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**EMPEROR JULIAN AND THE ANTIOCHIANS:  
CONFLICT OF CULTURAL TRADITIONS**

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the article is to explore the conflict over cultural traditions that took place between the Antiochians and emperor Julian in July of 362 – March of 363 AD. This confrontation is described in works by the participants, Julian and Libanius, as well as by other authors, both Christian and pagan, which provides with sufficient material to determine the aim of Julian's arrival in Antioch, to clarify the socio-political situation in the city, to highlight the emperor's main policies and to shed light onto the parties' perception of the conflict. The methodology is based on the principles of scientificity, historicism, systematics as well as the use of general scientific methods (induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis) and special historical methods (historical and systemic, historical and genetic, methods of historiographical and source analysis). The scientific novelty consists in the fact that it is the first attempt in the Ukrainian historiography to explore the cultural aspect of the conflict between Julian and the inhabitants of Antioch. The research results in the following conclusions. The crisis resulted primarily from Julian's intention to reverse cultural trends: the emperor intended to turn Antioch into the foothold for his reforms, so he focused on solving economic problems and, most importantly, on revitalizing pagan cults. Each of the policies failed due to a misunderstanding between*



*Julian and the Antiochians as well as communication problems. The emperor's economic rulings only exacerbated the food problems; his innovations in the governmental bodies met resistance from the curiales. The bitterest failure was the attempt to act upon religious and cultural traditions: Antiochian Christians refused to be converted to paganism, while religiously indifferent people were frightened by Julian's fanaticism and obsession with this topic. Julian's cultural ignorance prevented him from realizing the importance of his visits to the theatre that was primarily a platform for the authority to hear the public opinion in the form of acclamations. The crisis was escalated, among other factors, by the emperor's personality: he expected his subjects not only to accept his reforms but also to vigorously support them and admire him as the ruler, which was impossible in those circumstances.*

**Key words:** *emperor Julian, Libanius, the Antiochians, conflict, cultural traditions, paganism, Christianity.*

## **ІМПЕРАТОР ЮЛІАН І НАРОД АНТІОХІЇ: КОНФЛІКТ КУЛЬТУРНИХ ТРАДИЦІЙ**

**Анотація.** *Мета дослідження* полягає у конфлікті культурних традицій, який відбувся між імператором Юліаном та народом Антіохії в липні 362 р. – березні 363 р. н.е. Це зіткнення описується в роботах учасників, імператора Юліана та Лібанія, а також інших авторів як язичницьких, так і християнських, що забезпечує достатнім матеріалом для визначення мети приїзду Юліана до Антіохії, для з'ясування соціально-політичної ситуації в місті, для висвітлення основних векторів політики Юліана та для вивчення сприйняття конфлікту його учасниками. **Методологія дослідження** спирається на принципи науковості, історизму, системності, а також на використання загальнонаукових методів (індукції та дедукції, аналізу і синтезу) та спеціально-історичних методів (історико-системний, історико-генетичний, методи історіографічного та джерелознавчого аналізу). **Наукова новизна** статті полягає у тому, що вона є першою спробою у вітчизняній історіографії дослідити культурний аспект конфлікту Юліана з мешканцями Антіохії. Дослідження привело до таких **висновків**. Криза була спровокована першочергово наміром Юліана повернути назад культурні традиції: імператор планував перетворити Антіохію на форпост своїх реформ, тому й зосередився на розв'язанні економічних проблем та, найголовніше, на відродженні поганських культів. Кожна з цих реформ зазнала поразки через непорозуміння між Юліаном та антіохійцями, а також через проблеми комунікації. Економічні рішення імператора лише загострили проблему харчів у місті; його адміністративні нововведення натикнулися на опір з боку куріалів. Найприкрішою поразкою закінчилась спроба імператора вплинути на релігійні та культурні традиції: антіохійці-християни відмовилися повертатися до язичництва, натомість мени релігійні люди були відлякані фанатичністю Юліана та його зацікленістю на цю тему. Юліан виявив "культурну нечутливість" і не зрозумів, що візити до театру важливі для правителя, оскільки театр виконував функцію платформи для висловлення суспільної думки через акламації. Розгортанню конфронтації сприяв і характер самого імператора. Юліан вимагав не просто прийняття своєї політики, а енергійного схвалення як себе самого правителя, що було неможливим за тих обставин.

**Ключові слова:** *імператор Юліан, Лібаній, антіохійці, конфлікт, культурні традиції, язичництво, християнство.*

**The Problem Statement.** Despite the short period of his sole rule (361 – 363), Emperor Julian remains one of the greatest figures in the history of the Roman Empire in the 4<sup>th</sup> century AD. Being a pagan and a philosopher, the emperor became posthumously an idol for the pagans who inhabited the empire in the 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, and 6<sup>th</sup> centuries. During his life, however, most his contemporaries did not understand him. The period Julian spent in Syrian Antioch (July 18, 362 – March 5, 363) may be regarded as the turning point of his rule. The Antiochians did not comprehend the emperor's rich inner world and peculiarities of his policies. His stay in the city ended up in a conflict with his subjects, which has been extensively described in historical sources. This confrontation, its preconditions and development are of great interest to scholars.

**The purpose of the article** is to analyze the conflict between Emperor Julian and the Antiochians, tracing its cultural causes and consequences. The stages of the research include (1) clarifying social and political situation in the city during Julian's stay in Antioch, (2) distinguishing Julian's main economic and cultural policies in Antioch, (3) researching the opponents' perspectives on the conflict, and (4) exploring consequences of this confrontation.

**The Analysis of Recent Researches.** The main sources of the current research are writings by its participants and witnesses. The first among them is Emperor Julian himself. When his frustration was the bitterest and hopes to reach an understanding ebbed away, the emperor resorted to an action that was not typical of rulers but which agreed perfectly well with his character. He wrote the *Misopogon* (Julian, trans. 1913) that was put on public display on the Tetracylon of the Elephants nearby the emperor's palace while the ruler was residing in the city (John Malalas, trans. 2014, XIII, 19) (see also (Gleason, 1986, p. 106)). The speech is a camouflaged self-deprecating satire: the emperor is ironic about his appearance, namely his beard, he tells how, when in Lutetia, he felt sick, etc. (Julian, trans. 1913, 338B, 342A) (see also (Alonso-Nunes, 1979, p. 321)). The *Misopogon* is, in fact, the emperor's own apologia where he opposes himself as a pagan emperor-philosopher and his ascetic lifestyle to the Antiochians' effeminate purposeless life. The date of the text may be deduced from the writing itself: it was written during the seventh month of Julian's stay in Antioch (Julian, trans. 1913, 344A), i.e., within the period between January 18 to February 18, 363. Some modern researchers are inclined to assign an earlier date: Gleason, for example, believes that the text was written shortly after the New Year celebration as 'festive satire' (Gleason, 1986, p. 108). Others argue for a later date. Thus, van Hoof and van Nuffelen believe that the speech was made public just before Julian's departure from Antioch so that he could have the last word in the crisis (van Hoof & van Nuffelen, 2011, pp. 174–175).

Another witness of Julian's stay in Antioch was the city's outstanding rhetor Libanius. At that time, he was relatively young, under 50, which is not much taking into account that he lived to his 80<sup>th</sup> birthday. By 363, he had already become a well-known rhetor. He was also pagan, and these two features won the emperor's great respect. Besides, as official speaker of Antioch, Libanius was obliged to compose speeches addressed to the emperor during his stay in the principal city of Syria. As a result, it is quite natural that Libanius created seven speeches (*Orations XII – XVIII*) in Julian's honour (modern scholars even distinguish the "Julianian" period in the orator's heritage (Kurbatov, 1990, p. 62)). In the context of the conflict between Julian and the Antiochians, there are two most informative speeches by Libanius: *Oration XV. The Embassy to Julian* and *Oration XVI. To the Antiochians, On the Emperor's Anger*. Both *Orations* were written after Julian had left the city. The former speech aims at persuading Julian to temper his wrath and return to Antioch after the completion of the Persian campaign. The latter is addressed to Antiochians: Libanius is convinced that the city should express sorrow and remorse over the conflict with the emperor. Just like in the case with the *Misopogon*, historiographers argue over the date of the orations. In *Oration XV*, Libanius writes that it is the fifth month of the punishment the city goes through (Libanius, *Oration XV*, 73). If the starting point is the date of the *Misopogon* rather than the date when the temple of Apollo was destroyed, then the *Oration* was composed between late May and late June (Julian was killed June 26, 363, during the Persian campaign). However, van Hoof and van Nuffelen admit that the *Oration* could be completed even after Julian's death (van Hoof & van Nuffelen, 2011, p. 181). Whatever way it was, the emperor never heard the speech. As for *Oration XVI*, it is assumed that it was declared in the Curia of Antioch between

March and April of 363. Yet, van Hoof and van Nuffelen argue that *Oration XV* and *Oration XVI* make up one whole and may have been composed simultaneously (van Hoof & van Nuffelen, 2011, p. 184). More information on these orations is provided by church historian Socrates Scholasticus who claims that “these compositions were merely written, and never recited in public” (Socrates Scholasticus, trans. 1890, III, 17). In other words, the orations were meant for a narrow circle, yet it is not quite clear whether these were the Curia of Antioch or intellectuals close to Libanius. Accordingly, one may regard the orations as either the speaker’s public views on the social and political situation or rhetorical exercises aimed at the closest supporters. In any case, they shed light onto Libanius’ opinion of the crisis between Julian and Antioch.

Other sources that the study draws on are works by such authors of Late Antiquity as Ammianus Marcellinus, Zosima, John Malalas as well as church historians Socrates Scholasticus and Sozomenus.

The conflict between Julian and Antioch was an important milestone during the emperor’s rule, so it has been extensively explored in historiography. The publications on the issue include the classical works by Downey (Downey, 1939), a well-known expert in Antiochian history, as well as modern studies by van Hoof and van Nuffelen (van Hoof & van Nuffelen, 2011). Differences between the emperor and the city are analysed in articles that examine the key source, namely the *Misopogon* (Gleason, 1986; Alonso-Nunes, 1979). The emperor’s stay in Antioch is researched in works focusing on Julian’s life (Bowersock, 1997). Also, the crisis is discussed in fundamental studies on Late Antiquity (Cameron, 2008; Jones, 1964). Nevertheless, the issues brought up in this article are rather controversial. They require both an analysis of facts as well as an attempt to explore the emperor’s complicated inner world. These two issues contribute to the scientific novelty of the current research.

**The Main Material Statement.** Julian’s one-man rule begins with the death of Constantius II in November of 361. On December 11, the emperor reaches Constantinople where he is proclaimed the sole ruler (Socrates Scholasticus, trans. 1996, III, 1). He spends there about six months and then moves to Antioch. The formal reason for the move was the need to prepare for the Persian campaign. However, the military operation was due in the spring of 363, so Julian need not in fact have arrived in Antioch so early, in the summer of 362, which means that Julian had some motives to spend so much time in the principal city of Syria. Most likely, the reasons included his intention to launch a religious reform. Antioch, with its notable temple of Apollo in Daphne, was the ancient capital of paganism. It was the city of utmost cultural importance and cultural traditions: it had its own Olympic Games, the centre of public speaking art tightly bound with paganism and home to one of the most famous rhetors in the Empire, Libanius, who did not conceal his pagan views (see, for example, (Downey, 1939, p. 306; Bowersock, 1997, p. 95)). Julian could not help knowing that the majority of Antiochians had been converted to Christianity, yet the emperor might have assumed their Christian beliefs were superficial and thought that his persistence would help him to bring the population back to their old cults. Correspondingly, Antioch had to become not only the foothold for his religious policy but also an example for other cities of the Roman Empire to follow. The emperor also intended to restore curiae and some elements of traditional self-governance. Antioch seemed to be easier to reform than the capital, Constantinople with its bureaucratic system.

Julian started preparing for his arrival in Antioch beforehand. He received envoys from Antioch, who congratulated him on obtaining the status of the sole ruler (Alonso-Nunes,

1979, p. 323). In addition, the emperor freed the Antiochians as well as inhabitants of other cities from paying *aurum coronarium*, a quasi-forced tax imposed on citizens by rulers when they took over the supreme position (Julian, trans. 1913, 367D; Libanius, *Oration XVI*, 19). He also appointed his uncle and namesake Julian as *comes Orientis* in the city. This was an important position of the head of the Diocese of the East, who resided in Antioch. By appointing a close relative to this post, emperor Julian expressed his respect for the city and, simultaneously, secured a reliable associate who would introduce the planned reforms, in the sphere of religion in particular. During the emperor's stay in Antioch, the *comes Orientis* indeed shouldered the responsibility for supervising pagan cults and sacrifice, apart from his immediate duties (Downey, 1961, p. 384; Teitler, 2013, p. 280). Taking this fact into consideration, it is not surprising that church historian Sozomenus describes the official's death with a certain dose of *schadenfreude* (Sozomenus, trans. 1851, V, 8) (uncle Julian will die in early 363 when Emperor Julian is still in Antioch).

Finally, in May of 362, Emperor Julian leaves Constantinople for Antioch. He builds the itinerary on cultural landmarks and traditions and visits on his way as many pagan temples and altars as possible. In some places he gives a new life to abandoned pagan shrines, in some places he faces open resistance of Christians (Cameron, 2008, p. 68). Right before his arrival in the city, according to Malalas, the ruler visited Mount Casius, where he performed a sacrifice to Zeus Casius, and the temple of Apollo in Daphne (John Malalas, trans. 2014, XIII, 19). Julian arrived in Antioch on July 18, 362, when the city was celebrating the Adonia, a festival in honour of Adonis (Ammianus Marcellinus, trans. 2005, XXII, 13, 15; Bowersock, 1997, p. 96). The choice of the arrival date seems rather strange. According to cultural traditions, the Adonia lasted two days: the first day was a joyful celebration, the second one was a day of mourning Adonis' death. It was the second day, when streets were filled with people in tears, that Julian arrived in Antioch, which could be taken by some citizens as bad omen.

There are controversial data on the Antiochians' first reaction to the emperor's arrival. Ammianus Marcellinus writes that Julian was received as deity and was impressed by the noise of a huge crowd (Ammianus Marcellinus, XXII, 13, 14). Zosima adds that after the ruler came to Antioch, "the inhabitants greeted him warmly" (Zosima, trans. 2010, III, 4). John Malalas, however, claims that "since the people of Antioch were zealous Christians, they chanted insolent words to him" (John Malalas, trans. 1986, p. 178). The warm welcome seems to be more likely: it is very doubtful that the Antiochians were inclined to launch conflict with the emperor from the very beginning; rather, they intended to make a good impression and attempted to do their best to solve their problems.

And there were just enough problems in the city, one of the most vital being the food supply. Judging by Libanius' works where he gives a thorough description of the situation the city was in in the second half of the 4<sup>th</sup> century, the delivery of food was real Achilles' heel of Antioch. This is what the rhetor tells about Antioch in the 380s: "I saw an old woman carrying a child and crying, literally, that she would die unless someone gave her some bread... Bread became the object of struggle... A weaker one brought home wounds and torn clothes instead of bread" (Libanius, *Oration XXIX*, 3–4). The problem of food supply would exacerbate and reach its peak when harvest was poor and when the city housed a large army before Persian campaigns. It is these two factors that came together in 362. Correspondingly, prices for grains soared. When Julian arrived in Antioch, the citizens cried to him at the racetrack: "Everything plentiful; everything dear!" (Julian, trans. 1913, 368C) (also see (Cameron, 2008, p. 71)).

The following day the emperor gathered the city's elite, including big landowners, and they promised to bring down the prices. Having concluded that the problem was dealt with, Julian did not return to the issue of food pricing during the following three months. Yet, the prices were never reduced. The emperor accused large landowners of this: "the pressure in the market was due not to any scarcity but to the insatiate greed of the rich" (Julian, trans. 1913, 368D). The ruler resorts to decisive actions and starts controlling prices of grains by fixing the allowed maximum price (Libanius, *Oration XV*, 21) (also see (Alonso-Nunes, 1979, p. 323)). In addition, he brings to the city 400 thousand modii of grain from Chalcis and Hierapolis. Having run out of the stocks, the emperor started to transport grains from Egypt delivering them by five, seven and ten thousand modii at a time. The emperor covered the expenses for the Egyptian grains by himself and sold them at lower prices: one could buy 15 modii of his grain at the price of 10 (Julian, trans. 1913, 369A-C) (also see (Jones, 1964, p. 446)).

As we can see, the emperor got down to solving the issue of food delivery to Antioch energetically. Trying to please him, Libanius expresses his deep appreciation of Julian's actions. According to the rhetor, the ruler rescues the city: "If you had not given it [bread] then... the city would be deserted now" (Libanius, *Oration XV*, 8). But, in fact, the emperor's policies are a good illustration of the saying 'no good deed goes unpunished'. Julian's order to limit the top price for grains was sabotaged by some vendors. They preferred not to sell bread at all to selling it at a lower price, which forced the emperor to cancel his order (Libanius, *Oration XVI*, 21). Transporting grains from other territories was not always efficient either: the grains often ended up in the hands of affluent middlemen who either kept it 'until better times' or sold the food in other parts of the empire where the limitations were not valid (Downey, 1961, p. 390; Cameron, 2008, p. 71). It is noteworthy that the ancient authors see the cause of food supply problems in the emperor's actions rather than poor harvest or the army stationed in Syria. Ammianus Marcellinus argues that the emperor "caused the commotion for no solid reason apart from gaining popularity for lowering food prices; and this is such an issue that brings about famine, if it is not handled with consideration" (Ammianus Marcellinus, XXII, 14, 1). Socrates Scholasticus argues that Julian "reduced the prices much more than he should" (Socrates Scholasticus, III, 17) and, as a result, vendors stopped trading.

Stimulating small landowners was another measure taken to solve the supply crisis. Julian divided uncultivated land around Antioch into three thousand plots and distributed them among the citizens. The emperor himself admits that the idea failed: much land ended up in the hands of those who did not need it. Some of the land was never sown (Julian, trans. 1913, 370D). Thus, the emperor had to interfere once again and take the lots away from those who had got control over it illegally.

Julian tried to build an image of the ruler who enhances traditions and traditional values. Correspondingly, one of his policies was targeted at renewing municipal life. Even when in Constantinople, the emperor considerably reduced the bureaucratic apparatus and ordered to extend municipal curiae. A curia in large Syrian cities as a rule consisted of 600 people. Yet, Antioch, however, was the biggest city in Syria, so the number of curia members, the *curiales*, reached 1200 people (Jones, 1964, p. 724). Obviously, this was the number of curiales Julian aimed at. It is worth noting that the status of a curial member was a burden rather than an honour. In particular, it was a member of the curia that was responsible for collecting some taxes. If a tax was not collected in full, the curiales were to compensate for the shortage at their own expense. In the *Misopogon*, Julian remarks on expanding the Antiochene curia: "I increased



the register of your Senate by two hundred members and spared no man” (Julian, trans. 1913, 367D). The emperor realized that a large number of the newly-appointed curiales would not appreciate ‘the honour’ of this post. It is not surprising that when Julian came to Antioch, he found that his order to expand the curia had not been carried out. Then, on August 28, he issued a new order that defined clearly the criteria to select curiales (Downey, 1961, p. 386). Libanius reacted with a laudatory speech to the emperor’s reform saying that the curiae’s quarters had become too small for the number of the people that manned them (Libanius, *Oration XVIII*, 148). Nevertheless, a number of modern researchers do not share the rhetor’s appreciation and consider that the reform of the curiae failed (Kurbatov, 1962, pp. 189–192; Cameron, 2008, p. 548). This conclusion is based on the fact that the Antiochian curia did not actively support Julian and was not enthusiastic about his key initiatives. In fact, the curiales were not unanimous in their opinions of this reform. The expansion was not welcome either to the newly-appointed members or the curia’s leaders. The latter came from several richest Antiochian families who controlled the poorest curiales and were tightly bound with the emperor’s administration. They feared that the expansion of the curia would reduce their influence on this institution (Vedeshkin, 2018, p. 218). The ordinary members, however, should have accepted Julian’s reform willingly because the curia’s tax obligations were then divided among a larger number of people.

Still, the emperor saw religion as the principal sphere of his activity that was targeted at restoring religious traditions, namely pagan cults. Having arrived in Antioch, Julian starts frequently visiting pagan temples and performing sacrifices. Thus, the ruler is proud to report that “the Emperor sacrificed once in the temple of Zeus, then in the temple of Fortune; he visited the temple of Demeter three times in succession” (Julian, trans. 1913, 346B). The pagan ceremonies were accompanied with large-scale sacrifice of animals (Cameron, 2008, p. 69). Their meat was then distributed among participants: it was the way that Julian attempted to engage more people in the ritual. But the result was often the opposite. People were annoyed when they saw soldiers, dead drunk and overstuffed with meat, being dragged by city dwellers along the streets to the barracks (Ammianus Marcellinus, XXII, 12, 6). And this happened at the times when bread was scarce and prices were high. During one of the ceremonies, there could be a hundred of bulls killed. Also, Julian was often personally engaged in reading fortune on sacrificed animals’ entrails (Ammianus Marcellinus, XXII, 12, 7).

Some Julian’s religious actions ended up in an utter fiasco. For example, in August, there was a traditional festival in honour of Apollo in Daphne. Julian came to the festival and “imagined ... the sort of procession it would be, like a man seeing visions in a dream, beasts for sacrifice, libations, choruses in honour of the god, incense, and the youths of your city there surrounding the shrine” (Julian, trans. 1913, 361D). But what the emperor saw was only one priest from a local temple who had brought his own goose for sacrifice. Overall, however, the Antiochians did attend the ruler’s religious ceremonies, but what they wanted to achieve was a good impression on Julian rather than to show religious beliefs. The emperor felt that his subjects lacked the religious zeal dominating him:

“For you applaud men instead of the gods, or rather instead of the gods you flatter me who am a mere man. But it would be best, I think, not to flatter even the gods but to worship them with temperate hearts” (Julian, trans. 1913, 345B).

The most important events of Julian’s religious policy are connected with revitalizing cultural and religious traditions of the temple of Apollo in Daphne located in the suburbs of Antioch. According to the myth, Daphne was Apollo’s lover whom the god turned into a laurel tree. Thus, in Daphne, the forest was an important place for worshippers. The temple of

Apollo with the god's huge statue was erected nearby. In the vicinity there also was a spring and a local oracle (Sozomenus, V, 17). At the times of Julian's Christian predecessors, the temple had been abandoned. Julian's brother, Caesar Gallus, had ordered to bring the relics of Saint Babylas, Antioch's bishop in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century, to the temple in order to strip the pagan sanctuary of its significance. Before arriving in the city, Julian had ordered to restore the temple of Apollo (Downey, 1961, p. 385; Teitler, 2013, p. 280). Yet, the emperor believed that the Christian shrine on the territory of the pagan temple belittled the importance of the latter. Therefore, he claimed that Babylas' relics had turned the oracle silent. In order to restore the oracle's power, Julian ordered to return Babylas' tomb to Antioch (Socrates Scholasticus, III, 18). A large crowd of Christians gathered to accompany the relics to the city and the religious ceremony turned into a protest against the emperor's policy.

A bit later, on October 22, the temple of Apollo catches fire, which almost destroys it (Ammianus Marcellinus, XXII, 13, 1) (also see (Frendo, 2007, p. 86)). There were several explanations to the fire. One of them was a lightning. According to the other theory, it was pagan philosopher Asclepiades who came to Antioch to pay respects for Julian: he allegedly conducted religious rituals in the temple and left a burning candle that started the fire (Ammianus Marcellinus, XXII, 13, 3). The emperor, however, accused Christians:

“when I sent away the body from Daphne, some of you, in expiation of your conduct towards the gods, handed over the shrine of the god of Daphne to those who were aggrieved about the relics of the body, and the rest of you, whether by accident or on purpose, hurled against the shrine that fire which made the strangers who were visiting your city shudder” (Julian, trans.1913, 361B-C).

The emperor turned to repressions: he ordered to close the largest Christian church in Antioch (Ammianus Marcellinus, XXII, 13, 2) (also see (Cameron, 2008, p. 70)). Christian writers Sozomenus and Socrates Scholasticus also mention corporal punishments of the most active Christians (Sozomenus, V, 20; Socrates Scholasticus, III, 19).

Acting as a judge was another Julian's occupation in Antioch. According to Ammianus Marcellinus, the emperor thoroughly considered every case trying to get to its very core. Still, at times, the ruler switched to the issues of greater importance for him and, all of a sudden, asked the parties about their religious beliefs (Ammianus Marcellinus, XXII, 10, 2).

As we can see, Julian energetically introduced his agenda whose objective was, among other things, to gain Antiochians' affection. Yet, he failed to achieve this goal: he overdid in some aspects while in others his policies were blatantly resisted. The very personality of the emperor started to arouse irritation and mockery. The citizens did not like it that Julian rarely attended theatres and the racetrack. The emperor mistakenly believed that he was rejected because he did not participate in popular entertainments: “all of you hate me on account of the dancers and the theatres. Not because I deprive others of these pleasures, but because I care less for things of that sort than for frogs croaking in a pond” (Julian, trans. 1913, 357D-358A). However, that was not the core of the matter. In fact, the racetrack and the theatre were the only places where his subjects could express their opinions and tell him about their needs with acclamations, i.e., rhythmical exclamations. As a result, people took the emperor's reluctance to go to the racetrack and the theatre for the unwillingness to listen to citizens (van Hoof & van Nuffelen, 2011, p. 174).

In places of mass gatherings, the Antiochians start to openly mock their emperor. He is called ‘monkey’, ‘dwarf’, ‘victimarius’ (that is, an attendant at a sacrifice) (Ammianus Marcellinus, XXII, 14, 3), people laugh at his long beard that could be cut and woven into ropes, at the



image of a sacrifice bull that Julian ordered to depict on his coins (Socrates Scholasticus, III, 19) (see also (Gleason, 1986, p. 113; Frendo, 2007, p. 88)). Having said all that, the conflict, however, hardly reached its climax. Libanius convinced the emperor that the disparaging acclamations were produced by very few citizens (Libanius, Oration XV, 77; Oration XVI, 31). In general, when citizens of Antioch were extremely frustrated by emperors' policies, they started uprisings. Such a revolt broke out in 387; it was called the Riot of Statues and described in Libanius' later orations, namely *Orations XIX – XXIII*. The sources do not register any mass resistance movement during Julian's stay in Antioch. There is only a report that several soldiers of the emperor's army were executed (John Malalas, XIII, 19). Besides, the Christian tradition preserves names of several martyrs slain by Julian for their religious beliefs, yet the truthfulness of these data is considered disputable in modern science (Teitler, 2013, p. 288).

Nevertheless, the emperor was extremely frustrated and confused. Before leaving Antioch, he writes his famous *Misopogon*. This communication format with subjects was unusual for emperors in general but it was typical of Julian, who constantly sent messages to the citizens through his speeches. The *Misopogon* was designed to get across the emperor's viewpoint on the situation in Antioch to his subjects all over the Empire. In the writing, the Antiochians are depicted as greedy, vane, dissipated people, interested only in entertainment and pleasure, who tend "to begin ... revels at dawn, to spend ... nights in pleasure, and to show not only by ... words but by ... deeds also that [they] despise the laws" (Julian, trans. 1913, 342B). These people are opposed to the ascetic emperor-philosopher who knows no indulgence, who is focused on spirituality and limits his sleep and food (Julian, trans. 1913, 340B). Julian believes that the Antiochians should follow the Celts' example in their relations with him: "they [the Celts] loved me so much, on account of the similarity of our dispositions, that not only did they venture to take up arms on my behalf, but they gave me large sums of money besides" (Julian, trans. 1913, 360C). The ruler promises to leave Antioch soon and never come back. Soon after making the *Misopogon* public, on March 5, Julian keeps his promise. He planned to return to the city of Tarsus after the Persian campaign (Cameron, 2008, p. 73). When in Antioch, the emperor assigned Alexander from Heliopolis, famous for his cruelty, to be the *consular* of Syria. Julian said that Alexander was the right official to rule the mercenary and arrogant Antiochians (Ammianus Marcellinus, XXIII, 2, 3) (see also (Gleason, 1986, p. 115)). In an attempt to please the emperor, Libanius wrote that Alexander pursued strict policies and, by doing so, rescued the city (Libanius, Oration XV, 77).

The Antiochians tried to soothe the emperor's anger. A large crowd gathered to see him off and to wish good luck in the military campaign, but Julian answered irritably that they would never see him again (Ammianus Marcellinus, XXIII, 2, 3) (see also (Frendo, 2007, p. 89)). Two orations by Libanius were a reaction to the *Misopogon*. In *Oration XVI. To the Antiochians, On the emperor's anger*, the rhetor strives to convince the citizens of Antioch that the emperor's anger is really a problem (Libanius, Oration XVI, 8) (it should be noted here that if he felt obliged to prove it, it means that the Antiochians did not see it as a problem). Libanius believes that the city is indeed to blame for the conflict. The citizens should not have let anyone mock the emperor and should have found the way to silence Julian's detractors: "Who went and administered a thrashing? Who felt any personal grief? Who said to his neighbor, "Come on! Let's stop them, arrest them, imprison them, execute them"?" (Libanius, Oration XVI, 30). Antioch should have felt guilty and shown its repentance to the emperor. The theatre was to close for some time, mimes were to be driven away from the city and the number of chariot races was to be reduced (Libanius, Oration XVI, 41).

The rhetor also notes that the populace is expected to be more enthusiastic about participating in pagan practices (Libanius, Oration XVI, 56).

In *Oration XV. The embassy to Julian*, Libanius asks the emperor to be merciful. The city is guilty indeed but it has admitted the mistake (Libanius, Oration XV, 4). Among other things, the rhetor also lays on the Antiochians the blame for the food crisis: some citizens failed to watch bakers closely, others did not do anything at all, while some could not resist the temptation of a scoop (Libanius, Oration XV, 23). In fact, Antioch always liked the emperor and only few mocked him, but some people are not respectful even to their parents (Libanius, Oration XV, 77). Libanius makes efforts to convince Julian that after his departure, the situation has improved, practicing pagan rituals being one of the improvements. To confirm that the apologies have been accepted, Julian is expected to return to Antioch instead of Tarsus after the military expedition (Libanius, Oration XV, 15). Yet, fate decreed otherwise: it was the body of the emperor, killed during the Persian campaign, that arrived in Tarsus.

**The Conclusions.** Julian considered his stay in Antioch as an important stage of his reign. He intended to turn the city into the foothold of his cultural reforms, a successful example that the Empire would follow. Yet, the planned reforms did not correlate with the Antiochians' needs because the citizens were more preoccupied with food prices.

The main reforms of Julian's policies in Antioch concerned both political and cultural issues: solution of the food supply crisis, modification of municipal governance, and revitalization of pagan traditions. Julian failed to implement any of them to a greater or lesser extent. Julian's attempt to fix grain prices only exacerbated the food problem. His initiatives to expand the curia were not received favourably by some curiales, which deprived Julian of the institution's support. His attempts to convert Christians of Antioch to paganism and, thus, to revitalize cultural traditions were not successful either: zealous Christians were true to their faith, while religiously indifferent people were terrified by Julian's fanaticism and obsession with the issue. Besides, Julian and the Antiochians failed to understand each other and experienced communication problems: Julian did not realise that his presence in the theatre was important for the city dwellers because it was the place where they could use acclamations to communicate their opinions to him. However, one should not overestimate the Antiochians' hatred for the emperor, since the conflict did not reach its climax that would inevitably have led to an uprising, the way it happened many times throughout the history of Antioch. Yet, there was no outbreak that time. It was Julian's personality that fuelled the conflict.

On an emotional level, the situation was as follows. The emperor aspired to gain popularity with the Antiochians and did everything he could to achieve the goal, but all his attempts failed. As a result, the initial enthusiasm was replaced by hostile apathy of a person whose plan collapsed. After the failure, the coveted goal tends to turn into a trigger of anger and aggression. What Julian sought was not only being accepted as a politician; it also was gaining people's support for his reforms. It was important for him to be accepted as a personality, whose traits are respected and set as an example to follow. Julian thought that the key to the Antiochians' hearts and minds would be the image of a wise emperor-philosopher who took care of his subjects and encouraged to return to traditional values. This image, however, was distorted due to communication problems: the subjects perceived his ascetic lifestyle as barbarity, his focus on spirituality was taken for arrogance and excessive sophistication, his pagan beliefs were interpreted as attempts to solve ephemeral problems instead of dealing with real ones (famine). Julian's supporters might have had a reductionist view on the situation: down-to-earth philistines failed to accept the idealistic and intellectual

ruler. Yet, Julian's expectations were set much too high indeed: he expected them not only to agree with his policies silently (which they to a certain extent did) but also to admire his personality and to carry out his orders enthusiastically. Eventually, the emperor fell victim to his great expectations that could hardly have been met.

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**THE BOOK OF LVIV CITY COUNCIL (1460 – 1506):  
HISTORICAL AND SOURCE REVIEW**

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the article is to make a detailed historical and source review of the book of the Lviv city council (1460 – 1506). This article focuses on the study of the following issues: the history of the creation and existence of the council book from the second half of the 15th century to this day; authors of texts, city scribes and their handwriting; historical and source features of the book, the total number of entries in German and Latin. **The Sources and Novelty of the Research:** The main source of research is the Lviv council book and its entries for 1460 – 1506. The review of scientific interest in entries from the Lviv council book of 1460 – 1506 testifies to the great potential of historical information, only partially used in the works of researchers of the 19th and 20th centuries. The lack of a full-fledged scientific publication has led to a limited number of people who could benefit from the information of this valuable source. **The Methodology of the Research** is based on historical and source approaches in investigation of historical documents. **The Conclusions.** The Lviv city council book of the second half of*

*the 15th century remains today the council's oldest book at the territory of modern Ukraine. Avoiding the consequences of natural disasters and the human factor, the manuscript was constantly in the collection of documents of Lviv magistrate, which changed its location several times. The book was used by ancient chroniclers of Lviv, updating valuable information on the history of the city. The manuscript was a product of the city chancellery, the city clerks, among whom there were well-known humanists of the late Middle Ages, were engaged in making final records. The book includes both administrative and judicial entries of council government, which show the full life of the city community.*

**Key words:** book of city council, Lviv of the medieval period, city scribes, city chancery, gothic handwriting.

## РАЄЦЬКА КНИГА М. ЛЬВОВА (1460 – 1506): ІСТОРИКО-ДЖЕРЕЛОЗНАВЧИЙ ОГЛЯД

**Анотація. Мета дослідження:** У статті ставиться за мету зробити детальний історико-джерелознавчий огляд раєцької книги м. Львів 1460 – 1506 рр. Ця стаття зосереджується на дослідженні таких питань: історія створення та побутування львівської раєцької книги від другої половини XV ст. до сьогодні; авторство текстів, міські писарі та їх почерк; історико-джерельні особливості книги, загальна кількість записів німецькою та латинською мовами. **Джерела і новизна.** Головним джерелом дослідження є раєцька книга м. Львів та вписи до неї за 1460 – 1506 рр. Огляд наукового зацікавлення актами з львівської раєцької книги 1460–1506 рр. свідчить про великий потенціал історичної інформації, тільки частково використаної у працях дослідників XIX–XX ст. Відсутність повноцінної наукової публікації зумовила обмеженість кола осіб, які могли б користатися з відомостей цього цінного джерела. **Методологія дослідження** опирається на історико-джерелознавчі підходи дослідження історичних документів. **Висновки.** Львівська раєцька книга другої половини XV ст. на сьогодні залишається найдавнішою збереженою раєцькою книгою на території сучасної України. Уникнувши наслідків природних катаклізмів та людського фактора, рукопис постійно перебував у збірці документів львівського магістрату, що кілька разів змінював локацію. Книгою користувалися давні хроністи Львова, актуалізувавши цінну інформацію з історії міста. Манускрипт є продуктом діяльності міської канцелярії, внесенням чистових записів до нього займалися міські писарі, серед яких – відомі гуманісти пізнього середньовіччя. До книги вписані як адміністративні, так і судові рішення раєцької колегії, що показують у всій повноті життя міської громади.

**Ключові слова:** раєцька книга, Львів середньовічного періоду, міські писарі, міська канцелярія, готичне письмо.

**The Problem Statement.** The book of the Lviv city council, containing records for the years 1460 – 1506, remains the only codex of this institution survived from the Middle Ages (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 8). The fire of the town hall in 1381 had a fatal effect on the preservation of the oldest city documents after Lviv received the Magdeburg Law (Czołowski, 1892). Chronologically the first to be saved until today was council and court book of 1382 – 1389, which contained documents as from council government, as well as from the city court. Into scientific circulation were also put the first financial books of the beginning of the 15th (Czołowski, 1896; Czołowski, 1905) and the entries of the city court of the 1440s. (Czołowski, Jaworski, 1921). Back in the 17th century, Lviv chroniclers Jan Alembek and Bartolomei Zymorovych (Bartłomej Zimorowicz) have been working with a very valuable council book of the first half of the 15th century, which covered the source material of 1402 – 1459 (Badecki, 1927, pp. 528–548), but it disappeared from historical horizons at the end of the same century. In addition to the council book of 1460 – 1506 and the four codices already published, two manuscripts have been preserved during the medieval period: records of resignations of the city court (1471 – 1486) and the financial book of the city costs and expenses (1460 – 1518). Historians have long used a valuable historical source in their research on the history of Lviv and the region.



**The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications.** The earliest of all historians to draw attention to the Lviv council book was the first city chronicler Jan Alembek, who has made extracts from it in the 17th century (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 1153, pp. 47, 63–64). Scientific research of the codex began in the 19th century. Denys Zubrytsky quoted one of the records about the Armenian Wartik (Zubrzycki, 1844, p. 114; Zubrytsky, 2002, p. 102). Ksawery Liske and Oktaw Petruski, historical editors of Lviv, in the second half of the 19th century singled out a small part of the documents for printing in the historical series (*Akta Grodzkie i Ziemskie*, 1876, vol. 6, pp. 37, 50–51, 59–61, 76–78, 80–81, 99–102, 179, 181–182; 1879, vol. 7, pp. 112–114, 134–136, 175–176; 1883, vol. 9, pp. 147–148, 162–163, 167–168). Władysław Łoziński published a unique contract for painters to work on icons in Lviv and Sudova Vyshnia (Łoziński, 1891, p. lviii). Stanisław Kutzseba refers to the pages of the book to obtain information about Kraków and Lviv trading with eastern countries (Kutzseba, 1903, pp. 45–48, 91–94). Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga introduces into scientific uses documents on connections of Lviv merchants with Moldavian-Romanian lands (Iorga, 1899 – 1900; Iorga, 1900; Suceava, 1989 (republished)). At the beginning of the 20th century Ivan Krypiakevych elaborated the council records of Lviv of the second half of the 15th and first half of the 16th century, while writing a monograph on the community of Lviv Ukrainians (Krypiakevych, 1907, vol. 77, 77–106; vol. 78, 26–50; vol. 79, 5–51; Krypiakevych, 1994 (republishation)). Ignacy Schipper published records on the Jewish merchants of the medieval time (Schipper, 1911, pp. 339–348). Wojciech Hejnosz studied the documents, looking for the records of transit slave trading, which passed through Lviv with the initiative of Italian merchants (Hejnosz, 1933, pp. 162–163). Kraków urban historian Feliks Kiryk, in his research about trading relations between Kraków and Lviv, saturated his text with source information from the Lviv council book (Kiryk, 1998, pp. 9–39). Myron Kapral and Yuriy Zazuliak published some testaments, which were included in Lviv records (Kapral, 2010, pp. 545–550; Kapral, 2019, pp. 210–219; Zazuliak, 2017, pp. 227–237). Researching the palaeography of medieval manuscripts of Lviv, Mykola Ilkiv-Svydnytskyi studied the handwriting of the scribes of the Lviv council book of the second half of the 15th century and its features (Ilkiv-Svydnytskyi, 2006, pp. 285–300; Ilkiv-Svydnytskyi, 2010, pp. 511–533). Bohdana Petryshak drew wealthy factual material from this book for prosopographic studies of the milieu of urban scribes and collecting of their short biographies (Petryshak, 2010, pp. 473–500; Petryshak, 2014, pp. 329–336; Petryshak, 2015, pp. 76–85; Petryshak, 2018, pp. 165–175). This cursory review of the scientific interest in the records from the Lviv council book of 1460 – 1506 testifies about the great potential of historical information, only partly used in the works of researchers. The lack of full scientific publication led to a limited number of people who can benefit from this valuable source.

