused of speculation with its shares. In Paris, there were not enough funds to guarantee the stable operation of “Małopolska”. Some of the Polish oil workers believed that the concentration of enterprises into such a large concern, which owned more than 40% of Polish oil production, was not justified. By this time, “Małopolska” had already played an important role in the entire Polish oil industry. The leaders of the concern began to infiltrate economic self-government, removing representatives of the Polish oil companies from there (Paryska, 1931, pp. 40–43; Szlemiński, 1931, p. 141). The French entrepreneurs believed that the collapse of “Małopolska” came about because speculators took over the influence on the stock exchanges, and the Dewilder’s group had nothing to do with it (Wyszynski, 1931, p. 280).

The “Małopolska” concern began to ask the government to provide it with guarantees for its bonds for 70 million zlotyh. It was supposed to cover the concern’s multimillion-dollar debts in Viennese banks. The “Małopolska” management planned to issue these bonds in order to obtain loans from abroad, necessary for the rehabilitation of the concern and prevention of its bankruptcy. The authorities and businessmen began to discuss this

issue. At first, the Polish government did not agree to such a solution to the concern's issue (*Wiadomości...*, 1931, p. 152). For example, a deputy Bronisław Wojciechowski believed that the government should take care of the entire oil industry of Poland, and not the interests of one foreign association. If the "Małopolska" concern received some financial support by the government, the state oil policy would become even more dependent on the interests of the concern. In fact, the state would finance the foreign ownership (Wojciechowski, 1931, p. 1). The Parliamentary Commission of Poland was engaged in establishing the causes of the stock market crash. The Polish government was forced to apply remedial measures, because the concern played an extremely important role for the entire oil industry. As a result, it was possible to deal with the finances of "Małopolska" by 1936 (Franaszek, 1986, p. 243).

The concern consisted of approximately 30 firms, which retained their legal personality and property. The General Directorate was the governing body of "Małopolska", which began operating on August 1 of 1928. The General Director was Viktor Hlasko. According to the state letter issued on July 31 of 1928, the following departments of the concern were formed: General Management Department, Administrative Department, Mining Department (until 1934, it was called Field Mining Department); Commercial Department, Electrical Department; Investment and Workshop Department; Financial Department; Purchasing Department, Accounting Department. At the beginning of the 1930s, a Legal Department was formed. At the same time, the management of the concern retained separate management of the larger companies that were part of it: "Małopolska Oil Industry", "Premier", "Nafta", "Fanto" and "Dąbrowa" (CSHAUL, f. 207, d. 1, c. 850, p. 7; f. 225, d. 1, c. 27, pp. 1–31v; c. 28, pp. 1–13; c. 39, pp. 6–9; Franaszek, 1986, pp. 237–239; Kachlik, 1995, p. 188).

In addition to enterprises in Poland, the foreign companies also took part in the concern: "Nova" Oil Refinery in Austria, "Hazai" in Budapest and "Apollo" in Bratislava. The foreign trade was carried out by the representative offices of the group – "Nova" in Vienna to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Italy, Switzerland; to Germany – "Milag" in Berlin; to France – Paris Trading Company to Gdansk, England, Holland, Scandinavian countries and other states – the Polish Petroleum Company in Gdansk (Franaszek, 1986, p. 241; Kachlik, 1995, p. 188).

"Małopolska" was the biggest oil concern during the interwar period. In 1928, the mining enterprises managed 17,000 hectares of oil-bearing areas along the entire Carpathians, which were divided into five sectors: Bytkiv, Boryslav, Wankowa, Polianka and Rypne (CSHAUL, f. 225, d. 3, c. 1857, p. 7; Kachlik, 1995, p. 187). By 1934, the total area of oil-bearing land developed by "Małopolska" was already 21,5 thousand hectares. In the mid-1930s, the concern owned almost 900 oil and gas wells (CSHAUL, f. 207, d. 1, c. 850, p. 4). It produced approximately 20–25 thousand tons of crude oil (almost 65% of all raw materials extracted from the Boryslav field) and 13–14 million m³ of gas per month. At the same time, gasoline was produced from most of the gas (1,300–1,600 tons per month) (CSHAUL, f. 207, d. 1, c. 850, pp. 4–5; Kachlik, 1995, p. 188).

"Małopolska" oil refineries produced almost 50% of all Polish oil products (Franaszek, 1986, p. 241). The concern had 12 processing enterprises in Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary (total production capacity of almost 540 thousand tons per year) (Kachlik, 1995, p. 188). There operated seven "Małopolska" oil refineries in Poland in Trzebin and Rychtych (the Polish Union Refineries of Mineral Oils) by the middle of 1934, in Glinik Maryampolski, Jedlicze and Dziedzice (the Galician Carpathian Oil Joint Stock Company), Drohobych ("Nafta") and Ustrzyki ("Fanto"). The management of the concern regulated the

processing of oil at its refineries, so the weaker ones did not operate (CSHAUL, f. 207, d. 1, c. 850, p. 6; f. 225, d. 3, c. 1857, p. 8). In addition to the oil refinery, “Małopolska” organized the operation of nine gasoline plants (four in Boryslav, Bytkov, Glinik Maryampolskyi, Jedlicze, Rypny, Rohy and Ruvny) (CSHAUL, f. 225, d. 3, c. 1857, p. 9) and a plant for the production of liquefied gas (CSHAUL, f. 207, d. 1, c. 850, p. 5).

The following enterprises, which belonged to the concern: “Karpaty”, “Montan”, “Petrolea” and “Fanto” dealt with crude oil and oil products storage and transportation. In general, the concern’s oil collectors contained 350,000 m³ (approximately 190,000 tons), the length of the oil pipelines was 304 km in 1934. These enterprises pumped 80% of oil products of foreign companies from Boryslav field (CSHAUL, f. 207, d. 1, c. 850, p. 5; Franaszek, 1986, p. 241; Idem, 2000, p. 315; Kachlik, 1995, p. 188).

The Polish-French Oil Company (Société Franco-Polonaise des Pétales) is another large French company, which was founded in 1919 and associated with the Bank of Paris and the Netherlands (Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas), during the interwar period the Polish-French Oil Company controlled the shares of two major oil companies: the Polish-French Mining Company (Société Minière Franco-Polonaise) and the Galician oil company “Galicja” (Galicyskie Towarzystwo Naftowe “Galicja”). The Polish-French Oil Company prioritized profitability of its enterprises unlike other French financial groups that were active in the Galician oil industry, often speculating on the shares of their companies at the stock exchange. All profits were invested in their development and modernization, so shareholders did not receive dividends for almost ten years (Wyszyński, 1931, pp. 279–280; Khonihsman, 1964, p. 48).

The Polish-French Mining Company was founded in the mid-1920s and engaged in the oil production mostly. This French firm had oil mines in Bytkiv, Rosilna and Kitvan (CSHAUL, f. 222, d. 1, c. 14, p. 4; c. 15, p. 14).

“Halychyna” was founded as an Austrian joint-stock company in Drohobych approximately in 1904 (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 53, p. 24; d. 2, c. 22, p. 82). The company provided itself with raw materials, processed them and sold petroleum products (Kachlik, 1995, p. 185). The centre of the institution was located in Lviv in a tenement at Kostiuszko 8, street (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 2, c. 22, p. 82). “Halychyna” started to buy up other oil companies in the first half of the 1930s actively. There were difficulties with the finances of the Polish-French mining company due to the “Great Depression”, which had a pernicious effect on the company. Taking into consideration the common origin of the capital, its shareholders decided to conclude an agreement with “Halychyna”, giving it the right to drill wells in its oil fields in exchange for 15% of the extracted raw materials (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 2, c. 39, pp. 1–24; f. 1, p. 2). It actually meant the merging of the two companies of the Polish-French Oil Company.

“Halychyna” merged with “Limanowa” in the summer of the 1934. In order to do this, “Halychyna” bought all the shares (93,4 million francs) of the oil company “Silva Plana”, which was founded in 1914. The crude oil extracted at the “Limanova”, was supposed to be processed at the “Halychyna” refinery. As a result, “Halychyna” got rid of a competitor for the raw materials. Since then, the Limanovska Oil Refinery produced only special products from crude oil “Halychyna” turned into the second largest French oil concern after “Małopolska” (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 2, c. 22, pp. 92–93; Kachlik, 1995, p. 186; Wyszyński, 1931, p. 278).

The authorized capital of “Halychyna” was 14,280,000 Polish marks initially. In July of 1923, due to a significant devaluation of the currency rate, it was increased by as much as 99,960,000 Polish marks – to 114,240,000 (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 2, c. 3, pp. 7–8). By 1928, the share capital of “Halychyna” was 36 million zł (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 53, p. 24).

The financial reports on its activities testify to a skillful management of this company. Even in 1918 – 1919 budget year, when there were some issues with the sale of raw materials and there was no communication with the western deposit (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 15, p. 100) “Halychyna” ended up with a net profit of 6,713,133.80 kron (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 15, pp. 13a–17; c. 16, pp. 14v–15.). Despite a difficult financial situation in the country, the company managed to end up the following years without debt: the 1920 – 1921 budget year with the net profit of 30 499 240,28 Polish marks (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 20, p. 4); 1921 – 1922 – 56 761 981,04 (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 19, p. 5); 1922 – 1923 – 17 843 321 858,24 (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 21, p. 6v), 1925 – 1926 – 223 134,32 zł (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 36, p. 13v). “Halychyna” had to end up with a deficit of 48 031, 12 zł only in the 1926 – 1927 budget year due to long-standing debts to the Czechoslovak creditors (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 37, pp. 13–13v). Owing to the reserves from previous years, it was possible to improve the company’s finances, and in the 1927 – 1928 budget year, “Halychyna” ended up with a profit of 22 7092,99 zł (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 43, p. 13v; c. 46, p. 8). The company earned – 492 171,67 zł in the 1928 – 1929 budget year (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 54, p. 30v; c. 57, p. 21), 1929 – 1930 – 145 053,18 (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 65, p. 37v). During the crisis, the company managed to avoid major losses. The financial condition of “Halychyna” improved after overcoming the general crisis and merging with other oil companies. In the 1934 – 1935 budget year, its net profit was 1 629,72 zł (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 95, p. 4; c. 98, p. 21); 1935 – 1936 – 9 133,16 (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 102, p. 7); 1936 – 1937 – 37 663,36 (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 123, p. 4, c. 124, p. 3), 1937 – 1938 – 623 750,90 zł (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 141, p. 3; c. 146, p. 5; c. 150, p. 18), from May of 1938 to January 31, 1939 – 970 525,18 zł (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 136, pp. 2–3; c. 155, p. 3v). “Halychyna” managed to form its financial reserve in the amount of 1 573 649,26 zł at the end of January of 1939, owing to the profits earned in previous years (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 141, p. 3; c. 146, p. 5; c. 150, p. 18).

“Halychyna” owned approximately 120 oil mines in Bytkov, Boryslav, Krosno, Mraznytsia, Tustanovychi, Skhidnytsia and other localities (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 2, c. 22, p. 83; Kachlik, 1995, p. 185). In the mid-1930s, the concern modernized the technical equipment of its mining enterprises. There were ordered two towers of the “Rotary” system. In the future, they planned to drill only with it (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 102, p. 43v). “Halychyna” built its own oil pipelines with a length of more than 90 km and collectors for the raw materials (Kachlik, 1995, p. 185).

The firm’s oil refinery was built in Drohobych back in 1904 (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 15, p. 38v). During the interwar period, it was expanded and since then could process up to 140,000 tons of crude oil per year. They began to supply raw materials through oil pipelines from the mines of Boryslav deposit to the oil refinery already in 1912. The oil refinery enterprise “Halychyna” was the first one in Poland to produce asphalt of the “Molfart” and “Galbit” brands, and the impregnating emulsion “Drogol”. Its oil products were sold under the brand name “Galtol” (Kachlik, 1995, pp. 185–186; Nafta..., 2004, p. 366). In May of 1935, they decided to carry out a technical update of the oil refinery. The pipestill distillation equipment was ordered, stabilization equipment was built to prevent the loss of gas and gasoline (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 102, p. 43v). In 1936, this technique was launched (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 1, c. 124, p. 3).

In 1923, “Halychyna” built two gasoline production plants (Kachlik, 1995, p. 186). Furthermore, “Halychyna” oversaw the finances of the firms associated with Paris centre: “Bartoil” Mineralöl

und Tankanlagen in Gdańsk, Südkarpatische Mineralöl Handels-Gesellschaft in Prague, by the South Carpathian Oil Refining and Trading Company (Südkarpatische Mineralölraffinerie und Handelsgesellschaft) in Mukachevo (CSHAUL, f. 220, d. 2, c. 22, pp. 92–97).

Investments of the French companies in the oil industry of Galicia did not bring the desired results. According to the calculations of Otto Vyshinsky, the French companies spent approximately 2,4 billion francs, and were able to return a maximum of 400 million 2 billion francs by the beginning of the 1930s, the French lost on investments in the Polish oil industry due to speculation at the stock exchanges, and above all due to an unforeseen significant decrease in the production of raw materials (Wyszyński, 1931, pp. 285–286).

The Conclusions. During the interwar period, Poland did not have sufficient capital for the reconstruction and development of the oil industry in Galicia. For this purpose, the Polish government decided to attract foreign capital to the strategic sector of the economy. As a result, the majority of the oil industry enterprises ended up in the hands of the French bankers and industrialists. France wanted to provide itself with petroleum products with the help of the Galician resources. The majority of new owners of oil facilities almost did not modernize existing enterprises, were interested only in earning quick profits, and inflated the value of their companies' shares artificially. The Polish government did not supervise the process properly. As a result, many French companies went bankrupt during the economic crisis. Owing to the financial support of the Polish government and the union of French firms, they managed to overcome the crisis by the mid-1930s. As a result, two large oil concerns were formed in Poland – “Małopolska” and “Halychyna”, which determined the state of affairs in this industry before World War II break out significantly. The French investments did not bring the desired results due to an improper management of oil companies and a decrease in the production of raw materials in Boryslav field.

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**RECEPTION OF THE UNION OF UKRAINIAN LAWYERS' ACTIVITIES
IN THE COLUMNS OF THE NEWSPAPER "DILO" (1923 – 1934)**

Abstract. *The purpose of the research is to find out the reception peculiarities by the authors and editors of the newspaper "Dilo" of the activities of the Union of Ukrainian Lawyers in 1923 – 1934. The chronological framework is due to the fact that it was in the first decade of the activity of the UUL that the main forms and directions of the organization's activity took place, which was noted during the jubilee celebration of the 10th anniversary of the UUL in 1934. The research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, systematicity, objectivity, as well as methods of criticism of historical sources, content analysis of media materials. The Scientific Novelty. For the first time in historical science, the coverage of the activities of the UUL in the first decade of this organization's activity in the daily Ukrainian newspaper "Dilo" was analyzed. The Conclusions. Consequently, during the first decade of its existence, the UUL turned into an extensive, structured public organization of Ukrainian lawyers in*

Poland (primarily in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia), which united about 75% of the Ukrainian lawyers in its ranks. It was a unique trade union in the Ukrainian lands during the interwar years, as similar organizations did not exist in other Ukrainian lands within the USSR, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. Considering the lack of archival materials on the history of the UUL, one of the most complete and accessible historical sources remains the Ukrainian press, in particular the daily newspaper "Dilo". It published articles that contained facts (dates, events, names and surnames of people) about the organization's general meetings, its governing bodies, areas of activity, etc. It is important that the newspaper highlighted the results of the activities of the UUL branches in the provincial towns of Galicia (Stryi, Kolomyia, Sambir, Stanislaviv, Drohobych, Ternopil), and also summarized the content of scientific and practical informational reports of the members of the organization. The newspaper "Dilo" informed readers in detail about one of the most important areas of activity of the UUL – the protection of the rights of the Ukrainian language in the administrative and judicial system of interwar Poland. The newspaper focused on the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the UUL, which was celebrated in Lviv on September 22, 1934.

Key words: Union of Ukrainian Lawyers in Lviv, newspaper "Dilo", trade union activity, Ukrainian language rights, interwar Poland.

РЕЦЕПЦІЯ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ СОЮЗУ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ АДВОКАТІВ НА ШПАЛЬТАХ ГАЗЕТИ "ДІЛО" (1923 – 1934)

Анотація. Мета дослідження – з'ясувати особливості рецепції авторами та редакцією газети "Діло" діяльності СВА у 1923 – 1934 рр. Хронологічні рамки обумовленні тим, що саме у перше десятиліття діяльності СВА відбулося становлення основним форм і напрямів діяльності організації, що було відзначено під час ювілейного святкування 10-річчя СВА в 1934 р. **Методологія дослідження** спирається на принципи історизму, системності, об'єктивності, а також на методи критики історичних джерел, контент-аналізу пресових матеріалів. **Наукова новизна.** Уперше в історичній науці проаналізовано висвітлення діяльності Союзу українських адвокатів у Львові у перше десятиліття діяльності цієї організації у щодення української газети "Діло". **Висновки.** Отже, Союз українських адвокатів упродовж першого десятиліття свого існування перетворився на розгалужену, структуровану громадську організацію українських адвокатів у Польщі (передовсім на Східній Галичині і Волині), яка об'єднувала у своїх лавах близько 75 % адвокатів-українців. Він був унікальною професійною спільнотою на українських теренах у міжвоєнні роки, оскільки подібних організацій не існувало на інших українських землях у складі СРСР, Румунії і Чехословаччини. Зважаючи на нестачу архівних матеріалів до історії СВА, одним з найбільш повних і доступних історичних джерел залишається українська преса, зокрема щоденна газета "Діло". У ній публікувалися статті, які містили факти (дати, події, імена і прізвища осіб) про загальні збори організації, її керівні органи, напрями діяльності тощо. Важливо, що у газеті висвітлювалися результати діяльності осередків СВА у провінційних містах Галичини (Стрию, Коломиї, Самборі, Станіславі, Дрогобичі, Тернополі), а також конспектувався зміст наукових та практично-інформаційних доповідей членів організації. Газета "Діло" детально інформувала читачів про один із найбільш важливих напрямів діяльності СВА – захист прав української мови в адміністративній та судовій системі міжвоєнної Польщі. Не меншу увагу газета приділила святкуванню 10-річного ювілею СВА, який відзначали у Львові 22 вересня 1934 р.

Ключові слова: Союз українських адвокатів у Львові, газета "Діло", профспілкова діяльність, права української мови, міжвоєнна Польща.

The Problem Statement. In the Ukrainian daily newspaper "Dilo" (1880 – 1939) there were covered the issues of the Ukrainian public life. During the interwar period, one of the objects of editors' and authors' interest of the newspaper was the Union of Ukrainian Lawyers in Lviv – the first Ukrainian professional organization of advocates, which aimed at fighting for the rights, social and professional interests of lawyers and candidates for the Union of Lawyers. As you know, the idea of establishing such an organization appeared back

in 1919, when the Ukrainian lawyers often had to defend their colleagues from repression by the Polish authorities, who suspected the Ukrainian lawyers of disloyalty to the Polish state. The establishment of the Ukrainian lawyers professional organization lasted for several years, only at the beginning of May of 1923 the voivodeship government approved the Statute of the Union of Ukrainian Lawyers in Lviv (hereinafter – UUL). To this day, some documentation of the UUL has been preserved in several archival institutions of Ukraine, but it is the Ukrainian press, primarily the newspaper “Dilo”, that is one of the key sources for the history of this public organization.

The purpose of the research is to find out the reception peculiarities by the authors and editors of the newspaper “Dilo” of the activities of the UUL in 1923 – 1934. The chronological framework is due to the fact that it was in the first decade of the activity of the UUL that the main forms and directions of the organization’s activity took place, which was noted during the jubilee celebration of the 10th anniversary of the UUL in 1934.

The Review of Recent Researches. The activities of members of the Union of Ukrainian Lawyers are covered in several publications by Myhailo Petriv (Petriv, 1998), Ivan Hlovackyi (Hlovackyi, 2012), Olha Lazurko (Lazurko, 2014), Stepan Kobuta (Kobuta, 2016), Iryna Vasylyk (Vasylyk, 2023). The newspaper “Dilo” as a source for the history of Ukrainian schooling and Ukrainian public organizations is analysed in the publications by Vitaly Vyzdryk and Kostiantyn Kurylyshyn (Vyzdryk & Kurylyshyn, 2020; Vyzdryk & Kurylyshyn, 2022). The reception of Mykhailo Hrushevskiy’s activity and work by the authors and editors of the newspaper “Dilo” was clarified by Vitaliy Telvak, Kostiantyn Kurylyshyn and Victoria Telvak (Telvak, Kurylyshyn & Telvak, 2022). The materials for biobibliography in the newspaper “Dilo” were written by K. Kurylyshyn (Kurylyshyn, 1923). Some methodological aspects of processing the source material are elucidated in the publications by Mykola Haliv and Vasyl Ilnytskyi (Haliv & Ilnytskyi, 2021; Ilnytskyi & Haliv, 2022).

The Research Results. The first general meeting of the UUL was held on May 20, 1923, in the hall of the “Besida” Society in Lviv, which was reported by the “Dilo” newspaper somewhat late – in mid-June of the same year. The meeting was opened by an advocate Dr. Maksym Levytsky, who emphasized the desire of Ukrainian lawyers to establish the state organization, recalling the activities of the public association “College of Ukrainian Lawyers in Lviv”, whose members took an active part in “political processes” – court cases in which people contested on political grounds. The oldest participant – Dr. Osyp Partytsky from Stanislaviv – was elected the chairman of the meeting. Therefore, the Organizing Committee was elected, which included Dr. Lev Bachynsky from Stanislaviv, and Dr. Pylyp Evyn and Dr. Stepan Shukhevych from Lviv. On the initiative of the Organizing Commission, a well-known Ukrainian lawyer Dr. Stepan Fedak was elected as the chairman of the UUL, and Dr. Maksym Levytsky was elected as the first deputy chairman. The Board of the UUL included the following members: Dr. Lev Bachynsky, Dr. Antin Harasymiv, Dr. Volodymyr Zahaikivych, Dr. Pylyp Evyn, Dr. Lev Hankevych, Dr. Mariyan Hlushkevych, Dr. Mykhailo Voloshyn, Dr. Yevhen Davydiak, Dr. Stepan Shukhevych and Dr. Oleksandr Nadraha. In addition, Arkadiy Maletsky joined the Board as a representative of the UUL candidates (Zahalni zbory, 1923, p. 8).

The newspaper “Dilo” also reported on the content of the first discussions during the meeting of the UUL: increasing the representation of candidates in the Board; the transfer of the clerical apparatus of the former “Legal Advice” (a legal consultancy run by the Ukrainian lawyers in Lviv) to the UUL; advocacy of the Ukrainian language as the language of court

proceedings and documentation; publication of a legal advisor and a legal journal; publication of materials from the trial of Stepan Fedak Jr., who in 1921 attempted to assassinate Marshal Józef Piłsudski. Annual membership fees were approved (60,000 Polish marks for advocates and 15,000 Polish marks for bar candidates). Two weeks after the first meeting, the constitution of the Board of the UUL was continued – on June 3, 1923, the organizers elected Dr. L. Bachynsky as the second deputy chairman, Dr. L. Hankevych as the scribe (chancellor), and Dr. P. Evyn as the treasurer, the host – Dr. E. Davydiak, and their deputies – Dr. S. Shukhevych, M. Hlushkevych and O. Nadraha (*Zahalni zbory*, 1923, p. 8).

The next meeting of the UUL, about which it was recorded by the newspaper “Dilo”, dates from September 28, 1924. During the meeting, the reports of the Board and the control commission were heard, the chairman and his deputy (S. Fedak and M. Voloshyn) were elected, as well as 10 members of the Board, there was formed a new control commission (Ivan Voloshyn, Alfred Hovykovych, Maksym Levytsky). Oleksandr Maritchak became the secretary of the Board. Among the bar candidates, Osyp Levytsky joined the Board. During the meeting, P. Evyn delivered a report on the rights of the Ukrainian language in accordance with the new Polish legislation. The participants of the meeting tasked the Board of the UUL to defend the rights of the Ukrainian language as the language of legal proceedings (*Zahalni zbory*, 1924, p. 5).

At the end of January of 1925, another general meeting of the UUL was held, which was attended by about 40 Ukrainian advocates, mostly from provincial towns. Mykhailo Korol, one of the oldest Ukrainian lawyers from the town of Zhovkva, was elected as the honorary chairman of the meeting. However, in reality, the meeting was chaired by the Deputy Chairman Mykhailo Voloshyn, and O. Maritchak performed the duties of the secretary. The latter, by the way, delivered a thorough report on the activities of organization, which “significantly expanded and deepened its activities” (*Zahalni zbory*, 1925, p. 3). Unfortunately, the newspaper “Dilo” did not even provide a brief synopsis of the report, so we cannot establish more detailed information. The report was approved, and the chairman, deputies and all 10 members of the Board (V. Bachynsky, L. Bachynsky, M. Hlushkevych, E. Davydiak, P. Evyn, O. Maritchak, O. Nadraha, Ye. Olesnytsky, S. Shukhevych) were re-elected for the next term. Later, L. Hankevych delivered a report on the creation of the Fund for Widows and Orphans of Ukrainian Lawyers, the foundation of the Funeral Fund for deceased members of the Union of Ukrainian Lawyers. The participants of the meeting decided to establish Funeral Fund, and to postpone the creation of Fund for Widows and Orphans until the time when this case was normalized by the Chamber of Lawyers in Lviv (*Zahalni zbory*, 1925, p. 3).

The fourth general meeting of the UUL took place on February 13, 1926 in the premises of the Central Bank. As the “Dilo” newspaper reported, the meeting was opened by the deputy chairman Mykhailo Voloshyn, and a famous Ukrainian public and political figure Volodymyr Okhrimovych was elected honorary chairman. At that time, in the UUL there were 109 members, but 51 lawyers from Lviv and Eastern Galicia poviats took part in the meeting. However, the delegates from Ternopil, Stryi and Kolomyia could not come to the meeting. A secretary Yevhen Shchurovsky made a report on the work of the UUL for the past year. According to him, during this time, as many as 52 people joined the UUL, but there were 230 Ukrainian lawyers in Eastern Galicia, whom the organization’s management tried to attract to the UUL. In order to attract new members, the Board of the organization held meetings of local and non-local members, convened district (poviat) meetings of lawyers in towns where district courts operated. At these meetings, current issues were discussed,

new Polish laws and regulations were interpreted, but the chief focus was on "defense of the rights of the Ukrainian language in the courts and administration". The Ukrainian lawyers admitted that their activities were limited by the lack of their own printed body (a newspaper or magazine), and therefore the Board could not inform its members about the results of meetings and gatherings. Therefore, on February 13, 1926 at the meeting, a decision was made to instruct the newly created Board of the UUL to start publishing its own magazine immediately on the analysis and interpretation of laws and orders, as well as daily problems of a professional life of lawyers. The issue of charity fund for the families of deceased lawyers was once again discussed, and a call was made to all Ukrainian lawyers in Eastern Galicia to join the UUL (*Z zhyttia tovarystv i ustanov*, 1926, p. 4).

At the same time, a new chairman of the UUL was elected – a lawyer and politician Lev Hankevych, his deputies – Mykhailo Voloshyn and Lev Bachynsky, the secretary – Yevhen Shchurovsky, the treasurer – Pylyp Evyn. The composition of the Board was somewhat updated, Dr. Bohdan Savchak was included in its composition. Another representative of the bar candidates appeared in the Board – Dr. Osyp Halushchak. New membership fees were established – 14 Polish zł per year, a registration fee – 2 zł, contribution to the charity fund for widows and orphans – 3 US dollars. For candidates of the bar, membership fees amounted to 6 Polish zł, a fee – 2 Polish zł (*Z zhyttia tovarystv i ustanov*, 1926, p. 4).

In the same year (on November 7) a meeting of the branch/delegation of the UUL was held in the Hall of the People's House of the town of Kolomyia, Stanislaviv Voivodeship. In addition to the members of Kolomyia branch, representatives of Stanislaviv delegation took part in it. In both branches there were 41 members, but 23 people took part in the meeting. Dr. Andrii Chaikovsky from Kolomyia (a famous Ukrainian writer) and Dr. Roman Dombchevsky, an advocate from Mykolayiv, an active Ukrainian politician and publicist, made reports on the prospects for the development of the Ukrainian legal profession. Both speakers described the problems in the Ukrainian legal profession, which consisted, firstly, in a significant number of advocates, but the lack of sufficient employment; secondly, in insufficient protection of the professional group interests of Ukrainian lawyers; thirdly, the lack of organized support for the Ukrainian lawyers by broad circles of the Ukrainian public. The speakers considered the formation of a strong state organization, which the UUL should become, as one of the ways to eliminate the mentioned problems. In addition, in their opinion, it is the duty of every Ukrainian advocate to become a member of the UUL, as well as to establish support of the interests of the Ukrainian bar by the Ukrainian public organizations and political parties in the Republic of Poland. The report "The Ukrainian Language Rights in Governments" was delivered by a lawyer Dr. L. Bachynsky from Stanislaviv. He noted that the Ukrainian lawyers did not always protect the rights of the Ukrainian language in administrative bodies, they were satisfied only with formal submission of lawsuits in Ukrainian, but did not pay attention to the fact that representatives of the administration gave written answers in Polish. As reported in the "Dilo" newspaper, the reports caused an "unusually lively discussion". Therefore, several resolutions were adopted, in particular, to call on all Ukrainian advocates to join the UUL, to make a donation of 5 US dollars for the publication of the magazine "Pravnycha Chasopys" (*Skhodyny SUA v Kolomyi*, 1926, p. 4).

The fifth general meeting of the UUL was held on February 6, 1927, in the building of the "Ukrainian Besida" Society. Unfortunately, this time in the newspaper it was not reported on the number of participants in the meeting, but it was noted that the members of the UUL from the towns of Stryi, Berezhany, and Przemyśl could not come to the meeting,

but delegates from Volyn Voivodeship came there. The meeting was opened by the head of the organization, Dr. L. Hankevych, who briefly announced the names and surnames of those Ukrainian lawyers who died last year, calling to honour their memory. Dr. A. Tchaikovsky from Kolomyia was elected a chairman of the meeting, and Dr. Kmitkovsky from Drohobych and Dr. Kossak from Kolomyia were elected as secretaries. The report on the activities of the UUL for the previous year was prepared by the Secretary of the Board, Dr. E. Shchurovsky, and the report on the financial situation of the organization was made by the Treasurer, Dr. P. Evyn. Dr. L. Hankevych was re-elected as the chairman, as well as his deputies (M. Voloshyn and L. Bachynsky). The composition of the Board was almost unchanged, only Dr. Roman Dombchevsky became a new member of the board. Dr. Oleksandr Nadraha made a report on the professional journal "Pravnycha Chasopys", which was once published by the outstanding Ukrainian legal scholar Stanislav Dnistriansky, noting that not all members of the UUL made a donation to restore the publication of the journal. In addition, it was decided that the oldest representatives of the Ukrainian bar, Dr. Andriy Chaikovsky and Dr. Antin Horbachevsky, would express their gratitude to the president of the Lviv Chamber of Advocates for protecting Ukrainian colleagues from insults (V Zahalni zbory SUA, 1927, pp. 2, 3). It should be noted that in 1918 – 1919, Dr. A. Tchaikovsky and Dr. A. Horbachevsky took an active part in the formation of the Ukrainian state, headed the district commissariats, respectively, in Sambir and Drohobych.

The activities of Stryi branch of the UUL became more active, which was immediately recorded by the newspaper "Dilo". On June 5, 1927, in the People's House of Stryi, the first meeting of the members of the local delegation of the UUL was held, the agenda of which was the same as the content of the meeting in Kolomyia: 1) the position of the Ukrainian bar; 2) the Ukrainian language rights; 3) organizational development of the UUL; 4) publication of "Pravnycha Chasopys". The meeting was opened by a well-known lawyer from Stryi, Dr. Volodymyr Kalusky. Reports were delivered by Dr. R. Dombchevsky and Dr. Volodymyr Kalusky. Unfortunately, the newspaper did not specify the topics of the reports, but we assume that they were about the problems of the Ukrainian legal profession development. Dr. Petro Zvolynsky, a lawyer from Bolekhiv, and Dr. Antin Harasymov, a lawyer from Zhuravno, took an active part in the meeting. The resolutions of the meeting contained calls for the expansion of the UUL at the expense of new members, making a donation for the publication of the Ukrainian legal journal. "In the further discussion, the speakers stated with regret that, although the UUL of Stryi poviat stands at the heart of its task, unfortunately it has not yet found appropriate and proper understanding and support among its citizens", it was noted in the "Dilo" newspaper (Skhodyny stryiskoi delehatury, 1927, c. 4).

Meetings of the district branches of the UUL were held more and more often. On July 16, 1927, a meeting of members of two branches of the UUL – Ternopil and Berezhany – was held in the building of the "Prosvita" Society in Ternopil. The number of participants in the meeting was not indicated in the newspaper, and the agenda included organizational issues, the publication of a professional magazine, and the creation of a fund to help the families of deceased lawyers. Dr. M. Hlushkevych delivered an interesting report on the topic "Criminal Legislation of European States after the War" (Z diialnosti SUA, 1927, p. 4). At the same time, in the newspaper "Dilo" there were identified problems in the activities of Ternopil branch of the UUL, whose members belonged to different political parties. "It should be noted," as it was written in the newspaper article, "that relations among the Ukrainian palestra of Ternopil have not been quite right and correct for some time. It is possible that

the party-political struggle, which took over the Ukrainian citizenship of Ternopil, also took over the Ukrainian lawyers, as directly interested members of individual parties and groups" (Z diialnosti SUA, 1927, c. 4). At the same time, in the newspaper "Dilo" it was reported that on November 24, 1927, the UUL branch planned to hold a meeting of the UUL in the towns of Przemyśl, Sianok, Sambir, as well as in one of the towns of Volhynia that would spread its activities to Chełm region, Polissia, and Pidliashshia. In this way, it was planned to complete the coverage of Ukrainian lawyers by the network of UUL branches in all ethnic Ukrainian lands within Poland (Z diialnosti SUA, 1927, c. 4).

In 1928, AUA celebrated its small anniversary – 5 years of activity. On March 24 of this year, the sixth general meeting of the association was held in Lviv, which was opened by the chairman Dr. L. Hankevych. He honoured the memory of the Ukrainian lawyers who died last year, and also congratulated the six oldest senior members of the Ukrainian Bar: Antin Horbachevsky, Lonhyn Ozarkevych, Teofil Okunevsky, Stepan Fedak, Andrii Chaikovsky and Kostia Levytsky. A number of reports, the content of which was described in general terms in the newspaper "Dilo", were delivered by well-known Ukrainian lawyers. For example, a prominent scholar, politician and practicing advocate Dr. Volodymyr Starosolsky dedicated his report on the problem of "the value of law". In particular, he noted that in the countries of Western and Central Europe, despite the revolution, respect for the law traditionally developed, so its value was appreciated. The struggle for the law became a necessary factor in the development of these societies, one of the fundamental moments of their life. The issue of "the value of law" was especially important for the Ukrainians who had to live on the border of Western and Eastern cultures, to be influenced by the Eastern peoples, especially the Russians, who did not have European traditions of respect for law. Therefore, the Ukrainians as a nation must fight and defend the value of law (Z zhyttia nashykh ustanov, 1928, p. 3).

V. Starosolsky's opinion was continued by M. Hlushkevych, who spoke about advocacy and citizenship. He noted that the development of a social life of the peoples of Europe in the 19th century led not only to the struggle for the law and awareness of its value, but also to the formation of a qualified professional layer called to protect the law right – the legal profession. Gradually, the legal profession developed into a powerful factor, the position of which is closely related to the state and development of democracy. Therefore, the task of lawyers, according to M. Hlushkevych, was to be not only a spokesperson for human or collective rights, but also "creators of new things in law, fighters for new legal opinions and ideas". The speaker emphasized that a citizen lawyer, who was in a close contact with a social and legal life of people, was able to "peer deeply into the secret of a social and individual life of people". That is why, the role of the UUL in relation to the public was particularly high, and its position had to be truly objective and independent (Z zhyttia nashykh ustanov, 1928, p. 3).

M. Voloshyn presented the participants of the sixth general meeting with a brief history of the activity of the UUL. He emphasized that the UUL firmly defended the rights and interests of its members, as well as the rights of the Ukrainian nation, and further expressed the hope that in the next five-year period this organization would occupy one of the first places in a public life of people. At the same meeting, reports were made by the secretary, Dr. E. Shchurovsky, and the representative of the UUL branches, Dr. R. Dombchevsky, a treasurer Dr. M. Terletsky. According to them, at the beginning of 1927 there were 237 Ukrainian advocates, of whom 139 were members of the Ukrainian Association of Lawyers. During the year, 27 new lawyers became members of the UUL, 3 died, 1 left the organization (Dr. Babiuk from Rohatyn). Thus, by March of 1928, in the UUL there were

162 members. The UUL funds increased owing to the appearance of a printed organ – the “UUL Bulletin”. The “funeral fund”, from which 110 US dollars were paid to the widows of deceased lawyers last year, decreased somewhat. It was noted that in the past, the meetings of the branches of the UUL were held in the towns of Drohobych, Stryi, Sambir, Stanislaviv, Ternopil and Przemyśl, at which not only reports were heard, but also scientific reports of V. Starosolsky and M. Hlushkevych on the theory of law. A problem was identified in the activities of the UUL delegation from Volyn, Chełm region, Polissia and Pidliashshia, whose members did not show any initiative. After these reports, a new leadership of the UUL was elected – Dr. Kost Levytsky (a former head of the ZUNR government) became the chairma. A lawyer Dr. R. Dombchevsky reported to the participants of the meeting that it was possible to accumulate an amount of 280 US dollars for the publication of the legal magazine. Dr. B. Savchak reported that the T. Shevchenko Scientific Society published legal works and called to purchase them. The call to join and pay contributions to the Posthumous Fund was made by Dr. A. Hovykovych (*Z zhyttia nashykh ustanov*, 1928, pp. 3–4).

On March 31, 1928, at the meeting of the Branch of the UUL, the functional duties of the board members were redistributed and streamlined. Thus, M. Hlushkevych became the second deputy head of the UUL, a secretary – L. Hankevych, a treasurer – M. Terletsky, a chairman – O. Nadraha, a posthumous fund referent – A. Hovykovych, the Ukrainian language protection referent – V. Starosolsky, a property affairs referent – Ye. Davydiak, R. Dombchevsky as a representative for delegations, M. Voloshyn as a legal representative, B. Savchak as a publishing representative. In the newspaper “Dilo” it was stated: “The UUL has entered a new phase of its work. The meeting showed that this organization is alive and relevant and can be of great importance not only to the Ukrainian legal profession, but also to the whole nation” (*Z zhyttia nashykh ustanov*, 1928, p. 4).

In March of 1929, a small notice was published in the newspaper “Dilo” about the activities of the Board of the UUL. In the notice it was emphasized that during the “business year” (from 31.03.1928 to 31.03.1929) the Board held 20 meetings, rented premises in the building of the Cooperative Bank “Zemlia”, hired an administrator, started the operation of the law library, which was “supplemented with publications from Greater Ukraine from the area of legal studies” (apparently it was about the fact that the UUL also received some magazines and books from Soviet Ukraine). It was reported that on July 1, 1928, the Board of the UUL started publishing the quarterly legal magazine “Life and Law”. The editorial board consisted of doctors of law K. Levytsky, V. Starosolsky, M. Hlushkevych, O. Nadraha and R. Dombchevsky. The organization of the delegate continued, but the problem with the activities of the branch for Volhynia, Polissia and Pidliashshia was again recognized, since the number of Ukrainian lawyers there did not exceed ten people. Annual meetings were organized in various delegations (in particular, Lviv, Stryi and Sambir), during which reports were made by Dr. V. Starosolsky “On the Problem of the State Legality” and by Dr. R. Dombchevsky “On the Relationship of Citizenship to the Ukrainian Legal Profession”. Representatives of the Board of the UUL, Senator A. Horbachevsky, K. Levytsky and L. Hankevych, took part in the general congress of Polish Bar Associations, which took place on October 20, 1928 in Lviv. The Board also worked in the direction of organizing rest and health of the members of the UUL, having started measures to create a “vacation house” in the Carpathians (*Z zhyttia nashykh ustanov*, 1929, p. 3).

At the same time, the UUL Board tried to influence various aspects of the Ukrainian public life, representing the interests of Ukrainian lawyers. Thus, it was possible to

establish relations with the Metropolitan Ordinariate of the Greek-Catholic Church, which instructed the Greek-Catholic clergy to turn specifically to the Ukrainian adats in the matter of managing the parceling of erection (church) lands. The Board tried to fairly divide the spheres of activity among Ukrainian lawyers in Lviv, considered and resolved personal disputes between members of the UUL. The Board of the UUL took a consistent position in the matter of protecting the Ukrainian language as the language of legal administration, turning to the Polish state institutions on this issue many times. The number of members of the UUL increased: by the end of 1928, there were already 179 of them, which was 75% of the total number of Ukrainian lawyers in Poland. The finances of the UUL at the end of 1928 amounted to 756.36 US dollars and 486.11 Polish zł (*Z zhyttia nashykh ustanov*, 1929, p. 3).

The seventh general meeting of the UUL was held on March 23, 1929, in the building of the "Ukrainian Besida" Society. Dr. K. Levytsky was elected the chairman of the UUL for the second time, and Dr. M. Voloshyn became the deputy chairman again. The lawyers Roman Perfetsky and Volodymyr Konstantynovych appeared among the ten members of the Board, but R. Dombchevsky dropped out. The control commission included doctors Volodymyr Okhrimovych, Ivan Kmicykevych, Bohdan Savchak. Dr. R. Perfetsky was included in the editorial staff of the quarterly periodical "Life and Law" (*Z zhyttia nashykh ustanov*, 1929b, p. 5).

Since many Ukrainian lawyers of the interwar Poland lived and worked in Lviv, the members of the UUL formed a separate delegation in the city, which regularly held its meetings. Thus, on November 2, 1929, a meeting of the Lviv branch of the UUL was held under the chairmanship of Dr. S. Fedak. The secretary of the meeting was, in particular, a well-known lawyer and politician Dr. Osep Nazaruk. 32 members of the UUL took part in the meeting, including 12 lawyers not from Lviv. The newspaper "Dilo" once again published a summary of the speeches of the meeting participants. The chairman of the UUL, Dr. K. Levytsky, delivered a report "On the Task of Modern Lawyer", in which, in essence, he outlined the history of the Ukrainian advocacy from the middle of the 19th century, dividing it into two stages, and thus showing the "evolution of the type of Ukrainian lawyer". The author of the post to the newspaper "Dilo" pointed out the importance of this report: "For the younger generation of advocates, this report was a lecture all the more valuable because the history, or more precisely, an overview of the development of a legal profession and its role in the revival of the nation, has not yet had any special publication. At the end, the speaker clarified the requirements of a modern citizen advocate, who must stand guard not only of a private law, but also of a civil and national law" (*Z zhyttia nashykh ustanov*, 1929c, p. 3). The following report by Dr. M. Hlushkevych "On State Ethics and Morality" was a professional, scientific research, in which the speaker named an advocate's duties towards himself, clients, fellow professionals, and the public. In his report, Dr. R. Dombchevsky laid out the "fundamentals of the law of the nation" and explained the need for a practical implementation of laws on language. After discussing the reports, the participants of the meetings of the Lviv branch of the UUL adopted several resolutions, in particular, to involve other Ukrainian public and political organizations in the defense of the Ukrainian language, to organize a campaign in the press with the aim of expanding the UUL and affirming the role of the Ukrainian legal profession among its own nation (*Z zhyttia nashykh ustanov*, 1929c, p. 3).

The next general meeting of the UUL was held on March 2, 1930 in Lviv. The meeting was opened by Dr. K. Levytsky, who presented the activities of the organization for the past year, emphasizing the publication of the magazine "Life and Law". The report on the activities of the Branch was drawn up by the secretary Dr. L. Hankevych, the financial report

by the treasurer Dr. Mykhailo Terletsky, the report on the charity fund by Dr. A. Hovykovych, the report of the Control Commission by Dr. B. Savchak. Therefore, the chairman (K. Levytsky was elected one more time) and members of the Board were elected. For the first time, Dr. Volodymyr Hurkevych from Sambir, a well-known cultural figure, a member of the “Boikivshchyna” Society, was elected to the control commission. The first meeting of the newly elected Board was held on March 15, 1930, at which duties were distributed among the Board members. The majority of the members of the Board continued to work on the areas they had worked on before. Dr. P. Evyn was introduced to the editorial board of the magazine “Life and Law”. Dr. Arkadiy Maletsky became the delegate of the candidates of the bar as part of the Board of the UUL (*Z zhyttia nashykh ustanov*, 1930, p. 4).

Unfortunately, the “Dilo” newspaper provided only short notes about the next meetings of the UUL. In particular, it was reported on the ninth general meeting of the UUL on February 1, 1931, at which there were gathered 46 members of the organization and K. Levytsky was re-elected as the chairman the UUL (*Zvychaini IX Zahalni Zbory*, 1931, p. 5). A little more was reported about the meeting of Lviv delegation of the UUL on December 25, 1931, which was attended by members of Volyn delegation, but representatives from Ternopil, Kolomyia, Stanislaviv, Berezhany, Sambir and Sianok did not come to the meeting. 39 lawyers were present at the meeting. Dr. Ivan Blazhkevych, a lawyer from Drohobych, chaired the meeting, and Dr. Kost Pankivsky was the secretary. The chairman of the UUL, Dr. K. Levytsky, delivered a report “On Importance of the Ukrainian Lawyers Organization”, and Dr. M. Voloshyn – “On the Project of New Law Practice”. Reports on the activity of the UUL branch in Stryi were compiled by Dr. Roman Dombchevsky, in Przemyśl – by Dr. Mykola Rybak, in Volyn, Kremenets – by Dr. Stanislav Kmitkovsky. For the first time, a woman took part in the meeting of the UUL – a lawyer conceptualist Vira Yatskevych (*Skhodyny Soiuzu Ukrainykykh Advokativ*, 1931, p. 4).

In even more detail, the newspaper “Dilo” covered the meeting of the UUL branch in Sambir, which took place on January 31, 1932. Members of the delegation from Drohobych, as well as representatives of Sambir District Court, Jewish lawyers took part in the meeting. The meeting was opened by Dr. V. Hurkevych. The branch of the UUL from Lviv was represented by Dr. M. Hlushkevych, who delivered a report on the topic “Tasks of a Lawyer in the Light of Law and Ethics”, and Dr. L. Hankevych, who presented a report abstract “Objectives of the UUL and Work in the Delegation”. Dr. Volodymyr Ilnytsky, a lawyer from Drohobych, was elected a chairman of the meeting. The report on the activities of the branch in Sambir was made by Dr. V. Hurkevych, the report on the activities of the branch in Drohobych – Dr. I. Blazhkevych. Therefore, the participants of the meeting discussed the issue of uniting the two delegates, but decided to leave them the opportunity to act separately (*Z orhanizatsiinoho zhyttia*, 1932, p. 4).

The newspaper “Dilo” informed its readers about the meeting of Lviv delegation of the UUL on December 25, 1932. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Yevhen Shurovsky, a lawyer from the town of Vynnyky. Those present had the opportunity to listen to the report by doctors Ivan Kmitsykevych and Mykola Bahrynivsky about the new execution law. Mykola Bahrynivsky, a lawyer from Rivne, gave a report on the situation and prospects of the Ukrainian legal profession in Volyn. He said that there were only 5 Ukrainian lawyers per 120 district court lawyers in Rivne and Lutsk (*Skhodyny Lvivskoi Deliehatury S. U. A.*, 1933, p. 2). On September 8, 1933, the meeting of Kolomyia delegation of the UUL was held, which was attended by 15 lawyers and 11 applicants (lawyer trainees). The meeting

was opened by Dr. Andriy Tchaikovsky. Bohdan Didytsky was elected the chairman of the meeting. According to the activity report of Kolomyia delegation of the UUL, among of 33 Ukrainian lawyers in Kolomyia judicial district, only 20 people were members of the UUL. Among 26 applicants, only 16 volunteered to join the UUL. After that, a lawyer Cherniavsky delivered a report "On Current Position of Legal Profession in General and the Ukrainian one in particular", and Dr. Novodvorsky – a report "Ideological Foundations of Legal Profession" (*Z zhyttia ukrainskoi palestry Kolomyishchyny*, 1934, p. 4).

The newspaper "Dilo" covered the steps taken by the UUL in the protection of the rights of the Ukrainian language much more widely. On June 4, 1932, a meeting of representatives of Ukrainian organizations, institutions and the press regarding the struggle for the rights of the Ukrainian language in a public life was held in the building of the Central Bank in Lviv on the initiative of the Board of the UUL. It was attended by approximately 30 people, in particular, the UUL was represented by doctors of law K. Levytsky, S. Fedak, V. Starosolsky, L. Hankevych, M. Voloshyn, Ye. Davydiak, R. Dombchevsky, O. Nadraha, M. Hlushkevych, O. Maritchak. At the same time, representatives of the following institutions arrived: the T. Shevchenko Scientific Society, the "Native School" Society, the Audit Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives, "Dniester", "Tsentrsoyuz", "Tsentrobank" and the Ukrainian Technical Society. The conference was opened by K. Levytsky, who noted that the task of the UUL is to protect national rights, because Ukrainian lawyers were not only representatives of the profession, but above all citizens and public figures. R. Dombchevsky presented a historical and sociological sketch of the people's struggle for their rights. He emphasized that language rights depended on its use in the administrative apparatus, citing the examples of Belgium, Switzerland, Finland, and Czechoslovakia. Then he listed the laws and regulations in this area in Poland. He emphasized that the Ukrainian language had been removed from the documentation of railways, the post office, all central institutions, legislative chambers, and a public life. It was left with limited rights in schooling, court and lower levels of administration. "Polish laws completely eliminate the sovereignty of the Ukrainian language, and it is only allowed to be used in some cases in some areas. Even the national name itself in the official nomenclature was changed, and only after several years of struggle was the identity of the "The Russian language" recognized in practice with the Ukrainian language", said R. Dombchevsky (*Borotba za prava ukrainskoi movy*, 1932, p. 4).