**The Purpose of the Publication.** This article focuses on the study of the following issues: the history of the creation and existence of the council book from the second half of the 15th century to this day; authors of texts, city clerks and their handwriting; historical and source features of the book, the total number of entries in German and Latin.

**The Statement of the Basic Material.** The council book of 1460 – 1506 is an “inducta”, i.e., a manuscript of fair copies of records, which were introduced as a result of the activities of the council government. The name, given to this codex by the scribes, has several variants, in particular “*liber dominorum consulum*”, “*rathisbuch*”, “*statbuch*”. In the last named case, it is a “city book”, which indicates the primacy of the council government in the hierarchy of town authorities in Lviv. The council documents were considered to be ones of the most

important for the city, in their importance they were second after royal charters and privileges. These documents were kept as carefully, as possible in the archive room in the town hall. In ancient archival inventories of city books dating from the 17th and 18th centuries, this codex is mentioned in the first place. An exception is the register of city books from March 7, 1661, where the unpreserved council book (1402 – 1459) is mentioned primarily (Badecki, 1936, p. 5; CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 70, pp. 15–16). Apparently, the oldest medieval city book from the end of the 14th century was discovered later and was considered not as a fair copy, but as a protocol of sessions. During the systematization of documents of the town archives in the Austrian rule time at the beginning of the 19th century it was framed in a brown thick leather binding with an inscription on the spine of the book “1460 – 1506. I”. All entries were numbered, and the pages received pagination. This work was performed in 1803 – 1804 by city archivists (“indicants”) Bogdanowicz, Stefanowicz and Litwinowicz, who were subordinate to the town lawyer. Their work was not perfect, they have made many mistakes by splitting one entry into two parts (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 8, nos. 21 and 24; 27 and 28; 79 and 81; 241 and 243; 269 and 273; 466 and 468; 577 and 580; 622 and 627; 891 and 894; 1343 and 1345; 1447 and 1448; 1960 and 1961; 2036 and 2037; 2077 and 2078, 2777 and 2778) or vice versa – by combining two entries into one mechanically or forgetting to number (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 8, nos. 1175 and 1175a, 2217 and 2217a, 2257 and 2257a, 2414 and 2414a, 2682 and 2682a). On this basis, we can count the total number of entries in the book (2 760), correcting the submitted at the beginning of the 19th century number (2 780). In the process of this archival work, the city archivists also compiled an index (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 1179) of the participants of all cases, without underlining their names and surnames in the text consistently with red or ordinary pencil.

The further fate of the source can be traced quite clearly. The city archives remained undamaged after the fall of the town hall tower in 1826, the shelling of the city center and the fire in the town hall during the revolutionary events of 1848. In the second half of the 19th century the council book appeared in the city archives, that has been called the Archives of Ancient Records of the City of Lviv since 1891. In the 1930s, in two galleries of the town hall, the employees of the institution grouped and placed archival collections. In the first group were monuments of 1356 – 1787, the second contained documents of 1787 – 1870 (CSHAUL, f. 55, d. 1, c. 37, fols. 1–5). At the beginning of 1944, due to the military war, the most valuable documents, including the medieval books of Lviv magistrate, were taken to Tynec near Kraków in Poland. The eight oldest codices were even transferred to the Kraków City Archives, due to their value. The Soviet authorities, also understanding the importance of these monuments, in March of 1945 returned them almost undamaged to Lviv (Dolinovskyi, 2018, p. 13). Since then, the council book of 1460 – 1506 has invariably been kept in the fund No. 52 (“Government of the City of Lviv”) of the Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine, Lviv.

The council book of the second half of the 15th and early 16th century is a manuscript consisting of 954 pages. It is formed by 38 separate “sexterns”, i.e., booklets, where the number of sheets varies from 12 to 16. It is noticeable that after the 23rd booklet 3–4 sheets were cut out, while the numbering of entries remained correct, therefore, they were removed in the process of forming the book. The cover of the codex is a thin wooden plate covered with brown leather. Dark green cloth can be seen in some places under the shabby leather. The binding of individual books of the 15th century, as Valentyna Siverska noted, were restored at the end of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries (Siverska, 1966, p. 283). All pages



are filled with handwriting, except blank 58, 61, 100, 101, 103, 891 and 953. The paper is thick, in good condition, only a few sheets are damaged (restored with strips of white paper). On many pages (5–6, 165–166, 309–310, 315–316, 319–322, etc.) a watermark (filigree) is visible, that in the form of an ox's head, at the bottom of which hangs a cross, and at the top of it an eight-petalled rosette on a double cord extends upwards (Badecki, 1928, tabl. 4, no. 18). At the end of the volume (Pages 931–932, 933–934, 935–936, etc.) there is another filigree: a crown-diadem with a cross on the top, of German origin. The manuscript ends with a note in two handwritings from the beginning of the 19th century: “Salva collatione folium, qua incie gothico caracte[r]e a tubici cuius taxant 3 maÿ 1803. [signature] Bogdanouicz; Coll[ocauit] Stefanowicz cum Litwinowicz a pagina 1 ad paginam 954 die 29 februarii 1804”. This testifies to the significant fact that the city archivists did not interfere in the original order of the council book, giving it only a new pagination.

The scribes of the city chancery compiled and made entries in the manuscript. This institution in the second half of the 15th century has already acquired a certain organization and form, although it continued its development until the last third of the 16th century (Petryshak, 2017, pp. 208–217). From fragmentary references in the sources, it is still possible to reconstruct the place of creation of documents, the staff of the office and the scope of its activities. The main hall of the town hall was the venue for meetings of the council board, in which the city scribe took part. At the end of the 15th century the house was rebuilt significantly, its description mentions among the furniture a separate table for the city scribe and windows on the opposite wall for better lighting (Jaworski, 1907, p. 18). The working conditions of scribes were significantly improved in 1494, when the city chancery settled in the house of the former Jarosław reeve (*vogt*) Evstakhii Budek (the so-called Budkivska or Pisarska townhouse) (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 317, fols. 2–3).

The absence of a higher academy in medieval Lviv affected the predominance of invited guests among the city scribes. Among them were representatives of Kraków, Nove Misto, Rymanów. The Krakow University center was, without exaggeration, the closest cultural center from which hundreds of educated people traveled in search of intellectual work.

A total of eight scribes from the period of the Lviv council book are known from sources: Jorge Gobel (1453 – 1455, 1459, 1462 – 1467, 1472, 1474 – 1476), Stanislaw (before 1468 p.) (Janeczek, 2005, vol. 1, p. 36), Jan of Kraków (1480 – 1496), Jorge (1496), Jan Ursyn of Kraków (1497), Caspar Bober (1497 – 1499), Szymon of Rymanów (1499 – 1501), Michael Magister from Nove Misto (1505 – 1515, 1521). As can be seen from the list, there are gaps when information about the head of the city office remains unknown. Some of them appear in Lviv sources with an indication of their government, others are identified only by changes in handwriting or even mentions in non-Lviv texts. The title indicates the undeniable dominance of the scribe of the council board, who is identified with the city (“city scribe”, “our scribe”). In the absence of a scribe who participated in delegations and trips of government officials, entries in the book could be made by their deputies or assistants. It is known Wojciech, assistant of the scribe Jan of Kraków in 1493 (Rolny, 1930, vol. 2, p. 279).

In addition to the city scribes, the council book also mentions private scribes, who often act as authorized representatives or servants of their bosses. Scribes of other cities (Drohobych), and clerks of the land and castle courts, and the royal chancery also acted as parties to litigation. An important layer of written culture is also the activity of public scribes, in particular, the above-mentioned Jan of Kraków, who was a papal and imperial notary (Petryshak, 2011, pp. 179–180).

The research of M. Ilkiv-Svydnytskyi clarifies the main tendencies of handwriting of a codex. The leading type of Latin handwriting from the end of the 14th to the first half of the 16th century was Gothic. Italics and mixed varieties were used, where italics and book elements were intertwined. The use of book types of Gothic handwriting in the text is a rare case. In the first half of the 16th century there were late Gothic italics, Gothic humanistic, financial, and early humanistic handwriting (Ilkiv-Svydnytskyi, 2009, pp. 11–12).

In part, the mentions of scribes can be correlated with paleographic analysis (Petryshak, 2010, pp. 268–278). There is no doubt that from 1 to 333 pages of the book were conducted in 1453 – 1476 by Jorge Gobel, a city scribe, from a well-known Lviv Gobel family from Silesia (hence most of the German-language entries from this period, made in almost classical German) (Petryshak, 2015, pp. 76–85). Instead, the information about the former scribe Stanisław is not related to any of the handwriting specimens. The entries on Pages 408–754 were taken by the public notary Jan of Kraków, pages 801–835 filled Szymon of Rymanów, recently identified as the scribe of the Lviv chancery (Petryshak, 2018, pp. 165–175), Pages 836–844 belong to some of his assistants. Pages 909–952 were filled with definitive handwriting of Michael Magister. The handwriting of the well-known Kraków humanist Jan Ursyn (Ber) is also clearly notable (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 8, pp. 755–761). His notes on the execution of certain contracts are also noticeable in 1499 – 1500, which may indicate his stay in Lviv for a long time (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 8, pp. 742, 747, 753). Instead, Caspar Bober had a careless and difficult-to-read handwriting (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 8, pp. 762–801). In 1503, a scribe unknown to us tried to make entries with a humanistic minuscule (Ilkiv-Svydnytskyi, 2009, p. 140).

The council records open with a text from March 1, 1460 and end chronologically with consecutive entries from December 22, 1506. However, the dating of copies of some entries (*oblata*) dates back to the first half of the 15th century, precisely December 14, 1436, January 20, 1443, November 24, 1455 (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 8, nos. 28, 30, 168). Separate chronological inserts on the fulfillment of the conditions about the debt payment relate to a later period: 1507 and even 1517 (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 8, nos. 2772, 2776).

The number of documents by years (*table 1*) ranges from 20 in 1465 to 95 in 1493, by average 58 records per year, i.e. the council government considered more than one court case per week. The councilors held their meetings mainly on Mondays, Wednesdays and Saturdays. The frequency of sessions of the council board was determined not only by the importance of proceedings, but also by concomitant circumstances, such as the epidemiological situation, the lack of elections (in 1465, 1469) (Kapral, 2008, pp. 72–73), etc. The scribes made entries from the separate draft sheets into the fair copy, so the quality of the book records largely depended on the individuality of the scribe and control of the councilors over the document insertions.

In most cases the council book preserved the chronological order, but sometimes it was still violated – then one of the entries was recorded not on the current, but next month or even a year. Once, however, the practice of making entries from the draft sheets led to a serious violation of this sequence: on Pages 346–351 (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 8, nos. 1334–1361) we come across a mixture of documents from 1485 – 1488, while before and after these pages the chronological order is preserved. In a small part of the entries a dating formulary is missing, which can also be explained by insertion off draft sheets and negligence of individual scribes.

In the Lviv council chancery of the 15th century it was decided to cross out documents that lost their legal significance. Several times a special permission of the councilors was noted, they allowed to cross out the previous entries (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 8, nos. 1577, 1745, 1992). After

the record insertion, the scribes often left room for later notes, for them or their successors to entry data about the fulfillment of conditions, especially when it came to paying a certain amount by a specific date. This perhaps was done not only to save paper and time for writing a new entry, but also to avoid confusion with debt obligations. After such a note on the repayment of the debt, the corresponding obligation was crossed out, but only with the permission of the council board.

Table 1

**Number of entries by years (1460 – 1506)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Number of entries</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Number of entries</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Number of entries</b>
1460	48	1476	80	1492	90
1461	40	1477	49	1493	95
1462	37	1478	73	1494	76
1463	36	1479	80	1495	90
1464	59	1480	82	1496	76
1465	20	1481	67	1497	62
1466	48	1482	43	1498	56
1467	34	1483	78	1499	70
1468	41	1484	52	1500	44
1469	46	1485	21	1501	68
1470	51	1486	24	1502	77
1471	56	1487	31	1503	66
1472	64	1488	41	1504	66
1473	39	1489	70	1505	67
1474	47	1490	77	1506	61
1475	88	1491	74	Total	2760

All clerks almost always followed the rules of making the names of the parties' participants in the header of the entry. Sometimes their professions, positions, origin places, and degree of kinship were indicated (when matters within the family were settled). The headers were in Latin, even if the document was written in German. Usually, the scribes referred to the name of two participants, but there are cases with three or four. Sometimes in this title part the spelling of names or surnames differed from the variant in the main text of the document.

This codex also reflects the results of the annual elections of councilors, which mostly took place on the day of the Cathedral of St. Peter, i.e., February 22, if not prevented by epidemics or hostilities. However, the researcher will not find lists of these officials for all years: there is no data on 1460 – 1461, 1467, 1469, 1471, 1482, 1484 – 1485, 1497 and 1502. Data about Lviv councilors is more accurately recorded in the financial registers of that time (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 698; Kapral, 2008, pp. 70–86). The book contains almost no drawings. The exceptions are a few marginal pictures with a pointing gesture (*manicula*) or a fig (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 8, pp. 62, 66, 452). For historians of heraldry, the outlines of the coats of arms of several Italian nobles contain some value (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 8, p. 206).

According to the administrative and judicial nature of the council government, all entries in the council book can be divided into administrative and judicial. The first group includes: royal privileges, registers of elected councilors, letters of city governments to the Lviv council about the “legal birth” of persons who claimed the city law of Lviv, decisions of the city council concerning the regulation of the guild life of artisans and merchants. Among the most interesting documents are following: the decision of the city council in 1460 about

the measure of weight – Kolomyia stone – in relation to the Lviv stone (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 8, no. 41), a list of goods from 1506, allowed for sale by the burghers (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 8, no. 2780). The judicial prerogatives of the council board were very broad and vague and often overlapped with the authorities of the city court (Czołowski, 1896, pp. xxxix–xlix; Kapral, 2006, pp. 111–130). In the council book of the second half of the 15th century, the most numerous are judicial entries of amicable agreements of property matters with the councilors as intermediaries, debt obligations, real estate purchase and sale contracts, agreements about the authority to conduct matters, acquittance notice, divisions of movable and immovable property, etc. A separate category of documents is testaments made by both Lviv burghers and those who arrived in the city.

Lviv Ruthenians (the Ukrainians) appear in extracts from the council book, which were prepared for publication at the beginning of the 20th century (Krypiakevych, 1907, vol. 77, 77–106; vol. 78, 26–50; vol. 79, 5–51; Krypiakevych, 1994 (republishation)). However, the access to original documents of the Lviv council book gives a better picture of the life of the Ukrainian community, as it covers not only those mentions, where the Ukrainians are the main participants in the cases, but also those where they are the owners of neighboring houses, gardens and land plots. The Ruthenians from neighboring towns and villages, who did not settle in Lviv, but conducted trade business there or had other interests in the city, are also not mentioned in I. Krypiakevych's monograph.

Lviv Armenians should be highlighted, whose names and surnames are found in every third-fourth document. They had judicial and administrative autonomy in Lviv, and their community was subordinated to the Armenian reeve (*vogt*) and elders. The judicial and administrative documents of the community itself were called the records of the “spiritual court” (Tryjarski, 2017) and a mixed Armenian court headed by a city reeve appeared in the 16th century (CSHAUL, f. 52, d. 2, c. 513). Because of the need to register their commercial transactions, mainly from the eastern trade, which was the most profitable, the Armenians primarily used city books.

**The Conclusions.** Altogether, the array of documents in the Lviv council book represents the economic, cultural, national and religious life of the Ukrainian city of the late Middle Ages in all its diversity. No other source or collection of disparate entries of that time has such a powerful heuristic potential as the council book of 1460 – 1506. The manuscript has been preserved until today in the collection of Lviv government documents, these books and documents were in the town hall from the 15th to the 19th centuries, after that the council book appeared in the city archives situated in two galleries of the rebuilt town hall. Nowadays the manuscript is placed in the Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine, Lviv. Only eight city scribes of this period are known, they made draft entries to the final version. In addition to them, the book was worked on by the staff of the city office, deputies and assistants. Entries were kept in Latin and German, but the influences of Ukrainian and Polish are noticeable. Owing to the content of the book, we can learn not only about the official orders of the authorities, but also about the daily life of all communities of Lviv.

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**A SHORT-BARRELLED WROUGHT IRON FIREARM  
OF THE END OF THE XIVth – BEGINNING OF THE XVth CENTURIES  
IN THE COLLECTION OF LVIV HISTORICAL MUSEUM**

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the research is weapon analysis and refinement of gun attribution from Lviv Historical Museum Collection. The research methodology is based on empirical approaches to historical weapon science, laser scanning method has been used. The source base is the weapon of assets and inventory books of Lviv Historical Museum and Museum of Scientific Society named after T. Shevchenko. The Scientific Novelty.* The paper offers a detailed analysis of a short-barrelled wrought iron firearm of the end of the XIVth – beginning of the XVth centuries preserved in the collection of LHM. The history, development and dissemination of this type of guns has been analyzed. Furthermore, the museum history of the gun has been dealt with and its possible provenance has been proposed. **The Conclusions.** A thorough research of military artifacts of the museum collections enables to expand the horizons of scientific knowledge, open new aspects of the issue. In addition to documental items, the

remnants of armed artifacts are considered as important historical source. Nowadays, another important issue is given to the history of guns in the museum collections. Skilled reading of morphology of a barrel is particularly important in the study of a gun. Each saved artillery item has a historical, scientific, cultural, antique and ethnographic value and requires a thorough and comprehensive research. Considering the absence of a documental background, every single gun of that period is invaluable for science. Since the gunpowder implementation for military purposes, the era of experimental gunsmiths had launched. There were produced extremely large as well as small artillery guns. The original handmade guns differed just in size, weight and caliber from the first artillery systems. On the basis of analysis and comparison of a number of sources and facts, it was suggested that the guns could be manufactured in Belz at the end of the XIVth – beginning of the XVth centuries.

**Key words:** firearm, the XIVth – the XVth c., Belz, Museum of Scientific Society named after T. Shevchenko, Lviv Historical Museum.

### **КОРОТКОСТВОЛЬНА ЗАЛІЗНА КОВАНА ВОГНЕПАЛЬНА ЗБРОЯ КІНЦЯ XIV – ПОЧАТКУ XV СТОЛІТЬ У ЗІБРАННІ ЛЬВІВСЬКОГО ІСТОРИЧНОГО МУЗЕЮ**

**Анотація.** Метою статті є аналіз залізної кованої гармати під інвентарним номером 3-2838 з фондів Львівського історичного музею, уточнення та доповнення її атрибуції. **Методологія дослідження.** У ході дослідницької роботи обиралися методи відповідно до завдань конкретного етапу дослідження, потреби у використанні технічних прийомів (лазерне сканування, вимірювання), проведення операцій з теоретичним і фактичним матеріалом у логічній послідовності. **Новизна дослідження.** На підставі комплексного дослідження проаналізовано залізну ковану гармату кінця XIV – початку XV ст. з колекції Львівського історичного музею. В ході проведеного зброезнавчого аналізу встановлено типологію гармати, особливості її застосування. У процесі дослідження застосовано метод лазерного сканування для отримання схематичного графічного зображення гарматного ствола. Уточнено атрибуцію предмета. **Висновки.** Тенденції сучасного європейського зброезнавства тягнуть до поглиблення попредметного дослідження пам'яток зброї у музейних колекціях. Враховуючи одиничну кількість гармат кінця XIV – початку XV ст. в музеях України, ґрунтовне вивчення таких пам'яток набуває особливого значення. На підставі проведеного зброезнавчого аналізу встановлено типологію означеного гарматного ствола, описано специфічні особливості бойового застосування. На підставі порівняльного аналізу додатково підтверджено датування гармати. Через зіставлення низки джерел зроблено припущення про можливе виготовлення гармат у Белзькому князівстві вже з кінця XIV – XV ст. Досліджено музейну історію гармати. Встановлено, що до фондів Музею НТШ предмет передав отець-декан Іларіон Гела у 1935 р., звідки під час музейної реформи, що відбувалася у Львові в 1940 р. гармата була передана до новоствореного тоді Львівського державного історичного музею. На сьогодні описана гармата є найдавнішою пам'яткою вогнепальної зброї в зібранні музею.

**Ключові слова:** вогнепальна зброя кінця XIV – початку XV ст., Белз, Музей НТШ, Львівський історичний музей.

**The Problem Statement.** At present, studies on historical weapons, museum and military history develop in Ukraine rapidly. Early forms of weapons, including firearms preserved in museum collections attract particular interest of scholars. Thorough research of weaponry in the museum collections enables researchers to expand the horizons of knowledge and to open new fields of study.

In addition to the documents, surviving examples of weaponry are considered as important historical sources. Particular attention is required to read and interpret inscriptions, emblems or coats of arms, if present on a gun barrel. This is because a correctly read gun inscription may allow to attribute the artefact properly. Nowadays,

another important issue is the history of guns in museum collections. A competent interpretation of morphology of a barrel is particularly important in studies on old guns. Each surviving example of firearms has a historical, scientific, cultural, antiquarian and ethnographic value and requires a thorough and comprehensive investigation. Considering the absence of a documental background, every single gun of that period is invaluable for science.

**The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches.** There have been numerous studies on the XIVth – the XVth centuries firearms in European collections. Concerning works of contemporary Ukrainian and European researchers, the studies of O. Mal'chenko are worth noting. In one of his books he analyses in detail the history of the spread of artillery and traces the development of firearms' technologies at the territory of today's Ukraine in the XIVth – the XVth centuries. Based on historical sources he analyses the typology of guns that were in service in today's Ukraine castles (Mal'chenko, 2005, pp. 66–126). We should also mention the work "Museum artilleriae ucrainicae saeculi XV – XVIII. Pars I", which contains a detailed and informative description of two short-barrelled guns which date back to the XIVth – the XVth centuries (Mal'chenko, 2011, pp. 97–99). It is impossible to ignore the work on hand-held firearms of the XIVth – the XVth centuries published by Polish scholars: P. Strzyż in the work "Broń palna w Europie Środkowej w XIV – XV w." covers various aspects of early firearms development, and typologically similar to our weapon model from the Muravskaya Trebova Museum (Strzyż, 2014).

Several works on this subject were published by A. Kirpichnikov (Кирпичников 1959; Kirpicznikov, 1976) Early Harquebuses and Pistols from the Collections of Russian Museums, Fasciculi Archaeologiae Historicae, fasc. IX, 1996, 43–50. In the context of the outlined subject, the study of B. Markevych published in St. Petersburg in 1994 is an informative source (Маркевич, 1994, 55–60).

**The Purpose of Publication.** This work is an attempt at analysing a wrought iron firearm from Lviv Historical Museum (hereinafter – LHM). The gun barrel typology is established, the features of the application are made, the assumption is made about the origin of the gun, the way of entering the object into the LHM funds is analyzed. We used various research methods including 3D laser scanning. Additional data is offered by the collection and inventory books of the LHM and the Museum of T. Shevchenko Scientific Society (hereinafter – Museum of NTSH) (SALR, f. 2591, d. 3, c. 303; AMIE NASU, p. 137).

**The Main Material Statement.** Since the gunpowder implementation for military purposes, the era of experimentation in the gun manufacture began. Both extremely large and small firearms were produced. The earliest hand-held firearms differed just in size, weight and calibre from the first guns (Karman, 2006, pp. 135–147).

The short-barrel firearm was a kind of firearms used in the XIVth – XVth centuries. It was a gun with a short barrel and of a small calibre. It had a cylindrical powder chamber with a hemispherical bottom. The powder chamber slightly narrowed toward the bore. Such guns were muzzle-loaders. A touch hole was located in the rear part of the powder chamber. This gun fired buckshot which was in two forms – small stones or small pieces of iron, slag, or small lead bullets (Varentsov et al, 1959, pp. 97–99).

Barrels of such guns were usually fixed to a wooden bar that served as a butt with the use of metal fittings (Hassenstein, 1941, pp. 38–47). *Illustration 1*

Despite the small size and light weight of such guns themselves, they were not very mobile because of the size and weight of their stands. To be moved from place to place the gun had to be removed from the stand, and the stand had to be dismantled and moved along with the gun. Then, all parts had to be assembled together again. During a battle in the open field it was a difficult task. Therefore, such guns were unsuitable for combat in the open field. On the other hand, it can be assumed that they could be used in defence of fortification for destroying the enemy's manpower.

The lack of universally accepted terminology for firearms of the XIVth – the XVth centuries in Europe and Asia and a slow spread of this new weapon are completely natural phenomena. Therefore, the same types of guns could have different names in the East and the West. We have described a gun type which was called “tyufenh” in the East. This term was borrowed from the Turkic languages, and it originally meant handgun. Then, the term was transferred to the Russian terminology tradition as “tyufyak” but the name “shotgun” and a general term “gun” for artillery “gun” were used in parallel (Kirpichnikov, 1976, pp. 67–75). However, it should be noted that this term was later used for Turkish “tufaky” – muskets which were in use in the XVIIIth – the XIXth centuries. In inventory books of today's Ukraine castles and municipal arsenals, the term “tyufyak” is not mentioned. Instead, a general Slavic name “rifle”, as it comes from German “Büchse”, which on its part derives from Latin “pixis” – dose, round box; or a Latin origin “bombard” are used. In our work, we believe that it is correct to use the terminology of a particular region where the discussed firearm was found.

Currently, the firearm under analysis is stored in the LHM under Inv. No. 3-2838. **Photo 1.**

The present condition of the firearm is satisfactory. The barrel is slightly beveled. The wooden stock is lost. The inventory numbers, written with white paint, can be seen on the muzzle ring and the breech.

Specifications are listed starting from the bore of the barrel as the first part, and then, a sequential numbering of parts is continued towards the breech.



**Illustration 1.**  
**Image of a gun staircase**  
**from the Fwervekbuch tractat**



**Photo 1.**  
**Short-barrelled wrought**  
**iron firearm of the end of**  
**the XIVth – the XVth cn.**  
**in the collection of the LHM**  
**(Inv. No. 3-2838)**





**Photo 2.**  
**Short-barrelled wrought iron firearm of the end of the XIVth – the XVth cn. in the collection of the LHM (Inv. No 3-2838)**



**Photo 3.**  
**The breech of short-barrelled wrought iron firearm of the end of the XIVth – the XVth cn. in the collection of the LHM (Inv. No. 3-2838)**

For the sake of accuracy, substantial differences between the maximum and minimum measurement values are given. The diameters of the rings and a fillet are given as measurements of maximum points.

Dimensions: total length: 275–280 mm; diameter of the bore: 47–57 mm; length of the bore: 256–263 mm; length of the chamber: 55–60 mm; diameter of the chamber: 80 mm; length of the barrel: 275–280 mm; height of the muzzle (the first ring): 50–60 mm; diameter of the first ring: 135 mm; width of the first ring: 44–50 mm; diameter of the muzzle: 130–140 mm; height of the second ring: 12–20 mm; diameter of the second ring: 100 mm; height of the third ring: 55–57 mm; diameter of the third ring: 86–89 mm; height of the fourth ring: 40–50 mm; diameter of the fourth ring: 245 mm.

Lengths of the facets of the octahedral breech: facet 1, which contains the touch hole: 95 mm; then moving clockwise – facet 2: 100 mm; facet 3: 101 mm; facet 4: 103 mm; facet 5: 105 mm; facet 6: 102 mm; facet 7: 100 mm; facet 8: 95 mm.

Widths of the facets are in the same order: facet 1: 45–50 mm; facet 2: 30–39 mm; facet 3: 40–49 mm; facet 4: 35–40 mm; facet 5: 39–49 mm; facet 6: 37–47 mm; facet 7: 40 mm; facet 8: 35–42 mm.

Diameter of the base ring: 108 mm; diameter of the fillet (as above): 110 mm; diameter of the touch hole: 7 mm; distance from the base to the central ring of the touch hole: 33 mm; the height of the priming pan: 10 mm.

Weight: 11 kg. *Photo 2.*

Concerning the central axis, the gun is curved at 330°.

The body of the firearm is of a fungus-like shape. Visually and structurally it consists of five parts – rings of different diameters and lengths. The cylindrical powder chamber is slightly larger in diameter than the diameter of the bore. The chamber's bottom is slightly convex to the plate.

*Photo 3.*

The diameter of the outlet of the chamber is slightly smaller than the diameter of the bore. In O. Malchenko's opinion, this internal structure bears evidence of the use of buckshot, not full diameter projectiles, because this shape of the bore during the shot provided flying spread of the fractions (Malchenko, 2016, pp. 27–43).

The massive barrel comprises very thick and the largest diameter in the structure of the gun ring which is rather rough and somewhat oval, like all gun – a very rough work. The muzzle is uneven, of heterogeneous structure with clearly visible metal layers. Traditionally, the muzzle is a “weak point” of the gun barrel, and therefore it needs further strengthening. A surface examination of the muzzle suggests that the blacksmith simply wrapped several layers of metal in the process of manufacturing the ring which reinforces the muzzle. Given the volume of the powder chamber such a ring is quite practical. The muzzle’s orifice looks like an “egg” – it is oval and, slightly “deepened”. The edge of the muzzle is uneven. **Photo 4.**



**Photo 4.**  
**The muzzle of short-barrelled wrought iron firearm of the end of the XIVth – the XVth cn. in the collection of the LHM (Inv. No. 3-2838)**

Next, the second ring is uneven and is the smallest one with regard to its height. The third ring of the firearm has the shape of a truncated circular cone. The fourth ring is the smallest in diameter. Obviously, this ring was fastened to the stock with a metal fitting. The fifth ring, that is, the bottom part is in the form of an octahedron which is extended toward the fillet (the part of the bore closing the channel from the breech. The fillet is flat. The fillet of a mortar type can imply that the gun was used to conduct

plunging fire. There are no inscriptions, emblems or decorative ornaments. The gun was fastened with metal fittings to a wooden stock. The stock is lost.


In the study of guns it is helpful to use graphics – line drawings, which will show details and dimensions, as well as features that are not always clearly seen in photographs. The curvature of the firearm did not allow us to use a classical linear drawing. However, considering the need for a graphic presentation of the discussed gun, we used a 3D laser scanning method. This technology allows a high speed and accurate coordinated determination of a significant number of points on the surface of the examined artefact. This made it possible to express the metric measurements of the firearm graphically. **Drawing 1.**<sup>1</sup>

It must be pointed that it is a very interesting and original example of firearms. The gun’s dimensions and weight allow us to classify it as a handgun. A slightly conical bore is characteristic for such weapons as the “tyufenh” or “tyufyak”, a “shotgun”. The cross-section of the muzzle is slightly oval (Malchenko, 2011, pp. 97–99). The muzzle’s walls form a roughly worked ring. The gun’s calibre: 4.98 cm – is typical for early examples of hand-held firearm. In later development of handguns one can see a tendency to increase the length of the barrel and to reduce its calibre (Zuk, 1992, pp. 453–463).


After a simple cursory examination the barrel surface is clear that gun was manufactured from separate forge-welded parts, which is a typical early technology for ferrous firearms. A “cutting” in the central part of the barrel resembles architectural detail. This trait is typical for the Gothic style that prevailed in gun production in the XIVth – the XVth centuries.

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<sup>1</sup> The application of modern technologies in studies on medieval firearms can provide interesting results. For example, 3D laser scanning of the discussed gun allowed us to print 3D models. This greatly simplified the process of reconstruction of the wooden bed of the gun. Additionally, we should highlight the feasibility of using such models for exhibition purposes. This will give a visitor a chance to hold a 3D model of a gun, which will make a museum visit more interesting and will enable visitors to better understanding of how gun shooting was conducted.



**Drawing 1.**  
**Linear drawing of a firearm from the LHM**  
**(Inv. No. 3-2838) by laser scanning**



**Photo 5.**  
**The firearm of the end of the**  
**XIVth – the XVth cn. from**  
**Moravská Třebová Museum**  
**(Photo by P. Strzyż)**

A flat fillet and the lack of trunnions and dolphins are also considered as the characteristics that help attribute the gun to this period. For example, in the Military Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineering Troops and Communication Troops in St. Petersburg, a morphologically similar iron forged bombard is stored (Malchenko, 2011, p. 34).

Therefore, we believe that the discussed gun is an early short-barrelled firearm which can be dated to the end of the XIVth – beginning of the XVth century (Trubnikov, 1998, p. 695).

This type of small arms is considered to be widespread in Europe. Confirmation of this is a certain number of artifacts that have survived to our times. Taking into account the full uncertainty of the calibers and other technical characteristics of hand small arms of the XIVth and the XVth centuries, we will take into consideration those models, the diameter of the barrel channel, the length of the barrel and the weight of which are close to the parameters of the hand weapons described by us.

The Moravská Třebová Museum preserves a similar firearm of the end of the XIVth – the XVth cn. Structurally, the barrel of the firearm consists of two parts – the muzzle and breech. Muzzle part of the trunk is torn from the bottom. Muzzle is thickened with a ring. Breech part is octagonal and thickened. The inflammatory inlet is located in the breech part of the barrel. Weight – 11.6 kg (Durdik, Mudra, Sada, 1977, p. 25; Strzyż, 2014, pp. 29–30, p. 281). **Photo 5.**



It was mentioned the iron forged cannon from the collection of the Military Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineering Troops and Communication Troops in St. Petersburg (Inv. No. 9/7). It dates back to the XIVth – beginning of the XVth cn. and belongs to the type of hand firearms described by us. **Photo 6.** O. Malchenko identifies her as originating from the Genoese colonies in the Crimea. We are interested in the design features of the gun barrel, which consists of two parts – the muzzle and breech. The muzzle of the trunk is conical, and the breech l – extends somewhat to the base ring. Gunpowder chamber is cylindrical, diameter – 50 mm. Weight – 11.5 kg (Malchenko 2014, p. 34).

The described hand-held firearms as a rule, were fastened with metal plates or staples on a wooden box that served as a butt-stock.

Thus, comparing three firearms samples described above we can make a conclusion that they belong to the same type. Namely – hand short-barreled firearm of the end of the XIVth – beginning of the XVth cn. Considering the geographical origin of the samples we consider that this type of weapons was widely used from the second half of the XIVth – the XVth cn. and has become one of the first prototypes of the hand firearms.

The firearm has an interesting museum history. The museum reform of the 1940s which was conducted in Lviv led to the destruction of previously existing museums and transferred their collections to several major museums. While there were 26 fully self-sustaining museum institutions before the reform, five major museums were formed in result of it. Many exhibits, supporting documentation and archives were lost (Tersky, 2004, pp. 4–27). In the process of this reform it came to a destruction of one of the leading museums – the Museum of NTSH. The primary task of this institution was to show a high level of cultural development of the Ukrainians in multi-ethnic Galicia. The formation of collections of this museum was not a systematic process (Petruk, 2015, pp. 259–263). Many artefacts were found during different excavation works, and a large part was granted to the Museum by private persons. This was also the case with the bombard in question. Volume 7 of the Museum's inventory book gives information that the gun arrived in the collection on November 19, 1935 from Belz as a donation from Dean Fr. Ilyarion Gela. The artefact was assigned accession number 25492 (AMIE NASU, p. 137). After the dissolution of the Scientific Society Museum's collection in 1940, it was incorporated into the collection of the LHM, where the bombard was placed (LHM, p. 1309).

Consequently, based on records in the inventory book of the Scientific Society Museum, we will discuss a possible origin of the bombard.



**Photo 6.**  
**The firearm of the end of the XIVth – the XVth cn. from the Genoese colonies in the Crimea from the Military-Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineering Troops and Communication Troops in St. Petersburg (Inv. No. 9/7) (Photo by O. Malchenko)**

Belz (Sokal District, Lviv Region, Ukraine) – one of the oldest towns in Volhynia – was a significant administrative and defensive centre of the Western Bug region. It was mentioned for the first time in the “Primary Chronicle” under 1030 in connection with a campaign of the Kyievan Grand Duke Yaroslav the Wise (Pogoralsky, 2004, pp. 60–65). A difficult political and military situation enforced the construction of fortifications which were provided with powerful weapons (Krypiakevych, Hnatevych, Stefaniv, 1992, pp. 145–153). Another chronicle mention of Belz in 1188 is connected with the struggle for power between the princes. During 1207 – 1211, Vasily Romanovich ruled in Belz, and from 1234 Belz principality passed over to the possessions of Danylo Halytsky. The XIVth cn. was marked by the struggle for the rule of the principality between Poland, Lithuania and Hungary. In 1340, Belz fell under the power of Lithuania, but in 1349, along with other Volyn cities, it was subordinate to the Polish King Casimir III the Great. Next year, Belz again finds itself under the authority of the Lithuanian princes. Before the Polish crown completely subjugates the lands around Belz, more than 100 years will pass, during which the city will not stand beside the siege (Dabrowski & Jusupovic, 2017, p. 709).

As it is known, traditionally Volyn rulers had close relations with Central and Northern Europe: the Teutonic Knights and rulers of the Holy Roman Empire. A good piece of evidence for the growth of Belz’s defensive value at the time of the fall of the Galicia-Volyn state in the mid-XIVth cn. was an unsuccessful siege of the town by the Polish-Hungarian army in 1352. However, a rather difficult siege took place in 1377. It was at that time that the town was first granted the Magdeburg law that should have changed the ethnic composition of its population. Obviously, the town attracted lots of foreigners at that time, primarily from Latin Europe (Knush, 2004, pp. 66–72; Kozytsky, 2014, pp. 22–38). The inflow of new inhabitants could also contribute to the emergence of firearms specialists, and in fact, the first appearance of guns.

The town experienced active development. During the rule of Vladislaus II of Opole, analogously to Lviv, the starost’s castle was constructed in the old suburb, in the western part of the fortifications. Obviously, the inhabitants of the new-built town located on the Magdeburg law were almost entirely not the Ruthenians. This could also promote the appearance of firearms (Peteguruch, 2004, pp. 18–23).

In 1388 the Polish King Vladislaus II Jagiełło gave Belz to the family of the Masovian Duke Zemovit, who was married to his sister Alexandra. The duke had four sons – Zemovit V, Traidenis II, Vladislaus I and Casimir II. They rebuilt the fortifications and adapted them for artillery (Peteguruch, 2004, pp. 18–23). A rapid development of artillery in the lands of the Kingdom of Poland falls within the time of reign of King Jagiełło. At the same time the Lithuanian army under the leadership of Vytautas also used artillery on a broad scale (Malchenko, 2005, pp. 66–80). According to Jan Długosz, Casimir II of Belz was keen on forging. He forged weapons – swords. Considering the contribution of the ruling family to the construction of fortifications, it is logical to assume that the rulers of Belz were also interested in providing the town with the most modern weapons – artillery (Omelchuk, 2010, pp. 15–23).

It is known that there were temple buildings along defensive lines of medieval town and cities. The same was the case in Belz. It is possible that the bombard could belong to a town temple, and was supposed to defend a certain area of the town’s fortifications (Slobodian, 2006, pp. 176–185; Omelchuk, 2010, pp. 15–23). It is worth noting that the Dominican Friars were first invited to Belz by Duke Siemowit IV in 1394, who gave them land in the south suburbs. The cathedral of the Holy Spirit and the Dominican monastery was built in the area.

The municipal coat of arms depicts a defensive tower completed with four battlements from which a warrior fires a gun. This fact can serve an important argument of the use of artillery in the early days of Belz (Hrechlyo, 2004, p. 28). *Illustration 2.*

The emergence of the coat of arms of the town can be associated with granting the Magdeburg law to the town in 1377. However, after the burning of the town by the Tatars and Turks in 1509 Belz received a reaffirmation of the Magdeburg Law and a number of privileges that contributed to its rapid development. Thus, in 1578 there were 24 dryers, 8 tailors, 19 shoemakers, 9 furrows, 20 bakers, 6 cutters, 1 goldsmith, 2 malters, 8 bonders, 2 locksmiths, 2 carpenters, 7 weavers, 2 knives, 4 blacksmiths, 2 coppers, saddlers, shovels, reamers, swordsman one by one, 3 masts, 2 baths (Tkachuk, Kharuk & Verkhoturova, 2020, pp. 9–23).


The oldest known municipal seal with the coat of arms of Belz is dated to the XVIth cn. and is now kept in the National Museum in Krakow, in the department of manuscripts. It shows a stone tower with four spikes from which a warrior fires a gun. The seal is provided with an inscription “+ SIGILLUM + CIVITATIS + REGIE + BELZ” The seal is round with the diameter of 36 mm (Hrechylo, 1998, pp. 35–51). Images on the Belz coat of arms also show the town’s role as a defensive point.

Geographically Belz was located at the crossroads of trade routes. Therefore, it is likely that our short gun could be brought to Belz by merchants. Despite a great deal of research done by numerous outstanding scholars Belz still remains one of the least studied areas of Western Ukraine.

It is difficult to assert whether the bombard was made by a local blacksmith of Belz or it was brought to the town. The bombard is an example of a rough manufacture. Its “construction curvature” makes it possible to assume that the gun was made hastily or by a blacksmith who was not a professional gun manufacturer. On the other hand, the octagonal bottom excludes hasty manufacturing. It could be rather suggested that the gun is a piece of evidence for experimenting with an appropriate shape for a newly invented kind of weapon.

In addition to documental items, the remnants of armed artifacts are considered as important historical source. Particular attention is required to decrypt epigraphy, labeling or heraldry, if they are available on a barrel, because the correctly read gun texts allow to attribute the subject properly. Nowadays, another important issue is given to the history of guns in museum collections. Skilled reading of morphology of a barrel is particularly important in the study of a gun. Each saved artillery item has a historical, scientific, cultural, antique and ethnographic value and requires a thorough and comprehensive investigation. Considering the absence of documental background, every single gun of that period is invaluable for science.

**The Conclusions.** This work is an attempt to analyze a forged iron firearm from Lviv Historical Museum. The source base is the weapon of assets and inventory books of LHM and Museum of Scientific Society named after T.Shevchenko. In VII inventory book of the Museum it is said that the collection Cannon arrived in November 19, 1935 from Belz, granted on Dean Fr. Ilyarion Gela and assigned accession number 25492. Note that at that time only church of the Holy Spirit – Cathedral of Holy Spirit up to the end of the XVIIIth cn. –



**Illustration 2.**  
**Belz coat of arms**  
**(Hrechylo, 2004, p. 28)**

was in acting. After the dissolution of the Scientific Society Museum collection in 1940, the museum was included in the assets of LHM, where the firearm was placed.

One of the oldest cities in Volyn land – Belz (nowadays – the city Belz, Sokal district, Lviv region. Ukraine) – a significant administrative and defense center of the Western Bug region. In 1388 the Polish King Vladislav Jagiello gave Belz to the family of Mazowiecki knyaz Zymovyt, who was married to his sister Alexandra and had four sons Zymovyt V, Traidenis II Vladislav I and Casimir II. They rebuilt the fortification and adapted them for artillery. It is known fact the functioning of temple buildings along the defensive lines of medieval cities. The same was in Belz.

From the results of the research we can make preliminary conclusions briefly that the absence of those elements that are more advanced alloys of iron proves that we can consider confirmation of the correctness of the dating of the cannon carefully.

Since the gunpowder implementation for military purposes, the era of experimental gunsmiths had launched. There were produced as extremely large as small artillery guns. The original handmade firearms differed just in size, weight and caliber from the first artillery systems.

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**ORTHODOX PARISH COMMUNITIES AS UNITS OF CONTROL  
OVER THE MARITAL MOBILITY OF THE UKRAINIAN POPULATION  
OF THE XVIIIth – THE FIRST HALF OF THE XIXth CENTURIES**

**Abstract. The Purpose of the Research.** The article focuses on the issue of the territorial affiliation of people to the Orthodox parish communities; they controlled the marital mobility of the Ukrainian population of the XVIIIth – the first half of the XIXth centuries primarily to prevent illegal weddings and births. **The Methodology of the Research.** The construction of a generalized image of the Orthodox parish communities took place at the rational and emotional levels of knowledge, but at the same time based on the principle of objectivity. Interdisciplinary strategies of historical anthropology, the methods of critical, structural analysis and the method of sources deconstruction have been used. Interpretations and conclusions are based on the materials of seven archival institutions and documentation of a directive administrative, informational and publishing direction. **The Scientific Novelty.** The presentation of a new look at the Orthodox communities at the same time exposed the pressing social problems of the



period under study, some of which are relevant today: begging, profligacy, crime, illegal weddings and childbearing, infanticide, family breakdown due to the departure of one of the married couple to earn money or sale serfs and, etc. **The Conclusions.** In the XVIIIth century witness documentation was introduced, which allowed the population to migrate and get married legally. According to a civil law, the marriage registration by parishioners who were the bride or groom, was supposed to take place in the churches. People acquired membership in the new parish in the context of the issuance of the relevant permission documents in connection with the relocation, the redeployment of military units, the remoteness of the parish church from society, the unsatisfactory state of the church premises for worship, and etc. Significant factors that led to significant population movements and possible violations of matrimonial requirements were the salary movement of the common people and the flight of serfs. In the marriage case of dependent peasants of different owners and changes in the arrival of the bride-serfs, they had to submit manumission, letters of sale and purchase of peasants, or documents, which testified to releasing a person from serfdom.

**Key words:** brides, the Orthodox parish communities, testimonies, marriage, marital mobility.

### ПРАВОСЛАВНІ ПАРАФІЯЛЬНІ ГРОМАДИ ЯК ОСЕРЕДКИ КОНТРОЛЮ ЗА ШЛЮБНОЮ МОБІЛЬНІСТЮ УКРАЇНСЬКОГО НАСЕЛЕННЯ XVIII – ПЕРШОЇ ПОЛОВИНИ XIX ст.

**Анотація. Мета дослідження.** У статті порушено проблему територіальної належності людей до православних парафіяльних громад, які контролювали шлюбну мобільність українського населення XVIII – першої половини XIX ст. насамперед із метою попередження незаконних вінчань і народжень. **Методологія дослідження.** Конструювання узагальненого образу православних парафіяльних спільнот відбувалося на раціональному та чуттєвому рівнях пізнання з дотриманням принципу об'єктивності. Було використано міждисциплінарні стратегії історичної антропології, методи критичного, структурного аналізу і деконструкції джерел. Інтерпретації та висновки ґрунтуються на матеріалах восьми архівних установ і документації директивно-розпорядчого, інформаційно-публікаторського напрямку. **Наукова новизна.** Репрезентація нового погляду на православні громади одночасно викрила злободенні суспільні проблеми досліджуваного періоду, деякі з них є актуальними й сьогодні: жебрацтво, розпуса, злочинність, незаконні вінчання й дітонародження, дітозгубництво, розпад сімей унаслідок від'їзду одного з подружньої пари на заробітки тощо. **Висновки.** У XVIII ст. впроваджувалася засвідчувальна документація, яка дозволяла населенню законно мігрувати та одружуватися. Відповідно до цивільного законодавства, реєстрація шлюбу мала відбуватися у церквах, парафіянами яких були наречена або наречений. Набуття людьми членства в новій парафії відбувалося за умов оформлення відповідних документів-дозволів у зв'язку з переїздом, передислокацією військових частин, віддаленістю парафіяльного храму від громади, незадовільним станом церковного приміщення для проведення богослужінь тощо. Вагомими чинниками, які зумовлювали значні переміщення населення та можливі порушення матримоніальних вимог, були заробітчаський рух простолюду, а також втечі кріпосних селян. Міграціями відзначалися прикордонні населені пункти. У разі одруження залежних селян різних власників і зміни парафії наречених-кріпосних зобов'язували надати причту відпускні свідоцтва, листи купівлі-продажу селян або документи-звільнення особи з-під кріпосної залежності.

**Ключові слова:** наречені, православні парафіяльні громади, свідоцтва, шлюб, шлюбна мобільність.

**The Problem Statement.** Act documents of the XVIIIth – the first half of the XIXth centuries demonstrated involuntarily the concern of the state and the church in cases of non-compliance with the matrimonial requirements determined by the Orthodox faith. Illiteracy and legal ignorance of the population, the lack of an effective system of documentary register of persons caused uncontrolled movement of people and change of a permanent residence. Sometimes, while migrating, married individuals formed a new family

union. The legal validity of the previous marriage did not cease, which was contrary to the civil law (Borodenko, 2020; PSZRI, 1830c, p. 42; PSZRI, 1830e, p. 654; PSZRI, 1830i, pp. 1180–1181; PSZRI, 1830k, p. 352; Svod zakonov, 1832, p. 18).

To prevent illegal weddings in “Instructions to the Elders” No. 1612 of December 26, 1697, the Charter of the Spiritual College of January 25, 1721, May appendix to it of 1722 and the Synodal decree of August 5, 1775 emphasized the need for conducting the sacrament of marriage in those parishes where the bride or groom lived (PSZRI, 1830a, p. 422; PSZRI, 1830b, pp. 343, 707; PSZRI, 1830f, p. 197). In particular, Paragraph 12 of the Charter of the Spiritual College of 1721 emphasized the following: “however, it is not appropriate to marry in another parish, in which neither the bridegroom lives nor the bride; one should not to get married in another Episcopia. Not to call also priests from another parish or the Diocese for a wedding; because this, besides the reproaches of priests from native parishes, looks like the married couple is under suspicion of a wrong marriage essence” (PSZRI, 1830b, p. 343).

Marriage in non-native churches was permitted, but on condition that a passport or certificate of birth and marital status of the person who wished to marry was presented to a representative of the parish clergy. Otherwise, marriages without the consent of the priests of the native parishes were considered doubtful, and children born had to be recorded as illegitimate ones (Novyy klass, 1878, pp. 1143–1144). Statistics data calculated from church records show that marriages usually took place in the parish churches of the bride (Borodenko, 2018, p. 69).

**The purpose** of the research is the formation of a generalized image of the Orthodox parish communities, which performed the function of control over the marital mobility of the Ukrainian population in the XVIIIth – the first half of the XIXth centuries. The creation of such an intellectual product in the modern space of socio-cultural knowledge aims at understanding, comprehending and representing a new view on the Orthodox communities as territorial centers of parishioners, in which newly introduced certification documents about people were tested at the state level. Owing to newly introduced certification documents, the institution of citizenship, the legal basis of the family, control over displacement, place of residence and marital status of people were established, illegal marriages and violations of the Christian morality were prevented.

**The Scientific Novelty.** The imaginary portrait of the Orthodox parish communities makes it possible to reveal a number of acute social problems of that period of time, a significant part of which remains relevant nowadays. The historical reconstruction of the past is based on a two-level principle of acquiring new knowledge. Within a rational level of cognition there was the study of sources, the identification of such factual material that would create conditions for a certain field of interpretations and conclusions. Another sensory level allowed us to imagine the peculiarities of an everyday life of different segments representatives of the population, to perceive human vices critically, to find out the importance of a prayer for the military, to show their family conflicts, on the example of the churches of Chernihiv to feel the atmosphere of liturgy among the military, etc. Adherence to the principle of objectivity was reflected in the disclosure of this problem with the maximum avoidance of the authors’ personal worldviews.

**The methodology** of the intellectual product is based on an interdisciplinary research strategies of “a human science”, because the issues of social anthropology (a normative and deviant behaviour, customs and rights as a social regulator, crime and forms of violence, marginal social groups – thieves, prostitutes, beggars, etc.), socio-religious history (religious discipline of the society, forms and manifestations of piety, etc.), stories of an

everyday life (a private life of families, etc.). The use of methods of critical, structural analysis and deconstruction of sources made it possible not to take everything stated in the documents literally, because “inaccurate information” may be due to the very nature of a human reception, instead, to separate the necessary facts from the written texts and to overcome “naive historicism”, i.e. a straightforward understanding of what was written (Yakovenko, 2007, pp. 211, 235, 243, 244).

**The source base of the research** is based on the materials of eight archival institutions: State Archives of Vinnytsia, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Khmelnytsky regions and the Institute of Manuscripts of the National Library of Ukraine named after V. I. Vernadsky. The formulated problem necessitated the study of the court cases of county courts, church statistical books, documentation of clerical departments, certifying documents of individuals, etc. In addition, a directive and administrative documentation (decrees, civil legislation) and the information and publication “Poltava Diocesan Information” were included into the study. These sources are differentiated according to the conditional classification made in the collection “Business Documentation of the Hetmanate of the XVIIIth century” (Dubrovina, 1993, p. 32).

The study of a large array of sources made it possible to implement the following tasks: to study the system of control over the affiliation of people to a particular parish; to identify the reasons for the introduction of the necessary control over migration processes; to reconstruct possible ways to change the membership of the parish and draw up the necessary documentation; to single out factors, which caused the migration of the population and gave rise to violations of matrimonial requirements; to analyze the permit documentation from the landlords for the relocation and marriage of serfs; to point at antisocial manifestations of a human behaviour; to distinguish individual problems of the society, etc. At the same time, we are aware of the need for a careful interpretation of behaviour, urgent human affairs, because what is considered to be a standard behavioral manifestation for today may not have been characteristic of the people of that period of time.

**The Analysis of Researches and Publications.** The authors analyzed the works of the following researchers on some issues of the outlined problem: American researcher Michelle Lamarche Marreze – a legal status of the female nobles of imperial Russia (Marreze, 2009); Italian researcher Massimo Livi Bachchi – migration processes in Europe (Livi Bachchi, Massimo, 2010); Polish researcher Mateusz Wyżga – a rural family in the parish of Raciborowice near Kraków (Wyżga, 2009); Polish researcher Maria Sierocka-Pośpiech – marriage market in Warsaw in the XVIIth century (Sierocka-Pośpiech, 2009); Polish researcher Katarzyna Sulej – premarital relations of Polish magnate families of the XVIth – the XVIIIth centuries (Sulej, 2009); Ukrainian researcher Iryna Petrenko – marital relations in the daily life of the people in the lands of the Russian Empire in the XVIIIth century (Petrenko, 2010).

**The Main Material Statement.** Control over the affiliation of people to a particular parish was performed by the representatives of the parish clergy. They were one of the few educated members of the community who performed law enforcement functions, recorded information about parishioners in church statistics books, identified missing and newly arrived persons, and etc. Parishioners elected church elders for three years to help a priest and with his consent among the people of “a pious life and honest rules” (PSZRI, 1842, p. 234).

However, the parish clergy sometimes committed wrongdoings because they checked all marriage requirements and married people from other parishes inadvertently. Priests were to be prosecuted for violating executive discipline. This happened when colleagues, relatives or acquaintances of already married people complained about the illegal actions

of a priest. Complaints of members of the parish clergy can be found in the court cases of Slobidska Ukraine. Thus, in January report of 1773 written by the priest of Kropyventsi village, the priest Hryhorovych was accused of conducting church marriage ceremony to Pelahia Chernenkova, a resident of the neighbouring parish (State Archives of Sumy region, f. 960, d. 2, c. 1017).

In another court case of 1774 – 1775 – the case of a non-native resident Ivon Shemian, whose illegal church marriage ceremony was conducted by the representatives of the parish clergy of Ovlashi village: the priest Zubov and deacon Danylov (SASR, f. 960, d. 2, c. 1115). In March-April of 1766, on the denunciation of the priest of Pyriatyn Yakubovsky against his successor Pavlo Sukhodolsky, the court case on the illegal marriage of Paraskeva Holovnykha, a widow, a member of another parish, was considered. It turned out that the woman was not a widow but a married woman, but she did not have any official documents. However, the priest did not demand a certificate from the metric book, but believed the person's word and thus performed the wedding ceremony illegally (State Archives of Poltava region, f. 801, d. 1, c. 133).

In the first half of the XVIIIth century certification of the population “in the form of a document” in the context of the unification of office work in the Russian Empire provided for the issuance of certificates from metric books, marriage searches or confessional signatures, but most likely there was no obligation for such documents, and certificates were issued on request (Borodenko, 2019a, pp. 8–15). It is possible that uneducated people did not attach importance to the documents and did not preserve them.

In order to control the migration movement of the population, the recognition of newborns as legal, the gradual enslavement of peasants, the registration of conscripts and the prevention of illegal marriages, the practice of assigning people to parishes of individual churches became widespread. Even the inhabitants of the local diocese were admitted to monasticism. The villagers were asked about the virtue of a person who wants to be secluded from a worldly life: a marital status, age, criminal record / no criminal record, absence / presence of debts and serfdom, etc. (PSZRI, 1830b, p. 708). Divorce proceedings were also conducted within the dioceses where the plaintiffs lived (PSZRI, 1842, p. 250).

The procedure for registering people's place of residence was quite complicated. Let us try to reconstruct the acquisition by the population of a certain community registered membership of the Orthodox laity. Let's analyze the documentation of spiritual consistories or boards on specific examples. Thus, a retired cornet Lytvynov bought a house in Brovary and decided to move with his family from Kyiv. To move to Brovary the man sent a letter dated on May 11, 1807, to His Eminence asking him to include his family into the list of parishioners of the Trinity Church in Brovary because of the move. Two months later, on August 8, 1807, Kozelets Spiritual Board of Chernihiv Consistory reported receiving an imperial majesty's decree granting the cornet's request (State Archives of Chernigiv region, f. 679, d. 2, c. 334). Another example: on March 20, 1807 the people of the village Drobyshev appealed to Chernihiv Consistory with a request to enroll local residents to the parishioners' list of Chulativka church, which was nearby territorially. The reason was the distance of 10 verstv from the Church of the Resurrection of Chernihiv, the inhabitants of the village previously belonged to (SACHR, f. 679, d. 2, c. 331).

Interesting details about the change of parish membership are revealed in the church documentation of Chernihiv Consistory during the period of 1845 – 1846. In a petition dated on November 8, 1845, by Colonel Ruberg of Charles Prussian Infantry Regiment stationed

in Chernihiv, a request was made to assign one of the city's churches to conscripts. The answer was received a few days later (on November 14). The troops of this regiment were assigned to Chernihiv Resurrection Church. But in a subsequent petition dated on November 24, the regimental commander appealed to the Consistory with another request: in view of the remoteness of the Church of the Resurrection from the location of the military unit to secure the affiliation of the military to the Church of the Intercession. On November 30, Chernihiv Consistory, arguing their decision by unsatisfactory condition of the Church of the Intercession, assigned the ranks of this regiment to St. Catherine's Church.

Almost a year later, on September 24, 1846, another commander, Major General Fedir Shcherbatsky, "humbly asked" "to provide a moral benefit to my subordinates" and to give a more advantageous location for the military unit, as in the church of St. Catherine "it is too cold and the glass in many windows is broken, so that the birds flying into the church during the service, often interfered in the reverence of the worshipers with their chirping and in unbearable winter cold to make soldiers, burdened with the work of the service, address the earthly and forget a prayer". On September 27, 1846, in order to protect the military from catching a cold, Major General addressed the Vice-Governor of Chernihiv Province with a request to allocate the premises of Chernihiv City Duma for the regimental church, where services were held for the Lutherans and Catholics. Apparently on October 4 – 6, the warmest temperature was in Peter and Paul Cemetery Church, which was located outside the city and became a regimental church (SACHR, f. 679, d. 2, c. 4676, pp. 1–11).

The registration and mobile campaign to secure the soldiers of Charles Prussian Infantry Regiment in individual churches in Chernihiv lasted for almost a year. Commanders in search of a warm church addressed petitions to both the spiritual consistory and the provincial leadership. We understand that during this time the records of military parishioners in the church books could change and be lost sometimes. It is likely that data on the marital status of conscripts were lost, so if a soldier wanted to get married, there could be some difficulty with the supporting documents. The military had to be given permission by the leadership and the regimental priest, in which age and marital status were indicated (Borodenko, 2019a, p. 10).

This example demonstrated the concern of regimental commanders to create comfortable conditions for the military to hold the Orthodox services, because a prayer was important in their service life. Registration relocation of the population of certain communities from one parish to another could take place under different circumstances. Among circumstances are the following: change of permanent residence by a person or family in connection with the relocation, the military unit – redeployment; a territorial distance of parishioners from the church in the presence of another, closer, much more comfortable church; unsatisfactory conditions for worship in the church, etc.

To obtain documents for the transfer of the Orthodox laity from one parish to another at least permission from the clerical boards and consistories, in some cases from the provincial or city administration, but most from the Imperial Majesty, was required. In addition, servicemen, who decided to marry, had to provide permission from their commanders, regimental priests with extracts from church statistics books on marital status. The instructions gave the right to the field priest to marry only regimental soldiers, having previously conducted a premarital inquiry into the presence of living or dead wives from previous marriage (PSZRI, 1830g, p. 701).

In the confessional records of different villages, newcomers were marked differently. Border settlements were especially distinguished. In particular, the town of Zbryzh, Kamenets County, Podil Province, was noted for its border location, as it was located on the Zbruch



River, a natural borderline between the Right Bank, which in 1793 after the second division of the Commonwealth started to belong to the Russian Empire, and Eastern Galicia, which became the part of the Austrian Empire. During the period of 1801 and 1819 Zbryzhansk confessional records of the Trinity and St. Michael's Orthodox Churches indicated briefly the forms of registration of migrants and migratory movements of the population due to various circumstances (State Archives of Khmelnytsky region, f. 315, d. 1, c. 6795, pp. 129–142; f. 315, d. 1, c. 7059, pp. 337–350).

Firstly, a separate, most numerous category of parishioners, in addition to the clergy and nobles, were “settlers and their housemates”, who mostly appeared with surnames of clearly Russian or Left Bank Ukrainian origin: Velychko, Hovorukha, Kovaliov, Povoroznikov, Losiatsky, Zhukovsky, etc. We assume that the south-western borders of the Russian Empire were strengthened by the settlers. In the confessional records of the only Holy Dormition Orthodox Church of 1868 and 1875 there were clearly distinguished the categories of “the military and their family members” and “the border guard” in the structure of the population of the town (SAKhmR, f. 315, d. 1, c. 8817, pp. 1026–1044; f. 315, d. 1, c. 11908, pp. 673–690).

Secondly, there were moved people from abroad. Those were recruited workers, who were registered the following way: “Hryhoriy Stepankov, a worker who came from Galicia”, “Vasyliy Vasyliiev Zamrykot who came from Galicia, a worker”. Other notes indicated the absence of individual parishioners during Holy Pentecost. In particular, Ivan Stepankov Lazurkevych, who went to Galicia, is mentioned in the church register of 1801 without the specified number of years he lived (SAKhmR, f. 315, d. 1, c. 6795, pp. 132, 137, 139). Tymofiy Petrovych Sitarchuk, who is recorded in the confessional records of 1868 of the Roman Catholic religion, without a wife, but at the same time not in the status of a widower, with three children “were not present” in the church (SAKhmR, f. 315, d. 1, c. 8817, p. 1037). We should suppose that the absence of Tymofiy and his children in Zbryzh could be caused by his move in search of earnings, his marriage or relocation.

Thirdly, sometimes in Zbryzhansk registers there were recorded marriages with foreigners. Apparently, the newly formed family of 20-year-old Pelahia, who is registered in the confessional book of 1801 as “married to a Pole”, although the groom's surname is not recorded, she did not make a decision on her permanent residence after the wedding. The woman continued to live in the household of 44-year-old father Andriy Fedorov Pykha and 35-year-old Sofia Stepanova (SAKhmR, f. 315, d. 1, c. 6795, p. 141). Thus, the analysis of the registration records of confessional books in Zbryzh presented certain data on population migrations, which were primarily related to labour searches or marriages. Border settlements were especially distinguished by various manifestations of population movements.

Like the military, serfs had to present marriage certificates from their owners or landlords (Borodenko, 2019b, pp. 48–50). In the divorce proceedings of serfs there was the same situation. Giving letters of permission created certain problems for landlords and made it almost impossible to file for divorce by serfs in court. In the case of the move of serfs from their native parish, they had to have “a ticket” from the owner for free move, a sale or buy letter or leave certificate “free”. Such document dated on April 11, 1800, was provided by a landlady, Countess Daelowska of Kyiv Province, to her serfs, whom she released to earn money. By the way, the document for a free move was intended for a small group of labourers and was written in Latvian (State Archives of Kyiv region, f. 227, d. 1, c. 207, pp. 1–2). On April 7, 1847, the widow of the ponomar Pelahia of Chernihiv requested the issuance of a permit-ticket for a free move to Kyiv (State Archives of Kharkiv region, f. 40, d. 35, c. 170).



A long absence of a husband was often the cause of a family relationship break off. The court case of 1766 represents the history of the Cossack Danylo Kyrenko from the village of Yatsyny. Six-year absence of the husband-labourer led to the lewd behaviour of his wife Melania Ivanovna. The woman lived a promiscuous life with her husband's brother Timothy and several men from whom children were born: some were dead, the others were considered to have died quickly. After deceiving the priest, Melania married Kravets, a neighbour, because she said she was a widow (SAPR, f. 801, d. 1, c. 132).

In another situation, the wife spent six years abroad, at the Polish territory. She was engaged to a new husband allegedly. Meanwhile, in 1776, a legitimate husband Shapoval decided to remarry, but the priest Olshansky refused to conduct a marriage ceremony (SAPR, f. 801, d. 1, c. 510). In 1789 Yevdokiya Lavrynenko appealed to Pyriatyn Spiritual Board with a petition for divorce. The reason was the ten-year absence of the husband-labourer, after all the husband didn't send any information about himself (SAPR, f. 801, d. 1, c. 1014). In 1774 Theodosia Koloshko asked for permission for a new marriage, because for seven years her husband "went to the villages and nothing was known about him" and he did not come back (SAPR, f. 801, d. 1, c. 386). Civil law allowed to divorce on condition of the sixth year of the absence of one of the spouses (PSZRI, 1830j, p. 363).

Thus, the absence of labourers for five years, their illiteracy, distance from their families, communication with the family only by means of sending them presents or verbal greetings by acquaintances of parishioners could lead to a family break off, deviant behaviour of married couples, illegal marriages and even child-killing. During the second half of the XVIIIth century such families were apparently not allowed to be divorced, as the labourers were not found dead. It was illegal to enter into another family union for a person whose spouse was alive. Only at the beginning of the XIXth century decrees appeared that eased divorce conditions. Regulatory documents of the Synod of February 28, 1806, on September 25, 1810 defined the procedure for filing for divorce clearly: if within five years the family member did not appear, the other representative of the couple had every reason to start the divorce process. The military person was obliged to show a marriage permit from the head of the military unit, and the serf – from the landlord (PSZRI, 1830i, p. 106–107; PSZRI, 1830j, p. 363).

In some cases people with false certificates or without identification documents were revealed. Those were the fugitives or the homeless. In the middle of the XIXth century in the county courts of Podilsk province there were lawsuits about the validity of rights of individuals to the place of residence. Those were Anton, Evdokia and Marfa Voynarovsky, Semen and Ivan Strelbytsky and the others (State Archives of Vinnitsa region, f. 468, d. 1, c. 903; f. 468, d. 1, c. 939; f. 468, d. 1, c. 940; f. 473, d. 1, c. 89). Loss of passports, documents for real estate ownership by people from different social classes could create another social problem – the emergence of marginal elements, beggars, the homeless. Thus, on the crossing of the Dnieper River in May of 1834, on the way to Dnieper city, a man named Paul was stopped, had no identification documents, did not know or hid his origin. The homeless was punished with beatings and exile to Siberia (SAKR, f. 227, d. 1, c. 470, p. 1). In 1851 Pochtarenko, a fugitive peasant woman, was punished: by 50 blows with sticks and her detention in a labourer's (SAKR, f. 227, d. 1, c. 832).

In another case, in April of 1830, in Kyiv a group of people was arrested and accused of living under false documents. It turned out that they all came from different localities and differed in marital status. Among them there were both women and men, mostly of reproductive age: at the age of 25 to 50, but there was also a 65-year-old man. Among them

there were runaway women peasants from the village of Mykolayivka, Romensky district, Poltava province. The first one, 27 years old, was a serf of the landlady Paraskeva Poletyka, the other one, 34 years old, – was the landlady Maksymenkova (SAKR, f. 227, d. 1, c. 291, pp. 3, 58). In 1831, a man named Kuchynenko was detained because of the absence of a residence permit and a false certificate of a nobleman (SAKR, f. 227, d. 1, c. 311).

If a serf pretended to be a member of another social class and forged the documents and married a free person by deception, he was punished by deprivation of all estates, exile to Siberia, and beating with whips. If the wife knew of her husband's status, she was also found guilty and punished by being sent to a brothel for one to two years (PSZRI, 1846, p. 969).

The above mentioned documentation demonstrated a significant migration of the working population to Kyiv in search of work. In addition, it was quite ordinary for the common people to present false documents. In 1763, in large cities it was offered to accept beggars, soldiers, sailors and recruits, the elderly and the disabled in the almshouse with passports, and in case of passports absence to inspect the newcomers (PSZRI, 1830d, p. 175). A special provision of the Committee of Ministers of April 23, 1840, in Kyiv imposed fines for non-disclosure by the police the information about newcomers, visitors and those leaving the city (PSZRI, 1841, p. 301).

Another document that determined the fate of serfs and changed their place of residence was a purchase agreement document. At least at the end of the XVIIIth century such documents were concluded between the landlords as a result of arrangements on sheets of paper with a seal at the cost of 4 kopicks. For example, on May 4, 1784, a similar purchase agreement was concluded between Yelyzaveta Matviyeva, the wife of the retired life guards corporal Petro Ivanovych Lomanov from the village of Ivashev in Tver governorate, and Lieutenant Andriy Semenovych Lytvynov from the “village of Kiyevo”. The reason for concluding the document was the marriage of the serf girl of the landlady Martha Vasylyeva to the serf Kuzma Andriyev of the mentioned above owner. For the serf girl, who married and moved to live in the estate of the new owner, Yelyzaveta Lomanova received 40 rubles. The certificate was written by Tver provincial postman, “a serf affairs writer” Havrylo Verevnin, the landlady only signed it (The Institute of Manuscripts of the The National Library of Ukraine named after VI Vernadsky, f. 53, c. 307). It is noticeable that the serf trade took place not only in a certain province, but also outside it. In some cases, the Ukrainian serfs peasants married the Russian ones.

At the end of the XVIIIth century in Kyiv province, the cost of serf girls who were sold to other owners as a result of marriage or other circumstances ranged from 20 to 80 rubles (SAKR, f. 227, d. 1, c. 78; f. 227, d. 1, c. 81). In the materials of the journal of Kyiv County Court dated on July 14, 1787, a record was found, as well as a copy of the letter about the purchase of the serf girl Natalia Sevastianova by Lieutenant Pylyp Tarakanov from the secretary Stepan Polenets at the price of 80 rubles (SAKR, f. 227, d. 1, c. 88). Men were probably valued a little more. Purchase deals, at least we found out, started from 25 rubles (SAKR, f. 227, d. 1, c. 79). Much higher was the price for the sale of a serf Andreyev, for whom Ensign Mykhailov asked 102 rubles (SAKR, f. 227, d. 1, c. 198). With such documents, serfs changed their place of residence and became a part of a new parish. Quite often the reason for the sale of serfs was their marriage to serfs peasants of other owners. The serf trade destroyed their families. By Decree of February 19, 1841, the Senate sought to solve an urgent social problem. The act was aimed at preserving families, as it forbade the sale of serfs separately from their families, and in the case of purchase and sale it was emphasized

the registration of dependent peasants in the estates of new owners and, accordingly, in other parish communities. (PSZRI, 1842, p. 15).

There were also situations when serfs married without the permission of the landlord or the manager of the property. We found out about one of these couples from the case of Starodub County Court of Chernihiv Province. On January 25, 1810 a priest from the village of Luchkovych of Starodub County, Ioann Shermerevych conducted a church marriage ceremony of a serf woman from the village of Nestruev, Paraskeva Chemerysova and a Cossack from the village of Pechenyky Yefym Rubtsov. The priest conducted the ceremony without the permission of the managing housekeeper, because the landowner, colonel and cavalier Budlensky was in St. Petersburg at that time. The trial lasted from February 17 to November 15, 1810. The verdict was the following: the newly formed family should not be separated, and the pastors should not continue to perform the wedding ceremony without a letter of permission from the landlord or his proxy (SACHR, f. 676, d. 2, c. 469). A similar court case is found in the archives of Olhopol County Court of Podilsk Province during the period of 1844 – 1854. The court case concerned a serf Evdokiya Polishchuk, who also married without permission from the landlord (SAVR, f. 468, d. 1, c. 748).

Those serfs who received certificates “at large” were the happiest. They became free and mobile people because they could change their place of residence at will. In matrimonial documents, they were registered mainly as follows: “released”, “at large” or “released and not yet assigned to any social class” (SASR, f. 834, d. 2, c. 4, pp. 20, 32, 81; f. 844, d. 1, c. 3, p. 62; f. 844, d. 1, c. 6, p. 64; f. 855, d. 1, c. 41, pp. 77–78; f. 1187, d. 1, c. 10, p. 177). In addition, it should be noted that in this status there were women mostly. The document which certified liberation from serfdom was mostly written on sheets of paper with a seal. The price of such certificate varied depending on the period of time. In particular, one of these letters with the stamp of 1795 cost 10 rubles. There is depicted an appeal to the Emperor Pavel Petrovych, dated on February 26, 1797, from Moscow landlady Oryna Ivanivna Marmion with a request to certify the document “at large” of her serf. On August 26, 1787, the noblewoman bought a serf girl, Anna Mykhailova, from the state adviser, senator, cavalier, Prince Petro Mykhailovych Volkonsky. During the years, the woman served decently and devotedly, that is why, the landlady decided to express some gratitude and release Anna Mykhailova to eternal freedom. A certificate was attached to this appeal (SAKR, f. 227, d. 1, c. 189).

In the example given, the landlady gave her serf freedom on her own initiative, but there were situations when outsiders not landladies themselves appealed to judicial or local authorities to grant freedom to serfs who suffered humiliation and violence from their masters. On June 4, 1829, bourgeois neighbours from Kyiv appealed to Kyiv governor Vasyl Semenovych Katerynych to release a serf girl, Tetiana Fomina Zelenska because of the abuse by her burgher-owner, Ahafia Sytnikova (SAKR, f. 227, d. 1, c. 300). The same case took place during 1824 – 1825, bourgeois neighbours asked for a serf, Pavlovska who belonged to the landowner, Captain Kyrta (SAKR, f. 227, d. 1, c. 243).

Despite the patriarchal paternalistic nature of the society, some decrees of the XVIIIth century – the first half of the XIXth century defended the serfs. At the end of the XVIIIth century women nobles accused of using a physical torture against serfs were sent to convents (Marreze, 2009, p. 302). On April 4, 1802 a landowner Major Orlov was sent to the monastery for ten years for inhuman treatment of his peasants (PSZRI, 1830h, p. 90). In 1839, measures were taken to prosecute the white and black clergy of the Roman Catholic Church, who abused the “fundushev” population, especially peasants and servants

(PSZRI, 1840, p. 70). Thus, having received the document “at large” from a landowner, serfs peasants received personal freedoms, perhaps, the most important of which was the freedom to choose a matrimonial partner. Some serfs were lucky: outsiders, protecting them from a landowner violence, sought a court decision to release them from serfdom.

**The Conclusions.** The study allowed us to draw the following conclusions. Firstly, a number of decrees of the early XVIIIth century demonstrated concern about the violation of matrimonial requirements by the population and regulated weddings in those churches whose parishioners were the brides.

Secondly, there are noticeable attempts to form the institution of citizenship at the national level by the certification of the population issuing supporting documents: passports, certificates, certificates extracted from the metric, church search books, confession books and records.

Thirdly, the act documentation demonstrated the need to introduce control over the migration processes of the population, primarily, in order to prevent illegal marriages and the childbirth in invalid family unions.

Fourthly, the change of parish membership was mainly due to the relocation of a person or family due to marriage, employment, move, relocation of the military unit, territorial distance from the community church, when there was a closer and more convenient church, unsatisfactory conditions for conducting services in the church, etc. Border settlements were in a special situation, where migration movements were of both internal and interstate importance. For parishioners to move from one Orthodox community to another, documents were required with the permission of clerical boards or consistories, the provincial or city administration, and sometimes even Imperial Majesty.

Fifthly, serfs, before marrying or divorcing, showed permission from the landlord or his trustee. Serf brides, when moving to other local communities, had to present to the priest a certificate of leave, documents of sale or release from serfdom. Buying and selling serfs sometimes ruined their families. This painful public issue the authorities tried to resolve by the decree of 1841.

Sixthly, move of population and violations of matrimonial requirements were caused by leaving for earnings and the run away of serfs.

Seventhly, the uncontrolled mobility of the population could give rise to antisocial manifestations of the population: forgery of documents, violence of landlords against serfs, run away of serfs peasants, illegal weddings ceremonies without leave documents from landlords, infanticide, and etc.

Eighthly, important factors in maintaining the fighting spirit of conscripts were the Christian discipline, the creation of comfortable conditions in regimental churches. The military, before getting married, had to present a permit-certificate from the regimental commanders.

Ninthly, the loss of control of the Orthodox communities over the fate of their parishioners could be accompanied by the marginalization of individuals, i.e., their transformation into beggars, criminals, prostitutes, and etc. Owing to the religious discipline of the population by the observance of the Christian morality, especially marriage, and legislative levers, the state tried to establish the legal basis of the family, prevent crime, determine punishment for offenders, establish citizenship, and etc. Persons who committed lawlessness in compliance with the matrimonial requirements set by the Orthodox doctrine and the state laws, thus demonstrated a decrease in the level of piety, obedience to the law and responsibility of long-accepted in the society with Christian ethical, customary norms.

The prospect of our research consists in continuing the study of matrimonial family relations of the Orthodox Ukrainian population of the XVIIIth – the first half of the XIXth century: to study divorce requirements, illegal family formations, etc., in details.

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**HUMAN FACTOR OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT  
OF SOUTHERN UKRAINE AT THE END OF THE XVIIIth –  
THE BEGINNING OF THE XXth CENTURIES**

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the research* – is to examine and reconstruct the specificity of a human factor in town management at the territory of the South of Ukraine in the second half of the 18th – at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. **The research methodology** is based on the principles of scientificity, historicism, verification, author objectiveness, the frontier theory, human dimension, regionalism and also on the use of general scientific (analysis, synthesis and generalization) and specific historical (historical and genetic, historical and typological, historical and systemic) methods. **The scientific novelty** consists in the fact that the formation of a new socio-cultural reality and geo-political changes resulted in involving representatives of the Western European countries into management of the Southern Ukrainian region and towns that changed the bureaucratic system of the Russian Empire. That made it possible to transform the South of Ukraine into important centers of the economic life of both the region and the country intensifying modernization processes. Such processes are strongly

*related to the participation of deputies and foreign employees in the municipalities and the activities of public management in the towns of the South. This study considers bodies of self-government as a specific mode of activity of municipality deputies. Special attention is focused on characterization of their role in the practical activity of public elective institutions. **The Conclusions.** The results of the research contain the information that a deputy of a local self-government is considered not as a political construct, but as a personal and individual phenomenon reflecting different behavioral patterns of self-government deputies better and expressing their cultural values more obviously. The study also emphasizes that the towns were managed by the representatives of different socio-professional layers that enhanced the individual features of the region when compared to other regions of the country.*

**Keywords:** *the South of Ukraine, local self-government, deputies of public government, municipality, administrative and territorial organization.*

## **ЛЮДСЬКИЙ ФАКТОР ГРОМАДСЬКОГО УПРАВЛІННЯ НА ПІВДНІ УКРАЇНИ НАПРИКІНЦІ XVIII – НА ПОЧАТКУ XX ст.**

**Анотація.** *Мета дослідження – розкрити та реконструювати особливості людського фактору в управлінні містами на території Півдня України в другій половині XVIII – початку XX ст. Методологія дослідження спирається на принципи науковості, історизму, верифікації, авторської об'єктивності, теорії фронтиру, людиновимірності, регіоналізму, а також на використання загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, узагальнення) та спеціально-історичних (історико-генетичний, історико-типологічний, історико-системний) методів. Наукова новизна полягає у тому, що в результаті формування нової соціокультурної реальності та геополітичних змін до управління південноукраїнським регіоном та містами були задіяні представники західноєвропейських країн, які внесли багато змін у бюрократичну систему Російської імперії. Це дало можливість Півдню України перетворитися на важливі центри економічного життя як регіону, так і держави, що прискорило модернізаційні процеси. Такі процеси міцно пов'язані із участю в діяльності муніципалітетів працівники депутатів та найманих працівників у функціонуванні громадських управлінь в містах Півдня України. У запропонованій статті органи самоврядування аналізуються як специфічний образ діяльності і активності депутатів муніципалітетів. Основна увага приділена розкриттю їх характерів у практичній діяльності громадських виборчих установ. Висновки. У запропонованих результатах дослідження міститься інформація про те, що образ депутатів самоврядування розглядається не як політичний конструкт, а як особистісно-індивідуальний феномен, в якому краще розкриваються різні поведінкові моделі депутатів самоврядування і краще виражаються їх культурні цінності. Тако, відзначено, що містами управляли представники різних соціо професійних образів, що значно посилювало регіонально-індивідуальні особливості краю, у порівнянні з іншими регіонами держави.*

**Ключові слова:** *Південь України, міське самоврядування, депутати громадських управлінь, муніципалітет, адміністративно-територіальний устрій.*

**The Problem Statement.** At the present stage of the formation of the Ukrainian state, the system of state government is being created on the principles of decentralization which demands extensive reforms. The main aim of these reforms is to turn the already existing administrative and self-administrative system into an effective factor of acceleration of the regional social and economic development. Trying to form a modern system of local self-government, the society cannot but take into account the newest world experience of the state formation and the national and historical one as well giving the possibility to study and analyze the process of the Ukrainian state formation.