During this conference, an important speech was delivered by M. Hlushkevych, who reminded the audience of the Austrian language legislation and the rights of the Ukrainian language in Austria-Hungary. In his opinion, it was extremely important to ensure the functioning of the Ukrainian language in court: "The court, even more than the school, must adapt to the language of defendants. Defendants must understand both the process and the verdict. This is all the weight and moral significance of the judgment. A cultural mission and educational value of the court consists not only in ensuring that the verdicts are really fair, but also in ensuring that the population understands their content and justification... Otherwise, all the educational power of the court in the coexistence of society, classes, peoples, and humanity would disappear. Therefore, not the interest of the language should be decisive, not the interest of spreading one language to the detriment of other languages, only the interest of court and justice, the interest of the most important social function" (*Borotba za prava ukrainskoi movy*, 1932, p. 1). Therefore, the conference adopted a number of resolutions, of which we will name the most important: 1) members of the Ukrainian nation have full rights to their native language: throughout the national territory in courts, schools, all government institutions, in

general in public life; 2) the laws and orders issued in Poland so far on the use of the Ukrainian language do not satisfy the rights of the Ukrainian nation, but on the contrary, impose territorial, institutional, substantive and formal restrictions; 3) for the Ukrainian nation to acquire the full rights of its native language, it is necessary to use all means in solidarity on the part of Ukrainian institutions and organizations, the press and the entire Ukrainian citizenry; 4) every Ukrainian institution and every Ukrainian citizen, in every matter at every time and place, is obliged to use the Ukrainian language in speech and writing and stand up for the protection of the rights of their language (*Borotba za prava ukrainskoi movy*, 1932, c. 2).

In 1933, the UUL began preparations to celebrate its 10-year anniversary, which the Ukrainian public learned about from the newspaper “Dilo” (*Pered Yuvyleiem S.U.A.*, 1934, p. 1; *Yuvylei Soiuzu Ukrainsky Advokativ*, 1934, p. 3). For the anniversary, Dr. Stepan Baran’s report “Paths of our Revival”, previously published in the journal “Life and Law” and dedicated to the participation of Ukrainian lawyers in the Ukrainian national revival in Galicia, was published. The synopsis of this work is published in the newspaper “Dilo”. (*Shliakhmy nashoho virodzhennia*, 1934, pp. 1–2). A pathetic story about the historical growth of Ukrainian advocacy since the beginning of the 19th century was submitted by Tiberius Horobets (*Horobets*, 1934, p. 7). The anniversary celebration, which took place on September 22, 1934, was also described in the newspaper “Dilo” in detail (*Yuvyleine sviato Soiuzu Ukrainskykh Advokativ*, 1934, p. 6). Let us emphasize that on the occasion of the anniversary, L. Hankevych’s publication on the ten-year history of the UUL (*Hankevych*, 1933) and an anniversary almanac with a number of historical articles were published (*Yuvileinyi Almanakh*, 1934).

The Conclusions. Consequently, during the first decade of its existence, the UUL turned into an extensive, structured public organization of Ukrainian lawyers in Poland (primarily in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia), which united about 75% of the Ukrainian lawyers in its ranks. It was a unique trade union in the Ukrainian lands during the interwar years, as similar organizations did not exist in other Ukrainian lands within the USSR, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. Considering the lack of archival materials on the history of the UUL, one of the most complete and accessible historical sources remains the Ukrainian press, in particular the daily newspaper “Dilo”. It published articles that contained facts (dates, events, names and surnames of people) about the organization’s general meetings, its governing bodies, areas of activity, etc. It is important that the newspaper highlighted the results of the activities of the UUL branches in the provincial towns of Galicia (Stryi, Kolomyia, Sambir, Stanislaviv, Drohobych, Ternopil), and also summarized the content of scientific and practical informational reports of the members of the organization. The newspaper “Dilo” informed readers in detail about one of the most important areas of activity of the UUL – the protection of the rights of the Ukrainian language in the administrative and judicial system of interwar Poland. The newspaper focused on the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the UUL, which was celebrated in Lviv on September 22, 1934.

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**THE POLICY OF “DISARMAMENT” AS THE PREMISE OF SUBJUGATION
OF THE UKRAINIAN COUNTRYSIDE UNDER THE CONDITIONS
OF THE “GREAT TURNING POINT” OF 1929 – 1933**

Abstract. *The purpose of the article is to find out the mechanisms and means of “disarmament” of the Ukrainian countryside in the 1920s and early 1930s in the context of overcoming resistance to the policy of the Soviet authorities in the countryside. In a broader sense – to give an answer to the key question: why did the peasantry, having a colossal numerical advantage, lose the competition for the future, was forcibly taken under control and brutally pacified? The methodological basis of the research was concrete historical, comparative historical and analytical methods. The Scientific Novelty.* *The article formulates the authors’ definition and reveals the essential features of “disarmament” of peasantry in Soviet Ukraine during the period of the 1920s – 1930s. The Conclusions.* *The “disarmament” of the Ukrainian countryside in the 1920s and at the beginning of the 1930s was a complex of hybrid measures that was organized by the Soviet authorities in 1919 with the aim of subjugating the peasantry and depriving them of the means to wage an*

insurrectionary struggle and further resist the policies of the Bolsheviks. “Disarmament” is not reduced only to the process of “pumping out” weapons from the village, which accumulated there under the conditions of the end of the Great War, the revolutionary events of 1917 – 1921, as well as the peasant resistance to the policy of the Bolsheviks in the 1920s – at the beginning of the 1930s. The authors substantiate the “disarmament” of the village in a broader context – as a system of hybrid combined government measures aimed both at the “disarming” of weapons (in the military sense) and at the destruction of traditional peasant institutions (disarmament as the deprivation of all means, including moral and willpower, for waging the struggle (“debilitating”), which offered an alternative under the conditions of the creation of the Soviet image of a “new society”, a “new peasant”. A gradual elimination of institutions in the countryside that were an alternative to the Soviet ones created the prerequisites for the subjugation of the Ukrainian countryside during the period of the “Great Turning Point” of 1929 – 1933.

Key words: disarmament, unarming, debilitating, The “Great Turning Point” of 1929 – 1933, Soviet Ukraine, peasantry, collectivization, resistance.

ПОЛІТИКА “РОЗЗБРОЄННЯ” ЯК ПЕРЕДУМОВА УПОКОРЕННЯ УКРАЇНСЬКОГО СЕЛА В УМОВАХ “ВЕЛИКОГО ПЕРЕЛОМУ” 1929 – 1933 рр.

Анотація. *Мета статті* – з’ясувати механізми та засоби “роззброєння” українського села у 1920-х – на початку 1930-х рр. у контексті подолання опору політиці радянської влади на селі. У ширшому розумінні – дати відповідь на ключове питання: чому селянство, маючи колосальну чисельну перевагу, програло змагання за майбутнє, було силоміць взяте під контроль і жорстоко умиротворене? **Методологічною основою дослідження** є конкретно-історичний, порівняльно-історичний та аналітичний методи. **Наукова новизна.** У статті сформульовано авторське визначення та розкрито сутнісні риси “роззброєння” селянства в Україні протягом 1920 – 1930-х рр. **Висновки.** “Роззброєння” українського села у 1920-х – на початку 1930-х рр. був комплексом гібридних заходів, розпочатих радянською владою у 1919 р. з метою взяття селянства під контроль та позбавлення його засобів для ведення повстанської боротьби та подальшого опору політиці більшовиків. “Роззброєння” не зводиться лише до процесу “викачування” із села зброї, яка накопичилася в ньому в умовах закінчення Першої світової війни, революційних подій 1917 – 1921 рр., а також селянського опору політиці більшовиків у 1920-х – на початку 1930-х рр. Автори пропонують розглядати “роззброєння” села в ширшому контексті – як систему гібридних комбінованих урядових заходів, спрямованих як на “вилучення” зброї (у військовому розумінні), так і на руйнування традиційних селянських інститутів (роззброєння як позбавлення всіх засобів, у тому числі моральних і вольових, для ведення боротьби, які пропонувала альтернативу в умовах створення радянського образу “нового суспільства”, “нового селянина”. Поступова ліквідація на селі інститутів, альтернативних радянським, створила передумови для упокорення українського села в період “великого перелому” 1929 – 1933 рр.

Ключові слова: роззброєння, “викачка зброї”, “Великий перелом” 1929 – 1933 рр., селянство, “суцільна” колективізація, опір, Голодомор 1932 – 1933 рр.

The Problem Statement. A long and wide public discourse around the right of an individual to armed defense has formed numerous camps of supporters and opponents of free possession of weapons.

A significant historical argument, on the one hand, is the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which provides that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”. Thus, in 1791, the founders of the American Republic saw the armed population as a guarantee of protection against tyranny.

The opposite example is the strict regulation of arms circulation in Japan, where at the end of the 16th century the government of Toyotomi Hideyoshi carried out measures that went down in history as the “sword hunt” – a programme of forceful seizure of cold steel and firearms from people who did not belong to the military class. A century later, in 1685, Japan launched the first known weapons buyback programme for the population.

After Russia's full-scale invasion to Ukraine, the number of firearms not only increased, but new ways and means of obtaining them were discovered. Thus, the problem of illicit arms trafficking has become one of the current and projected threats to the national security and national interests of Ukraine.

From a scientific point of view, the relevance of the topic we propose lies in the lack of works by Ukrainian and foreign historians that would have made the “disarmament” of the Ukrainian village on the eve of the “Great Turning Point” the subject of special study.

The Review of Recent Researches and Publications. Modern historical scholarship is represented by a significant number of works that cover the social attitudes, behavior, and resistance of the Ukrainian peasantry to the Bolshevik regime in the 1920s and 1930s.

The relations between the Soviet government and the Ukrainian peasantry in the 1920s and at the beginning of the 1930s are summarized in a number of works by N. Bem (Bem, 2003), V. Vasyliiev (Vasyliiev, 2005), O. Hanzha (Hanzha, 2000a, 2000b), H. Kapustian (Kapustian, 2003, 2005), S. Kornovenko (Kalinkina, Kornovenko, etc., 2017), S. Kulchytskyi (Kulchytskyi, 2013), R. Podkur (Podkur, 2005), N. Romanets (Romanets, 2014), and others (L. Hrynevych, V. Kalinichenko, V. Lazurenko, V. Marochko, B. Patryliak).

Scholars have focused on the repressive mechanisms of socialist restructuring of the agricultural sector, the role of coercion in the implementation of a “continuous collectivization” repressive measures during the grain procurement campaigns of 1930 – 1933, and the extent and forms of resistance of the Ukrainian peasantry, which took on the character of an internal war against the Soviet regime.

The topic of state pressure on the Ukrainian countryside on the eve of the “Great Turning Point” is not entirely new to foreign scholarship. Since the 1990s, its historiographical reflection has expanded thematically and conceptually. We are talking about the thorough works by O. Arkhipova, Alexis Berelovich, Andrea Graziosi, V. Danilov, M. Ivnitsky, Robert Conquest, Hiroaki Kuromiya, Robert Manning, Viola Lynn, Norman Naimark, S. Neklyudov, William Noll, James Scott, N. Tarkhova, Sheila Fitzpatrick, and the others. Among the latest conceptual approaches proposed by foreign scholars to the relationship between the peasantry and the government, the works of J. Scott, in particular, the monograph “The Art of Not Being Governed”, in which the author showed a complex system of limited relations between the peasantry and the state, which was built on the initiative of the former to avoid influence and interference in their lives by the latter.

The purpose of the article is to find out the mechanisms and means of “disarmament” of the Ukrainian village in the 1920s and at the beginning of the 1930s in the context of overcoming resistance to the Soviet policies in the countryside. In a broader sense, to answer the key question: why did the peasantry, having a colossal numerical advantage, lose the struggle for the future, was forcibly taken under control and brutally pacified?

The Results of the Research. On the eve of the 1917 revolution, when 83% of the Russian Empire's population lived in rural areas, the peasantry had accumulated enormous energy that had remained imprisoned for many years within the traditional culture and pyramidal demographic structure of the empire, because since the 1880s, the state, in order to guarantee political stability, had taken measures to isolate or segregate the peasantry from both civil society and the political core. Such efforts had the unexpected effect of increasing the autonomy of the village and the peasantry's sense of “difference”.

Moving on to consider armed resistance among other forms of peasant resistance, let us first try to explain what resistance itself is. L. Viola notes that this is a complex question that

cannot be answered simply, as we try to fit the term into a larger number of questions and often messy definitions. In fact, resistance includes the notion of opposition – active, passive, skillfully disguised, attributed or even assumed (Viola, 2005, p. 104).

The active forms of peasant resistance to the Soviet government's policies include: 1) agitation (anti-Soviet, anti-collective farm, against the delivery of bread); 2) riots; 3) murders and attempted murders of activists; 4) peasants leaving the 'Society for Joint Land Processing' and collective farms, accompanied by the dismantling of communal property; 5) establishing ties with local military units and police in order to obtain weapons, agitating the latter to their side; 6) peasants fleeing their homes (mainly to the mines of Donbas, construction sites of the first five-year plans, or illegal border crossings); 7) self-seizure and unauthorized cultivation of collective farm land by peasants; 8) massive theft of collective property; 9) attacks by peasants on food warehouses; 10) arson; 11) picketing of district police stations to release arrested fellow villagers; 12) beatings of activists; 13) uprisings; 14) demonstrative church services and memorial services for the Soviet regime; 15) spoilage of livestock feed; 16) dispersal of commissions, party cells, committees, village councils; 17) peasant Luddism.

Passive forms of resistance include: 1) anti-Soviet (and anti-collective farm) folklore; 2) refusals to sell bread at low state prices; 3) refusals of peasants to fulfill sowing plans; 4) refusals to create seed funds; 5) imitation of work on collective farms, poor quality work; 5) letters of complaint to the "good" higher party leadership; 6) failure to go to work in collective farms; 7) hiding grain; 8) secret sale, starvation or slaughter of their own livestock by peasants to prevent collectivization. Although the manifestation of passive resistance is subject to multiple interpretations and explanations, its objective reality cannot be questioned given the context and results of peasants' behavior in collective farms. Motivated by a number of not always clearly defined reasons, they used various forms of passive resistance. S. Fitzpatrick (Fitzpatrick, 1994) described in detail the strategies of peasants in the 1930s, when they faced work, life, and survival in the new system of collective farms.

Many of the actions of the peasantry are difficult to qualify as resistance, although they clearly demonstrate elements of unusual or antisocial behaviour. Is there a place in the spectrum of resistance for crime, the black market, bribery and banditry, or for alternative subcultures and features inherent in religious sects, the world of traditional healing, etc.? Can we define critical expressions in personal diaries or words spoken at the dinner table as resistance? Is the very existence of an alternative social space a typical act of resistance in the context of Stalinism?

In view of the above, we can conclude that tradition itself became a resource of legitimization and mobilization for peasants in search of justification for their interpretations of and responses to state policy. The peasants used the usual arsenal: spreading rumors, running away, hiding grain, and a number of other active and passive forms of resistance, the choice of which was determined by their effectiveness and the reaction of the authorities. At the same time, the forms of peasant resistance were characterized by pragmatism, flexibility, and adaptability, which were vital resources in the struggle against powerful and repressive authorities.

Analyzing the means of peasant self-defense, V. Vasyliiev noted that the peasantry organically combined both active (peasant Luddism) and passive (self-dispossession, flight from their native places) forms of resistance, which manifested themselves in the form of "social mimicry". The belief of most peasants that the "good" ruler and his entourage were unaware of the barbaric actions of local leaders was clearly manifested in tens of thousands

of peasant letters to the central authorities. A peculiar form of peasant resistance was leaflets and anonymous letters, which contained not only threats of physical violence against local communists and activists, but also calls for disobedience and peasant uprising against the authorities (Vasyliiev, 2005, p. 143).

It should be emphasized that, despite the availability of significant stocks of weapons, peasants resorted to violence only as a last resort, when despair and thirst for revenge reached a level that could push them into open conflict.

The above-mentioned extensive network of active and passive forms of resistance naturally encountered equally diverse forms of counteraction from the authorities, which were manifested in arrests, interrogations, show trials, expulsions and exiles, intimidation of peasants with weapons, raids and raids, party propaganda, family hostage-taking, etc. However, the Holodomor of 1932 – 1933 in Ukraine was the final means of “pacifying” and “exhaustion” the countryside by the authorities, which would not have been possible without the prior “disarmament” of the village.

The “disarmament of the countryside” was a set of hybrid measures launched by the Soviet authorities in 1919 to subjugate the peasantry and deprive it of the means to wage insurgency and further resistance to Bolshevik policies.

The organized “deprivation of weapons” in the countryside began after the 1919 decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR “On the Surrender of Weapons by the Population of Ukraine” was issued. Weapons were confiscated in the form of campaigns, either two-week or one-month campaigns. The decree declared all weapons, firearms and cold steel, on the territory of Ukraine to be the property of the state. People were asked to immediately register their weapons and hand them over at the first request of local revolutionary committees. As for persons who used hired labour, Article 9 of the decree stated that they certainly had no right to keep weapons and were obliged to immediately hand them over to the revolutionary committees under penalty of death. In addition, the decree prohibited the purchase and sale of weapons on the territory of Ukraine (Kucher, 1971, p. 104).

According to the decree “On the Surrender of Weapons...”, special troops were created to “deprivation weapons”, which included representatives of the district party committee, revolutionary committee, and later the district military committee and police. On behalf of the troikas, orders were printed out, which included prices for voluntary surrender: for example, “Russian carbine – 800 rubles, foreign one – 500 rubles”. Those who would indicate who had the weapons were guaranteed non-disclosure and a reward: 1,200 rubles for a machine gun (600 rubles for a faulty one), 600 rubles for a rifle (Balabanova, 2007, p. 189).

Guided by the resolution of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, on August 21, 1919, the VUNK published an appeal to the population on the resolution of M. Latsys, which stated that those guilty of keeping firearms without permission would be subject to the highest form of punishment – execution. Those who hid bandits and assisted them were also punished in the same way (Chuvakov, 2007, p. 107).

The number of weapons confiscated from the population in 1921 is evidenced by the data provided in the report of the Deputy Commander of the troops of Ukraine and the Crimea K. Avksentievsky at the 6th All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets (December 14-17, 1921): rifles – 4412, revolvers – 2719, checkers – 1307, machine guns – 664, cannons – 5, ammunition – about 1.5 million (Kucher, 1971, p. 103).

In a regional projection, the scale of the “disarmament of the village” can be illustrated by the example of Kryvyi Rih district. Thus, in June of 1921, 59 rifles, 20 sawed-off shotguns

(“kutsaks”), and 4 nagans were confiscated from peasants in Novokryvyi Rih only. During the “weapons deprivation” in Kryvyi Rih district from May 5 to June 5, 1922, 280 rifles, 218 sawed-off shotguns, 13 revolvers, 13 grenades, 14 shells, 10 hunting rifles, 23 sabers, and 6 bayonets were confiscated from the population. During March 1923, 1451 rifles, 1127 sawed-off shotguns, 607 revolvers, 207 grenades, and 30,600 rounds of ammunition were confiscated in the Kryvyi Rih district (Balabanova, 2007, p. 189; CSAPO of Ukraine, f. 1, d. 2, c. 238, p. 108; c. 644, p. 29; c. 1690, p. 96; SADO, f. P-3225, d. 1, c. 53, p. 178; f. 3650, d. 1, c. 431, p. 81).

In 1922, according to a report by the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, thousands of rifles, hundreds of revolvers, tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition, several cannons, and many machine guns were seized in rural areas. For example, in Podilsk province, 17,000 pieces of various weapons, including 11,000 rifles (Kucher, 1971, p. 104), were seized from the population. According to official data, in Podillia, the 1922 “arms deprivation” campaign was “conducted firmly”, which resulted in the confiscation of 90% of the population’s weapons. As of November 20, 1922, about 5,000 rifles had been “deprived the peasants, most of them voluntarily” (Oliinyk, 2015, p. 117). On January 9, 1923, summarizing the practice of using the institute of defendants and in order to support families whose sons served in the Red Army, the regional executive committee ordered to exclude persons from such families from the list of defendants. According to M. Oliinyk, the accumulated experience, the actual immunity of the members of the operational teams, and a certain liberalization of the attitude towards the defendants allowed “almost without pressure” to “deprived up to 2000 rifles, sawed-off shotguns, and other weapons from the village” in March-April of 1923 (Oliinyk, 2015, p. 117).

When analyzing the statistical data, one should note the frequent and sometimes significant discrepancies between the data on the volume of seized weapons in Ukraine as a whole and the results of “weapons deprivation” operations conducted by local authorities during the same period.

Thus, between February and April of 1923, 6956 rifles, 1339 revolvers, 571 sabers, and 14 machine guns were confiscated in Ukraine (CSASBPG of Ukraine, f. 3204, d. 2, c. 9, pp. 6–17). At the same time, as a result of law enforcement operations in January-February of 1923, 1451 rifles, 1125 sawed-off shotguns, 607 revolvers, 30635 rounds of ammunition, and 207 pieces of explosives were seized from the population of Kryvyi Rih district of Yekaterynoslav province alone (CSAPO of Ukraine, f. 1, d. 20, c. 1690, p. 96). During one month, in 1923, 8 machine guns, 3764 rifles, 1139 sawed-off shotguns, 958 revolvers, etc. were seized in the Katerynoslav province (Pakhomenkov, 2021, p. 26; SADO, f. P-3373, d. 1, c. 2).

In 1922 – 1927, the peasantry outplayed the Soviet government. It had a better grasp of market mechanisms and maneuvered with ingenuity and patience between the mines constantly laid by the government in the form of changes to the tax code, “price scissors”, creeping inflation, and finally the so-called self-taxation. The peasantry won elections to local authorities, despite all the constitutional restrictions, disenfranchisement, and crookedness of district officials (Smolii, 2013, p. 282). The experience of the first years of the new economic policy showed the country’s top leadership that the countryside was not capable of being satisfied with individual concessions, that harmony in the relations between the Communist Party authorities and the countryside was possible only if the peasant program was adopted, and that for this to happen the government had to be truly reborn – in its ideology, economic policy, and foreign policy. Obviously, this was a sacrifice too great, simply impossible for the ruling party.

Campaigns to confiscate weapons continued until the beginning of the “Great Turning Point” in the countryside. According to the administrative department of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, during the period of 1927 – 1928, 13486 firearms, 2087 cold steel weapons, and 35438 pieces of various ammunition were confiscated from the population of Ukraine. During the following years, 1928 – 1929, the number of seized weapons was 13810 firearms, 1417 bladed weapons and 40767 pieces of various ammunition (Ulianych, 2004, p. 45).

During the “disarmament of the village”, the Bolsheviks did not disdain terrorist methods, executions, and family hostage-taking.

In his memoirs, M. Doroshenko described an incident that occurred in the Znamianka district in 1920: “A group of selected thugs from the special unit went from one wealthy or even semi-wealthy household to another, carried a box they called a ‘device’ for finding weapons, and at night they stuck the weapons in the owner’s roof somewhere, and when they found them, they severely punished the poor owner, frightening others” (Doroshenko, 1973, p. 122).

On May 15, 1923, the secretary of the Podillia regional committee, Denys, reported to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine that by January 1, 1923, “the Opposition managed to siphon off up to 20,000 rifles and breechblocks... However, they “discredited themselves in the eyes of the peasants, acting with terrorist methods and inevitably getting involved in the maelstrom of official crimes” (Oliinyk, 2015, p. 117).

In Zaporizhzhia province, in October of 1921, extraordinary troops took 307 local people in order to seize weapons from the population. Of these, 103 were shot for not handing over their weapons. After that, in its report, Zaporizhzhia Provincial Military Council noted that the work of the emergency troops made a huge political and moral impression on the population (CSAPO of Ukraine, f. 1, d. 20, c. 616, p. 119).

Such isolated incidents, the incompleteness of the process of “disarmament of the village”, and the need to seek a compromise with the peasants in order to avoid a new round of insurgency forced the provincial committees to decide in 1922 – 1923 to liquidate the three arms deprivation teams in the countryside.

Obviously, the process of “deprivation of weapons” from the countryside was uneven. According to the criminal investigation authorities of Kyiv district, even in 1927 in the village of Voronkiv, Rohoziv district, Kyiv region, the local population “had a large number of weapons” and “considered themselves Cossacks” (SAKO, f.P-112, d. 1, c. 8495, p. 36).

In the context of the “disarmament of the village”, such a passive form of resistance as rumors about the war deserves special attention, as they reflected the political and moral atmosphere that existed in Ukraine in the 1920s. The spread of rumors was closely linked to the general assessment of the authorities, or rather, the spread of rumors was a kind of manifestation of the alienation of the masses from the authorities. It is interesting that the war was discussed as a *fait accompli*: “we read it in the newspaper”, “a friend told it”, “relatives wrote about it in a letter”. “Rumors are spreading in the village that the war is already underway and that Piłsudski is already attacking Ukraine” / “There is talk that we will live only until 1927. And in 1927 there will be a big war, such that few people will be left alive. Stop getting rich. We need to go out...” / “They say that the bourgeois countries have already divided up which part of the Soviet Union will go to whom, and that we will be attacked from all sides” / “We have been heard rumors for a long time that Poland is already near Kyiv. England is also on the move”. Different conclusions were drawn from the information about a possible war. For many, it caused despair and apathy: “Dark people are even avoiding

farming, saying that if you do it for someone else, it's better not to make money". There was also a willingness to take up arms again, as in the past: "Peasants say: 'The lord is dead or alive, but we will take up arms. Poland will not get Ukraine cheaply'" (Smolii, 2013, pp. 261–263). Such sentiments and rumors can be considered evidence that the peasantry had significant resources for armed struggle.

In the second half of the 1920s, the Bolsheviks, having "deprived" a significant number of military weapons from the peasants, focused on confiscating hunting weapons. In the summer of 1927, the secretary of Krynychy regional branch of the communist party reported to the Central Committee of the communist party of Ukraine that the "Union of Hunters" had appeared in the area, which had its own branches in the villages, sold weapons and taught how to use them, and conducted training shootings. The secretary believed that rebel peasant groups were being formed under the guise of hunters and under the cover of the Union (SADO, f. 7, d. 1, c. 857, p. 69).

In connection with the wave of anti-Bolshevik peasant uprisings of 1929 – 1930, the head of the Joint state political administration of the Ukrainian SSR, V. Balytskyi, noted that only in some cases were villagers armed with hunting rifles and sawhorses. "This suggests", he wrote, "that the timely work on deprivation of weapons in the countryside was successful and the Ukrainian village, previously filled with weapons, is now completely disarmed" (Podkur, 2005, pp. 97–98; CSAPO of Ukraine, f. 1, d. 20, c. 3184, p. 65).

In our opinion, "disarmament" is not limited to the process of "deprivation" weapons from the countryside that had accumulated there after the end of World War I, the revolutionary events of 1917 – 1921, "disarmament" of the countryside is understood in a broader context – it is a system of hybrid combined governmental measures aimed at both unarming and the destruction of traditional peasant institutions (debilitating as deprivation of all means, including moral and volitional ones), which offered an alternative in the context of the creation of the Soviet image of a "new society" and a "new peasant". Thus, by destroying the economic foundations of market relations and establishing a dictatorship in the field of an agricultural pricing, the authorities put the peasantry in opposition to the existing regime. A gradual elimination of institutions in the countryside that were an alternative to the Soviet ones created the preconditions for the subjugation of the Ukrainian countryside during the "Great Turning Point" of 1929 – 1933.

The Bolsheviks' instruments of "debilitating" of the Ukrainian countryside in a broad sense on the eve of and in the context of the "Great Turning Point" were mass arrests and executions; blockade of districts and villages affected by peasant uprisings ("volynky"); expulsion of peasants to other regions of the USSR; unblocking of village councils and other important buildings surrounded by rebels or protesters; demonstration trials of peasants (in some cases – demonstrative executions); intimidation with weapons; sending agents and provocateurs to villages or insurgent centres; campaigns to seize weapons in the countryside; control of suspicious people and movement of the population; disarmament/bleeding/liquidation of insurgent groups; registration of civilians; organization of ambushes; party propaganda, fight against anti-Soviet, gossip, "defeatism"; patrolling or combing the area; increased protection of state borders, prevention of crossing the border by peasants; postal censorship; interrogations; sudden, mostly nighttime, raids in villages; raids by punitive units; dispersal of mass peasant rallies, gatherings, etc.; compilation of lists of insurgents with their relatives and addresses; family hostage-taking.

Thus, the complex and hybrid nature of the process of "disarmament" of the Ukrainian countryside on the eve of the "Great Turning Point" is a combined approach – the confiscation

of cold steel and firearms while suppressing the will of the peasants to resist. The latter was achieved by attacking various peasant institutions: the yard, assembly, community, church, market, traditional holidays, etc., as all of these ensured self-organization and social autonomy of the peasantry. Disarmament in a broad sense also occurred through the split of peasant society into “Kurkuls” – “enemies of the people” – and “poor people” – conscious supporters of Soviet rule. An equally effective tool of psychological oppression was the creation of an atmosphere of fear in society – fear for one’s own life and the lives of one’s family members; fear caused by the repressive measures of the Soviet authorities against opponents of collectivization; fear of “losing everything” – being among the dispossessed and/or being arrested and sent to Stalinist camps.

The Conclusions. Thus, we should summarize that in the first third of the twentieth century the rural community in Ukraine retained the features of a para-civil peasant society and for some time could resist the Bolsheviks’ economic and socio-cultural transformations in the countryside, in particular the formation of a new type of peasantry – the state and collective farms.

In 1917 – 1933, in the context of a political instability, weakness of local authorities (often complete powerlessness), critical crime situation, militarization of public consciousness, uncertainty of the agrarian issue, low culture of conflict resolution at the local level, actualization of vengeful goals, etc. Traditional peasant institutions remained the only reliable means of self-defense and defending their own interests, a source of self-organization and social autonomy: yard, assembly, community, church, market, holidays, and weapons (which were overflowing in the village as a result of the collapse of the Eastern Front of World War I and the seizure of military depots).

Although the campaigns of unarming and debilitating during the period of 1919 – 1929 did not result in the total disarmament of the peasantry, they largely deprived it of the means to conduct active resistance, including insurgency. On the eve of the “Great Turning Point”, the peasantry became much weaker than in 1920 – 1922, when it was properly armed and threatened the existence of the new Bolshevik state.

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**SOCIAL PORTRAIT OF THE PARTY-SOVIET NOMENCLATURE
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE WESTERN REGIONS OF UKRAINE
AT THE END OF THE 40s OF THE XXth CENTURY
(BASED ON ARCHIVE CRIMINAL CASE MATERIALS)**

Abstract. *The purpose of the research is to reconstruct the social portrait of the party-Soviet nomenclature representatives of the western regions of Ukraine at the end of the 40s of the 20th century according to the materials of the archival criminal case. The research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, scientificity, authorial objectivity, the use of source studies methods, in particular, the method of internal criticism of sources. The Scientific Novelty.* In the article there have been elucidated the social markers of the party-soviet nomenclature representatives in the western regions of Ukraine, based on the materials of the archival and criminal case, and there has been proven

the need to involve a diverse source base to highlight the issue. **The Conclusions.** The socium of the western regions of Ukraine during the first post-war years, when the Stalinist totalitarian regime was restored/established in the region, was much more colorful and diverse than the Soviet class structure, to which they tried to reduce it. An important social group, which was recorded under this name in official documents, was the party-Soviet nomenclature. A diverse historical toolkit, in particular, documents of the Soviet repressive and punitive bodies, help to recreate its complete portrait. The materials of archival and criminal cases, despite their specificity, contain factual data that make it possible to show what social attributes the representatives of the party-Soviet nomenclature were supposed to possess, to find out the specifics of its formation and activity. In addition, they shed light on the ideological beliefs, communication environment, survival strategies and other factors that determined the social status of this stratum of party functionaries. The criminal case illustrates the methods used by the Soviet special services, makes it clear how arrests and punishments quickly changed the status of the nomenclature – from “missionaries of the Red Power” to “enemies of the people”.

Key words: Western Ukrainian lands, criminal case, party-soviet nomenclature, soviet system, social groups, repressive and punitive apparatus.

СОЦІАЛЬНИЙ ПОРТРЕТ ПРЕДСТАВНИКІВ ПАРТІЙНО-РАДЯНСЬКОЇ НОМЕНКЛАТУРИ ЗАХІДНИХ ОБЛАСТЕЙ УКРАЇНИ У КІНЦІ 40-х рр. ХХ ст. (ЗА МАТЕРІАЛАМИ АРХІВНО-КРИМІНАЛЬНОЇ СПРАВИ)

Анотація: *Мета статті* – реконструювати соціальний портрет представників партійно-радянської номенклатури західних областей України наприкінці 40-х рр. ХХ ст. за матеріалами архівно-кримінальної справи. **Методологія дослідження** спирається на принципи історизму, науковості, авторської об’єктивності, застосування джерелознавчих методів, зокрема, методу внутрішньої критики джерел. **Наукова новизна.** У статті на основі матеріалів архівно-кримінальної справи показано соціальні маркери представників партійно-радянської номенклатури західних областей України, доведено необхідність залучення різноманітної джерельної бази для висвітлення проблеми. **Висновки.** Соціум західних областей України у перші повоєнні роки, коли у краї відновлювався / утверджувався сталінський тоталітарний режим, був набагато строкатішим, ніж радянська класова структура, до якої його намагалися звести. Важливою соціальною групою, яка фіксувалася під такою назвою в офіційних документах, була партійно-радянська номенклатура. Відтворити її цілісний портрет допомагає різноплановий історичний інструментарій, зокрема, і документи радянських репресивно-каральних органів. Матеріали архівно-кримінальних справ, попри їхню специфіку, містять фактологічні дані, які дають можливість показати, якими соціальними атрибутами мали володіти представники партійно-радянської номенклатури, з’ясувати специфіку її формування та діяльності. Крім того, вони проливають світло на ідеологічні переконання, комунікативне середовище, стратегії виживання та інші чинники, які визначали соціальний статус цієї частки партійних функціонерів. Кримінальна справа ілюструє, якими методами діяли радянські спецслужби, дає зрозуміти, як арешти та покарання швидко змінювали статус номенклатури – з “місіонерів червоної влади” на “ворогів народу”.

Ключові слова: західноукраїнські землі, кримінальна справа, партійно-радянська номенклатура, радянська система, соціальні групи, репресивно-каральний апарат.

The Problem Statement. To justify the large-scale aggression against Ukraine, modern Russia uses the same narratives that were used by the Stalinist regime, establishing itself in the western regions of Ukraine during the first years after World War II. Under the slogans of “liberation” and the fight against “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism”, all nationally conscious Ukrainians were exterminated, the Ukrainian liberation forces of the OUN and the UPA, which desperately resisted the Stalinist totalitarian system, were killed.

The party-Soviet nomenclature was the leader and embodiment of all the instructions of the union and republican Bolshevik authorities, their support in the region “infected by the

Ukrainian nationalism”. In order to oppose modern enemies of Ukraine, to have a national patriotic state elite, we need to study the historical realities of the past years thoroughly, based on source materials that are diverse in origin and content, to do the research on the factors that contributed to the repressive transformation of all spheres of life of the population in the western regions of Ukraine during the first post-war years. This will make it possible to finally and forever eradicate the signs of the Soviet nomenclature rule in our country, to complete decommunization.

The Review of Recent Researches. Many domestic scholars focused on the issues related to the formation and clarification specifics of the party-Soviet nomenclature essential characteristics in the Ukrainian SSR during the first post-war years: Oleksiy Shteinle (Shteinle, 2009, 2010), Petro Kyrydon (Kyrydon, 2012), Victor Krupyna (Krupyna, 2009; Krupyna, 2010). They analysed the nomenclature place in the system of Bolshevik power, an educational and cultural level, a professional competence, everyday practices.

The Party-Soviet nomenclature as a component of the personnel policy of the Soviet system in the western regions of Ukraine during the first post-war years is elucidated by Oleksandr Rublov, Yuriy Cherchenko (Rublov & Cherchenko, 1994), T. Pershyna (Pershyna, 2009), Vasyl Hulai (Hulai, 2002), Andriy Zhyviuk (Zhyviuk, 2009), Vasyl Ilnytskyi (Ilnytskyi, 2015; Ilnytskyi, 2016), Ruslana Popp (Popp, 2014). The scholars elucidate the activities of nomenclature employees in a regional section during this period. A detailed analysis of power representatives in the western regions of Ukraine in 1944 – at the beginning of 1946 was carried out by Halyna Starodubets in her articles and monographs (Starodubets, 2016). The scholar elucidated not only socio-professional characteristics, but also the features of a general style of behaviour of the party leaders, calling them “missionaries of the red government”. The everyday life and survival practices of this professional group in the western region in the mid-1940s and at the beginning of the 1950s are highlighted by H. Starodubets in a separate section of the collective monograph (Starodubets, 2021).

The publications of Vasyl Ilnytskyi and Mykola Haliv are of a methodological significance to our research (Haliv & Ilnytskyi, 2021, Ilnytskyi & Haliv, 2022).

The social history issues of the postwar era in the USSR under totalitarianism became the subject of research by foreign scholars. Discussions in American historiography of the 1980s – 2000s regarding the peculiarities of the Soviet society development were analysed by Natalia Laas (Laas, 2010). They revolve around the problems of a social structure and stratification, a social mobility, the impact of ideological pressure, terror and repression on the Soviet society in general, as well as on its separate social groups and the private sphere of relations between the authorities and Soviet citizens.

However, the source science aspect of the issue has not yet been sufficiently covered.

The purpose of the research is to reconstruct the social portrait of the party-Soviet nomenclature representatives of the western regions of Ukraine at the end of the 40s of the 20th century according to the materials of the archival criminal case.

The Research Results. The post-war society of the Western Ukrainian region, when the Soviet system was being restored/established in the region, was characterized by a sufficiently large diversity in terms of ethnic, religious, social and territorial origin, education, property status, attitude to the Bolshevik government and other criteria. Its new group became the party-Soviet cadres – “nomenclature”. An important source, although rather rare (the majority of those repressed during the first post-war years were representatives of the local population), which allows to reproduce its social features, are the documents of the Soviet punitive and

repressive bodies. Information from this type of sources, despite their specificity, allows to supplement the information of official documents, to compare them to reports from other sources, to reproduce the repressive activity of the Stalinist penal system, in particular, in terms of different social groups and an individual.

The archive-criminal case P-1794 (D) analysed by us consists of three volumes and is kept in the archives of the Office of the Security Service of Ukraine in Lviv region (AOSSULR). Three people were accused in it. At the time of his arrest (December 30, 1948), Baza Mykola Mykytovych worked as the head of the agitation and propaganda department of Drohobych district committee of the CP(b)U, Fedir Andriyovych Fursa (arrested on January 19, 1949) was the head of the party cabinet of Drohobych district committee of the CP(b)U, Yusukhno Mykola Dmytrovych (arrested on January 19, 1949) – the head of the agitation and propaganda department of Drohobych city party committee (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, pp. 1, 285, 297; vol. 2, p. 7). The personal composition of the nomenclature was approved by party committees of various levels – from the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) to city and district party committees. It had a branched and clearly hierarchical structure, was differentiated by spheres of activity, level of power and functional responsibilities (Shteinle, 2010, p. 267). All the above mentioned people were representatives of the party-Soviet nomenclature, which was responsible for a very important part of the work – ideological and propaganda. The ideological influence of Stalin's totalitarian regime had to change the social consciousness of the population of the western regions of Ukraine completely. A widespread promotion of communist postulates, advantages of the Soviet power and the Soviet way of life, and discrediting of the Ukrainian liberation movement gave the regime the opportunity, along with coercion and repression, to enslave and dominate the region. That is why, the relayers of Bolshevik propaganda had to be politically reliable and unquestionably loyal to the Soviet government, to believe in all the preached narratives firmly, to convince others persistently. And in fact, it was distorting reality successfully. And it was from this angle that the party-Soviet apparatus formation in the region took place during the first post-war years.

The case materials make it possible to reproduce in a sufficient detail a set of mandatory markers (social, political, moral) necessary for appointment to these positions. First of all, it is a social origin. At the time of their arrest, all the three accused were “correct” according to the class structure of the Soviet society – from “peasants-collective farmers” (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, p. 4). Subsequently, during the investigation, it was found out that the questionnaire data of M. Baza were not true. In 1933, his father was sentenced to 10 years in prison for “sabotaging the spring sowing company, and his farm was sold off”, therefore, later in the investigative documents, his social position is noted as one of the “kurkuls”, and the degree of mistrust also increased (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, p. 332).

The territorial origin of party functionaries was also important. Due to political mistrust of the local population, even under the conditions of understaffing of the party-Soviet apparatus in the region during the first post-war years, important party positions, as well as the majority positions in general, were occupied by “sent” personnel. This tendency established a new social differentiation in the region, which became established during the post-war years: between “own” and “foreign”, the latter automatically falling, as a rule, from the western regions of Ukraine (Стародубець, 2021, с. 53). All the three people involved in the criminal case were from the eastern regions of Ukraine (local residents called them among themselves “easterners”) from Chernihiv region, i.e. in the informal sense of the system, “our people”. Mykola Baza was born in the urban-type village of Ponomysia in 1914, Fedir Fursa – in 1919,

in the village of Velyka Doroha, Mykola Yusukhno – in 1915, in the village of Horodyshche (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, pp. 4, 276, 278). They were Ukrainians by nationality, but it is difficult to determine to what extent nationality corresponded to the national identity based on the source materials. Testimony protocols are in Russian, appeals to the country's top party officials, letters to the press are also in Russian (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, pp. 4, 278, 281).

Other parameters were also necessary for appointment and approval for a party position in the western regions of Ukraine during the first post-war years, which would distinguish their representatives, especially among the local population. The accused corresponded to the parameters, namely: they served in the Red Army, fought as part of it against the German troops and their allies, participated in the partisan movement, for which they were awarded orders and medals, i.e. they proved their loyalty to the motherland (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, pp. 8, 47–48, vol. 2, p. 18). None of them “was” in captivity and encirclement, which was also an important proof of a political trust in them (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, pp. 49, 138v.). M. Baza's conviction for a non-political offense in January of 1941 (Article 161 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR) did not become an obstacle to his appointment to a party position (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, p. 332).

The accused belonged to a small percentage of the nomenclature workers of Drohobych region who obtained a higher and incomplete higher education diploma (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, p. 6; vol. 2, p. 183; vol. 3, pp. 135, 196). As of January 1, 1948, in Drohobych region 20.3% of people worked with a higher education diploma, and 8.5% – with incomplete higher education, with a special secondary education – 5.5%, with a completed general education – 22.5%, with a primary education – 12.5% of nomenclature employees (Popp, 2014, p. 353).

A mandatory condition for holding a leadership position was party affiliation. All three nomenclature representatives were communists who had joined the ranks of the CP(b)U relatively recently, namely during the German-Soviet war. F. Fursa became a member of the CP(b)U in 1942, M. Baza – in 1943, and M. Yusukhno – in 1944 (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, pp. 332–333). In addition, everyone made previous career steps. After demobilization from the ranks of the Red Army, M. Baza was directed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine to Drohobych Region, where he initially worked as the Deputy Chairman of Drohobych District Executive Committee (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 3, p. 183). M. Yusukhno was also assigned to party work in the region after demobilization in 1946 (he completed his service as the commander of the headquarters of the aviation squadron). At first, he worked as the head of the party cabinet in one of the districts of Drohobych region, later as an instructor of Drohobych regional committee of the party, then he was appointed the head of the propaganda and agitation department of Drohobych district committee of the CP(b)U. From July of 1948, he occupied the post of the head of the propaganda and agitation department of Drohobych city party committee (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 3, p. 196). The majority of the representatives of the party-Soviet nomenclature took this path “to the top”. Under conditions where the selection of personnel was not carried out taking into account business qualities, knowledge, education, and cultural level, it was important at the distance of career growth to have, first of all, the skills to prove one's political reliability, devotion to the Communist Party in various ways at work and everyday practices order, readiness to obey without appeal and not to doubt the orders of authority.

A clear system of party-political education functioned in the post-war years to raise the political level of party-soviet cadres of the republic at various levels. V. Krupyna notes that “it

was at party schools that preventive ideological reloading of the nomenclature consciousness took place” (Крупина, 2009, с. 272). The availability of party and political education was an important achievement in a career growth. In 1946 – 1947 M. Baza studied at the Republican party school under the Central Committee of the CP(b)U and had prospects after returning to work in Drohobych to be recommended for the post of the first secretary of one of the district committees of the party, and according to him, there had already been discussions with him in Drohobych regional committee of the party (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 3, p. 182).

Investigative materials make it possible to determine the range of duties of party functionaries at that time. Employees of the propaganda and agitation departments at the district and city levels conducted lectures and made reports on political topics to various professional groups, led groups on “studying the works of Lenin and Stalin”, organized and were responsible for all ideological and propaganda companies and measures of the Soviet system in the region, which were primarily directed against the activities of the OUN and the UPA, organization of grain procurement, collection of contingents and loan funds, establishment of collective farms (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, pp. 23, 27, 412). It was dangerous for them to go to the villages of the region, where the Ukrainian insurgents resisted Sovietization fiercely, and to fulfill the tasks set before the party-Soviet nomenclature, so the party members were given weapons. F. Fursa was given a 1944 PPSH submachine gun by the Drohobych RV MVS, and M. Baza was given a “TT” pistol (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, p. 13; vol. 2, p. 15). As evidenced by the archival and criminal case materials, M. Baza received the party reprimand by the Drohobych Regional Committee of the CP(b) for “voluntarily leaving the village”, where he was assigned by Drohobych Regional Committee of the CP(b). He was not allowed to explain the situation, and it was an ordinary matter in the then directive style of management (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, p. 297). Taking a party post, nomenclature representatives sincerely believed that they would be able to correct certain deficiencies in the system’s operation. However, in practice, all these intentions turned out to be illusory and dangerous for the one who manifested them. M. Baza was convinced that the reason for his persecution and arrest was that what he had reported to the party authorities “about improper actions during the collectivization of the secretary of the party committee of UMVS of Drohobych region and other employees of his department” (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 3, p. 2). It is about the organization of a collective farm in the village of Bronytsia. Violent methods of collectivization in the western regions of Ukraine during the post-war years are confirmed by the reporting documentation of the Ukrainian nationalist underground. In the OUN reports it was stated that peasants who did not want to go to the collective farm were beaten, mutilated, blackmailed, and staged various provocations. Methods of physical influence on Western Ukrainian peasants became permanent “arguments” for demonstrating the advantages of collective farming (Попп, 2023, с. 188–189, Медвідь, 2023, с. 584). M. Yusukhno also linked the suspicions about him with a critical article in the republican newspaper “Soviet Ukraine” about the activities of Zhydachiv district committee of the party, in which he noted that its leadership had turned into “dealers and thieves” (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, pp. 401–402, 410).

Having the social role of ensuring the existence of the Soviet system, the nomenclature was not only constructed, but also a controlled stratum, which was under a close observation of the Soviet special services. During the first post-war years, there were constant checks of the party and Soviet authorities personnel in the western regions of Ukraine. Loyalty and devotion to the regime of its “missionaries” was confirmed not only by their official

position and specific cases, but also by intelligence data collected about them. The whistleblower became a fairly effective tool that helped the Soviet system determine and navigate the moods of not only ordinary citizens, but also representatives of the authorities, who could express their true thoughts and feelings in an informal situation. And not whistle-blowing “against the enemies of the people” was equated to a crime in the realities of a totalitarian society (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, p. 72). Double standards and adaptation were certain survival strategies in the soviet society. The arrest of M. Baza took place precisely on the denunciations of several agents (excerpts from them are cited in the case), who testified about his alleged “anti-soviet sentiments” (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 3, pp. 311–312). The materials of the archival and criminal case also show that under conditions where there was no honest competition for positions and cronyism flourished, denunciations could be used as a tool to eliminate rivals or ill-wishers (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 3, p. 105). In addition, cooperation with the “organs” was also a source of income. Agents received a monetary reward (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 3, p. 45). It also contributed to their career promotion. In the analysed source, it is noted that the exclusion of one of the informers from the agent network of the MDB of Drohobych region is connected with the fact that he began to occupy a “responsible party position” (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 3, p. 45).

It is difficult to recognize how truthful and objective the testimony is recorded in the investigation protocols during interrogations of the accused, witnesses, and eyewitnesses. We can question their authenticity, given the fear experienced by the interrogators, the desire to protect themselves and save themselves at any cost. The methods of activity of the soviet special services were intimidation, psychological and physical pressure. After Stalin’s death, in his letters to the top leadership of the USSR and law enforcement agencies, the convicted M. Baza claimed that he and the witnesses were subjected to physical influence, that his persecution was due to his conflict with the secretary of the party bureau of the UMDB in Drohobych region and the envy of his colleagues due to his prospect of assuming a higher position (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 3, pp. 109, 177). F. Fursa and M. Yusukhno also noted in their appeals that there were and are loyal to the party, and the investigation was “fabricated”, it was conducted incorrectly, “the investigation materials are false from the beginning to end, due to force”, “blackmail” (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, p. 336; vol. 3, pp. 195–197). M. Yusukhno claimed that “he did not sleep, did not eat or drink for seven days, endured tragic torment, as a result of which he signed any protocols” (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, p. 454).

Despite the subjectivity and possible unreliability of such source materials, we can still single out the issues that were then discussed in the circle of the local party-soviet leadership. They expressed their attitude towards the ideologists and leaders of the communist party and the country, personnel reshuffles in the republic, evaluated individual events in the history of Ukraine and russia, asserted the low effectiveness of Bolshevik agitation and propaganda among the local population, mentioned the attributions and submission of false information in numerous party reports, analysed the economic profit and the repressive policy of the authorities towards the Ukrainian peasantry, doubted the correctness of collectivization methods in the region, determined the reasons for the population’s dissatisfaction with the authorities, condemned the moral image and behaviour of some of their colleagues (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, pp. 21, 23, 25, 50–51, 159, 160, 164, 165–168, 177, 182–183, 210–219, 232, 235–240). In the conversations it was also compared what was seen abroad during the war to the then soviet reality (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, p. 172).

They even shared the experience of meeting with the OUN and the UPA and exchanged the content of propaganda materials of the Ukrainian underground, banned literature, heard in banned broadcasts of radio stations in Western countries (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, pp. 23, 24, 26, 50, 130, 178, 221).