Identification of the parts of the general problem which have not been solved before – in the previous studies sufficient attention was not almost paid to a human factor in the activities of a local self-government. They mainly focused on social and economic, political and organizational aspects in the life of towns. The administrative relations of the past epochs

continue to exist in new social relations as the inherited administrative culture, administrative technology, people's consciousness, subjective rights and duties, legality, legal order, etc.

**The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches.** In the research, we are talking about a human factor in the activity of the institution of municipal power in the South Ukrainian provinces/huberniias at the end of the XVIIIth – beginning of the XXth centuries – Khersonska, Katerynoslavska and Tavriiska. The analysis of the activity of the local public self-government organs remains an important precondition of creating the integral picture of the historical process in the South of Ukraine and in the whole Ukraine.

In the historiography of previous years, some parts of this issue were analyzed. S. Pryklonskyi (Priklonskiy, 1886) and Ye. Maksymov (Maksimov, 1905) contributed to the problem elaboration from democratic standpoints. They criticized deputies of a local self-government for insufficient, from their point of view, help to those in need (in the sphere of medical service, people's education, provision of housing), for absence of appropriate urban amenities, irrational expenses of local costs, etc. Nevertheless, no concrete examples of the solution of these problems could prove their critical observations.

D. Semenov's research (Semenov, 1901) was interesting because he characterized not only the issues of structure and functions of a local self-government, but their positive and negative moments; he generalized the experience of leading European countries in the issues of municipal self-government and proposed a series of practical recommendations how to improve the work of organs of a local self-government. In his research, the author mentioned the South Ukrainian towns as well.

In the works of P. Zelenyi (Zelenyi, 1890), the attempt was made to analyze the experience of the South Ukrainian local public government deputies' work before 1870, to characterize the directions of their activity, problems, practical results. The author criticized the self-government activity, pointed out its negative sides which had influence on its work.

During the Soviet period, a local self-government was not considered actual but a bourgeois organ of power not having been able to solve the problems of citizens. That's why, in the works of the Soviet researchers, the subject of the tsarist municipalities was mentioned superficially. In A. Shefer's work (Shefer, 1939), "Organs of Self-Government of the Tsarist Russia" the activity of local Dumas of the pre-Soviet period was analyzed. The book became the basis of the Soviet historiography having contributed to the creation of a negative attitude towards the deputies of local Dumas in the following researches. L. Velykhov (Velikhov, 1928) elaborated the whole municipal science from historical, state-legal, financial and technical points, having enlightened at the same time the most important economic urban problems and municipal improvement.

The interest for the activity of the South Ukrainian municipalities of the pre-Soviet period arose with the Ukraine's Independence Declaration. The traditional questions of formation, structure and competence of the municipal organs, their budget policy and practical activity in the economic and social and cultural spheres were analyzed in the works of O. Marchenko (Marchenko, 1997), T. Plaksii (Plaksii, 2001), T. Shcherba (Shcherba, 2001) and the others in the problematic and chronological vein with the emphasis upon the generally determined stages from the history of the object research (1785 – 1870, 1870 – 1892, 1892 – 1917). The urban regulations of 1870 and 1892 were analyzed in details including the elective procedures in municipalities, their structure and competence. V. Konstantynova (Konstantynova, 2010) contributed to the research of the South Ukrainian urban history of the last quarter of the XVIIIth – middle of the XIXth centuries. She examined urban problems and the role of a local self-government in Southern Ukraine as well and concluded about higher tempos of

the urban processes there than in other regions. Despite a great deal of works dedicated to a local self-government in the South of Ukraine, the researched problem of the human factor of this period was not enough analyzed. According to the researchers, municipalities were impersonal political institutions.

**The purpose of the publication** is to analyze the organs of self-government as a specific image of the South Ukrainian local Dumas deputies' activity through the prism of variety of their characters.

**The Main Material Statement.** In the second half of the XVIIIth century, in the consequence of important geopolitical changes, the central authorities of the Russian Empire incorporated the territory of the South of Ukraine. It was transformed into New Ukraine very quickly that made the government start renewing general government standards at the national level. Later, the central authorities of the Russian Empire confirmed and adopted a new system of self-government having been spread at the South Ukrainian territory as well. This system was targeted to turn local stany ("stan" is an administrative and territorial unit in the tsarist Russia) into bourgeoisie on the principles of decentralization and to lessen the costs burden of the state budget to support towns. Having taken all this into account, towns were divided into several categories (principal towns of province/huberniia, district/povit towns, unimportant towns (which did not serve as administrative centers)) where local authorities were created – public administrations called local Dumas. Representatives from six stans could be elected to them for three years; local budget formation, land property management, local taxes, state organs support, provision of urban amenities, etc., were in their competence (Mykhailenko, Cheremisin, 2020, pp. 36–45). All of its points were hardly realized because the reform of 1785 was not perfect. Newly established local Dumas were not independent and had to coordinate their decisions with administrative and central organs of power. It created inconveniences in the government of towns and made public organs of power a lower grade of state administration. After the public upheaval of 1840 – 1860, the Central Government implemented other reforms and made local Dumas independent from administrative surveillance, without stany organs of local power in the spirit of the public theory of self-government in 1870. The reform of 1892 took place already on the principles of the state theory of self-government having meant limitation of local Dumas independence in their decisions. A leading role in the activity of local Dumas during this period belonged to the deputies of public organs of power having elaborated top-priority directions of the development of every town. In historiography, organs of self-government were regarded as impersonal political formations in social and economic, demographic, political and other spheres. There is no biographical information about deputies of self-government and no significant quantity of scientific works. To our mind, it is high time pay attention to a human factor in the activity of public establishments, to examine moral and spiritual values of the officials of municipalities, to analyze their behaviour and to observe the process of self-government from the point of view of individual characteristics of its participants.

In the present aspect, a methodological concept of a human factor is used in the research as a specific image of the South Ukrainian self-government deputies' activity and value orientations. Deputies' practical activity is characterized to be their individual charge examined through the prism of variety of their characters. It brings us to regard municipalities as a personal and individual phenomenon with the purpose to reveal behavioral models of public elected deputies to understand better the system of values under the conditions of quick adaptation, modernization, urbanization of the South Ukrainian region. In the actual aspect,



the human factor helps to study the self-government activity through the prism of people's needs and relationships in the sphere of municipal administration, to pay attention to dwelling and individual conditions of existence and their production of an urban image through the prism of concrete experience (Vermenych, 2009, pp. 37–40). It helps to understand a person and his/her interests under the conditions of the accelerated development of commerce, industry better and to identify him/her in a new social and cultural situation of Southern Ukraine. It brings us up to the characteristics of unordinary individuals in substandard situations and adequate penetration into an individual's consciousness and make conclusions about the world of thoughts, intentions and world reception of concrete deputies of self-government (Yakovenko, 2007, p. 214).

Thus, organs of a local self-government involve persons with positive and negative features who determine which separate moral qualities are their strong, because deputies of self-government support not only public or state interests but personal as well.

At the moment of making efforts for joint life activity, some individuals (deputies of self-government) turn into the only social system providing an urban way of life and community of people with certain appropriate functions, conscious stereotypes of behaviour. Thus, as a result of their mutual activity, as a social system, towns get their own image, cultural aura, space configuration, social phenomena.

Such model of research can be organically present in the history of a local selfgovernment and opens many possibilities for the further research, as in every municipality there were peculiarities having led the South Ukrainian towns on the way of modernization or conservatism, the way of corruption and bribery or capitalization and commercialization. Railways, industry development, modernization of ports and engineering infrastructure, development of cultural, medical, educational spheres and formation of town image depended on deputies' decisions having determined an industrial strategy of urban development.

That's why, the possibilities to determine social mobility, system of contacts, social functions of self-government deputies, their local and individual structure, social and cultural, moral viewpoints, in public elected people's mentality, etc., are revealed. And furthermore, the human factor approach allows to conclude about the correlation between the urban life organization of individual communities with the political organization of self-government upon the condition of determining the influence of a separate deputy's personal activity upon the development of the urban vital space.

Taking into account deputies' behavioral model, self-government of the South Ukrainian towns can be divided into several types: "egocentric", "conformist", "philanthropic", "silent", "town fathers". They had different attitude to public, state and individual interests, purpose of activity, values orienting points and corresponding behavioral culture, etc.

Thus, the most widely spread type of the behavioral model in the South Ukrainian towns was egocentric. The most important indicator of such behaviour was total indifference towards state and public interests, but their biggest activity was self-enrichment and solution of own problems in various ways. For example, by means of additional taxes and duties of local population, whose gatherings passed over the municipal purse and went directly into the municipal figures' pockets. The spread phenomenon in towns of the region had to double or triple existing legal taxes. Embezzlement of public funds and inappropriate use of public money were also widely spread (The State Archive of Kherson Region, f. 14. op. 1. d. 438, pp. 2–50). Having acted like this, public deputies tried to look decent and hid their activity results at any rate; they impoverished and ruined those who tried to reveal them by

destroying small shops, etc. Among the deputies, a negative attitude towards such features of a municipal deputy's character as decency, honesty, responsibility, care about people's well-being grew ripe and became widely spread. Odesa municipal head N. Novoselskyi was always reproached of such character features.

In many towns, there were constant and serious violations. The representatives of self-government in Oleksandrivsk P. Zakharin and O. Vasylichenko were ill during several months, after that went on a 3-month business trips because of their own commercial affairs. A person refused to have the position of archivist in a public self-government. A. Miller, a merchant, was greatly surprised to have been elected to self-government; he was constantly ill and couldn't fulfill any duties and didn't even participate in the elections. Neither A. Liashenko nor P. Zakharin appointed instead of A. Miller could work because of serious illnesses either.

In Oleksandrivsk, Councilor Psovakha und Bürgermeister Zakhariev made 600 roubles a year having sold public property for own enrichment during their public activity, meanwhile ordinary deputies got 200–400 roubles a month, and heads of municipalities got 800–1000 roubles a month [Cheremisis, Mikhailenko, 2018, pp. 73–78]. Of course, this additional income was quite good to their salaries though everyone officially had sworn in their honesty and inspiration (The State Archive of Zaporizhzhia Region, f. 21. op. 1. d. 14, pp. 15–51).

There was one more behavioral type among deputies of self-government defined as “conformist”, having meant subnormal (not enough scrupulous) attitude towards their public duties. The dominating work challenge was an individual interest to do nothing. The representatives of this behavioral model were completely satisfied with the existing regime and wanted to change nothing in private, public or state life. They were entirely adapted to the existing order and felt comfortably with no necessity to change anything. They never fulfilled necessary work even with delay having regarded it useless for anyone and unpunished. The representatives of the given behavioral model could be found in district/povit or unimportant towns of Southern Ukraine: Oleksandriia, Bobrynets, Beryslav, Hryhoriopol, Novoheorhiivsk, Olviopol, Ochakiv, Oleshky, Yevpatoriia, Melitopol, Perekop, Bakhchysarai, Balaklava, Karasubazar, Nohaisk, Orikhiv, Staryi Krym, Yenikale, Verkhniodniprovsk, Bakhmut, Novomoskovsk, Pavlohrad, Slovianoserbsk, Maiaky.

The representatives of this model of behaviour were low educated. Similar facts were known in the towns of huberniia though in povit and unimportant towns it looked more seriously. For instance, in Bobrynets, citizens' cases were heard by local self-government for decades. In Ananiev and Ovidiopol, deputies of municipalities did not come to work at all. In Yelysavethrad, there was a complete disorder in the papers of self-government. That's why, Odesa mayor P. Zelenyi had an impression that the representatives of Yelysavethrad self-government weren't aware of paperwork at all. An interesting fact was known to have happened in Ochakiv; someone who dealt with paperwork was low educated and because of it, the activity of municipality was not fulfilled (Zelenyi, 1890, pp. 4–7).

The only thing that the deputies of local Dumas did was writing imaginary complaints about one another or about honest deputies. A very noticeable fact was that the described type of behaviour did not impress anybody but on the contrary had many supporters. After the reforms, this phenomenon was preserved and prospered almost in all the towns of Southern Ukraine where life and public money were spent with no aim, sense and punishment.

However, there always were people who fulfilled their duties in front of the public honestly and diligently having shown that, despite all the difficulties, a person could be a

moving factor of human relationships, modernization and, what was the most important, the carrier of the best spiritual forces.

According to the documents, deputies of self-government had different background, family status, financial situations and other characteristics and never had a mutual wish and possibility to work in favor of public that made them different from others: neither formalism nor bureaucracy but humanity in problems solution.

The notion of “town fathers” for the South Ukrainian towns was not abstract but personified in concrete individuals, for instance, in Kherson, D. Horlovskiyi, N. Blazhkov, M. Bekker, in Mykolaiv – V. Dotsenko, in Oleksandrivsk – Ya. Novytskyi, in Odesa – V. Novoselskyi, in Yelysavethrad – A. Pashutin and the others. Mariupol mayor A. Chebanenko and the members of administration K. Popov and K. Avertanov were highly respected and honoured for their working capacity, activity and innovations. Among the others one could speak about A. Karamanov, having combined functions of a secretary, member and deputy of Mariupol self-government and member of fairy and estimating commissions as well (The State Archive of Donetsk Region, f. 113. op. 1. d. 127, p. 2; SADR, f. 113. op. 1. d. 190. p. 20; SADR, f. 113. op. 1. d. 18, pp. 21–89).

They made themselves perfect, participated in active and social-political life, propagandized positiveness and necessity of self-government, were an example of behavior for the others and the most active at Duma sessions. Owing to their activity, a positive image of self-government was created and Southern Ukrainian towns became modern with water pipes, canalization, electrification, installation of telephones, trams, railways, cultural and educational events, medico-sanitary service, etc.

The public of the South Ukrainian towns elected the most capable, active and hardworking deputies of self-government and mayors to the State Duma at the beginning of the XXth century. In O. Konyk’s research one could read about 382 deputies in parliament having been elected from various Ukrainian huberniias, among which 15 deputies were from the South Ukrainian town self-government and made 4 % of all the deputies from the Ukrainian huberniias. Among the elected South Ukrainian representatives of town self-government there were: 9 municipal activists from Kherson huberniia, 3 municipal activists from Katerynoslavsk huberniia and 3 municipal activists from Tavriisk huberniia as well were elected to the State Duma. Having taken a social characteristic into account, it should be mentioned that 10 deputies, 3 honorable citizens, 1 bourgeois, 1 colonist were elected from noblemen. Having taken a religious characteristic into account, it should be said about 11 Orthodox people, 1 Carait, 1 Orthodox Jew, 1 Jew, and 1 Moslem. Among the deputies of the State Duma, the majority (11 people) had higher education, 3 people had secondary education and 1 person had a primary one. It should be mentioned about the most active participants (from 10 to 17) in the work of town дума, the rest people looked like inert masses with their incredible, just “heroic” efforts to sit in sessions silently. That’s why, the presence of a certain group of deputies called “silent or speechless” in the municipalities was typical of the most of South Ukrainian towns (Konyk, 2013, pp. 395–432).

For example, the deputy of Kherson municipality S. Kostyliiev spoke only twice for four years of his presence in the дума sessions: one time he spoke about the water pipe in Mykhailivska Street, the second time he spoke about a free commercial place in Admiralteiska Street which he wanted to acquire (Duma session, 1899, p. 2). S. Kostyliiev was one of the oldest activists of self-government, very energetic before 1900 and proposed many social-useful questions to have been discussed (Duma session, 1899, p. 2). Councilor I. Korbul was also too speechless during the sessions of municipality (Duma session, 1899, p. 2). Deputy N. Spozito was

constantly silent in sessions as well (Duma session, 1899, p. 2). Deputy A. Khodushyn was not very healthy to have been occupied with public affairs though he understood quite well all the peculiarities of town economy (Duma session, 1901, p. 2). Such deputies as P. Biliek, H Konyk, A Serebriakov, Tropin and the others were mostly silent at duma sessions (Duma session, 1901, pp. 1–2). Deputy P. Biliek took part in different commissions, showed independent and unusual thinking, but his positive features were not exposed in the debates in the municipality, so he remained speechless too (Duma session, 1901, p. 2).

Philanthropic representatives among town councilors were self-sufficing enough and differed from the others by their corresponding level of sacrifice for the sake of public affairs. The representatives of this kind can be characterized as super-normative and exclusively scrupulous officials of municipalities. They invested charitable events, participated in various commissions and committees. At the same time, they enjoyed their public duties. Public interest, development of own towns, modernization of urban vital space was the stimulus of their activity.

For instance, Kherson duma deputy M. Tropin did not only speak with the initiative of a free hospital for poor people but established it with his own money (Duma session, 1901, p. 2). Owing to his philanthropic activity, a great deal of poor population could have been treated free of charge that saved many lives. People appreciated such deeds greatly.

S. Chaikovskiy (Odesa magistrate official) (SAKR, f. 14. op. 1. d. 1579, pp. 1–14), B. Kartamyshev and V. Kharlamov (Odesa Bürgermeisters) (SAKR, f. 14. op. 1. d. 1654, pp. 1–7) were also famous with their philanthropic activity (SAKR, f. 14. op. 1. d. 455, pp. 1–4). They always helped (with their own money) the poorest, supported people during many epidemics. The direction of the huberniia proposed them higher positions but they refused because they wanted to be always with those who needed their help. With the first order they bought everything necessary. During a whole year, they helped to treat those having been suffering from plague, for this deed they were elected to the public committee having been helping poor people. They neither boasted with their merits nor demanded any compensation from town duma or from the state for their efforts. They helped the Orthodox church with own money and things as well. They gave expensive presents to seminarists. The highest reward for them was “appreciation and gratitude” and a gold(en) medal.

**The Conclusions.** Thus, it is possible to conclude that in the South Ukrainian towns, the only socio-professional image of a municipal official and behavioral identity was not formed.

According to the behavioral model, municipal officials can be divided into such types: egocentric, conformist, philanthropic, speechless, “town fathers”. That was exactly what made this region different from other regions where the composition of public institutions was mainly mixed; the South Ukrainian region was not completely dependent upon administrative authorities. In some regions of the Russian Empire, special positions of observers were created in municipalities to control their activity. The South Ukrainian towns did not have such positions and it gave freedom for individual activity; groups to protect town interests from self-will of administration and groups to organize town population in the cases of epidemics were formed; all this was full of town patriotism. A great interest of administrative authorities to rule this region with the help of military men and policemen gave freedom for self-government to have more initiatives in the affairs of towns. Such phenomena like bureaucratism, indifference, embezzlement of public funds or waste of budget costs were typical of the Southern Ukrainian towns, but there were many deputies who tried to work in a modernized (new) way because “a new life” opened space to modernize the activity of many deputies from municipalities. It was connected with the wish to become closer to Europe.

Town self-government became modern very quickly together with population; the officials of self-government were the first against the administrative tutelage and for autonomy, democratization of municipalities, they fought against bureaucratism and corruption as well. However, it should be noted that bribery and embezzlement of public funds were again spoken about with the beginning of “a new life” because of a big distance between this region and the center and as a result of a rapid modernization. The activity of deputies from public institutions was not always successful, many of them were imprisoned and beaten, honesty and sincerity were not always welcomed, opinion of their work was not positive but one can ascertain that regional and individual activity of the participants of the South Ukrainian self-government was considerably higher than in other regions.

The retreat from traditional relationships in the structures of power was seen in the absence of familial-protective relationships which were typical in other regions of the Empire. The beginning of “a new life” led to a rapid modernization, the self-government of Southern Ukraine got more active and there appeared hardworking representatives of the public who fought for autonomy and democratization of public structures. Foreigners in the structures of power of the Southern Ukraine spread West-European ideas and models of government that turned the New-Ukrainian region into European and formed a modernized town public to have thought in a modernized (European) way. Though familial and protective relationships were strong in different regions of the Empire and began to play a certain role and form a system at the end of the XIXth – the beginning of the XXth centuries, they were not very noticeable in town self-government; it was rare to see a father and son or other relatives at the same public office, though during the elections, the families of candidates into deputies were very active in advertising them.

Just in the South Ukrainian region, it was forbidden to elect the Jews to municipalities. They were allowed to have been elected to public administrations only after the reform of 1870; in other regions of the Empire, they were elected to municipalities where they hold leading positions in self-government and made a necessary majority even before the reform. Neither the South Ukrainian noblemen nor merchants had many seats in municipalities unlike in other regions, though in the South Ukrainian towns, the merchants were numerous in comparison with the other layers of the population. In a great number of public institutions of the Southern Ukraine, deputies were mainly Orthodox meanwhile in other regions there were many the Roman-Catholics, the Protestants, the Moslems, the Jews.

Thus, the representation of deputies in municipalities, social and professional images and types of behaviour were different in different regions of the Empire and depended upon regional and individual peculiarities of each region. In the South of Ukraine, the level of self-organization, entrepreneurship, opposition and typical models of behaviour was, to a great extent, higher than in other regions.

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## THE ROLE OF MUSIC CULTURE IN THE PROCESSES OF THE UKRAINIAN NATION FORMATION IN GALICIA (THE SECOND HALF OF THE XIXTH – THE BEGINNING OF THE XXTH CENTURY)

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the study is to determine the role and place of the musical component in the processes of the Ukrainian cultural nation formation in Galicia under the rule of the Habsburg monarchy. The research methodology is based on the integrated application of historical, retrospective and cultural methods. Historical method – in the coverage of the historical realities of socio-political life of Galician Ukrainians in the Habsburg Empire. Retrospective method – in the analytical reconstruction of cultural forms of public realization of national self-awareness of the Ukrainians in Galicia during the second half of the XIXth – the beginning of the XXth centuries. Culturological method – in the aesthetic assessment of artistic phenomena and forms that were born in the cultural space under the Austrian Galicia of the period under study and contributed to the Ukrainian nation-building in these areas. The scientific novelty of the research consists in singling out the cultural and artistic sphere as analytical optics, which allows a more complete understanding and evaluation of the historically significant processes of the Ukrainian identity formation of Galicians in the multicultural society of the Habsburg Empire. The Conclusions.* In the development of the Ukrainian national culture in Galicia during the second half of the XIXth – the beginning of the XXth century an important place was played by the activities of numerous musical societies, as well as the work of Galician composers, associated with the poetic words of Taras Shevchenko. These factors became an important issue in overcoming the Germanization and Polonization of the Galician population, who was under conditions where the Ukrainian language was removed from public life and sometimes even from home. This problem was partially tackled owing to the creative activity of O. Nyzhankivsky, D. Sichynsky, F. Kolessa, H. Topolnytsky, and Ya. Lopatynsky. The above mentioned composers referred to the texts of famous writers who represented the Ukrainian literature in Ukraine under the Russian rule (O. Konysky, B. Hrinchenko, Lesya Ukrainka, A. Krymsky) and in Galicia under the Austrian rule (I. Franko, U. Kravchenko, V. Pachovsky, B. Lepky, O. Lutsky). Thus, they affirmed and promoted not only the Ukrainian music, but also the Ukrainian word, awakening the “expressive spirit of the nation” by their work.

**Keywords:** national identity, Galician Ukrainians, cultural life, evenings dedicated to T. Shevchenko, music societies.

## РОЛЬ МУЗИЧНОЇ КУЛЬТУРИ В ПРОЦЕСАХ УКРАЇНСЬКОГО НАЦІЄТВОРЕННЯ У ГАЛИЧИНІ (ДРУГА ПОЛОВИНА XIX – ПОЧАТОК XX ст.)

**Анотація.** *Метою пропонованого дослідження є визначення ролі і місця музичної складової у процесах українського культурного націєтворення у Галичині в умовах панування монархії Габсбургів. Методологія дослідження побудована на комплексному застосуванні історичного, ретроспективного та культурологічного методів. Історичного – у висвітленні історичних реалій соціо-політичного буття галицьких українців в умовах імперії Габсбургів. Ретроспективного – в аналітичній реконструкції культурних форм публічної реалізації національного самоусвідомлення українців Галичини на межі XIX – XX ст. Культурологічного – при естетичній оцінці мистецьких явищ та форм, що народжувалися в культурному просторі південно-західної Галичини досліджуваного періоду і сприяли українському націєтворенню на цих теренах. Наукова новизна здійсненої розвідки полягає у виокремленні культурно-мистецької сфери як аналітичної оптики, що дає змогу більш повно осмислити її оцінити історично вагомі процеси формування української ідентичності галичан у мультикультурному соціумі імперії Габсбургів. Висновки.* У розбудові української національної культури у Галичині другої половини XIX – початку XX ст. вагоме місце відігравала діяльність численних музичних товариств, а також творчість галицьких композиторів, пов'язана з поетичним словом Т. Шевченка. Ці фактори стали вагомим чинником подолання германізації і полонізації галицького населення, що перебувало в умовах, де українська мова була усунута з публічного життя і деколи навіть з домашнього життєвого простору. Частково цю проблему вдалося подолати завдяки творчій діяльності

*О. Нижанківського, Д. Січинського, Ф. Колесси, Г. Топольницького, Я. Лопатинського. Згадані композитори зверталися до текстів відомих письменників, які репрезентували українську літературу в підросійській Україні (О. Кониський, Б. Грінченко, Леся Українка, А. Кримський) і в півдавстрійській Галичині (І. Франко, У. Кравченко, В. Пачовський, Б. Лепкий, О. Луцький). У такий спосіб вони утверджували та пропагували не лише українську музику, але й українське слово, пробуджуючи своєю творчістю “виразний дух нації”.*

**Ключові слова:** національна ідентичність, галицькі українці, культурне життя, шевченківські вечори, музичні товариства.

**The Problem Statement.** The movement for the national revival in Galicia, which intensified after the revolution of 1848, exacerbated the problems of the Ukrainian cultural society of that period. Absence of professional intellectuals (scientists, historians, writers, composers) in the Galician culture of the first half of the XIXth century caused the situation in which the Galician culture was created by “dilettantes” – representatives of the church administration, priests, officials. Therefore, the period, which began in the 1860s, is extremely important for understanding the peculiarities of the Ukrainian nation-formation, taking into account the role played by Eastern Galicia in the national history of the second half of the XIXth – the first decades of the XXth century.

One of the most important factors in the national identity formation of the Ukrainians in Galicia is the creative work of Taras Shevchenko. After all, it is he, according to Hryhoriy Hrabovych – “the core of the Ukrainian self-identification, the Ukrainian spirituality” (Hrabovych, 2000, p. 12). From the very beginning, the new national movement, led by students, writers, composers, publicists, teachers and students of the Ukrainian high schools, gravitated to the secular cultural tradition, which focused on the culture of the Dnieper Ukraine of that time.

**The Analysis of Recent Researches.** In the context of the processes of the Ukrainian nation-formation, the ceremonial symbolic aspect of celebrating the anniversaries and jubilees of prominent figures of the Ukrainian culture in Habsburg Galicia became especially important, first of all the anniversaries of Taras Shevchenko, who in the minds of the Ukrainians became a “living and eternally renewed myth” (Sverstiuk, 2011). According to Anthony Smith, this is the “area in which individual identity is the most closely linked to collective [...] and the importance of aesthetic considerations should not be underestimated – a sense of beauty, diversity, dignity and perseverance, generated by the masterful arrangement of forms, masses, sounds and rhythms, by which the arts are able to awaken the expressive “spirit” of the nation” (Smit, 1994, p. 170).

In the article “Nationalism and Jubilees” Ihor Chornovol, analyzing the monograph of the American historian Patricia Dabrowska, notes that the XIXth century can be classified as “the age of anniversaries” (Chornovol, 2017, p. 365). In her work the researcher proves that in Galicia jubilees had an extremely great influence on the political and cultural life of the region. The Ukrainian historians, in particular Mykola Lytvyn, Ihor Raikivsky, Ostap Sereda, Feodosii Stebliy, and the others, analyzed the topic of the cult formation of T. Shevchenko in Galicia. Instead, the problem of the musical component of literary and musical evenings dedicated to T. Shevchenko and its role in the processes of the Ukrainian nation formation in the works of historians and musicologists is still covered insufficiently. This also concerns other public forms of Galician musical life in the second half of the XIXth – the beginning of the XXth centuries.

Therefore, **the purpose** of the study is to determine the role and place of cultural and artistic component in the processes of the Ukrainian nation formation in Galicia under the rule of the Habsburg monarchy.

**The Main Material Statement.** Musicologist Tetiana Cherednychenko focuses on the importance of music in the knowledge of history, supporting her own arguments with authoritative statements of a prominent German historian, Felix Mendelssohn's home teacher, Johann Gustav Droyzen, who believed that musical works, as a historical document, could be more authentic than written chronicles. Instead, according to the researcher, from the middle of the last century music was not only forgotten "to be heard and understood", but it was not also forgotten to extract from music cultural and historical meanings (Cherednychenko, 1995, p. 189). And although the history of music, according to the English culturologist Peter Burke, was not completely removed (along with other arts) from the traditional historical and political paradigm, it was marginalized and found itself on the sidelines of historians' interests. Instead, J. G. Droyzen included musical works into the subjective category of sources, the hallmark of which was complicity, the desire of composers to express that, what excited them as a result of certain historical events and attempts to arouse the same feelings in their listeners. The historian argued that "a work of art can be fully understood only in its historical context" (Droyzen, 2004, p. 129).

Anthony Smith wrote about the importance of music in the process of crystallization of original national images and their distribution to a large audience in the work "Nations and Nationalism in the Global Age". Thus, in his opinion, interest in "operas by Verdi, Wagner and Mussorgsky, symphonies and symphonic poems by Elgar, Dvorzhak and Tchaikovsky, or in this century by Bartok, Janacek and Sibelius testifies to the increasing involvement of broad sections of the population in the national ethnic culture, re-appropriated and supported by indigenous intellectuals" (Smit, 2009, p. 97).

The annual evenings dedicated to T. Shevchenko in Lviv and other Galician cities stimulated the creative activity of the Ukrainians, whose cultural space was separated by the Austrian-Russian border, and the need for the Ukrainian musical repertoire initiated its constant replenishment. Yakym Horak and Natalia Dziatko based on reviews and materials of the Ukrainian periodicals compiled a chronograph of the programmes of literary and musical concerts dedicated to T. Shevchenko in Lviv during 1866 – 1914, on the basis of which it is possible to form an idea not only about the state of acquaintance of the Galicians with the work of Taras Shevchenko (which was reflected in the musical concerts dedicated to T. Shevchenko), but also to draw a conclusion about a certain level of maturity of the Galician-Ukrainian culture. This is indicated, in particular, by the principle of selection of works for those evenings, as well as their artistic value (first of all, it is about compliance with the requirements of "raising the national spirit") (Horak, 2014, p. 66).

In contrast to the "evenings dedicated to T. Shevchenko" of the 1860s, which were quite modest in their compositional and performance capabilities and scale, the 1870s demonstrated a completely new approach to holding these evenings (since 1868 – annual) events, in which the musical component increased significantly. Evenings in memory of Taras Shevchenko were gradually transformed into large-scale concerts with an introductory speech about the poet, which in different years was proclaimed by prominent figures of the movement for a national revival: Julian Tselevych, Omelian Ogonovsky, Volodymyr Barvinsky, Oleksandr Barvinsky, Anatol Vakhnianyn, Mykhailo Podolynsky, Omelian Kalytovsky, Hryhoriy Tseglynsky, and at the end of the XIXth and the beginning of the XXth century – Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Oleksandr Kolessa, Ivan Franko, Volodymyr Shukhevych, Vasyl Shchurat and the others.

From 1872, the concerts dedicated to T. Shevchenko in Lviv, due to their representativeness, began to be held for some time in the Town Hall, then in the Great Hall of the People's



House, and from 1904 – in the philharmonic hall. Even Austrian military orchestras were regularly invited to participate. This tradition lasted until 1914 and was not interrupted even with the beginning of World War I, but only changed the form of presentation, because the celebrations took place in the Legion of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, and in 1818 – 1819 – in the Ukrainian Galician Army (UGA). Despite the annual changes in the programmes, the principle of their formation remained unchanged for a long time. A literary and musical evening usually began with a speech, followed by an orchestra or choir or, conversely, – a performance by an orchestra, and then one or sometimes two speakers delivered their essays on the creative figure of T. Shevchenko. During the period of 1874 – 1914 the military orchestra of Regiment 9, Infantry Regiment 80 under command of Friedrich, Infantry Regiment 30 under command of P. Roll and Jakubicek were invited to participate in the concerts, Infantry Regiment 15 under command of Konopasek. Among the performed orchestral works – Mykhailo Verbytsky's "Symphony", Mykola Lysenko's "Cossak-Shumka" and the overture to the operetta "Chornomoret" by Mykola Lysenko, overture by Petro Shchurovsky, from the opera "Bohdan Khmelnytsky", as well as his orchestras "Dream" and "Tropak", Symphonic Dance No. 1 and military march "Under the Walls of Jericho" by Stanislav Lyudkevych, "Ukrainian Rhapsody" by Vasyl Barvinsky, etc. As for the orchestral music of Western European composers, the works of Bedrich Smetana, Richard Wagner, Zdeněk Fibich, Anton Rubinstein, and Petro Tchaikovsky were performed in these concerts during different years.

Among the participants of these concerts a prominent politician and public figure Anatoly Vakhnianyn should be noted, primarily as a singer, conductor and composer, who took an active part in all events in the honour the poet for many years. His own vocal works, as well as solo songs and scenes from operas by M. Lysenko, Semen Hulak-Artemovsky and Western European composers sounded in the evenings dedicated to T. Shevchenko performed by the stars of the European opera scene during different years: Panteleimon Borkovsky, Oleksandr Myshuha, Solomiya Krushelnytska and Modest Mentsynsky. Active participants of the concerts were the choirs of the societies "Liutnia", "Lviv Boyan", academic choir "Banduryst". During the fifty-year history of "music and recitation evenings", not only singers but also well-known instrumentalists of that time were invited to perform there. The programmes included piano sonatas and concerts of Ludwig Beethoven, violin pieces and concerts of F. Mendelssohn, Henri Vietan, Henryk Wieniawski, Pablo Sarasate; piano concertos, rhapsodies and transcriptions by Ferenc Liszt, piano pieces by Frederic Chopin, M. Lysenko and W. Barvinsky, and the list can be continued.

Concerts dedicated to T. Shevchenko became one of the most important components of the cultural and social life of Galician Ukrainians in the last third of the XIXth – the beginning of the XXth centuries. According to Ostap Sereda, they were the watershed that "witnessed the transition from" church-folk "to cultural nationalism" (Sereda, 2013, p. 32). T. Shevchenko set another height for the Ukrainian culture, returning it to eternal universal spiritual values (Sverstiuk, 2011, p. 75).

In the programmes of these evenings, starting from the 1860s, you can see a fairly large percentage of works of Western European music, and this, in turn, encourages reflection on what did the organizers intend when they included into the concerts instrumental virtuoso works of classical and romantic composers, as well as orchestral music, which was not even thematically connected with the Ukrainian culture or its history? The answer is that Galician intellectuals sought to draw the musical heritage of national culture into the wider pan-European cultural context, thus forming a common axis, where next to the composers

who represented the high canon of European musical art, there was a place for the Dnieper Ukraine inhabitants: M. Lysenko, S. Hulak-Artemovsky, Peter Nishchinsky; the Galicians: M. Verbytsky, A. Vakhnyanyn, Isydor Vorobkevych, Viktor Matiuk, Ostap Nyzhankivsky, Denys Sichynsky, Filaret Kolessa, Henryk Topolnytsky, Yosyf Kyshakevych, S. Liudkevych and V. Barvinsky. By such a conscious and to some extent ideological act, Galician Ukrainians tried to demonstrate the importance of their own artistic achievements in their genre diversity publicly (after all, no wonder an important place was occupied by orchestral music) and high performance professionalism, and hence the ability to perceive and create high culture. Therefore, the diverse repertoire of literary and musical evenings dedicated to T. Shevchenko (at which there was performed the music of Georg F. Handel, Johann S. Bach, R. Wagner and Max Bruch) was enriched by the works of the Ukrainian composers annually. At the end of the XIXth century, the Ukrainian works made up the majority of concert programmes. All this testifies to the political foresight of the national cultural movement leaders in the field of the Ukrainian culture and national consciousness formation.

By including works of European music in the programmes, as well as by inviting not only Ukrainian, but also Polish and German performers, their organizers sought to promote still little-known Ukrainian culture at that time (including the Ukrainian performers) among the Polish and German populations of Galicia. After all, since 1870, these concerts were attended by the top leaders of the political establishment, including the Galician governor Count Agenor Golukhovsky and other high-ranking officials. It should be noted that the performance of works by Western European composers during the concerts dedicated to T. Shevchenko also helped the Galicians to learn about and reflect on other cultures. In this act of self-reflection, one's own and another's culture become interconnected, because "one can understand his or her culture only by trying to understand the others" (Voiakovskiy, 2012, p. 100).

According to O. Sereda, the recitation of T. Shevchenko's poetry during musical and literary evenings encouraged the joint emotional experience of his texts, and thus influenced the formation of a collective Ukrainian identity in the circles of educated Galician Ukrainians (Sereda, 2013, p. 32). The musical works of the Ukrainian composers had even a stronger influence on the Galician public, because some of them (including choral and solo vocal compositions based on the words of Taras Shevchenko) were written and dedicated to these events specially, and it was not in vain because in 1872 there were many people willing to listen to M. Lysenko's "Testament" at the concerts dedicated to T. Shevchenko. And if O. Sereda emphasizes that the recitation of Shevchenko's poems together with the works of Galician Ukrainian writers contributed to the formation of a common national literary canon, the concerts dedicated to T. Shevchenko, on the one hand, gave impetus to the enrichment and replenishment of the musical repertoire, on the other hand, – they created conditions for the formation of a single national cultural and musical space, the central figure of which was M. Lysenko. It should be added that the programmes of the evenings of 1880 – 1914 were marked by a certain Slavophile bias, as at the concerts there were often performed the works by composers of the Slavic origin: Stanislav Moniushko, F. Chopin, B. Smetana, Z. Fibich, Vitezlav Novak, Alexander Borodin, Alexander Dargomyzhsky, A. Rubinstein, P. Tchaikovsky.

We should pay tribute to the Galicians, who, at concerts dedicated to T. Shevchenko, promoted the creative achievements of M. Lysenko actively and composers of that part of Ukraine which was under the Russian rule. This greatly influenced the national discourse in Galicia of that period, which professed the idea of a national unity and cultural homogeneity of the Rusko-Ukrainian lands on both sides of the Zbruch. It is common knowledge that the

national identity, as an integral part of the existence of a modern person, manifests itself through a cultural homogeneity. F. Kolessa in the obituary in memory of M. Lysenko, recalling the impression made on the student youth by his cantatas and solo songs, performed by such primary singers as S. Krushelnytska, M. Mentsinsky, O. Myshuha, stated, “that the long-term activity of Mykola Lysenko was of a great importance for the awakening of the national forces of Galician and Bukovynian Ukrainians, his activity was a great rise of their cultural revival” (Kolessa, 1947, p. 32). Therefore, a significant event in the cultural life of Galicia was the celebration of the 35th anniversary of M. Lysenko’s creative activity. I. Franko in the article “Celebration of Lysenko’s Creative Activity in Austria” called the anniversary of the composer a great and “purely Ruske holiday”. The writer noted that “these were not those Ruski masses who flooded Lviv many times with thousands of serdaks, sheepskin coats, and reverends, these were not the Rusyns whom the Poles had long been accustomed to characterizing with contemptuous words “popi i chłopi” (Franko, 2006, p. 81). After all, M. Lysenko’s enthusiastic audience consisted mainly of young people, women, lawyers, doctors, courtiers, teachers, government officials, businessmen, merchants, and the secular intelligentsia. The ethnic Pole, Marshal Count Stanislaw Badeni, who closely followed the process of celebrating the anniversary, in a private conversation said: “Although I knew that there were many of you, the Rusyns, scattered around the country, I never thought that there were so many of you” (Franko, 2006, p. 81).

Literary and musical evenings were an important, but not the only form of a national, cultural life of the Ukrainians in Galicia. Taking into consideration the development of public culture as one of the reasons for the nation formation, we can observe a great role of numerous societies in this process, whose activities in the Habsburg monarchy, although began before the Restoration, but intensified during this period. In Galicia, this camaraderie was manifested in a male cappella choral singing and developed a sense of unity, the performers themselves, taking into consideration the culture orientation of that time to autocommunication, were both its addressees and recipients, aware of dignity and a spiritual rank of music. In addition, the activities of these societies were not limited to programmes of a purely cultural nature, as their musical enthusiasm was politically motivated. After all, identity, according to E. Smith, is not just identity, when members of one group differ in their tastes, customs and language from members of another group. It is no less important to discover the “collective self” through art, literature, history, because each nation has its own unique way of thinking (Smit, 1994, p. 84).

It is known that the first Russian-Ukrainian music society in Galicia “Theorban” was founded in Lviv in 1871 by the efforts of A. Vakhnianyn and a famous Galician politician and cultural figure Julian Lavrovsky. Although it did not operate for a long period of time, but, as it can be seen from the published Statute, it aimed at promoting the development of a national musical art. In 1880, in Lviv “Lviv Men Choir”, also known as “Liutnia” Singing Society, was organized on the basis of the choir of the Galician Music Society. One of its leaders was A. Vakhnianyn. In programme terms, the society, whose members were representatives of different nationalities, declared interethnic tolerance, and its choir took an active part in the Ukrainian representative musical and literary events for many years.

At the end of the XIXth – the beginning of the XXth century one of the most important events in the national cultural life of Galicia was the foundation of the Ukrainian singing and choral society “Lviv Boyan” in December of 1890, whose chairman was V. Shukhevych, a conductor A. Vakhnianyn, and one of the honorary members – M. Lysenko. From the first months of its existence, the society promoted the national musical art, held various

musical events on the occasion of memorable anniversaries, honored prominent figures of the Ukrainian culture.

It should be noted that almost all comrade organizations that operated in the large cities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, had the same tasks approximately. The primary task of “Lviv Boyan”, as well as other “subsidiary” societies, which on the example of “Lviv Boyan”, were organized in other cities of Galicia, in particular in Przemyśl (1891), Brzezany (1892), Stryi (1894), Kolomyia (1895) and Stanislav (1895), was the desire to mobilize by involving in choral singing “a formerly passive community to form a nation around a new folk-historical culture, rediscovered by intellectuals” (Smit, 1994, p. 74). The attempt to provide art education in the “spirit of national values” prompted the leaders of the “Union of Singing and Music Societies” (formed in 1903 as a result of merging the societies into one organization) to establish the “Higher Music Institute” in Lviv.

In a letter to the Governorate dated on September 27, 1903, A. Vakhnianyn formulated the goal of establishing the first higher music school in Ukraine, emphasizing that music had a great influence on the development of general education, and the establishment of a music institution “would improve the younger generations” (Mazepa, & Mazepa, 2003, p. 214). Leaders of the Ukrainian national movement were well aware that the awakening of the nation to its collective “I” is impossible without a sense of identity, independence, without the formation of their own culture, their national symbols and attributes, national forms of education. After all, the lack of cultural and educational resources limits the possibilities of the national movement and weakens it significantly. And this serves a convincing proof that cultural values, “selected, interpreted, restored, form one unique national identity among many other no less unique cultural identities” (Smit, 1994, p. 93). It is no coincidence that S. Liudkevych, as one of the founders of music education in Galicia, noted in one of his articles that “we must not serve as a pliable material to another’s culture; this would be an unforgivable sin. We must create in Lviv such musical institutions as soon as possible that would produce our good musical material for their musical culture” (Liudkevych, 2000, p. 254).

According to S. Liudkevych, “the creation of “high” culture is inconceivable without an appropriate level of education, because “without intensive the so-called cultural work we do not think not only about the rise of cultural, but even about the political significance” (Liudkevych, 2000, p. 254). It is no coincidence that E. Smith argues that nationalism as an ideology and symbolism [...] everywhere calls on the intelligentsia to turn “low” culture into “high”, oral culture into written, on the literary tradition, in order to preserve its fund of irreplaceable cultural values to posterity [...] earlier peoples were chosen for their alleged virtues; today they are called to be nations in view of their cultural heritage” (Smit, 1994, p. 93).

Music played an important role not only in the activities of music societies in Galicia. To music important role must be added the Ukrainian student organizations that emerged at the beginning of the 1960s as a result of the division of the public into supporters of Russophiles and nationalists. The Ukrainian student movement was nationally centric, and the activities of the first official student society of “the Sich” were associated with Vienna, where it was formed in 1868. The idea of founding the society belonged to A. Vakhnianyn (at that time a student at the University of Vienna), who was elected its first chairman. In his “Memoirs”, the composer noted that the aim of the society was to represent the Rusyns as a separate people, and thus to acquaint other Slavic peoples with our song and literature. In 1906, in Lviv a student choir society, known as Lviv Men’s Choir “Banduryst”, was organized. Its goal was to nurture the Ukrainian music, many concerts in Galicia and abroad, the organization of lectures on music theory and, etc.

In 1909, an all-Ukrainian student congress was convened in Lviv, which resulted in the founding of “the Ukrainian Student Union”. The objective of the newly created society was the “the culture movement of the Ukrainian people”, and the ultimate goal – the state conciliar independence of the Ukrainian people (Kuzmyn, 2016, p. 47). Owing to the efforts of the “Ukrainian Student Union” in 1913 a solemn concert was organized in honour of Ivan Franko, and the following year, in 1914, the society in cooperation with the men’s choir “Banduryst” and the student choir of the Higher Polytechnic School “Fundamentals” organized events to honour the memory of Taras Shevchenko. Researchers draw attention to the difficult conditions in which the activities of the Ukrainian cultural and educational societies in Galicia unfolded, taking into consideration the Polish-Ukrainian confrontation, which forced the Ukrainians to defend their national rights and interests constantly.

The musical component was important in the activities of those public organizations that, at first glance, did not have common ground with music. This is, in particular, the Ukrainian patriotic sports society “Sokil”, founded in 1894 in Lviv, and later in other cities of Galicia, like the Polish and Czech patriotic and gymnastic societies under the same name. As it is known, one of the tasks of the “Sokil”, in addition to the development of certain sports, was the cultivation of singing and music among its members. In 1902, at the meetings of the music commission of the above mentioned society, the issues of the curricula of the future Higher Music Institute were discussed. One of the main speakers was S. Liudkevych. Moreover, for the regional movement “Sokil”, which took place in 1911, the composer wrote a number of works with a strong patriotic theme, in particular, a march for the brass orchestra “Zaporizhzhya campaign” on the theme of the song “Oh, our Glorious Cossacks Went”; marches for brass orchestra on the themes of songs “Hey there, on the Mountain, the Sich Goes”, “Be Brave, Friends”, “Hey, do not be Surprised”, “Grow, oh you, old oak”, “Hey, boasted”. They were intended for a musical accompaniment of gymnastic exercises with sticks, as well as for marching. In 1911, in honour of the chairman of the society Ivan Bobersky (he was also a professor of physical culture, the German language and classical philology at the first academic gymnasium in Lviv) S. Liudkevych wrote a cantata, the manuscript of which did not survive.

Analyzing the contacts of the Galicians in the Austrian Empire with representatives of Ukraine in the Russian Empire, the Galician historians usually highlight the most important stages of the national movement in Galicia, which took place with the direct participation of figures from the Dnieper region (Naddniproshchyna). According to Volodymyr Doroshenko, each of these periods is associated with some iconic figure (Raikivskyi, 2012, p. 30). The majority agrees that in the second half of the XIXth century such individuals were Panteleimon Kulish, Mykhailo Drahomanov and Mykhailo Hrushevsky. If we analyze the Galician-Dnieper relations in the context of the development of musical art, then we should single out only two figures: Dmytro Bortniansky, whose undeniable influence marked the 1820 – 1850s in the history of professional musical culture in Galicia and M. Lysenko, whose contacts with Galicia began at the end of the 60’s of the XIXth century. From 1869 M. Lysenko corresponded with A. Vakhnyanin, O. Partytsky and O. Barvinsky actively, and from the 1880s – with I. Franko, his wife (Olha Franko), O. Ohonovsky, O. Nyzhankivsky, F. Kolessa, I. Puliuy and many other figures of the Galician national movement. In one of the first letters to O. Barvinsky, dated from 1869, M. Lysenko expressed the opinion that “we, blood people, children of the only mothers, should not, should not separate, but unite the strongest way” (Lysenko, 1964, p. 84). In a letter to A. Vakhnyanyn, the composer asks:



“Do not be ashamed of us and our letters” (Lysenko, 1964, p. 85). In the letters addressed to I. Franko, O. Nyzhankivsky and F. Kolessa, M. Lysenko raises a number of issues concerning the development of Galician musical art on a national basis.

**The Conclusions.** In the development of the Ukrainian national culture in Galicia in the second half of the XIXth – at the beginning of the XXth century a significant place was played by the activities of numerous musical societies, as well as the work of Galician composers, associated with the poetic words of Taras Shevchenko. These factors became an important factor in overcoming the Germanization and Polonization of the Galician population, who was under conditions where the Ukrainian language was removed from a public life and, often, even at home. Partially, this problem was overcome owing to the creative work of O. Nyzhankivsky, D. Sichynsky, F. Kolessa, H. Topolnytsky. The above mentioned composers used the texts of famous writers who represented the Ukrainian literature in Ukraine of the Russian Empire (Olexander Konysky, Borys Hrinchenko, Lesya Ukrainka, Ahatanhel Krymsky) and in Galicia under the Austrian Empire (I. Franko, Uliana Kravchenko, Vasył Pachovsky, Bohdan Lepky, Ostap Lutsky). Thus, they affirmed and promoted not only the Ukrainian music, but also the Ukrainian word, awakening the “expressive spirit of the nation” with their work.

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**FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO RZECZPOSPOLITA:  
HISTORY OF THE POLISH STATE IN THE RECEPTION OF THE JOURNAL  
"KWARTALNIK HISTORYCZNY" (1887 – 1939)**

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the research is to reveal how the process of researching issues related to the origin, formation and development of the Polish state from ancient times to Rzeczpospolita was reflected on the pages of the journal "Kwartalnik Historyczny". The methodology of the research is based on the principles of historicism, systematization, scientificity, verification, authorial objectivity, moderate narrative constructivism, as well as the use of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and special historical (historical genetic, historical typological, historical systemic) methods. The scientific novelty is to present a discussion on the pages of the journal "Kwartalnik Historyczny" issues on the history of the Polish state: the origin, formation and its political and legal functioning. The latter is of utmost importance in the context of attempts to create synthesis on the history of Poland at the beginning of the XXth century, which was joined, first of all, by historians*

of state and law. **The Conclusions.** As we can see, many issues from the history of Poland from ancient times to Rzeczpospolita were covered in numerous studies, critical and source materials on the journal's pages. The most numerous group of materials devoted to this epoch were critical reviews and studies of political history, in the study of which scholars appealed to the time of the creation of the state and its greatest power. The authors of the journal dealt with a very wide range of topics: from the ancient state's name genesis, clarifying the history of the persons of the founding princes and builders of the state to the influence of geographical factors on its development features. The Polish statehood's restoration in 1918 forced the researchers of the time to draw parallels: first of all, with the plots of ancient Poland, second of all, with the times of its greatest economic and political power in the XVIth – at the beginning of the XVIIth centuries, inspiring reflection on the development models of the most optimal functioning of the Second Rzeczpospolita.

**Key words:** Polish historiography, historical press, journal “Kwartalnik Historyczny”, history of the Polish state.

### ВІД ДАВНІХ ЧАСІВ ДО РЕЧІ ПОСПОЛИТОЇ: ІСТОРІЯ ПОЛЬСЬКОЇ ДЕРЖАВИ У РЕЦЕПЦІЇ ЧАСОПИСУ “KWARTALNIK HISTORYCZNY” (1887 – 1939)

**Анотація.** *Мета дослідження* – розкрити як на сторінках часопису “Kwartalnik Historyczny” відобразився процес дослідження проблем, пов'язаних із походженням, становленням й розвитком польської держави від найдавніших часів до Речі Посполитої. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на принципах історизму, системності, науковості, верифікації, авторської об'єктивності, поміркованого нарративного конструктивізму, а також на використанні загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, узагальнення) та спеціально-історичних (історико-генетичний, історико-типологічний, історико-системний) методів. **Наукова новизна полягає** у представленні обговорення на сторінках часопису “Kwartalnik Historyczny” питань з історії польської держави: зародження, утворення та її політико-правового функціонування. Останнє має особливе значення у контексті спроб створення на початку ХХ ст. синтезу історії Польщі, до чого долучилися найперше історики держави і права. **Висновки.** Як бачимо, на сторінках часопису у численних дослідженнях, критичних та джерельних матеріалах знайшло висвітлення чимало питань з історії Польщі від найдавніших часів до Речі Посполитої. Найчисленнішою групою матеріалів, присвячених згаданій епосі, були критичні огляди та студії з політичної історії, у студіюванні якої вчені апелювали до часів створення держави та її найбільшої могутності. Автори часопису торкалися дуже широкого діапазону тем: від генези назви давньої держави, з'ясування історичності персон князів-засновників та будівничих держави до питань впливу географічних чинників на особливості її розбудови. Відновлення польської державності у 1918 р. нав'язувало тодішнім дослідниками проведення паралелей: по-перше, з сюжетами створення Давньої Польщі, а по-друге – з часами найбільшої економічної та політичної її могутності у XVI – початку XVII ст., інспіруючи до роздумів про вироблення моделей найбільш оптимального функціонування II Речі Посполитої.

**Ключові слова:** польська історіографія, історична преса, часопис “Kwartalnik Historyczny”, історія польської держави.

**The Problem Statement.** From the beginning of its existence, “Kwartalnik Historyczny”, as an integral part of Polish historiography, reflected its current state with all the changes of both methodological and ideological nature. Created as an official body of the Historical Society in Lviv, the journal very quickly, primarily due to the high scientific level and universality of its content, took the leading positions not only among historians but also in the Polish society united around the idea of restoring their own state. At the end of the XIXth century, after a series of unsuccessful attempts by the Poles to regain their independence by force of arms, it was historiography that became the epicenter of reflections on the past and future of the Polish state. And topics devoted to the history of the Polish state and law began to dominate on the pages of scientific publications.

**The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications.** The first reflections on the Polish state formation study in the Middle Ages date back to the 30-ies of the XXth century and they were related to the summing up of half a century of activity of the Polish Historical Society (Tymieniecki, 1937, pp. 258–288). Subsequently, a number of works of a generalizing nature appeared, such as the research of E. Maternicki, which in a problematic personalist way represented the study of the history of Ancient Poland and its political and legal system at the end of the XIXth – at the end of the XXth centuries (Maternicki, 1982). Nowadays the above-mentioned issue is raised in works on theoretical and methodological transformations of Polish historical science of the period (Kolbuszewska, 2005), as well as in the context of individual stories from the past of Polish historical science (Lazurko; Luchenko, 2019). The researchers turn to the Polish state genesis in the concepts of Galician historians at the turn of the XIXth – XXth centuries (Wierzbicki, 2015, pp. 63–84). However, there are still no special studies devoted to the pages of the journal “Kwartalnik Historyczny” topics related to the history of the formation and development of the Polish state, especially given that this magazine throughout its publication in Lviv (1887 – 1939) remained the most authoritative tribune of Polish historical science.

**The purpose of the research** is to reveal how the process of researching issues related to the origin, formation and development of the Polish state from ancient times to Rzeczpospolita was reflected on the pages of the journal “Kwartalnik Historyczny”.

**The Main Material Statement.** The main part of the content of “Kwartalnika Historycznego” of Lviv period was occupied by research on the history of Poland, in particular political. In the work “Polish historiography in the Context of the Restoration of the State”, published in the magazine in 1923, S. Zakrzewski, writing about the development of Polish historical science during captivity, noted that during this period researchers focused primarily on disseminating knowledge about history Homeland, dealt with the problem of the relation “The Polish state – the Polish people” (Zakrzewski, 1923, p. 289). A reflection of this state of affairs is, in fact, the content of the magazine “Kwartalnik Historyczny”, on the pages of which we see a large number of materials on political history. In these studies, the scholars tried to find an answer to the most painful for the then the Polish society the question of loss of state independence, and in this context the question of “viability” of the state since its inception.

At the time of the organization of the Historical Society and the founding of “Kwartalnika Historycznego” Polish studies of the Middle Ages already had their own established traditions and moved on the echoed by the scientists of the XIXth century. The magazine presented the political history of medieval Poland in a number of problems: the genesis of the Polish people, the origin of the state, the formation and rule of the Piast dynasty, the foreign policy history of the Piast dynasty, domestic and foreign policy during the Jagiellonian dynasty, the Jagiellonian idea.

On issues related to ancient history, the Polish researchers paid great attention to the problem of the genesis of the Polish people, which was at the intersection of interests not only of historians but also of ethnographers and linguists. The Polish scholars always studied the historical origins of their people actively and, given the breadth of discussion, this historiographical phenomenon was called in science “Lehiada”. Since the creation of “Kwartalnik Historycznego”, the editorial board took an active part in the scientific controversy over these issues. Having a wide literary base and its own long research tradition in the Polish historiography, the problem received a new impetus for development in connection



with the publication of A. Maletsky's work "Lechites in the Light of Historical Criticism" (1897). A review of A. Maletsky's research, which actualized a critical consideration of the question "Why is the name "the Poles" associated with the older name of the Lyakhy – Lechites?", was carried out in the journal by K. Potkansky. The reviewer emphasized that the author revised the existing theories of the genesis of the Polish people, subjecting them to professional scientific criticism in the spirit of the classical positivist method. In his own scientific hypothesis, A. Maletsky composed elements of historical and historical literary criticism successfully (Potkański, 1898, pp. 291–300). Furthermore, being closely connected with the era of "Kwartalnika Historycznego" humble beginnings and the creation of the "face" of the magazine, this work conducted by A. Maletsky led to the creation of a special column called "Lechica" (Lechica), which the editorial board established for scientific discussion and invited to discuss the above-mentioned issue all interested persons (Redakcyja Kwartalnika Historycznego, 1898, p. 1). One of the first responses to the editorial board's call was the intelligence of the Russian historian E. Kunik "Lechica" – a kind of critical view on the previous interpretation of the Lechica issue. E. Kunik outlined the main research periods in the history of the scientific "Lechiada", addressed the Slavic onomastics' issue and the names of Poles' variants in the languages of different European nations (Kunik, 1898, pp. 3–20). In addition, the renowned linguist Jan Baudouin de Courtenay also took part in the discussion, translating E. Kunik's work from German into Polish for the magazine and publishing fragments of personal polemical correspondence with the Russian scholar on the pages of "Kwartalnika Historycznego".

It should be mentioned that the traditions in the "Lechica" section, which were laid down during the magazine's thematic priorities formation, carried on in the interwar period. Thus, the topic of "Lechiada" on the pages of "Kwartalnika Historycznego" of that time was addressed by T. E. Model in his work on medieval onomastics. He made a number of critical remarks concerning the names of Greater Moravia, Greater or White, Croatia and White Serbia, which were mentioned in the work, written by the Byzantine Emperor Constantine VII Flavius Porphyrogenitus "On the Governance of the Empire" (the Xth century). The researcher E. T. Modelski dwelled on the Slavic (Polish) tribal union of the Lendians issue, which was mentioned by Constantine, on purpose. The term "Lendians" ("Lendizi"), derived from the word land (ląd), meant a plot of arable land. According to E. T. Modelski, such ethnonyms came from the "Lendians" and were used in different nations in order to describe the Poles, such as "lyakh" – the Russians, "lenkas" (lenkas) – the Lithuanians, and lendel (lendyel) – the Hungarians (Modelski, 1920, pp. 1–29).

Furthermore, another issue that became the subject of lively discussion on the pages of the magazine was the genesis issue, along with finding out the Polish state's name origin. In particular, much attention was paid to issues related to the legendary Piast activities, whose name gave the name to the dynasty of Polyany rulers, who ruled in Poland until 1370. It is noteworthy that these issues became the subject of research not only historians, but also philologists and ethnographers, which indicates the interdisciplinary orientation of the publication. Thus, the work of one of the most authoritative medievalists of the time, T. Wojciechowski, which was devoted to the Piast dynasty establishment, received a positive review. T. Wojciechowski dwelled on the problem of finding out the Piast identity. Consequently, the author reoriented the reader from the traditional for his time study of writing in other areas – in the world of legends and retellings, using in his studies a method different from the traditional positivist. In his opinion, there was no proper name for the

“Piast”, but there was a strong government of the Piast. Hence, the author made a conclusion that the father of Zemomysl (or himself) was the Piast (literally – the right hand, majordomo, manager) of the previous prince (Piekosiński, 1897, pp. 137–147).

In addition, A. Brickner, the famous historian and philologist, devoted a study to the philological aspect of this issue, which was called “On the Piast” (1897). Like T. Wojciechowski, A. Brickner substantiated his research with the oral folk art materials. The author put forward his own original interpretation of the origin of the Piast name and, unlike T. Wojciechowski, proved the historicity of his person. One more researcher, K. Potkański also reviewed the study for the journal (Potkański, 1900, pp. 2–16).

V. Bruchnalski, who treated these issues from a philological and ethnographic point of view, also focused on elucidating Piast’s personality in his study published in the journal. Based on the works, written by T. Wojciechowski, A. Brickner and S. Ciszewski, devoted to the historical, philological and ethnographic aspects of the Piast issue, V. Bruchnalski built his own concept, close to T. Wojciechowski’s concept. According to the researcher, since the name Piast was not later repeated in this dynasty, it was rather a term meaning the government or the governor. In addition, it was suggested that the name was invented a bit later, was of ethnological origin and meant the same thing as the Pole. Based on another version, it could be a nickname of non-aristocratic origin, which because of this later in the dynasty could not be repeated (Bruchnalski, 1906, pp. 626–663).

A milestone in the reconstruction of the history of this dynasty was the appearance of the fundamental work of O. Balzer “The Piasts Genealogy”, which to this day remains the most accurate, encyclopedic study of the topic. The above-mentioned study, devoted to the dynastic ties of the Piasts, was published by S. Laguna on the pages of the journal “Kwartalnik Historyczny”. O. Balzer created the most complete register of names of the Piast dynasty at that time, which began with the name of Zemomysl, Meshko’s father. Omitting legends about Piast, he clarified and corrected a number of dates and names, covering and “plowing”, as S. Laguna noted, six centuries of the Polish history. Due to the limitations of the review article, the reviewer focused on only some issues of this work, which for the virtuoso use of a huge number of materials equated to a large-scale Venetian mosaic (Łaguna, 1897, pp. 745–788).

Since none of the above-mentioned hypotheses received general acceptance, the interwar period was marked by the introduction of new approaches to the Polish state principles interpretation. In particular, the pages of the magazine contain a review of K. Krotoski’s work “Historical Echoes in the Legends of Ashes and Piast”, where he even suggested Kyivan-Rus origin of the Polish state founders. K. Krotoski tried to prove that expansion, as everywhere, and not his own evolution of tribal relations, was the impetus for the rise of the Polish state, and this allowed him to expand the time limits of the beginnings of Polish history (Krotoski, 1925, pp. 33–69).

Along with research on the Polish state founders, we find intelligence and critical materials about their successors on the pages of the magazine. Hence, in “Kwartalnik Historycznym” was noted a study of the person of the first historical leader of the Polish state, actually its builder, Bag I, conducted by S. Zakrzewski. A native of Krakow historiographical environment, he was a prominent Krakow medievalists representative in Lviv. The work, conducted by S. Zakrzewski was considered by critics to be one of the best devoted to the problems of the Polish statehood formation. Describing it, K. Krotoski wrote in a review on the pages of the magazine: “Perhaps Lviv historian did not recognize Meshko’s exceptional political abilities as

much as A. Maletsky did, but he built the most accurate monument to the builder of the Polish state” (Krotoski, 1923, pp. 201–205). In addition, S. Zakrzewski also addressed the problems of studying the history of Poland during the time of Bolesław I the Brave. In this context, he cited in the journal a large and well-commented list of sources and literature on the era and outlined the main program areas of its further research (Zakrzewski, 1925, pp. 1–32).

A report delivered by W. Semkowicz at a meeting of Krakow Circle of the Polish Historical Society and the Polish Historical Society was devoted to the geographical features of Poland during the time of Bolesław I the Brave (including the natural elements role study – the surface morphology, the hydrographic factor) and their influence on the political formation of the state, its borders and territorial expansion were devoted to a report delivered by Semkowicz (Semkowicz, 1925, pp. 258–314).

As an independent detailed study on the history of the struggle for the monarchy in 1288 – 1294, A. Semkowicz’s introduction to his work on the Piast history was published in the “Kwartalnik Historycznym”. The author focused on the circumstances of the struggle for the throne of Krakow, which unfolded after the death of Leszek Chorny in 1288 and in which the Czech King Wenceslas II took an active part. According to the Czech legend, Leszek Chorny’s widow, Wenceslas II’s aunt, inherited the lands of Lesser Poland, Krakow and Sandomierz. In his work, A. Semkowicz highlighted how the Czech king, supported by the Bishop of Krakow, burghers and numerous German settlers, conquered these lands (Semkowicz, 1891, pp. 727–778).

In addition to domestic history, the magazine’s editorial staff tracked the foreign policy history of the Piast era. Hence, B. Włodarski’s research was devoted to the problem of clarifying Polish-Ukrainian relations during the time of Leszek Bily (Włodarski, 1924, pp. 29–36). In addition, the magazine’s editorial staff published a journal and the work written by A. Prochaska on the political relations between the State of the Order of the Crusaders and Poland at the end of the XIIIth century (Prochaska, 1896, p. 1–66). According to the magazine’s observers, the two main results of L. Koczy’s historical research on the Polish-Danish union during Wladyslaw Loketko’s time were to clarify the circumstances of the union’s formation in 1315 and to establish the Polish-Brandenburg clashes chronology in 1316 (Zajączkowski, 1932, pp. 181–184). The journal also noted the research of S. Zajączkowski and J. Karwasińska, devoted, respectively, to the relations between Poland and the Teutonic Order during the reign of Wladyslaw Loketko, as well as to clarify the role of Pomerania in their confrontations in the XIIIth – XIVth centuries (Zajączkowski, 1928, pp. 633–637; Karwasińska, 1930, pp. 213–229).

Furthermore, along with issues on the history of the Piast dynasty, much of the journal’s content was covered by the history of the Jagiellonian dynasty. Hence, the Historical Society established in 1886 coincided with a significant date in Polish history – the five hundredth anniversary of the accession to the Polish throne of the Jagiellonian dynasty, which ruled Poland until 1572 continuously. The journal, in particular, responded with a thorough review of the synthetic study “anniversary” of the famous Krakow medievalist historian S. Smolka. In the above-mentioned work on the events of 1386, he analyzed the significance of the “Russian cause” for the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Union. A. Prochaska, the work’s reviewer, noted its high scientific level, dwelled on the description of the innovative, at that time, the psychological method used by the author in characterizing the personality of Queen Jadwiga (Prochaska, 1887, p. 101). We can come across reviews on a number of other works, written by S. Smolka, also devoted to the Jagiellonian period in Polish history in

the journal. For instance, the work “Algirdas and Kęstutis”, in which the author focused on the confrontation between Wladyslaw II Jagiello and the Lithuanian opposition. A notable feature of the above-mentioned work, as the critics noted, was the clarification of a number of historical dates, honest criticism of sources and special attention of S. Smolka to the analysis of the internal structure of Lithuania at that time (Prochaska, 1890, pp. 176–179).

In the context of European politics, A. Lewicki told the story of Svydrygail’s uprising against his brother King Wladyslaw II Jagiello. The critics called this work a “Polish historical literature pearl” and noted that “the author, coloring the work with sentimentalism, broke with the tradition of K. Shainoha” (Prochaska, 1893, pp. 537–545). Consequently, the observers and S. Smolka’s research on the monarchical marriages during the reign of King Jagiello (the XVth century) were highly appreciated (Lewicki, 1897, pp. 601–603). In the interwar period, the personalist studies on the history of the Jagiellonian dynasty also continued. Thus, a new wave of interest in the person of Queen Jadwiga was aroused by the question of her canonization. In particular, the journal put emphasis on V. Matsievska’s and A. Strzelecka’s historical explorations (Pieradzka, 1935, pp. 401–411).

A. Prochaska paid great attention to Jagiellonian history in his works. In the magazine, we may come across numerous reviews on his works concerning the history of this era. For example, the critics welcomed his work on Kazimir Jagiellonchik’s foreign policy (Prochaska, 1898, pp. 250–290). It should be mentioned that Lviv researcher’s intelligence on the parliamentarism’s development during the first Jagiellonians also received positive reviews from the magazine’s columnists (Rembowski, 1900, pp. 274–292). And in response to his study “The desire for church union under Jagiello”, the main leitmotif of which was the implementation of the civilizational mission of Poland in the East, the magazine published a polemical article by A. Lewicki (Lewicki, 1897, pp. 310–337). The analysis of Polish-Russian relations of the late Middle Ages was devoted to the work of F. Pape “The Jagiellonians and Moscow”, where the author, like A. Prochaska, emphasizing the cultural confrontation between the two peoples, defended the civilizational mission of Poland in the East (Papeé, 1922, pp. 41–50).

The phenomenon of the “Jagiellonian idea” was also hotly debated in the pages of the magazine. Highlighting the above-mentioned issue, Polish historians tried to answer the question: what was the leading idea of the epoch that lasted two centuries – from Kievan Rus to Lublin – and united and made an amorphous Piast Poland a strong state. The term “Jagiellonian idea” was introduced into historiography by the Warsaw publicist, historian and literary critic S. Ksheminsky, who used it in the article “The Jagiellonians” written for the Great World Illustrated Encyclopedia in 1902. In his understanding, the main Jagiellonian idea was the program of unification of Poland. Lithuania into a single state body based on political and social freedom and equality of the peoples of both countries, religious tolerance, broad self-government.

Active reflections on the Jagiellonian idea date back to Polish historiography in the 1980-ies and 1990-ies and associated with the emergence of systematic source studies on this era. At the turn of the century, the idea of rethinking the history of Polish-Lithuanian relations and selecting everything that could be used to build a synthesis emerged. The process of conceptualization of the Jagiellonian idea in science began in the works of V. Abraham, J. Fijałek, S. Smolka, A. Lewicki, S. Kutrzeba, O. Balzer, devoted to various, mainly legal and administrative aspects and problems of the Polish-Lithuanian Union. They tried to avoid extremes, but still represented a rather one-sided view of the union process, supporting the traditional apologetic view of the coexistence of the Poles, the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians

within a single state (Maternicki, 1996, pp. 55–69). As a result, in a study called “Poland Union with Lithuania”, S. Kutrzeba, whose views were typical of Polish historiography at the time, argued that Lithuania had some autonomy in building internal relations and that its ties with Poland ensured its acceptance of Western culture. At the same time, Lithuania received support in the fight against the Crusaders, and later with Moscow. According to S. Kutrzeba, Lithuania always looked for opportunities to unite with Poland, renewed the union in the face of the military threats (*Sprawy Towarzystwa*, 1914, p. 138).

The Jagiellonian idea received a new impetus in its development with the independence of Poland, which was due to the need to prove the historical legitimacy of the Lithuanian and Ukrainian territories within the ancient Polish state. On the pages of the magazine, O. Halecki analyzed the Polish historiography achievements concerning the above-mentioned issue, finding out whether the Jagiellonian idea is just a beautiful slogan or a strictly defined scientific term. O. Halecki painted an apologetic image of the Jagiellonian Union in national and religious relations in the ancient Rzeczpospolita (the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth). As a supporter of the idea of a “historical” Rzeczpospolita (within the borders until 1772), he believed that the Union with Lithuania not only did not provoke the decline of Poland, but also saved it. According to him, if not for the expansion of Poland, it would have divided the fate of other small states east of the Roman Empire, such as the Czech Republic or Hungary. As for Lithuania, O. Halecki believed that the Union provided it with cultural progress and preservation of independence (Halecki, 1937, pp. 486–510).

**The Conclusions.** As we can see, many issues from the history of Poland from ancient times to Rzeczpospolita were covered in numerous studies, critical and source materials on the journal’s pages. The most numerous group of materials devoted to this epoch were critical reviews and studies of political history, in the study of which scholars appealed to the time of the creation of the state and its greatest power. The authors of the journal dealt with a very wide range of topics: from the ancient state’s name genesis, clarifying the history of the persons of the founding princes and builders of the state to the influence of geographical factors on its development features. The Polish statehood’s restoration in 1918 forced the researchers of the time to draw parallels: first of all, with the plots of ancient Poland, second of all, with the times of its greatest economic and political power in the XVIth – at the beginning of the XVIIth centuries, inspiring reflection on the development models of the most optimal functioning of the Second Rzeczpospolita.

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## THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINE IN SYMON PETLIURA'S PUBLICIST LEGACY OF 1902 – 1917

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the research* is to analyze Symon Petliura's journalistic heritage of 1902 – 1907, to explore his views concerning the national issue, in particular, to identify the key factors in the Ukrainians' national revival, who were in Petliura's field of view during his socio-political worldview formation. **The Methodology of the Research** is based on the principles of historicism, objectivity, comprehensiveness and integrity, systematicity, as well as the use of numerous methods – analysis and synthesis, historical comparative, historical typological, problem chronological. **The scientific novelty** consists in S. Petliura's views comprehensive coverage concerning the role of education, science, culture, journalism, book publishing in the Ukrainians national development process, determining S. Petliura's worldview religious component of the Ukrainian Movement at the beginning of the XXth century, S. Petliura's social democratic and national components' worldview paradigm correlation at the stage of his personality formation. **The Conclusions.** S. Petliura's creative heritage demonstrates the multi-vector nature of his public interests even before the Ukrainian national revolution breakout in 1917 – 1921. At the same time, the national issues dominated on the pages of S. Petliura's early publications. According to the activist, the Ukrainian school of science, literature, theater, journalism, and book publishing should have promoted the Ukrainians national

self-identification development, awareness of the need to achieve the Ukrainian autonomy among the Ukrainians broad circles, and the workers and peasants class struggle. According to S. Petliura, the humanitarian component of the social process had to be socially determined, meet the Ukrainian people needs concerning the national revival and the socialist ideals establishment. S. Petliura considered the Ukrainian people's further national development through the prism of social-democratic postulates. S. Petliura's worldview of that period was also characterized by a religious component, which was not characteristic of the Ukrainian socialists at the beginning of the XXth century.

**Key words:** Symon Petliura, social democracy, Ukrainian school, national development, autonomy, religious themes.

## НАЦІОНАЛЬНИЙ РОЗВИТОК УКРАЇНСТВА В ПУБЛІЦИСТИЧНІЙ СПАДЩИНІ СИМОНА ПЕТЛЮРИ 1902 – 1917 рр.

**Анотація.** *Мета дослідження* – аналізуючи публіцистичну спадщину Симона Васильовича Петлюри 1902 – 1917 рр., дослідити його погляди на національне питання, а саме – визначити ключові фактори національного відродження українців, що перебували в полі зору діяча в період формування його суспільно-політичного світогляду. **Методологія дослідження** спирається на принципи історизму, об'єктивності, всебічності і цілісності, системності, а також на використання методів аналізу та синтезу, історико-порівняльного, історико-типологічного, проблемно-хронологічного. **Наукова новизна** полягає у комплексному висвітленні поглядів С. Петлюри на роль освіти, науки, культури, журналістики, книговидання у процесі національного розвитку українства, визначенні релігійної складової світогляду С. Петлюри періоду наростання українського руху на початку ХХ ст., кореляції соціал-демократичного та національного компонентів світоглядної парадигми діяча на етапі становлення його особистості. **Висновки.** Творча спадщина С. Петлюри демонструє багатовекторність його суспільних інтересів ще до початку Української національної революції 1917 – 1921 рр. Водночас національні питання домінують на сторінках ранніх публікацій С. Петлюри. Українська школа наука, література, театр, журналістика, книговидання покликані, на думку діяча, сприяти розвитку національної самоідентифікації українців, усвідомленню необхідності досягнення автономії України серед широких кіл українства, а також класовій боротьбі робітників і селян. Гуманітарна складова суспільного процесу, на думку С. Петлюри, мала бути соціально детермінована, відповідати потребам національного відродження українського народу та утвердженню соціалістичних ідеалів. С. Петлюра розглядав подальший національний розвиток українського народу крізь призму соціал-демократичних постулатів. Світогляду С. Петлюри зазначеного періоду притаманна також і релігійна складова, що не було характерно для українських соціалістів початку ХХ ст.

**Ключові слова:** Симон Петлюра, соціал-демократизм, українська школа, національний розвиток, автономія, релігійна тематика.

**The Problem Statement.** Symon Petliura played one of the key roles in the Ukrainian statehood revival in 1917 – 1920. His figure left a strong imprint on the Ukrainian revolution's course and character of 1917 – 1920. Furthermore, S. Petliura's journalistic legacy of 1902 – 1917 depicted the future Chief Ataman and the Ukrainian People's Republic Directory Chairman worldview formation. The analysis of his early works in the context of views on the national development contributed to a deeper understanding of the Ukrainian Movement at the beginning of the XXth century, the Ukrainian intelligentsia national identity development of that time, the history of Ukrainian socio-political thought of that period and prominent statesman comprehensive characteristic.

**The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications.** Numerous modern Ukrainian researchers dealt with Symon Petliura's social political views issue at the beginning of the XXth century, for example, V. Serhiychuk (Sergiychuk, 2004), S. Lytvyn (Lytvyn, 2018),

V. Verstyuk (Verstyuk, 1997), V. Soldatenko (Soldatenko, 2007), V. Savchenko (Savchenko, 2004), V. Hotsulyak (Hotsulyak, 2013), E. Kostyshyn (Kostyshyn, 2011), O. Holobutskyi (Holobutskyi, 1995), D. Myronyuk, Myronyuk, 2004 ), O. Chekmyshev (Chekmyshev, 1996). Some aspects of the Ukrainians national development in S. Petliura's journalism were covered in the works of A. Zavadovskyi (Zavadovskyi, 1999), L. Baraban (Baraban, 1997), N. Sydorenko (Sydorenko, 1994), V. Hrytsuk (Hrytsuk, 1998), A. Tkachuk (Tkachuk, 1994), T. Sheptytska (Sheptytska, 2005), S. Boltivets (Boltivets, 1997), Yu. Bezkrivnyi (Bezkrivnyi, 2016), u. Kolisnyk (Kolisnyk, 2016), V. Polumysna (Polumysna, 2014), at the same time S. Petliura's views concerning the role of education, culture, language, religion in the period 1902 – 1917 are poorly studied and require the detailed study. It should be mentioned that the fourth and fifth volumes publication of his works edited by V. Serhiychuk (Petliura, 2006), (Petliura, 2016) were an important factor in studying S. Petliura's worldview, as the above-mentioned works illustrated S. Petliura's views on the Ukrainians national development at the beginning of the XXth century.