An impoverished life of the Ukrainian population, difficult living conditions of former military personnel, and famine in the eastern regions of Ukraine were mentioned in the conversations many times (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, pp. 23, 24, 26, 51, 231, 234). The descriptions of the confiscated items of the detainees testify to the financial situation of the local nomenclature representatives. Concerning F. Fursa, it was a jacket from a woolen suit, breeches, an overcoat, a bed with a mattress and a chest of drawers (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, p. 10). A coat, a suit, an old one, a chest of drawers, a wooden bed, and a sewing machine were also confiscated from M. Yusukhno (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 2, p. 145). After the statements of their wives, the arrest of some property was cancelled (beds, wardrobes, sewing machine were returned). M. Yusukhno also noted that “he, as a party worker, “gave all his energy to work, and he himself went half-naked””. His salary was 1,000 rubles, and he wasted them to buy literature, collected a library that was confiscated (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, p. 405).

The frank conversations of the nomenclature representatives with their colleagues, acquaintances about their attitude to the events in the country, about what they experienced or witnessed, even by virtue of their official duties, became grounds for officially accusing them of “a hostile attitude towards the Central Committee of the CP(b)U”, “the creation of the anti-soviet group”, “arrangement of gatherings where conversations on anti-soviet topics took place from the right-wing Trotsky positions, the measures of the party and the soviet leadership were discussed”, “praising the OUN”, “preserving anti-soviet literature”, “spreading slander and obscenity towards the leaders of the Communist Party of Ukraine(b) and the soviet state”, “in every possible way defamed organization of collective farms in the USSR, at the same time praising peasant farms in capitalist countries” (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, pp. 69, 284, 296–302, 333; vol. 3, pp. 172). And to condemn M. Baza, F. Yusukhno, and M. Fursa to 10 years of correctional labour camps by the resolution of the Special Meeting of the MDB of the USSR under Articles 54-10 part 2, 54-11 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR (counter-revolutionary propaganda and agitation, counter-revolutionary organizational activity), with property confiscation and restriction of rights for five years (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 2, p. 39; vol. 3, pp. 2, 66, 82). When M. Fursa wanted to deny the accusations against him several times, we learn from his words that the investigator answered him that “they cannot let him go, because if he is not an enemy now, he can become one” (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 2, p. 5). Repressions against party cadres were a warning to other functionaries, a constant reminder of what doubts or critical remarks about the actions of the Bolshevik government and its leaders, the activities of power structures, and “higher-ranking” colleagues can lead to.

Falling into disfavour meant the loss of one’s social status, which for the nomenclature entailed a certain set of benefits and preferences, in particular, the priority of obtaining state housing. All those involved in the case lived with their families in Drohobych in separate apartments (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, p. 1; vol. 2, p. 151). The status of each in the then nomenclature hierarchy can be determined by the apartments location. M. Yusukhno, as the head of the agitation and propaganda department of Drohobych city party, lived in the very centre of Drohobych, in Shevska Street (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 2, p. 151). After

the arrests, the situation changed radically, the stigma of “enemies of people” was transferred to the whole family. In his statement in December of 1955, M. Yusukhno complained to the State Security Committee of the Ukrainian SSR that his wife “has been humiliated for seven years, lost her apartment and job, she is treated with contempt everywhere, some call her a “banderivka”, the others – a “fascist”, the others – “the wife of the enemy of people... children are also – “children of the enemy of people” (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, p. 40). The wife of M. Baza also speaks about the consequences of repression to her family, “sharply negative” (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, p. 339).

Extreme living conditions, arrests, investigations, exile had a negative impact on a moral and physical condition of people. Baza’s wife, in another appeal to the Military Prosecutor of the Armed Forces of the USSR in January of 1956, with a request for her husband’s release, stated that he was wounded twice in the war, the previous detention in custody lasted for 13 months (the accused were first in Drohobych, then in Kyiv), it weakened him a lot, in exile he had a paralyzed part of his body (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 3, pp. 182, 183).

The criminal case contains photographs and verbal portraits of the detainees (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, p. 5; vol. 2, p. 10; vol. 3, p. 139). Such data help find out the presence of physiological, psychological and mental traits of a person, give an idea about his appearance, considering his belonging to a certain social group under certain historical conditions and life circumstances. Among the special signs of M. Bazibula were named: “penetrating bullet wounds of the hand and right forearm” (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 2, p. 10).

After several additional checks, the case of M. Baza, F. Fursa, and Yu. Yusukhno was reviewed, and due to the “unprovenness of the charge brought against them”, “in the absence of a crime” they were released from correctional labour camps on June 5, 1956, and sent to special settlements. They were rehabilitated by the Law of Ukraine “On Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression in Ukraine” of April 14, 1991. (AOSSULR, c. P-1794 (D), vol. 1, pp. 442, 454; Reabilitovani istoriieiu, 2019, pp. 73, 181, 190). That is, everything they thought, saw and uttered on the sidelines was a real Soviet reality. And this gives hope that, despite the bombardment with fictitious propaganda, which is constantly carried out by the Russian Federation, critical thinking and an objective reception of the situation will be awakened among the majority of those to whom it is directed.

The Conclusions. The socium of the western regions of Ukraine during the first post-war years, when the Stalinist totalitarian regime was restored/established in the region, was much more colorful and diverse than the Soviet class structure, to which they tried to reduce it. An important social group, which was recorded under this name in official documents, was the party-Soviet nomenclature. A diverse historical toolkit, in particular, documents of the Soviet repressive and punitive bodies, help to recreate its complete portrait. The materials of archival and criminal cases, despite their specificity, contain factual data that make it possible to show what social attributes the representatives of the party-Soviet nomenclature were supposed to possess, to find out the specifics of its formation and activity. In addition, they shed light on the ideological beliefs, communication environment, survival strategies and other factors that determined the social status of this stratum of party functionaries. The criminal case illustrates the methods used by the Soviet special services, makes it clear how arrests and punishments quickly changed the status of the nomenclature – from “missionaries of the Red Power” to “enemies of the people”.

A promising direction of the research is the characterization of nomenclature based on the materials of the reporting documentation of the Ukrainian nationalist underground (OUN).

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**DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN UNITS OF THE ORGANIZATION
OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS IN 1948 – 1951**

Abstract. *The purpose of the study is to elucidate the development of foreign units network of the Organization of Ukrainian nationalists in 1948 – 1951, the legal public organizations established by the Ukrainian nationalists, and the network of mass media. The research methodology is based on the application of the principles of historicism, objectivity, and scientificity, using concrete historical, comparative historical, problem chronological, and structural systemic methods. The scientific novelty consists in the fact that for the first time, on the basis of previously unavailable documents from the OUN archives, there has been elucidated the organizational structure development of the foreign units of the OUN and the system of public organizations and mass media networks established by them in emigration during the specified chronological period. The Conclusions.* It has been determined that the process of mass resettlement of the Ukrainians with the status of relocated people within Europe and other countries overseas had a significant impact on the organizational development of foreign units of the OUN in 1948 – 1951. As a result, field organizations in Germany and Austria lost a significant number of members and ceased to be basic. After the resettlement of the former participants of Division 1 of the United National Army from Italy, the field organization of Great Britain became basic in Europe. At the same time, the process of resettlement made it possible to develop the Foreign Units of the OUN in the USA, Canada, Argentina, and Australia, which practically had not existed there before 1948. As tools of an external activity, the Foreign Units of the OUN also developed a wide system of legal public organizations, a network of printed mass media, organized their own underground radio station, and after its closure, the Ukrainian department as part of the Spanish radio station. This allowed them to effectively increase their public influence and spread the ideas of national liberation among the Ukrainian emigration and foreign citizens in the countries of settlement.

Key words: *foreign units of the OUN, field organization, SUM, ABN, public organization, printed mass media, underground radio station.*

ОРГАНІЗАЦІЙНИЙ РОЗВИТОК ЗАКОРДОННИХ ЧАСТИН ОРГАНІЗАЦІЇ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ НАЦІОНАЛІСТІВ В 1948 – 1951 рр.

Анотація. Метою дослідження є аналіз розвитку ЗЧ ОУН в 1948 – 1951 рр. в сукупності організаційної мережі, створених ними легальних громадських організацій та мережі засобів масової інформації. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтувалася на застосуванні принципів історизму, об'єктивності та науковості із використанням конкретно-історичного, порівняльно-історичного, проблемно-хронологічного та структурно-системного методів. **Наукова новизна** статті полягає у тому, що вперше на основі раніше недоступних документів з архівів ОУН проаналізовано розвиток організаційної структури ЗЧ ОУН та створеної ними в еміграції системи громадських організацій і мережі засобів масової інформації у вказаний хронологічний період. **Висновки.** Встановлено, що на організаційний розвиток ЗЧ ОУН в 1948 – 1951 рр. суттєво вплинув процес масового переселення українців зі статусом переміщених осіб в межах Європи та в інші країни за океан. Внаслідок цього теренові організації Німеччини та Австрії втратили значну кількість членства і перестали бути базовими в структурі ЗЧ ОУН, а після переселення з Італії колишніх учасників I дивізії УНА такою у Європі стала теренова організація Великої Британії. Водночас процес переселення уможливив створити організаційні структури ЗЧ ОУН в США, Канаді, Аргентині та Австралії, яких до 1948 р. не існувало. Як інструменти зовнішнього впливу ЗЧ ОУН також розбудували широку систему легальних громадських організацій, мережу друкованих засобів масової інформації, створили власну підпільну радіостанцію, а після її ліквідації організували відкриття українського відділу в структурі іспанського “Radio Nacional”. Це давало змогу ефективно поширювати ідеї національного визволення серед української еміграції та іноземних громадян у країнах поселення.

Ключові слова: Закордонні Частини ОУН, теренова організація, СУМ, АБН, громадська організація, друковані ЗМІ, підпільна радіостанція.

The Problem Statement. Since the restoration of independence in Ukraine, the study of the national liberation struggle in the 20th century and history of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) has gained a significant development. However, the Foreign Units of the OUN remain beyond the focus of the Ukrainian researchers. Established in 1946, this nationalist formation played a supporting role in it until the mid-50s of the 20th century, and after the defeat of the nationalist underground in Ukraine, as a coherent organizational formation, took over the function of continuing the national liberation struggle. The lack of researches on this issue is of an objective nature, since the archives of the Foreign Units of the OUN are mostly located abroad and access to them is difficult for the Ukrainian scholars. Therefore, the topicality of this research consists in partially filling this gap in the history of the organizational network development of the Foreign Units of the OUN on the basis of documents from the archives of the OUN.

The Review of Recent Researches. The activities of the Foreign Units of the OUN remain an undisclosed page of the Ukrainian national liberation struggle of the 20th century. If at the dawn of Ukraine's independence, only certain aspects of it were “reanimated” (Ukhach, 2020), then even to this day, the history of the Ukrainian Nationalist Front is one of those “aspects” that remains “unreanimated”. After all, in modern Ukrainian historical science there is lack of focus on the issue of the Ukrainian diaspora nationalist organizations (Akymenko, 2018).

Certain aspects of the history of the Foreign Units of the OUN are fragmentarily reflected in the final collective research of the group of historians, created under the Government Commission for the study of the activities of the OUN and the UPA (OUN and UPA, 2005) and in the researches by Kateryna Akymenko (Akymenko, 2018; Akymenko, 2022),

Yaroslav Antoniuk and Volodymyr Trofymovych (Antoniuk & Trofymovych, 2021), Dmytro Viedienieiev and Henadiy Bystrukhina (Viedienieiev & Bystrukhin, 2006, Viedienieiev & Bystrukhin, 2007), Pavlo Hai-Nyzhnyk (Hai-Nyzhnyk, 2022), Anatoly Kaminsky (Kaminskyi, 1999), Anatoly Kentii (Kentii, 1999), Yuriy Kyrychuk (Kyrychuk, 2003), Vasyl Kuk (Kuk, 1999), Oleksandr Panchenko (Panchenko, 2003), Ivan Patryliak (Patryliak, 2012), Hryhoriy Riy (Riy, 2021), Anatoly Rusnachenko (Rusnachenko, 2002), Vasyl Ilnytskyi and Mykola Haliv (Ilnytskyi & Haliv, 2019; Ilnytskyi & Haliv, 2020), Vasyl Ilnytskyi and Vitalii Telvak (Ilnytskyi & Telvak, 2018), Volodymyr Troshchynskyi (Troshchynskyi, 1994). The range of the author's analyses of the Foreign Units of the OUN is quite wide – using Mykola Slobodianiuk's approach, from “non-complimentary” to moderate and positive (Slobodianiuk, 2023, pp. 243–244). However, in these researches the organizational network of the Foreign Units of the OUN is not elucidated, knowledge of which is basic for a systematic study of the history of this nationalist formation.

The Purpose of the Research. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to analyse the development of the Foreign Units of the OUN in 1948 – 1951 concerning their organizational structure and system of public organizations established by them in emigration, a network of mass media and other means of an external influence.

The Research Results. The specified chronological framework of the article is tied to the author's previous research on the formation of organizational network of the Foreign Units of the OUN at the initial stage of their creation in 1946 – 1947 (Sych, 2017). The sources for both studies were the documents on the activities of the Foreign Units found in the Archive Collection of the OUN in New York (ACOUN).

A lower chronological limit of the study is connected with the mass resettlement of the Ukrainians with the status of relocated people to other countries in 1948, including outside Europe, which had a significant impact on the changes in the organizational network of the Foreign Units of the OUN. Instead, the upper one – with the Third Conference of the Foreign Units of the OUN, which took place in Munich on April 14–17, 1951 (ACOUN(h), p. 1) and at it, among other issues, a similar issue was considered on the basis of the relevant organizational reports (ACOUN(d); ACOUN(i)). In turn, these materials became the basis for the preparation of information transmitted in the same year by a courier for the OUN Provid in Ukraine (ACOUN(f)). It is these documents and other reports of field organizations that make it possible to reconstruct the state and dynamics of the organizational network development of the Foreign Units of the OUN and related institutions of external influence during the specified period.

Based on the previous research, we should state that at the initial stage of formation during the period of 1946 – 1947, the network of the Foreign Units of the OUN spread in Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, Great Britain, Italy and had its representative in Switzerland. At the same time, the field organizations of Germany and Austria were the basis for the deployment of activities in other countries. According to our calculations, the number of this network was about 2,000 members and candidates for membership of the OUN and about 4,000 supporters. Two thirds of them lived in Germany (Sych, 2017, 278).

During the period of 1948 – 1951, significant changes took place in the organizational network of the Foreign Units of the OUN, which were connected with the resettlement of temporarily relocated people to other European countries and overseas, which since 1948 had gained massive proportions. As a result, the organization weakened significantly in Europe and instead spread to the overseas countries. As of the beginning of 1951, the Foreign Units

of the OUN already operated in the following 9 countries: Germany, Austria, England, Belgium, France, Canada, the USA, Argentina, Australia. In a number of countries, such as Spain, Holland, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and Tunisia, there were only small centres or contact people (ACOUN(d), p. 1).

Each of these countries had its own specifics that influenced the development of the respective field organization. Thus, in particular, Germany and Austria, due to the mass emigration of the Ukrainians, ceased to be its main membership base. Instead, owing to the personnel of these two field organizations, foreign units were established in other countries of Europe, America, and Australia.

On this occasion, the former head of the Security Service (SS) of the Foreign Units of the OUN, Stepan Mudryk, recalled: "In 1948 – 1950, there was a mass emigration of the Ukrainians from IRO Germany, mostly to the USA, Canada, Argentina, and Australia. Even earlier, England, France, and Belgium took several thousand people from the camps of relocated people, which were called "DP", choosing the young and healthy ones. [...] In these years, there were members of the OUN in France, Belgium and England, who settled there and launched organized political activities in the countries" (Mudryk-Mechnyk, 1995, p. 49).

As a result of such processes, the field organization of Germany, in which in 1947 there were 1,388 members of the OUN, 135 candidates and 3,510 organized supporters (Sych, 2017, p. 270), in 1951, there were 190 members and 22 candidates (ACOUN(b), p. 2).

With the arrival in Great Britain from Italy of the members of the former Division 1 of the Ukrainian National Army (UNA), the most numerous network of the Foreign Units of the OUN was established in this area. At the beginning of 1951, there were 1,506 members, 32 candidate members and 652 organized supporters. Only in the organization of combatants, which was under its influence, there were 3,000 members (ACOUN(n), p. 1). At the same time, after that, Italy practically lost the opportunities for the Foreign Units organizational network development of the OUN.

Although much smaller in number, a well-structured and disciplined field organization was developed in Belgium. At the beginning of 1951, there were 178 members (ACOUN(k), p. 2). This increase became possible owing to a dense concentration of the Ukrainian workers in the country's coal mines.

Similarly, in France, the organizational network development of the Foreign Units of the OUN was also based on the Ukrainian working environment. However, due to the predominance of pre-war and less politically active emigration, it operated there only in places with a larger concentration of the Ukrainians. Accordingly, the membership of the OUN was small and weaker by the criterion of a political development. In 1951, there were 63 members of the OUN in France (ACOUN(l), p. 1).

Until 1948, in the USA and Canada, field organizations were counted only on paper, and the Organization was practically not active there. There was a whole set of reasons for this: 1. lack of an appropriate organizational personnel; 2. fear of local government sanctions for a political activity; 3. giving preference to work in legal public organizations; 4. the efforts of representatives of the internal organizational opposition from the UHVR to take control of these areas and cut them off from the influence of the Foreign Units of the OUN. The situation was changed by those who arrived at the end of 1948 – the first half of 1949, immigrants from Europe, mostly from Germany and Austria. And just after that in the second half of 1949 – 1950, an organizational network was established in the USA and Canada (ACOUN(d), p. 2). At the beginning of 1951, there were 393 members in the USA (ACOUN(e), p. 2), and

690 members in Canada (in the ranks of the League for the Liberation of Ukraine (LVU), as a “front” legal organization of the OUN) (ACOUN(c), p. 2). In view of an extremely large concentration of new Ukrainian immigrants from Europe, the state of Field Organizations was assessed as insufficient by the Foreign Units of the OUN.

In Argentina, the development of organizational network of the Foreign Units also began just in the spring of 1949, when the first leading members of the OUN arrived there from England and Austria. They first formed a temporary field organization, which was later transformed into a permanent one. In this country, there were difficulties in developing an organizational network: 1. vast expanses of the country and the spread of Ukrainian emigration there; 2. an absolute advantage (up to 90%) of pre-war labour emigration; 3. strong communist influences among it (ACOUN(d), p. 2). By the beginning of 1951, an organizational network of 24 people actually existed in the capital of the country, Buenos Aires, and its suburbs (ACOUN(g), pp. 4–8). Argentina’s field leadership also managed to establish correspondence with individual members of the OUN in Paraguay and Venezuela (ACOUN(d), p. 2).

In the second half of 1949, the first leading members of the OUN also arrived in Australia, who were tasked with establishing a field leadership and uniting the existing members of the Organization into an organizational network. In Australia, as in Argentina, similar difficulties were observed: the lack of a required number of leading membership, vast expanses of the country and a small number of the Ukrainian emigration scattered there (ACOUN(d), p. 2). However, in 1951 Australian field leadership also reported that in the organizational network there were 53 members and 32 organized supporters (ACOUN(m), p. 3).

Under the influence of objective factors, the organizational network of the Foreign Units of the OUN developed to a greater extent spontaneously than purposefully. In the Information for the Provid OUN in Ukraine, the Provid of the Foreign Units of the OUN was forced to state: “Such arrangement of our personnel happened and is happening regardless of our plans and most often contrary to them. It is caused primarily by the difficulties of living and earning conditions in European countries” (ACOUN(f), p. 1).

If we add to the already mentioned figures a small organizational unit of the Foreign Units of the OUN of eight people in Spain (ACOUN(a), p. 1) and active but only one Omelian Kushpet (ACOUN(j)) on the territory of Holland, in 1951, in total, in the Foreign Units of the OUN there were approximately 3,150 members and candidates for members of the OUN.

Having such an extensive organizational network and a human potential, the Foreign Units of the OUN continued to conduct all their activities from the point of view of the greatest possible promotion of the liberation struggle in Ukraine and the spread of its ideas among the Ukrainian emigration and local population. All their activities were divided into the following main areas: 1. among their own personnel, 2. among the Ukrainian emigration, and 3. among a foreign environment.

In turn, the work with the personnel was dominated by the following main priorities: a) a quantitative expansion of the organizational network in all countries of the Ukrainian emigration settlement; b) the so-called “personification of the organization”, i.e. the maximum involvement of people from Naddniprianshchyna in it; c) raising the political level of personnel through their systematic training.

Accordingly, the Provid of the Foreign Units of the OUN stated that as of the beginning of 1951 “today we constitute the most numerous, sufficiently disciplined and mobile political force in emigration”. Due to the active migration processes and membership spread, the case

of a systematic training experienced significant difficulties. At the same time, regular special trainings under separate programmes were conducted by the military reference office, SB and youth reference office (ACOUN(f), pp. 2–3).

Efforts to involve people from Naddniprianshchyna to the Organization were also quite successful. And although in the beginning there was resistance among some leading figures of the Foreign Units, in the end it was possible to overcome it, and according to the assessment of the Provid of the Foreign Units of the OUN “the people from Naddniprianshchyna included in the organizational ranks are a high-quality, politically developed element” (ACOUN(f), p. 2).

In addition to the organizational network, an influential system of legal public organizations was also developed through the efforts of the Foreign Units of the OUN. Usually, members and supporters of the OUN played a leading role in them. Among them, two categories can be conventionally distinguished – those that spread their activities to different countries and those that operated locally in some of them, taking into account local specifics.

The Union of Ukrainian Youth (SUM) belonged to the first category. Its cells operated in various countries and seriously strengthened the local organizations of the the Foreign Units of the OUN. At the beginning of 1951, the total number of members of the SUM was 7,000 people (ACOUN(f), p. 1). Omelian Koval, who headed this organization in Belgium, recalled that at the beginning of 1952, there were 1,000 members in this country (Koval, 206, p. 145).

The Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Peoples (ABN) was the same public organization with an inter-territorial nature of activity. It mainly acted as a tool for the implementation of tasks in a foreign environment. At that time, it already included representatives of national revolutionary formations from 20 post-Soviet and satellite countries: the Estonians, the Latvians, the Slovenians, the Serbs, the Albanians, the Ukrainians, the Georgians, the Azerbaijanis, the Bulgarians, the Croats, the Lithuanians, the Belarusians, the Slovaks, the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Romanians, the Armenians, the Cossacks, the Turkestans, the Idel-Urals and representatives from the Union of Caucasian Nations. In some countries, in particular in the USA, “Associations of the ABN supporters” were also formed. Given its composition, H. Riy reasonably characterizes the ABN as an “Eastern European anti-communist network” (Riy, 2021, p. 86).

Ya. Antoniuk and V. Trofymovych note that the SUM and the ABN were also included in the system of a close cooperation with other reference offices of the Foreign Units of the OUN Provid, including such special ones as the Reference Office of Communications (KZ) and SB (Antoniuk & Trofymovych, 2021, p. 114).

In Great Britain, as for locally influential public organizations, it became the Union of Ukrainians of Britain (SUB), in Belgium and France – the “Confederation of Ukrainian Free Professional Organizations” (KUVPO), and in Germany – the “Coordinating Centre of Ukrainian Public Institutions” (KOYTIY) (ACOUN(f), p. 4).

The experience of organizing the Ukrainian trade unions in Belgium and France seemed especially valuable. It even gained international significance, because for the first time representatives of a non-state people, such as the Ukrainians, managed to have their own branch in the international union of free labour unions. Later, representatives of other nations followed their example – the Poles, the Yugoslavs, the Hungarians, etc. (ACOUN(f), p. 4).

The general specificity of the organizations in the USA and Canada was the preference for external forms of action within the framework of legal political and social institutions. The already traditionally old emigration there was not divided into political parties according to the European tradition, but into “insurance and aid societies, which, having their own

press, compete with themselves, often wage an unhealthy religious struggle”. The Ukrainian organizations and societies of the old emigration in the USA were united in the Organization for the Defense of the Four Freedoms of Ukraine (OOChSU), and in Canada – in the Canadian-Ukrainian Committee (CUC). They were joined by associations of new emigration, through which the Foreign Units of the OUN tried to influence their policy, and ultimately these organizations began to “have a positive attitude towards the liberation struggle in Ukraine” (ACOUN(f), p. 8). At the same time, on the territory of Canada, the Foreign Units of the OUN managed to develop an influential and controlled public organization of the LVU independently.

In Argentina, the Polish Communist Party of Ukraine used Prosvita for public influence. Although it was not controlled by them, it was to some extent influenced by its local leading members. It was from the position of Prosvita that the members of the OUN overcame communist influences, which were based on the promotion of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR) as a true Ukrainian state. This made it possible for local communist activists to rally politically unaware Ukrainians around cultural and educational societies named after the cult Soviet figures such as Pavlo Tychyna, Mykola Shchors, etc. (ACOUN(f), p. 9).

In Australia community work was at a low level during the period under analysis. The Foreign Units of the OUN Provid noted that “in Australia, the current settlers are the first Ukrainian emigration to the country where the spread is large and the earnings are high. Because of that, there is little political activity” (ACOUN(f), p. 9). In 1950, the Association of Ukrainians of Australia (OUA) was founded there, but supporters of the Ukrainian Nationalist Party of Ukraine were a minority in it and did not influence its policy (ACOUN(m), p. 4). Instead, the local field organization contributed to an active development of the SUM, purchased a printing house and tried to have a public influence through the newspaper “Vilna Dumka” founded in 1949 (ACOUN(d), p. 2).

In general, during this period, the Foreign Units of the OUN developed a fairly extensive network of printed mass media. At the beginning of 1951, they already had 8 newspapers and magazines at their disposal: the monthly “Surma” in Germany, “Vyzvolny Shliakh” in Great Britain and “Visnyk OOChSU” in the USA; the weeklies “The Ukrainian Independent” in Germany, “The Ukrayinets Chas” in France, “The Homin of Ukraine” in Canada, “The National Tribune” in the USA, “Free Ukraine” in Argentina, “Free Thought” in Australia. The publications “Ukrainian Slovo”, the weekly “Prosvita” in Argentina, and the weekly “Lemkivshchyna” in Canada also held ideological and political positions close to the Foreign Units of the OUN. The SUM magazines “The Avanhard” and “The Voice of Youth” also exerted a significant educational influence on the Ukrainian youth. (ACOUN(f), p. 5).

In addition, as part of the activities of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Peoples (ABN), monthly magazines were published in foreign languages aimed at influencing foreigners: “ABN Korespondents” in English, German, French and Spanish; “The Ukrainian Information Service” in English; the library of monthly brochures in English “Library of Current World Affairs”. For some time in Belgium, the semi-monthly “The Voice of Ukraine” was also published in French, which was closed after the editor left for another place of residence (ACOUN(f), p. 5).

As K. Akymenko notes in his research, owing to such publications, and in particular to the commemorative practices widely used in them, “the connection and succession between the nationalist movement in the Motherland and in the diaspora were established” (Akymenko, 2022, p. 310).

In addition to the network of print media, two secret radio stations (“radio vysylni”) were established by the efforts of the Provid of the Foreign Units of the OUN in 1950 (Дві, 1950, 9). The first of them was of a rather experimental nature, operated under the name “Underground Ukraine” and broadcast only within the borders of Germany and England. The second and much more powerful one called “Radiovysylna named after Gen. Chuprynka” was launched in the Belgian Ardennes in December of the same year (ACOUN(f), p. 5).

O. Kushpeta recalled the details of preparatory actions regarding the installation of an underground radio station: “Due to the access I had to external Dutch intelligence, I agreed on the purchase of radio devices in Holland and conducting radio communication with Ukraine. Stepan Bandera and Stepan Lenkavskiy came to negotiate” (Sych, 2007, p. 136). An English specialist was engaged for the technical work during the installation of the radio station (Koval, 2016, pp. 142–143).

“Radiovysylna named after Gen. Chuprynka” broadcast its programmes at first twice a week, and then daily, including the territory of Ukraine. Having discovered its activities, the Soviet special services first tried to jam radio transmissions, but then the radio station switched to neighbouring waves. In the end, due to diplomatic means, in March of 1951, the Belgian police surrounded the location of the radio station, arrested its employees, and confiscated the equipment (ACOUN(f), p. 5).

According to O. Koval’s recollections, Yaroslav Stetsko came to Belgium as the Chairman of the Ukrainian State Board (UDP) to settle the situation at the political level. The author himself assisted him, presenting himself as a former political prisoner of the Nazi concentration camps. Ya. Stetskiv managed to hold a number of meetings with influential people in the state – “Count de Grün, close to the royal dynasty, M. De Foix the Chairman of the KhSParty and with the head of the Police for Foreigners”. In the end, at the court hearing, this case was qualified as an administrative offense, the detainees received only two months of arrest, and the equipment of the radio station was eventually returned to the owners (Koval, 2016, pp. 142–143).

From the end of April 1951, the Provid Radio of the OUN managed to restore the Ukrainian radio broadcasts from Madrid, which were carried out three times a week. For this purpose, the local representatives of the Foreign Units of the OUN turned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Spain and, having received the appropriate permission, established the Ukrainian branch of the local “Radio Nacional” (ACOUN(a), p. 1).

The Conclusions. In 1948 – 1951, the process of mass resettlement of the Ukrainians with the post-war status of relocated people within Europe and other overseas countries had a significant impact on the organizational development of the Foreign Units of the OUN. As a result, field organizations in Germany and Austria lost a significant number of members and ceased to be basic. After the resettlement of the former participants of Division 1 of the United National Army from Italy, the field organization of Great Britain became basic in Europe. At the same time, the process of resettlement made it possible to develop the Foreign Units of the OUN in the USA, Canada, Argentina, and Australia, which practically had not existed there before 1948. As tools of an external activity, the Foreign Units of the OUN also developed a wide system of legal public organizations, a network of printed mass media, organized their own underground radio station, and after its closure, the Ukrainian department as part of the Spanish radio station. This allowed them to effectively increase their public influence and spread the ideas of national liberation among the Ukrainian emigration and foreign citizens in the countries of settlement.

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**“INTOURIST” DEPARTMENT IN LVIV: LEGAL BASIS, ECONOMIC
CONDITION AND EXCURSION ACTIVITY (the mid-1960s)**

Abstract. *The purpose of the research is to determine legal basis, economic condition and excursion activity of “Intourist” department in Lviv in the mid-1960s. The research methodology is defined by an interdisciplinary approach (history, law, economics) and is based on general scientific and special scientific methods, first of all, retrospection and historical analysis. The scientific novelty of the research is that on the basis of the Central State Archive of Higher Authorities and Administration of Ukraine there have been reproduced the peculiarities of “Intourist” department activity in Lviv. The acquired information makes it possible to understand the principles of the tourism sphere functioning under the conditions of a full state control and refutes the stereotypes about the high level of provision and service of foreign citizens. The Conclusions. In the mid-1960s, the Soviet leadership focused on improving the country’s image among foreigners and increasing the management efficiency in the tourism sector: For this purpose, in particular, the Department of Foreign Tourism under the Council*

of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR was established. The All-Union joint-stock company "Intourist" operated in its structure, the department of which operated in Lviv. In the 1960s Lviv was inferior to several Ukrainian cities in terms of the number of tourists, but the number of foreign visitors grew every year. Obviously, their number could be significantly higher in the city, but there were objective reasons that inhibited the development of tourist activity (closedness of the country, artificial restrictions on visits to Lviv due to the "uncharitable" nature of many of its residents, impossibility of deviating from the approved route without special permission, constant problems in the service, etc.). Therefore, an integral part of the activities of "Intourist" was ideological and propaganda work with foreigners, aimed at eliminating the shortcomings of a domestic nature. Excursion routes were determined in such a way as to illustrate the "greatness of socialism". At the same time, the Department of Foreign Tourism sought to increase foreign currency income due to the stay of foreigners in Lviv. That is why, "Intourist" focused on selling of souvenirs in currency, but their variety was limited and did not meet the needs of tourists. A similar situation arose with the sale of jewelry, besides, the packaging and labelling of such goods left much to be desired. Since the supply of services did not meet the demand of tourists, a "shadow market"/speculative trade developed outside the walls of "Intourist". Despite all the difficulties, the economic and financial condition of the Lviv department of "Intourist" was better than in other regional branches of the company. The management efficiency in the tourism industry was reduced by the lack of a competition and the command-administrative economy, which restricted the freedom of activity and made the initiatives dependent on the decisions of the centre. A promising direction of the research remains the study of the so called "individual work" with foreign tourists and the practice of office power abuse by "Intourist" employees.

Key words: foreign tourism, "Intourist", propaganda, excursions, legal status, economic development, deficit.

ВІДДІЛЕННЯ "ІНТУРИСТ" У ЛЬВОВІ: ПРАВОВІ ЗАСАДИ ФУНКЦІОНУВАННЯ, ГОСПОДАРСЬКИЙ СТАН ТА ЕКСКУРСІЙНА ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ (середина 1960-х рр.)

Анотація. *Мета дослідження* – визначення правових засад діяльності, особливостей господарського розвитку та організації екскурсій відділенням ВАТ "Інтурист" у Львові у середині 1960-х рр. **Методологія дослідження** визначається міждисциплінарним підходом (історія, право, економіка) і базується на загальнонаукових і спеціально-наукових методах, передусім ретроспекції та історичного аналізу. **Наукова новизна дослідження** полягає у тому, що на основі документів Центрального державного архіву вищих органів влади та управління України відтворено особливості діяльності відділення ВАТ "Інтурист" у Львові. Набута інформація дає можливість зрозуміти принципи функціонування туристичної сфери в умовах повного державного контролю та спростовує усталені стереотипи про високий рівень забезпечення й обслуговування іноземних громадян. **Висновки.** У середині 1960-х рр. совєтське керівництво перейнялося поліпшенням іміджу країни серед іноземців та збільшенням ефективності господарювання в туристичній сфері. З цією метою, зокрема, було утворене Управління з іноземного туризму при Раді Міністрів Української РСР. У його системі діяло Всесоюзне акціонерне товариство "Інтурист", відділення якого функціонувало у Львові. Хоч за кількістю туристів у 1960-х рр. Львів поступався декільком українським містам, чисельність іноземних відвідувачів з кожним роком зростала. Вочевидь, їхня чисельність у місті могла бути суттєво більшою, проте існували об'єктивні причини, які гальмували розвиток туристичної активності (закритість країни, штучні обмеження візитів до Львова через "неблагонадійність" багатьох його мешканців, неможливість без спеціального дозволу відхилитися від затвердженого маршруту, хронічні проблеми у сфері обслуговування тощо). Отже, невід'ємною частиною діяльності "Інтуристу" виступала ідеологічно-пропагандистська робота з іноземцями, покликана нівелювати недоліки побутового характеру. Екскурсійні маршрути визначались у такий спосіб, щоб показати "велич соціалізму". Водночас Управління з іноземного туризму прагнуло збільшити валютні надходження від перебування іноземців у Львові. Саме тому значну увагу в "Інтуристі" приділяли продажам сувенірів за валюту, проте їхній вибір був обмеженим і не відповідав запитам туристів. Подібна ситуація склалася і з продажем

ювелірних виробів, до того ж, проблемним залишалося упакування і маркування таких товарів. Оскільки пропозиція послуг не задовольняла попит, поза стінами "Інтуристу" розвивувався "чорний ринок" / спекулятивна торгівля. Попри всі труднощі, господарсько-фінансовий стан львівського відділення "Інтурист" був кращим, аніж в інших регіональних відділеннях товариства. Ефективність господарювання у туристичній галузі знижувалася відсутністю конкуренції та особливостями командно-адміністративної економіки, яка звужувала свободу діяльності, ставила їхні ініціативи у залежність від рішень центру. Перспективним напрямом дослідження залишається вивчення "індивідуальної роботи" з іноземними туристами та практики службових зловживань працівниками "Інтуристу".

Ключові слова: іноземний туризм, "Інтурист", пропаганда, екскурсії, правовий статус, господарський розвиток, дефіцит.

The Problem Statement. During the post-Stalin period ("Khrushchov thaw") political changes in the Soviet Union, in particular the declaration of the principle of "a peaceful coexistence of two systems", directly affected the development of a foreign tourism. The communist regime became obsessed with improving its image in the international arena suddenly, seeking for forming a positive image of the socialist system among tourists (Siromskiy, 2018 – 2019, p. 243). There is no need to talk about the observance of human rights in such a context (Siromska, H., Gaivoroniuk, N., 2023, p. 285). Due to the "closedness" of the country, the number of foreigners who visited the USSR was small. The world "tourist revolution" of the 1950s acquired a peculiar character in the country – it was not so much about creating new educational routes or expanding the geography of tourists, but about effective propaganda work and increasing financial income to the state treasury (Assipova, Minnaert, p. 218). In the 1950s and 1960s, if it were not paradoxical, but the Soviet officials even began to study the experience of other countries in the development of tourism, including outside the "iron curtain" (this is confirmed by analytical notes on the development of tourism in Czechoslovakia, France, Spain, etc.). However, the management system, based on the state ownership and a rigid centralized planning, prevented the implementation of many initiatives. How it looked in practice, let's take a look at the activity of the Lviv branch of the All-Union Joint Stock Company (JSC) "Intourist" in the mid-1960s.

The Review of Sources and Recent Researches. The issue raised in the article is insufficiently covered in historical research. However, some of its aspects, primarily the economic activity of "Intourist" and the role of propaganda, were elucidated in the researches by the Ukrainian scholar Olha Radchenko (Радченко, 2013). The researches by Zhanna Assipova and Lynn Minnaert are important (Assipova, Minnaert, 2014), and Andrii Kozovoi (Kozovoi, 2014), which focused on the Soviet policy in the field of foreign tourism. Some components of the issue, in particular, the regulation of tourist activities, personnel policy of "Intourist", control over foreign tourists by the State Security Committee (KGB) were studied by the authors of this article (Сіромський, 2019; Сіромська, 2021).

The research is based on the documents of the Central State Archive of the higher authorities and administration of Ukraine in Kyiv (The Central State Archive of Higher Authorities and Administration of Ukraine – далі CSAHAAU). The key in this case was the Fund of the Department of Foreign Tourism under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, which contains correspondence of the management of the Lviv branch of "Intourist" with higher authorities, years reports, minutes of republican meetings, certificates, development plans, reports, etc.

The purpose of the article is to determine the legal basis of activity, features of economic development and the organization of excursions by the branch of VAT "Intourist" in Lviv.

The Results of the Research. In 1955, a new charter of VAT “Intourist” was approved – a monopolist organization responsible for receiving foreign tourists. The institutional transformation of the tourism sphere reflected a change in the state course aimed not only at strengthening the role of tourism within the economic complex, but also using it as a component of the state’s foreign policy (Zake, 2018, p. 44). In 1964, “Intourist” was removed from the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Foreign Trade and incorporated into the structure of the newly created Department of Foreign Tourism under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The Administration established in the Ukrainian SSR was subordinated to the Republican Council of Ministers and the All-Union Main Directorate for Foreign Tourism under the Council of Ministers (Siromska, 2021, p. 54). In the spirit of the times, the administration was given the task of “implementing the party and government directives on inbound and outbound tourism in the Ukrainian SSR, ensuring a constant control over the implementation of these directives by Intourist branches and agencies, ministries, departments” (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 3, pp. 22–23).

In the Ukrainian SSR “Intourist” had a number of regional offices, one of which operated in Lviv. In 1940, one of the oldest hotels in the city – Hotel “George” in Mickiewicz street, 1 was renamed “Lviv” and entered into the hotel chain of “Intourist” OJSC (Lemko, Mykhalyk, Behliarov, 2009, p. 60). At the time, its main clients were, as a rule, representatives of the delegations of the social camp countries who visited the city (Poland, Czechoslovakia). Changes in the tourism industry in the 1960s, initiated by the top Soviet leadership, led to the development of the infrastructure of the “Intourist” and “Suputnyk” branches (Kozovoi, 2014, p. 57). In the mid-1960s the priority tasks of the Lviv branch of OJSC “Intourist” were: construction of a new hotel, overhaul of an old hotel, construction of motels and campsites for the reception of foreign citizens. In addition, the management recommended establishing permanent control over the quality of service provision, studying the demand of foreign tourists, organizing advertising of goods for sale, etc. (Assipova, Minnaert, 2014, p. 221).

The field of service in the USSR/UkrSSR was relatively less developed than in Western, or even socialist countries, such as Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria or Yugoslavia. In the development of tourist infrastructure, the Office of Foreign Tourism focused on the situation in Kyiv, Odesa and Yalta. In the 1960s, Lviv was not considered a priority tourist destination, even despite its historical and cultural wealth. This fact can be explained by various reasons, one of which is the “political distrust” of Lviv residents, which greatly disturbed the state security authorities (Siromskyyi, 2021). In terms of the number of foreign tourists received in 1964 – 1965, the city was inferior to Kyiv, Odesa, Yalta and Uzhhorod (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 4, p. 23). For example, in 1964, the Lviv “Intourist” serviced 9,766 foreign tourists (a third of 3,662 were car tourists; 906 stayed at a campsite). Among them, tourists from “capitalist countries” – 2,725, “people’s democracies”, i.e. the socialist countries – 7,041 people. The increase in arrivals of foreign tourists to Lviv in 1964, compared to 1963, amounted to 29% (from socialist countries by 139%). Traditionally, the largest number of foreigners visited the city in the summer. From the middle to the second half of the 1960s, the number of foreign tourists in Lviv constantly increased: in 1968 – 19.4 thousand, in 1970 – 25.9 thousand, in 1972 – 32.8 thousand, and as of in 1979, in terms of the number of foreign tourists, Lviv was second only to Kyiv (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 7, p. 35). Obviously, the number of tourists could have been greater, but the closed borders for many categories of people wishing to visit the USSR/UkrSSR, the lack of hotel rooms and problems in the field of service stood in the way of the tourism sector development (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 7, p. 39).

What was planned to show foreigners in Lviv? The tourist guide published in 1961 contained 46 objects for display, it began with a preface and a photo of the monument named after Volodymyr Lenin. Brief information about the airport and the central railway station – “one of the best in the republic” was included. The compilers focused on the “Intourist” hotel at Mickiewicz, 1 Square and its history. In the guidebook, among the architectural monuments, there were the city council building (Town Hall), the historical museum, the museum of ethnography and artistic craft, the art gallery, the main building of the Lviv University, the opera and ballet theatre, the palace of pioneers (Svobody Prospect, 18), the monuments named after Adam Mickiewicz, tankers, etc. Interestingly, the list of objects for display also included churches, such as St. George’s Cathedral. However, the emphasis is not on the value of the baroque architecture and sculptural compositions of the temple, but on marginal events in the style of communist propaganda: “In 1921, in the basement of one of the buildings of the cathedral, without informing its owners, there took place an illegal convention (a very bold statement – *H. S., R. S.*) of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine” (Pashuk, Derkach, 1961, p. 129). The main goal of excursion programmes for foreigners was to get acquainted with “socialist achievements”. The guide began each tour with information about the country, its system, the role of the Communist Party, an inextricable connection between the Ukrainian and Russian history, plans for the next five-year plan (Radchenko, 2013, p. 109).

In 1965, it was decided to add new tourist facilities. At the time, in Lviv 85 objects were approved for showing to foreign tourists. Of them: 21 – industrial enterprises, 9 – higher educational institutions and libraries, 9 – museums, 21 – schools; 7 – kindergartens and nurseries, 5 – medical institutions, 5 – sports arenas, 5 – cultural centres, 5 – other facilities. The excursion routes were arranged in advance and any initiative and “self-activity” were not welcome. In 1966, the main excursion route was revised, which included new buildings of the city and “places of revolutionary glory” (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 23, p. 52). For example, in a later guide published later, special emphasis was on the “unforgettable autumn of 1939”, “the awarding of the city with the Order of Lenin” (Shved, 1971, p. 124).

Every year, in April the Regional Department of Trade, the Regional Commune Farm and JSC “Intourist” were tasked with checking the readiness of hotels, restaurants, camping sites, car service stations to welcome foreign tourists. After the inspection, Kyiv management gave a certain time to eliminate the drawbacks (usually it was possible to partially repair the furniture or sanitary equipment) (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 4, p. 18). A typical defect recorded in the Lviv branch of OJSC “Intourist” is a malfunction of buses for the transportation of tourists. For example, as of 1966, in the Lviv bus fleet 10 out of 23 buses were broken and there were not enough spare parts for their repair; the others had an “unsightly appearance” (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 23, p. 8). Before the opening of the tourist season (May 1), the Council of Ministers traditionally set the task of completing road works to ensure the normal passage of motorists: eliminate spring deformations, to fill potholes, to equip detours in the places of work, to improve landscaping in populated areas on tourist routes, to update road signs (these were constant wishes in Lviv and Stryi). However, it was not always possible to eliminate the shortcomings in full. In 1965 the government commission that inspected the condition of roads in Lviv region recorded the unsatisfactory condition of the Lviv-Mykolaiv and Lviv-Shehyni roads (“deformation of the road surface, which made it difficult for vehicles to move normally, the settlements near the highway are not in order, the passage through Lviv is not ensured relevant road pointers”) (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 7, p. 37).

No less acute was the issue of gas stations (gas stations) on the roads leading to Lviv. At one of the meetings on tourism, the representative of Holovnaftozbut A. Khlebnikov

drew attention to the fact that in the entire Ukrainian SSR as of 1965 there were only 103 gas stations (of which 15 were in Kyiv), while there were 100 in one Moscow, and about 4 thousand in the Netherlands. Of the mentioned 103 gas stations, only 25 were “designated” to operate for foreign tourists. There was a constant lack of gasoline at Lviv gas stations #1 and #2: instead of eight, there were only three types of gasoline at gas station #1, and six – at gas station #2 (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 7, p. 37). In order to refuel the car, a foreigner had to go to the city to get a special fueling ticket. Therefore, natural questions arise: What if the gas ran out? Wasn’t it more logical to issue such a ticket at the border?

Employees of the hotel and restaurant of the Lviv branch of “Intourist” faced a considerable number of problems. There was allocation issue of refrigeration equipment, coffee machines, cutlery, high-quality dishes, high-quality bed linen, menu cards in a foreign language (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 23, p. 47). A relatively small number of a service personnel spoke foreign languages, the service personnel did not have uniforms, badges, etc. How did the Foreign Tourism Office try to solve these problems? Mostly by administrative means: regional offices were tasked with bringing restaurants and cafes designed to serve foreign tourists into a proper condition, and when even this seemed insufficient, in 1966 they increased the prices for foreign tourists staying at hotels (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 19, p. 109).

The Lviv branch of “Intourist” had problems with providing vegetables and fruits. There was a constant demand for national dishes, fish delicacies, and confectionery (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 4, p. 46). Also, from time to time, there were problems in the supply of chicken and salmon in the “Intourist” branch. For example, as of 1965, the restaurant needed the supply of 1.5–2 tons of salmon per quarter, and the actual supply was 25–30% of what was needed. A similar situation was observed with the provision of dry wine: Zakarpattia riesling wine, Naddniprianske wine, Berehivske wine, Oksamyt Ukrainy wine, and Promenyste riesling wine were supplied infrequently, usually until May 1 or November 7 – i.e., on the occasion of the Bilshovyk holidays. The situation with cognacs (fortified wine) was almost the same. The head of the Lviv branch of “Intourist” H. Kozlov complained about this: “We get three-star cognacs. Vintage Ukrainian cognacs are supplied very rarely and in insufficient quantities” (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 23, p. 47). The Kyiv leadership had its own vision of the problem: insufficient resources for the purchase of the necessary and “the use of delicacies not for their intended purpose” (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 23, p. 54). We can assume that abuse of official position did take place, but this fact does not explain a significant shortage of products.

It is worth noting that the Kyiv leadership also saw systemic drawbacks in the service of foreign tourists. Volodymyr Boichenko, the chairman of the board of OJSC “Intourist” admitted: “There is no company paper, no company envelopes, etc. in the hotels. There is no even toilet paper in the hotel in Lviv. Dim light bulbs in the toilets” (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 23, p. 104). In Resolution No. 6 of the Department of Foreign Tourism of the Ukrainian SSR dated December 25, 1965 it was stated: “In a number of hotels of the Ministry for Communal Economy of the Ukrainian SSR that serve foreign tourists, luggage trays are not provided, there are no foreign currency exchange points and urgent laundry, dry cleaning, and repair clothes and shoes, service personnel do not have uniforms. In many hotels there are no service bureaus, and where they operate, their work is poorly organized. There were cases when foreigners were accommodated in rooms that did not correspond to the class of the purchased tour” (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 6, p. 9).

The requirements for the service of foreign tourists in the Ukrainian SSR did not meet the challenges of the time. A number of norms were established as early as 1948, in particular

the frequency of changing bed linen and towels in the rooms. At the time, there was no understanding of what a "Lux" room should look like. The above mentioned V. Boichenko emphasized: "In all rooms, where the price is 25 kr. (luxury), after two hours the maid should come in and change the towel... The bedclothes should be starched" (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 23, p. 103). Vadym Kryvoruchenko, deputy head of the Department of Foreign Tourism of the Ukrainian SSR, admitted that "hotel hunger forces customers to take what they are given and say 'Thank you'". At the time, the occupancy rate of hotels in socialist countries, in particular, in Czechoslovakia was 54%, in Yugoslavia – 63%, while in the USSR – 93% (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 23, p. 86).

In 1965 the analysis of complaints in the Lviv "Intourist" is interesting – there were four of them (in 1964 – 12) and all of them related to an improper service in the restaurant: a tactless behaviour with customers, a careless serving, tasteless dishes, lack of salads and poorly prepared barbecue (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 10, p. 183). Usually, those involved in such complaints were deprived of their bonuses. However, a positive feedback about the work of "Intourist" was also recorded, such as feedback from the Prague regional committee of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship or the board of the Shestayovits agricultural cooperative (Siromska, 2021, p. 113).

In the documents of the Department of Foreign Tourism of the Ukrainian SSR, we record constant reports about the insufficient attention of the regional offices of "Intourist" to the trade in souvenirs, which was considered as a source of foreign currency income. In 1963 in the Ukrainian SSR, the actual revenue of foreign currency was only 9.1 thousand dollars. In 1964, as a result of the opening of ten new points of trade in souvenirs in foreign currency, revenues reached 72.5 thousand dollars (50% of the income were sent to the budget of the republic) (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 4, p. 20). But even despite the visible increase in income, the situation with souvenir trade did not look too optimistic. The assortment of souvenirs was limited – locally made caskets and statuettes of eagles predominated (by the way, a similar situation with the provision of souvenirs existed throughout the Soviet Union (Kozovoi, 2014, p. 58)). Foreign tourists, mainly representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora, lamented the lack of Ukrainian national souvenirs, photo albums with photos of the city's architectural monuments. Also, in limited quantities, goods that were in demand among tourists arrived in Lviv, for example, radio receivers, fountain pens, cognac (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 7, p. 40).