**The purpose** of the publication is to analyze Symon Petliura's journalistic heritage of 1902 – 1917, to explore his views concerning the national issue, in particular, to identify the key factors in the Ukrainians' national revival, who were in Petliura's field of view during his socio-political worldview formation.

**The Main Material Statement.** Symon Petliura at a fairly young age, at the time of his formation as a politician, assessed the Ukrainians national identity state objectively, comparing the Ukrainian society political state with the “embryo” (Petliura, 2016, p. 134). The words written by Symon Petliura in 1907, seem to be prophetic that the Ukrainian people will have to go through a difficult and thorny path before they obtain all the necessary guarantees for the national law's free development (Petliura, 2016, p. 135). According to S. Petliura, the starting point of the national revival was its obligatory precondition for the education's nationalization. The renowned figure noted the “abnormal Russification state of education” in Ukraine (Petliura, 2016, p. 136), S. Petliura spoke of the need to Ukrainianize education at all levels, “from lower to higher” (Petliura, 2016, p. 209). Furthermore, he noted the Ukrainian departments' emergence in universities, the Ukrainian students' performances demanding the Ukrainization of education, praised Kyiv University students' appeal, Hlukhov Institute students, where they required teaching in Ukrainian and the Ukrainian studies introduction (Petliura, 2016, pp. 139–140). Hence, the need for nationalization of education in S. Petliura was inextricably linked with the workers and peasants class rights. The combination of class and national components of S. Petliura's worldview, which characterized him as a Ukrainian Social Democrat, illustrated the thesis from S. Petliura's article written in 1907: “The struggle for the right to a national school and culture is as necessary for the Ukrainian proletariat as and the struggle for the improvement of the economic living conditions of the working class, and must go hand in hand with the latter, for only with free national development can there be the development of class consciousness” (Petliura, 2016, p. 137). The Ukrainization of higher education issue was inextricably linked with the “the Ukrainian proletariat class struggle” (Petliura, 2016, p. 137).

Moreover, the Ukrainian students occupied a significant place in Petliura's journalistic legacy. Petliura believed that the students should become the driving force concerning the Ukrainian society's change, the Ukrainian Movement further development should lead to the students Ukrainization and its transformation into a “conscious national force” (Petliura, 2016, p. 155).

The main idea that could be traced through all his early works on the Ukrainian people's education was formulated in the article “The Russian cultural and educational institutions in Ukraine”: “education in Ukraine must be national” (Petliura, 1956, p. 72). He considered



education in the native language a necessary condition for the Ukrainian nation development, otherwise, without its own school, the nation, according to S. V. Petliura, was doomed. He wrote about this in 1907: “Having no school of its own, no national institutions, the genius of an oppressed nation languishes, its wings are forcibly cut off, and the nation itself quickly goes to denationalization, does not develop, but perishes, does not flourish, and slowly freezes” (Petliura, 1956, p. 64). S. Petliura believed that another’s “culture” destroyed the children’s soul and brain (Petliura, 1956, p. 65). The truth of the words of the prominent statesman was confirmed by modern events, because the Russian aggression became possible in those regions of Ukraine, where there was an absolute minority of schools with the Ukrainian as the language of instruction.

S. Petliura praised the Synod decree on the Ukrainian language instruction’s introduction in the church-parish schools in Podilsk hubernia (province) and in Vinnytsia church-teacher school, but pointed out its limitations, as such norms should be extended to all Ukraine and finance the Ukrainianization of education from the state budget, not local communities. Because the Ukrainian population paid taxes to the Russian state’s budget, and therefore had the right to return these taxes in the form of the national school maintenance (Petliura, 2016, p. 227). S. Petliura substantiated consistently the right to a national school, science, culture by economic factors.

It should be mentioned that an important factor in the Ukrainian nation development was the Ukrainian science, according to the figure, science should have practical significance, meet the Ukrainian society’s needs. Arguing with the rector of Kyiv University, Professor Tsytovyeh, S. Petliura emphasized the economic grounds for the higher education Ukrainianization in Ukraine, as taxes were collected from the Ukrainian people, which must be returned to Ukraine in the form of financing useful affairs for the Ukrainians development (Petliura, 2006, p. 89). As a result, the Ukrainian departments were introduced in Ukrainian universities, in particular, Kyiv University (Petliura, 2006, p. 90).

It should be noted that Symon Petliura himself intended to obtain higher education at Kharkiv University, S. Petliura asked about the possibility of entering the university in a letter to Professor Sumtsov (Petliura, 2006, p. 98). Although his intention was not destined to be realized, but the high school, the student movement was always in the field of view of the figure.

Describing “The Ukrainian Scientific Society” in Kyiv, S. Petliura noted that it was to play both a scientific and public role, become a consolidating institution for scientists in various fields of knowledge and bring significant benefits to the Ukrainian people’s national and cultural development (Petliura, 2016, pp. 176–177). Comparing S. Petliura’s assessment of the Scientific Society in Kyiv in 1907 and in 1914, we can spot that in 1907 S. Petliura only formulated tasks for the scientists (the publishing house establishment at the society, the Ukrainian scientists congress organization, holding public lectures on various Ukrainian studies topics, the Ukrainian textbooks creation, the study of economic relations in Ukraine, the scientific justification of the need for autonomy of Ukraine, etc. (Petliura, 2016, pp. 179–181), in 1914 called on broad circles of the Ukrainian society to create a national scientific fund, which served the needs of the scientific society, the library and museum he founded. According to the activist, the charitable contributions of all concerned Ukrainians should become the sources of filling such a fund. The material support of the society would contribute to the museum’s and library’s transformation at the society into national public institutions, creation of its own premises, opening of scientific offices in various fields of scientific knowledge, collection of manuscripts, family archives, antiquities, the Ukrainian prominent figures’ memoirs (Petliura, 2016, pp. 280–281). The National Scientific Society

existence issue should become the national question of “honor and freedom” (Petliura, 2016, pp. 279–280). In this context, S. Petliura's views on the need to finance the national scientific institutions at the expense of the conscious Ukrainians were close to his contemporary Yevhen Chykalenko: “We need to love Ukraine not only to the depths of our souls, but also to the depths of our own pockets”.

In addition to it, Symon Petliura did not ignore the pages of his publications and works of art. He was a supporter of realism in art and believed that the art's task was to cover the real socio-economic conditions of the people's life. Until 1917, the convinced socialist Symon Petliura approached the a work of art's evaluation exclusively from the ideological positions (Petliura, 1993, p. 19).

The theater occupied a special place in the S. Petliura's worldview, as he was a theater critic (Drum, 1997, p. 150). Moreover, S. Petliura regarded the theater also from a socialist standpoint until 1917. “The theatrical art has not only aesthetic significance – the theater is also a huge social force”, he wrote in an article dedicated to Maria Zankovetska's stage anniversary (Petliura, 1956, p. 145). Even describing I. Karpenko-Kary's dramatic legacy, S. Petliura criticized the author for not depicting in his works the struggle “waged by the working class for new living conditions, in which the whole meaning of its life is concentrated” (Petliura, 1956, p. 15).

The preface to E. Chirikov's play “The Jews” of 1907 was the embodiment of young S. Petliura's particularly vivid socialist views concerning the Ukrainian theater. S. Petliura emphasized the following: “The attention of these writers was not attracted by the great struggle that has now become dominant in the arena of socio-political life of all countries and nations – the class struggle” (Petliura, 1993, p. 46). He accused the Ukrainian playwrights of “bourgeoisie” and “philistinism”, of not understanding the spiritual needs of the proletariat, emphasizing that the bourgeoisie was far from life, that's why the proletariat hated them (Petliura, 1993, p. 48). The whole work was imbued with the socialist rhetoric and illustrated S. Petliura's socialist views, which were inherent in his assessment of most social phenomena during 1902 – 1917.

S. Petliura stated the current problem of the provincial Ukrainian theater: the limited repertoire. The theater, in his opinion, was to develop according to world trends, its repertoire should include the best examples of world drama (Petliura, 1956, p. 154). Assessing the life and work of Ukrainian theater actors, he wrote the following: “The laws of civic development are the same everywhere; they dig a deep chasm between the class of proletarians, workers and the class of wealthy dukes, capitalists. As long as there is oppression of the Ukrainian capital over the Ukrainian worker, from this oppression in the organization, in the comradely defense of their rights” (Petliura, 1956, p. 76).

Hence, Symon Petliura, engaged in journalism, socio-political activities, was aware of the humanitarian component importance in the society's development. According to S. Petliura, science, education, culture should not develop separately from the needs of the nation, but should promote the national revival, the Young Socialist S. Petliura noted that the Ukrainian culture, in particular, the theater, should also contribute to the class struggle of the working class.

S. Petliura's creative heritage demonstrates the multi-vector nature of his public interests at a young age. In addition, social processes in the Russian Empire were analyzed by S. Petliura in his early publications through the socialist views' prism. From a class standpoint, S. Petliura also evaluated works of fiction. He responded positively if they were socially determined from his point of view, like Leonid Andreev's “The Red Laughter” (Petliura, 2006, pp. 45–46). Conversely, he criticized V. Vynnychenko's play “The Steps of Life”, which, according to S. Petliura, did not solve important social problems (Petliura, 1979, p. 70).

S. Petliura also sets socially determined tasks for the Ukrainian book publishers. In general, praising the activities of Kyiv “Prosvita” in 1907, in particular the competition for the best pamphlet on autonomy, at the same time noted what issues should be devoted to the Ukrainian literature: agriculture, the Ukrainian workers, peasants, political freedoms lives (Petliura, 2016, pp. 159). Instead of books about the life of other countries, S. Petliura advised to publish books on the Ukrainians national life, arguing that it is an urgent need for the Ukrainian people. He stressed out that the popular publications on topical issues of economic, political, national and class life of Ukrainians “can not wait”, so they should be published first (Petliura, 2016, p. 160).

The theme, which was reflected on Petliura’s early works’ pages was the Ukrainian press analysis, analyzing it mostly from a class standpoint, Petliura stated its great importance for the Ukrainian society development, the national identity development (Petliura, 2016, p. 217). To intensify the Ukrainian National Movement, S. Petliura advised to use the press published in Ukraine in Russian, in order to prevent the “Russian assimilation” of the Ukrainians (Petliura, 2016, p. 271). Although, in the future, the Ukrainian-language press should dominate the territory of Ukraine, during the period Ukrainian growth, the Russian press should become Ukrainianized, if not in language, then in content, and contribute to the quantitative increase of the conscious Ukrainians (Petliura, 2016, p. 274).

Furthermore, S. Petliura’s characteristic feature was traced, in particular, the use of all existing means to resolve the national issue and obtain positive results for the national cause, using all possible factors.

Thus, the fiction, as well as the press, science, theater, should be aimed at the Ukrainian people’s national development and the social issues’ solution through the social democratic ideology prism.

It should be stated that I. Franko’s work had a great influence on S. Petliura’s worldview principles formation. Values of an exclusively national character filled S. Petliura’s work, which was called “I. Franko – a poet of national honor” (Petliura, 1956, pp. 160–179). Analyzing the socio-political concept of the great poet, and that was what S. Petliura considered him, he introduced the concept of the “national honor” – an inextinguishable guide to national development. S. Petliura noted the following: “These days, by the way, it will be a reminder of the sense of national honor, which must be dear to the nation, just as everyone has a dear sense of personal honor, personal dignity” (Petliura, 1956, p. 174). S. Petliura, like I. Franko, considered the slavish consciousness to be the most terrible disaster, the greatest enemy of the Ukrainian people, and the conscious Ukrainians efforts should be directed to that negative phenomenon, because otherwise any ascetic activity will be defeated. Prophetic, in relation S. Petliura’s future state building activity, in the vortex of which he will fall four years after the publication of the article, we can consider his following words: “You can pity the slave and sympathize with him; it is possible to explain the features of the slave psychology in later free generations, but to live with them, but always to be among them and go with them to a common goal – is impossible” (Petliura, 1956, p. 170).

S. Petliura analyzed the Ukrainians spiritual state and its development comprehensively. The statements, identification of causes and consequences, identification of ways to overcome, sharp criticism, such phenomena as low national identity of the Ukrainians, the national elites betrayal, lack of patriotism, the spiritual nihilism, a large number of works by S. Petliura. He came to the conclusion that these phenomena have deep historical roots, the beginning of which he connected with the time of Hetman I. Bryukhovetskyi, who “sold his Ukraine for sweets and Moscow gifts, despised its honor and the interests of his people” (Petliura, 2006, p. 53). According to S. Petliura’s article “On the Little Russians” (the Malorosy) that the difficult national situation

in which Ukraine found itself at the beginning of the XXth century was led by the activities of the Ukrainians themselves – “the traitors” (Petliura, 2006, pp. 53–54), followed by the following denationalized generation of “Little Russians” (“malorosy”) (Petliura, 2016, p. 56).

Even at the beginning of his socio-political activity S. Petliura was interested in the problems of religion and the church. In his early publications we can trace a positive attitude to the Christianity issues, and an understanding of faith as an inner state of man. But he criticized the Russian clergy activities as a reactionary tool of the Tsarist regime. In particular, in an article on the publication of the Bible in Ukrainian in London, S. Petliura noted that the Bible translated by P. Kulish and I. Levitskyi into Ukrainian was not published in the Russian Empire due to opposition from the Russian Synod (Petliura, 2006, p. 19). In a critical article on the establishment in Russia of societies for the revival of church and public life in 1903, S. Petliura called the Russian clergy an element that tainted itself with betrayal of the people's interests and “extinguisher of all that has in common mind, the light and the truth ...” (Petliura, 2006, p. 33).

In a review on A. Pruhavin's book on the monastic prisons in Russia, Symon Petliura considered the the Russian church position in relation to the other religions “inquisitorial” representatives. He condemned the methods and techniques used by the Russian clergy in the struggle against the believers of other religions, “free religious thought” (Petliura, 2016, pp. 164–165). S. Petliura stated the unexplored phenomenon of the Protestantism in Ukraine in its various forms and manifestations, and the numerous Ukrainian Protestants' persecutions by the church and the secular Russian authorities (Petliura, 2016, pp. 164–165). S. Petliura also mentioned the Ukrainian political prisoners in Russian monastic prisons, in particular the last Kosh Ataman of the Zaporizhzhya Sich, Petro Kalnyshevskyi.

Thus, in general, assessing the people's right to freedom of conscience positively, S. Petliura noted the punitive and repressive nature of the Russian Orthodox Church, its subordination to the secular imperial power.

S. Petliura's interest in religious issues at a young age was confirmed by his work “The Religious Statistics”, where he compared his current statistics on the religious affiliation of the world's population and statistics of the previous century (Petliura, 2006, pp. 40–41). He stated a proportional increase in the number of representatives of each of the world's religions (Petliura, 2006, p. 40).

Numerous references to the biblical texts in his works testify to a certain religious component of S. Petliura's worldview. His articles dedicated to the Russian Empire's current socio economic problems contained quotations from the Bible. For example, S. Petliura's article on the political line of the Octobrists on the 17<sup>th</sup> of December in 1906, entitled “The Lord Teaches Babies and Opens the Eyes of Even the Blind” (Petliura, 2006, pp. 93–96), where S. Petliura called King David “wise”, and his above statement “the great truth” (Petliura, 2016, p. 93). This fact seems especially interesting, considering that S. Petliura was a socialist, a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party since December 1905, the USDRP program provided for the separation of religion from the state, schools from the church (Shevchenko, 1993, p. 41). V. Vynnychenko, S. Petliura's renowned co-member of the party, was hostile and even mocked the religion and church issues. According to V. I. Ulyanovskyi, V. Vynnychenko emphasized that he was a socialist and did not recognize the church in principle (Ulyanovskyi, 1997, p. 39). The interest in religion was an atypical phenomenon for the Ukrainian socialists at the beginning of the XXth century, which was mainly in the atheistic positions (Ulyanovskyi, 1997, p. 42).

S. Petliura's considerable attention to religious issues can be explained by his studies at the seminary, where he received a thorough knowledge of Theology and Canon Law, as well

as family origin (grandfather was an Orthodox hieromonk, grandmother – a nun and abbess, brothers – Poltava Theological Seminary graduates) (Serhiychuk, 2004, p. 7).

**The Conclusions.** S. Petliura's creative heritage demonstrated the multi-vector nature of his public interests even before the Ukrainian national revolution breakout in 1917 – 1921. At the same time, the national issues dominated on S. Petliura's early publications pages. According to the activist, the Ukrainian school of science, literature, theater, journalism, and book publishing should have promoted the Ukrainians national self-identification development, awareness of the need to achieve Ukrainian autonomy among the broad circles of the Ukrainians, and the class struggle of workers and peasants. According to S. Petliura, the humanitarian component of the social process had to be socially determined, meet the Ukrainian people's needs on the national revival and the socialist ideals establishment. S. Petliura considered the Ukrainian people's further national development through the prism of social-democratic postulates. S. Petliura's worldview of that period was also characterized by a religious component, which was not characteristic of the Ukrainian socialists at the beginning of the XXth century.

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**DMYTRO STOLYPIN'S SOCIAL EXPERIMENT REPERCUSSIONS  
IN THE AGRARIAN REFORM OF 1906 – 1917**

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the research is to study Dmytro Stolypin's social experiment repercussions in the agrarian reform of 1906 – 1917 through the family's vision retrospective concerning the peasant issue's essence in the Russian Empire at the second half of the XIXth – at the beginning of the XXth century. The Methodology of the Research.* *The key to understanding the publication's subject essence could be found in the plane of the postmodern methodology. Due to the use of the principles of objectivity, multifactorialism, historicism, as well as historical genetic, problem chronological, historical and biographical, retrospective, prosopographic methods and content analysis, the goal was achieved. The scientific novelty.* *The D. A. Stolypin's experiment is considered not only as one of the domestic sociological science's sprouts, but also the family practice, which influenced P. A. Stolypin's worldview formation, as a microsocioal process from the steps of the “problem statement” and the “revolution in consciousness” that preceded the agrarian reform break out in 1906 – 1917. The Conclusions.* *The social experiment took place in 1874 – 1893 near the village of Mordvynivka, Berdyansk district (povit), Tavriya huberniya (province) and covered 214 people. Its purpose was to create the rental farms in order to increase D. A. Stolypin's estate profitability and to popularize among the local peasantry of the leading at that time the intensive forms of the local management.*

*D. A. Stolypin, Comte's student and follower; the experiment was an empirical proof of the correctness concerning the views on the peasant issue's essence. It became the basis of a report proclaimed in March 1882 in the Moscow Imperial Society of Agriculture. The latter contained proposals for the relaxation and further abolition of ransom payments for the peasants, the introduction of private ownership of communal land, the land management, and stimulating the growth of the peasant land ownership. The comparison with the agrarian legislation of 1905 – 1911 allowed to reveal a number of similar features.*

**Key words:** social experiment, khutir, peasantry, community, sociologist, agrarian reform.

## ВІДЛУННЯ СОЦІАЛЬНОГО ЕКСПЕРИМЕНТУ ДМИТРА СТОЛИПІНА В АГРАРНІЙ РЕФОРМІ 1906 – 1917 рр.

**Анотація. Мета статті** – крізь ретроспективу родинного бачення сутності селянського питання в Російській імперії другої половини XIX – початку XX ст. дослідити відлуння соціального експерименту Дмитра Столипіна в аграрній реформі 1906 – 1917 рр. **Методологія дослідження.** Ключ до розуміння сутності предмета публікації лежить у площині методології постмодерну. Досягнення мети стало можливим завдяки використанню принципів об'єктивності, багатофакторності, історизму, а також історико-генетичного, проблемно-хронологічного, історико-біографічного, ретроспективного, просопографічного методів та контент-аналізу. **Наукова новизна.** Експеримент Д. А. Столипіна розглянуто не лише як один з паростків вітчизняної соціологічної науки, а й родинну практику, що вплинула на формування світогляду П. А. Столипіна, як мікросоціальний процес з кроків “постановки проблеми” й “революції в свідомості”, що передували аграрній реформі 1906 – 1917 рр. **Висновки.** Соціальний експеримент проходив у 1874 – 1893 рр. поблизу с. Мордвинівка Бердянського повіту Таврійської губернії та охопив 214 осіб. Мета його полягала у створенні орендних хуторів задля підвищення рентабельності маєтності Д. А. Столипіна та популяризації серед місцевого селянства провідних на той час інтенсивних форм ділянкового господарювання.

Для Д. А. Столипіна, як учня та послідовника О. Конта, експеримент був емпіричним доказом правдивості поглядів щодо сутності селянського питання. Він став основою проголошеної у березні 1882 р. доповіді в Московському Імператорському товаристві сільського господарства. Остання містила пропозиції щодо послаблення і подальшого скасування для селян викупних платежів, запровадження приватної власності на общинні землі, проведення землевпорядних робіт, стимулювання зростання селянського землеволодіння. Порівняння їх з аграрним законодавством 190 – 1911 рр. дало змогу виявити низку схожих рис.

**Ключові слова:** соціальний експеримент, хутір, селянство, община, соціолог, аграрна реформа.

**The Problem Statement.** The limit of research on the agrarian history at the second half of the XIXth – at the beginning of the XXth century determined by the Peasant and Stolypin reforms. Furthermore, it is impossible to be aware of the phenomena and processes essence of that time in the Ukrainian countryside without a detailed analysis of the social organization's forms' evolution, the economic system transformation, the commodity market relations development, the changes in agrarian policy. At the same time, the macro- and, sometimes, metahistorical nature of the vast majority of the scientific research involves modeling the object of study – the peasantry or the landlord nobility – as a social monolith or a complex community. Hence, the above-mentioned approach is thorough, comprehensive, but not infrequently faceless and depersonalized. That is why, recently the research on the microhistorical direction, the subject of which is on the edge of biography, social and agrarian history, became more and more vital. Bringing to the forefront and being in the limelight in the content of the last extraordinary historical figures, which were forgotten, little known, received the stigma of a person of secondary status, is quite natural, logical and relevant. One of such figures can be considered Auguste Comte's student, sociologist experimenter,

“zemskyi” and public figure, the South Ukrainian landowner Dmytro Arkadiyovych Stolypin. His ideas on solving the peasant and land issues were not only based on a complex theoretical and sociological basis, but also for a quarter of a century ahead of the basic principles implemented by his cousin – P. A. Stolypin – the agrarian reform. The possibility of using their historical experience in terms of reforming the agrarian sector of modern Ukraine, as well as the logic of the study of their repercussions in the agrarian reform of 1906 – 1917, determine the problem area of this publication.

**The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications.** There are few historiographical works, which mention D. A. Stolypin’s name. Diverse works were based on studies of historical and local lore (Karagodin, 1998, p. 176) and historical and biographical nature, which contained information about the stages of life (Golosenko, 2001), psychological (Dal, 1906, p. 272) and sociological (Pryimak, 2011) heritage, the course of the social experiment conducted by Dmytro Arkadiyovych (Pryimak, 2019). In addition, in the context of a general review of genealogy, P. A. Stolypin’s state and political activity was mentioned in a number of monographs (Kacharovskiy, 1911, p. 138; Zyryanov, 1992, p. 8). At the same time, achieving the goal of publication would not be possible without analyzing the landed economy’s state issue in the South of Ukraine during the inter-reform period. The researcher, N. R. Temirova managed to disclose the above-mentioned issue comprehensively in the studies (Temirova, 2003), as well as publications, written by M. Kazmyrchuk (Kazmyrchuk, 2019, p. 61), O. Cheremisin and N. Mykhailenko (Mykhailenko & Cheremisin, 2020, p. 42).

In our opinion, it is expedient to include D. Macy’s article in the historiographical work, which proposes to recognize the Stolypin reform not only as the key to understanding the ‘tsarism’ fate, but also as the result of a number of complex and long intellectual, social and political processes. The researcher did not once mention D. A. Stolypin, when he was considering the reform from the standpoint of long-term perspective and retrospective and identified four stages of preparation of the latter: 1) the problem statement; 2) a revolution in consciousness, or an ideological revolution, associated with the rejection of those relations and policies that contributed to both the problem and the adoption of a new radical decision; 3) the program’s deployment of these new ideas in the government and in the society as a whole; 4) the political figure’s emergence, capable of providing the political support for the reforms needed to win their approval and further implementation (Macy, 1993, p. 3). To our mind, P. A. Stolypin’s activities as the Prime Minister and the implementation of the new course of the agrarian policy at this time was clearly synchronized with the last step of that linear process. But it should be mentioned that D. A. Stolypin’s idea concerning changing the course of the agrarian policy’s popularization from the community support to the peasant farming individualization and intensification coincided with the first two stages completely.

**The purpose of the research is** to study Dmytro Stolypin’s social experiment repercussions in the agrarian reform of 1906 – 1917 through the family’s vision retrospective concerning the peasant issue’s essence in the Russian Empire at the second half of the XIXth – at the beginning of the XXth century.

**The Main Material Statement.** Dmytro Arkadiyovych Stolypin was born on the 15<sup>th</sup> of January in 1818. He spent his childhood in the village. Mordvynivtsi, Berdyansk district (povit), Tavriya huberniya (province) (nowadays the village of Mordvynivka, Melitopol district, Zaporizhia region) (Holosenko, 2001, p. 1109). Dmytro graduated from the School of Guards Ensigns; took part in the Crimean War. In 1856 Dmytro went abroad, where he engaged in self-education. For several years he attended the private lectures of the father

of modern sociology, Auguste Comte, a follower and student of whom Dmytro Stolypin considered himself until the last days of his life. Upon his return to his homeland, during the 1860-ies he worked as an integral part of the Free Povit (County) presence on the peasant issues in Berdyansk Povit (County). After moving to Moscow, Dmytro Arkadiyovych became a member of the in 1867, and later on – the Farm Commission Chairman of the Imperial Society of Agriculture (Pryimak, 2011, p. 135). Based on Auguste Comte's sociological heritage in numerous reports, brochures, articles, monographs of the time, Dmytro Stolypin substantiated such ideas as the economic weakness of the rural community and the artificiality of its creation in southern Ukraine, the need to increase and intensify the agriculture, the feasibility of changing the agrarian policy, reforming the social system in the countryside and introducing a farm system. He substantiated these views on the basis of Comte's triad "observation – description – experiment" (Stolypin, 1890, p. 37).

Taken into consideration the level of contemporary sociological science, the social experiment was a method of empirical research, which was based on active, the purposeful intervention of the subject in the process of cognition of phenomena and objects of real social reality, by creating controlled and managed conditions to identify certain qualities, connections in the researched or created object and to reproduce them repeatedly. It included not only the observation, comparison and measurement of the social reality, but also the active influence on the created socio-economic unit in order to correct, improve, give it a boost for the self-development.

The main reasons for D. A. Stolypin's social experiment were the crisis of landlordism and the peasant scarcity, which hindered the agrarian capitalism development. The goal coincided with the direction of the search for social support in the countryside by the imperial elite. Its essence was to create the rental farms on the landed estates to increase the profitability of the latter and popularize among the local peasantry the leading at that time intensive forms of local management (Stolypin, 1876, p. 34). Furthermore, the general logic of D. A. Stolypin's social experiment consisted in choosing as an object of experience a group of peasants displaced from the community to the farms in order to influence them with the chosen specific means to trace the direction and level of sustainability of transformations. Dmytro Stolypin also set himself the task of making changes in the traditional social, economic and domestic relations of the peasants and control over the influence of these factors on the activities and behavior of not only the community members but also the "khutoryan" (farmers).

The experiment was implemented in the village of Mordvynivtsi from 1874 to 1893. Dmytro Arkadiyovych was not limited to passive observation, which was created in the middle of the peasant community space forms of the family farm organization of labor, but also deliberately interfered in the process of their genesis, during 19 years as the experiment was carried out. The popularization of the results obtained in numerous publications and public speeches not only stimulated the social development of the village, but also confirmed Dmytro Stolypin's status in the social environment as a sociologist experimenter and ideologue of the agrarian reform. In addition, an important place in the process was occupied by such a component as proving the effectiveness of the achievements of sociological science in solving the peasant issue.

Dmytro Arkadiyovych chose the community members from the village of Mordvynivka as the social experiment's subject. As a result, 22 peasant families took part in the experiment, which included 55 men, 54 women of working age, as well as 38 boys and 48 girls for 19 years. By ethnicity, members of 13 families were the Russians, 6 – the Ukrainians,



2 – the Germans, 1 – the Tatars. Taking into account the fact that 15 families of them kept 13 seasonal and 6 permanent employees, it is possible to determine the final number of participants was 214 people. Typically, all families were large or joined (Pryimak, 2012, pp. 440–442).

Hence, D. A. Stolypin's social experiment can be divided into three stages: 1874 – 1877, 1878 – 1888, 1889 – 1893. Each of them was marked by the groups of farms (khutir) consolidation, drafting or amending the text of the lease agreement, increasing the amount of rent or replacing the latter with a purchase and sale transaction (Stolypin, 1892, p. 15). In addition, over time, the social composition of farmers changed. If at the first stage the agreements were final exclusively with the 'kurkul' and wealthy peasants, then at the second stage there was one middle-class family among the wealthy families. The ratio between the last pair in the third stage was 50:50. In just 19 years, 20 farms were built. But the further course of the experiment was followed by Dmytro Arkadiyovych's death (For more details on the course of the social experiment in the village of Mordvinivka, see (Pryimak, 2019, pp. 77–84).

Recognizing the leading role of science, especially sociology, in the development of society Dmytro Stolypin used the experiment in Mordvynivka as an empirical justification of their views on the nature of the peasant issue and the nature of state agrarian policy after the abolition of serfdom. In his numerous publications at the time, he argued that the reforms of the 60–70s of the XIXth century stimulated the commodity capitalist relations development in the economy, including in the agrarian sector (Stolypin, 1874, p. 6). At the same time, in his opinion, the remnants of the patriarchal system in society played an important role. It hampered the rationalization of life of various social strata significantly, mainly the peasantry. In the peasants' daily life, these remnants were manifested not only in the economic and agricultural, but also in the social spheres. Subjecting to a detailed analysis of such features of the southern Ukrainian peasantry as traditionalism, the patriarchy of family life, extensive management, weakness of the community, Dmytro Stolypin concluded that the emergence of overcrowding and land famine in the rural areas (Stolypin, 1876, p. 9). The observations and descriptions supported by the experiment became for D. Stolypin a platform on the basis of which he formulated his vision of solving the agrarian problem.

Already during the second stage of the social experiment in Modvynivtsi, namely in March 1882, Dmytro Arkadiyovych made his fifteenth report at a meeting of the Moscow Imperial Society of Agriculture. The course was devoted to the farm settlement issues and the state of the peasant economy analysis. Proclaiming it, the researcher was already in the position of the Farm Commission Chairman, the Moscow Imperial Society of Agriculture, and allegedly proposed to the meeting the results of all previous activities. Outlining the established theses about the artificial nature of the community, the rural population differentiation existence, the need to intensify both the landlord and the peasant farming, Dmytro Stolypin focused on the analysis of the agrarian policy course. As a result, he brought in the recommendations, the content of which reflected the views of the most progressive representatives of the then elite on the issue concerning making changes in this area of the domestic policy. Hence, D. A. Stolypin's suggestions on the peasant issue solution were contained in the following paragraphs: 1) in the statutes of existing banks, it would be appropriate to make changes that would allow the peasants to purchase the land and sell the land in personal ownership, except to increase grazing. Unless the purchase was made by the peasant societies; 2) it was desirable to hand over the state leased land articles to individual peasants, and not to the rural communities. But both in the first and in the second cases, in order to avoid the

lack of fees and arrears issue, hence, the pressure of the latter must be tolerable and not damage the peasant economy; 3) delimitation of peasant land per capita allotments, as well as giving them the opportunity to separate from the community or move to the court ownership; 4) it was desirable to demarcate the lands of those belonging to several rural communities, as it was the cause of confusion and many misunderstandings and disputes; 5) the relief of Art. 165 on redemption – to allow a peasant to buy a plot for half the price set within the redemption operation; 6) the spread of Art. 165 on ransom for the peasant communities that paid their ransom, as well as for the peasants, who were on the allotment. Hence, in the above-mentioned six points, in fact, D. A. Stolypin predicted the content of the main directions of the agrarian reform of 1906 – 1917 (Stolypin, 1883, p. 11).

At the time of the announcement of this report, the peasants' payments on ransom payments lasted for 21 years. As a long-term government loan with 6% annual payments, they had to be terminated in 1910, subject to compliance with the schedule. But the accumulation of arrears prolonged the financial operation until 1932. In the spring of 1882, two tendencies were clearly observed in this direction – if a certain part of rural communities carried out redemption operations in advance, the vast majority accumulated arrears. However, neither in the fifth nor in the sixth paragraphs introduced by D. A. Stolypin did not explicitly point out the need to abolish the ransom payments completely. But his attention to Article 165 of the Regulations was quite logical. On the one hand, based on the intermediate results of Dmytro Stolypin's social experiment, he pointed to the expediency of freeing a strong, solvent, hard-working peasant from the influence of the community. He proposed to cancel the debt to those who paid the state half the value of their allotment with "the obligatory obligation of the rural community to allocate the appropriate plot to the peasant, if possible, in one place for consideration by the community" (Stolypin, 1883, p. 8). The latter, thus, became not merely the owner of the land; he was able to reduce his allotment strips into a single piece, in fact – in the cut. On the other hand, Dmytro Arkadiyovych proposed recognizing the peasants of those communities, who had paid the ransom payment as sole private owners of land plots. In both cases there was an understanding of the need to stimulate the agrarian capitalism by significantly easing the financial ransom burden for the peasants, the introduction of individual private ownership of allotted land, the departure from state support of the rural community.

In addition, the tendency, which was noticed by D. A. Stolypin, turned into a pattern at the beginning of the XXth century. The need for the complete ransom payments' abolition was recognized as urgent during the Special Meeting on the Needs of the Agricultural Industry. It was demanded by the peasants during spontaneous revolutionary demonstrations. The government of S.Yu. Witte and Nicholas II could not ignore these facts. Therefore, on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of November in 1905, the Manifesto and the accompanying order were published, according to which "ransom payments of former landlord peasants from the 1<sup>st</sup> of January in 1906 were reduced by half, and from the 1<sup>st</sup> of January in 1907 were abolished completely" (Sidelnikov, 1973, pp. 45–46). The imperial elite, therefore, deliberately made the largest financial sacrifice to the state, as the total budget losses from the abolition of redemption operations reached 1 billion. 674 million karbovantsi. Payments from the state treasury to the landlords of 4% of the state redemption obligations were supposed to last until 1955. Stolypin, who was appointed as the Council of Ministers Chairman on the 21<sup>st</sup> of July in 1906, did not have the laurels of authorship, but the official duty to implement the measures determined by his predecessor to abolish the ransom payments.

The discussion's level concerning the community's fate increased in a similar way. Even after returning from abroad, during trips to the territory of Berdyansk povit (district), Dmytro

Arkadiyovych noticed several interesting changes in the rural everyday life, for example, the plots' fragmentation, the multi-layered and distant lands' growth; the transition of the community from general to the partial redistribution, or even without a redistributive state; purchase of landlord or state lands by wealthy peasants united in a society; the peasant land lease development (Stolypin, 1877, pp. 3–8). It did not go unnoticed that the Mordvin community members, in order to prevent the allotment of new settlers and prevent the reduction of land, turned to the court system (Stolypin, 1874, p. 3). As D. A. Stolypin spotted the fragility of the community and the attraction of peasants to individual farming, he went on a social experiment to accelerate the trend. And the success was obvious – if on the eve of the experiment the Mordvinians were wary of the proposals of the master, because “in the community, as in a glove all together and warm”, then before the second stage behind the farms was a long queue (Stolypin, 1877, p. 3). The success of that, to some extent provocative step, was reflected in the third and fifth paragraphs of the fifteenth report written by Dmytro Stolypin. In fact, it provided not only the ransom payments abolition for the peasant elite, but also its release from the guardianship and the circular guarantee of the community, and the shaking of the social organism of the latter.

According to Macy, at first, the pair of points reflected the belief of the loner, but then in the 1890-ies the idea of the appropriateness of withdrawal from the state support of the community was already quite popular both among the liberal zemstvo and in the aristocratic salons (Macy, 1993, p. 18). It was brought to the level of discussion by the higher state bureaucracy by the commission of V.Y. Hurko and the Special Meeting of S. Yu. Witte (Pryimak, 2002, pp. 26–27). The order, issued on the 9<sup>th</sup> of November in 1906, which triggered Stolypin's agrarian reform, turned this idea into a public policy course. According to the content of his first article, the owner, who owned allotted land, was given the opportunity to consolidate their strips in the individual private property. According to the second article, in those communities where there was no general redistribution for 24 years, for each peasant who submitted a declaration of a desire to move from communal to private land ownership, both homestead and arable lands that were previously in permanent use were assigned to ownership. In the communities, where general redistributions took place on the eve of the reforms, the allotments that were given to him by the east for permanent use became the individual private property of the peasant. If a separate farm had more land than was established by the east during the redistribution, the peasant had to pay the community the value of the surplus. In addition, the surplus was determined by the initial redemption price (Sidelnikov, 1973, pp. 99–105).

Therefore, the Decree issued on the 9<sup>th</sup> of November in 1906 ensured the full right of the peasant to private ownership of the former communal allotment. On the one hand, the impoverished peasants, who did not have the opportunity to run their own farms, had the opportunity to sell the communal plots. On the other hand, conditions were created for the wealthy owners to increase the size of the sown area by purchasing the plots. However, the process of mobilization of communal land was limited by the Rules issued on the 6<sup>th</sup> of August in 1907, according to which the peasants had the right to concentrate in one farm no more than 6 purchased plots (Sidelnikov, 1973, pp. 150–151).

At the same time, the Decree issued on the 9<sup>th</sup> of November in 1906 was replaced in 1910 by the Law issued on the 14<sup>th</sup> of June. As a result, the process of introducing individual private property on communal lands accelerated – unrestricted communities were automatically transferred by law to a court or personal-private ownership. In addition,

the local administration was given broad powers to influence the process of peasants leaving the redistributive communities.

It should also be added that during the social experiment D. A. Stolypin had neither the right nor the opportunity to interfere directly in the land relations of Mordvyniv community. In his experience, Dmytro only hinted to the peasants at the backwardness and obsolescence of their economic system; it raised doubts in the community's social consciousness concerning the fidelity of traditional land use. But the third to fifth paragraphs of this report contained an indication of the appropriateness of the allocation of peasant strips to one side, the need for the boundary work, the transition to farming. Hence, on the basis of phenomena's observation derived from the experiment, Dmytro Stolypin, in fact, made the assumption that in the future the main object of land management should be the allotment of the rural community.

The first and second paragraphs of the fifteenth report conducted by D. A. Stolypin stemmed from the problem of peasant scarcity of land. Founded by the provisions of the 1861 reform, it was complicated by the weakness and limited financial mechanisms by the end of the 1870-ies, through which the land fund of the landlord nobility, the State and Specific Departments, could gradually become the property or long-term use of the main agricultural producer. The above-mentioned points were devoted to stimulating the development of the land market, with the obligatory involvement of individual farmers in the latter. But due to cast affiliation, Dmytro Stolypin could not directly point out that the nobility, especially small businesses, unrestrainedly withdrew from economic affairs and handed them over to managers, mortgaged and re-mortgaged property, plunged into debt, led a parasitic lifestyle. Instead, Dmytro spoke of the crisis of the landed economy, one of the ways out of which he considered the establishment in the estates of rental farms for peasants (Stolypin, 1893, p. 6). In meeting the land needs of the latter, Dmytro Solypin saw the prospect of a new social support for the state in the countryside. He defined his social experiment in Mordvynivka as an argument in the proven fidelity of such a step. Realizing the unprecedentedness of the latter, the amateur sociologist did not stop only at the lease of the created improved plot farms. Without the mortgage institutions' involvement, only on the basis of the terms of the agreement with the peasants, he initiated the mechanisms of direct purchase and sale of noble land by individual peasants (Stolypin, 1893, p. 12). Thus, the cost of proving the correctness and social viability of beliefs reached for D. A. Stolypin in the amount of about 246 thousand karbovantsi, which was equal to the value of more than 1,200 acres of their own land and the money spent on the construction of farms (the author's estimate).

Dmytro Stolypin put emphasis on the drastic need to accelerate the development of the land market in the fifteenth report, by removing class restrictions and stimulating servicing banking institutions, Dmytro wasn't cognizant of the fact that an order to establish the Peasant Bank would be signed two months later. From the very beginning, the Peasant Bank functions were limited to providing loans to the wealthy peasants on the security of purchased land. But with the adoption in 1885 of the new Statute, the range of its activities expanded significantly, the basis of which was the provision of local branches the opportunity to buy privately owned land at their own expense (Kacharovskiy, 1911, p. 137). The transformation of the bank into one of the main levers of the agrarian reform of 1906 – 1917 took place before P. A. Stolypin's appointment as the Prime Minister – from the 3<sup>rd</sup> of November in 1905 the bank received the right to use a wide range of mortgage services, to conduct brokerage activities, to circulate its own securities (Sidelnikov, 1973, p. 47). Its fund was replenished with large areas of land from the State and Specific Departments (Sidelnikov, 1973, pp. 90–91). In the South of Ukraine,

71% of bank plots, which were sold to the peasants looked like delapidated farms (Pryimak, 2002, p. 55). Although commodity management in the latter was possible only in 32% of cases (Pryimak, 2002, p. 50), the payment for them was calculated using the coefficient of soil profitability. It should be mentioned that the indicator became, at one time, the basis for deducting rent and payment created by D. A. Stolypin farms. Combined with the principles of marketability and individuality, the indicator was the amount, the detection of which allows us to speak about the conceptual identity of Stolypin's social-experimental and banking plots.

**The Conclusions and Prospects for Further Research.** Thus, it would not be appropriate to characterize D. Stolypin's paragraphs, in particular, the fifteenth report as a concept of agrarian transformations, since they were neither primarily nor in the future considered by the author as a pre-legislative initiative. They did not contain legally binding regulations and articles. In addition, the target audience of all reports D. A. Stolypin did not consist of the government officials or the representatives of the political elite of the Russian Empire, but of several hundred landowners, amateur farmers and scientists, who were members of the Moscow Imperial Society of Agriculture. The author of the paragraphs, like most of his like-minded people, who made similar proposals, belonged to the era of the "revolution in consciousness". Due to the "revolution in consciousness", the peasant issue was not only separated from the agrarian one, but also received the primary attention of the general public.

The experimenter Dmytro Arkadiyovych and the reformer Petro Stolypin considered the search for ways to solve the agrarian (peasant) issue a family affair certainly. The search logically fit into the Russian Empire progressive nobility's social consciousness elements system at that time, which chose the path of service to the state. Dmytro Stolypin, in this context, from the standpoint of the macro-administration, was one of the many amateur researchers, who were members of various metropolitan aristocratic scientific or public associations. He did not intend to make a bureaucratic career, and in the course of a long search for the self-development and self-realization, he focused on the idea of popularizing Comte's sociological knowledge principles, the agrarian sector capitalization, the peasant farming intensification. Through his social experiments, Dmytro Arkadiyovych not only drew attention to the possibility of creating a wealthy stratum among the rural population, which would become the mainstay of the monarchical regime but also formed an empirical basis for confirming the fidelity of the six points of the fifteenth report. Dmytro Stolypin was one of the farm business pioneers and at the time of the land leased plots establishment, he had no idea that his cousin's nephew would undertake its implementation on a national scale in more than thirty years. Dmytro Stolypin's activity occurred at a time when in the agrarian sector only tendencies of comradeship of the peasant economy were formed, when the entrepreneurial consciousness among the rural population of the South of Ukraine was still in its infancy.

Instead, Petro Stolypin chose a bureaucratic career as the stratagem of his life. At the time of receiving the post of Minister of the Interior and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, he had extensive experience at various levels of public administration. On the eve of the publication of the Order issued on the 9<sup>th</sup> of November in 1906, the reformer P. A. Stolypin saw quite clearly the way to bring the Russian Empire to the level of the world's leading countries. The Agrarian reform, in this regard, was seen by him as one of the most important tools needed for the chosen goal. It should also be taken into consideration that the above-mentioned order and other agrarian bills were not Petro Arkadiyovych's individual intellectual work product. In the historical literature, they are logically characterized as the result of the Special Meeting on the needs of the agricultural industry, the United Nobility and other small official commissions.



Hence, behind the reformer was not only the family experience of the experiment, but also the fruit of systematic work of several thousand progressive statesmen, the power of the imperial bureaucracy and society's expectations to improve things in all (including agrarian) sectors of economics, politics, education, culture, etc. In addition, the agrarian capitalization tendencies noticed in the 1870-ies by his cousin turned into the agrarian development regularities, among which the intensification of peasant economy belonged to one of the priority places at the beginning of the XXth century. The bet on the "strong and sober" in the reform of 1906 – 1917 was not only the family business echo, but also a socially expected pattern, the basis of the evolutionary path of further development of the state.

However, we should not ignore the fact that Petro Arkadiyovych Stolypin was well acquainted with the results of the social experiments implemented by his cousin. The latter, in turn, probably saw in his nephew the most likely heir to the family business. The paramount evidence for this thesis was the fact that in P. A. Stolypin's personal archive was a complex, albeit scattered, documents on the estate in the village of Mordvynivtsi, Berdyansk povit (district), Tavriya huberniya (province). But Petro Arkadiyovych could not make this family connection public and expose the case of hutorization as a family affair, as a politician, as the Head of the Executive Branch of Power of the Russian Empire. In his numerous reports, speeches, appeals, and reports, there was no mention of Dmytro Arkadiyovych and the rental farms in Priazov region. The world of family affairs for the reformer was clearly separated from the world of state-building practice. At the same time, D. A. Stolypin's peasant economy formation of trends in commerce echoed the sociological heritage of the contemporary era and responded to P. A. Stolypin's agrarian reform – when the regular capitalization of the agrarian sector received an additional incentive. At least such a connection was clearly traced on the thorns of the southern Ukrainian huberniya (provinces).

The publication is D. A. Stolypin's part of a comprehensive study on sociological views and practices. The prospects for further research are in the plane of analysis of the preconditions for the effectiveness of the social experiment in the South of Ukraine, the remnants of it in the socio-historical memory of the modern local rural population. The study on D. A. Stolypin's contribution in the sociological cognition methods development could be also interesting, as well as the evolution of his views on the social stratification issues, the peasantry intensification, the rural community fate.

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**INTELLECTUAL BASES OF UKRAINIAN AGRARIANISM  
OF THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH: VYACHESLAV LYPYNSKY<sup>1</sup>**

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the article – to explore the intellectual foundations of the Ukrainian agrarianism of the revolutionary era in the views of V. Lypynsky. The research methodology is based on such principles of historical knowledge as scientificity, historicism, objectivity, systemanalysis, etc., as well as on the application of general scientific, special historical study methods. The scientific novelty consists in the following issues: it is in V. Lypynsky's works analysed by us the thinker focused on such basic agrarian meanings as: 1) uniqueness and indisputable value for mankind of spiritual, moral, cultural and social properties inherent in the peasantry and its labour; 2) recognition of the peasantry as a stratum capable of playing an independent role in political life; 3) non-capitalist, “separate” peasant way of society development,*

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preservation of private property – small peasant property as its optimal regional option and the basis of social progress, as well as the idea of a peasant cooperative state; 4) the predominance of agriculture and rural way of life over industry and the city, as well as the peasantry over other social groups; 5) the peasantry – the agricultural strata – concentrates the basic positive values and qualities of society, is the foundation of state stability and the bearer of national identity, and the above virtues should determine its political power. **The Conclusions.** After the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921, the peasantry continued to defend their own path of development. At the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, the peasantry resisted the state, from covert to overt armed. It did not tolerate another communization of the countryside. V. Lypynsky's grain grower ideology had a clear agrarianist meaning, and the intellectual was one of the theorists of the Ukrainian agrarianism of the revolutionary and interwar periods. The principled ideologues proposed by him clearly correspond to the key meanings of both Eastern European and Ukrainian agrarianism.

**Key words:** V. Lypynsky, Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921, Eastern European agrarianism, Ukrainian agrarianism.

## ІНТЕЛЕКТУАЛЬНІ ПІДСТАВИ УКРАЇНСЬКОГО АГРАРИЗМУ РЕВОЛЮЦІЙНОЇ ЕПОХИ: В'ЯЧЕСЛАВ ЛИПІНСЬКИЙ

**Анотація. Мета статті** – дослідити інтелектуальні підстави українського аграризму революційної епохи у поглядах В. Липинського. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на таких принципах історичного пізнання, як науковість, історизм, об'єктивність, системний аналіз тощо, а також на застосуванні загальнонаукових, спеціально-історичних методів. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що обґрунтовано, що в працях В. Липинського зацентровано на таких основних аграристських сенсах, як: 1) унікальність та незаперечна цінність для людства духовних, моральних, культурних і соціальних властивостей, притаманних селянству та його праці; 2) визнання селянства верствою, здатною відігравати самостійну роль у політичному житті; 3) не капіталістичний, “окремішній” селянський шлях розвитку суспільства, збереження приватної власності – дрібної селянської власності як оптимального регіонального її варіанта та підґрунтя соціального прогресу, а також ідея селянської кооперативної держави; 4) перевага землеробства і сільського способу життя над промисловістю і містом, а також селянства над іншими соціальними групами; 5) селянство – землеробська верства – зосереджує в собі основні позитивні цінності й якості суспільства, є фундаментом стабільності держави й носієм національної ідентичності, а вищевказані чесноти мають визначати його політичну владу. **Висновки.** По завершенню Української революції 1917 – 1921 рр. селянство продовжувало збройно обстоювати власний шлях розвитку. Наприкінці 1920-х – на початку 1930-х рр. селянство чинило опір державі: від прихованого до відкритого збройного. Воно не мирилося з черговою комунізацією села. Хліборобська ідеологія В. Липинського мала виразний аграристський зміст, а сам інтелектуал був одним із теоретиків українського аграризму революційного та міжвоєнного періодів. Запропоновані ним принципові ідеологеми чітко кореспондуються з ключовими смислами як східноєвропейського, так і власне українського аграризму.

**Ключові слова:** В. Липинський, Українська революція 1917 – 1921 рр., східноєвропейський аграризм, український аграризм.

**The Problem Statement.** Each historical epoch is unique in its own way. It has an internal logic of events, semantic load, etc. It is directly related to the past and also determines the future. Radically changing reality, the epoch is not always epochal in the sense of chronological boundaries. The closer to the twentieth century, the more rapid are the essential socio-cultural transformations and the more limited their duration. These processes significantly accelerated at the beginning of the XXth century and are even more fleeting in the XXIst century. In our opinion, the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921 belongs to such historical, milestone epochs of the Ukrainian past.

Considering the understanding of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917 – 1921 as a multidimensional, integral historical and sociocultural phenomenon as well-founded

(Verstiuk, Holovchenko, Ostashko, Pyrih, Soldatenko, Sokalskyi, 2011), we defend the opinion that among all its components the peasantry was the most expressive. Accordingly, the active subject of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917 – 1921 was the peasantry (Kornovenko, 2017, pp. 83–94). This gives us reason to speak of the peasant character of the Ukrainian revolution (Kornovenko, 2014, pp. 142–146), which does not contradict the fact that the Ukrainian revolution is national democratic. The agrarian character of the Ukrainian society, peasant-centric considerations of the Ukrainian intellectuals of the second half of the XIXth – beginning of the XXth century, active socio-political position of the peasantry before and during the Ukrainian revolution of 1917 – 1921, the peasant nature of these events led to the formation of a new ideological Ukrainian peasant-centric phenomenon – the Ukrainian agrarianism (Kornovenko, Zemziulina, 2019, pp. 14–20) as a variant of Eastern European agrarianism (Kornovenko, Pasichna, 2019, pp. 24–30)

A new era, and such, no doubt, was the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921, caused the crystallization of a new generation of the Ukrainian intellectuals, whose formation occurred at the end of the XIXth – beginning of the XXth century: A. Krymsky, V. Vernadsky, M. Hrushevsky, L. Kurbas, M. Narbut and the others. Their unique heritage has become not only a Ukrainian, but a common European heritage, a significant contribution of Ukraine to the development of European culture. Among them, the leading place, in our opinion, belongs to V. Lypynsky – a multifaceted talented person, a Ukrainian thinker in spirit. The uniqueness of his figure, a variety of works has attracted and continues to attract attention of researchers and the general public. Owing to the efforts of many generations of scientists, the work of V. Lypynsky became the object of aspecial research, and his figure came out of the shadow of artificial oblivion. There are enough reasons to say that in the modern Ukrainian and foreign humanitarian discourse a self-sufficient scientific direction has been formed – Lypynsky studies (Ostashko, 2007, pp. 113–130). Applied in this regard are the scientific works of T. Ostashko, Y. Tereshchenko – compilers of the five-volume edition “Vyacheslav Lypynsky and his Time”, authors of numerous scientific publications on this topic, I. Hyrych – the author of the latest monograph on V. Lypynsky in Ukrainian historiography (at the time of writing of our article) (Hyrych, 2019). In this context, it is important to study the intellectual foundations of the Ukrainian agrarianism of the revolutionary era in the vision of V. Lypynsky. This is due to the fact that, firstly, the Ukrainian agrarianism and intellectual achievements of the thinker have a high scientific potential for their further understanding; secondly, the Ukrainian agrarianism and the work of the historiosophist made a significant contribution to the development of Ukrainian state thought itself.

**The purpose of the article** – to explore the intellectual foundations of the Ukrainian agrarianism of the revolutionary era in the views of V. Lypynsky.

**The Analysis of Recent Researches.** Plots in tune with the theme of our study were partially reflected in foreign and Ukrainian historiography (Teslya, 2014, pp. 33–62; Matveev, 1991; Makovetskaya, Pokivaylova, 1984; Holec, 2011, pp. 3–32; Bernstein, 2018, pp. 1127–1150; Sumpf, 2017, pp. 102–116; Finkel, Gehlbach, Kofanov, 2017, pp. 710–721; Halushko, 2000, pp. 164–200; Vietrov, Zborets, 2012, pp. 134–140; Halushko, 2002; Zhydkov, 2017, pp. 113–119; Halushko, 1999, pp. 64–70; Masnenko, 2008, pp. 22–26; Masnenko, 2012, pp. 141–144; Ostashko, 2007, pp. 113–130; Artiukh, 2006, pp. 115–128; Halushko, 2010). The researchers mainly focused on aspects related to the essence and content of Eastern European agrarianism, the implementation of the so-called “third” way in some Eastern European countries, the unfolding of the peasant revolution in the



post-imperial Russian space, the formation of grain-grower ideology in the works of V. Lypynsky and its Eastern European agrarianist context.

**The Main Material Statement.** Eastern European agrarianism (in particular, Ukrainian) as a formed ideology of Eastern European nations of the second half of the XIXth – first third of XXth century represented by a multi-genre discourse. Its ideas are reflected in the treatises of G. Ruland, A. Scheffle, A. Schwegl, M. Hodza, O. Frankenberger, A. Stamboliisky, P. Kulish, G. Simantsiv, the concept of J. Melin, etc., the programme provisions of the Bulgarian, Polish, Romanian, Ukrainian, Czechoslovak political parties, etc. Based on the analysis of a wide range of primary sources on Eastern European agrarianism (in particular, Ukrainian), the work of predecessors, there are enough reasons to believe that in a broad sense, Eastern European agrarianism is a holistic socio-cultural phenomenon, a phenomenon of Eastern European history, which is the object of knowledge. In a narrower sense, Eastern European agrarianism in general and Ukrainian in particular – the system of peasant-centric ideas of different subjects of the socio-cultural space of Eastern Europe in the second half of the nineteenth – first third of the twentieth century and their practical implementation. Concretizing a narrower understanding of Eastern European agrarianism in general and Ukrainian agrarian in particular in the second half of the XIXth – first third of the XXth century, we state that it is a system of ideas about peasants, peasants about themselves, about the peasantry as an active subject of history; component of a domestic economic policy aimed at solving the agrarian/peasant issue; as the peasants' self-awareness of themselves, as the peasants' political culture and political consciousness, as the realization in practice of the peasants' hopes and ideas about their just future; component of socio- and party-political thought.

The key ideologems of Eastern European agrarianism in general and the Ukrainian agrarianism in particular are the following: 1) uniqueness and indisputable value for mankind of spiritual, moral, cultural and social properties inherent in the peasantry and its labour (Matveev, 1991, pp. 3–4); 2) recognition of the peasantry as a stratum capable of playing an independent role in political life (Krapivin, Bychixin, 1998, p. 69); 3) non-capitalist, “separate” peasant way of development of society, preservation of private property – small peasant property as its optimal regional variant and the basis of social progress, as well as the idea of a peasant cooperative state (Makovetskaya, Pokivaylova, 1984); 4) the predominance of agriculture and rural way of life over industry and the city, as well as the peasantry over other social groups (Agrarizm); 5) the peasantry – the agricultural strata – concentrates the basic positive values and qualities of society, is the foundation of state stability and the bearer of national identity, and the above virtues should determine its political power (Halushko, 2000, pp. 164–200).

In our opinion, the ideas of the Ukrainian agrarianism of the epoch of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921 are presented in the programmes of such political parties as the Ukrainian People's Community, the All-Ukrainian Union of Grain Growers-Owners, and the Ukrainian People's Party (Kornovenko, Zemziulina, 2019, pp. 14–20). We believe that they are also contained in the “Materials for the Programme of the [Ukrainian Democratic Political Party]” (hereinafter – “Materials”) and in the “The Outline on the Programme of the Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian Party” (hereinafter – “The Outline”). The authorship of “The Outline” belongs to V. Lypynsky (Turchenko, Zaliska, 1994, pp. 171–181; Hai-Nyzhnyk, 2018, p. 309). He is also considered the ideological inspirer of the Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian Party. This gives us reason to talk about the agrarian views of V. Lypynsky, formed during the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921, presented in the above documents, as well

as in the “Letters to the Brothers-Grain Growers” and further developed in the interwar period, first of all in “Universalism in Grain Grower Ideology (Letter to Prof. Yavorsky)”, when the thinker was in exile.

In “The Materials” the question is raised of the fact that in the Ukrainian political life of the period of the Ukrainian revolution clearly defined political forces that do not tend to either socialist or non-socialist tendencies. In fact, the organizing committee of the Ukrainian Democratic Party was declared as a third political force, which it positioned itself (Lypynsky, 1994, p. 253).

In “The Outline” V. Lypynsky more specifically spelled out not only the political priorities of the Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian Party, but also embossed the leading social stratum of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. First of all, the name of this political force reflects its agrarianist character, because “as a grain grower party, we will ensure that the grain grower part of the Ukrainian democracy in the process of creating our free political life takes a position that corresponds to its number (85% of the population) and strength (Lypynsky, 1994, p. 257)”. The author of “The Outline”, and in fact, in our opinion, the “Manifesto of the Peasantry” writes confidently that political power in Ukraine should primarily belong to the Ukrainian peasantry, and the city should not dictate its will to the Ukrainian countryside. Ukraine is a land of grain growers, and the Ukrainian state must become a state of grain growers. Standing on such a ground, our party will use all means to increase the political, economic and cultural strength of the Ukrainian peasantry” (Lypynsky, 1994, pp. 257–258).

In this way, V. Lypynsky, like P. Kulish, clearly distinguished two Ukrainian worlds: the countryside and the city. The countryside, according to both thinkers, should become free from the dictates of the city and the social basis of the Ukrainian state, which is peasant in nature. At the level of the programme of the political party, the understanding of the peasantry is crystallized not only as the custodian of cultural and spiritual values of the people, but as a full-fledged, active subject of history, national state-building. V. Lypynsky’s understanding of the agrarian character of the Ukrainian society is clear. We believe that *de facto* we are talking about the Ukrainian peasant state, and accordingly the Ukrainian peasant nation. R. Vetrov’s and S. Zborets’s arguments about the fact that “Lypynsky considers a peasant not as a villager with his ethno-cultural attributes, but as a conscious citizen of the state, a producing master, are correct for its good and independence, the most important value – the bread” (Vetrov, Zborets, 2012, p. 136).

The provisions of “The Outline” concerning the educational, cultural, and economic sectors also are saturated by agrarianism. The sections of the programme document clearly state that “in matters of education and culture, our party as a grain grower party, in addition to general democratic aspirations, aims to spread education and culture in the countryside as much as possible peasants of universities. The work of a rural teacher in a free grain grower Ukraine must be surrounded by special respect, and his material condition must be well enough to attract our best intelligentsia to this important and difficult work” (Lypynsky, 1994, pp. 259–260).

The economic model of grain grower Ukraine as a state, from the point of view of the Ukrainian Democratic Agricultural Party (hereinafter – UDAP), and in fact V. Lypynsky, will have nothing to do with the chaos of “private capitalist economy”. It will be based on fundamentally different principles: “the interest of the private entrepreneur” must be limited “to the widest possible state control over the national economy, and from below to the organization and association of the productive masses of the people”. That is why, our party will stand for the greatest development of the democratic cooperative movement in all its forms and differences” (Lypynsky, 1994, p. 261). Thus, the third, alternative economic

model – cooperative was proposed. According to the thinker and his associates, he was the most acceptable for the main producer of material goods – the peasantry. It harmoniously combined private and public interests, there was no excessive capitalist exploitation and socialist dissolution of the individual in the team.

The agrarian issue did not go unnoticed by the UDAP political programme. However, the understanding of its essence and solutions was based on different principles from the proposals of other parties. First of all, the difference was that for UDAP “Free grain grower Ukraine” is “the land of highly developed, intensive farming” (Lypynsky, 1994, p. 262). In this way, they considered the agrarian issue as a component of the state peasant agrarian policy, and the peasant as a citizen, whose private land ownership was the foundation of the Ukrainian state. The party’s vision of the prospects of the Ukrainian countryside is the third way of development. It was understood as the placement throughout Ukraine of “hamlets of the working Ukrainian peasantry, where the Ukrainian grain grower, united in powerful cooperative societies, obtains from our fertile land by his labour and his family the maximum that it can give” (Lypynsky, 1994, p. 262). UDAP members in “The Outline” paid attention to another detail that favourably distinguished their vision of the essence and ways to solve the agrarian issue. For them, Ukraine “belongs to the lands of Western European agricultural culture”. In view of this circumstance, the party members emphasized that they would fight against all Russian projects of agrarian reform based on the primitive psychology of the “community” (all redistributions and allotments “per capita”) and the “cutting” of land to the three-field peasant economy) (Lypynsky, 1994, p. 263). In this way, the representatives of the UDAP, first, saw in the Ukrainian peasantry the social basis of the Ukrainian statehood; secondly, they clearly understood that the Ukrainian peasant is a unique self-sufficient subject, qualitatively different from the Russian one; thirdly, the solution of the Ukrainian agrarian question should be based on European-Ukrainian principles that contribute to the formation of a high-tech industry while preserving the identity of the Ukrainian peasantry as the embodiment of cultural and national values. Other options, based on other principles, according to UDAP members, are “reactionary because they lead back to the lower stages of this development and threaten a large decline in productivity and land yield” (Lypynsky, 1994, p. 263).

The central figure of socio-political life in Ukraine during the period of the national-democratic revolution of 1917 – 1921, first of all Ukrainian state-building, for V. Lypynsky, was a grain grower. The same term – “grain grower” – was used by G. Simantsev in the work “Modern Agrarianism”, published in Prague in 1929. In “Letters to the Brothers-Grain Growers” (hereinafter – Letters), in particular written in 1919 – 1920, panoramic his views on the unique role of the peasantry as an active subject of history in the life of the Ukrainians are presented, the concept of Ukrainian agrarianism as a variant of Eastern European is presented. However, the author of the Letters did not use the concept of “agrarianism”, although there is every reason to qualify his views as agrarianist. In this context, we share the views of K. Halushko. R. Vetrov and S. Zborets (Vietrov, Zborets, 2012, pp. 134–140), S. Zhydkov (Zhydkov, 2017, pp. 113–119) and other researchers. The thinker, in accordance with the general principles of Eastern European agrarianism, clearly distinguished two worlds: the world of countryside and land and the world of city and capital. Such his thoughts agree with the views of such Ukrainian agrarianists as P. Kulish, H. Simantsiv. They do not contradict the ideas of such representatives of Eastern European agrarianism as A. Schwegla, M. Hodza, A. Stamboliisky, etc. V. Lypynsky considered psychology to be the basis for distinguishing these worlds. He is convinced that the psychology of the grain grower and the psychology of

“stock exchange gesheftsmakers” are two opposites that do not intersect, even at an imaginary point. Their psychology differs radically in responsibility and values (Lypynsky, 1995, p. 33).

In V. Lypynsky's interpretation, “the struggle not for life, but for death” continues between them. He calls these worlds “laws”: “the laws of the land and the laws of capital. The old civil law, based on the possession of land, and the new commercial law, based on the possession of capital” (Lypynsky, 1995, p. 32). It is a struggle, the philosopher continues, of two irreconcilable worldviews. The fundamental difference between them, in our opinion, is a socio-cultural abyss caused by ways of life, values, and the meaning of life. At its core, this struggle is “a deadly battle between the countryside and the modern capitalist world. The state-household and the state-exchange” (Lypynsky, 1995, p. 33). H. Simantsev also draws attention to this. For him, the “law of the land” is eternal, not fluid values, salvation from despair, the basis for building an optimistic perspective (CSAHAAU, f. 4465, d. 1, c. 747, pp. 4, 37).

The hyperbolization of grain growership by V. Lypynsky reaches its apogee in the sentences in which he substantiated the direct relationship and interdependence between the grain grower stratum and national statehood. According to him, “only the only grain grower class, firmly tied to the land and living from agricultural products and not from politics, is interested by blood – life and not words – in the existence of its own, independent Ukrainian State” (Lypynsky, 1995, p. 41). According to the historiosophist, the unifying and organizing basis in the cause of nation-building and state-building in Ukraine is only the “Ukrainian grain grower class”. It is the “strongest class in the Ukrainian Nation”, and “the unification and organization of the entire Ukrainian Nation depends on it” (Lypynsky, 1995, p. 72).

At the same time, the thinker did not idealize grain growers. He offers concrete steps to “improve the health of the grain grower class”. In his opinion, first of all it is necessary to solve agrarian antagonisms which do not add unity to a social basis of the Ukrainian statehood and the nation. Elimination of agrarian antagonisms will free grain growers from parasites and speculators, “will make richer grain growers needy and useful citizens... the poorer grain growers will be destroyed by land-grabbing and hatred to “lords”...” (Lypynsky, 1995, p. 74).

In the post-war period, the agrarianist ideas of V. Lypynsky in the revolutionary era were further developed. In particular, in 1926 in Prague the publishing house “Ukrainian Flag” published the work of V. Lypynsky “Universalism in Agricultural Ideology (Letter to Prof. Yavorsky)” in Ukrainian translation by E. Tomashivsky (Lypynsky, 1926). In it, the author set out an understanding of the essence of grain grower ideas, their differences from other ideologies of that time: communism, “bourgeois burgher liberalism” and fascism. He categorically and unequivocally distinguished grain grower ideology from the above ideologies. Its uniqueness lies primarily in the fact that, according to V. Lypynsky, grain grower ideology –is the defeated ideology (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 4). This argument can be accepted only in part. Historical and ideological reality was more diverse than its bipolar imaginary model of V. Lypynsky – communism/fascism – liberalism. In the countries of Central-Eastern and Southern Europe: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania – grain grower ideology or agrarianism was on the rise as a third way – an alternative to the above. Its representatives were powerful political parties, government circles, it was implemented in the agrarianist by the sense agrarian reforms in these countries in the 1920s – 1930s.

We believe that there is more reason in the thinker's judgments about differences in principles. According to V. Lypynsky, “the fundamental feature of grain growers' ideology is irrationalism” (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 4). “Irrationalism, on the other hand, is completely alien to the way of thinking of the modern Western European liberal burgher and to the communist or

semi-intellectual communist or fascist who fights for power with him” (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 4). H. Simantsiv understood agrarianism as a “peasant political religion” (CSAHAAU, f. 4465, d. 1, c. 747, pp. 33, 37). This interpretation has much in common.

In addition, there are different subjects – the bearers of grain grower ideology. To express his judgment, the thinker uses a comparative approach. He compares the bearers of grain grower and non-grain grower ideologies, outlining their existing differences. In particular, V. Lypynsky believes that grain growers are closer to nature. This thesis, in our opinion, is correct, given that the life of a grain grower is closely intertwined and associated with the agricultural year. The greater naturalness of farmers determines the originality of their worldview and worldview, which are clearly irrational in nature: “Hence the irrational metaphysical religiosity and faith in God...” (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 4).

The grain grower is radically different from the burgher. This idea is pervasive in V. Lypynsky’s explanation of the separation of grain grower ideology from the others. It resonates with the conceptual provisions of both Eastern European agrarianism in general and Ukrainian agrarianism in particular. First of all, it is distinguished by the fact that the burgher is “mashinized” because its inner world, value system, etc., are generated by the “burgher machine” (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 4). The burgher paradigm is a rationalist, materialist-atheist paradigm. In it, the universe, man in the universe, “appears... in the form of identical to its content figures, from which the human mind can and should create arbitrary combinations” (Lypynsky, 1926, pp. 4–5). Accordingly, according to V. Lypynsky’s logic, the burgher paradigm is a paradigm of manipulations, meaningless form: “... hence the rationalist free-thinking and irreligiousness of the modern burgher...” (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 5).

Such a rationalist, “machinized” worldview and worldview are the sources of communism / fascism and liberalism. This is due, according to the thinker, to the fact that materialism / rationalism is a rejection of religion and the church as natural institutions of the irrational, on the one hand. On the other hand, communism / fascism and liberalism are fanatically convinced of “their rationalist, dialectical “truth””. In this way, they approach religion in content, as they become “the modern magic: the belief in the divine omnipotence of the human mind and its miracle workers, sitting either in Masonic lodges and the League of Nations, or in the Third International and communist “cells”, or finally in fascism” (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 5).

The grain grower and the burgher are cultural antipodes. V. Lypynsky resorts to the traditional methodological approach for both Ukrainian and Eastern European agrarianism. He, as in his previous works (“Letters to the Brothers-Grain Growers”), grotesquely contrasts the two socio-cultural worlds: villages and cities. At the same time, compared to his previous thoughts on this topic, he adds a new argument. It concerns the agricultural settlement of grain growers, as opposed to the burgher nomadic way of life. According to him, the farmer is most closely connected with the land, he is “the most prominent representative of the type of settled human” (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 5). In this way V. Lypynsky identifies the agricultural settledness of grain growers as a natural/primary culture. Instead, machine-burgher culture is not only secondary to grain grower one, but also nomadic, antagonistic to grain grower one, such that it destroys the latter: “Modern culture is burgher, machine, destroys all the shackles of settlement. European people, who are moving faster and faster to a nomadic state, to a state of perpetual migration from one city to another, from village to factory, from one factory to another, etc.” (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 5).

P. Kulish expressed a similar understanding of the essence of urban culture. According to him, the city is “an abyssal burh”, “this roar, this commotion, noise, sound, whistle”. The city is a “temptation”, a “miserable civilization”. This understanding of the city by the author



of the letters from the hamlet testifies to his rejection of urbanization. In the modernization processes he witnessed, the philosopher saw a shift in the hierarchy of personal values in the direction of moving away from moral and ethical imperatives to material, from eternal to changeable. Such changes were regarded by him as an unequivocal negative. According to the thinker, the worldview of citizens is formed by “high chambers”. It is permeated only by material, superficial meanings. Due to this, the outlook of urban residents is limited. This is manifested in the fact that urban residents are grounded in their aspirations, thoughts, feelings. In this regard, P. Kulish wrote: “Born in the cities, growing up in high chambers, they do not invent anything better over their gentlemanly, or, as they say, comfortable life” (Kulish, 1989, p. 244). For him, “gentlemanly” and “comfortable” are words synonymous with a common negative connotation.

Based on the differences between the settled and nomadic way of life, V. Lypynsky substantiates the difference in grain grower and burgher identities. Guided by this logic, the grain grower is a patriot for whom “The land is the Motherland” (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 5). He paid considerable attention to this aspect, revealing the close relationship between these concepts. In his understanding, “A grain grower is a land. The homeland, the Motherland of the grain grower is his land, and his nation is the people who inhabit that land. The “nationalism” of the grain grower is called patriotism. This is the “nationalism” of the former “Roman Field”, which has nothing to do with the nationalism of “selfishness” and “interest” of extraterritorial nationalist burgher unions, nor with the nationalism of a nomadic horde for which the people are nomads or community scattered among foreigners. Nation and land in the concept of a grain grower are synonyms” (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 12).

In contrast, the burgher is deprived of such an identity because he roams: “Hence the prevailing burgher nationalism, based on the liberal formula of “self-determination”, which identifies the notion of a nation with the notion of an extraterritorial action union with branches, “minorities” in different lands” (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 5).

The consequence of opposite identities, according to V. Lypynsky, are different political cultures of grain growers and burghers. He distinguishes between two kinds of political extremes, the subject of which is the burgher, who “manages modern capitalist machine culture” (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 6). On the one hand – unlimited burgher liberalism, on the other – communist-fascist totalitarianism. Liberalism is interpreted by him as “the broadest political freedom” designed to ensure burgher speculations: financial, industrial, intellectual, etc., – that are “detached from nature”. Instead, “a communist or fascist must suppress all political freedom in order to seize and lead modern hordes” (Lypynsky, 1926, pp. 5–6). The thinker criticizes and condemns these extremes. “Bourgeois republics” for him – a manifestation of the “emerging liberalism of the burghership”. Communist-fascist totalitarianism is also an unacceptable phenomenon. V. Lypynsky reacts sharply negatively to such manifestations of “fanatical intolerance of people living from demagoguery and hypnosis of the crowd” (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 6).

The above extremes of the political culture of the burghers, according to the philosopher, due to the essence of the burghers, their way of life. The burghers are a fertile ground for free-thinking ideologies because they are cut off from the ground. The latter is interpreted as the lack of conservative institutions, socio-political and value brakes. This gives the burghers a high capacity for revolutionism, which knows no brakes in its manifestation, creates political extremes: liberalism and communist-fascist totalitarianism (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 7).

V. Lypynsky revealed grain grower political culture in a different semantic tone. The author of the grain grower ideology does not hide his sympathy for it. He gave a special place to the

grain grower and grain growers' culture in the socio-political and ideological space of that time. The basis for the separation of grain grower ideology as an alternative to burgher political culture, its extremes, is the nature of the grain grower different from the burgher's. "The grain grower and the grain grower culture occupy the middle between these two opposite runners. A grain grower's hard struggle with nature requires progress, discipline, organization; but at the same time, it cannot do without individual freedom", the thinker remarks. Thus, the political culture of the grain grower as a producer of natural material goods is a natural / harmonious combination of organization and freedom. In our opinion, such judgments of the ideologue of the Ukrainian agrarianism are motivated, based on the analysis of the Ukrainian history, first of all the history of the peasantry. They do not contradict the Ukrainian agrarianist theoretical thought and the views of Eastern European agrarianists.

In this way, the grain grower and the burgher, the grain grower and burgher culture/ideology are opposite phenomena. Their subjects, the grain grower and the burgher, are separate. The difference between them is as follows: 1) in religiosity; 2) in settledness; 3) in identity; 4) in political culture. In view of this, grain grower ideology/agrarianism occupies a special place from burgher liberalism and communist-fascist totalitarianism.

In our opinion, V. Lypynsky's judgments regarding the content of agrarian reforms in the European countries of that time are debatable. He believes that the agrarian reforms initiated and carried out by the "liberal burghers or the revolutionary intelligentsia" are "the last stage in the elimination of the leaders of the grain grower masses of that time, leaders who have lost their ability to lead" (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 9). An objective analysis of the agricultural legislation of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and other European countries shows that the agrarian issue in these countries had socio-economic and socio-political nature. An active subject of the European revolutionary upheavals at the beginning of the XXth century was the peasantry. The ruling circles of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and other European countries saw the peasantry as the basis of the newly established national states. The priority in their domestic policy belonged to the solution of the agrarian issue on the basis of peasant-centrism – agrarianism. Despite the objective differences, characteristic of these state formations, agrarian reforms in these countries had one common denominator. They aimed at the formation and development of numerous national individual middle peasant land tenure. The allotment of land to peasants took place through the alienation of large land holdings and the determination of the boundaries of inalienable land ownership (Kornovenko & Zemziulina, 2018, pp. 45–49).

V. Lypynsky believed that grain growers have "less political ability" in comparison with the burghers, which has a greater ability to political organization due to its concentration, way of life and production, and in comparison, with the so-called "proletariat", which by its nature is adapted to combine in the thirst for power and the prey of the community" (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 10). He was convinced that the peasants should be united neither on republican nor on dictatorial principles. According to him, the optimal form of unification for the peasants is the monarchy. V. Lypynsky, in accordance with his conservative Hetman ideals, revealed the meaning of such a monarchy. In particular, he wrote: "Only a monarchy based on respect for religion and law – a monarchy with limited complacency of the ruling and military castes, and with limited freedom of the leaders of the grain grower masses – is the only political organizational form... And at the same time the only political system in which a family, estate and grain growers' ideology can play a leading role in the life of their people" (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 11).

In favour of his position, he argued that "every republic, always based on the unrestricted freedom of the rulers, decomposes and demoralizes the grain grower class, which by its

nature is prone to political anarchy. ... Also, a dictatorship, whether hereditary in the form of an absolute monarchy or lifelong, in the form of one or another Caesarism, is not provided for the political organization of the grain growers masses” (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 11).

It is difficult to agree unequivocally with such sentences of the author. To a large extent, he repeats the historiographical traditions, socio-political practice of the second half of the XIXth – beginning of the XXth century, which established an unfounded, in our opinion, understanding of the peasantry as an inert, pro-monarchist, conservative-minded social class, which cannot be a self-sufficient, active subject of the historical process in the broadest sense of the word. However, a careful analysis of the agrarian history of Ukraine at the beginning of the XXth century allows us to speak about the emergence of qualitatively new features in the peasant environment, especially the Dnieper region, about the transformation of the peasantry into an active subject of history (Kornovenko, 2017, pp. 83–94). The peasantry in the early twentieth century was qualitatively different from both the urban proletariat and the peasantry of previous centuries, formed under fundamentally new conditions of post-serfdom reality. The events of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921, which, among other things, had a distinct peasant character, confirmed the peasant revolutionism. The peasants realized themselves as a separate community of the then socio-cultural space. The unifying value was the “Idea of the Land”, its distribution on fair, in their understanding, principles. The peasant republics became a phenomenon of the peasant revolution begun by the peasants of Poltava and Kharkiv provinces in 1902 (Kornovenko, 2017, pp. 25–36). There are enough reasons to understand them as a socio-cultural, holistic historical phenomenon. In essence, peasant republics are a form of socio-political and social self-organization of peasants united by common spiritual and cultural, socio-political and socio-economic values/ideals to address common spiritual and cultural, socio-political, socio-economic issues. The key to understanding the concept of “peasant republic” is a common cause. The peasant republic as a socio-political entity had a number of fundamental and classical features inherent in this kind of formations. First of all, they were as follows: the antithesis of monopoly power, the election of leadership, the presence of legislative and executive institutions, democracy in the peasant understanding in resolving common issues, territorial boundaries, armed formations, etc. Peasant republics were a form of manifestation of peasant revolutionism, socio-political and social self-organization of the peasantry, embodied the common peasant values and ideals, reflected the political culture and political programme of the peasants. Their emergence, short existence, unique role in the revolutionary processes at the beginning of the XXth century convincingly testified to the emergence in the then historical arena of a new active subject of history – the peasant (Kornovenko, Berestovyi, Kompaniiets, Pasichna, Pianzin, Shcherbakov, 2019), who was the bearer of a new ideology, different from those imposed on him by various political regimes that participated in the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921, which opposed his own communization actively. Thus, during the first two decades of July 1919 alone 207 military peasant uprisings against the Soviet rule were registered in Ukraine. Of these, 111 took place in Kyiv region, 37 – in Poltava region, 20 – in Volhynia region, 14 – in Kherson region, 12 – in Chernihiv region and Podillia (Zinchenko, 2008, p. 131).