In Lviv, trade in cash currency was paid comparatively much attention, and the local branch of "Intourist" demonstrated better results than, for example, branches in Kharkiv and Yalta. In 1968, Yalta together with Simferopol gave 33 thousand dollars to the treasury (20 thousand foreign tourists), and Lviv – 36 thousand dollars (11 thousand tourists) and this despite the fact that in the Crimea there was a special store and a stall for trading in cash currency, and in Lviv there was only a stall at the hotel (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 23, p. 18). The Department for Foreign Tourism of the Ukrainian SSR encouraged expanding the list of provided services. In all hotel rooms there was such an unpretentious list – printed in Russian, Ukrainian and English. Additional services could be unscheduled excursions, language translation, car rental, organization of festive dinners (evenings), provision of hotel rooms for relatives of visitors, trips outside the city to nature (included food, entertainment games), etc. (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 23, pp. 21–22). In the documents of that time, we also find radical ideas aimed at earning additional money – not to install televisions in the rooms, but to provide them for a separate fee. In the report of the Lviv branch of

“Intourist” we also find such additional services as: extension of the tour, provision of higher class rooms, sale of theatre and cinema tickets (foreign tourists were served by the Shchors cinema, in which there were the Soviet films on). (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 23, p. 53). In 1965, the Lviv branch of OJSC “Intourist” received the equivalent of 8,144 krb 40 kopicks for additional services provided to foreigners (as compared to branches in Kyiv, Uzhhorod and the Crimea which received higher revenues) (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 15, p. 6).

“Jewelirtorg” and insufficient advertising of its products were periodically criticized. One of its employees, N. Polkovnykova, lamented at a special meeting in Kyiv: “What is preventing the development of trade? These are the prices... This is the processing, packaging and labelling of the product. Trade is also held back by the lack of proper conditions for work... We have colossal expenses for renting premises in hotels. Why do we have to pay for the rental of the stall space? That’s wrong” (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 23, pp. 96–97). As for the situation in Lviv, Polkovnykova noted that here “in stalls there are open displays (of jewelry products), but security is poor, so these products are hidden at night” (CSAHAAU, f. 4672, d. 1, c. 7, p. 19).

The Conclusions. Therefore, the legal principles of functioning and financial and economic activity of the Lviv branch of OJSC “Intourist” were strictly regulated by the Department of Tourism under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. This regulation led to dependence on the centre in many matters and reduced the efficiency of management. Although a material condition of economic facilities that made up the “Intourist” complex in Lviv (hotel, restaurant, camping) was better than that of the majority of the regional branches of the company, there were many shortcomings. They tried to solve them, as a rule, administratively, which did not always bring the desired results. Since OJSC “Intourist” was a monopoly in serving foreigners, the lack of competition restrained radical changes in the tourism industry. In the mid-1960s a certain increase in the attention of the Soviet leadership to the state of tourism allowed the Lviv branch of JSC “Intourist” to implement or plan some infrastructure projects (for example, the construction of a new hotel complex for foreign tourists). The number of foreign tourists in Lviv grew from year to year, but the development of tourism was held back by an insufficient material base, not a high level of customer service and the fact that the Soviet Union was behind the “Iron Curtain”.

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**NATURE PROTECTION ACTIVITY IN THE WESTERN REGION
OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR: ON THE EXAMPLE
OF IVANO-FRANKIVSK REGION (the 1960s – 1980s)**

Abstract. *The purpose of the research is to characterize the funding mechanism and entire set of measures, as well as accumulated experience of the public in the field of nature protection and a rational use of natural resources Ivano-Frankivsk region of the western region of the Ukrainian SSR, based on archival materials and researches. The research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, objectivity, and systematicity. When conducting the research, general scientific (analysis and synthesis, abstraction) and specifically scientific methods were used. The scientific novelty consists in the fact that based on the study of the perspective plans for the economy development in Ivano-Frankivsk region, the main resolutions of the communist party and the government, the relevant orders of the regional executive committee, the funding mechanism and a set of activities carried out by the public and relevant organizations for nature protection were revealed: improvement of the protected area, an effective use land, construction of sewage treatment plants, dust and gas treatment plants, establishment of water*

protection zones, bank strips of small rivers, improvement of forestry and hunting management. **The Conclusions.** Interdepartmental Council for Environmental Protection under the Regional Executive Committee, Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Organization of the Ukrainian Society for Nature Protection, Regional Inspectorate for Nature Protection, a voluntary association of hunters and fishermen, posts of public control, pedagogical teams of secondary schools, squads of "blue" guards, "green" patrols carried out a constant control over industrial enterprises, organizations, collective farms, state farms for the implementation of complex measures, which had a positive effect on improving the ecological situation. Similar measures, to one degree or another, were carried out in all regions of the republic and the western region of the Ukrainian SSR, with the difference that the Carpathian Mountains added some features to Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Transcarpathian and Chernivtsi regions. Along with this, in the matter of nature protection and rational use of natural resources in Ivano-Frankivsk, as well as in other regions, there were significant shortcomings. In the USSR nature protection was declared a national and national issue, and significant success in this matter was officially declared. The Soviet propaganda tried to create the illusion that the party and the government care about the protection of the environment and the health of citizens. However, the priority tasks remained the development of the region's heavy industry, a maximum use of natural and human resources for the country's military and industrial complex.

Key words: nature protection, ecology, Western Region of Ukraine, Ivano-Frankivsk Region, economic development plans.

ПРИРОДООХОРОННА ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ У ЗАХІДНОМУ РЕГІОНІ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ РСР: НА ПРИКЛАДІ ІВАНО-ФРАНКІВСЬКОЇ ОБЛАСТІ (1960 – 1980-ті рр.)

Анотація. Мета дослідження – на основі архівних матеріалів і літератури охарактеризувати механізм фінансування та весь комплекс проведених заходів, а також напрацьований досвід громадськості у справі охорони природи і раціонального використання природних ресурсів в Івано-Франківській області західного регіону Української РСР. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на принципах історизму, об'єктивності, системності. При проведенні дослідження застосовувались загальнонаукові (аналіз і синтез, абстрагування) та конкретно наукові методи. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що на основі вивчення перспективних планів розвитку економіки Івано-Франківської області, основних постанов партії і уряду, відповідних розпоряджень облвиконкому розкрито механізм фінансування та комплекс заходів, проведених громадськістю й відповідними організаціями з охорони природи: удосконалення заповідної справи, ефективного використання земель, будівництво очисних споруд, пилогазоочисних установок, встановлення водоохоронних зон, прибережних смуг малих рік, удосконалення ведення лісового і мисливського господарства. **Висновки.** Міжвідомча рада охорони навколишнього середовища при облвиконкомі, Івано-Франківська обласна організація Українського товариства охорони природи, обласна інспекція охорони природи, добровільне товариство мисливців та рибалок, пости громадського контролю, педагогічні колективи загальноосвітніх шкіл, загони "голубих" дозорців, "зелені" патрулі вели постійний контроль на промислових підприємствах, організаціях, колгоспах, радгоспах за виконанням комплексних заходів, що позитивно впливало на поліпшення екологічної ситуації. Аналогічні заходи тією чи тією мірою проводилися в усіх областях республіки та західного регіону УРСР з відмінністю, що гори Карпати вносили свої особливості у Івано-Франківській, Львівській, Закарпатській і Чернівецькій областях. Водночас у справі охорони природи і раціонального використання природних ресурсів в Івано-Франківській, як і в інших областях, мали місце істотні недоліки. Охорона природи в СРСР проголошувалася справою загальнодержавною та загальнонародною, офіційно декларувалися значні успіхи в цьому питанні. Радянська пропаганда намагалася створити ілюзію піклування партії і уряду про охорону навколишнього середовища та здоров'я громадян. Проте пріоритетними завданнями залишалися розвиток важкої промисловості регіону, максимальне використання природних і людських ресурсів для військово-промислового комплексу країни.

Ключові слова: охорона природи, екологія, західний регіон України, Івано-Франківська область, плани розвитку економіки.

The Problem Statement. In 1960 – 1980, in Ivano-Frankivsk region, as well as in the western region of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR), industrialization of industry and agriculture took place at an accelerated pace. The region became a regional centre for the production of oil, gas, potash salts, and forest processing. Power plants, plants, and factories were put into operation, which replaced artisanal production. In 1960 – 1965 the development of capital investments reached record figures – 2 billion 319 krb at Kalush Chemical and Technological Plant (SAIFR, f. P–1, d. 1, c. 2427, p. 88). In the eighth five-year plan (1966 – 1970), in Ivano-Frankivsk region, the development of state capital investments amounted to the following figures: electricity production – 1 billion 771 million krb., chemical industry – 1 billion 535 million krb., oil production – 1 billion 255 million krb., oil refinery – 992 million krb. In the ninth five-year plan (1971 – 1975): oil production industry – 1 billion 497 million krb., chemical industry – 835.5 million krb., oil refining industry – 623 million krb. At the same time, 91.4 million krb. were allocated for forestry, forestry and woodworking, 74 million krb. – for light industry, 39.3 million krb. – for meat and dairy industry, and 23 million krb. – for food industry (SAIFR, f. P–1, d. 1, c. 2427, p. 46).

In 1959 – 1975, development of the state capital investments in the economic sectors of Ivano-Frankivsk region of the Ukrainian SSR amounted to 17 billion 206 million krb. Industry increased its capacities and, accordingly, the pollution of atmospheric air, rivers, and soil grew steadily and reached a critical limit.

From numerous information on the implementation of resolutions of the central committee of the communist party of Ukraine (CC CPU) and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (CM of the Ukrainian SSR), it is possible to outline a complete picture of the measures taken and the funds allocated by the state. Thus, in the ninth five-year plan (1971 – 1975), only 19 million krb. were used for environmental protection measures in Ivano-Frankivsk region of the Ukrainian SSR (SAIFR, f. P–1, d. 1, c. 4152, p. 26). These figures testify to the real state of affairs – 1.6% for nature protection. If we also take into account non-target revenues, it is within the range of 3 – 5%.

How were complex plans implemented at local places regarding the resolutions of the party and the Soviet government on nature protection and a rational use of natural resources in the Ivano-Frankivsk region? What was the accumulated experience of the public and its role in the development of tourism in Ukraine?

The Review of Recent Researches and Publications. Environmental and social policy in the process of implementing reforms in Ukraine was analysed in dissertations by Ruslan Chyhur (Chyhur, 2003) Maria Potabenko (Potabenko, 2004), Mykhailo Bolotskyi (Bolotskyi, 2006), Yuriy Humen (Humen, 2008), Oksana Lenevych (Lenevych, 2017) and the others. The scholars characterized the preconditions for the deterioration of an ecological situation, in particular in the western Ukrainian regions. A scholar Serhii Vasiuta made a significant contribution to the study of socio-ecological problems “Soviet Ecocide in Ukraine: Historical Origins and Overcoming Difficulties” (Vasiuta, 2000). The researcher suggested the method of studying environmental problems by creating an interdisciplinary system of analysis of crisis phenomena. The ecological movement development was analysed in the research by Maria Aleksiiievets “Ecological Movement in Ukraine” (Aleksiiievets, 1999). The theoretical and methodological principles of political science research on environmental problems in the light of the latest developments in the state’s environmental security are covered in Olha Vasiuta’s monograph “Problems of Ukraine’s Ecological Strategy in the Context of Global Development” (Vasiuta, 2001) and the others.

On December 13 – 14, 2022 in the village of Stara Huta, Ivano-Frankivsk region, the scientific practical conference “The First Winter Readings in Siniokhor” was held (Danylko & Shparyk, 2023) dedicated to topical issues of nature protection, energy and environmental security of Ukraine. The materials of the conference present the results of scientific research in various areas of science and environmental protection legislation against the background of global challenges. The history of the study of these issues in the European context is quite long, as evidenced by numerous scholars’ publications (Prędko, 1999); (Olive, Marion, 2009); (Wimpey, Marion, 2010); (Švajda, Korony, Brighton, Michael Esser, 2016); (Amodio, Cerdà, Aucelli, Garfi, 2019); (Sidor, 2020) and the others. We used some methodological aspects for the study of this issue from the works of Volodymyr Sabadukha and Mychailo Kosylo (Sabadukha & Kosylo, 2022), Mykola Haliv and Vasyl Ilnytskyi (Haliv & Ilnytskyi, 2023).

The purpose of the research is to characterize the funding mechanism and entire set of measures, as well as accumulated experience of the public in the field of nature protection and a rational use of natural resources Ivano-Frankivsk region of the western region of the Ukrainian SSR, based on archival materials and researches.

The Research Results. The focus on environmental protection problems in the republic on the part of the party and the government began to be declared at the end of the 1960s actively, when the consequences of an industrial and agricultural industrialization caused concern and alarm among not indifferent public. Thus, “according to the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR No. 568 “On Organization of New State Reserves in the Ukrainian SSR” dated February 12, 1968, the Carpathian State Reserve with a total area of 12.7 thousand hectares was organized (on the territory of Zakarpattia region – 6.9 thousand hectares and Ivano-Frankivsk region – 5.8 thousand hectares). According to the commission initiative of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR on nature protection, the directorate of the reserve was established in the town of Rakhiv” (Maliarchuk, 2023, p. 344). A number of resolutions of the central committee of the communist party of Ukraine and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, the central committee of the communist party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were aimed at strengthening nature protection and improving the use of natural resources: Resolutions No. 191 dated April 28, 1972, No. 223 dated May 8, 1973, No. 439 dated September 9, 1975, No. 166 dated April 9, 1976, No. 326 dated June 20, 1977, No. 984 dated December 1 1978, No. 36 of January 23, 1979 and the others.

Pursuant to Resolution No. 191 of the central committee of the communist party of Ukraine “On Measures to Protect Air Basin from Emissions by Industrial Enterprises for 1972 – 1975” dated April 28, 1972, a number of measures were taken to protect atmospheric air from pollution by industrial gas emissions in Ivano-Frankivsk region enterprises, construction of dust collection and gas cleaning facilities. In particular, the boiler rooms at Vyhoda woodworking plant and Kolomyia brewery plant were switched from a solid fuel to gas, and at Bovshiv sugar factory and Otyniansky furniture factory – from a solid fuel to fuel oil. At Ivano-Frankivsk cement and slate plant, a system of shaking bag filters using vibrators was implemented, bag filters were reconstructed. A number of other measures aimed at reducing dustiness of air pool in the vicinity of the plant were implemented. At the Nadvirna oil refinery, a cyclone furnace for burning harmful waste from synthetic fatty acid workshop and a flare plant for burning harmful gases were put into operation. In the city of Ivano-Frankivsk, the construction of a bypass road for transit vehicles was carried out, with the introduction of which air pollution in the city with exhaust gases by cars was

supposed to decrease. Much was done in the collective farms and state farms of the region, albeit belatedly, to ensure a proper storage and use of pesticides. There were 197 warehouses of toxic chemicals in farms, of which 179 were typical. In addition to the measures listed above, other measures aimed at the protection and rational use of natural resources were implemented. In particular, a fish nursery for herbivorous fish was built at the Burshtynska DRES, which was foreseen by the resolution of the Central Committee of the communist party of Ukraine and the Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR No. 223 dated May 8, 1973. In 1976, an experimental workshop for the production of ash gravel from solid waste was built at this enterprise (SAIFR, f. R–295, d. 5, c. 4449, pp. 16–17).

In implementation of the resolution of the central committee of the communist party of Ukraine and the Republic of Ukraine No. 439 “On Organization of Implementation of the Central Committee of the CPSU Resolution dated May 29, 1975. The regional committee and the regional executive committee adopted joint Resolution No. 388 of November 18, 1975 “On the State of Pollution of Atmosphere, Soil, Land and Sea Waters and Further Measures to Improve Nature Protection”, which approved measures to strengthen nature protection and improve the use of natural resources for 1975 – 1980. Pursuant to this resolution, the regional executive committee and regional nature protection services established a daily control. The most important were considered to be: putting into operation the treatment facilities of Ivano-Frankivsk fine organic synthesis plant; production of technical passports for 250 artesian wells; implementation of planned tasks for draining waterlogged lands; soil protection against erosion; completion of the construction of important environmental protection facilities at Kalush Industrial Association “Chlorvinyl” (SAIFR, f. R–295, d. 5, c. 4449, pp. 17–18).

Information on the implementation of Resolution of the bureau of the regional committee of the communist party of Ukraine and the regional executive committee No. 388 “On Implementation of Resolution of the Party and Government on Nature Protection and Rational Use of Natural Resources” dated November 18, 1975. In all farms, collective farms and state farms, and schools of Ivano-Frankivsk region, the following organizations were established: primary organizations of the Ukrainian Society for Nature Protection, posts of public control over the rational use of natural resources and environmental protection; squads of “blue” watchmen and “green” patrols at district schools; “Knowledge of Nature” schools; propaganda work on nature protection and rational use of natural resources was intensified. In educational institutions, a course of lectures on the basics of nature protection was introduced, lecture groups were organized under the nature protection society.

In order to implement the Resolution of the Bureau of the party regional committee and the regional executive committee in all districts of Ivano-Frankivsk region, Resolutions of the Bureau of the District Committees of the communist party of Ukraine and district executive committees were adopted and measures were drawn up for its implementation, which included: afforestation of steep slopes, ravines, and river banks on an area of 10 – 20 hectares; to carry out plowing across the slopes annually on an area of 600–18,000 hectares; to reclaim heavily eroded land on an area of 500–700 hectares; to build hydrotechnical structures in the amount of 300–500 thousand krb.; to drain waterlogged lands on an area of 2,200–3,200 hectares; to recultivate 300–500 hectares of land that was set aside for industrial purposes; to carry out cultural and technical works on hayfields, pastures, liming of acidic soils; to improve works on the construction of manure storage facilities and manure storage; to improve protection and reproduction of hunting fauna, the ban on fishing during the spawning period; to build coastal fortifications; to oblige the executive

committees of local councils of workers' deputies, boards of collective farms and directorates of state farms, district associations of nature protection periodically consider the issue of rational use of natural resources and nature protection; to strengthen control over compliance with legislation on the protection of land, water, forests and other natural resources (SAIFR, f. P-1, d. 1, c. 4222).

In order to control compliance with the rules of forestry management in collective farms, forest protection and more effective management of forestry, forest management of collective farm forests was carried out, district inter-collective forest farms were established. Employees of sanitation stations strengthened control over compliance with the legislation on natural resources protection. During the year, several dozen heads of various organizations were fined by them for violating the law, not implementing the decisions of the party and government on nature protection issues. The issues of nature protection and rational use of natural resources were repeatedly brought up for consideration by the party, Soviet, and economic bodies, and violators among the party members were severely reprimanded. At meetings of executive committees, sessions of district Councils of Workers' Deputies, the issues of approving the volume of felling for forest care, sanitary and other works in collective farm forests were considered, on holding of a two-month period of sanitary cleanliness and improvement of settlements, on the waste of public land for individual construction, etc.

In Ivano-Frankivsk region, significant work was carried out by district organizations of the voluntary society of nature protection, hunters and fishermen, and pedagogical teams of secondary schools on promotion of nature protection knowledge among population, fight against poaching and forest trespassers. At enterprises, organizations, institutions, collective farms, and state farms of each district of the region, one hundred or two primary organizations were established, and there were 20,000–25,000 members. Nature conservationists widely propagated nature conservation knowledge by conducting lectures, giving interviews in the press and on the radio. They performed significant practical work: planting forests, taking care of green spaces in towns, urban-type settlements, villages, planting flowers in alleys, parks, squares, on the territories of enterprises, schools, and estates in spring.

At schools, a lot of work was done on breeding of insectivorous birds. For this purpose, birdhouses were massively made and hung at handicrafts lessons. Pupils and young people were instilled with concern for ants, as constant helpers in the fight against forest pests. Anthills were fenced off and looked after by forest guards. Thus, in the collective farm Cheremshyna breeding of another species – pheasants – started in Sniatynsky district. The pheasant is a very useful bird that provides dietary meat and eats larvae and adults of the Colorado potato beetle. It was the only pheasantry in the region.

Implementation of the party and government resolutions on nature protection and a rational use of natural resources was under the control of district committee of the communist party of Ukraine and primary party organizations. In the districts, meetings were held on the issues of nature protection and a rational use of natural resources, in particular, with heads of primary organizations of nature protection society, public inspectors for the protection and use of land, and with land managers, foresters and hydraulic engineers of collective farms. Collective farms were forbidden to pour manure into rivers, and auto companies were forbidden to pour oily waste into rivers.

Ivano-Frankivsk city committee of the communist party of Ukraine informed on the implementation of this resolution on the work carried out. Thus, on October 21, 1976, measures to strengthen nature protection and improve the use of natural resources were

approved at the Bureau of the city party committee for the period of 1976 – 1980. With the aim of a more rational use of drinking water for economic and household needs, the city executive committee reviewed the limits on water supply for industrial enterprises. The decrease in water supply to the city's industrial enterprises was compensated by the implementation of a return water supply system and the use of new technological processes in production. During the years of 1975 – 1976, such measures were carried out at 10 enterprises of the city, including tire repair, boiler and welding, rebar plants, a furniture factory, a woodworking plant, an alcohol-and-vodka association, and the “Positron” plant. If in 1977, the amount of drinking water used by city enterprises was 29.3%, then since the beginning of 1978 – 25.7%. Some work was carried out on the protection of river water basins and the atmosphere from pollution. The work of treatment facilities of the bus fleet, the “Holovpromtransport” depot, the chemical plant, the meat processing plant, the poultry processing plant, and the conversion of boiler equipment from solid fuel to gas and fuel oil improved significantly. In May of 1977, measures to reconstruct and increase the capacity of city sewage facilities were approved at the bureau of the city committee, implementation of which made it possible to significantly increase the effect of sewage treatment and reduce pollution of the Bystrytsia-Solotvynska and Bystrytsia-Nadvirnianska rivers (SAIFR, f. P–1, d. 1, c. 4222, pp. 94–95).

In order to improve the water supply of the city of Ivano-Frankivsk, reduce water losses during intake and supply to the city, a filtering station and a water pipeline were built, outdated technological equipment was replaced, and three sedimentation tanks were built at Cherniyivsky water intake. In the city, watering of streets, squares and green spaces with water of technical quality began. Discharge of untreated sewage into natural reservoirs decreased by 20%. A number of measures were taken by joint efforts to stop the pollution of water bodies with impurities, oil products, toxic chemicals, fertilizers and manures.

In the ninth five-year plan in Ivano-Frankivsk region, 20 facilities for the treatment of industrial effluents and return water supply with a capacity of 62 thousand cubic meters per day were put into operation, which made it possible to reduce their discharges by 40%. Some work was done to improve the use of agricultural land and forests. In the region, 6.9 thousand hectares of land were recultivated and additionally put into active economic activity, 18 thousand hectares of soil-protective forest plantations were planted, and corresponding objects for protection against flooding and destruction were built for the amount of 15.3 million krb. (SAIFR, f. P–1, d. 1, c. 4152, p. 26). From the systematic critical materials in the regional newspaper “Prykarpatska Pravda”, the thematic sections “Man and Nature”, “Nature – our Wealth” in the regional press, it is possible to express doubts about the effectiveness of treatment facilities at Kalush production association “Chlorvinyll”, fur factory “Tysmenytsia”, Nadvirnya oil refinery, Bolekhiv tannery, etc. In the districts, the issues of construction of central city sewers, sewage treatment plants and their reconstruction for factories and plants were resolved rather slowly.

From the information in the letter of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR No. 4489/10 dated 08/9/77 “On Implementation of Resolutions of the Party and the Government on Environmental Protection” for the years of the ninth five-year plan only for measures to protect agricultural land from flooding and destruction and for construction more than 34 million krb. were spent on sewage treatment facilities. In total, about 40 million krb. of state capital investments were used for environmental protection measures during the specified five-year period. A number of important environmental protection measures were implemented during the period of 1976 – 1977. In particular, in 1976, additional

5,000 hectares of land were brought into agricultural circulation, which made it possible to produce products worth about 1 million krb. At 13 industrial and communal facilities, water protection structures costing more than 2 million 500 thousand krb. were put into operation. During this period, wastewater treatment plants with a total capacity of 23,000 cubic meters per day were put into operation. At the same time, the use of wastewater in return water supply systems increased by 30 million cubic meters (SAIFR, f. R-295, d. 5, c. 4449, p. 28).

Pursuant to the resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR No. 3599-IX “On State and Measures to Further Improve Environmental Protection Measures in the Republic in Light of the Decisions of the XXVth Congress of the CPSU”, the Regional Executive Committee adopted Order No. 534 dated October 18, 1978 and approved further measures improvement of nature protection activity in the region. Similar measures, based on specific conditions of nature management, were worked out by district executive committees and brought to the executors. In June of 1979, at the Bureau of the regional committee of the communist party of Ukraine there was heard the issue of the state of decisions implementation of the party and the government on the issues of nature protection and a rational use of natural resources. The relevant resolution of the Bureau of the regional committee of the party and the regional executive committee, as well as the decision of the regional executive committee No. 323 “On Nature Protection and Rational Use of Natural Resources in the Region” dated October 2, 1979, were adopted.

The materials of inspections of the regional nature protection inspection and other nature protection inspections, information of the district executive committees on the implementation of the order of regional executive committee show that in 1979, in Ivano-Frankivsk region, relevant organizational and practical work was carried out on the implementation of the aforementioned resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR. Chief focus was on the rational use of land. In addition, 1.7 thousand hectares of land, including 870 hectares under arable land, were discovered and brought into agricultural circulation. Afforestation of eroded lands on an area of 200 hectares was carried out. Out of 3 million 683 thousand krb. allocated for the construction of anti-erosion structures, 62.5% was used in eight months. Enterprises and organizations of the region implemented proven land reclamation plans successfully. In Ivano-Frankivsk region, 1,520 ha of water protection zones with a length of 230 km were registered in kind in 40 farms of an agricultural profile in the state forest fund, of which 4,422 ha and 890 km were planned to be completed by 1982, respectively. In 1979, the construction of water protection facilities was carried out at 23 industrial and communal enterprises. 4 million 528 thousand krb. were allocated for the above mentioned construction (SAIFR, f. R-295, d. 5, c. 4741, pp. 18-19).

Resolution No. 166 of the central committee of the communist party of Ukraine and the Republic of the Ukrainian SSR “On Measures to Prevent Pollution of the Basins of the Black and Azov Seas” dated April 9, 1976 provided for the construction of water protection facilities at two facilities in Ivano-Frankivsk region: in the town of Kolomyia, town sewage treatment facilities and at the Bolekhiv leather factory – expansion of sewage treatment facilities. The state of construction was unsatisfactory. In the town of Kolomyia, town-wide treatment facilities were built extremely slowly, and the expansion of the treatment facilities of the Bolekhiv leather factory was delayed due to delays in the preparation of project documentation. In October, the regional inspectorate of nature protection together with the basin management of water protection brought the issue of protection of water resources of the region for consideration by the standing commission of the regional council of people’s

deputies on nature protection. The meeting was held on October 22, 1979. Extensive decisions were made on this issue. In 1979, treatment plants were put into operation, which made it possible to reduce the discharge of untreated sewage into the reservoirs of the region in the amount of more than 300 cubic meters per day (SAIFR, f. R–295, d. 5, c. 4741, p. 19).

Pursuant to the resolution of the central committee of the communist party of Ukraine and the RM of the Ukrainian SSR No. 326 “On Measures to Protect Air Basin from Pollution by Harmful Emissions by Industrial Enterprises and Motor Vehicles” dated June 20, 1977, cyclones for cleaning gases from dust were installed in workshop No. 105 at Kalush Industrial Association “Chlorvinil”, which reduced dust emissions by 600 kg per day. At Nadvirna Oil Refinery, hydrocarbon emissions were reduced by 2 tons per day by supplying gas waste to the flare economy and technological furnaces, and the reconstruction of the first stages of the dust collection units from KS devices reduced sodium sulfate by 5.2 tons per day. Such a dangerous source of pollution of the air basin as the wood distillation shop at the Vyhoda woodworking plant and Kalush research and enrichment factory was closed. 12 points for inspection of fuel equipment and 12 points for inspection of electrical equipment were created in the automobile farms of the regional administration. With the aim of drastically reducing atmospheric air pollution by car exhaust gases, the regional inspectorate jointly with the regional sanitary and sanitary station and the state inspectorate prepared a project by decision of the regional executive committee, which approved measures aimed at strengthening control over serviceability of engines, improving the operation of diagnostic points, etc. In addition, the regional executive committee, at the suggestion of environmental protection organizations, developed a number of measures for the protection and rational use of fish stocks, forest resources, fauna protection, conservation (SAIFR, f. R–295, d. 5, c. 4741, p. 20).

However, the state of atmospheric air in the western region of the Ukrainian SSR worsened. One of the main culprits of this was the officially named production association “Chlorvinil”. According to the conclusions of the environmental protection authorities, the industrial giant, which united 12 chemical plants, did not cope with the purification of waste gases and water. Thus, “according to the data of the Kalush sanitary station, 44% of the hydrogen chloride samples exceeded the “limit permissible concentration norms” of the sanitary protection and residential zones. The main source of chlorine entering the atmosphere was the magnesium plant, which emitted about 2 tons of harmful substances. In January of 1978, the gross emission of harmful substances into the atmosphere was about 40 tons/day, including 18 tons/day of calimagnesia dust, 3 tons/day of dichloroethane, 2 tons/day of chlorine, 1 ton/day of polyvinyl chloride, 0.5 tons /day of cinebe”. In 1976 – 1980, more than 100 million krb. were used for environmental protection measures in the Ivano-Frankivsk region of state capital investments – facilities for wastewater treatment with a total capacity of 55,000 cubic meters per day, return water supply systems, installations for capturing and decontamination of harmful substances were put into operation (Humen, 2005, p. 190).

In the region, 85% of wastewater was treated. At the same time, emissions of harmful substances into the air pool decreased or stabilized at some enterprises. The complex of measures for nature protection and rational use of land resources, including the construction of anti-erosion hydrotechnical structures, afforestation of banks, ravines, gullies (reclamation) amounted to 2.3 thousand hectares of land. In 1981, 5 million 935 thousand krb, were used for nature protection in the region of state capital investments under the plan of 6 million 454 thousand rubles, or 92% of the plan. In addition, 251,000 krb. were used at the expense of forestry enterprises and collective farms for the construction of ponds, manure storage

facilities, the protection of protected objects, the creation of forest plantations in ravines and streams, the arrangement and improvement of green areas, and other environmental protection measures, a total of 6 million 461.9 thousand krb. were used during the year, or 100.1%. The results of the socialist competition for achieving the best indicators in nature protection and rational use of natural resources for 1981 were summarized. The winners of the socialist competition were Horodenkivsky, Dolynsky and Rozhniativsky districts of the region (SAIFR, f. R-295, d. 5, c. 5134, pp. 75-76).

In 1985, industrial enterprises and communal services of Ivano-Frankivsk region withdrew 304 million cubic meters of fresh water from water sources, compared to 302.6 million cubic meters in 1984. Of this amount, 220.2 million cubic meters were used for the needs of industry, 51 million cubic meters for household and household needs of the population, and 31.2 million cubic meters for agriculture. In 1985, the amount of polluted sewage discharged into rivers amounted to 36.8 million cubic meters (SAIFR, f. R-295, d. 5, c. 5676, pp. 37).

According to the "Scheme of Integrated Use of Land and Water Resources of Ivano-Frankivsk region" for the period up to 2000, it was planned to carry out work on the regulation of small rivers with a length of 578.6 km at a cost of 84.2 million krb. As of May 1, 1986, 497.2 km of small rivers were regulated in the region, for which 65.6 million krb. were spent. Regulation of small rivers was carried out due to the participation of enterprises and organizations of five ministries, and funds were allocated from the reserve of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR for anti-flood measures. If in 1982, 4.8 million krb. were allocated for the construction of 19 water protection facilities, then in 1986 another 5.5 million krb. were allocated for the planned construction of 14 water protection facilities (SAIFR, f. R-295, d. 5, c. 5676, p. 25).

In Ivano-Frankivsk region, appropriate work was carried out to prevent contamination of soils, water bodies, and atmospheric air with toxic waste from industrial enterprises. In April of 1986, the regional executive committee adopted the order "On Organization of Disposal of Toxic Production Waste", by which it obliged the executive committees of Ivano-Frankivsk, Kolomyia, Kalush town, and Nadvirna district Councils of People's Deputies to formalize, in accordance with the procedure established by law, the allocation of land plots for toxic waste landfills, which were not subject to disposal. As the inspection showed, in the village of Kropyvnyk, Kalush district, 21 hectares were set aside for a landfill for the disposal of toxic waste (hexachlorobenzene) of the Kalush "Chlorvinil". The issue of expanding this landfill for the disposal of toxic waste for all industrial enterprises of the region was resolved (SAIFR, f. R-295, d. 5, c. 5676, p. 31).

The accumulated experience of nature protection bodies with the participation of teaching teams of secondary schools and the public intensified all measures constantly. Issues of improving nature protection and rational use of natural resources were systematically discussed at the sessions of the regional, district, city, township, village Council of People's Deputies. Resolutions of the Bureau of the Regional Committee of the Party and the Regional Executive Committee, orders of the Regional Executive Committee were adopted on environmental issues. Comprehensive regional scientific and technical programmes "Harvest" and "Nature" were considered, approved technical documentation on the establishment of water protection zones and coastal strips of small rivers, on streamlining reporting and the procedure for depriving of bonuses for non-implementation of nature protection plans and measures. In the region, a comprehensive plan of nature protection measures was developed for all state and

public nature protection organizations, approved by the regional executive committee. Such plans were developed for each enterprise, collective farm, organization. The progress of these plans was constantly monitored (SAIFR, f. R–295, d. 5, c. 4741, p. 25).

In order to coordinate all inspection services, the regional planning commission, the regional state administration, regional departments of agriculture and communal economy, and the others, the order of the regional executive committee was adopted, according to which the results of the implementation of environmental protection work and the development of capital investments were carried out quarterly. The regional headquarters for construction, headed by the head of the regional executive committee, promptly took effective measures to ensure the implementation of plans. In Ivano-Frankivsk region, a public inspection of the culture of production was held annually, during which the progress of environmental protection measures and compliance with environmental standards at industrial enterprises, collective farms and state farms was checked. In addition, economic organizations, at the expense of non-centralized sources of financing, annually used millions of krb. for the construction, reconstruction of water and dust and gas treatment facilities, implementation of work to combat soil erosion, protection of rivers, flora and fauna, as well as for implementation of other measures.

Significant work was carried out by the interdepartmental council for environmental protection, created under the regional executive committee. The interdepartmental council considered the issue of the state of forestry management in collective farm and state farm forests, the state of protection of young trees, and the implementation of capital investment plans for the protection of the surrounding environment. Meetings-seminars on protection and rational use of water resources were held in the districts of the region.

An important prerequisite for the successful implementation of nature protection issues was an active participation of the public in nature protection activity, and effective promotion of the best practice in nature management. Ivano-Frankivsk regional organization of the Ukrainian Society for Nature Protection counted almost 300,000 people in its ranks, which was 25% of the region's population. District and city organizations of the society were headed by deputy heads of district executive committees and city executive committees.

In Ivano-Frankivsk, as well as in other regions of the western region of the Ukrainian SSR, the establishment of nature protection methodical centres in districts and towns, at enterprises, collective farms, state farms, and educational institutions was completed. In Ivano-Frankivsk region, there were regional, town and district Nature Houses, more than 500 rooms and nature protection offices. During the establishment of the Houses of Nature, the possibilities of the houses of scientific and technical information, local history museums and other organizations that carried out work on nature protection were widely used (SAIFR, f. R–295, d. 5, c. 5676, p. 73).

In order to intensify the propaganda work on nature protection in Ivano-Frankivsk region, joint summer days and days of deputies on this issue were organized. During these days, members of the lecture groups of the party regional committee, heads of regional and district organizations, scholars, and specialists made speeches at enterprises, collective farms, state farms, organizations, polling stations, and village meetings. The system of political and economic training of management personnel and specialists in the national economy was effectively used to promote environmental knowledge and environmental protection legislation. The programme of monthly retraining courses for the party and Soviet cadres at the regional House of Political Science necessarily included classes on the topic of

environmental protection. Various circles were active in the district Nature Houses and systematic events were held.

In the editorial offices of regional and district newspapers and radio broadcasting, departments of nature protection were established on a public basis, which systematically published materials on nature protection issues, regularly organized programmes on local radio broadcasting. In all districts of the region, nature protection stands and showcases “Nature is our Home” were produced. Other forms of propaganda were also actively used – scientific and practical conferences, seminars, competitions, thematic exhibitions, etc.

In Ivano-Frankivsk region, there were 25 “Nature” national universities, in which almost 5,000 people studied. 70 permanent lecture halls and cinema lecture halls, 110 “Knowledge of Nature” schools were established. Young people acquired the skills of practical nature protection work in 11 school forestry offices, numerous detachments of “blue” and “green” patrols (SAIFR, f. R–295, d. 5, c. 5676, p. 72).

All this made it possible to direct the efforts of the public to solving practical problems of rational nature use. Owing to the coordination of efforts of local Councils of People’s Deputies, economic and nature protection bodies, and the public high indicators were achieved in Ivano-Frankivsk region. Every year, several thousand hectares of land, which had previously been used unproductively, were put into agricultural use. Areas of arable land were constantly growing. Control over the correct use and storage of toxic chemicals and mineral fertilizers was established. Much had been done in the region for the rational use of drained lands, obtaining the greatest return from them. In collective farms, the position of deputy chairman for nature protection on public grounds was introduced. The saving of fresh water at industrial enterprises of the region reached 90%, 95% of polluted effluents were sent for treatment (SAIFR, f. R–295, d. 5, c. 5676, p. 70). In all farms, documentation was prepared for water protection zones and coastal strips of small rivers, and their removal in kind was carried out.

Ivano-Frankivsk region was an example of a rational use and increase of forest resources. Several thousand hectares of new plantations of forest crops were created every year. At the beginning of the 1980s, more than 90% of forest waste was used at wood processing enterprises in the region, compared to 70% in 1970 (Maliarchuk, 2023, p. 181). Much was done in the region to restore the animal world (flora and fauna), develop nature reserves and nature reserves. The reserve fund made up 5% of the territory of the region. In Ivano-Frankivsk region, considerable work was carried out on the protection of atmospheric air from pollution by motor vehicles. However, the largest polluter continued to be the “Chlorvinil” industrial association, and secondary and minor enterprises were subject to fines.

The Conclusions. Interdepartmental Council for Environmental Protection under the Regional Executive Committee, Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Organization of the Ukrainian Society for Nature Protection, Regional Inspectorate for Nature Protection, a voluntary association of hunters and fishermen, posts of public control, pedagogical teams of secondary schools, squads of “blue” guards, “green” patrols carried out a constant control over industrial enterprises, organizations, collective farms, state farms for the implementation of complex measures, which had a positive effect on improving the ecological situation. Similar measures, to one degree or another, were carried out in all regions of the republic and the western region of the Ukrainian SSR, with the difference that the Carpathian Mountains added some features to Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Transcarpathian and Chernivtsi regions. Along with this, in the matter of nature protection and rational use of natural resources in Ivano-Frankivsk, as well

as in other regions, there were significant shortcomings. In the USSR nature protection was declared a national and national issue, and significant success in this matter was officially declared. The Soviet propaganda tried to create the illusion that the party and the government care about the protection of the environment and the health of citizens. However, the priority tasks remained the development of the region's heavy industry, a maximum use of natural and human resources for the country's military and industrial complex.

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DISTRICT AND MULTI-CIRCULATION PRESS OF THE WESTERN REGIONS OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE “PERESTROIKA” ECONOMIC FAILURES TRANSFORMATION INTO POLITICAL REFORM DEMANDS IN 1988

Abstract. The Purpose of the Study. *It is common knowledge that one of the important components of the source basis of scientific research is the analysis of periodicals of the historical period to which they belonged to. Especially when there is an opportunity to study the local press, which was the closest to the socio-economic, political and other demands of the societies of that time. During the period of the Russian-Soviet occupation of Ukraine, and especially during its final stage known as “Perestroika”, such were district-level and multi-circulation newspapers published in all administrative districts, large enterprises and prominent institutions of the Ukrainian SSR. Since these publications were at the centre of labour collectives of the Western Ukrainian regions, which were the mass bearer of the*

national democratic movement at the end of the 80s of the 20th century, the author sets himself the objective of illustrating a rapid development of economic failures of "Perestroika" into demands for a political reform, presented against the background interpretation of local press publications. **The research methodology** is based on the principles of a historical objectivity and impartiality in the interpretation of historical facts. In the course of the study, methods of a critical structural analysis and classification, systematization and verification of the periodical material of the local press of seven regions of western Ukraine have been used. **The scientific novelty** of the historical research consists in the fact that, on the basis of a large number of periodical materials of the local press of Western Ukrainian regions, the events little known to the general public have been reconstructed, connected with the development of unsuccessful socio-economic reforms of "Perestroika" into calls for a political reform in the USSR and CPSU. As a result, in 1988, at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the ruling Communist leadership from Moscow was forced to announce the transfer of power to the hands of Soviet institutions and a number of internal party changes, which, combined with the industrial unrest, caused the collapse of the state. **The Conclusions.** Therefore, the analysis of the articles published in the columns of the Western Ukrainian regional and multi-circulation press shows that the first sprouts of disbelief of the residents of the region in the socio-economic innovations of the "Perestroika" appeared at the stage of its apogee in 1988. Incompatible with the planned economy, implementation of segmental market innovations in the form of self-financing and state self-support gave positive results only in the first half of the specified year. The positive results manifested themselves in the form of a short-term increase in wages, which quickly became inconsistent with last year's planned financial estimates. Then the budgets were exhausted, which led to the reduction in salaries, the curtailment of social programmes, and an increase in the deficit of food and industrial consumer goods. On this basis, the attitude of the Western Ukrainian public towards the initiator of reforms of the CPSU-CPU, in the format of its district committee and party committee units, deteriorated significantly. Gradually there came the understanding that the communist power was not capable of effective implementation of economic innovations, and therefore the political ones should be introduced to limit its influence on the production process. However, after the introduction of a political reform at the 19th All-Union Party Conference towards the transfer of power into the hands of the Soviet institutions, the negative attitude towards the party nomenclature continued to grow. The nature of the publications in the second half of the year indicated that the mistrust in the economic innovations of the party apparatus, caused by the unfolding of the crisis, was also reflected in its political attempts to maintain dominance in the state created for itself.

Key words: Western Ukraine, district press, multi-circulation, "Perestroika", socio-economic innovations, political reforms, national democratic movement.

РАЙОННА ТА БАГАТОТИРАЖНА ПРЕСА ЗАХІДНИХ ОБЛАСТЕЙ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ РСР ЯК ІЛЮСТРАТОР ПЕРЕРОСТАННЯ ЕКОНОМІЧНИХ НЕВДАЧ "ПЕРЕБУДОВИ" У ВИМОГИ ПОЛІТИЧНИХ РЕФОРМ У 1988 р.

Анотація. Мета дослідження. Як відомо, одним із важливих складових джерельного підґрунтя наукового пошуку є аналіз періодичних видань того історичного періоду, якому вони були притаманні. Особливо, коли є можливість вивчати локальну пресу, що стояла найближче до соціально-економічних, політичних та інших запитів тогочасних соціумів. У період російсько-радянської окупації України, а надто у часи її заключного етапу званого як "перебудова", такими були газети районного рівня і багатотиражки, що виходили в усіх адміністративних районах та великих підприємствах і помітних закладах УРСР. Оскільки вказані видання перебували у центрі трудових колективів західноукраїнських областей, що наприкінці 80-х рр. ХХ ст. були масовим носієм національно-демократичного руху, автор ставить перед собою завдання ілюстрації стрімкого переростання економічних незарадів "перебудови" у вимоги політичної реформи, поданої на тлі осмислення публікацій місцевої преси. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на принципах дотримання історичної об'єктивності й неупередженості у трактуванні історичних фактів. У ході дослідження використано методи критичного і структурного аналізу та класифікації, систематизації й верифікації періодичного матеріалу локальної преси семи областей західної України. **Наукова новизна** історичної розвідки полягає у тому, що на

основі численної кількості періодичних матеріалів місцевої преси західноукраїнських областей реконструйовано маловідомі широкому загалу події, пов'язані із переростанням невдалих соціально-економічних реформувань “перебудови” у заклики до політичної реформи у СРСР й КППС. Як наслідок, у 1988 р. на XIX всесоюзній партійній конференції правляча з Москви комуністична верхівка країни змушена була проголосити передачу влади у руки радянських інституцій та зініціювати низку внутрішньопартійних змін, що, зрештою, у синтезі із виробничими незарадами спричинили розпад держави.

Висновки. Коли у 1985 – 1986 рр. новий керівник СРСР – генеральний секретар ЦК КППС Михайло Горбачов започаткував курс на умонтування фрагментів ринку у планове економічне тло, а у політичну надбудову – елементів демократичного суспільства, то у 1988 р. стало зрозуміло, що без комплексної політичної реформи не обійтися. Але на заваді постала природна несумісність авторитарних й демократичних принципів господарювання, що априорі вимагала цілковитої зміни перших на другі. Тому уведення госпрозрахунку та самофінансування лише у першій половині вказаного року дало тимчасово позитивний результат у вигляді швидкого збільшення заробітних виплат. Унаслідок розбалансування укладених минулоріч фінансових кошторисів підприємств і відомств із незапланованими витратами, у другій половині року розпочався процес стрімкого падіння і без того невисокого матеріального рівня жителів Галичини, Волині, Закарпаття й Буковини. Його доповнювали наростаюче ослаблення уваги до соціальних програм, дорожнеча й дефіцит тих товарів, що донедавна були у вільному доступі. Як результат, у трудових колективах західної України визріває переконання, що головним винуватцем кризи є КППС-КПУ та її локальні структури, нездатні до ефективного керівництва державою. Тому серед громадськості формується запит на політичні реформи, які віддалили б обласні, міські, районні та місцеві партійні комітети від розв'язання виробничих проблем на максимальну відстань.

Ключові слова: західна Україна, районна преса, багатотиражки, “перебудова”, соціально-економічні новачі, політичні реформи, національно-демократичний рух.

The Problem Statement. In the structure of the Soviet mass media of the second half of the 20th century, along with radio and television, its periodicals controlled by the pro-Russian communist government occupied a prominent place. Newspapers and magazines of that time were divided vertically into union, republican, regional, city, district and multi-circulation newspapers. In a horizontal dimension, they consisted of party, Soviet, trade union, international press and publishing houses working in the fields of culture, science, technology, education, sports, etc. Moreover, the two first segments were often united, which, in the opinion of the party apparatus, should testify to the unbreakable unity of the party and Soviet bodies in the country, where the real power was in the hands of the Moscow nomenclature of the central committee level.

The historical value of the district and multi-circulation press consists in the fact that, being the most local and operating among local residents and in the “thick” of labour collectives, it was the least censored by regional and city party committees. Before the beginning of the “Perestroika”, its cheap and generally uninteresting editions were compulsorily subscribed to by residents of the regions, according to the place of work.

In 1988, the western Ukrainian district press was represented by joint publications of the district committees of the CPSU-CPU and Soviet authorities. We mean district councils of people’s deputies with its executive subdivision – district executive committees. The number of such a press was equal to the number of administrative districts in one or another region. Lviv region consisted of 20 districts, Ternopil region – 16, Rivne region and Volyn region – 15 each, Ivano-Frankivsk region – 14, Zakarpattia region – 13, Chernivtsi region – 10 districts. There were 103 districts in total, and therefore the same number of district newspapers (State Committee of the Ukrainian SSR on Statistics, 1989, p. 13).

However, the mass-circulation press was the most numerous, since the majority of industrial enterprises and large agricultural collective farms, higher educational institutions and other important institutions of the republic published articles, which periodically appeared in large circulations and had their own editorial offices. Being inspected party committees even during the years of “Perestroika”, they were still the closest to a daily life of residents of the western regions of Ukraine, and therefore promptly reflected their social, economic, political, ideological, and later national and religious demands.

In 1988, the largest number of factories and plants was concentrated in Lviv region – 381 enterprises (Economic indicators, 1990, p. 24). 212 enterprises operated in Ivano-Frankivsk region (SCUkonS, 1989, p. 5.), in Zakarpattia region – 205 enterprises (State Committee of the Ukrainian SSR on Statistics, 1989, p. 6), in Ternopil region – 195 enterprises (Ternopil Regional Department of Statistics, 1989, p. 156), in Rivne region – 173 enterprises (National Economy, 1993, p. 142), in Volyn region – 167 enterprises (Results of the implementation, 1989a, p. 36), in Chernivtsi region – 151 enterprises (Results of the implementation, 1989b, p. 21). Thus, the production complex of western Ukraine united 1,484 factories and plants that were on an independent balance sheet (Main indicators, 1989, p. 74). Therefore, the number of multi-circulation press, taking into account departmental newspapers owned by scientific, educational, cultural and other institutions, did not exceed approximately two thousand editions.

When, at the end of 1988, the socio-economic initiatives of the new head of the USSR, Mykhailo Gorbachov, reached a dead end and caused a rapid deterioration in the material situation of the country’s citizens, labour collectives of Western Ukrainian enterprises and institutions naturally began to demand political reforms in the direction of narrowing the power amplitude of party committees, and therefore – CPSU-CPU in general. In the second half of the year, this process, supported by the councils of labour collectives (RTK), gained such momentum that the district and multi-circulation press could not ignore it.

The Review of Recent Researches and Publications. The evolution of “Perestroika” into a national democratic movement in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s was the object of scientific studies by domestic researchers. In this direction the following researchers continue working: Volodymyr Baran (Baran, 2003), Ihor Pidkova (Pidkova, 2001), Oleh Muravskiy (Muravskiy, 2011), Stepan Kobuta (Kobuta, Kuhutiak, Havryliv, 2002), Mykola Aliksiievets (Aliksiievets, Bilchuk, Boiko, 1993) and the author of this article (Chura, 2021). In the all-Ukrainian format, the processes of the collapse of the USSR are studied by Stanislav Kulchytskyi (Kulchytskyi, Aleksieiev, Sliusarenko, 2000), Heorhiy Kasianov (Kasianov, 1995), Anatoliy Rusnachenko (Rusnachenko, 1998). Among the scientific researches of recent years, there should be mentioned the works by Yuriy Kahanov (Kahanov, 2019) Iryna Ovchar (Ovchar, 2011), Aisel Omarova (Omarova, 2017), Serhiy Plokhii (Plokhii, 2019), Volodymyr Tarasov (Tarasov, 2016), Oleksandr Tertychnyi (Tertychnyi, 2014), Oleksandr Boiko (Boiko, 2021), Yuriy Shapoval and Oleksandra Yakubets (Shapoval & Yakubets, 2021) and Oleksandra Zinchenko (Zinchenko, 2024).

The vectors issues of the development of the Soviet press was raised by such scholars as Kateryna Yermieieva (Yermieieva, 2018), Aliona Yakubets (Yakubets, 2018), Ruslana Popp (Popp, 2018) and the others. However, the materials of the periodicals of the second half of the 80s of the 20th century in district and multi-circulation segment, they still remain outside the focus of domestic scientific opinion, which caused the author’s interest. Therefore,

the objective of the article is an attempt at a factual reconstruction of the evolution process of the socio-economic requests for “Perestroika” into political appeals at the stage of introduction of a political reform in the USSR – before and after the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

The source base of scientific research is regional and multi-circulation publications of enterprises of Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Volyn, Rivne, Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi regions of Ukraine. The author analysed 33 newspapers representing the industrial and agrarian spheres of activity of the Soviet industrial press.

The Research Results. Even before the start of the conference – in January of 1988, workers and rank-and-file communists of Sambir glass factory of Lviv region in the local newspaper of the district committee “Chervonyi Prapor” expressed their fears not so much about the introduction of state financing and self-financing, unknown to them, which in their opinion could lead to a decrease in wages, but regarding the tools for the introduction of market innovations. In their statements, there was noticeable some hesitation regarding the expediency of an excessive control of party committees over the implementation of industrial innovations (Tymochko, 1988, p. 1). L. Tsiupka, the secretary of the party committee of the Nesteriv road-exploitation district No. 872, on the pages of the district communist party publication “Nove Zhyttia” reproached the regional party apparatus for the fact that the secretaries of the regional committee were not interested in the activities of the primary party organizations, and held few meetings with communists of small party groups. “Then let them not be surprised that members of party groups do not go to party meetings and do not carry out party assignments”, he summarized (Tsiupka, 1988, p. 1).

When the deputy general director of the “Kinescope” VO, a member of the central committee of the communist party of Ukraine, V. Apryntseva, expressed the opinion in the columns of the “Lampochka Ilyicha” newspaper that as a result of the introduction of new business conditions, more than a thousand people were expected to be laid off, the labour team became concerned that ordinary workers and communists would be the first to lose their jobs (Krykun, 1988, p. 2). Therefore, during the discussion of theses for the 19th party conference, an electrician V. Kabyshev openly asked the secretary of the party committee: why, during the transition to new economic conditions, only workers are reduced (Stybelska, 1988, p. 1).

The newspaper of the Lviv Vocational Education and Training Centre “Progress” “Vzuttiovyk” published an article called “Answers for Everything” in its columns. Its author, N. Roshchuk, logically placed the responsibility for difficult working conditions on the regional party leadership, which had been talking beautifully about “restructuring” for three years, but did not really want to be restructured (Roshchuk, 1988, p. 1). In the words of a brigadier M. Sobol, a delegate of the 19th party conference, the mass circulation of the Lviv Bus Plant warned the regional communist leadership: the factory party committee solves problems that come from the grassroots poorly, or does not solve them at all, which can have unforeseen consequences (Soroka, 1988, pp. 1–2).

Rank-and-file communists of Bolshivtsivsky bakery of Ivano-Frankivsk region M. Pankiv, V. Kolodiy, I. Yaskiv, L. Byshentsev expressed their surprise that for a long time they could not meet with the employees of the district committee to tell them about the progress of reforms at the enterprise. And this was when the members of the district committee incessantly announced frequent visits to grassroots party organizations. This information was written in the newspaper “Prapor Peremohy” – a periodical of the Galician district committee of the party. Subsequently, in the heading “Perestroika: Word and Deed”

there were published a number of publications about the progress of the district enterprises under self-financing conditions. The leitmotif of these articles was the common opinion of the labour groups that there were no positive consequences from the visits of various oblast commissions and there would not be any (Hural, 1988, p. 2).

In the columns of the district committee newspaper of the Nadvirna district “Radianska Verkhovyna”, the head of the animal husbandry department of the local agro-industrial association, I. Oliinyk, tried to explain to readers why interruptions in the supply of dairy products began in the district retail network. According to him, the quarterly milk production plan was fulfilled by 116%. And the question why these products did not reach the stores should not be addressed to him (Oliinyk, 1988, p. 1). It got to the point that a critical situation developed in Nadvirna forest plant, which caused the interference of the regional party leadership. At the meeting of the labour team, the employees of the farm spoke out against the administrative and party management of the enterprise, citing the fact that they continued to work as during the period of “stagnation” (Zabachynskyi, 1988, p. 1).

In August of 1988, the district committee newspaper of Rohatyn district “Zoria” published the first results of the introduction of new management methods in the words of the chief economist of the agro-industrial association V. Ilkiv, presented in the article “Examining the Farm Calculation”. It turned out that for half a year, costs for the production of plant and animal products increased significantly (Ilkiv, 1988, p. 1). The semi-annual consequences of the introduction of the communist party innovations were documented in the article “And there Could Be no Queues”. The indignation of the author O. Klymtsevych was caused not so much by the usual shortage of food products in the retail network, but by the increase in the number of peasants who went to Ivano-Frankivsk to buy meat and dairy products, making long queues (Klymtsevych, 1988, p. 3).

Interesting were the publications in the newspaper “Zoria Prykarpattia” by the spokesperson of Kalush City Committee of the CPSU-CPU. Its columns were filled with the column “How we are Served”, which was full of articles like “Such Indifference” (Levytska, 1988, p. 2), “Who Ate Candies?” (Havryliuk, 1988, p. 3), “Criticism in Packaging” (Trach, 1988, p. 3). In the articles there was written about a noticeable decrease in everyday goods on the shelves of grocery and industrial stores. Attention was drawn to the fact that the growing complaints of the public were caused by the lack of products that had not been in short supply recently.

The results of the implementation of a new economic model of management were summarized by the newspaper of the communists of Horodenkivsky district “Kolhospnyk Prydnistrovia”. Having published the results of a social development for the first half of 1988, the publication noted that 347.5 thousand krb. were not added to the plan of the total volume of merchandise turnover. The demand for various types of shoes and clothes, especially children’s, was not satisfied. Alcohol, tobacco, cereals, meat, dairy and confectionery products were not available for sale, the assortment of fruits and vegetables was poor, the need for detergents, personal hygiene products, televisions, refrigerators, washing machines and other household appliances, furniture and radio equipment, etc. (Kolhospnyk Prydnistrov’ia, 1988, p. 1).

When on January 1, 1988, the “Khlorvinyl” production association (PO) was transferred to a full economic accounting, on January 8, in the article of the plant newspaper “Kalushsky Khimik” there were expressed doubts about correctness of the methods of its introduction, according to the deputy head of the workshop S. Khomitskyi. Therefore, the head of the workshop advised the secretary of the party committee to interfere in production affairs less

and to deal more with ideological issues (Khomitskyi, 1988, p. 2). These suspicions were confirmed at the conference of the labour team of the plant on August 3, 1988. Reporting on the “achievements” for six months, the general director of the plant, O. Romanenko, stated that under the new economic conditions, there were not produced goods worth 1.3 million krb. As a result, awarding slowed down and many social programmes, including housing construction, were cancelled. This caused undisguised dissatisfaction among the plant workers. Working under harmful production conditions, they claimed various benefits, which were postponed indefinitely (Kaluskyi khimik, 1988, p. 1).

Against a visual background of dull regional and mass-circulation periodicals, the newspaper “Ahro” stood out favourably, belonging to the modern Kolomyia agricultural enterprise “Prut”. Made in an atypical bright colours and illustrated with advertising, the publication set itself the goal of being the local “pulse” of democratization and promptly covering the achievements of “Perestroika” (Ahro, 1988, pp. 4–5). This opportunity was provided by V. Tkachuk, the chairman of the board of the agricultural enterprise, a hero of the Soviet Union, awarded by two Lenin orders, who was personally acquainted with M. Gorbachov.

Therefore, critical articles about the consequences of the “updating” of the country and the party often found a place in its columns. Among them is an interview with the director of Kolomyia inter-business enterprise, V. Hridzak, published in the “Problems of Self-financing” column. According to him, as a result of ill-conceived reforms, costs for housing construction, expansion of rural infrastructure, purchase of seeds, fodder, and repair of equipment increased by 1.3 million krb. (Artsikhovskiyi, 1988, p. 2). Therefore, the publication of P. Sehal, a resident of Kolomyia, a member of the CPSU since 1940, a veteran of war and labour, and a personal pensioner of local significance, published at the address of the 19th Party Conference, was natural. Being a convinced communist, he said that it was time to distinguish between the functions of the party and state bodies, to abolish the industrial departments of the regional committee, city committees and district committees of the party, and to transfer the solution of all social problems to the competence of the executive committees of the councils of people’s deputies (Sehal, 1988, p. 3).

The newspaper of Communist Party members of Berezhansky district “Nove Zhyttia” published a polemic with H. Chaskovskiyi, the head of the executive committee of Lapshyn village council. Despite the declared political reform towards the transfer of power into the hands of the Soviet institutions, he emphasized the lack of a real expansion of the powers of local councils of people’s deputies. According to him, the government continued to be at the mercy of the party nomenclature (Chaskovskiyi, 1988, pp. 1–2). H. Syvak, a seamstress of Berezhany tailoring atelier “Prykarpattia”, tried to understand the reason for this situation. In the article “More Demanding” she noted that the bureaucratic actions of the party nomenclature, who should only deal with ideological issues, interfere in “Perestroika” (Syvak, 1988, p. 1).

The “Kolos” newspaper of Zalishchyky district committee of Ternopil region spared no epithets to praise the positive consequences of the state and Communist Party “updating” (Hubenko, 1988, p. 1). However, in the second half of 1988, its columns were full of sharply critical articles, central among them was the sprawling publication “Criticism is not a Quarrel, but Ideas in Favour of Perestroika”. A report on the work of the 16th district report-election party conference was published there. Among the 14 speakers there were M. Nykoruk – a head of the department of the “Zoloty Kolos” collective farm, M. Didych – a foreman of the Household Goods Factory, M. Koroliuk – a head of the leasing team of the

“Iskra” collective farm, M. Shmeliova – a secretary of the party organization of the public education department, I. Horuk – a foreman of the agricultural construction organization, S. Bolibrukh – a secretary of the party committee of the Tovsten hospital, T. Khmurych – a secretary of the party committee of educational and cultural institutions, V. Palchynskyy – a transport company welder.

Unanimously, they reproached the party leadership for slowness, one-sidedness, and sometimes unwillingness to implement democratic reforms and market management methods. The words of V. Haiyaniuk, the head of the rental cooperative that worked at the production base of the “Ukraina” collective farm, were indicative. He stated that he fulfilled the plan for the sale of meat and milk by 136%, providing the population with services in the amount of 30,000 krb. But the owners of the earned funds were the head of the collective farm and the chief accountant, who disposed of them as if they were their own, causing anger among the employees of the rental enterprise (Kolos, 1988, p. 1).

The column “Economic Comprehensive Education” was started by the newspaper of the Ternopil Combine Plant – “Kombainobudivnyk”. In the first half of 1988, from issue to issue, this factory publication explained to employees all the intricacies of introducing self-financing and painted vivid pictures of a bright future. Various administrative and party leaders published their articles there, always campaigning to work diligently under new conditions, and the results, they say, will not be long in coming (Kombainobudivnyk, 1988, p. 1). However, in the second half of the year, at a “round table” meeting of the labour team with the management, it turned out that the plant was in a financial trouble. The plant engineer M. Baisarovych, a grinder M. Kozitskyi, a locksmith Yu. Vasylyk, a foreman Yu. Yehorov and a welder S. Bilyk claimed in the article “The Owner Means Frugal” that this happened under the conditions of compliance with all the instructions of the visionary party leadership and competent administration, which had been refined to the point that the factory did not even smell of self-support and self-financing” (Kombainobudivnyk, 1988, p. 1).

At the beginning of 1988, in the communist “district” newspaper of Horokhiv district of Volyn region, “Budivnyk Komunizmu”, there was published the extensive publication “Open Dialogue”. Local leaders, led by the second secretary of the district committee, L. Melnychuk, answered citizens’ questions on the telephone hotline. Among the ten questions, nine concerned the improvement of towns and villages of the district, and only one concerned the holding of seminars by the party committee secretaries. First of all, residents were interested in why in the third year of the “Perestroika” the shortage of consumer goods progressed, housing construction decreased, rural medicine declined, building materials became more expensive, etc. They asked the head of the district committee whether he should reduce the party’s interference in industrial affairs and switch to ideological problems (Budivnyk komunizmu, 1988, p. 1).

Six people took part in the discussion of a new statute of collective farms of the USSR, published on the pages of the newspaper of Liubeshiv district “Nove Zhyttia”. These are the heads of collective farms “Komunist” – H. Miroshnychenko, “Svitanok” – M. Hrynevych, “17 Veresnia” – O. Shukalovych, “Zoria Komunizmu” – A. Kurinchuk and secretaries of the party committees of collective farms “Chervony Partyzan” – M. Sheremet and “Bohdan Khmelnytskyi” collective farm – A. Parfesiuk. Four of them noted a sharp decrease in the financial focus of the regional leadership in solving social problems of the village. This provoked a noticeable condemnation of peasants, in the direction of the regional committee authorities, positioned as the chief one main (Nove zhyttia, 1988, p. 1).

At the meeting of the council of labour collective of VO “Volynprombud” the administration and the party committee were criticized for the lack of proper working conditions and positive results in the introduction of new forms of management, which reduced the wages of workers and employees of the enterprise. N. Hruzynska, a foreman of whitewashers of “Opariadbud”, V. Stasiuk, head of RTK M. Shokun, a foreman of plasterers of “Kovelprombud” spoke about this state of affairs in front of the management. On this occasion, the newspaper “Budivelnik Volyna” in the article “Overcoming Stagnant Waters” expressed an assumption: if things continue like this, the management of the enterprise may be left without executors of its instructions (Yukhymenko, 1988, p. 3).

V. Tchaikovsky, a correspondent of the newspaper “Holos Robochoho” of Lutsk VO “Osnastka”, prepared materials from the industrial meeting that took place on May 10, 1988. The speeches of the head of the department V. Khlamov, a deputy head of the workshop D. Dolych, the foremen H. Pashchuk, M. Melnyk, M. Savyk and V. Kurstak indicated the management’s misunderstanding of the methods of implementing innovations, which caused deterioration of the material situation of the labour team. The words of V. Kurstak were particularly telling. He said: “The labour team fulfills everything that is required, but does not receive benefits from state support. Therefore, there is no need to count on the support of workers” (Chaskovskyi, 1988, p. 2).

In January of 1988, the newspaper of Rivne District Committee “Slovo Pravdy” launched the “Open Letter Day” column. 23 district heads, including those of the district committee, had to give answers to more than 80 complaints received from residents of Shubkiv village. The lion’s share of complaints concerned the well-being of rural residents, starting with a low level of provision of consumer goods and ending with the issues of a slow housing and school construction and unsatisfactory medical care and the condition of roads. The majority of the authors of complaints turned to the party nomenclature, asking them where the party apparatus hides meat and dairy products. After all, the peasants sell it to the state at reduced prices, and it is not available on the shelves of city stores (Moroz, 1988, p. 1). The situation worsened even further when, in December of the above mentioned year, the chief zootechnician of the local agro-industrial association, O. Chupryna, made public data that out of 22 collective farms in the district, only 5 coped with the task of producing milk and meat (Chupryna, 1988, p. 2).

The article by S. Olishevsky, a vulcanizer of Ostroh Tire Repair Plant, “Following the Word of Business” opened the column of the same name in the district committee newspaper “Zoria Komunizmu”. As a member of the district committee, the author expressed the hope that tangible changes at the enterprise would begin with the implementation of the “Law on State Enterprises”, which would expand the rights of labour councils and narrow the influence of the party apparatus on production (Olishevskyi, 1988, p. 2). The correspondent of the newspaper “Zoria Komunizmu”, A. Suprun, in the publication “If Demandingness is Weakened”, placed the responsibility for the non-rhythmic work of Ostroh Maslosyrzavod on the secretary of the party committee, L. Melnychuk, who only distracted the rank-and-file communists with excessive demands for the fulfillment of party assignments (Suprun, 1988, p. 1).

At the end of 1988, the newspaper “Vysokovoltnyk”, which belonged to Rivne plant of high-voltage equipment, testified in the words of the head of the technical bureau Yo. Tumakha: the introduction of state financing and self-financing was the cause of constant disruptions in the technological process, which caused the reduction of salaries (Tumakha, 1988, pp. 1-2). Therefore, in the second half of the year, the newspaper columns were flooded with articles such

as “Why Are We Losing Profits?”. The head of the plant’s financial bureau, N. Hudz, found out that the transition to market conditions forced banks to monitor the fulfillment of credit obligations more carefully. The result: the excess of the loaned amount by 3.2 million krb. Under other circumstances, this debt would have been repaid by the state, but under market conditions it became the cause of a decrease in wages (Hudz, 1988, pp. 1–2).

One of the flagships of the industrial complex of Rivne region was Rivne nuclear power plant (RAES). In its newspaper “Enerhetyk” it was written about the party meetings, at which there was discussed the summing up of the first results of the plant’s work under the conditions of state support. From the critical speeches of the chief construction engineer V. Ohorodnyk, a chief mechanization engineer V. Liutykov, a foreman H. Okhrimchuk, lankova N. Klymchuk, it became clear that the reforms gave a positive result only a few months after the beginning of 1988. Then there was a short-term increase in wages, which devastated the financial funds not only of individual enterprises, but also of entire industries. Then there was the previous year design and estimate documentation, which quickly returned salaries to a usual low level (Enerhetyk, 1988, p. 1). That’s why, preferential payments and other preferences of RAES workers seemed unlikely. Therefore, the authors of the newspaper called for abandoning of a numerous management apparatus, optimizing unnecessary structural divisions – including the party ones (Energetik, 1988, p. 1).

As usual, reporting on the previous year overachievement of planned objectives by 108%, the editor of the “Shakhtar” newspaper of the “Ilnytsk” mine in Irshava district, Zakarpattia region, F. Markovtsii, sublimely described the expectations associated with the implementation of the “Law on Enterprise” (Shakhtar, 1988, p. 1). But in the same month, the communist party newspaper of Svaliavsky District Committee “Leninsky Shliakh” published the January meeting of the party committee of the local lumberyard, which was held in the presence of H. Kamenish, the first secretary of the district committee. To the question of rank-and-file communists A. Fales, H. Taliyan, P. Rebrantov, Yu. Fizer, Yu. Sabov, heads of workshops T. Honda and M. Yakym: why is the success of the “Perestroika” not visible? – the director of the plant V. Subotovskiyi answered that low indicators were explained by the introduction of market management methods. His opinion was supported by the first secretary of the district committee, who motivated this situation by the transition period from administrative to economic management methods (Olashyn, 1988, p. 1).

But such explanations were of a little help. In March of the same year, the employees of the woodworking plant came to the director and demanded to find out the reasons for the decrease in wages by 30 thousand krb., because there was the same quantity and quality of products as last month. Neither the administration nor the party committee gave a clear answer. Then the workers sent a collective complaint to the Union Minister for Forestry Industry with a demand to appoint a local nominee of the labour collective council as the director of the enterprise (Andriichuk, 1988, p. 1).

At the end of 1988, many such articles appeared on the pages of Transcarpathian “districts” and mass-circulation press. Especially in the columns of the communist newspaper of Berehivsky district “Chervony Prapor”. This was indicated by their names: “What Justified Itself And What Did Not?” (Dierke, 1988, p. 2), “Problems Remain” (Palish, 1988, 1), “Why are Milk and Meat Expensive?” (Dierke, 1988, p. 3) and many others. These publications more than visibly demonstrated how the fall of the already low material level gave rise to the levelling of communist power at local places and convinced the residents of the region of the party apparatus inability to ensure a proper level of their well-being.

It got to the point that in March of 1988, the “district” newspaper of Putylsky district committee of Chernivtsi region “Radianski Karpaty” published the article “Problems Still Exist” authored by V. Volskyi, the head of the department of propaganda and agitation of the district committee. According to him, the transition to self-financing and household accounting turned out to be more difficult than expected. Scholars did not have a clear idea of the essence of innovations, and the system of economic comprehensive education could not clearly explain it to them (Volskyi, 1988, p. 1). This state of affairs was evidenced by the interview of the newspaper correspondent S. Sopetyk with Yu. Skrypchuk, the foreman of the builders of the collective farm “Prohres”. “So the Reconstruction is Dormant”, he said, “so we will have to solve our problems on our own once again” (Sopetyk, 1988, p. 3).

The newspaper “Budivelnik”, a periodical of the Party Committee of Chernivtsi District of Ukraine, published the article “Under New Conditions”, dedicated to the two-year anniversary of the formation of the labour collective council. “To Be Honest”, said the machinist V. Vizniuk, “self-financing did not play a decisive role in the struggle for the implementation of the plan”. And the hosprozrakhunok did not cause any particular positive changes” (Vizniuk, 1988, p. 1). The above mentioned opinion was published on the pages of the newspaper of F. Dzerzhynsky Machine-Building Plant by the director of the enterprise V. Fotokakis. At the beginning of 1988, from the tribune of the 19th party conference, he said that “Perestroika” needed guarantees of the irreversibility of its processes. It is extremely necessary to reduce the management apparatus and the party apparatus as well. And the main thing is giving more opportunities for independence (Roztotska, 1988, p. 1). At the end of the year, the article with the eloquent title “Although Glasnost is not always Pleasant” was published in the pages of the newspaper of the communists of Storozhynetsky district “The Soviet Village”. The head of the collective farm named after Dzerzhynskyi M. Flekivchuk, the farm manager H. Kovtsun and the locksmith V. Savchuk stated that glasnost existed only on television, but glasnost in the payment of labour, housing construction and filling of stores with goods was absent as such (Levina, 1988, p. 1).

The Conclusions. Therefore, the analysis of the articles published in the columns of the Western Ukrainian regional and multi-circulation press shows that the first sprouts of disbelief of the residents of the region in the socio-economic innovations of the “Perestroika” appeared at the stage of its apogee in 1988. Incompatible with the planned economy, implementation of segmental market innovations in the form of self-financing and state self-support gave positive results only in the first half of the specified year. The positive results manifested themselves in the form of a short-term increase in wages, which quickly became inconsistent with last year’s planned financial estimates. Then the budgets were exhausted, which led to the reduction in salaries, the curtailment of social programmes, and an increase in the deficit of food and industrial consumer goods.

On this basis, the attitude of the Western Ukrainian public towards the initiator of reforms of the CPSU-CPU, in the format of its district committee and party committee units, deteriorated significantly. Gradually there came the understanding that the communist power was not capable of effective implementation of economic innovations, and therefore the political ones should be introduced to limit its influence on the production process. However, after the introduction of a political reform at the 19th All-Union Party Conference towards the transfer of power into the hands of the Soviet institutions, the negative attitude towards the party nomenclature continued to grow. The nature of the publications in the second half of the year indicated that the mistrust in the economic innovations of the party apparatus,

caused by the unfolding of the crisis, was also reflected in its political attempts to maintain dominance in the state created for itself.

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PAN-SLAVIC IDEAS IN MODERN RUSSIAN POLITICAL IMAGINATION AND THE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

Abstract. The Purpose of the Research. Whether the Russian war against Ukraine has been ideologically motivated constitutes a part of a broader discussion of a revanchist turn in Russia's foreign policy. The period since the dissolution of the Soviet Union witnessed a quest for a new state ideology and the emergence of various forms of modern Russian nationalism. In this context, the Pan-Slavic ideas that spread in academic, quasi-academic, and political spheres in the decades preceding the full-scale invasion deserve particular attention. **The Methodology of Research.** Critical discourse analysis of speeches, official statements, and media publications was used to detect embedded messages and compare them to sentiments typical of Pan-Slavic doctrine. **The Research Novelty.** Such an approach allowed to identify particular elements in the Russian official discourse and propaganda dating back to the late imperial times and explain the role of such elements in the ideological justification of the war against Ukraine. **Conclusions.** The ideas and symbols influencing how the Russian leadership presents themselves on the global stage often draw from characteristics commonly associated with Pan-Slavism. One of the outcomes has been framing the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a battle of civilizations to prevent Ukraine's westernization and position it as “anti-Russia”. The Russian nationalism emphasizes the unity and strength of the Russian nation, viewing Ukraine as an integral part of a broader Russian identity. This approach has been fueled by a sense of historical injustice and a desire to regain what is accepted as lost influence and territories in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Top officials, including Vladimir Putin himself, have consistently employed the isolationist, quasi-Orthodox, and messianic language. As circumstances evolve, they adjust their rhetoric pragmatically, but Pan-Slavic concepts serve as one of the foundations for the growing appeal of civilizational discourse.

Keywords: Pan-Slavism, Russian imperialism, propaganda, war against Ukraine.

ПАНСЛОВ'ЯНСЬКІ ІДЕЇ В СУЧАСНІЙ РОСІЙСЬКІЙ ПОЛІТИЧНІЙ УЯВІ І ВІЙНА СУПРОТИ УКРАЇНИ

Анотація. Мета дослідження. Питання про те, чи була війна Росії проти України ідеологічно вмотивованою, є частиною ширшої дискусії про реваншистський поворот у російській зовнішній політиці. Період після розпаду Радянського Союзу став часом пошуків нової державної ідеології та появи різних форм сучасного російського націоналізму. У цьому контексті на особливу увагу заслуговують панслов'янські ідеї, які поширювалися в академічній, навколоакадемічній та політичній сферах протягом десятиліть, що передували повномасштабному вторгненню.

Методологія дослідження включала критичний дискурс-аналіз виступів, офіційних заяв, публікацій у ЗМІ, що уможливило виявити вбудовані повідомлення та зіставити їх з тезами, характерними для панславистської доктрини.

Новизна дослідження. Такий підхід дав змогу розпізнати ті елементи в російському офіційному дискурсі та пропаганді, які сягають пізньої імперських часів, і пояснити їх роль в ідеологічному виправданні війни супроти України.

Висновки. Концепції та символи, які впливають на те, як російське керівництво уявляє і себе, і свою роль на світовій арені, часто спираються на характеристики, які асоціюються з панслов'янськими ідеями. Як наслідок, російсько-український конфлікт представляють битвою цивілізацій з метою запобігти вестернізації України та викрити її нібито "антіросійську" сутність. Російський націоналізм розглядає Україну як невід'ємну частину ширшої російської ідентичності. Цей підхід підживлюється відчуттям історичної несправедливості та бажанням повернути, як вважається, втрачений вплив і території у Східній Європі та колишньому Радянському Союзі. Ізоляціоністська, псевдоправославна і месіанська мова постійно використовується вищими посадовими особами, включаючи Володимира Путіна. Хоча вони прагматично пристосовують свій дискурс до конкретних обставин, панслов'янські ідеї є одним із джерел дедалі популярнішої цивілізаційної риторики.

Ключові слова: панславізм, російський імперіалізм, пропаганда, війна проти України.

The Problem statement. Whether the Russian war against Ukraine has been ideologically motivated constitutes a part of a broader discussion of a revanchist turn in the Russian foreign policy. In retrospect, it is evident that the period since the dissolution of the Soviet Union witnessed the quest for a new state ideology and the emergence of various forms of modern Russian nationalism, including civic, ethnic, imperial, and Eurasian versions. In this context, the Pan-Slavic ideas that spread in academic, quasi-academic, and political spheres in the decades preceding the full-scale invasion deserve particular attention.

The Analysis of Recent Research and Publications. One prevalent perspective postulates that contemporary Russian elites have primarily focused on a personal enrichment and political survival without a solid ideological drive (Gessen, 2012; Harding, 2011; Zygat, 2016). Another influential trend emphasizes the pragmatic considerations behind the aggressive geopolitical moves. According to such a *Realpolitik* approach, Russia's strategic interests in Ukraine are linked to its location, economic ties, and access to important resources. Scholars stress various domestic and international factors shaping Russia's policies within this paradigm (Toal, 2017, p. 298). A central theme that transcends not just Russian propaganda but also academic discussions revolves around the allegedly pivotal role played by the West, particularly the United States, in initiating and escalating the conflict among Slavic nations (Mearsheimer, 2014). The accepted advance of Western influence in Ukraine, especially after the 2014 Maidan Revolution, in Russia has been interpreted as threatening its security and interests (Miller & Wert, 2015). However, as convincingly demonstrated by Ihor Torbakov, foreign policy development goes beyond a rational assessment of economic interests or geopolitical positions. According to this perspective, other factors, including political imagination, historical myths, and symbolic geographies, influence geopolitical

decisions (Torbakov, 2018). Recent researches by Marlène Laurelle, Timothy Snyder, and Jane Burbank also shed light on the ideological currents that have converged in Russia, ultimately leading to the invasion of Ukraine (Burbank, 2022; Laurelle, 2019; Snyder, 2018).

The purpose of this article is to do the research on the influence of Pan-Slavic ideas in contemporary Russia by following the ways they spread in academic, quasi-academic, and political spheres in the decades preceding the full-scale invasion. After contextualizing the messages embedded in speeches, official statements, and media and considering historical parallels, it will be shown that these narratives contain discursive elements dating back to the late imperial times.

The Research Results. Historically, the Slavophile-Westernizer divide emerged during the era of Romanticism in opposition to liberal ideas coming from the West and attempts to modernize Russia according to European models (Walicki, 2015, p. 167). Russian Slavophilism developed as a “conservative criticism of modern society”, and as such, it appealed to Russia’s Slavonic origins, Orthodox faith, and the traditional wisdom of the people (Rabow-Edling, 2006, p. 1). In the writings by Alexei Khomiakov, Konstantin Aksakov, Yury Samarin, and Ivan Kireevsky, Russia appeared as the Holy Land of God’s chosen people. At the same time, any pro-European orientation (including Petrine reforms) constituted the betrayal of its Slavic roots (Walicki, 2015, pp. 167–173). The Slavophiles believed in an impassable barrier between Russia and the West caused by historically distinct sets of spiritual principles and the superiority of the said principles over the “false” values of the West (Riasanovsky, 1952, p. 3). Another essential aspect of Slavophiles’ worldview, the nostalgic longing for the past, gave Andrzej Walicki the reason to define their philosophy as conservative utopianism: “*utopianism* because it was a comprehensive and detailed vision of a social ideal, sharply contrasted to existing realities; and *conservative*, or even reactionary because it was an ideal located in the past” (Walicki, 2015, p. 183).

Eventually, Slavophile ideology came to play a significant role in Russian intellectual and political tradition. In the mid-1850s, the profound sense of national humiliation caused by Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War gave rise to a powerful aspiration to revive Russian national glory. This, in turn, spurred a transition from Slavophilism to Pan-Slavism (Kovalchuk, 2019, p. 139). Later on, the 1863 Polish uprising played a pivotal role in reshaping Slavophilism into a more comprehensive agenda that aimed at the “nationalization” of the Russian Empire. This involved the “subordination of its internal policy to Russian ethno-nationalism, and its external policy to Pan-Slavism” (Walicki, 2015, p. 200). A militant programme of the Russian expansion in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East emerged in the writings of Ivan Aksakov, Iurii Samarin, and Nikolai Danilevskii (Kohn, 1953, pp. 158–159). Since then the all-Slavonic mission became an inseparable part of Russia’s political programme.

Nikolai Danilevskii, a Russian conservative philosopher and a prominent Pan-Slavist, authored a book in 1869 that is widely regarded as the “first and only ... systematic exposition of Russian political Pan-Slavism philosophy” (Walicki, 2015, p. 339) or even a “codex and catechism” of the doctrine (MacMaster, 1967, p. 123). Danilevskii categorized civilizations into distinct types based on their dominant cultural and historical characteristics. He identified Europe as belonging to the Franco-German cultural-historical type and posited that its influence would gradually wane, giving way to the rise of a new Slavic civilization. Since Russia and Europe, in his view, represented different cultural-historical types, he believed it was both impossible and harmful to apply European models to Russian conditions. Danilevskii asserted that Russia’s foreign policy should be driven by Slavic interests, aiming

to dismantle the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires and establish the Slavic Federation under the Russian Tsar. As noted by Walicki, such a “programmatically political immoralism was bound to be most convenient for Russian great-power chauvinism” (Walicki, 2015, p. 341). Ukraine was accepted by Danilevskii not just a sphere of influence, but as an inherent and inseparable part of the broader all-Russian nation. He argued that Russia never truly “conquered” this territory, as it was impossible to conquer something that had always been considered its natural extension (Danilevskii, 2013, p. 321).

Danilevskii’s popularity in Russia and interest in Slavic ideas in general correlate with the country’s political situation and dominant geopolitical agenda. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 – 78, a surge of Pan-Slavic enthusiasm led to the complete sale of all copies of his *magnum opus*, published eight years prior. In post-Soviet Russia, the interest in the heritage of influential Pan Slavists became visible as early as 1991 when 70,000 copies of “Russia and Europe” appeared in print. Over the next two decades, numerous editions of the book were published (in 1995, 2002, 2003, 2008, 2010, and 2013), including a luxurious version in 1995. Additionally, an English translation of the book by Stephen M. Woodburn was made available in 2013 (Danilevskii, 2013).

Just as the humiliation experienced during the Crimean War fueled the emergence of Pan-Slavism, the identity crisis that followed the collapse of the USSR and the upheaval of post-Soviet socio-economic transformations triggered a sense of nostalgia among a significant portion of the Russian population (Yanov, 2007). In both instances, Russia found itself on the losing side against the West, with the USSR considered a form of the Russian civilization. The loss prompted many to become deeply concerned about “Russia’s stature as a great nation with not only unique but superior characteristics. Hence they employed Slavophile conceptions as part of the ideology of national patriotism” (Scanlan, 1994, p. 45).

A renewed interest in Slavophilism emerged first in academic circles, although many academic discussions were already full of political implications. At the beginning of the 1990s, Yevgenii Troitskii founded the Association of the Comprehensive Study of the Russian Nation. Troitskii’s viewpoints can be characterized as chauvinistic, as he firmly believed in “not simply the value and uniqueness, but the superiority of “Holy Russia” over Western society and culture, echoing a similar conviction on the part of early Slavophiles” (Scanlan, 1994, p. 46). Additionally, he propagated the idea, consistent with Danilevskii’s thinking, that the West had already exhausted its spiritual resources while “the genius of the Slavdom” had not been yet to be revealed.

Established in 1993, the Institute of Russian Civilization is another example of a quasi-academic organization, primarily focusing on the publication of significant texts by the Russian intellectuals dealing with the evolution of the Russian national worldview. These works are aimed at showcasing Russia’s resistance to what the institute’s leadership characterizes as “global evil, Russophobia, and racism”. The statement also reveals cooperation with the movement toward creating the All-Slavic Union. To this end, IRC published three volumes of “The Slavic Encyclopedia,” the historical encyclopedia “Slavophiles”, and several volumes of works by prominent Russian Pan-Slavists.

A noticeable revival of interest in the life and heritage of Danilevskii was also quite symptomatic (Kovalchuk, 2019). As early as 1994, a team of volunteers coordinated memorial readings and uncovered his previously unknown grave in the Crimean town of Foros. Notably, years later, the leader of this group, affiliated with the local university, emerged as one of the ardent supporters of what state propaganda labeled the “Russian Spring.” Then he openly

referred to the heritage of prominent Pan-Slavist while attempting to justify Russia's actions in the Crimea and Ukraine in general: "Danilevskii's book is a comprehensive, in-depth analysis of whether Russia has the right as an independent civilization ... to develop according to its internal laws or it should be a pathetic appendage ... to a hostile civilization" (Kiselev, 2014).

The Danilevskii Institute of Russian-Slavic Civilization also actively stimulates discussions on contemporary political matters by applying the "civilizational" perspective in addition to its research and publishing activities. The institute manages an online platform and multiple social media channels, providing commentary on the Russian domestic and foreign policy aspects as events unfold. Their Telegram channel with the characteristic name "Russia is not Europe" belongs to the ultra-nationalist segment of the social media landscape.

Many researchers point out not only the importance of Danilevskii's text in modern Russian intellectual history but also "its impact on the thinking of a growing number of twenty-first-century readers". Stephen M. Woodburn calls Danilevskii's book an "essential background for Russian Pan-Slavism and Eurasianism, the ideologies best poised to inform Russian policy over the next decades", and thus – the most important 19th-century book for the post-Soviet period (Danilevskii, p. XXV). Michel Elchaninoff, a French philosopher, considers Danilevskii one of the primary sources of the official ideology of contemporary Russia (Eltchaninoff, 2015). The Russian intellectual historian Alexandr Yanov observes that Danilevskii "most fully, accurately and frankly formulated – and thereby brought to the point of absurdity – one of the three historical perspectives of the country, which seems to be the most popular in Russia today" having in mind contrasting Russia with Europe as a civilization fundamentally alien and hostile to it (Yanov, 2007).

Some of the arguments Russian president made in his well-known article "Russia. The Ethnicity Issue" (2012) also showed parallels to Pan-Slavic ideas and included allusions to the ideas of Danilevskii (Malykhina, 2014, p. 50). "The Russian people are state-builders... Their great mission is to unite and bind together a civilization ... This kind of civilizational identity is based on preserving the dominance of Russian culture, although this culture is represented not only by ethnic Russians but by all the holders of this identity, regardless of their ethnicity" (Putin, 2012). Ideas from Danilevskii's work appeared in the speeches of Putin on multiple occasions, both explicitly and implicitly. Using the concept of state-civilization as a marker of pertinent discourse, one can discern their presence, often filled with particular significance: "It is precisely the state-civilization model that has shaped our state polity", said Putin addressing the Valdai forum in 2013 (President of Russia, 2013).

The interest in the legacy of influential Pan-Slavists reflected a broader quest for a new ideology or a new "Russian idea" as well as a sense of "ontological insecurity" and an identity crisis in post-Soviet Russia (Tsygankov, 2017, p. 586). Nationalist tendencies gained momentum in the country, sometimes "deviating into a racist and xenophobic character" when parties with strong nationalist platforms rooted in notions of Slavic superiority saw their influence grow in the Duma (Çiçek, 2012, p. 112).

Putin began to employ the rhetoric of civilization and emphasize Russia's distinctive values more prominently following his return to power in 2012, a period marked by corrupted parliamentary elections and subsequent protests that were suppressed. He positioned Russia as a global champion of conservative values and adopted the language of civilization to justify his new domestic and foreign policy direction (Tsygankov, 2017, pp. 583–585). Putin's new ideological agenda meant, among other things, the popularization of "traditional values" close to Slavophile philosophy (Zygar, 2016, pp. 248–249).

These claims have been based on the idea of the moral superiority of Slavic nations against the decadent and spiritually inferior West. Putin commented on this topic on multiple occasions. In one of his most extensive monologues on the subject at the Valdai Forum in 2013, when he speculated that “many Euro-Atlantic countries are rejecting their roots, including the Christian values that constitute the basis of Western civilization. They deny moral principles and all traditional identities: national, cultural, religious, and even sexual. They are implementing policies that equate large families with same-sex partnerships and belief in God with the belief in Satan” (President of Russia, 2013, July 19).

Russia’s view of Europe changed diametrically during Putin’s years, from claiming that Russia is a part of Europe to the idea that it “constitutes a self-sustained civilization distinct from the European one” (Torbakov, 2017, p. 241). A deterioration in relations with Western countries accompanied the shift toward a more authoritarian stance within Russia. According to Richard Sakwa, Putin’s third term aimed to position Russia as an autonomous force in global politics through a strategy of neo-revisionism (Sakwa, 2020, p. 234). Ukrainian geopolitical move towards the West (especially evident after 2014) served as another reason behind Russia’s “civilizational self-determination”. Euromaidan promoted and protected the vision of Ukraine as part of Europe and relied on its values. Predictably, in Russian official discourse it was interpreted as a Western plot directed against the Russian Federation.

The abovementioned pretext was presented as a reason for the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This action faced widespread condemnation from the United States and European countries, deemed a breach of international law. During this time, Putin’s government increasingly stressed the significance of Russia’s sovereignty and the imperative of protecting its interests. It frequently positioned Russia as a counterbalance to the Western world on the global stage. The narrative of Western “hostility” toward Russia gained further traction when the European Union and the United States imposed economic sanctions. According to this reasoning, consistent with Pan-Slavic ideology, Russia asserted its right to disregard international law, perceiving it as a product of a distinct and adversarial civilization. For example, Putin informed his audience that there was “every reason to assume that the infamous policy of containment, led in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, continues today” (Putin, 2014). In another president’s speech, delivered after the commencement of the full-scale war, certain portions also focused on the purported “pressure” exerted by the West to manipulate Russia for its geopolitical objectives. The speech also featured a citation from Danilevskii, referred to as a “great Russian philosopher” (President of Russia, 2022). In practical terms, Russian leadership was claiming the ability to act as a regional hegemon and ruin international order, displaying what Torbakov defined as an “obsessive quest for greatness” (Torbakov, 2018, p. 247). It is also the reason behind Moscow’s attempts to portray Russia as a state-civilization in its own right, clearly separate from Europe, refusing to play a role (allegedly prescribed for her in European identity discourses) of the “eternal apprentice”(Miller & Lukyanov, 2016).

Ukraine’s role in the relationship between Europe and Russia has been crucial. Moreover, Ukraine is often considered the singular and most significant reason for the confrontation between these entities (Torbakov, 2018). The years preceding the full-scale Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2024 witnessed numerous proofs. While public speeches before 2014 demonstrate the need to recognize Ukrainian independence conventionally, they still revealed a skeptical approach. One characteristic example comes from Putin’s speech at the 2013 Valdai forum: “I want to repeat again; we are one people. Of course, the Ukrainian

people, the Ukrainian culture, and the Ukrainian language have wonderful features that make up the identity of the Ukrainian nation. And we not only respect it, but moreover, I, for one, really love it; I like all of it. It is part of our greater Russian, or Russian-Ukrainian, world. But history has unfolded in such a way that today, this territory is an independent state, and we respect that” (President of Russia, 2013). The existence of the Ukrainian state is presented in this narrative as an accident (the formula “history has unfolded in such a way” is repeated at least twice), which does not change the obvious (for Putin) fact that it always belonged to the great Russian whole. Similarly to Danilevskii, Putin presented Kyiv as the birthplace of the Russian state and the source of Christianity: “Here at this site, at the baptismal site on the Dnieper River, a choice was made for the whole of Holy Rus, for all of us” (President of Russia, 2013, July 27).

Putin and his close aides repeatedly claimed that Ukraine suffered from the West’s attempts to undermine Slavic unity. Former defense minister Sergey Ivanov, said in a TASS interview in 2015 that “...Ukraine is a special case, millions of our people still live there... Mentally, religiously, and culturally, we have a lot in common. Including language. One Slavic people, there is nothing to argue about” (Ivanov, 2015). Importantly, Ivanov belongs to a particularly influential group of Russian officials commonly known as “siloviki” (“strongmen”). It is believed that representatives of this group, especially those from security services, were largely responsible for the aggressive turn of Russia’s foreign policy (Kragh & Umland, 2023). The views of Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, reflect Russia’s official position pretty well. On multiple occasions, he ascribed what he called “the Ukrainian crisis” to the “systemic activities of the United States and its closest allies” attempting to separate Ukraine from Russia (Patrushev, 2014). Generally the abovementioned circle interpreted Western geopolitical orientation as a conscious anti-Russian policy to hurt it by targeting its very core. By appealing to the past, they were borrowing ideas from a “rich reservoir of metaphors, meanings, images, and tropes created over the past 200 years by Russian conservative and nationalist thinkers” (Torbakov, 2018, p. 246). The Russian variant of Pan-Slavic ideology does not just emphasize politically relevant cultural similarities among different Slavic-speaking peoples. Rather, it asserts that the “Great Russians” (ethnic Russians), “White Russians” (the Belarusians), and “Malorosy” (the Ukrainians) collectively constitute the “Russian people”. According to this ideology, they are part of a single East Slavic Orthodox/Russian super-nation or civilization.

Historical narratives have also been manipulated to support the image of Russia as a superpower with legitimate interests in the region and view of Ukraine as a part of a broader Russian nation (Torbakov, 2018, p. 238). In 2021, Putin’s essay, “On Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, expanded on his recurring assertion that the Ukrainians and the Russians constitute “one people” and Russia and Ukraine are “the parts of what is essentially the same historical and spiritual space”. According to this text, “historical unity” did not refer to common historical events or processes but rather to “malorussian cultural identity” that existed only within “the greater Russian nation”. Towards the conclusion of the article, Putin made at least seven references to the “anti-Russia” project, which, in his viewpoint, Western nations are attempting to execute within the borders of Ukraine (President of Russia, 2021). The author denied Ukraine any agency and blamed the Soviet national policy for the emergence of Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian peoples instead of what he called “the large Russian nation, a triune people comprising the Velykorussians, the Malorussians, and the Belorussians”. He presented modern Ukraine as “entirely the product of the Soviet era”

shaped “on the lands of historical Russia”. Such “lectures on history” figured prominently in Putin’s speeches before and during the invasion of Ukraine, as noted by observers from both inside and outside Russia (Miller, 2023; Torbakov, 2016).

In the abovementioned article, one can also identify the central motif, used less than two years later to justify the aggression against Ukraine, namely the pledge not to “allow our historical territories and people close to us living there to be used against Russia” (President of Russia, 2021). Ann Applebaum correctly assessed the article as an “essentially a call to arms, laying the groundwork for a Russian invasion of Ukraine” (Applebaum, 2021). Indeed, in his address to the nation on February 21, 2022, Putin used exactly the same language to justify imminent invasion, emphasizing that “Ukraine is not just a neighboring country for us. It is an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space” (President of Russia, 2022). This introduction set the stage for Russia’s subsequent invasion of Ukraine.

In the early hours of February 24, 2022, Putin delivered a new speech as a formal declaration of war. In this address, he explicitly claimed the “territories adjacent to Russia”, which he asserted were historically Russian lands. According to his narrative, these regions were witnessing the emergence of a hostile and “anti-Russia” presence. He squarely blamed “irresponsible Western politicians” for creating military threats near Russia’s borders and attempting to erode the traditional values of the Russian people while imposing what he described as “false values”. According to Putin, these alleged false values contradict human nature and lead to societal degradation.

It is well known that Putin and his aides have anticipated a swift and triumphant military campaign. It is, therefore, not surprising that different groups of propagandists prematurely celebrated the presumed conquest of Ukraine. The article released by the Russian state information agency on February 26, 2022, titled “The Emergence of Russia and New World” once again reiterated the crucial ideological justifications for the war: “Russia is restoring its historical fullness, gathering the Russian world, the Russian people together – in its entirety of Great Russians, Belarusians and Little Russians” (Akopov, 2022).

On February 28, “Literary Gazette” published an open letter, signed by 500 writers and poets, expressing their full support for the so called “Special Military operation” and blaming the West for nurturing animosity between the Slavs: “The pitting of the Slavs among themselves is unacceptable. We, the Russians, do not want to pit anyone against anyone! The Russians do not start a war. The Russians usually finish it. Russia’s special military operation is aimed at bringing peace to Europe. We love the Ukrainian people, we sing the Ukrainian songs, we watch the Ukrainian movies, we pray in the same churches” (Literary Gazette, 2022, February 28).

The fact that the motives of Slavic unity are persistently present in the official discourse proves the potential of the Pan-Slavic myth on the one hand and the imperial character of Russian ideological searches on the other. As the closest Slavic neighbour, Ukraine occupies a special place on the Russian mental map because “it is where the *imperial* and the *national* meet”. To put it differently, controlling this territory is crucial for preserving the status of great power and “the cornerstone of what might be termed the Russian imperial mindset” (Torbakov, 2018, pp. 239–240).

The Conclusions. The ideas and symbols influencing how the Russian leadership presents themselves on the global stage often draw from characteristics commonly associated with Pan-Slavism. In particular, this worldview contains the messianic belief that Russia has a special task to lead the Slavic nations and protect Orthodoxy and Slavic cultures.

The Russian politicians and “opinion leaders” often insist on the moral superiority of the Slavic world over the “materialistic” and “cynical” West, which is typical for conservative Slavophile doctrine. This has resulted, among other things, in framing the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a civilizational struggle aimed at preventing the westernization of Ukraine and positioning it as “anti-Russia”. The Russian nationalism emphasizes the unity and strength of the Russian nation, viewing Ukraine as an integral part of a broader Russian identity. This approach has been fueled by a sense of historical injustice and a desire to regain what is accepted as lost influence and territories in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Top officials, including Vladimir Putin himself, have consistently employed the isolationist, quasi-Orthodox, and messianic language. As circumstances evolve, they adjust their rhetoric pragmatically, but Pan-Slavic concepts serve as one of the foundations for the growing appeal of civilizational discourse.

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**CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS DURING
THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR (2014 – 2024)**

Abstract. *The purpose of the article is a comprehensive analysis of church and religious policy in the focus of political institutions under the conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian war 2014 – 2024; elucidation of the main areas of Church activity of different denominations, their position regarding the Russo-Ukrainian war, characteristics of the interaction between the Church and the state, taking into account the challenges of the national security, geopolitical influences. The Methodology of the Research.* To achieve the goal, general scientific and special scientific principles and methods, as well as principles of systematicity and consistency, have been used. **The Scientific Novelty.** A hybrid dimension of the Russo-Ukrainian war and its ideological basis, in particular in the concept of the “Russian world” promoted by the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate, actualizes the study of religious institutions activity. That is, the study of church-state interaction, socio-religious relations in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war is relevant in view of the national security issue. At the same time, a comprehensive study of the role of leading church institutions, not only of the Orthodox, but also of the Catholic denomination, in the Russo-Ukrainian war demonstrates their identification and civilizational choice. **The Conclusions.** Civilizational challenges of the Russo-

Ukrainian war, actualized under the conditions of a full-scale invasion, affected the identification processes of citizens, a religious landscape of the state. The Orthodox churches of the Kyiv Christian tradition were united, and the Tomos on autocephaly was received. The reformation of the religious network of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, in particular the loss of some religious buildings, the transfer of parishes to the newly created OCU, is accompanied by a significant polarization of relations between the UOC MP and the OCU, and even open aggression on the part of the leaders of the Moscow Patriarchate. Under such difficult conditions, the state apparatus, responding to challenges, pursues the policy of making it impossible, reducing the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church and its Ukrainian representatives – the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. After all, supporting the independent Orthodox Church in Ukraine is the matter of national security, confirmation of the Ukrainian identity, and a geopolitical choice. Restrictions on the presence of the UOC MP in the Ukrainian public space are carried out through the discussion of draft laws banning the Russian Orthodox Church, banning the activities of religious organizations registered outside of Ukraine, and a gradual implementation of resolutions aimed at depriving the right to use religious buildings of the national level.

Key words: Russo-Ukrainian war, Church, state, religious policy.

ВІДНОСИНИ ЦЕРКВИ І ДЕРЖАВИ В ПЕРІОД РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ (2014 – 2024)

Мета роботи: комплексний аналіз церковно-релігійної політики у фокусі політичних інститутів в умовах російсько-української війни 2014 – 2024 рр. Виокремлення головних напрямів діяльності церков різної конфесійної приналежності, їхню позицію щодо російсько-української війни, характеристика взаємодії між Церквою та державою, враховуючи виклики національної безпеки, геополітичних впливів. **Методологія дослідження.** Для досягнення окресленої мети використано загальнонаукові та спеціально-наукові методи, а також принципи системності та послідовності. **Наукова новизна.** Гібридний вимір російсько-української війни та її ідеологічне підґрунтя, зокрема у концепції “русского мира”, пропорованої РПЦ та УПЦ МП актуалізує вивчення питання діяльності релігійних інституцій. Тобто вивчення церковно-державної взаємодії, суспільно-релігійних відносин у контексті російсько-української війни є актуальним з огляду на питання національної безпеки. Водночас комплексне дослідження ролі провідних церковних інституцій не лише православної, а й католицької конфесії у російсько-українській війні демонструє їхній ідентифікаційний та цивілізаційний вибір. **Висновки.** Цивілізаційні виклики російсько-української війни, актуалізовані в умовах повномасштабного вторгнення вплинули на процеси ідентифікації громадян, релігійний ландшафт держави. Відбулося об’єднання православних церков Київської християнської традиції, отримання Томосу про автокефалію. Переформатування релігійної мережі православної церкви в Україні, зокрема втрата частини культових споруд, перехід парафій до новоствореної ПЦУ супроводжується суттєвою поляризацією відносин між УПЦ МП та ПЦУ, та навіть відкритою агресією з боку керівників Московського патріархату. У таких складних умовах державний апарат, реагуючи на виклики, провадить політику унеможливлення, зменшення впливу РПЦ та її українських представників – УПЦ. Адже підтримка незалежної православної церкви в Україні є питанням національної безпеки, утвердження української ідентичності, геополітичного вибору. Обмеження присутності УПЦ МП в українському суспільному просторі здійснюються шляхом обговорення законопроектів про заборону Російської православної Церкви, заборони діяльності релігійних організацій, зареєстрованих за межами України, та поступової імплементації постанов, спрямованих на позбавлення права користуватися культовими спорудами національного рівня

Ключові слова: російсько-українська війна, Церква, держава, релігійна політика.

The Problem Statement. The unfolding of the modern Russo-Ukrainian war in 2014 became a civilizational challenge, and a full-scale invasion (according to analysts of the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies) – an existential war (Telvak & Ihnytskyi, 2023, pp. 249–250). Responding to threats, the Ukrainian civil society underwent a significant transformation consolidating the efforts in supporting the state’s defense capability, a

humanitarian aid to victims of military operations (Kravets & Barvinenko, 2024, p. 200). Religion is an important institutional resource in politics at all levels (Kulahina-Stadnichenko, 2023, p. 97). At the same time, the Church as an institution and community is part of a civil society (Lotiuk, 2014, p. 125). The annexation of the Crimea and the occupation of parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions in 2014, and later the full-scale war of Russia against Ukraine in 2022, affected qualitative and quantitative changes in the religious landscape of the country (Kolodny & Fylypovych, 2022, pp. 6–7).

The Review of Recent Researches and Publications. The issues of the study of Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the political influence on these processes are raised in the publications of well-known researchers: Anatoly Kolodny (Kolodny, 2014, pp. 122–127; Kolodny & Fylypovych, 2022, pp. 6–17), Liudmyla Fylypovych (Fylypovych, 2024, pp. 210–220), Serhiy Zdioruk and Volodymyr Tokman (Zdioruk & Tokman, 2023), Svitlana Kahamlyk (Kahamlyk, 2021, pp. 79–84), Mykola Obushny (Kahamlyk & Obushny, 2023, p. 74–82). Andrii Kobetiak (Kobetiak, 2022; Kobetiak & Sliusar, 2022, pp. 43–49; Kobetiak, 2023, pp. 41–48). Among a number of researches on the study of the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on Ukraine, its role at the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war, there should be singled out the publications by Pavlo Artymyshyn (Artymyshyn, 2020, pp. 236–252; Artymyshyn, 2024, pp. 221–238), Oleh Muravskiy (Muravskiy, 2022, pp. 39–40), Andriy and Mariana Mishchuk (Mishchuk & Mishchuk, 2023, pp. 43–52), Dmytro Vovk and Elizabeth E. Clark (Clark & Vovk, 2019), Andriy Fert (Fert, 2019, pp. 192–210; Fert, 2024, pp. 1–36), Jerry Pankhurst (Pankhurst & Kilp, 2022, pp. 1–23; Pankhurst & Kilp, 2023, pp. 1–27). Therefore, the historiography of political influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, the UOC MP, and creation of the concepts of the “Russian world”, their promotion in various spheres of a public life remain a constant research focus by both domestic and foreign scholars, but there are significantly fewer publications on a comprehensive analysis of the specifics of the state-church and social-religious processes under the conditions of war, opposition to anti-Ukrainian activities, a full-scale military aggression of Russia against Ukraine.

The purpose of the article: a comprehensive analysis of church and religious policy in the focus of political institutions under the conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian war 2014 – 2024; elucidation of the main areas of Churches activity of different denominations, their position regarding the Russo-Ukrainian war, characteristics of interaction between the Church and the state, taking into account challenges of national security, geopolitical influences.

The Research Results. Religion has a great influence on social structures, so it has always been in the field of state, political and ideological structures (Buchma, 2023, p. 55; Kryński, Bodak & Tkachenko, 2021, p. 196). The Government of Ukraine, i.e. the Cabinet of Ministers (exercises executive power through ministries and central bodies), the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (responsible for the “formation and implementation of state-church and inter-religious relations) belong to the political institutions that influence the formation of a religious policy within the limits of their powers” (Kobetiak, 2022, pp. 355–356). The President of Ukraine acts as a guarantor of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, compliance with the Basic Law of Ukraine, human rights and freedoms. Also, as the head of the state, the President forms the directions of state policy, including religious ones. Its duties also include ensuring the right to freedom of conscience and religion. In practical terms, this is regulation of the state policy directions in a religious sphere, in particular through introduction of draft laws for consideration by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, creation of advisory bodies in the sphere of religion (Kobetiak & Sliusar, 2022, p. 44).

The beginning of the hybrid war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2014 became possible due to the anti-state activities of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP). Therefore, it is necessary to outline the main milestones of the Russian Orthodox Church activities directed against the statehood of Ukraine. In 2013 and 2015, according to Pavlo Artymyshyn, the Ukrainian researcher of Russian issues, the specified church structures were “the ideological basis for the promotion of Russian geopolitical interests” (Artymyshyn, 2020, pp. 247–248). With the rise to power of Volodymyr Putin in Russia, at the beginning of the 2000s, the ROC became an important political actor for implementation of pro-Russian politics and ideology. The rhetoric of the Russian clergy (ROC) was aimed at affirming theses about the historical commonality and cultural heritage of the Russians, the Ukrainians, and the Belarusians, who created the so-called “Eastern Slavic Orthodox civilization”. Since the mid-2000s, an even more aggressive concept has been established – the “Russian world”. In 2007 V. Putin issued Decree on the establishment of the “Russian world” fund, the main goal of which was to popularize the Russian culture and language. In 2009, the ROC was headed by Metropolitan Kyryl (Hundiayev), who publicly emphasized the importance of the “Russian (“Rusky”) world”, which aims to unite the society of Russia and the Russians (“Rusky”) – a cultural community, which also included the Ukrainians and the Belarusians) abroad in order to preserve their identity, while the ROC assigned the role of a consolidating institution (Artymyshyn, 2020, pp. 238–239). The leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church condemned the events of the Revolution of Dignity and called it the “Ukrainian crisis”, which was initiated by the West in order to destroy the “spiritual unity” of the Russians and the Ukrainians; supported the preservation of Viktor Yanukovich’s regime. After the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the occupation of a part of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church expressed support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine formally, but in practice the Russian Orthodox Church took diametrically opposite steps. At the same time, following the leadership of the Russian Federation, the Russian Orthodox Church used the definition “political crisis in Ukraine” to describe the military operations in Donbas (Artymyshyn, 2020, pp. 242–243).

The UOC MP relayed the ideas of the Russian Orthodox Church together with a number of public Orthodox associations that promoted the ideologies of the “Russian world” actively. No less revealing was the organization of the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Forum “For Peace in Ukraine” in November of 2014 in Kyiv with the assistance of the UOC MP. Only pro-Russian religious formations from Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and representatives from the Russian Federation took part in it. The resolutions of the forum reflected the ideological influence of the concept of the “Russian world”, the participants appealed to this identification. But they believed that the achievement of peace is possible only with the improvement of the Russian-Ukrainian relations and rejection of European integration aspirations, they favourably evaluated the “peacemaking mission of the Russian Orthodox Church” (including the mission in Donbas) (Artymyshyn, 2020, p. 245).

It is worth noting that the leadership of the UOC MP did not condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which led to the violation of civil rights, in particular, the freedom of religion in the regions occupied by the Russian Federation. Instead, some bodies of the UOC MP, in particular in Luhansk and Donetsk regions, instead took a neutral position regarding the spread of separatism, or on the contrary, openly supported the Russian side and the so-called “militia” (Artymyshyn, 2020, pp. 245–246; Kahamlyk, 2021, p. 81).

Instead, the UOC KP took a distinctly pro-Ukrainian position. This Church openly condemned the actions of the Russian aggressor at the Synod. Also, the priests of the Kyiv Patriarchate actively helped in the provision of servicemen, internally relocated people from the eastern regions of Ukraine (Marchyshak, 2015, pp. 65–66).

It is also worth noting that after the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation, systematic violations of the rights of religious communities, in particular the UOC KP, began. In 2014, 6 parishes were liquidated on the Crimean peninsula, approximately 10% of the priests left, instead the parishes of the UOC KP were joined to the Russian Orthodox Church (Marchyshak, 2015, p. 65)

With the beginning of the hybrid Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014, the UOC KP and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church activated the institution of chaplaincy. The position of military chaplain was introduced in the units that participated in the anti-terrorist operation in the eastern regions of the country (Kahamlyk, 2021, p. 81). According to a researcher Dmytro Vovk, the process of introducing the service of military clergy, i.e. chaplaincy, is one of the manifestations of “convergence of the state and the church” (Vovk, 2016, p. 108).

Among the researchers of the military religious relations, different stages of formation and institutional design of the chaplain service are distinguished (Nepinenko, 2022, pp. 128–130). Since 2014, according to the Ukrainian philosopher Larysa Vladychenko, there has been a significant revival of cooperation between religious and military bodies, the formation issue of the institute of chaplaincy began to be considered at the national level (Vladychenko, 2016).

On July 2, 2014, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine issued Order “On Service of Military Clergy (Chaplain Service) in the Armed Forces, the National Guard, State Special Transport Service and State Border Service”. By the end of 2014, regulations on the service of military clergy had been developed and approved, and a new profession was introduced in the National Classification of Professions – a military priest (chaplain). Further legitimization of the institute of chaplaincy took place in 2015 and 2017. In particular, the official status of the activity of military chaplains was approved by the Order of the Ministry for Defense of Ukraine No. 40 “On Approval of Regulations on Service of Military Clergy (Chaplaincy) in the Armed Forces of Ukraine” (dated January 27, 2015), Order of the Ministry for Defense No. 685 “On Approval of Regulation on Service of Military Clergy (Chaplain Service) in the Armed Forces of Ukraine” (dated 14.12.2016). In 2017, the process of transition of chaplains to full-time positions in military units took place, for the first time in the structure of the National Guard of Ukraine (Nepinenko, 2022, p. 132).

In December of 2021, the President of Ukraine signed the Law “On Military Chaplaincy Service” approved by the VRU, which entered into force on March 19, 2022. According to this law, “The Military Chaplaincy Service is formed as a separate structure within the Armed Forces, the National Guard, and other military formations formed in accordance with the laws of Ukraine”. The law also provides for amendments and additions to the Laws of Ukraine “On Military Duty and Military Service”, “On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Members of Their Families”, “On Statute of Internal Service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” (Nepinenko, 2022, pp. 132–133).

At the end of 1996, an inter-confessional institution was formed – the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations (VRCiRO). The main goal of the activity was to unite “the efforts of denominations in the cause of the spiritual revival of Ukraine and the coordination of inter-church dialogue both in Ukraine and abroad, as well as participation

in the development of projects of normative acts on issues of state-confessional relations and the implementation of comprehensive measures of a benevolent nature”. As of 2020, VRCiRO included 15 churches and religious organizations (Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Protestant and Evangelical churches, Jewish and Muslim religious associations), 1 inter-church organization. VRCiRO represents about 90% of religious organizations in Ukraine (Informatsiia pro VRTsiRO, 2021; Kobetiak, 2022, p. 371).

The Council of Churches is actively involved in a public life in Ukraine. With the beginning of the Russian aggression in 2014, it spoke in support of the current government, condemned the aggression of the Russian Federation, and appealed to the international community for help “to preserve peace in Ukraine and preserve the territorial integrity, sovereignty and inviolability of the borders of the Ukrainian state” (Statement of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations, 2014; Vasin, 2021, pp. 186–187). Also, at the beginning of 2015, VRCiRO called on “believers, in accordance with their religious beliefs and capabilities, to participate in the defense of Motherland” (Vasin, 2021, pp. 197–198). Church organizations that had been part of the Council of Churches since 2014 were also actively included in the process of protecting believers who suffered from religious persecution in the temporarily occupied territories of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, Autonomous Republic of the Crimea. Another important area of activity of this interfaith organization is the work to facilitate the release of Russian military prisoners and people who were arrested for political reasons (Informatsiia pro VRTsiRO, 2021).

VRCiRO also conducts multi-vector international activities, in particular, in 2014, its delegation held a number of meetings in Oslo (Norway) with the Russian religious figures, testifying about the war in Ukraine. In 2015, the delegates of the Russian Orthodox Church held meetings in Kyiv with the delegation of the World Council of Churches (Informatsiia pro VRTsiRO, 2021).

Church-state interaction of the Russian Orthodox Church of Ukraine is carried out at all levels, in particular with all heads of state. After the election of Petro Poroshenko as the President of Ukraine, the Council of Churches appealed to the President to make a stable dialogue aimed at “establishing freedom of religion, high moral values and developing partnership relations between the state and the religious community in Ukraine”. Subsequent meetings with President P. Poroshenko confirmed the recognition of importance of interfaith institution activities for the support of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. After the appointment of Volodymyr Zelenskyi as the President of Ukraine, a meeting was also held with the new head of state (Kobetiak, 2022, pp. 372–373).

Considering the Church as one of important elements of a social life, aware of geopolitical challenges of the Russo-Ukrainian war, President P. Poroshenko actively contributed to the process of obtaining the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. A comprehensive activity of President Poroshenko and his associates, the church leadership became the final link in the long-term process of establishing the national church in Ukraine (Bondarenko, Vysotska & Kushnirchuk, 2024, pp. 10–11).

One of the first important documents that testified to the leading role of the state in the establishment of autocephaly was the Appeal of the Supreme Ukraine of June 16, 2016 to the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople with a request for the recognition of the autocephaly of the UOC, which will help in settling the issue of internal divisions within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, “normalizing the canonical status of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine in the spirit of ... the historic Address to the Ukrainian Nation on July 26, 2008, as well as the

canonical actions of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to normalize church life in the Orthodox churches of Estonia (1996), Bulgaria (1998) and the Czech Republic and Slovakia (2014)”; a request for cancellation of the transfer act of the Metropolis of Kyiv (Orthodox) to the Patriarchate of Moscow, carried out with gross violations in 1686; with a request for an active involvement in overcoming the consequences of “church division by convening under the auspices of the Ecumenical Patriarchate the All-Ukrainian Unification Council for the purpose of resolving all controversial issues and unifying the Ukrainian Orthodoxy” (Kobetiak, 2023, p. 46; Postanova Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy, 2016).

There were held numerous meetings at the international level in 2016 – 2019, the official documents were adopted that contributed to the establishment of the autocephalous status of the OCU. The USA also supported the above-mentioned aspirations. In 2018, the draft “Resolution on Supporting the Appeal of the President of Ukraine to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew Regarding Granting of Tomos on Autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine” was submitted to the VRU for consideration. There were the following people, who were involved in the creation of this project: A. Parubiy, the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, I. Herashchenko, the First Vice-Speaker, the leaders of factions “Petro Poroshenko Bloc”, “Narodny Front”, “Batkivshchyna”, Radical Party, “Samopomich”; a representative of the president in the Verkhovna Rada I. Lutsenko and the others. Instead, the representatives from the Opposition Bloc (V. Novinsky and O. Dolzhenkov) submitted an appeal to the Constitutional Court to recognize the resolution of the Verkhovna Rada supporting the granting of autocephaly as illegal. The CCU replied that it was beyond its competence to consider the following affairs, in particular, the appeals of the Orthodox Church religious communities to recognize as illegal VRU Resolution No. 241-VIII dated 04/19/2018 “On Support of Appeal of the President of Ukraine to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew on Granting of Tomos on Autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine” (Kobetiak, 2022, pp. 360–362).

The Synod of the Orthodox Church of Constantinople, was an important step in resolving the issue of obtaining autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which took place on October 9 – 11, of 2018 in Kyiv. The Synod cancelled the Act of 1686 on the subordination of the Metropolis to the Moscow Patriarchate (Synodal letter of 1686), renewed the stauropygy of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Kyiv, a canonical status of the Ukrainian clergy. The Ukrainian state and the Patriarchate of Constantinople signed Cooperation Agreement in order to intensify the negotiation process for granting Tomos in the future. The key condition for obtaining Tomos was the unification of the Ukrainian Orthodox churches, so the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew invited the leadership of the UOC KP, UAOC and UOC MP to join the organization of the Unification Council. However, the leadership of the UOC KP forbade its Metropolitans to take part in this event. There were present all the hierarchs of the UOC KP, UAOC and two Metropolitans of the UOC MP, who took part in the Council’s Congress. The President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada A. Parubiy were also present (Palinchak, Kapitan, Mehela & Pupena, 2020, p. 87; Kobetiak, 2022, pp. 347–348).

There was a landmark event, which was hold on December 15, 2018. The Council adopted the resolution on unification of the Ukrainian Orthodox churches into the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), the Statute was approved, the Primate was elected – “Metropolitan Epiphanius of Kyiv and All Ukraine” (Kobetiak, 2022, p. 348). The newly elected Head of the OCU, Epiphanius, was invited to Istanbul by the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew for the presentation of Tomos on autocephaly, as well as official representatives of the state (the President and the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine). The Ecumenical Patriarch

Bartholomew signed the Tomos document on January 5, 2019, and it was officially presented to Metropolitan Epiphanius of Kyiv and All Ukraine on January 6, 2019 (Khronolohiia, 2019).

Metropolitan Epiphanius and his team began to work on the governing bodies formation of the newly created church – the Holy Synod, synodal institutions, and diocesan structures after a protracted and successful struggle to obtain Tomos on the autocephaly of the OCU. The next issues that needed to be resolved were the following ones: process of introducing the New Julian calendar, intensifying international contacts, training priests, especially for the Ukrainian citizens who, as a result of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation in 2022, found themselves abroad (Bondarenko, Vysotska & Kushnirchuk, 2024, p. 12).

Numerous scholars analysed the issues on the introduction of autocephaly and a further development of the OCU, in particular, Viktor Bondarenko, Tamara Vysotska, Vasyl Kushnirchuk, and noted that P. Poroshenko's decision to actually stop working with the bishopric of the UOC MP, involving only two bishoprics in the transition to the OCU, was politically incorrect, and were not fully settled as well as relations within the leadership of the OCU, which led to ambiguous actions of Filaret (Denysenko) – the “honorary patriarch” of the OCU. The above-mentioned scholars also noted that among the complex of unresolved problems faced by the leadership of the OCU and the Ukrainian state is a low intensity of the recognition process of the OCU by other Orthodox churches, a long transition process of the UOC MP parishes to the OCU, and especially monasteries, the Ukrainian lavras (Bondarenko, Vysotska & Kushnirchuk, 2024, pp. 11–12).

It is obvious that the President of the Russian Federation and the church leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church criticized systematically the actions of the Ukrainian authorities aimed at obtaining Tomos on autocephaly, had openly clashes with Constantinople, and threatened to break relations with the Ecumenical Patriarch (Ecumenical Patriarchate recognized the illegal annexation in 2018). However, the issue of the OCU MP existence remains unresolved, because according to the statutory documents the ROC Ukraine, as it was noted by a researcher A. Kobetiak, it is “a canonical territory over which its jurisdiction extends. The UOC can maintain relations with the Local Orthodox Churches of the world only through the Russian Orthodox Church. The Primate of the UOC takes office only after presentation to the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, blessing and handing over of the “Blessed Letter”” (Kobetiak, 2022, p. 349). There were also some scholars, who specialize in the study on the state-church relations in Ukraine, in particular Anna Slubska. She expressed some concern that the creation of the OCU became “a challenge to the established model of state-church relations”, because the support of prominent state bodies for obtaining Tomos can lead to its formation in Ukraine models of the state-church relations with a dominant role of the OCU, which will play the role of the so-called “state church”. Although after the Presidential elections, when Volodymyr Zelensky came to power these processes slowed down (Slubska, 2019, p. 110).

There were not included any items related to a religious policy in V. Zelenskyi's election programme, and in his public statements he also maintained neutrality towards any Church (Shchotkina, 2019; Bokoch, 2019, p. 15). According to a scholar Viktoriya Bokoch, due to Zelenskyi's “lack of clear religious orientations”, it was difficult for the church leaders to predict his further actions, however, after his victory, he was welcomed by many church figures of various denominations in Ukraine, and at the same time Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, Head of the Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill (Bokoch, 2020, p. 100).

President V. Zelenskyi showed respect for the religious organizations representatives of various faiths and denominations, so one of the first official meetings was with religious

leaders. Diverse political, social, and religious issues were discussed at the above-mentioned meeting. The issue of a spiritual care, support of the population in the occupied territories, internally relocated people was emphasized. The mandate of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to prepare invitations for the representatives of various faiths to take part in the celebrations of the 28th anniversary of Ukraine's Independence, the request to hold prayers for Ukraine on this day, was the evidence regarding further steps to establish cooperation between the Office of the President and the religious leadership (Bokoch, 2020, p. 101).

It should be noted that the President's meetings with the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew played an important role in the state religious policy in August of 2019. However, the parties did not sign the joint statement that was planned the day before, even though, according to the Official Release of the Office of the President, "Bartholomius supported the sovereignty of Ukraine, and V. Zelenskyi was grateful to him for his support". During the meeting the Head of state also highlighted that "the authorities of Ukraine will not interfere in the affairs of the church in any way and will protect and defend people's right to freedom of religion in every possible way" (Na zustrichi Zelenskoho, 2019). The President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyi had an audience with Pope Francis in the Vatican in February of 2020. The Head of Ukraine highlighted the important role that the Holy See could play in the cessation of hostilities and bringing peace. In addition, there were discussed the issues on the humanitarian initiatives and the release of prisoners. V. Zelenskyi expressed gratitude for the help to the victims of the war in Donbas, invited His Holiness to visit Kyiv (An audience with the President of Ukraine was held in the Vatican, 2020; Bokoch, 2020, p. 101).

There were certain misunderstandings, which still existed in the religious and church sphere, despite all the above-mentioned steps taken by V. Zelenskyi, in particular with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which remained under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church interprets the events in the East of Ukraine as a "civil conflict", but according to the President it is a consequence of the aggression of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the UOC condemned Zelenskyi's statements regarding the adoption of the course of the European integration and Euro-Atlantic rapprochement of Ukraine. Although Metropolitan Onufriy stated that some special treatment was not expected from the new Head of state, but sought the same treatment as for the other Churches, so that "we are equal before the law" (Mytropolyt Onufriy zaveril, 2019).

The development of relations with the OCU was another important direction of V. Zelenskyi's state-religious relations. An unambiguous line of communication was hindered by political differences. As it was noted by Metropolitan Epiphanius of Kyiv and All Ukraine, he maintains contacts with the President: "The new government has a conceptually different attitude towards the Church than the previous one. The new government has an equidistant attitude towards all Churches. Although we established a good rapport, we met with Zelenskyi... It shows that the authorities understand the role of the UOC. We are satisfied with this position, because we strive to have friendly relations with the state authorities" (Predstoiatel PTsU, 2020).

According to the scholars: Svitlana Kahamlyk and Mykola Obushnyi, the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine on February 24, 2022 "ultimately polarized... the positions regarding the national identification and civilizational choice" of the institutions of the Ukrainian Orthodoxy (Kahamlyk & Obushny, 2023, p. 76). The Orthodox Church of Ukraine condemned the military aggression of the Russian Federation immediately in 2022, in contrast to it, contrary to the leadership of the UOC MP continued to profess the pro-

Russian views and supported the invasion of the Russian troops. For example, Metropolitan Iosyf of Romensky and Burynsky (Olexii Maslenikov) (Hierarch's page. Ukrainian Orthodox Church) visited Moscow during a full-scale invasion, namely, when there was the period of the Russians' mobilization in order to be sent to the war in Ukraine. In addition, the representatives of the UOC MP from Eastern Ukraine took part in the celebrations on the occasion of the declaration of illegal annexation of 4 regions of Ukraine (Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk) on September 30 of 2022 in Moscow. Law enforcement bodies and the Security Service of Ukraine also revealed numerous facts of an open cooperation between the Russian Federation and UOC MP (Koshkina, 2022). However, it is worth emphasizing that part of the leadership of the UOC MP distances itself from the Russian Orthodox Church, the priests together with the believers join the OCU. There should be singled out among such "oppositionally"-minded leaders of the UOC MP Andriy Pinchuk, the group of the protopriest of Dnipropetrovsk Diocese, who was one of the initiators concerning collecting the signatures for the international church tribunal against Patriarch Kirill on April 18 of 2022 (Sviashchennyky UPTs (MP) zibraly, 2022).

The UOC MP continued to declare an ambiguous position regarding the war in Ukraine at the official level, its attitude towards the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church. After the appearance of the draft law on the Moscow Patriarchate ban in Ukraine on March 22, 2022, despite the declared separation from the structures of the Russian Orthodox Church, in accordance with the decision of the Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Russian Orthodox Church of May 27, 2022 on "autonomy and independence from the Russian Church". However, in this resolution of the Council, the UOC did not condemn the actions of Patriarch Kirill, stating the formation of the OCU non-canonical (Kahamlyk & Obushny, 2023, p. 77). The following scholars Serhii Zdioruk and Volodymyr Tokman emphasized that the attitude of the UOC to the aggression of the Russian Federation did not change, the Eucharistic communication with Constantinople was not restored, the establishment of a dialogue with the OCU did not take place, the visits of the UOC MP representatives to Russia continued, collaborationism only intensified during the following year (Zdioruk & Tokman, 2023, p. 16).

The state apparatus took numerous important measures after the full-scale invasion, as it was cognisant of the threats related to the national security in the religious sphere. The draft law was registered in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine On the introduction of amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" regarding the prohibition of the activities of religious organizations (associations) that are part of the structure (are part of) a religious organization (association), the management centre (management) of which is located outside of Ukraine in a state recognized by law as having carried out military aggression against Ukraine and/or temporarily occupied part of the territory of Ukraine" No. 7213 issued on March 26, 2022; "On Ensuring Strengthening of the National Security in the Sphere of Freedom of Conscience and Activities of Religious Organizations" No. 8221 on November 23, 2022; "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Regarding Improvement of Legal Regulation of Activities of Religious Organizations" No. 8262 dated December 5, 2022. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine also prepared its draft law "On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding Activities of Religious Organizations in Ukraine" No. 8371 dated January 19, 2023 (Здіорук, Токман, 2023, pp. 15–16). According to this draft law, "it is offered to amend the laws of Ukraine "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations", "On State Registration of Legal Entities, Individual Entrepreneurs, and Public Organizations", providing for provisions on making it impossible for religious

organizations to operate in Ukraine, the management centre (management) which is located outside of Ukraine in the state that carries out armed aggression against Ukraine. The changes envisage reliance on the central body of an executive power, which implements the state policy in the field of religion (State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience)” (Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy pryiniata zakonoproekt, 2023).

Draft Law No. 8371 issued on January 19, 2023 was supported in the first reading on October 19, 2023 (the Council previously supported the ban of the UOC MP (2023)), at the beginning of May of 2024. The Humanitarian and Information Policy Committee of the Verkhovna Rada completed work on this Draft Law, it is expected that it will be adopted in May-June of 2024 (Povna zaborona UPTs MP: u Radi, 2024).

From the moment of the full-scale invasion, the UOC MP parishes were transferring to the OCU, however, as it was noted by Taras Antoshevskiy, a director of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2024, the activity of such transitions decreased significantly (Haliv, 2024). However, there is a constant positive dynamic of support for the local church in Ukraine, according to the data of a sociological study conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in July of 2022, the number of supporters of the UOC MP decreased from 18% to 4% (Dynamika, 2022). There was another sociological study also conducted by KMIS at the request of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, carried out at the end of December of 2022, and it showed that only 6,6% of people consider themselves the supporters of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, as compared to 21,9% in 2021 (Zdioruk & Tokman, 2023, p. 18).

Under the conditions of war the OCU develops the institute of military chaplaincy, provides a comprehensive support to families affected by the war (Kagamlyk & Obushnyi, 2023, p. 76). In the autumn of 2022, the Metropolitan Fund of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine allocated funds for the construction of 50 houses for the families from Kyiv region (in Hostomel, in the villages of Ozerne, Moschun, Irpin, Bucha), the next series of houses was also supposed to be built at the beginning of autumn of 2022 (Mytropolychy fond, 2022).

According to a scholar Olha Spys, Western Christendom was mostly “pacifist” at the beginning of a full-scale war. There were demonstrated significant disagreements regarding the understanding of the peacekeeping mission of the Church in war by the Vatican, in particular the organization of the annual Way of the Cross prayer on April 15, 2022. During the event, a Ukrainian woman and a Russian woman carried “the Cross as a symbol of forgiveness and reconciliation of warring nations” together (Bodak). There was also no clear condemnation of V. Putin’s actions in the statements of the Pope Francis in 2022 – 2023. The pontiff got into another scandal, reflecting in an interview “about the courage to win under the white flag” in 2024 (Bodak, 2022; Novyi skandal iz pontyfikom, 2024). Despite the odious statements of Pope Francis, the RCC in Ukraine and the Vatican envoys conduct active charity service, provide assistance to the victims of war (Yakubovska, 2023; Dianova, 2023, p. 92).

The UGCC condemned the Russian aggression of February 24, 2022, emphasizing that “Our Country... calls us today to stand up for its defense – to defend its dignity before God and humanity, its right to exist and the right to choose its future. It is our natural right and sacred duty to defend our land and our people, our state”. The leadership of the UGCC also condemned the crimes of the Russian military against the civilian population in Ukraine on February 28, 2022; together with the representatives of other faiths, in cooperation with the network of Catholic charitable organizations “Caritas”, they provide humanitarian aid to the victims of war throughout Ukraine (Moroz, 2022; Dyrektory ukrainskykh Karitasiv,

2022). It should also be noted that on the eve of the invasion of the Russian Federation, His Beatitude Sviatoslav addressed in absentia to representatives of the International Forum “The Mediterranean – The Border of Peace”: “These days, the Russian government has officially violated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our country, recognizing the autonomy of the self-proclaimed republics of D/LPR and sending the Russian army... Ukraine defends European values at the cost of the blood of its children” (Ukraina zakhyschaie, 2022).

Another important contribution of the UGCC under the conditions of full-scale Russian aggression is the actualization of the “issue of war and defense of the Motherland” in religious documents, in particular, in 2022, the “Catechism of the Christian Warrior” was prepared. It “contains various prayers, an examination of conscience, a number of answers to pressing questions to soldiers, as well as a kind of “decalogue” to the Ukrainian defenders” (Nedavnia, 2023, pp. 87–90).

The Conclusions. The Russo-Ukrainian War affected all spheres of a social and political life in Ukraine significantly. There was a temporary occupation of part of the eastern and southern regions, the country suffered demographic losses. Hence, significant qualitative and quantitative changes took place in the church and religious sphere. The systematic violations of the rights of religious communities began, some religious premises were lost or damaged due to the Russian aggression. Intensification of the processes of establishing national identity in the context of violation of the state territorial integrity by the Russian aggressor affected the religious and church environment, politics in this area. An important place in the state policy of the religio-political vector was played by the promotion of obtaining Tomos on autocephaly as a countermeasure to the spread of the “Rusky myr” and the subsequent approval of the international recognition of the OCU. The full-scale aggression of Russia in 2022 actualized the issue of regulating the activities of the UOC MP, strengthening opposition to the ROC network, and resolving inter-confessional conflicts.

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NATIONAL MINORITIES PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC LIFE OF UKRAINE UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR (2014 – 2024)

Abstract. *The purpose of the research* is to study the peculiarities of the national minorities participation in a public life, in particular, in the political, public, cultural, educational and other spheres under the conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian War, as well as to clarify the possible challenges to the national ethnopolitics during the postwar years. **The Methodology of the Research.** There have been applied the methods of analogy, comparison, generalization, source analysis, content analysis, systemic and structural functional in the article. **The Scientific Novelty.** The prospects for the participation of civil society institutions in the processes of the post-war reconstruction have been revealed in detail for the first time, as well as the peculiarities of the social and political activities of public associations of the national minorities under the conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian War. **The Conclusions.** The ethno-

national issue is a crucial component of the state policy. Taking into consideration the experience of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the can state that ignoring the ethno-national issues can cause vulnerability to the external factors and hybrid threats. Despite the lack of systematicity in the implementation of state ethnopolitics, the presence of diverse challenges that induce contradictions in society, the Russian aggression led to consolidation around a civic identity. There are numerous challenges that Ukraine has to face, in particular, for the state authorities, a local self-government and a civil society. During the post-war years, a number of vital issues related to the post-war reconstruction, implementation of reforms, improvement of the national security system, minimization of social contradictions, etc. will intensify. There are challenges to the establishment of relations between state institutions and society as a whole, as well as the development of ethno-national relations in the de-occupied territories.

Key words: ethno-national relations, ethnopolitics, civil society, identity, institutions, resilience, security.

УЧАСТЬ НАЦІОНАЛЬНИХ МЕНШИН У СУСПІЛЬНОМУ ЖИТТІ УКРАЇНИ В УМОВАХ РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ (2014 – 2024)

Анотація. Метою статті є вивчення особливостей участі національних меншин у суспільному житті, зокрема у політичній, громадській, культурній, освітній та інших сферах, в умовах російсько-української війни, а також з'ясування ймовірних викликів національній етнополітиці у повоєнні роки. **Методологія дослідження.** У дослідженні були використані методи аналогії, порівняння, узагальнення, джерелознавчий аналіз, контент-аналіз, а також системний і структурно-функціональний методи. У статті визначено основні напрями діяльності національних меншин в умовах російсько-української війни і їхню реакцію на російську агресію у 2014 р. і 2022 р. **Новизна дослідження.** Уперше детально розкрито перспективи участі інституцій громадянського суспільства у процесах повоєнної відбудови, а також висвітлено особливості суспільно-політичної діяльності громадських об'єднань національних меншин в умовах російсько-української війни. **Висновки.** Етнонаціональне питання є важливою складовою успішної державної політики. Як засвідчив досвід російсько-української війни, ігнорування етнонаціональних проблем спричиняє вразливість до зовнішніх чинників і гібридних загроз. Попри відсутність системності у реалізації державної етнополітики, наявність низки викликів, які породжують суперечності у суспільстві, російська агресія зумовила консолідацію навколо громадянської ідентичності. Важливо цю єдність зберегти і надалі. В Україні вже зараз постала низка викликів перед державними органами влади, місцевим самоврядуванням і громадянським суспільством. У повоєнні роки збільшиться низка важливих питань, пов'язаних із повоєнним відновленням, проведенням реформ, удосконаленням системи національної безпеки, мінімізацією суспільних суперечностей тощо. Розв'язання цих проблем потребує налагодження взаємозв'язків держави з міжнародними партнерами і громадянським суспільством.

Ключові слова: етнонаціональні відносини, етнополітика, громадянське суспільство, ідентичність, інституції, резильєнтність, безпека.

The Problem Statement. The Russian aggression both in 2014 and 2022 became the factor in the unity of the Ukrainian society. Due to the threat to the Ukrainian state independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, there was an increase in the level of civic identity of the population. At the same time, the war provided the proof that Ukraine has a civil society, the institutions of which were quickly organized, changed the direction of activity under the war conditions, and became a crucial factor in the reconstruction of the liberated territories.

Ukraine has a diverse ethnic population. Even though, the Ukrainians are the overwhelming majority, the national minorities, indigenous peoples are an important part of the Ukrainian civil nation. A vivid example is that the national minorities of Ukraine took an active part in the defense of the country, providing for the needs of the military and

internally relocated people, destroying the Russian propaganda, establishing relations with the volunteer, public associations, voluntary formations, etc. when the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2014 broke out. It is relevant to form the Ukrainian civil nation's unity, the prospects of the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine and the establishment of a national dialogue, the national minorities participation in public life in the context of modern realities of the civil society development under the conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian War.

The Recent Researches and Publications Analysis. Diverse scholars studied the issue on the national minorities participation in the public and political life of Ukraine. First of all, it is worth noting the publications by the scholars of Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, in particular, O. Kalakura, V. Kotyhorenko, V. Kulyk, O. Liashenko, Yu. Nikolaitis, A. Podolskyi, O. Rafalskyi, M. Riabchuk, and the others. The above-mentioned scholars studied the issues of identity, the national minorities participation in the political processes, the issues of controversy and contradictions in the Ukrainian society comprehensively, as well as the analysis of the scientific discourse on these issues. There were covered vital aspects of the ethnic communities life in Ukraine in the studies by N. Belitzer, O. Hazizova, V. Kotsur, V. Yavir, and the others. The ethno-national issue in Ukraine became the subject of scientific, political and public discourse not only for domestic scholars, but also for the foreign ones. As V. Kotsur stated decently, the ethno-national issue became one of the tools of an external influence of the neighbouring states on Ukraine. The scholar is convinced that the ethno-national issue in Ukraine became one of the factors of the Russian aggression (Kotsur, 2020). We could come across a similar point of view in the works written by V. Horbulin (Horbulin, 2017), Ye. Mahda (Mahda, 2016), V. Yavir (Yavir, 2022) and the others. The study by N. Kravets and V. Barvinenko, which covered the place and role of the Ukrainian civil society in countering the Russian aggression, is quite significant (Kravets & Barvinenko, 2024). Foreign scholars not only analyzed the challenges, which modern globalized world has to face, but also studied partially Russia's application of the tools for introducing a hybrid warfare. There were thorough studies carried out by A. Bilal, A. Mumford, P. Carlucci, M. Rühle, K. Roberts, M. Harvey, and the others. According to A. Bilal, despite the established measures in order to protect against hybrid threats, a "hybrid war" is a controversial concept and does not have a universally recognized definition (Bilal, 2021). The methods of a hybrid warfare, which were tested in Ukraine led to a rethinking of the security strategies in numerous countries around the world. According to A. Mumford and P. Carlucci, there were used the political, technological and military methods in complex by Russia in order to help the kremlin achieve its own political goals, while avoiding responsibility for its actions (Mumford & Carlucci, 2023). M. Rühle and K. Roberts stated that more and more NATO member states are supplementing their own instruments for responding to the threats, after the the Alliance's strategy adoption for countering the hybrid threats (Rühle & Roberts, 2021). It should be noted that the foreign scholars point out that the ethnic factor became a component of the Russian aggression. D. Carment and D. Belo are convinced that the West ignores a detailed analysis of the political, cultural, and ethnic situation, which does not contribute to the prevention of such conflicts (Carment & Belo, 2018). According to M. Harvey, the hybrid threats are aimed not only at the security sector of the state, but also at other aspects, including the national minorities. A "hybrid war" can only be introduced efficiently if there is weakness of the civil society and the ethnic heterogeneity, which makes it easier for the aggressor to manipulate the consciousness of the population (Harvey, 2016). The prerequisites for the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2014 and the key factors of the Russian aggression were the following: the diversity of

the population's ethnic composition and the socio-political discussions on the language issue. According to J. White and D. Overdeer, the ethno-national issue became one of the means of the Russian aggression in Ukraine (White & Overdeer, 2020). E. Johansson-Nogués and E. Şimanschi noted that the Russian information campaign was aimed at the russified and the Russian-ethnic population of Ukraine (Johansson-Nogués & Şimanschi, 2023). According to O. Bilichak and A. Huz, the hybrid war was only a foreign policy tool for Russia (Bilichak & Huz, 2024).

The issue on the direct participation of the national minorities in the public and political life of Ukraine under the conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian War, their reaction to the Russian aggression, resilience, volunteer, cultural, and educational activities is not studied thoroughly. It is also vital to be aware of the likely scenarios regarding the ethno-national relations in Ukraine and the formation of a balanced ethno-politics during the post-war period.

The purpose of the research is to study the peculiarities of the national minorities participation in a public life, in particular, in the political, public, cultural, educational and other spheres under the conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian War, as well as to clarify the possible challenges to the national ethnopolitics during the postwar years.

The Results of the Research. The Russian aggression both in 2014 and in 2022 was supported by the following hybrid methods of waging war: mass propaganda, influence on the ethno-national relations in certain regions, abdication of responsibility for the start of the war, etc. Taking into account the dynamic activities of the pro-Russian forces, the military presence in Sevastopol, Ukraine's dependence on the Russian energy resources, the activity of the Russian and pro-Russian media in Ukraine and, of course, distorting the identity issue, which became one of the main factors of the Russian aggression, we can state that Russia had a significant leverage over the internal situation in Ukraine even before 2014 (Boulègue & Lutsevych, 2020). Following the onset of the war, Russia lost some leverage and placed a significant wager on the pro-Russian political forces or the public associations, specifically the Ukrainian information sphere. At the same time, a full spectrum of the military tactics, from the information campaigns to the use of force, were employed concurrently. Hence, the above-mentioned had impact on Ukraine's ability to withstand the external influences, which in turn affected the Ukrainian society resilience. Despite this, in 2014 there was consolidation of the Ukrainian society in response to the armed aggression (Boulègue, Lutsevych & Marin, 2018). A similar situation was observed, but on a much larger scale in 2022.

The position of the national minorities of Ukraine regarding the Russian aggression

The kremlin focused on the issues of the ethno-national and religious relations in Ukraine, language discussions, etc., trying to deepen the social confrontation, which was supposed to legitimize the Russian armed aggression. As a result, it only caused the reverse reaction of the Ukrainian society instead. There was a rise in a civic identity (awareness of oneself first and foremost as a citizen of Ukraine) in 2014 and in 2022, despite the diverse ethnic composition of the population of Ukraine. In 2015, 68% of the respondents, who became the subject of the survey carried out by the Razumkov Centre, took pride in the Ukrainian citizenship (Boulègue, Lutsevych & Marin, 2018). Similar results were obtained by sociological studies in 2022 – 2023. The civic identity took precedence over the ethnic and regional identity under the conditions of the Russian aggression in 2014 and 2022. In fact, this is one of the key indicators that demonstrates the position of the Ukrainian citizens, regardless of their origin.

In this context a specific focus should be on the reaction of the national minorities of Ukraine, which actually destroyed the myth created by the Russian propaganda, about the

manifestation of “fascism” and “nazism”. At the same time, there were separate organizations with a clear anti-Ukrainian position that supported Russia’s actions. These were the pro-Russian political and public organizations for the most part, which were financed by the Russian special services and carried out their instructions (“Donetska Respublica”, “Rusky Rukh Ukrainy” (“The Russian Movement of Ukraine”), “Russkoye Viechie” (“The Russian Veche”, “russky Mir” (The Russian World”), etc.). It is obvious, that many of the above-mentioned organizations ceased to exist or were banned due to the unconstitutional actions after 2014. However, there remained diverse pro-Russian public organizations, which were another front of the hybrid war against Ukraine (Martyniuk, 2019). However, the position of the Bulgarians, the Armenians, the Romanians, the Hungarians, the Moldovans, the Jews, the Greeks and other minorities was clearly observed in contrast to the pro-Russian organizations. The majority of the national minority organizations condemned manifestations of separatism and the Russian aggression in Ukraine officially. The following organisations should be noted among them: The Association of the Bulgarians of Ukraine, Gagauz National Cultural Society “Birlik”, The Jewish Organizations Council of Dnipropetrovsk Region, The Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities (VAAD), The Hungarian Community of Kyiv and Kyiv Region, The Hungarian Democratic Federation in Ukraine and the others.

The Crimean Tatars suffered perhaps the most from the Russian aggression in 2014. First of all, some of them were forced to move from the Crimea to other regions of Ukraine, unable to return due to a number of circumstances (political persecution, loss of housing, work land, etc.). Second of all, some of the Crimean Tatars, who remained on the occupied peninsula had to adapt to new realities (a social mimicry). Third of all, the occupation authorities, nevertheless, resorted to the political repression of the Crimean Tatar activists. In 2015, the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, A. Tors, noted that the Ukrainians, the Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups, who support the territorial integrity of Ukraine, do not support the occupying power and renounce the Russian citizenship have fallen into the risk group (European Parliament, 2016). On the one hand, the Russian occupying regime of the peninsula declared support and assistance in the national and cultural autonomies development since 2014 (Belitser, 2017), and on the other hand, it created the conditions to prevent dissidence (European Parliament, 2016). A successful cooperation with individual organizations of the national minorities was also observed, which can be explained by the following reasons: 1) a significant level of assimilation, especially language, which affected the formation of identity; 2) adaptation to the new conditions of existence on the Crimean peninsula, as well as protection from persecution by new authorities. The factor of assimilation played an important role in this context. According to J. White and D. Overdeer, precisely those areas where there was a significant share of the Russian ethnic group and where the Russian-speaking population prevailed were the most vulnerable to separatism (White & Overdeer, 2020). It should be noted that the Russian full-scale invasion in 2022 refuted the thesis regarding the pro-Russian position of the russified population. Due to mass bombings, missile attacks on the civilian structures, destruction of cities, and the commission of war crimes by the Russian soldiers and mercenaries, there was only increase in the negative attitude towards the Russians by the civilian population. Owing to the hostilities, the majority the population became relocated by force.

The Russian authorities tried to keep in touch with the Mejlis, the Kurultai, and the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the Crimea (DUMK) in February-March of 2014. It should be mentioned that not all representatives of the above-mentioned organizations

were categorically against a mutual understanding, in particular, a “common language” with the occupation authorities, since it was about the future of the Crimean Tatars on the peninsula. The official statements of the Mejlis stated that the Russian government was not recognized despite the search of consensus (Belitser, 2017). In addition, the Mejlis was one of the organizations that started protests against the decision of the Verkhovna Rada of the ARC to secede from Ukraine. M. Dzhemiliev was denied to enter the ARC in May of 2014 and R. Chubarov – in July, as the reaction to their position regarding the occupation of the Crimea. Mass repressions broke out in September of 2014, and on April 26, 2016, the so-called “Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea” recognized the Mejlis as an “extremist organization”. (Sviezhentsev, 2016). According to M. Dzhemiliev, 98–99% of the Crimean Tatars do not recognize the Russian government, but being under its pressure are forced to accept new conditions and, in some cases, the Russian citizenship (Radio Svoboda, 2014). In February of 2022, the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people condemned the Russian aggression and also called on the international community to support Ukraine (Chubarov, 2022). Due to the Russian troops’ invasion from the south, about 2,000 Crimean Tatars of Kherson region (who lived compactly in the town of Henichesk and in the surrounding villages) came under occupation for the second time. The Crimean Tatars expressed their protest against the Russian aggression. Hence, on March 6 of 2022, the residents of Novooleksiyivka took to the streets and protested with the flags of Ukraine and the Crimean Tatar people (Drapak, 2022).

In 2014, the Crimean Tatars took an active part in the formation of volunteer units. There were two factors that determined the activation of the Crimean Tatars in this direction: 1) the fervent desire to liberate the occupied peninsula and armed resistance to the Russian aggression; 2) bureaucratic obstacles somewhat hindered the official registration in the Ukrainian security forces. In 2014, the “Crimea” battalion of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the Crimean Tatar Sotnia of the DUK Right Sector, and the “Asker” battalion of the Navy of Ukraine were created. In addition, they took part in the formation of the international units, the personnel of which included the Kazakhs, the Chechens, the Azerbaijanis, etc. According to M. Dzhemiliev, there were 450 Crimean Tatars in various armed formations in November of 2014 (Novorodovskyi, 2018, pp. 136–137). There were not only the Crimean Tatars, but also other minorities, who decided to join the defense of the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

The main evidence concerning the unity of the Ukrainian civil nation, regardless of the ethnic origin is the following appeal: “Ukraine is a peaceful home for all of us: an appeal in support of Ukraine”, initiated by the ethnic communities of Ukraine and published on February 22 of 2022 (Derzhavna sluzhba z etnopolityky ta svobody sovisti, 2022). In addition, before the start of the full-scale invasion, the Jews of Ukraine appealed to the Federal Chancellor of Germany, O. Scholz, with a call to stop “the Russian militarism”, because it is about the security and independence of Ukraine (VAAD, 2022). When the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian War broke out, numerous organizations of the national minorities (the Hungarian, the Jewish, the Romanian, the Armenian, etc.) received calls to condemn the Russian aggression and support Ukraine. In particular, the Hungarians of Zakarpattia appealed to the political parties of Hungary with appeals not to use them for political purposes, as well as to the Hungarian government regarding the support for Ukraine (Natsionalnyi instytut stratehichnykh doslidzhen, 2022). During the sociological research in Zakarpattia, implemented by the sociological company “Smartpoll” along with the Department of Sociology and Social Work of Uzhhorod National University, it was determined that 53,6% of the Hungarians in the

region believe that Hungary should provide Ukraine with weapons. But there was also the opposite point of view: 28,8% of the Hungarians, who actually supported the position of V. Orban's government. In addition, 71,4% of the Hungarians from Zakarpattia considered Russia responsible for the war in Ukraine, 67,3% agreed with the statement: Russia is and was a threat to peace in Europe (Diachuk, 2023).

The Jewish minority had a clear position regarding the preservation of the territorial integrity and state sovereignty both in 2014 and in 2022. The Chief Rabbi of Ukraine, Yaakov Dov Bleich, stated at a press conference in the United States that the threat to the Ukrainian Jewish was the policy of the kremlin back in 2014 (Likhachev, 2014). Similar statements can be heard from the leaders of the Jewish organizations in Ukraine even after the full-scale invasion. Thus, they debunked the myths created by the Russian propaganda regarding the development of the anti-Semitism and radical nationalism in Ukraine. The key theses of the statements made by the Jewish organizations in Ukraine were the following: condemnation of the Russian aggression, requests for the international support for Ukraine, appeals to the government, the Knesset, a civil society of Israel to provide assistance to Ukraine (Bykvu, 2022). The reaction of the Chief Rabbi of the Brodsky Synagogue in Kyiv, Moshe Reuven Azman, to the full-scale Russian invasion was remarkable. At the beginning of March of 2022, he recorded a video message and turned to the Russian Jews, the Russians, which was distributed in various languages around the world. In the future, Moshe Reuven Azman tried to convey the truth about the Russian aggression and its consequences for Ukraine to the whole world through social networks (Churikova, 2023). The official position of the Romanians, the Armenians, the Moldovans, the Bulgarians, the Gagauz and other minorities was similar. First of all, they condemned any manifestations of unconstitutionality, in particular the idea of creating the "Narodna Rada Bessarabia" ("People's Council of Bessarabia"), which was supposed to be aimed at protecting the rights of the national minorities in the South of Ukraine.

The Russian aggression in 2014, on the one hand, contributed to the growth of integrating processes within the Ukrainian society, to the growth of the level of civic consciousness and identity, and on the other hand, a significant part of society lives in a state of insecurity (Boulègue, Lutsevych & Marin, 2018). At the same time, these processes caused adaptation to new realities, strengthening vitality of the Ukrainian society.

Therefore, the Russian aggression in 2014 and 2022 led to an increase in the level of civic identity of the population. The official statements made a number of organizations of the national minorities of Ukraine destroyed the Russian propaganda regarding mass xenophobia, anti-Semitism in the Ukrainian society and provided the evidence to the process of integration around the idea of preserving Ukraine' statehood, its territorial integrity and state sovereignty, democratic progress, Euro-Atlantic integration.

Social activities of the national minorities under the conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian War

Since 2014, the ethno-national stability became as a significant feature of the ethno-political system of Ukraine under the conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian War. The ethno-national stability manifests itself in anticipating, identifying and preventing hybrid-conventional ethno-political threats, transforming them into an internal impulse to mobilize all components of the system to achieve a common goal, as well as countering full-scale Russian aggression in order to preserve and restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine (Yavir, 2022 p. 204).

The national minorities concentrated their social activities in several spheres: socio-political activity, volunteer activity, educational activity, cultural activity in 2014 – February 24 of 2022. In 2022, the range of activities mostly related to the protection of Ukraine from

the Russian aggression (assistance of the army, participation in voluntary movements), combating the consequences of the Russian occupation or mass missile attacks, assistance to internally relocated people and victims of the hostilities, cooperation with international organizations and funds, etc. The public associations temporarily deviated from the goals and directions of activity officially approved by the program documents. It was caused by the introduction of the martial law, the constant threat to the life and health of the Ukrainian citizens, the priority of solving the problem of logistical support for the military or the restoration of infrastructure destroyed by hostilities, shelling, and aid to the victims. There was characteristic the increase in the level of civic consciousness of the population in the western and central regions of Ukraine in 2014 mostly, compared to the year of 2022 when there changes, which covered the entire country. The Russia's full-scale aggression caused a strong attachment of the majority of the population to the nation and the state (Kulyk, 2023), according to political science, there was an effect of gathering around the flag. The desire for freedom is considered to be a characteristic feature of the Ukrainian civil nation. Despite a varied ethnic composition of the population, e diversity of cultural, religious, political preferences, and the standard of living, the category of "freedom" is a key consolidating factor, especially in the conditions of the Russian aggression.

The national minorities participation in ensuring the ethno-national stability became characteristic of the Ukrainian society, while its reaction to the emergence of the ethno-political threats was faster than the state's reaction (Yavir, 2022, p. 204). The skeptical views of the Western experts were shattered, who predicted the occupation of Ukraine or its possible disintegration due to ethnic, religious, cultural heterogeneity, and institutional weakness of the Ukrainian society. The realities of the Russo-Ukrainian War proved that a critical situation is a catalyst for consolidation and activation of a civil society, regardless of an ethnic or religious affiliation, political views, social status, etc.

Volunteering became one of the key activities of the public associations of the national minorities. We can distinguish certain features, while characterizing the work of thr ethnic groups in this sphere: 1) the volunteer activity of the national minorities of Ukraine became an integral part of the nationwide volunteer movement; 2) the implementation of volunteer or other public projects led to consolidating processes in society; 3) the development of volunteerism contributed to the growth of the level of civic self-identification, while the ethnic, religious affiliation, cultural, political views were not of significant importance. The activity done by the following public organization is considered to be a powerful example of volunteering among the national minorities in Ukraine: "The Union of Armenians of Ukraine", the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine, the Association of Bulgarians of Ukraine, the Gagauz National-Cultural Society "Birlik", the Hungarian Community of Kyiv and Kyiv Region, the Democratic Union of Hungarians of Ukraine, MBO "the Roma Women's Fund "Chirikli", the Crimean Tatar Resource Center, etc. The volunteering activity was aimed at helping not only the military people, but also solving crucial social issues of the community.

The work in the educational and cultural direction was another direction of the social activity of the national minorities during the years of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Due to the activity of the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia and the Ukrainian authorities, numerous changes took place in education in the Crimean Tatar language in 2014 – 2022. First of all, the teaching of the Crimean Tatar language was implemented in places of the Crimean Tatars' settlement in the south of Kherson region, in particular, the appropriate classes were created

at schools. Second of all, studying the Crimean Tatar language at Sunday schools. On the initiative of the public organization “Alem”, such institutions studied not only the language, but also the history and culture of the Crimean Tatar people. Third of all, the publishing house of educational literature in the Crimean Tatar language was fully funded by the Ministry for Education and Science of Ukraine. Fourth of all, teaching and creation of the specialty “The Crimean Tatar language” in institutions of higher education, state support for the Crimean Tatar youth in obtaining higher education. Fifth of all, the implementation of diverse public projects on the study of the Crimean Tatar language, in particular, the development of the corresponding platform “BÜLBÜL” (in Ukrainian “Solovei” (“Nightingale”)) at the request of the Ministry for Culture and Information Policy (the presentation took place on December 15 of 2021) (Hazizova, 2022). The joint activities of the Crimean Tatar public organizations, state authorities and local self-government gave certain results. As a result, it contributed to the integration of the Crimean Tatars.

Owing to a special activation of the national minorities, which took place with the adoption of the Laws of Ukraine “On Education” (2017) and “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as a State Language” (2019), which caused numerous discussions at the domestic and international levels. Mostly, there were controversies, which arose around provisions regarding the scope of use of languages in the fields of education, public administration, service, etc. At the same time, there were frank manipulations, which only complicated the ethno-national relations in Ukraine. The Hungarian, the Romanian, the Polish, and the Moldovan minorities criticized the language article of the Law of Ukraine “On Education” sharply, considering it discriminatory. The Russian minority and the russified ethnic groups also considered it unacceptable to establish the Ukrainian language in a number of spheres of the society’s life. There were discussions regarding the language article of the Law of Ukraine on Education, especially in regions where the national minorities live compactly. The local authorities, as well as an active Hungarian minority in Zakarpattia, believed that Article 7 of the legislative act contradicts the norms of the European Charter of Regional or Minority Languages, the Law of Ukraine “On National Minorities of Ukraine” and the international agreements. A similar position was held by the the Romanians and the Moldovans of Bukovyna. The Romanian press, as well as the Romanian-speaking users of the social networks, criticized the new education law (Kotsur, 2021, p. 91). The members of the Interregional Association “The Romanian Community of Ukraine” wrote an appeal to the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, in which they stressed out the Law of Ukraine “On Education” was unconstitutional (ACC, 2017). It should be noted that among the signatories was A. Bohescu, who was a co-author of the Law of Ukraine “On the Principles of State Language Policy”, known as the “Kolisnichenko-Kivalov Law”. It should be noted that the appeal was not signed by such Romanian organizations as the Congress of the Romanians of Ukraine and Mihai Eminescu Regional Society of Romanian Culture (Marusyk, 2017). It should be noted that even before the adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On Education”, numerous associations were formed, the statutory goals of which were to protect the national minorities’ rights. Most of them were the pro-Russian, as the proof was their composition and activities p (Kovalchuk, 2017). It is obvious that these organizations were aimed at destabilizing Ukraine, using the ethno-national issue. It should be noted that the majority of the national minorities studied the Russian language at schools and it was the mother-tongue. among There were only the Bulgarians and the Moldovans, who went to the Ukrainian-language schools (Pylypenko & Pryvalov, 2020).

A similar situation was observed when there was the adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as State Language”. An attack on the language rights of the national minorities, violent Ukrainization was the key thesis of opponents of this document. According to the sociological research, conducted by the KMIS, the majority of the respondents noted that during the year of the above-mentioned legislative act, the level of usage of the Ukrainian language did not change significantly. It was the opinion of 52% of respondents throughout Ukraine. According to the respondents there was the rise in the usage of the Ukrainian language, in particular, 23% and 14,8% “A little more” and “Significantly more” (Kyivskyi mizhnarodnyi instytut sotsiologhii, 2020). In general, the law did not limit or prohibit the use of languages of the national minorities, but only protected the status of the Ukrainian as the state language. The language issue was always a subject of the manipulation and caused tension in the society.

The UN mission in Ukraine proved that linguistic identity was crucial for the national minorities in 2014 (Izsak, 2015). At the same time, it should be noted that a significant part of the national minorities organizations is convinced that there should be one state language in Ukraine. Instead, the development of languages of the national minorities should be ensured comprehensively and supported by the state. It is obvious that there are provisions that ensure the language rights of the national minorities of Ukraine after analyzing the Law of Ukraine “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State” (Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2019). But the key goal is to protect the Ukrainian language as the state language, which does not contradict the Constitution of Ukraine and current international acts ratified by Ukraine.

The threat of a new stage of the Russian aggression at the beginning of 2022 and the beginning of the full-scale war led to the strengthening of the civic identity of the population of Ukraine and the role of the Ukrainian language and culture as the factors of resistance to aggression. There was consolidation of the population aimed at protecting the independence of Ukraine, regardless of an ethnic origin, place of residence, religious outlook, political preferences. According to the study by the Razumkov Centre in May of 2023, 94% of respondents were “very proud” or “rather proud” of their Ukrainian citizenship, 98% perceive Ukraine as their Motherland, and 97% noted that they have feelings of love and patriotism for it (Tsentr Razumkova, 2023a). There was also an increase in those, who considered themselves to share the Ukrainian and European cultural traditions (respectively 81% and 10% as in May 2023) and a decrease in those, who considered themselves to share the Russian or the Soviet cultural tradition (respectively 0,5% and 4 %) (Tsentr Razumkova, 2023b).

The Russian aggression in February of 2022 increased the mobilization of a civil society, which adapted to the challenges of war quickly. According to the survey data of the Zahoria Foundation in mid-2022, 86% of the respondents indicated that they carry out charitable activities in support of resistance to the Russian aggression. There was also an increase by 8 times in the number of charitable organizations from February 24, 2022 (Lutsevych, 2023).

The activities of the Union of the Armenians of Ukraine, the Crimean Tatar Resource Center, the Association of the Jews of Ukraine and diverse other public associations of the national minorities under the conditions of the full-scale Russian aggression were aimed at helping the military, immigrants, work in the information space, cooperation with international organizations, etc. The defense of the country became a crucial factor in the integration of the Ukrainian society, which destroyed numerous stereotypes and widespread myths about the lack of the unity in Ukraine. The potential of a strong civil society remains today, however,

with the further development of the Russo-Ukrainian War, changes in public activity are likely, which may be related to a number of factors: adaptation to the war, the absence of hostilities on a significant territory of Ukraine, violations of important, from the point of view ethno-national unity, issues (language, religion, culture), discrediting by individual officials, political figures, journalists, bloggers of the achievements of the military, volunteers, and civil society under the conditions of full-scale Russian aggression.

Challenges of the post-war period

A high level of civic consciousness was a vivid example that there was the unity of the Ukrainian society under the conditions of war. Due to a powerful potential, the civil society of Ukraine can become a vital factor in the post-war recovery. The experience of the Russo-Ukrainian War proved that a civil society is capable of solving complex tasks, partially taking over the functions and responsibilities of the state. The issue remains whether the Ukrainian civil society will be able to maintain its consolidation after the end of the war for the reconstruction of Ukraine? If all the conditions for its further development are created, new opportunities for work are created, interaction with state institutions or international organizations is strengthened, as well as a balanced ethnopoltics is built and implemented, we will have a high probability of preserving unity. It is obvious that there will be some controversial moments, but it is crucial for the state to find an optimal approach to solving possible issues along with the institutions of a civil society.

The Ukrainian multicultural civil society was recognized as one of the factors of Ukraine's resilience even before the beginning of the full-scale phase of the Russo-Ukrainian War. The key features of the Ukrainian multicultural civil society were an active network of public and volunteer organizations and a high level of trust in them among citizens, a prevailing culture of non-hierarchical connections/relationships, and the experience of a successful social mobilization (Lutsevych, 2023). It is not surprising that under the conditions of a full-scale Russian invasion, civil society institutions (CSOs), including those of the national minorities, made efforts to protect the country, support the military, and help the injured and socially vulnerable categories of society.

It should be noted that there will be diverse challenges, which will occur during the post-war years, in particular, demining, rebuilding destroyed cities, restoring the economy, solving social issues of the war victims and their integration into peaceful life, preventing conflicts on the ethnic or social grounds, adapting the information space, rethinking the national security policy at all levels in order to minimize the threats of aggression from other countries, etc. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned, there are numerous issues, which require a comprehensive approach, both from the state, and from international partners and a civil society. CSOs have already their own vision for the restoration of Ukraine and are ready not only to make proposals, but also to work in this direction actively. According to Kyiv civil society institutions there are the following three most important ways of involving civil society in the country's recovery processes: 1) creation of special advisory groups in relevant ministries with the CSOs' participation; 2) civic society participation in the work of the National Reconstruction Council, by delegating its own representatives; 3) conducting consultations on the issues of state policy with the participation of citizens and CSOs. On the contrary, the regional institutions of a civil society have a different point of view regarding the involvement of CSOs in the reconstruction of the country: 1) the involvement of CSOs in the development of plans for the reconstruction of communities; 2) creation of the public control groups in order to monitor reconstruction projects; 3) institutional consolidation of the public

participation budgets and social contracts for the provision of services (Lutsevych, 2023). The above-mentioned ways of involving the civil society institutions are crucial and need to be implemented instantaneously. To our mind, it is vital to guarantee the public associations' participation in advisory and consultative structures at state and local self-government bodies, in the context of the formation and implementation of the country's recovery policy. Furthermore, it is important to involve the public organizations of the national minorities in the development of the conceptual provisions of the state ethno-national policy in the context of the national minorities participation in the political processes of Ukraine. Taking into consideration the ethnic factor used by the Russian propaganda in order to justify aggression, the above-mentioned aspect is of an utmost importance. Ethnopolitics is one of the components of national security, especially in the context of hybrid threats, given the current geopolitical challenges.

The Russian aggression caused serious damage to Ukraine's economy and environment, in addition to significant human casualties in June of 2023. The outcome is the following: the direct damage to infrastructure is about 130 billion dollars, 411 billion dollars should be given for recovery and reconstruction, 750 billion dollars should be donated to the National Reconstruction Fund; the environment suffered from the damage, which constitutes to 35 billion dollars and another 37 billion dollars should be provided for demining territories. In 2022, there was decrease in GDP in Ukraine, which reached 35% (Lutsevych, 2023). The Ukrainian experts are convinced that Ukraine, in particular, the state, public organizations, entrepreneurs and individual citizens should demand the reparations for all types of damages (Vyetrov & Hamula, 2022). Hence, one of the biggest challenges is to force Russia and Belarus to make reparations, because, in addition to legal aspects, there are other factors that will influence this process: the political will of the world community and, most importantly, an official capitulation with recognition of one's own guilt in the crimes committed.

It should be noted that Ukraine, started planning post-war recovery in 2022 (restoration of industry, reform of the agricultural sector, development of education, science, culture, information space, digitization, restoration of the military industry, energy security, human rights, implementation of necessary reforms for further Euro-Atlantic integration, etc.) along with the international partners. Civil society was to play an important role in post-war reconstruction. In particular, in the implementation of the institutional reforms (development and submission of proposals), in the investigation of war crimes (monitoring and collection of evidence of war crimes, advocacy, creation of a special tribunal), social welfare of IDPs, victims of war, veterans (development and submission of proposals, assessment of needs, awareness raising), in infrastructure restoration (public control, quality control, promotion of the "green agenda", direct participation in grant projects, etc.), community restoration (ensuring inclusion, needs assessment, consulting and mediation in dispute resolution, design and innovative solutions, public control, quality control, participation in state, local and international grant projects for the restoration of communities), environmental protection (development and submission of proposals, monitoring, data collection, provision of services), economic recovery and development (formation of proposals, creation of jobs through social entrepreneurship, strategy development, fundraising, policy implementation monitoring) (Lutsevych, 2023). It is vital to create conditions that will involve the institutions of a civil society in the activities of the post-war realities.

In 2022 there was the Ukrainian Recovery Conference in London, which brought together a number of domestic and foreign experts with the aim of finding optimal ways to rebuild

Ukraine during the post-war years. The conference set three key goals of the Recovery Plan of Ukraine: sustainability, recovery and modernization (National Recovery Council, 2022). Diverse thematic groups were formed, which developed their own vision of restoration and reform of every sphere of public life in Ukraine thoroughly. It should be noted that some thematic groups focused on the development of legislation in the field of the national minorities, as well as made their own proposals regarding the preservation of the ethno-cultural diversity during the war and subsequent reconstruction. Organizations of national minorities, as well as other institutions of a civil society, were supposed to be given the role of consultants regarding the formation and implementation of ethnopolitics. The plan provided for numerous crucial points that were related to the modernization of the legislative framework, the introduction of state support for the development of the language and culture of ethnic groups in 2022 (The National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from the Consequences of the War, 2022a). The formation of the Law of Ukraine “On Ethnic Diversity and National Unity” plays an important role among the offers made by the participants in the preparation of the recovery plan, which provides for the protection of minority rights, integration of the Ukrainian society taking into account hybrid threats from the aggressor state, and will contain provisions on the settlement of the minority languages’ issue in accordance with current legislation (The National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from the Consequences of the War, 2022b). There is no doubt that it is vital to implement the policy of cultivating common national and civic values of the country’s citizens, while contributing to the preservation and development of the cultural heritage of all its ethno-specific components. The national minorities of Ukraine should be not only the object, but also the subject of the development of such a policy. It will contribute to the strengthening of a civic identity, ethno-national harmony and integration of the Ukrainian society.

The de-occupation of the Crimea, parts of the eastern and southern regions will be a significant challenge due to the significant proportion of the Russian ethnic group living there. The idea of mass deportation to Russia circulates in public discourse, as it is a security issue. On the other hand, it will be impossible to implement this process fully due to the following issues: 1) the lack of forces and means that will allow this resettlement to be implemented; 2) the democratic world community will condemn these actions. In any case, the Russian minority will be a serious aggravator, and, therefore, this issue will need to be resolved at the state level. R. Chubarov noted that there cannot be a monopoly of one ethnic community in administration in the Crimea. Hence, according to Chubarov, one of the primary tasks of the state is to create of a complex of legal mechanisms for the joint management of the Crimea by the Crimean Tatars with other ethnic groups living on the territory of the peninsula (Semena, 2023).

Another challenge of the post-war years is to strengthen the national resilience of the Ukrainian society. There is a possibility of a decrease in the activity and commonality of actions between different CSOs, a decrease in the level of civic identity and an increase in the ethnic identity, and the appearance of new contradictions in society after the end of the war. It is vital to strengthen a civil society and its role in state building, community development and as a factor of national security, minimize internal conflicts, modernize security policy, improve interaction and trust between the state and society, and implement balanced ethnopolitics in order to strengthen resilience.

The Conclusions. The ethno-national issue is a crucial component of the state policy. Taking into consideration the experience of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the can state that ignoring the ethno-national issues can cause vulnerability to the external factors and hybrid

threats. Despite the lack of systematicity in the implementation of state ethno-politics, the presence of diverse challenges that induce contradictions in society, the Russian aggression led to consolidation around a civic identity. It is crucial to preserve this unity in the future.

Taking into account the presence of the ethnic, linguistic and religious factors, which Russia used to justify aggression, it is vital to understand the reaction of the national minorities to the course of the Russo-Ukrainian War. First of all, the Russian minority and part of the russified population in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as the Crimea, were under the influence of the ideas of the concept of the “russky mir” (“the Russian world”). The aggressive imposition of the “russky mir” (“Russian world”) provoked the emergence of the anti-Ukrainian movements, which, with the support of Russia’s special services, created a space for occupation. Second of all, the vast majority of the national minorities, despite certain misunderstandings with the state, spoke out against the Russian aggression, condemning it publicly, organizing volunteer activities or taking a direct part in the war, both in volunteer formations and in the force structures of Ukraine. Third of all, the Russian aggression strengthened the population’s civic identity both in 2014 and 2022, which prevailed over the ethnic or regional ones. That is, the national minorities perceive themselves as part of the Ukrainian civil nation, which is fighting for independence.

There are numerous challenges that Ukraine has to face, in particular, for the state authorities, a local self-government and a civil society. During the post-war years, a number of vital issues related to the post-war reconstruction, implementation of reforms, improvement of the national security system, minimization of social contradictions, etc. will intensify. In this context, civil society must act as a subject of policy formation and implementation. It is necessary to start the process of restoring the country even under the conditions of war. It should be applied to the renewal of decentralization processes, the development of a balanced ethno-national state policy, the promotion of the development of the humanitarian sphere, the implementation of anti-corruption activities and the assignment of the role of IGS in these processes. There are challenges to the establishment of relations between state institutions and society as a whole, as well as the development of ethno-national relations in the de-occupied territories.

Taking into consideration the current realities of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the geopolitical turbulence the world is experiencing, it is crucial to adapt the Ukrainian society to new changes. In this context, it is important to do a further research on the relationship between organizations of the national minorities of Ukraine and the international organizations and their joint activities in the process of recovery. To our mind, it is also important to detail the Recovery Plan of Ukraine regarding the participation of the IHS in the formation of the ethno-national policy. The scientific studies on the prospects and ways of involving the public associations (including the national minorities) in the recovery process are promising/long-term and will have important practical significance for the CGI, state authorities and local self-government

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**HIGHER EDUCATION REFORM IN UKRAINE (2014 – 2022)
IN THE RECEPTION OF DOMESTIC SOCIAL MEDIA**

Abstract. The Purpose of the Research. It is important to elucidate the content of the media discourse on the higher education reform in Ukraine, to single out the main topics covered by the Ukrainian mass media, and also to indicate an analytical and evaluative component of the materials on the reforms in higher education. The chronological framework of the study (2014 – 2022) is determined by: a) the end of the Revolution of Dignity and the coming to power of pro-European governments in Ukraine, b) the beginning of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine, which suspended the reform process temporarily. **The research methodology** is based on the principles of scientificity, systematicity, as well as the use of discourse analysis as an interdisciplinary approach to the study on mass media space. **The scientific novelty** consists in the fact that the directions and substantive aspects of the issues on higher education reform of Ukraine have been elucidated in the discourse of social media (2014 – 2022) for the first time. **The Conclusions.** Therefore, the reception of the reforms in the field of higher education by the Ukrainian media was concentrated around several aspects that formed the basis of the

media discourse in this direction. Firstly, the content of the Law of Ukraine “On Higher Education”, adopted in July of 2014, was covered in detail. In general, the approval of the law was called “the first real reform after the Maidan”, although there were opposing opinions about the creation of “corruption risks”. Secondly, the media discussed the success and failures of the reform, noted such achievements as autonomy of universities, formation of a system for ensuring the quality of higher education, growth of the role of student self-government, and activation of international activities of universities. On the other hand, the mass media noted the failure to solve the problem of scholarship payments and outdated approaches to the state order for the training of specialists with a higher education diploma. Thirdly, the changes introduced in 2016 to the requirements for scientific and pedagogical staff to obtain the scientific titles of Professor and Associate Professor were highlighted. Fourthly, reforms in the field of higher medical education were described, which were related to the strengthening of requirements for the level of training of applicants and students (introduction of a high passing score at admission, testing of students’ knowledge using American tests). Fifthly, for some time the mass media discussed the issue of a formulaic principle introduction of funding distribution among universities, introduced by the government resolution at the end of 2019, giving both positive and critical opinions. Sixthly, the Ukrainian media were not sufficiently interested in the work of National Agency for Quality Assurance of Higher Education, focusing only on a number of scandals regarding the formation of its composition.

Keywords: social media, Russo-Ukrainian War, reforms, higher education.

РЕФОРМУВАННЯ ВИЩОЇ ОСВІТИ УКРАЇНИ (2014 – 2022) У РЕЦЕПЦІЇ ВІТЧИЗНЯНИХ СОЦІАЛЬНИХ МЕДІА

Анотація. *Мета дослідження* – з’ясувати зміст медійного дискурсу щодо реформування вищої освіти в Україні, виокремити основні теми, які висвітлювалися українськими ЗМІ, а також вказати на аналітичну й оцінювальну складову матеріалів, присвячених реформам у вищій освіті. Хронологічні рамки дослідження (2014 – 2022) зумовлені: а) завершенням Революції Гідності та приходом до влади проєвропейських урядів в Україні, б) початком повномасштабної війни Росії проти України, яка на деякий час призупинила процес реформ. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на принципах науковості, системності, а також використанні дискурс-аналізу як міждисциплінарного підходу до студіювання мас-медійного простору. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що вперше розкрито напрями і змістові аспекти проблематики реформи вищої освіти України в дискурсі соціальних медіа (2014 – 2022). **Висновки.** Отже, реценція українськими ЗМІ реформ у сфері вищої освіти концентрувалася навколо декількох аспектів, які склали основу медійного дискурсу у цьому напрямі. По-перше, детально висвітлювалися зміст Закону України “Про вищу освіту”, прийнятого у липні 2014 р. Загалом схвалення закону називали “першою реальною реформою після Майдану”, хоча й звучали протилежні думки про створення “корупційних ризиків”. По-друге, в медіа дискутувалися успіхи і невдачі запровадження реформи, відзначалися такі досягнення, як автономія університетів, формування системи забезпечення якості вищої освіти, зростання ролі студентського самоврядування, активізація міжнародної діяльності університетів. З іншого боку, у ЗМІ констатувалося нерозв’язання проблеми виплат стипендій та застарілі підходи до державного замовлення на підготовку фахівців з вищою освітою. По-третє, висвітлювалися запроваджені у 2016 р. зміни вимог до отримання науково-педагогічними працівниками вчених звань професора та доцента. По-четверте, описувалися реформи у сфері вищої медичної освіти, які стосувалися посилення вимог до рівня підготовки абітурієнтів і студентів (запровадження високого проходного балу при вступі, перевірку знань студентів за допомогою американських тестів). По-п’яте, деякий час ЗМІ обговорювали питання запровадження формульного принципу розподілу фінансування між університетами, запровадженого Постановою уряду наприкінці 2019 р., наводили як позитивні, так і критичні думки. По-шосте, українські медіа недостатньо цікавилися роботою НАЗЯВО, приділяючи увагу цій структурі лише з огляду на низку скандалів щодо формування її складу.

Ключові слова: соціальні медіа, російсько-українська війна, реформи, вища освіта.

The Problem Statement. The educational policy of Ukraine during the period under analysis was determined due to several issues, on the one hand, by the conditions of russia’s

unconventional aggression, on the other hand, by the political course for joining the European Union (EU), and, hence, by a drastic need to meet the European requirements regarding educational field. The Ukrainian mass media covered meticulously and analysed the key components of the educational policy of numerous Ukrainian governments that worked under the conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian War. A significant part of the educational discourse in the media concerned the issues of reforming higher education. It is explained by the fact that the higher education reform was one of the first after the victory of the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine. Taking the above-mentioned into account, we consider that it is important to study the reception of the higher education reform in Ukraine in the Ukrainian mass media, primarily in social media, which are the most popular among the population.

The Review Analysis of Recent Researches. The Ukrainian scholars studied the role, meaning and discursive practices of the mass media under the conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian War, in particular, Marian Zhytariuk (Zhytariuk, 2023), Tetiana Rohova and Kateryna Kasimova (Rohova & Kasimova, 2023), Valeriya Yarzhevska (2023). Mykola Filonov outlined the achievements and prospects in the Ukrainian mass media transformation during the war (Filonov, 2023). The American researcher K. J. Boyte (Boyte, 2017) and the Ukrainian scholars Mykola Makhortykh and Maryna Sydorova (Makhortykh & Sydorova, 2017) did the analysis on the technologies and narratives of social media in the context of propaganda during the war in Ukraine. The British scholar Piers Robinson (Robinson, 2014), Oxford University Professor Marta Dyczok (Dyczok, 2015), and the Ukrainian researcher Oleksiy Izhak (Izhak, 2016) found out the theoretical principles of the media activity under the conditions of war at the beginning of the 21st century. There were borrowed some methodological aspects of the research from the works written by Mykola Haliv and Vasyl Ilnytskyi (Haliv & Ilnytskyi, 2021; Haliv & Ilnytskyi, 2023). It should be noted that the reception of the issues on the higher education reform in Ukraine by the Ukrainian mass media has not been studied in the scientific field yet.

The Purpose of the Research. It is important to elucidate the content of the media discourse on the higher education reform in Ukraine, to single out the main topics covered by the Ukrainian mass media, and also to indicate an analytical and evaluative component of the materials on the reforms in higher education. The chronological framework of the study (2014 – 2022) is determined by: a) the end of the Revolution of Dignity and the coming to power of pro-European governments in Ukraine, b) the beginning of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine, which suspended the reform process temporarily.

The Results of the Research. Serhii Kvit, Rector of the National University “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”, headed the Ministry for Education and Science of Ukraine (MON) at the beginning of 2014, as a result of the victory of the Revolution of Dignity, changed the management staff of the Ministry. It is obvious that the mass media tried to find out the tasks and priorities of a new team of the Ministry for Education and Science. Yevhen Solonyna, the correspondent of Radio Svoboda (Radio Liberty) based on S. Kvit's press conference, made an attempt to outline the priority areas of the reformers' team activity at the beginning of March of 2014. First of all, Yevhen noted the limited financial resources of the Ministry for Education and Science of Ukraine and the educational sphere in general, stating that it serves as a deterrent to educational reforms. According to Yevhen, there were among the priorities of the team reformers the following ones: the desire to make transparent the influx of money in the field of education, streamline the licensing procedure for higher education institutions, to improve the system of external examinations, to promote the development of science

at Universities and turn scientific achievements into a key criterion for evaluating their activities, improve the legislation on higher education. Furthermore, to Ye. Solonyna's mind, due to a lack of finances, the Ministry for Education and Science of Ukraine will be forced to develop reform projects "for later" in the near future and their implementation is possible only with the achievement of a political and economic stability of the state (Solonyna, 2014).

Consequently, in mid-March of 2014, the media revealed that S. Kvit had determined the Ministry for Education and Science the goal as "the quality of secondary and higher education". However, he admitted that at this stage it was necessary to work mainly with complaints about the work of the predecessors. At the same time, he stressed out that the Law of Ukraine "On Higher Education" was being prepared, which, according to the Minister, would be adopted within a few weeks, as well as the development of a new concept on licensing of higher education institutions and the concept of reforming the procedure for nostrification of diplomas (Stelmakh, 2014). At that time, the undeclared Russo-Ukrainian War had already begun, the adoption of the new law had to be postponed, so the media somewhat focused less on the government's initiatives in the field of education.

The activities of the post-revolutionary government in the field of education were quite often reactive, related to the solution of current issues, which arose due to the occupation of the Crimea and parts of Donbas, as well as the fulfillment of annual objectives defined by law. However, the main feature of the activity of the Ministry for Education and Science under the leadership of S. Kvit was the growing attention to the higher education issues, which was also marked by the adoption of the Law of Ukraine "On Higher Education" on July 1 of 2014.

The higher education reform was developed even before the Revolution of Dignity, but owing to the revolutionaries, who came to power, it was finalized and started with the adoption of the law mentioned above. The mass media put emphasize on the innovations provided for by the law on higher education: 1) the National Agency for Quality Assurance of Higher Education (the Ukrainian abbreviation –NAZIAVO) emergence; 2) the anti-plagiarism norms strengthening and responsibility for them (it was about a mandatory publication of scientific papers); 3) a new mechanism formation for the election of higher education institutions Rectors; 4) the term limit of office for senior higher education employees (Rectors, Deans, Heads of Departments) to two five-year terms; 5) granting the right of higher education institutions to award academic degrees; 6) granting the right to state universities to place their own funds, obtained as a result of educational and scientific activities, in state banks accounts; 7) reduction of educational workload of scientific and pedagogical workers to 600 hours; 8) introduction of an electronic admission mechanism to higher education from 2016; 9) creation of conditions for increased mobility of students and teachers; 10) a gradual abandonment of the junior Specialist level and the introduction of the junior Bachelor's Degree. It was highlighted that the law expands the autonomy of higher education institutions (HEI), obliges HEI to implement an internal monitoring regarding the quality of education and publish it on the official websites (Rada ukhvalyla zakon, 2014).

There was a sublimated message about "the first real reform after the Maidan", which appeared on the website of the "Ukrayinska Pravda" after the Law of Ukraine "On Higher Education" was signed by President Petro Poroshenko (July 31, 2014) (Persha realna reforma, 2014). In general, such ideas, which were borrowed from S. Kvit's post on social networks, were also shared by other Ukrainian mass media. Taras Shamaida, the journalist, published on the "Osvita.ua" portal a description of the new law that had just entered into force in September of 2014. The journalist singled out not 10, but 16 innovations in higher education

if to compare to the previous posts. In particular, Taras Shamaida highlighted a growing role and influence of student self-government, which would receive a permanent funding (0,5% of the financial income of higher education institutions). There were also mentioned: the emergence of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), the reduction of the work load on students (because the amount of credit will be 30 hours instead of 36), the establishment of scholarships not lower than the living wage, the introduction of a competitive system of state procurement. The author emphasized that from now on, teaching would be carried out exclusively in the state language, and a new classification of higher education institutions would be introduced: universities; institutes and academies (branch educational institutions); colleges (with the right to train specialists at the junior Bachelor's and Bachelor's Degree). T. Shamaida also stressed out there was the "war against plagiarism", the possibility for students to choose at least 25% of academic disciplines, the prohibition of combining administrative positions in educational institutions, and also emphasized: "there will be no eternal Rectors and Deans" (Shamaida, 2014).

The critical opinions about the new law appeared in the mass media in a short time. Hence, the Vice-Rector of Kherson State University, Oleksandr Spivakovsky, published an article "How to Reform Education" on the website of "Ukrayinska Pravda" at the end of December of 2014. To his mind, the new law on higher education will not solve the current issues of this education sector, but, on the contrary, will create prerequisites for the development of "a local corruption". He brought in several further steps on the way to reforming higher education, which would be of a "systemic nature". First of all, O. Spivakovsky emphasized the need to "create balance in management" of higher education institutions. The author of the article made the following suggestion, while criticizing the concentration of power in the hands of one person – the Rector: 1) to introduce the position of chancellor in HEI, who will be responsible for the financial side of the institution's activities (hence, to deprive rectors of the "right to sign" financial documents); 2) all decisions regarding the development of higher educational institutions should be made by the Academic Council, which should not be headed by Rector, Vice-Rector or Dean; 3) to return the norm according to which Dean is elected by a faculty's staff, not Academic Council of the University. According to the author, the separation of the functions of Rector, Academic Council, Chancellor, the dependence of Dean on the staff, and not on Rector, will make it possible to "decentralize education from top to bottom" (Spivakovskyi, 2014).

In addition, O. Spivakovsky suggested creating the National Agency for the Management of the Scholarship Fund, which would eliminate Higher Education Institutions from managing student scholarships, and would enable financing of students with the help of three mechanisms: without refund, with refund without interest, with refund with interest. It would make it possible to personalize a scholarship, to adapt it more to the needs of each specific student by taking the above-mentioned steps. There was the introduction of salary payments directly by the State Treasury, the formation of the National Agency for the Management of Grants for Scientific Research among other suggestions made by O. Spivakovsky. The author focused on the functions of the Ministry for Education and Science, which, to his mind, should consist in the development of standards and measurements in the education system, creation of a mechanism for licensing professional activities, development of a toolkit for interaction with the labour market, coordination of national agencies work, financing of material and technical needs of higher education institutions, proportional financing of utility services of the HEI, approval of staff lists of the HEI and their control (Spivakovskyi, 2014).

The article written by S. Kvit was published on the website of the “Ukrayinska Pravda” immediately, in which there were explained the principles of reform in the field of higher education. First of all, S. Kvit pointed out the shortcomings that had accumulated in higher education: a low quality of education, the Ukrainian universities uncompetitiveness that are not included in the first hundred world rankings, deterioration of basic funds, aging of scientific and pedagogical personnel, inefficient use of funds. Despite the fact that 7% of GDP was spent on education in Ukraine in general. S. Kvit stated that the most important achievement of the reform was the introduction of University autonomy and the formation of modern mechanisms for ensuring the quality of higher education. He considered the autonomy of higher education institutions as a tool that would strengthen responsibility of University management in the decentralization process of forming the content of education. The control over this would be carried out by the universities themselves and by NAZIAVO. According to the Minister, the labour market and competition among graduates will force higher education institutions to take care of the quality of education and efficient organization of the educational process. He also emphasized that universities should offer a different level from school curriculum (and not catch up the school curriculum), not consider humanitarian disciplines as an educational, ideological means of influencing students, emphasized the need for Bachelors to master the English language (Kvit, 2015).

There were several ideas in S. Kvit’s article about the need to reduce the number of higher education institutions in Ukraine, unprofessionalism and irresponsibility of higher education institutions management (he interpreted the latter as a consequence of the post-colonial reality), the need for students to form their own educational trajectory. The Minister also focused on student scholarships, as there are allocated significant funds every year – about 5 billion hryvnias by the state. In his opinion, the academic scholarship covers 2/3 of the “students who are financed by the state” and it turned into a kind of a social payment. Instead, there should be an individual approach, taking into account first of all a student’s academic success, a student’s need for a dormitory, travel and food expenses. At the same time, S. Kvit gave examples of the European countries with regard to scholarship payments, when an individual approach was applied. He also emphasized the change in the principles of financing universities (Kvit, 2015). The Minister tried to highlight the need to reveal the educational potential of our country fully.

There were rumors about S. Kvit’s dismissal from the post of Minister, which appeared in the mass media at the end of 2015. Hence, the press and online media started discussing the success and failures of the Minister’s team.

Yehor Stadnyi, the Executive Director of the CEDOS analytical centre, mentioned the following achievements of S. Kvit and his staff: emergence of a new list of fields of knowledge and specialties, the right to manage universities’ own funds outside of the State Treasury, simplifying academic mobility procedures, and introducing a new format of admissions campaign, which involved selection of priorities by applicants. Ye. Stadnyi also dwelled on the shortcomings of the Minister’s work, among which there was a problematic nature of the Unified State Database on Education (YEDEBO), which still performs authorization functions, instead of becoming a tool for registering processes in education, collecting relevant data, etc. The formation of the NAZIAVO team was another issue. There were people, who got into NAZIAVO with the help of University quota, with whom “nobody would shake hands in an ordinary academic environment” (Rozmovy pro vazhlyve, 2015). At the same time, Ye. Stadnyi expressed his fear that the removal of the MON team would

block the progress of reforms, which had been already hampered by the bureaucratic system.

The expert Volodymyr Bakhrushyn considered among the achievements of the Ministry for Education and Science, headed by S. Kvit, the following: cancellation of numerous unnecessary outdated normative documents, a dynamic activity under war conditions, preservation of social guarantees for educators, courage to conduct unpopular measures. The project manager of the National Reform Council, Olena Zaplotynska, noted the “titanic work” of the Ministry for Education regarding development and implementation of dozens of regulatory documents aimed at implementing the Law “On Higher Education” (Rozmovy pro vazhlyve, 2015). The mass media also characterized positively the provision of the opportunity for the Ukrainian higher education institutions to participate in the European Union’s “Horizon 2020 Programmes”. It is known that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ratified the relevant agreement with the EU on July 15 of 2015 on the initiative of the Ministry for Education and Science, while Ukraine received a 95% discount on the membership fee, and payments for year of 2015 were transferred to the following years in the amount of more than 5 million euros (2016 – 2020) (Rada ratyfikovala uhodu, 2015). The correspondents of the RBK-Ukraine noted a crucial role of the agreement in bringing the Ukrainian higher education closer to European standards.

Inna Sovsun, People’s Deputy published an article in the form of a “progress report” on the “Ukrayinska Pravda” website in order to sum up the reforms in higher education two years after the Revolution of Dignity. In the article it was emphasized that, in general, changes in the field of higher education occurred slowly, sometimes almost imperceptibly, but since the adoption of the Law “On Higher Education” it became possible to change the procedure for admission to higher education institutions, making it automated, eliminating the possibility of non-transparent enrollment of students after completing the promotion procedures rating lists.

There was approved a new list of fields of knowledge and specialties, which was brought closer to international classifications, which facilitated the procedures for recognition of qualifications, and also gave the opportunity to universities to form new interdisciplinary educational programmes. In order to implement the principle of the universities’ autonomy, typical staff lists were abolished, the universities were allowed to place funds in bank accounts, as well as to create educational programmes without approval by the Ministry for Education and Science, and the requirements regarding a mandatory nature of certain mass disciplines were abolished. I. Sovsun noted the growing opportunities for more intensive international cooperation for the Ukrainian higher education institutions, in particular through joining the “Horizon 2020 Programme”. Among the positive achievements I. Sovsun singled out the holding of a series of trainings for student activists aimed at clarifying the rights and opportunities of students under modern conditions (Sovsun, 2016).

At the same time, I. Sovsun, who supported Minister S. Kvit unconditionally, listed the key objectives regarding changes in higher education for 2016. First of all, she emphasized the need to update the content of education, for which Scientific and Methodical Council should be formed at MON, and competitions for scientific and methodical commissions that would develop new standards of higher education. In addition, it is necessary to reform state procurement, as well as financing of higher education in general, moving from the “traditional Soviet scheme for the distribution of state procurement” to a modern European system based on indicators of higher education institution success. The changes provide that the distribution of funds for higher education institutions will be carried out according to a formula that will

take into account both the number of students and scientific results, internationalization, the internal system of ensuring the quality of education, the level of employment of graduates, etc. Performance indicators should be collected through monitoring systems that will ensure the objectivity and reliability of the information obtained. According to I. Sovsun, the number of universities should be further reduced, creating an optimal network of higher education institutions that would meet the needs of society. In addition, the People's Deputy announced a pilot project for conducting external examinations (ZNO) for admission to Master's Degrees, which will concern lawyers primarily (Sovsun, 2016).

The Ministry for Education and Science of Ukraine brought out changes to the requirements for the scientific and the pedagogical workers to obtain the academic titles of Professor and Associate Professor in 2016. It was required to certify their knowledge of a foreign language at a level not lower than B2, complete an international internship, and publish a certain number of articles in publications that are indexed in the scientific-metric databases Scopus, Web of Science. Mostly, only the media paid attention to this news, which specialize in covering educational information (Vcheni zvan'nia, 2015). These innovations were also called "reforms" in the media discourse. Despite the fact that the teachers of higher education institutions in the majority of cases reacted negatively to such a decision, opinions in support of the changes appeared in the media. Hence, Yuriy Khalavka, Associate Professor of Chernivtsi National University published an article on the website of the "Ukrayinska Pravda" in which he justified the need for changes. He emphasized the importance of the English language proficiency for the scientific and scientific pedagogical workers, emphasized that most of the implemented criteria are objective, although not always easily accessible. Yu. Khalavka predicted competition between universities for teachers, who would strive to form a high-quality teaching staff (Khalavka, 2016). Tetiana Tyshchuk, the editor-in-chief of "Vox Ukraine" supported the changes in the requirements for Professors and Associate Professors, calling them a "Ukrainian filter". She criticized those Rectors and lecturers, who were against the innovations, as well as the Ministry for Education and Science, which, under pressure, backed down from the requirements and offered to change a new provision, removing the requirement for knowledge of a foreign language. Hence, the journalist called such a step "anti-reform". According to T. Tyshchuk, the previous system of requirements, which was functioned until 2016, was extremely imperfect, because even Viktor Yanukovich was able to receive the academic title of "Professor" (Tyshchuk, 2016).

The scale of reforms in higher education did not meet the needs of the public, which was also reflected in the mass media. For example, Maria Repko and Yulia Ruda, the members of the non-governmental research organization "Economic Strategy Center" published their conclusion on the state of higher education in Ukraine on the "Vox Ukraine" website at the beginning of 2017. They pointed at numerous of disparities. First of all, in Ukraine in 2000 – 2015, the number of youth aged 15 – 19 years benefited by 41%, while the number of students – by only 8%. The reduction in the number of people obtaining higher education took place, but slowly: in 2013, 4/5 of the Ukrainian youth studied at higher education institutions. In 2000, 50% of school graduates entered higher education institutions, and in 2016 – 80%. Second of all, in 2010 – 2015, the total number of higher education students decreased by 33,5%, and the number of those, who studied with state funds decreased by 19%. If in 2000, 38% of those seeking higher education studied with state funds, then in 2016 – 51%. Third of all, the number of teachers at higher education institutions almost did not decrease (for 2010 – 2015, it decreased by only 13%, while the number of students

decreased by 33,5%). In 2015, there were 11 students for one teacher of higher education in Ukraine, while in European countries this indicator was 15 people. Fourth of all, the level of public spending on higher education is 1,1-1,4% of GDP, while in developed countries it is 1%. Lecturers' salaries account for 60% of the total expenditure on higher education, and scholarship funding accounts for 32%. In European countries, this indicator is, respectively, as follows: 66 and 17%. Children from affluent families become students, and the state pays scholarships to them in the majority of cases. Fifth of all, due to the outdated system of financing and inflexible remuneration, the Ukrainian universities lose competition in the world. There are 6 universities per 1 million people in Ukraine, while there are 2 in Great Britain, 5 in Sweden and Germany. The Ukrainian universities are not included in the world rankings at the same time (in particular, in the TOP 800 Times Higher Education and ARWU TOP 500). Understanding this, the Ukrainian applicants and students show dissatisfaction with the quality of higher education in Ukraine, choosing to study abroad. If, there were 28,000 Ukrainians in 2010, who studied in foreign higher education institutions, then in 2015 – almost 60,000 Ukrainians. (Repko & Ruda, 2017).

In the article by M. Repko and Yu. Ruda it was emphasized that the development of higher education institutions was hindered by excessive bureaucracy, dependence on the Ministry for Education and Science in decision-making, lack of understanding of the interaction of education with the labour market, and lack of competition among universities regarding the quality of education. Hence, the authors stated the following: higher education needs a “radical and comprehensive reform”. In general, they made the following suggestions for reforming higher education: 1) to corporatize universities and create Supervisory Boards on the model of those operating at state-owned enterprises; 2) to grant higher education institutions broad financial autonomy by establishing strict control over the use of state funds; 3) to change the system of providing scholarships, giving the right to higher education institutions to pay scholarships at their own expense only to the most talented students, and therefore to build their own student motivation systems by providing dormitories, health care services, travel expenses, etc.; 4) to reform the state order by introducing a system of grants, which will create a situation of competition between state and private universities for the opportunity to educate a student (Repko & Ruda, 2017).

There was information on the initiative of Minister L. Hrynevych to revise the Law “On Higher Education”, which appeared in the mass media at the beginning of 2018. According to the Minister, granting a wide autonomy to universities strengthened a certain gap among the leading universities and the “other” higher education institutions. If the leading universities used autonomy for the development (introduced new educational programmes, intensified international activities, attracted grant funds, in particular for research), the “other” higher education institutions only increased the requirements for teachers to provide reports. L. Hrynevych highlighted the need to debureaucratize universities, and also invited representatives of higher education institutions to take part in the development of changes to the Law “On Higher Education” (Hrynevych planuie, 2018). The Minister expressed similar theses at the beginning of 2019 in her comments for the “Radio Svoboda”. However, this time L. Hrynevych also stressed out the bribery issues in higher education institutions, referring to the results of student surveys, according to which 30% admitted that it was more convenient for them to pay a teacher than to prepare for an exam. The Minister called the “corruption agreement” between teachers and students immoral (Ukrainsku shkolu reformuiemo, 2019). However, there were not taken any specific measures.

There were certain reforms, which took place in the field of the medical education in 2017 – 2019. At that time, a series of scandals broke out related to Rectors of the medical universities in Kyiv and Odesa, which were covered in the mass media. The new leadership of the Ministry for Health of Ukraine (MHU), led by Uliana Suprun, set a course not only for the reforms in the system of training doctors. The Ministry for Health launched an assessment on the state of the medical education in Ukraine based on the international standards at the beginning of 2017. The mass media reported on the holding of the licensing exam “Krok 3. General Medical Training”, which is mandatory for the medical interns attestation. It was planned to conduct an international comparative study based on the “International Foundations of Medicine” (IFOM) test for the students of the sixth year of the “Medicine” field (Znannia studentiv-medykiv, 2017). The Deputy Minister of Health Oleksandr Linchevskiy and the Deputy Director of the Testing Centre at the Ministry for Health Lesia Voitenko revealed the purpose, content and organizational conditions of the testing to the journalists of the “Ukrainian Pravda” (Blyzko 10% maibutnikh likariv, 2017). In addition, at the initiative of the Ministry for Health, there was determined a passing score for applicants to medical universities (150 points), which strengthened the requirements for the level of training of applicants (150 baliv, 2017). However, there were scandals, which were related to the cancellation of the corresponding order that broke out almost immediately. Oleksandr Yabchanka, the Chief Expert of the medical group of the “Resuscitation Package of Reforms”, made some attempts to oppose the reform, hence, he argued against the cancellation of the order, criticized the state order system for medical higher education institutions, approving the initiative of the Ministry for Health to eliminate a “manual distribution” of the number of places at the medical universities in an article for the “Ukrayinska Pravda” (Yabchanka, 2017). Eduard Rubin, the founder of Kharkiv IT cluster, shared similar thoughts in the media (Rubin, 2017). In 2017, the representatives of the Ministry for Health continued to defend their position with the help of the media, proving the need for the “150 points” criterion and the KROK 1 Exam (general academic disciplines) and KROK 2 Exam (professionally oriented disciplines) (Linchevskiy, 2017).

The passing score (150) was still applied for the admission to medical universities in 2018. It led to the fact that 28% fewer applicants entered medical specialties than the previous year (Do medychnykh vyshiv, 2018). The student protests broke out against such changes in various cities of Ukraine, as well as against the international IFOM test developed in the USA, which became mandatory for the third-year students in 2019, and lawsuits were filed against the Ministry for Health. It is obvious that the mass media covered various vicissitudes of the above-mentioned struggle. Yevhen Solonyna, the journalist, wrote a thorough article on this issue and published it on the “Radio Svoboda” website. He collected the views of various participants in the process of reforming medical education. Hence, U. Suprun noted that the IFOM exam was not a “bullying” of students – it was an international exam on disciplines that every doctor must know. The students’ representatives highlighted their unpreparedness for the exam, because “the curricula are old, and the testing is new”. O. Linchevsky pointed at the sabotage actions by the management of the medical universities, who were interested in foreign students and contract students. An expert Zoriana Chernenko criticized the previous system of training specialists, but noted the following issue: the test tasks were based on the American model, and the training method in the USA was somewhat different: the application of an inductive method at first and then theory. Instead, the theory is taught first, and then examples are considered in Ukraine. Therefore, curricula should be improved,

so that, the implementation of the idea of the American testing would be more productive for the Ukrainian students. The article also emphasized that the IFOM exam would also be mandatory for the sixth-year students of the Ukrainian medical higher education institutions from 2022 (Solonyna, 2019).

It should be stated that less attention was paid to higher education issues in the Ukrainian media in 2019 – 2020, especially against the background of the adoption and implementation of the laws “On Education” and “On General Secondary Education”. However, for some time the mass media discussed the issue of the introduction of the formulaic principle of distribution of funds between educational institutions, introduced by a government decree at the end of 2019. On the website of the portal “Osvita.ua” a new approach was described at the beginning of 2020. It was stressed out that from then on, state higher education institutions would receive 80% of funds from their budget of the previous year, and the rest of the budget funds would be distributed among universities taking into account the following indicators: the scale of University, the regional coefficient, the number of students, employment of graduates, positions in international rankings, the amount of funds for research, which the university would earn from extrabudgetary sources. In addition, the requirement of the indicative cost of providing educational services was introduced for higher education institutions in order to stop massive dumping of the cost of education and to force universities to bring tuition prices in line with market prices (Kontsepsiia reformy, 2020).

In this regard, a blogger Yevhen Nikolayev noted on his website that the distribution of funds for financing higher education would become more transparent, and also noted the following innovations: financing of training students in certain expensive and narrow professional specialties (musical arts, medicine, engineering specialties); elimination of correlation between the number of teachers and the number of students, which will enable higher education institutions to regulate the issue of the number of personnel independently; private higher education institutions will also be able to receive state orders for the training of specialists. At the same time, he noted that larger universities would receive more funding, and smaller ones would have an incentive to merge with larger institutions. However, according to Ye. Nikolayev, the formula does not eliminate the problem of irrationality of the state ordering system for the training of specialists: the state will continue to order the training of a certain number of specialists from various specialties at the higher education institutions every year, at a time when there are no objective indicators to determine this number among the majority of specialties (Nikolaiev, 2020).

Serhii Zakharin, the scholar-economist, criticized strongly the formulaic principle of distribution of state funds between HEI and pointed out two issues. First of all, the formula will apply only to those higher education institutions that are subordinate to the Ministry for Education and Science, which introduces a certain inequality in the funding of different departmental universities. Second of all, any model of budget financing must be based on the Budget Code, according to which the state is obliged to cover the wages of employees of budget institutions (and therefore, reducing the funding of higher education institutions according to the formula may violate the state’s obligations to employees) (Zakharin, 2020). The media discourse was dominated by positive assessments of this reform mostly despite everything.

It should be stated that, unfortunately, the mass media were not sufficiently interested in the work of NAZIAVO. There were reports about the scandalous composition of this body, which was formed back in 2015 from time to time in the press and online publications. It is known that at that time Serhiy Khrapaty, who previously worked in the team of the odious Minister

Dmytro Tabachnyk, was elected the head of the National Agency. In addition, NAZIAVO included people who fell under the lustration law, namely Volodymyr Bondarenko and Yuriy Dudnyk. By the way, back in November of 2016, S. Khrapaty gave an interview to the online publication “Left Bank”. In the preamble to the published interview, the journalists reminded readers that in 2011, the official scandalized himself during a speech at the Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, appealing to the “historians” with the demand to “understand and present Ukrainian history correctly” (Urubkov, 2016). In the end, the first NAZIAVO staff did not start working.

The government approved a new NAZIAVO staff headed by ex-minister S. Kvit at the end of 2018. In one of his first interviews in his new position (March of 2019), he emphasized that the primary objective of the new body would be accreditation of educational programmes (he compared them to “specializations”), which should be consolidated and combined. The official complained that unification of small educational programmes was still taking place slowly, although at Ukrainian universities even before 2015, the number of academic disciplines was three times numerous than in Western institutions of higher education. S. Kvit also recognized insufficient attention of the Ukrainian higher education institutions to the issues of education quality, an insignificant involvement of students in improving educational programmes (Shymkiv, 2019).

However, NAZIAVO’s activities took place in the context of several court processes. Some of them were related to the agency’s decisions regarding plagiarism in the scientific papers of top officials. Ultimately, in October of 2021, the Supreme Court of Ukraine ruled to cancel the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to approve the composition of the agency in 2018, based on shortcomings in the legislation. The following month, the Ukrainian parliament unblocked the work of the institution, making the necessary changes to the law “On Higher Education”, which was reported by the media (Lysohor, 2021).

The Conclusions. Therefore, the reception of the reforms in the field of higher education by the Ukrainian media was concentrated around several aspects that formed the basis of the media discourse in this direction. Firstly, the content of the Law of Ukraine “On Higher Education”, adopted in July of 2014, was covered in detail. In general, the approval of the law was called “the first real reform after the Maidan”, although there were opposing opinions about the creation of “corruption risks”. Secondly, the media discussed the success and failures of the reform, noted such achievements as autonomy of universities, formation of a system for ensuring the quality of higher education, growth of the role of student self-government, and activation of international activities of universities. On the other hand, the mass media noted the failure to solve the problem of scholarship payments and outdated approaches to the state order for the training of specialists with a higher education diploma. Thirdly, the changes introduced in 2016 to the requirements for scientific and pedagogical staff to obtain the scientific titles of Professor and Associate Professor were highlighted. Fourthly, reforms in the field of higher medical education were described, which were related to the strengthening of requirements for the level of training of applicants and students (introduction of a high passing score at admission, testing of students’ knowledge using American tests). Fifthly, for some time the mass media discussed the issue of a formulaic principle introduction of funding distribution among universities, introduced by the government resolution at the end of 2019, giving both positive and critical opinions. Sixthly, the Ukrainian media were not sufficiently interested in the work of NAZIAVO, focusing only on a number of scandals regarding the formation of its composition.

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**UKRAINE UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND YEAR
OF EXISTENTIAL WAR IN ANALYSTS' REFLECTIONS
OF THE WARSAW CENTRE FOR EASTERN STUDIES**

Abstract. The purpose of the article is to elucidate the reflection of the main aspects of the full-scale stage of the Russo-Ukrainian war by analysts of the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies.

The research methodology is based on the principles of objectivity, scientificity, systematicity and historicism, as well as the application of an interdisciplinary approach. Structural functional and comparative historical methods have been used. **The scientific novelty** of the article consists in an attempt to elucidate the current stage coverage of the Russian aggression against Ukraine by analysts of the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies. **The Conclusions.** Thus, during the second year of the Russo-Ukrainian war, the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies analysts followed all the events (both in foreign and domestic arenas) quite carefully. According to them, the withdrawal of the Armed Forces from Avdiivka (February 19, 2024) was the symbolic date of the end of the second year of war. In their publications, the analysts focus on combat operations at the front, political processes, socio-economic, information security, environmental, educational, cultural, religious problems, the policy of Western countries regarding war and security in Europe in general. During this year, the chief focus of analysts was on the battles for Bakhmut, the counteroffensive launched by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on June 4, the restoration of the transport corridor through the Black Sea, achieved owing to strikes on the ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, grain exports, attacks by the Ukrainian drones on military, energy and oil facilities on the territory of the Russian Federation, Ukraine's entry into the EU, the signing of security agreements and internal processes within it, etc. At the same time, in their publications, analysts also mention a number of negative factors that directly affected the front – corruption scandals, political competition, which reached its peak with the dismissal of Valery Zaluzhnyi from the post of Commander-in-Chief, etc. In this way, the reader can get a holistic view of the main aspects of the war. Perhaps the main conclusion is the opinion of the director of the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies, Wojciech Kononchuk, that Ukraine needs weapons for defense and victory, and, accordingly, the political will and quick decisions of Western countries.

Key words: Russo-Ukrainian war, reception, Ukraine, Marek Karp Center for Eastern Studies, hostilities.

УКРАЇНА В УМОВАХ ДРУГОГО РОКУ ЕКЗИСТЕНЦІЙНОЇ ВІЙНИ В АНАЛІТИЧНИХ РЕФЛЕКСІЯХ ВАРШАВСЬКОГО ЦЕНТРУ СХІДНИХ СТУДІЙ

Анотація. Мета статті – розкрити відображення основних аспектів повномасштабного етапу російсько-української війни аналітиками Центру східних студій імені Марєка Карпа. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на принципах об'єктивності, науковості, системності та історизму, а також застосуванні міждисциплінарного підходу. Використанно структурно-функціональний та порівняльно-історичний методи. **Наукова новизна статті** полягає у спробі розкриття особливостей висвітлення сучасного етапу російської агресії проти України співробітниками ЦСС імені Марєка Карпа. **Висновки.** Отже, оглядачі ЦСС упродовж другого року російсько-української війни досить ретельно стежили за усіма подіями (як на зовнішній, так і на внутрішній арені). На думку аналітиків ЦСС, символічною датою завершення другого року війни став вихід ЗСУ із Авдіївки (19 лютого 2024 р.). У своїх текстах аналітики ЦСС найбільше уваги приділяють бойовим діям на фронті, політичним процесам, соціально-економічним, інформаційно-безпековим, екологічним, освітнім, культурним, релігійним проблемам, політиці західних країн щодо війни та загальному безпеці в Європі. Упродовж цього року основна увага оглядачів була прикута до боїв за Бахмут, розпочатого ЗСУ 4 червня контрнаступу, відновлення транспортного коридору Чорним морем, досягнутого завдяки ударам по кораблях Чорноморського флоту, експорту зернових, атаки українських дронів на військові, енергетичні та нафтові об'єкти на території Російської Федерації, вступ України у ЄС, підписання безпекових угод та внутрішніх процесах у ній тощо. Водночас аналітики у своїх публікаціях виявляють й цілу низку негативних чинників, які безпосередньо впливали на фронт – корупційні скандали, політична конкуренція, яка досягла піку звільненням Валерія Залужного з посади Головнокомандувача тощо. Отже, читач має змогу отримати цілісне уявлення про головні аспекти війни. Мабуть, основним висновком є думка директора Центру східних студій Войцех Конончук, що Україні для захисту та перемоги необхідне озброєння, а відповідно – політична воля та швидкі рішення західних країн.

Ключові слова: російсько-українська війна, реценція, Україна, Центр східних студій імені Марєка Карпа, бойові дії.

The Problem Statement. Over the past two years, various aspects of the Russo-Ukrainian war have been actively discussed on various world platforms. At the same time, the circle of people who join such discussions is quite wide. First of all, let's name those who elucidate these issues professionally. In this context, it is necessary to mention the work of analysts of the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies during the second year of the war. Compared to the first year, the number of reviewers has slightly increased. Among them are Andrzej Wilk, Piotr Żochowski, Jakub Ber, Jacek Tarociński, Sławomir Matuszak, Krzysztof Niecypor, Jakub Gratsa, Justyna Hotkowska, Witold Rodkiewicz, Lidia Gibadlo, Tadeusz Ivanski, Philip Rudnik, Iwona Wisniewska, and the others.

The Review of Recent Researches. The problems of the Russo-Ukrainian war (2014 – 2024) in general and its full-scale stage, in particular, were covered both in scientific and popular science texts. Scholars analyzed various aspects of this more than a decade-long war. First of all, there should be mentioned thorough researches by Larysa Yakubova (Yakubova, 2023) and Serhii Plokhii (Плохий, 2023). The origins of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and Moscow's purposeful anti-Ukrainian policy were elucidated by Oleksiy Pokotylo and Oleksandr Nashyvochnikov (Pokotylo, & Nashyvochnikov, 2021). The main prerequisites, means and methods of conducting a hybrid war against Ukraine by the Russian Federation were analyzed by Olena Bilinchak, Anatoly Huz (Bilichak, & Huz, 2024). Continuing the study of the issue of information warfare, Vasyl Ilnytskyi, Volodymyr Starka and Mykola Haliv focused on the main propaganda measures used by Russia in preparation for armed aggression against Ukraine (Ilnytskyi, Starka & Haliv, 2022). The formation of civil society institutions through the prism of challenges that arose under the conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian war (2014–2022) was researched by Nataliya Kravets, Vitaly Barvinenko (Kravets, & Barvinenko, 2024).

The issue of the Russo-Ukrainian war was analyzed by Antonina Boichuk, Nataliya Ilnytska and Nazariy Zadorozhnyi on the pages of the scientific publications “Eastern European Historical Bulletin” and “Military Scientific Bulletin” (Boichuk & Ilnytska, 2023; Zadorozhnyi & Boichuk, 2023). Various aspects of the Russo-Ukrainian war were covered in the columns of The New York Times newspaper. It was Yuriy Ofitsynskyi who conducted an analytical review of the publication and singled out the main thematic areas (Ofitsynskyi, 2018). The issues of the Russo-Ukrainian war were analyzed in modern dissertation studies by Yuriy Ofitsynskyi and Liliya Hrynyk (Ofitsynskyi & Hrynyk, 2023). Borys Drohomiretskyi made an attempt to study the historiographic research of the modern Russo-Ukrainian war comprehensively (Drohomiretskyi, 2022).

The Polish reception of the Russo-Ukrainian war was the object of many historiographical studies (Masnenko, Telvak, Yanyshyn & Telvak, 2021). Analysis of the reflection of the beginning of the full-scale stage of the Russo-Ukrainian military conflict by the Polish journalists was studied by Oksana Medvid (Medvid, 2022). The authors of this article found out the peculiarities of understanding of the first year of the full-scale stage of Putin's aggression by analysts of the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw (Telvak & Ilnytskyi, 2023).

The purpose of the article is to elucidate the reflection of the main aspects of the full-scale stage of the Russo-Ukrainian war by analysts of the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies.

The Research Results. Carefully observing the events of the second year of Russia's war against Ukraine and analyzing them, the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies prepared a

significant number of texts during the period from February 24, 2023 to February 20, 2024. In their analytical comments, they focus on combat operations at the front, political processes, socio-economic, information security, environmental, educational, cultural, religious problems, the policy of Western countries regarding war and security in Europe in general.

First of all, in their publications, the analysts of the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies made detailed reviews of military operations at the front. The majority of the publications are on combat actions (defensive and offensive). In the publications there is actually conducted a day-by-day review of the course of the war, analyzed the most important events (battles for Bakhmut, Avdiivka, counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia direction) in detail. Emphasis is also placed on the Ukrainian attacks on the Crimean and Chonhar bridges. Publications of the second year of the war begin with information about the defensive battles for Bakhmut. Probably, the largest number of texts belongs to the author tandem of Andrzej Wilk and Piotr Żochowski. Their review opens the research of the second year of the war (February 24, 2023). In the review there is noted the tenacious defense of the Ukrainian military, which slowed down the enemy's advance, while at the same time providing the opportunity to fight back in certain areas of the front successfully, push back the occupiers to previous positions, and seize the initiative. In general, the losses on both sides were determined to be numerous. Breakthroughs of the Ukrainian defense were local in nature (mostly several hundred meters, less often – kilometers), and it was not considered appropriate to write about a large-scale breakthrough at the front and the deployment of a wider Russian offensive in Donbas (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023b). On March 3, 2023, the same observers continued to write about a difficult situation of the Bakhmut defenders (destroyed and broken communication routes, complicated food supply and evacuation of the wounded), taking a defensive position, they were constantly pushed to other positions (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023p). On March 6, Andrzej Wilk and Piotr Żochowski confirmed the slowing down of the offensive in order to rest and probably reduce their own losses, emphasizing the exhaustion of the Ukrainian forces. The above mentioned authors wrote about the main direction of the Russian offensive – Chasiv Yar and the towns located to the north of it (in fact, the natural defensive line of the north-western part of Donetsk region) (Wilk, Żochowski, 2023o). Monitoring the withdrawal of the Russian troops to the northwest of Avdiivka, the reviewers emphasized as early as March 20, 2023 that the withdrawal created a threat to encirclement of Avdiivka and a repetition of the operation to occupy Bakhmut (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023j). In the next publication (May 12, 2023), the purpose and goals of the Ukrainian counterattacks near Bakhmut are analyzed (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023s).

In the context of hostilities, a significant number of publications are on the preparation and conduct of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. For example, Andrzej Wilk, Jakub Ber, Kamil Kłysiński note the softening of the statements regarding a probable counteroffensive, which they directly associate with the supply of weapons (primarily heavy and aviation). At the same time, the number of casualties is also mentioned, citing data from the Pentagon (ratio 1 to 1.66 in favour of the Ukrainians) and representatives of the Ukrainian government O. Danilov, H. Maliar (1 to 7–10 occupiers) (Wilk, Ber & Kłysiński, 2023a). Instead, Andrzej Wilk, Piotr Żochowski, and Jakub Ber write about the Ukrainian counteroffensive on June 4, which began with the breakthrough of the defense lines in the direction of Mariupol and intensification of operations in the north-east of Donetsk region (such actions were considered a diversionary maneuver for the success of operations in the south) (Wilk, Żochowski, Ber, 2023). The main goal of the counteroffensive was seen as the interruption of Russia's land

corridor with the Crimea (at the same time, nine brigades trained and armed by partners remained in reserve) (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023q). Continuing to analyze the possibilities of conducting hostilities (June 20, 2023), the Polish reviewers note a significant lack of artillery and aviation, which there was nothing to compensate for, however, the worst thing was that the military units suffered irreversible losses in the battles, believing that even if broke through the first line of defense of the russians, the losses incurred would not allow them to develop a further offensive and would cut off the Crimea from land communication with russia (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023n).

The Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies analysts followed the course of the counteroffensive. In particular, on July 4, 2023 Andrzej Wilk and Piotr Żochowski concluded that the month of hostilities in general did not make it possible to break through the first line of defense in the south. Instead, in the area of Velyka Novosilka, it was possible to advance 8 km and regain control over seven towns, and further military operations entered the phase of a positional war. Attacks took place with much smaller forces than at the beginning of the offensive (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023h). Therefore, these authors, referring to V. Zaluzhnyi's article, write about the first official confirmation of the failed Ukrainian counteroffensive, emphasizing at the same time, that in the publication V. Zaluzhnyi took responsibility for its improper preparation and implementation, admitting underestimation of the russian forces potential. The general also noted other factors that influenced this failure – the lack of fighter jets and long-range missiles, a slow supply of offensive weapons, weather conditions (rain, mud). The emphasis was on the need for a regular supply of weapons in order to continue the “war of maneuver” (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023k).

The above-mentioned analysts attached a particular importance to the new opportunities for the Ukrainian forces to strike deep into the russian territory with the help of drones made by the Ukrainian engineers using foreign components (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023r). There was also the discussion on the issue of the first use of ATACMS missiles with a cluster warhead (for the destruction of manpower and lightly armored targets), however, the older model M39 by the Ukrainians. Andrzej Wilk and Piotr Żochowski emphasize that the Ukrainians, in addition, received missiles with a range of 250 km from Great Britain (Storm Shadow) and France (SCALP) (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023m).

Analysts analyzed the russian offensive on the border of Kharkiv, Luhansk and Donetsk regions. They emphasized the stability of the Ukrainian defense line and determined the main goal of the russians – to reach the line of the Oskil River in order to gain an advantage in natural obstacles, and then, having strengthened this section, transfer the military forces and proceed to the offensive in other areas (Ber, Żochowski & Tarociński, 2023).

In a new publication, Andrzej Wilk and Piotr Żochowski emphasized Ukraine's preparation for the next stage – a war of position. It is noted that the winter significantly slowed down the intensity of hostilities, small groups of servicemen were involved in attacks, without the use of armored vehicles. Instead, although slow, the advance of the russians, in their opinion, showed the fatigue of the Ukrainian servicemen from the war and absence of long rotations (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023l). Continuing to analyze russia's war in Ukraine, Andrzej Wilk, Jakub Ber (December 28, 2023) note the restraint of comments by the Ukrainian military at the end of 2023 (as opposed to December of 2022). In particular, in their statements, theses about another difficult year of the war stand out, and as the main goal – preservation of the held territorial positions. Such a change in narratives was explained by the authors as the failure of counteroffensive, the loss of servicemen, and a significant reduction in the military

support of the West. That is, the messages were adapted to the real situation at the front. At the same time, it was written about the need to make changes to the mobilization rules. It was also written that the President, as the guarantor of the Constitution, responsible for planning and decisions on mobilization, avoided responsibility and did not explain to the public the complexity of the situation and a critical need to strengthen military reserves. Instead, General V. Zaluzhnyi made a positive impression on the analysts, who clearly defined the priorities and needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the third year of the war, without hiding the problems from the army and society (of course, as much as it is allowed to talk about it publicly) (Wilk & Ber, 2023).

Andrzej Wilk and Piotr Żochowski consider February 19, 2024, when the russian troops occupied Avdiyivka, which had not only a symbolic meaning (the fighting for it began back in 2014, and since then it has become a pillar of defense north of occupied Donetsk) as a kind of end to the second year of the war, but also strategic (the main fortified area of the first line of defense in Donetsk region). As a result, an operational space was opened for the further advance of the russian invaders to the west (Wilk & Żochowski, 2024c).

It is common knowledge that war takes place not only in the form of hostilities, but also in the form of information and propaganda operations. And it is precisely these issues the focus is in the publications of the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies analysts. Thus, in the article (February 24, 2023) Andrzej Wilk, Piotr Żochowski also explain the russian information and propaganda operation (about a possible escalation on the northern border of Ukraine, in Transnistria), which was aimed at spreading misinformation, psychological influence, and therefore distraction the Ukrainian Defense Forces. The authors believe that the russians would not be able to attack Moldova from Transnistria due to a small military contingent (1,500 people). Although local armed provocations were not excluded (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023b). At the same time, Witold Rodkiewicz (June 23, 2023) writes about intensification of discussions regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons and war with NATO. The main goal of such information is seen as the desire to deprive Ukraine of Western support, convincing of its ineffectiveness and impracticality (Rodkiewicz, 2023). In this context, another author – Maria Domańska (February 9, 2024) quite correctly characterizes V. Putin's interview with T. Carson as “a large-scale propaganda operation of Russia”, which has both internal and external goals (Domańska, 2024).

The second, closely related to combat operations, is the issue of providing various types of support. Thus, Andrzej Wilk and Piotr Żochowski consider the decision to transfer MiG-29 fighters to Ukraine (more than 30 units in total) from Poland and Slovakia as an important political and military act. Nevertheless, they state that they will not change the situation at the front (although they will be able to shoot down the planes and missiles of the aggressors), primarily due to the limited ability to counter, for example, the modern Su-27 (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023g). The same authors reflect on the approval of the EU's seven-year programme of joint procurement and production of artillery (Wilk, Żochowski, 2023t). They write about the transfer of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine, which will certainly increase the effectiveness of repelling missile attacks (individual russian missiles could not be shot down by the previously transferred NASAMS and IRIS-T systems) (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023d).

The issue of a regular and full supply of weapons to Ukraine by the allies is updated. It was the supply of weapons that made it possible not only to stop the russian aggressors, but also to recapture the occupied territory. However, in the spring of 2023, a shortage of artillery shells,

rockets, cartridges for bomb throwers and portable firearms began to be felt. It is noted that the supply of weapons at the level of 2022 covered only limited use – three times less than by the russians. The formation of a reserve necessary in the event of an increase in attacks by the russians seems urgent to the authors. The lack of a reserve could lead to the impossibility of waging an equal war (this motivated the need for a constant supply of all types of weapons – from cartridges to tanks and air defense). One of the main difficulties is determined by the reduction of stocks of the soviet weapons, the only way out is the rearmament of the Armed Forces with used and new models of Western weapons (Tarociński & Wilk, 2023). Andrzej Wilk's and Piotr Żohowski's next publication is about the creation of an air defense coalition, which was to be led by Germany and France (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023c).

In the next publication, well-known analysts emphasize the ever-increasing shortage of ammunition, especially artillery shells. At the same time, they claim that the EU does not have the technical ability to produce the necessary amount of ammunition, and the USA provides Israel with it. It is predicted that only in 2025, manufacturers will reach an average monthly capacity of 90-100 thousand missiles per month (russia increased production to 2 million units in 2023 and additionally purchased 500 thousand units from North Korea) (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023i).

One of the most relevant issues – the transfer of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine – is considered by Jakub Ber, Jacek Tarociński, and Krzysztof Nieczypor, noting generally significant shifts in the West's self-restraint. However, they state that the number of units and the delivery schedule will not be able to make a noticeable impact on the battlefield. An important problem will be the maintenance of a proper technical condition of planes, as they are made many years ago, and wear and tear, the training of technical and flight personnel (a pilot training takes about six months, skill improvement takes two years, improvement to the instructor level takes five years) (Ber, Tarociński & Nieczypor, 2023). The same analysts continue (January 9, 2024) to consider the issue of the timing of the transfer of F-16. Referring to the Danish newspaper "Berlingske", they write about the postponement of the transfer of the first fighter jets for six months (the summer of 2024). In the publication, for its part, citing its own sources, there is explained this situation by the infrastructure's unpreparedness for the use of F-16 (Wilk & Żochowski, 2024b).

A significant number of publications are on foreign policy aspects. For example, Michal Bogusz and Krzysztof Nieczypor analyze China's game around the peaceful settlement of the Russo-Ukrainian war, which, in their opinion, is aimed at achieving its own interests. At the same time, a number of arguments are noted: the absence of demands to withdraw the russian troops from Ukraine, the appeal to a specific addressee in the demands to cease fire (thereby creating the impression of equal responsibility of the parties for the war), not using the term "war", but only "crisis", etc. Instead, analysts consider Beijing's initiatives aimed at splitting the Western coalition and not only in the context of the war in Ukraine, but also in the light of the China-American rivalry. Even more, with such demands, China indirectly provides political support to Russia (calling for the cancellation of "unilateral sanctions" imposed on the decision of the UN Security Council, "not to inflame the conflict", i.e. to stop supplying weapons). The authors correctly conclude that the Chinese peace plan is congruent with the russian propaganda (with the exception of references to NATO), an interest in its failure for a further use in propaganda against the US and in political interests in the global South (primarily due to the problem with sanctions, disruption of logistics in the supply of grain, which affects many developing countries) and seeking to change the established international

order and become the basis of a new international world order. For its part, Kyiv is trying (albeit unsuccessfully) to involve Beijing in ending the war, offering to act as a guarantor of Ukraine's security (Bogusz & Nieczypor, 2023).

Continuing to consider the issue of the peace treaty, the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies analysts analyze (June 21, 2023) the ideas of the African delegation regarding the settlement of the Russo-Ukrainian war, which are of an informal, general character, and because of this they believe that it cannot be called a peace plan, because it is not aimed at solving the main issues (withdrawal of troops, payment of reparations, bringing those guilty of armed aggression to justice, etc.). In addition, they admit that the mission had little chance of success, also because the Ukrainian counter-offensive began, each of the parties placed the main bet on a military solution to the war (Bartosiewicz & Nieczypor, 2023).

Michał Bogusz and Kamil Kłysiński consider in detail the arrival of O. Lukashenko (February 28 – March 2) and his reception in Beijing, which they consider to be a serious signal for Russia about the increasing influence of China in the post-Soviet space (Bogusz & Kłysiński, 2023). Special focus is on the visit of O. Scholz to the USA on March 2, 2023. This visit was defined as confirmation of Germany's role as a key partner of the USA in the European Union and American security guarantees for Europe. During the meeting of J. Biden and O. Scholz, a chief focus was on the Russian aggression in Ukraine (Gibadło, 2023). At the same time, Michał Bogusz and Witold Rodkiewicz focus on the analysis of Xi Jinping's trip to Moscow, noting the creation of an ever deeper coalition between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China in opposition to the West. This coalition is considered as a form of survival of authoritarian regimes and ruling groups (Bogusz, Rodkiewicz, 2023). An equally important publication (June 6, 2023) by Andrzej Wilk, Piotr Żochowski, and Witold Rodkiewicz, in which they emphasize that NATO's lack of reaction to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus was accepted as an unequal treatment of the security of the countries on the eastern flank and will contribute to further aggressive Russia's actions not only against Ukraine, but also against Western countries (Wilk, Żochowski, Rodkiewicz, 2023). The legal and practical consequences of the international criminal court issuing a warrant (March 20, 2023) for V. Putin's arrest are also considered (Rodkiewicz & Menkiszak, 2023).

V. Zelenskyi's business trips abroad became important events in the foreign policy. For example, Lidia Gibadło, Krzysztof Nieczypor, and Jacek Tarociński in an article (May 16, 2023) focus considerable attention on his visit to Germany and meeting with O. Scholz (the eighth foreign meeting since the full-scale invasion). They explained the late trip as a delay in providing military aid to counter the Russian aggression. The visit proved the versatility of Germany's support for Ukraine in the political, economic, military, humanitarian, and financial spheres (Gibadło, Nieczypor & Tarociński, 2023). In foreign policy activities, V. Zelenskyi's visit to Bulgaria was of great importance. The main achievement is the agreement to support Ukraine's accession to NATO after the end of hostilities. In addition, the establishment of cooperation in nuclear energy (the parliament decided to sell to Ukraine the necessary equipment for installation at the Khmelnytsky NPP) (Kobeszko, 2023).

In the context of a foreign policy activity, Justyna Gotkowska, Krzysztof Nieczypor, Jakub Graza (January 16, 2024) consider Ukraine's agreement with Great Britain, quite correctly predicting that its content will become the basis for similar agreements with other countries (Canada, France). At the same time, it is noted that there were no clear "security guarantees" in the agreement, but President V. Zelenskyi, according to the analysts, "exaggerated the nature of the British obligations". This exaggeration was explained by a kind of appeasement

of the public and at the same time encouraging the signatories to make more ambitious promises, as well as disappointment due to the lack of an official invitation to NATO at the Vilnius summit and levelling of the Budapest memorandum of 1994. (Gotkowska, Niecypor & Graca, 2024). The analysts Andrzej Wilk and Piotr Żochowski write about the same agreements “on security and cooperation” with Germany and France, signed by President V. Zelenskyi on February 16 (February 20, 2024). There were primarily the following issues discussed: the allocation of a financial assistance and determined long-term support through the provision of military aid, deepening of economic cooperation, assistance in restoration of critical infrastructure, etc. (Wilk & Żochowski, 2024c).

The issue of Ukraine’s movement towards joining the European Union gained active consideration. In particular, Krzysztof Niecypor and Kamil Całus focused on Ukraine’s implementation of the recommendations of the European Commission regarding the start of negotiations on EU accession. It is believed that the task of reforming the procedure for selecting judges of the Supreme Court was the most important among the seven recommendations (introduction into legislation of the provision of opinions on the judges by the Consultative Group of Experts, in which the members selected by the international organizations will have a decisive vote). The reforms were also supposed to relate to deoliharchization (the introduced changes were criticized for violating the rights guaranteed by the European Charter of Human Rights) and reforming the legislation on the national minorities (the norm on quotas for the use of the national minority languages in education and mass media was criticized). The Polish analysts highlighted that the above-mentioned issue would continue to increase the tension in Ukraine’s relations with the neighbouring countries, for example, with Hungary, which for a long time insists on granting broad rights to the Hungarian minority as a precondition for Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO (Niecypor & Całus, 2023).

Furthermore, Krzysztof Niecypor and Ilona Gizińska turn to the analysis of Ukraine’s compliance with the requirements of the European Commission regarding the introduction of diverse legislative changes. The amendments to legislation on the national minorities was the first issue, which was considered as well as the most controversial one. According to the authors, there is one issue among the discriminatory ones that is the rule on the liquidation of schools for the national minorities and they should be superseded by classes for the national minorities, with a full instruction in the language of the national minorities only at the primary level of education (grades 1–4). At the same time, they present the main arguments of the authorities that language plays an important role in protection against the separatist movements and provides an opportunity to deconstruct the myths of “Ruskyi myr”. There were also mentioned the obstacles created by Hungary on Ukraine’s path to NATO and the EU without the implementation of these measures (Niecypor & Gizińska, 2023). The above-mentioned issue was analyzed thoroughly by the analysts of the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies (December 13, 2023). In particular, it covered the introduction of amendments to numerous normative acts regarding the national minorities, which mainly corresponded to the recommendations of the Electoral Commission and became a prerequisite for the opening of membership negotiations at the EU summit (December 14–15). These changes turned out to be the most difficult of the seven demands of the European Commission, as they related to the language of instruction of the national minorities in secondary education – it was not an obligation to teach the subjects “Ukrainian Language and Literature” and “History of Ukraine” in the state language. By taking the above-mentioned steps, it was possible to

settle a long-standing dispute, primarily with Hungary and Romania (Jędrysiak, Niecypor, Całus & Gizińska, 2023). In addition, they write about the opening of EU negotiations on the accession of Ukraine and Moldova. However, the adoption of the negotiation framework (requires unanimity) with Ukraine and Moldova is indicated as an important next stage, followed by the verification of internal regulatory documents for their compliance with EU legislation. In parallel, the EU countries must agree on the basic rules for accepting new members by June of 2024 (Niecypor, Szpala & Sadecki, 2023).

The Polish analysts did not omit mentioning the meeting between V. Orban and V. Putin, which they assess as Hungary's further departure from pro-Western policy and, accordingly, isolation in the EU and NATO. It is stated that V. Orban is the only leader from the EU countries, who met with V. Putin after the International Criminal Court warrant for his arrest, the second after the Chancellor of Austria since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. It is also noted that the Hungarian letterer consistently puts forward demands favourable to Russia: the lifting of sanctions, the termination of aid to Kyiv, the repetition of Moscow propaganda, the blocking of unfavourable decisions (Sweden's entry into NATO, a veto on the start of Ukraine's negotiations on joining the EU, etc.) (Sadecki & Rudnik, 2023). An analyst Lidiya Gibadło (February 13, 2024) focused on O. Scholz's visit to the USA. She stressed out that it took place at an extremely difficult time – discussions in Congress regarding the allocation of financial assistance to Ukraine. The Chancellor of Germany supported the policy of J. Biden, strengthened the image of a key ally in the European Union and supported Ukraine in the fight against Russia. Although the author believed that O. Scholz's trip was aimed at supporting J. Biden during the Presidential campaign (Gibadło, 2024).

There are numerous publications, which focus on economic issues. In this context, the following ones are important: harvest, export, etc. Thus, Slawomir Matuszak explains the decrease in harvest by a number of factors: occupation and mining of part of the fields, deterioration of weather conditions, etc. At the same time, the fall in productivity affected cheap types of export products (for example, corn), the cultivation of which was on the verge of profitability. On the contrary, expensive crops increased (for example, canola, soybeans, etc.). The expert predicted that foreign sales of grain would slow down even more significantly in 2023. However, after the cessation of hostilities and restoration of logistics lines, the growth of exports was naturally predicted (Matuszak, 2023c).

A significant array of publications is on the export of grain products. Thus, analysts clearly assess Russia's refusal to extend the grain agreement as an attempt to destabilize the world agricultural market and contribute to the growth of prices, and thus to the increase of its own income from the export of agricultural products (the market immediately reacted by raising prices). At the same time, these actions are evaluated from a political point of view – this is how the Russian Federation tests the unity of the Western coalition in the matter of sanctions policy and tries to aggravate the internal problems of the EU through the transit of Ukrainian grain by land routes. It was also emphasized that withdrawing from the agreement significantly undermined Turkey's position as a guarantor (Rudnik, Matuszak, Michalski, 2023). The same issue is continued to be researched by Slawomir Matuszak and Jakub Ber (December 22, 2023), who wrote about the launch of a new corridor (through Ukrainian territorial waters towards Romania), intended primarily for the export of Ukrainian agricultural products. At the same time, they note that this route, unlike the previous one, is not limited to the export of food, but is also actively used for the sale of other goods abroad (iron ore, metal products, etc.) (Matuszak, Ber, 2023).

Ivona Wiśniewska analyzes the economic situation, its future changes in Russia and the impact of the war it started (predicting an increase in inflation, an increase in costs, an increase in a domestic debt, cancellation of mortgage subsidy programme, an increase (by 10%) in utility payments, an increase in business taxes). The author is convinced that, despite everything, one should not expect protests from the Russians that could change this policy, on the contrary, deterioration of social conditions may even encourage young people to join the army (in order to receive high wages and benefits) (Wiśniewska, 2023a). On the anniversary of the full-scale invasion, this author writes about the expansion of sanctions against Russia by Western powers as an element of solidarity (along with a financial and military aid) with Ukraine and continued unity in its support. However, he states that with each subsequent package it becomes more and more difficult to reach a consensus among the allies (the economy of the EU countries also suffers an increase in losses) (Wiśniewska, 2023b). Sławomir Matuszak (March 24, 2023) calls the success of Ukrainian negotiators the achievement of agreements with the IMF (the approval of the programme of a country in which a full-scale war is ongoing) (Matuszak, 2023b).

An important component is the energy sector. The analytical publication focuses on the study of reflection in the German and American press of the investigation on the sabotage of the gas pipelines NS1 and NS2. It is noted that the majority of analysts are restrained in their assessments, however, they note the strengthening of the split in society and the use of this information to weaken military support for Ukraine (Kędzierski, 2023).

Analysts focus on the Russian missile attacks on the energy system of Ukraine and effectiveness of their repulsion. In particular, after the attack on March 9, 2023, Andrzej Wilk and Piotr Żochowski write about a change in the tactics of the Russians – a simultaneous use of several “Kynzhal” missiles to hit one target (they consider this to be indirect evidence of the problem of the Russians due to Western aid to Ukraine). The release of information about low effectiveness of the shooting down (34 missiles (36%) out of 95 were hit) is considered a pressure on partners to increase and accelerate the supply of air defense systems (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023f).

Writing about the Russian terrorist attacks on March 10, 2023, Sławomir Matuszak notes that since October 2022, Russia has carried out 15 massive missile strikes. Despite everything, the analyst believes that the missile terror did not succeed – there was no energy collapse, the energy system continued operating. Among favourable factors, he singles out the support of Western countries with equipment, a relatively warm winter, precipitation that contributed to a greater production of electricity at hydroelectric power stations, reconstruction of the power unit at the Rivne NPP, etc. (Matuszak, 2023a).

Ecological losses became some especially acute problems, which were reflected by the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies analysts. In particular, writing about the destruction of valuable (June 13, 2023) ecosystems on the territory of the Nyzhniy Dnipro National Park, Jakub Ber, Sławomir Matuszak note that the ecology has suffered colossal losses (the Dnipro was polluted by sewage, dead animals, construction debris, chemicals washed from the fields, mass death of fish was observed), the problem of providing towns with drinking water (for example, Berdiansk, Melitopol, Kryvyi Rih), the loss of capacities in the power system and the loss of necessary water resources in the production processes of metallurgical enterprises (Ber & Matuszak, 2023). Separately, Jakub Ber refers to the consequences of the Russian aggression on the natural environment in Ukraine as “ecocide” and “war against nature”. And the lack of access to the occupied territories and the territories where hostilities are taking

place makes it impossible for experts to make a real calculation of the losses, and they will become known only after a long time (flooding of mines in Donbas causes land collapse and salinization of groundwater), expansion of the “dead water zone” in the Black Sea, the death of endemic plant and animal populations, a decrease in the number of certain animal species, etc. He sees the only positive impact on nature through the destruction of large industrial enterprises that used outdated cleaning technologies, and the cessation of their work allows the environment to recover (Ber, 2023c). The publications raised the issue of demining the territory of Ukraine in the western part of the Black Sea basin (Niecypor, 2023).

The issues of personnel changes in the Armed Forces were reflected in the publications of the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies analysts. For example, about the resignation of the commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Donbas Moskaliov. Writing about the difficult military situation in Donbas, Andrzej Wilk and Piotr Żochowski consider this personnel rotation to be a manifestation, on the one hand, of a loss of trust in him by the leadership, and on the other hand, an attempt to make him guilty in the case of Bakhmut's capture. Leaving the position of the commander of the United Forces vacant was received as an alarming signal (Wilk & Żochowski, 2024a). Other personnel changes in the defense sector were considered, first of all, the dismissal of O. Reznikov and the appointment of R. Umerov, as well as officials of the Ministry for Defense of Ukraine. Emphasizing the main reasons – numerous scandals related to the purchase of products, equipment, inventory for the army and the mobilization process (Ber, Żochowski, 2023b). In another long article (February 9, 2024), authoritative Polish commentators Jakub Ber, Piotr Żochowski, and Tadeusz Iwański emphasize the misunderstanding and even criticism (of a large part of the military, volunteers, and the public) of V. Zelenskyi's decision to dismiss V. Zaluzhnyi from the post of Commander-in-Chief. At the same time, they note that such a decision was not properly substantiated, since V. Zaluzhnyi had the highest rating of trust and support in society, even despite the counteroffensive failure, he became a symbol of the struggle of the Ukrainian people against the Russian aggression. They even write about the massacre of a political opponent: “The President systematically undermined the positions of the Commander-in-Chief, violating the principle of a unified command and hierarchy in the Armed Forces”, giving orders directly to V. Zaluzhnyi's subordinates, carrying out personnel rotations without his approval, etc. As a result, such actions led to the formation of “competing factions that have a high degree of autonomy and direct ties to the Office of the President” in the army. Instead, they emphasize that V. Zaluzhnyi avoided an open conflict with the President (Ber, Żochowski & Iwański, 2024).

In the publication (February 13, 2024), Jakub Ber describes personnel changes in administrative, organizational and planning positions. He notes that they were received in the army well, especially considering that several junior officers who enjoyed considerable authority and had previous combat experience in the Russo-Ukrainian war were promoted, made their way from commanders of battalions in 2014 – 2015, and thus, to commanders of brigades or operational groups in 2022 – 2024. In addition, they participated in foreign missions, international exercises, obtained military education diploma or completed training courses in the armies of NATO countries. However, the issue of staffing command positions at the front (operational strategic groups and operational groups) remained acute. The appointment of junior officers to higher positions is considered a skillful move by V. Zelenskyi, aimed at reducing dissatisfaction with the resignation of V. Zaluzhnyi in the army and society (Ber, 2023b).

A number of other equally important events related to the Russo-Ukrainian war were also reflected in the reviews of the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies analysts. In particular, the special features of the Kremlin's "regulation" of the status of residents of the occupied territories through the forced granting of the Russian citizenship, and those who did not agree to receive it, were planned to be deported to remote areas of Russia, instead of which the territory would be populated by poor Russians from the remote areas. In this way, it was planned to clear the occupied territories from possible resistance of "disloyal" Ukrainians, reducing resistance to the Russification policy (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023e).

A chaotic nature of mobilization, lack of a proper digital database with registers of conscripts, and obsolescence of existing paper database, which makes it impossible to track the internal movement of the population (lack of information on conscripted men with military experience), were not overlooked by the Polish analysts of the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies. As a result, a chaotic nature of mobilization caused summonses which are served in the streets and at workplaces (Ber, 2023a).

The Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies analyst Jadwiga Rogoża focuses on the important problem of an extremely rapid population decline, which in a short term, in her opinion, actualizes the need to attract labour from immigrants from African and Central Asian countries. At the same time, European countries, where a significant number of the Ukrainian refugees are located, are interested in keeping them, primarily because of their own demographic problems. Such circumstances may lead to tension in relations between Kyiv and other countries. Among the factors that will contribute to the return of the Ukrainians, serious transformations and progress on the way to the EU are mentioned. Instead, the lack of prospects for reform, jobs, infrastructure restoration, and opportunities for personal and professional development will lead to a further outflow of citizens abroad (Rogoża, 2023).

Religious processes in Ukraine do not go unnoticed. In particular, Jadwiga Rogoża, Katarzyna Chawryło (April 14, 2023) analyze efforts to weaken the influence of the UOC-MP on the Ukrainians (Rogoża & Chawryło, 2023).

A significant part of the publications is dedicated to the review of socio-political and economic processes in Russia. In particular, Jakub Ber and Piotr Żochowski write (April 14, 2023) about the difficulties of the mobilization campaign in Russia (first of all, the lack of up-to-date data on conscripts, attempts to avoid military service), as a consequence of conducting it in a hidden format (Ber & Żochowski, 2023a).

Analyzing the drone attacks on the Kremlin (May 5, 2023), Andrzej Wilk and Piotr Żochowski do not reject the version that this could have been an insinuation by the FSB (as a basis for an internal strengthening of military rhetoric, for an external one – justification for refusing negotiations, spreading propaganda narratives and increasing nuclear blackmail) (Wilk & Żochowski, 2023a).

There are a number of publications on the rebellion of E. Prigozhin. A thorough analysis of its beginning was made by Marek Menkišak (June 24, 2023). In particular, he considers it the culmination of a long conflict between the leadership of Wagner's group and the highest military command (S. Shoigu, V. Gerasimov). The author considered the main goal in the attempt to subordinate Wagner's units directly to the Ministry for Defense and the desire of Ye. Prigozhin to take advantage of the minimal success from the capture of Bakhmut to obtain greater political and business opportunities. Marek Menkišak admits that there are few chances to achieve changes in the military and civil administration, primarily due to the disproportion of forces and means. Therefore, he predicted the of the uprising suppression,

and Prigozhin should either be killed or arrested. Although the author suggests that if there are no clashes with regular army units and no resistance from larger military units, then moral spirit may drop and the decay of Putin's regime will accelerate, causing a "palace coup". In this case, he assumes that control could be taken over by Prime Minister Mykhailo Mishustin and Moscow Mayor Serhii Sobiakin, who will negotiate with Ye. Prigozhin on the division of power (Menkiszak, 2023). Piotr Żochowski develops this issue, analyzing Ye. Prigozhin's refusal to continue the offensive on Moscow. Highlighting several main theses – weakness of Putin's position, who did not give the order to destroy the "rebels", weakness of the state security system, hence the loss of Ye. Prigozhin's control over his group and departure to Belarus (control passed to the Ministry for Defense) (Żochowski, 2023). Maria Domańska and Piotr Żochowski consider this issue in detail, calling the death of Ye. Prigozhin a special operation of V. Putin to eliminate the rebels, rejecting the version that Ye. Prigozhin staged his own death. The authors considered this a signal sent to all potential opponents of the regime and in this way strengthening V. Putin's positions, which were shaken. There are also mentioned secret spot repressions against security forces (primarily the armed forces) and representatives of radical movements who had relations with Wagner's group (Domańska & Żochowski, 2023).

The Conclusions. Thus, during the second year of the Russo-Ukrainian war, the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies analysts followed all the events (both in foreign and domestic arenas) quite carefully. According to them, the withdrawal of the Armed Forces from Avdiyivka (February 19, 2024) was the symbolic date of the end of the second year of war. In their publications, the analysts focus on combat operations at the front, political processes, socio-economic, information security, environmental, educational, cultural, religious problems, the policy of Western countries regarding war and security in Europe in general. During this year, the chief focus of analysts was on the battles for Bakhmut, the counteroffensive launched by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on June 4, the restoration of the transport corridor through the Black Sea, achieved owing to strikes on the ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, grain exports, attacks by the Ukrainian drones on military, energy and oil facilities on the territory of the Russian Federation, Ukraine's entry into the EU, the signing of security agreements and internal processes within it, etc. At the same time, in their publications, analysts also mention a number of negative factors that directly affected the front – corruption scandals, political competition, which reached its peak with the dismissal of Valery Zaluzhnyi from the post of Commander-in-Chief, etc. In this way, the reader can get a holistic view of the main aspects of the war. Perhaps the main conclusion is the opinion of the director of the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies, Wojciech Kononchuk, that Ukraine needs weapons for defense and victory, and, accordingly, the political will and quick decisions of Western countries.

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