After the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921, the peasantry continued to defend their own path of development. At the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, the peasantry resisted the state, from covert to overt armed. It did not tolerate another communization of the countryside. According to A. Graziosi’s observations, the second phase (1928 – 1933) of the peasant war against the Bolsheviks lasted (Graziosi, 2008, p. 5). In our opinion, this was a manifestation of the peasant revolution. The peasant-Soviet confrontation was large-scale and fierce. A. Besançon,

comparing it with the period of the revolution of 1917 – 1921, remarked aptly: “... In its scope and danger to the Bolshevik government, the peasant war was more massive and nationwide than the civil war” (Bezanson, 1993, p. 129). According to V. Tylishchak, the peasant revolt against the agrarian policy of the Soviet government in the Ukrainian countryside at the end of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s spread exponentially. In 1927 there were 173 “terrorist attacks” in that-time terminology, in 11 months of 1928 – 351, in 1929 – 1437, in 1930 – 4000 (Tylishchak). Peasant partisan detachments continued to operate in some regions of Ukraine. The anti-Soviet peasant movement of resistance gained a special scale in Eastern Volhynia and Podilia. As of the second half of March 1930, peasant riots engulfed the territory of 16 districts of the border zone of the Ukrainian SSR. According to B. Patryliak’s observations, the insurgent peasants of these territories managed to take control of some district centres (Patryliak). Only the artificial Holodomor led to the collapse of the peasant revolutionary struggle in 1932 – 1933.

V. Lypynsky’s views on the consolidating role of grain grower ideology for the Ukrainian state-building, the importance of grain growers’ ideology for reconciliation with neighbours, in particular Ukrainian-Polish, for European culture in general, are valid and have not lost their relevance. On and according to him, grain grower ideology is an ideology whose ideologems contribute to a broader understanding of the essence of nations, it is a universalist ideology. The universalism of agricultural ideology is different from the universalism of “burgher democracy”, “the destructive universalism of communism”. First of all, neither burgher nor communist ideology is really universalist, because these are ideologies based on extremes. In the first case – unlimited freedom, in the second – totalitarianism. In view of this, the convinced thinker only grain grower ideology is truly universalist. The universalism of grain grower ideology is real – idealistic. That is why, “there is no other salvation for European civilization” than the universalism of grain grower ideology (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 15).

Thanks to universalism, grain grower ideology can fulfil an important international task – reconciliation. V. Lypynsky interpreted the universalism of grain grower ideology as “a way of thinking – thinking the same ideas, both for oneself and for the others...” (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 14). At the same time, the decline of this “same way of thinking” has negative consequences. First of all, they concern the subject of such thinking – the grain grower: “Because the decline of the universalist way of thinking leads primarily to the loss of those who think – and with it the sense of their own place, their own rights and their own responsibilities in the universe – lost” (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 15). Without universalism, according to the author of the grain grower ideology, grain growers are doomed to decline. “Without universalism and its all-encompassing foundations in grain grower ideology, the representatives of this ideology will not win in every country. They will perish together with the liberal burghers... or perish together with pagan fascism...” (Lypynsky, 1926, p. 15), – V. Lypynsky wrote.

**The Conclusions.** Thus, V. Lypynsky’s grain grower ideology had a clear agrarianist meaning, and the intellectual was one of the theorists of the Ukrainian agrarianism of the revolutionary and interwar periods. The principled ideologues proposed by him clearly correspond to the key meanings of both Eastern European and Ukrainian agrarianism. The works of the thinker analysed by us focus on such basic agrarian meanings as: 1) uniqueness and indisputable value for mankind of spiritual, moral, cultural and social properties inherent in the peasantry and its labour; 2) recognition of the peasantry as a stratum capable of playing an independent role in political life; 3) non-capitalist, “separate” peasant way of society development, preservation of private property – small peasant property as its optimal regional option and the basis of social progress, as well as the idea of a peasant cooperative state;

4) the predominance of agriculture and a rural way of life over industry and the city, as well as the peasantry over other social groups; 5) the peasantry – the agricultural strata – concentrates the basic positive values and qualities of society, is the foundation of state stability and the bearer of national identity, and the above virtues should determine its political power.

At the same time, this does not contradict the fact that V. Lypynsky is a theorist of the Ukrainian conservatism, a state trend in historiography. In our opinion, this confirms the thesis about the diversity of his talent, the uniqueness of his personality.

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**WARSAW TREATY OF 1920 BETWEEN UKRAINE AND POLAND:  
HISTORY OF SIGNING AND LESSONS FOR TODAY**

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the paper is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of key factors and circumstances which caused the evolution of the Ukrainian-Polish relations in 1919 – 1921 from military and political confrontation to partnership, as well as to determine the reasons for failure of Warsaw Treaty of 1920. The methodology of the research includes historical method, system approach, objectivity, the use of general research methods (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and special historical methods (historical and genetic, historical and typological, historical and systemic ones). The scientific novelty consists in comprehensive research of the internal political situation in the Ukrainian People's Republic and Poland before signing the Treaty of Warsaw on April 21–24, 1920, elucidation of external factors that favoured signing of the Ukrainian-Polish Allied Treaty, identifying lessons from the failure of the Allied Treaty of 1920 for contemporary Polish relations.*

**The Conclusions.** The writers are convinced that during the period of concluding World War I and restructuring the world geopolitical space, the UPR and Rzeczpospolita Polska II were to establish allied relations in order to strengthen their resumed statehood and ensure security in the Baltic-Black Sea region. However, signing of the Treaty of Warsaw, due to a number of internal and external factors, failed to ensure stable Ukrainian-Polish interaction, which had an extremely negative impact on the prospect of preserving state independence of the UPR and Ukrainian-Polish partnership.

**Key words:** the UPR of the Directory period, Rzeczpospolita Polska II, the Treaty of Warsaw, allied relations.

## ВАРШАВСЬКА УГОДА 1920 р. УКРАЇНИ І ПОЛЬЩІ: ІСТОРІЯ ПІДПИСАННЯ ТА УРОКИ ДЛЯ СЬОГОДЕННЯ

**Анотація. Мета дослідження** – проведення всебічного аналізу ключових факторів і обставин, які зумовили еволюцію українсько-польських міждержавних відносин у 1919 – 1921 рр. від військово-політичної конфронтації до партнерства, а також у визначенні причин неспроможності реалізації Варшавської угоди 1920 р. **Методологія дослідження** заснована на принципах історизму, системності, авторської об'єктивності, використанні загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, узагальнення) та спеціально-історичних (історико-генетичний, історико-типологічний, історико-системний) методів. **Наукова новизна** полягає у комплексному дослідженні внутрішньополітичної ситуації в Українській Народній Республіці і Польщі напередодні укладення Варшавської угоди 21–24 квітня 1920 р., з'ясуванні зовнішніх чинників, що сприяли підписанню українсько-польського союзницького договору, визначенні уроків неспіху союзницької угоди 1920 р. для розвитку сучасних українсько-польських відносин. **Висновки.** Автори переконані в тому, що в умовах завершення Першої світової війни і переструктурування світового геополітичного простору УНР і друга Річ Посполита були приречені на встановлення союзницьких відносин задля зміцнення відновленої державності і забезпечення безпеки в Балтійсько-Чорноморському регіоні. Проте підписання Варшавської угоди, в силу цілої низки внутрішньополітичних і зовнішніх чинників, не змогло забезпечити стійкої українсько-польської міждержавної взаємодії, що вкрай негативно позначилося на перспективі збереження державної незалежності УНР й українсько-польських партнерських стосунків.

**Ключові слова:** УНР доби Директорії, друга Річ Посполита, українсько-польське порозуміння, Варшавська угода, союзницькі відносини.

**The Problem Statement.** Today, the definition of the Ukrainian-Polish relations as a strategic partnership is something that has long been understood and ordinary. But this was not always the case. And the fact that we are now celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Warsaw signed on April 21–24, 1920, makes historians pay close attention to the events of that time. It is known that the UPR of the Directory period, both geopolitically and militarily and strategically, was objectively interested in establishing allied relations with the newly restored Rzeczpospolita Polska II. The Entente's victory in World War I made it impossible for the Ukrainian statehood to gain diplomatic recognition in the nearest period by France, Great Britain, the USA and Italy as a result of Ukraine's signing the Brest Treaty and thus getting “a stigma” of accomplice or even “creation” of Central Powers. Left alone in the opposition to Bolshevik and “white” Russia, Ukraine had little chance for survival. Instead, the Polish Republic, officially recognized by the Allies, could not only become a powerful ally of the UPR in the struggle against attempts to revive a “united and indivisible” Russia, but also act as a diplomatic “window to Europe” for Ukraine.

**The Analysis of Recent Research and Publications.** The topic of concluding the Treaty of Warsaw in 1920, as well as the then Ukrainian-Polish relations became the subject of the Ukrainian research (Hud, Golubko, 1997; Lisevych, 1997; Tereshchenko, 1999; Krasivsky,

1999; Lytvyn, 2001; Matviyenko, 2002; Tymchenko, 2011; Datskiv, 2015; Trofymovich, 2017) and Polish writers (Wandycz, 1969; Koko, 1996; Karpus, 1999; Pisuliński, 2004). However, the importance of the Treaty of Warsaw within the context of formation of allied relations between the UPR and Poland in 1919 – 1920, the prospects of defending the independence of the UPR, and especially in resolving the problem of unity of the Ukrainian lands, still causes much discussion amidst the scientific and expert environment (Verstyuk, 2005). If in the papers of the Ukrainian contemporaries of those events negative assessment of consequences of the Treaty of Warsaw is dominating (Shelukhin, 1926; Shapoval, 1928), as it did not solve the key issue – the UPR survival under war conditions on several fronts, the research of modern authors abound with statements concerning the compelled nature of the alliance with Poland, to which Simon Petliura was prompted by the Bolshevik threat and indifference and misunderstanding of the Entente states (Yeremenko, 1997; Lytvyn, 2001). Therefore, there is an urgent need to rethink the events of a century ago in order to answer the key question of that period of the Ukrainian history: why the Ukrainian-Polish alliance appeared unable to stand in the way of the Bolshevik occupation of Ukraine.

Thus, **the purpose of the paper** is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of key factors and circumstances which caused the evolution of Ukrainian-Polish relations in 1919 – 1921 from military and political confrontation to partnership, as well as to determine the reasons for failure to implement the Treaty of Warsaw of 1920. Equally important is the answer to the question concerning what exactly aspects of the Ukrainian-Polish cooperation of that time is worth noting for today, emphasizing that experience of allied relations between the two countries, initiated a hundred years ago, turned into a comprehensive cooperation between Ukraine and Poland and is now classified as a strategic partnership. We will try to give the answer to the outlined issues in this article.

**The Main Material Statement.** To find out how the policy of Rzeczpospolita Polska II towards Ukraine was being formed, it is necessary to dwell on the positions of the main Polish political groups at the end of 1918 – the beginning of 1921 concerning the Ukrainian issue. The so-called Belvedere Group, which consisted of supporters of the Head of State Józef Pilsudski and the first Prime Minister of the Polish government, Andrzej Moraczewski, advocated the idea of creating a federation with Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania liberated from the Russian rule. This would have created a “corridor” to protect Poland from direct aggression by the Kremlin or “white” Russia if the latter won the civil war. At the same time, Kholmshchyna, Western Volyn up to the Styr River and Lviv Region were to be withdrawn to Poland. However, the idea of federation was supported by the political force of J. Pilsudski, as it became known from the instructions of the Head of State to the Polish ambassadors to the Paris Peace Conference of 1918 (Nowak, 2009), published only in 2009, only for external factors. Concerning the problem of the future of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus, the text of instructions written by J. Pilsudski was practically indistinguishable from the position of Roman Dmowski’s National Democratic Party (NDP), which believed that Russia, but not Ukraine, would be the eastern neighbour of restored Poland. In the instructions of the Head of State, written, according to the apt remark of the Polish researcher M. Maszkiewicz, in the “national democratic style” (Maszkiewicz, 2015), it is stated that Poland, without taking away any of its own lands in Russia ..., has to get enough terrain for its own expansion (to the East. – The authors.), as well as to establish a convenient and strong border in the East. This border must cover [sic] Lithuania, Pinshchyna, Western Volyn and industrial areas of central Galicia” (Nowak, 2009, p. 137).



The above mentioned federalist concept was supported by the Polish Socialists (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, PPS) and the Polish People's Party "Wyzwolenie" (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL-W), who stood for a peaceful settlement of the Polish-Ukrainian territorial issue with the inclusion of Lviv and Kholmshchyna into Poland. In the rest of Eastern Galicia and Volyn, the Left-wing Democrats proposed granting the Polish minority national and cultural autonomy within the UPR.

As to the National Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczno-Narodowe, SDN) of Roman Dmowski, regarding the Ukrainians immature for independent state existence, its ideologists were first of all concerned about the prospect of Ukraine pursuing a Germanophile policy, which, due to Poland's geopolitical location between Germany and Russia, would pose a threat to the Polish state. Therefore, the National Democrats assumed that in the East, Poland would border directly on Russia. However, advocating the creation of a multinational state, they sought to possess not all the lands of previous Rzeczpospolita, but only those where the Poles could dominate, assimilating in the long run other ethnic groups. The incorporation programme of the National Democrats concerned Kholmshchyna, Western Volyn to the Sluch and the Horyn rivers, the whole of Eastern Galicia and Western Podillya to the Zbruch and the Smotrych rivers. These demands were supported by the Polish Peasant Party "Piast" (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL "Piast").

The most conservative views on the Ukrainian issue were held by the so-called "żubry kresowe" from among the owners of large estates in Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, who insisted on the restoration of Rzeczpospolita within its 1772 borders, including Eastern Volyn, most of Kyiv region and Eastern Podillya.

In spite of this, the forces of supporters of federalist and incorporation concepts on the problem of Poland's eastern borders, as shown by the results of elections to the Constituent Sejm in February 1919, were approximately equal, which created certain grounds for finding ways to the Polish-Ukrainian understanding.

As for the Ukrainian government, even in the leadership of the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic there was no unity in matters of the Polish politics. Of the five members of the Directory, only the Chief Ataman of the Republican Army, Simon Petliura, was well aware of the need for rapprochement with Poland, even through the concessions of certain territories in Kholmshchyna, Podlasie, Western Volyn, and Eastern Galicia, which had already been occupied by the Polish troops by the end of 1918.

Through the mediation of Warsaw, S. Petliura hoped to reach an agreement with the Entente and thus bring Ukraine out of international diplomatic isolation and receive effective military and political assistance against Bolshevik Russia in order to defend the UPR state independence. Already in December of 1918 the Polish armed forces, numbered 130,000.

Not surprisingly, it was S. Petliura who initiated sending a UPR special mission headed by Viacheslav Prokopovych to Warsaw on December 31, 1918. It was to find out the conditions for reaching an agreement on joint actions against Bolshevik Russia and receiving assistance (Dotsenko, 1924, p. 7). However, because of opposition by the supporters of a peaceful agreement with the Kremlin, led by the Head of the Directory, V. Vynnychenko, V. Prokopovych's mission failed to achieve significant results and at the end of January of 1919, it had to return to Kyiv. Nevertheless, Warsaw talks facilitated the establishment of the UPR first diplomatic representation in the Polish capital, headed by O. Karpinsky, which began functioning on January 18, 1919. Warsaw government, in its turn, sent to Kyiv the former ambassador of the Regency Council S. Wankowicz, who held consultations with

circles interested in the Ukrainian-Polish rapprochement (CSAHAAU, f. 3696, d. 1, c. 31, pp. 10, 13, 39). Another positive result of V. Prokopovych's mission was J. Pilsudski's personal interest in S. Petliura's position, about which it is informed in an excerpt from the report of the American liaison officer in Warsaw Foster to the USA delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in the first half of January 1919. In particular, the American officer reported that in a conversation with him J. Pilsudski noted that it was impossible to find ways to armistice with Galician Ukrainians. Instead, the "Head of State" expressed the belief that "it would be easier to negotiate with Petliura in Kyiv" (Stakhiv, 1965b, pp. 152–153).

The position formulated by J. Pilsudski on the Ukrainian issue was confirmed by V. Prokopovych upon his return to Kyiv. The Ukrainian diplomat stated at the time that "our initiative to establish normal relations was met with sympathy from Polish ... . It was the easiest to talk about Kholmshchyna, Podlasie and Berestya (Beresteishchyna. – Authors), and it was difficult to speak about Lviv and Boryslav" (Dotsenko, 1924, p. 8).

As V. Prokopovych's diplomatic mission, despite its formal failure, proved that there was a solid ground for continuing the Ukrainian-Polish dialogue, the Council of People's Ministers UPR decided at the end of January 1919 to send a special delegation in the nearest days to negotiate with the Polish government. It was to be headed by the former Minister of Education of the Ukrainian State Petro Stebnytsky. However, the hasty evacuation of the Directory and the UPR government on February 2, 1919 from Kyiv to Vinnytsia prevented the departure of P. Stebnytsky's mission. And the signing of the "Pre-accession Treaty" on December 1, 1918 in Fastiv, intended to "merge in the nearest future in one great state" by members of the WR UPR Directory V. Vynnychenko, P. Andrievsky and F. Shvets and representatives of WUPR State Secretariat L. Tsehelsky and D. Levitsky, made it extremely difficult to establish a political dialogue between Kyiv and Warsaw. Probably because President of the Western Ukrainian National Council and a member of the UPR Directory Yevhen Petrushevych, around whom the vast majority of Galician political figures gathered, opposed any territorial concessions to Poland in Eastern Galicia. He was supported by a substantial part of the UPR leadership actively, who considered withdrawal from ethnic borders a betrayal of the Ukrainian national idea. Thus, the lack of unity among the Ukrainian leadership did not favour the Entente's mediation efforts to resolve the armed conflict and transfer the Polish-Ukrainian dispute to the diplomatic dimension.

Meanwhile, the resignation of V. Vynnychenko from the Directory on February 9, 1919, and the appointment of a new centrist government of Serhiy Ostapenko on February 13, to certain extent created favorable conditions for the intensification of the Ukrainian-Polish dialogue. The new Head of the UPR's foreign ministry, Kost Matsievych, in agreement with S. Petliura, left for Odessa to personally participate in negotiations with representatives of the Entente and Poland on concluding an agreement on joint hostilities against Bolshevik Russia (Matviyenko, 2001, p. 31).

With the consent of S. Petliura, K. Matsievych secretly sent Colonel Borys Kurdynovsky, an official of the Ukrainian mission in Odessa, to the Polish capital at the beginning of April of 1919. His powers stated that "the Government of the Directory grants all rights in order to enter into diplomatic relations with representatives of the Republic of Poland to discuss and sign agreements and establish relations between the Government of the Republic of Ukraine and the Government of the Republic of Poland" (Stakhiv, 1965b, pp. 158–159).

The secret nature of B. Kurdynovsky's mission will become clear if we take into account the failed negotiations between the Entente delegation led by French General Jean Barthelemy

and the Western region (WR) UPR leadership and the Galician Army Command with S. Petliura's participation in Khodoriv on February 27–28, 1919. Polish armistice, proposed by the mission of J. Barthelemy, according to which the government of the WR UPR would retain control over two thirds of the territory of Eastern Galicia (but without Lviv and Drohobych-Boryslav oil region), with the full assistance of the Antante in the rearmament and reorganization of the Galician Army and the right to use the required amount of oil, could be the basis for developing a mutually beneficial Ukrainian-Polish compromise. Personally S. Petliura "strongly advised the members of the Galician delegation to accept the proposal of the Barthelemy Commission, pointing out that in addition to the recognition of Ukraine by the Entente states, this would enable provision of ammunition and other military materials from Europe to continue the struggle for the Ukrainian issue" (Mazepa, 2003, p. 142). The deployment of a joint front of Polish and Galician troops against Bolshevik Russia was envisaged to radically alleviate the position of the Directory Republican Army, which had left Bila Tserkva, Cherkasy, Kremenchuk, Katerynoslav and retreated under the blows of the Red Army further to the West and South-West.

At a meeting with General J. Barthelemy, S. Petliura supported his mission's attempt to reconcile Galicians with Poles and agreed with the idea of Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Entente, to put an end to the armed conflict in Eastern Galicia and direct the Polish and Ukrainian armies to fight against Bolsheviks. Mykhailo Lozynsky, a participant in the negotiations on the part of the WUPR, rightly mentioned that "even then Petliura was ready to make concessions at the expense of Eastern Galicia in order to obtain peace with Poland and recognition by the Entente" (Lozynsky, 1922, p. 77).

But the Galician military, politicians and diplomats strongly rejected the proposals of J. Barthelemy's mission and S. Petliura's advice. Finally despairing of the possibility of understanding with the Galicians, S. S. Petliura, elected Head of the UPR Directory on May 9, 1919, carried out all further measures concerning establishment of interaction with Poland personally and in deep secret not only from E. Petrushevych but also from many of his associates (Stakhiv, 1965b, pp. 168–169).

At that time, the problem concerning if not an alliance, then at least reconciliation with Poland became a matter of life and death for the UPR, because on April 5, 1919, Bolshevik troops took Mohyliv-Podilsky and reached the Dniester river, having split the Directory Army into two parts. The southern group was forced to move to Romania-controlled territory of Bessarabia and underwent internment, while the northern group retreated rapidly to Volyn, having lost grounds to the east of Sarny-Rivne-Kremenets-Starokostiantyniv-Proskuriv line by mid-June.

At the insistence of S. Petliura, in May 1919, the new government of Borys Matros came to a principal decision to conduct direct truce talks with Warsaw without informing the State Secretariat of the WR of the UPR. On May 31, 1919, on S. Petliura's initiative, a representative mission headed by Lieutenant General of the former tsarist army Serhiy Delvig was sent to Lviv, which had the authority to conclude a truce between the UPR and Poland and reach an agreement on joint hostilities against the Bolsheviks. Negotiations were quite successful and on June 16 the Ukrainian-Polish agreement on the demarcation line between the Galician Army and Polish troops through Zalozce – the Seret river – Ternopil – Ostriv – Lytyatyn – the Zolota Lypa river – Nezvisk was agreed. The "Delvig Line" was undoubtedly much worse than the "Barthelemy Line", but the only one possible under those circumstances. However, Yevhen Petrushevych, who had been proclaimed a "Dictator" of the WR UPR a week earlier, and newly appointed by him Commander-in-chief (Commander) of

the Galician Army, General O. Grekov, who replaced General M. Omelyanovich-Pavlenko, inspired with success of the counter-offensive at the Polish front when “advanced Ukrainian detachments reached as far as Bibrka, Khodoriv, and Mykolayiv, threatening Lviv itself ... refused to confirm the armistice with the Poles, signed by the Ukrainian military delegation headed by General S. Delvig, although a representative of the Galician Army lieutenant-colonel K. Slyusarchuk also took part in the delegation”, and continued the Chortkiv offensive (Mazepa, 2003, p. 223).

The failure of the WR UPR leadership to implement an armistice was used by Warsaw to ensure that the “Council of Ten” of the Paris Peace Conference passed a resolution on June 25, 1919, allowing the Polish army to completely occupy Eastern Galicia. And three days later the Galician Army was forced to begin a retreat at the entire Polish-Ukrainian front, until on July 16 it crossed the Zbruch River into the territory controlled by S. Petliura’s troops. “Dictator” Ye. Petrushevych together with his government was also forced to move to Kamianets-Podilskyyi – at that time the temporary capital of the UPR.

Thus, S. Petliura and his close surroundings were forced to take into account the position of Ye. Petrushevych, at least formally, for another three months, as they needed the loyal attitude of the 50,000-strong Galician Army, the best organized and disciplined part of the UPR armed forces. But after the occupation of the entire territory of the WR UPR by Polish troops (with the permission of the Entente), the Head of the Directory was given much more freedom in seeking for compromises with J. Pilsudski.

The basis for the Ukrainian-Polish understanding remained the same threat of the revival of “united and indivisible” Russia, which would not only put an end to the Ukrainian statehood, but also call in question Poland’s independence. J. Pilsudski asserted at the time that “regardless of what its government will be like, Russia is stubbornly imperialistic. This is even the main feature of its political nature ... The attack on Poland depends primarily on the Ukrainian issue... If the Ukrainian issue is resolved in their favour, then it (Russia – *Authors*) will attack Poland” (Hud, Golubko, 1997, pp. 13–14).

In return, in his letter to Yu. Pidsudsky of August 9, 1919, S. Petliura wrote that while defending state independence, Poland and Ukraine had common foreign policy strategic interests that “require coordination and cooperation.” And as a starting point on this path he offered to reach full understanding between the armies of the two neighboring states. “The return to Ukraine of our prisoners from Poland, respectively armed,” wrote the Head of the Directory, “would be the first step towards the following friendly acts of Polish and Ukrainian peoples” (Petliura, 1979, pp. 357–358).

To reach understanding with Poland, a mission headed by P. Pylypchuk was directed from Ukraine to Warsaw, which represented Ukraine at three joint meetings of the Ukrainian mission and the Polish government delegation on August 19–21, 1919. Activities of P. Pylypchuk’s mission resulted in signing on September 1, 1919 of an armistice agreement for a period of one month (further it had to be extended by other agreements). According to it, Polish troops ceased the hostilities, and a neutral zone was established between the Zhvanchyk and the Zbruch rivers, and to the North, the demarcation line ran between Slavuta and Shepetivka to Sarn-Luninets and crossed into Belarus. Liaison officers were to stay at the headquarters of both armies to exchange information, and joint anti-Bolshevik actions were to be coordinated by a special bilateral commission (Ukraine, September 6, 1919).

After concluding an armistice, mutually beneficial Ukrainian-Polish trade and economic relations began to be established at the front. The “Polish Mission of the South-Eastern Trade”

arrived in Kamianets-Podilskyi consisting of representatives of the interested ministries for negotiations with the UPR Ministry of National Economy. As early as October 7, 1919, an agreement was signed under which Poland was to supply Ukraine with textiles, salt, and oil products in exchange for the Ukrainian bakery products and sugar. The Polish side undertook to pay for a certain part of the supplies in hryvnias of the UPR (CSAHAAU, f. 3696, d. 1, c. 34, pp. 30–32, 51). The trade agreement was also political in nature, as it was a guarantee that the Polish side had no intention to violate the armistice.

The cessation of the hostilities and the establishment of mutually beneficial trade laid the groundwork for full-scale government talks on signing a major interstate treaty. On September 22, 1919, at a joint meeting of the UPR Directory and the Council of People's Ministers, a decision was approved to send a special mission to Poland headed by the Minister of Justice and Foreign Ministry official A. Livytsky.

On October 28, 1919, at the first Ukrainian-Polish meeting, A. Livytsky's mission published a declaration which promoted ethnographic principle for defining the interstate border. The document stressed that "common interests in defense against the common enemy should become the basis for close military cooperation, which is necessary for a victorious end of the war imposed on Ukraine and Poland by Russian imperialism." On a parity basis, both states had to lay together "long-term foundations for lasting peace and order in the East of Europe" (CSAHAAU, f. 3696, d. 2, c. 275, p. 63).

The intentions expressed in the declaration failed to be implemented, first because of the Directory's most capable armed formation, the UGA, going over to the command of General A. Denikin's Russian Volunteer Army, and then due to the loss of real control over the national territory by the UPR government in early December 1919.

At the meeting of S. Petliura with J. Pilsudski, which took place on December 9, 1919 in Warsaw, the parties agreed to accelerate measures to provide assistance to the government of the UPR even before signing of a large-scale allied agreement. However, official Ukrainian-Polish negotiations resumed only in March 1920, given the government crisis in Warsaw and opposition to J. Pilsudski's eastern policy in the Sejm. In particular, on March 12, 1920, the parties agreed to focus on developing such provisions of the draft allied agreement as: the status of the administration on the Ukrainian lands occupied by the Polish army, preparation of an act of diplomatic recognition of the UPR by Poland, delimitation of interstate borders (CSAHAAU, f. 3696, d. 2, c. 275, pp. 102–103).

But already on April 9, during the discussion of Paragraph 1 of the allied Treaty, some differences emerged in the formulas of recognition of the UPR proposed by the parties. A. Livytsky's delegation insisted on that "Poland recognizes the UPR as an independent sovereign state with which it enters into friendly and good-neighborly relations as an equal party". Instead, the Polish draft stated that "Poland recognizes the Provisional Government of the Ukrainian Directory, headed by Otaman S. Petliura, as a "de facto" government". In the final version, the delegations agreed on a compromise formula: "Rzeczpospolita Polska recognizes the Directory of the independent Ukrainian People's Republic, headed by the Chief Otaman Mr. Symon Petliura, for the Supreme Power of the UPR" (Dotsenko, 1924, p. 225).

A compromise was also reached on determining the composition of the local administration on the Ukrainian territories occupied by the Polish army. After long discussions, it was decided that "power on the hitherto occupied territories, which, on the basis of political conditions, are recognized the UPR, remains temporarily in the hands of the Polish government, and the Ukrainian government would organize its administrative apparatus and with its establishment,



in agreement with the Polish government, the power at those territories passes into the hands of the Ukrainian government” (Paragraph 8 of the Military Convention of April 24, 1920) (Shelukhin, 1926, p. 30).

Regarding the provisions of the Political Convention, signed on the night of April 22, 1920, the most contradictory comments of politicians and diplomats were made on its Paragraph 3, which stated that the Polish government “recognizes as Ukraine’s territory to the East of the border specified in Article 2 of this condition (i.e., along the line: the Zbruch river – Vyshegrudok – Kreminets hills – Zdolbunov – the eastern administrative border of Rivne district (‘povit’) – the eastern administrative border of the Minsk province (‘gubernia’) – the Pripjat river. – Authors), to the Polish borders of 1772 (pre-divisional), which Poland already occupies, or will acquire from Russia in an armed or *diplomatic* way (italicized by us. – Authors)”.

This meant that in the event of the UPR military defeat of by the Bolsheviks on the Left Bank and the South or the impossibility of liberating these regions at that time, the territory of the Right Bank outlined in Paragraph 3 of the Political Convention would become the center of the Ukrainian statehood. According to the UPR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this territory would cover the entire Podillya province (‘gubernia’) and most of Volyn and Kyiv ones, some districts (‘povits’) of Minsk, Mogilev and Kherson provinces (‘gubernias’). The northern border of such a mini-UPR was to pass along the line of the river Pripjat – Mozyr – the mouth of the Sozh river, its area would exceed 160 ths sq. km, and the population – 12 million people (CSAHAAU, f. 3696, d. 2, c. 370, p. 169). That is, the Ukrainian-Polish Political Convention guaranteed at least the preservation of the UPR’s center of power on the Right Bank.

Paragraph 4 of the Political Convention, which obliged both parties “not to conclude any international conditions” against each of them, also complied with the norms of International Law fully. The UPR retained full sovereignty in its foreign policy at both the regional and European levels.

Can the interstate border outlined in Paragraph 3 of the Political Convention be considered a betrayal by the authorities of the UPR Directory of Ukrainian national interests in terms of the territorial affiliation of Eastern Galicia and Western Volyn? Olexander Shulgin gave a comprehensive answer to this question in 1931, writing: “What was going on then: “Petliura gave (some even said “sold”) Galicia and Volyn to the Poles”. In fact, Symon Petliura did not give anything away, and there was nothing for him to sell, because he had nothing. He and his successor, Andriy Livytsky, on behalf of the government: 1) agreed with the current line of the Polish borders and 2) did not mention anything concerning Galicia in the Treaty.

“Why did he do that? What rights did he have? – his enemies shouted. Firstly, because these lands were in fact already in the hands of the Poles; secondly, because the Galicians themselves wanted that we would leave them alone, because they hoped that without us they would win an easier case against the Poles in the League of Nations; thirdly, because in the terrible circumstances at this and only this price the rest of Ukraine could be liberated, that is, four-fifths of our territory, and finally – and this is the most important point – this and only this could save the state.

At that time it did not work. But no matter how much we think over it now, it was basically the only true decision of the case” (Shulgin, 1931, pp. 6–7).

Signing of the Political Convention paved the way to intensify the Ukrainian-Polish dialogue in financial and economic sphere. On the instructions of S. Petliura, the Ukrainian Trade Mission to Rzeczpospolita Polska was established, headed by First Vice-Premier and Minister of National Economy Ivan Feshchenko-Chopivsky, which was to develop and conclude a bilateral trade and economic agreement. At negotiations held in Warsaw on May

8 – August 4, 1920, the Polish side was led by Vice-Minister of the Polish Government Henryk Strasburger.

At negotiations the sides agreed that the UPR had to grant Warsaw concessions in Kryvyi Rih iron ore basin with the permission to transport raw materials to the Black Sea ports under the Polish protection, as well as the primacy in exploitation of Podolian phosphorites, followed by their transportation by the Polish. Postal and telegraph and railway conventions and agreements concerning the distribution of state property and debts of the former Russian Empire were envisaged (CSAHAAU, f. 2486, d. 1, c. 1, p. 23). To meet the needs of the Ukrainian Army, governmental and cooperative institutions in Polish goods, the 'Krajowa Spółka Handlowa' gave credit of 200 mln Polish marks for the UPR.

Thus, the projected trade and economic agreement had a somewhat unequal character for the UPR, given the complete disruption of economic life in the latter. Similarly, the Polish side also gained significant advantages in the Military Convention signed on April 24, 1920, which was an integral part of the political agreement. In particular, combat operations on the Right Bank were supposed to take place “according to mutual understanding of the Polish Armed Forces’ initial command and the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ main command” but “under the general command of the Polish Armed Forces’ command”. The Polish military control over the Ukrainian railways was envisaged during the military campaign, as well as the participation of the Polish officers in the organization and formation of power structures etc. The UPR government had to provide the Polish troops with food and cartage.

The main result of the Treaty of Warsaw was, as A. Nikovsky mentioned, due to the Treaty of Warsaw the UPR received “moral assistance in the form of de jure recognition of state sovereignty and real support in political, military and financial fields. After long and persistent struggle against the enemies of the Ukrainian statehood – the Bolsheviks and Denikin, Ukraine for the first time found an ally, whose troops, together with our reorganized and well-equipped army, were to clear the Ukrainian territory from hostile occupation and assist in establishment peace and public tranquility ... The Ukrainian People’s Republic, up to recently closed by hostile neighboring states, with this Treaty broke the barrier which obstructed its way to Western Europe” (CSAHAAU, f. 3696, d. 2, c. 278, p. 6).

When allied Ukrainian-Polish troops liberated Kyiv on May 7, 1920, the UPR Foreign Ministry informed in “Foreign Policy and the Ukrainian Issue Abroad” monthly review that “now the press of England and France is discussing a new political situation in the East of Europe, as well as economic prospects that would open up in connection with the future liberation of the whole territory of Ukraine from the Bolsheviks ... English capitalists and industrialists express their desire to participate in the economic reconstruction of Ukraine” (CSAHAAU, f. 3696, d. 3, c. 26, p. 27). At the end of March of 1920, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly, Louis Barthou and MP Gailard, submitted an issue concerning the recognition of the UPR independence, to the Parliament. It was to be considered on May 25, and, as the Ukrainian government was assured by Warsaw’s political circles, “the matter would be certainly resolved positively” (CSAHAAU, f. 3696, d. 3, c. 26, p. 27).

However from the very beginning of formation and implementation of Ukrainian-Polish military and political alliance, its vulnerable domestic and international aspects were obvious. Firstly, it actually remained the ‘personal alliance’ of the two Heads of State – S. Petliura and J. Pilsudski – and was based on their trusting personal relations and private arrangements. After all, the two leaders had a lot in common, firstly, regarding their socialist past and their rejection of the idea of “Great Russia” revival. S. Petliura and J. Pilsudski managed to reject

the dramatic stratification of the complicated historical past of the two peoples and, despite national mentality and negative social stereotypes, found courage and wisdom in themselves to embark on the path of partnership relations.

For all this, none of those politicians could convince their countrymen of the expedience of allied relations between Ukraine and Poland, that is why the Ukrainian-Polish military-political alliance did not become a consolidating factor in either the UPR or Poland. Moreover, both leaders faced strong opposition to their plans within their own states, since past misunderstanding, potent confrontation and conflicts between the two nations came to the fore.

In Poland, the National Democrats and centrist parties, having a majority in the Sejm, were concerned that the pro-Ukrainian policy of the 'Head of the state' was merely antagonizing Moscow. Besides, they did not trust the Directoty government either, considering the latter as a potential ally of Germany and competitor in the struggle for Eastern Galicia, and therefore opposed the support of Ukrainian statehood in any form strongly. The Polish Socialists, though were keen on the UPR independence, did not approve the hostilities against Bolshevik Russia principally and insisted on peace talks (Wandycz, 1980, pp. 190–196).

S. Petliura, in his turn, got under fire of shattering criticism by almost all prominent figures of the Ukrainian movement (V. Vynnychenko, M. Hrushevsky, M. Shapoval, etc.), who considered Warsaw agreements to be a betrayal of the interests of Greater Ukraine ("Soborna Ukraina"). Hostile or, at best, neutral attitude to the arrival of the Polish Army was also demonstrated by the majority of the Ukrainian Right Bank peasantry, who strongly held in memory the recent times of the Polish landowners' domination. The mass anti-Bolshevik uprising that S. Petliura and J. Pilsudski hoped for, had not taken place.

Last but not least, the lack of expected support from the Entente states played a significant role in the defeat of the Ukrainian-Polish alliance. Following the Entente's cessation of economic blockade of the RSFSR, the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference on February 24, 1920 adopted a special resolution, supported by France and Britain, which did not advise the neighboring with Bolshevik Russia countries to proceed with the war, to say nothing of passing to the offensive (Wandycz, 1980, p. 166). At the same time, the US Secretary of State Robert Lansing informed the US Ambassador to Warsaw that in the event of war against Bolshevik Russia, Poland could not rely on military and economic assistance of the United States (Wandycz, 1980, p. 149). In the midst of the Bolshevik counter-offensive on Warsaw on July 10, 1920, the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, on behalf of the Allies, promised Poland assistance only if it concluded a truce with the Kremlin.

Such a position of the great powers in the East of Europe can be explained by their outspoken skepticism concerning the possibility of asserting Ukrainian statehood, a wary attitude towards the personality of J. Pilsudsky (his participation in the socialist movement and pro-German orientation during the First World War) and considering interests of the "ally" – "white" Russia. On June 21, 1920, the Embassy of "White Emigration" in Paris circulated a memorandum stating that the creation of the Ukrainian state "would be contrary to the natural state of affairs" and that "economic, historical, ethnic, political and cultural grounds deny such artificial formation" while Ukraine's union with Russia is "necessary and inevitable".

Hence, under pressure of the Entente on October 12, 1920, in Riga, between Poland, on the one hand, and Soviet Russia and Ukraine, on the other, a Treaty of armistice and preliminary peace conditions was signed. It happened at a time when, after the "miracle over the Vistula", which became possible due to successful interaction of the Polish and Ukrainian troops, the Bolshevik troops were moving eastward from Warsaw and Lviv constantly.

S. Petliura believed that “the joint advance of the Polish and Ukrainian troops into the depths of Right-Bank Ukraine considering the situation of the Russian-Communist hostile forces, after our the capture of the Zbruch line, could have ended with the complete defeat of the enemy, and in connection with this, the prospects for restoring our statehood could be brighter and have signs of a real affair” (Petliura, 1956, p. 391). And J. Pilsudski later recollected: “The Bolshevik Army was so broken that I had no military obstacles to step where I wanted to go at the whole front. But at that time I was detained at the campaign because of the lack of moral force in the society” (Hud & Golubko, 1997, p. 32).

In fact, in Poland itself, everybody was against the continuation of war against Bolshevik Russia – the government, the Sejm, political parties, media – with the exception of the Head of the State. The majority of Warsaw politicians were interested not in the defeat of Russia but in the retention of Western Ukrainian lands under power. After experiencing critical moments in the middle of August 1920, when the Red Army stood at the walls of Warsaw, the Poles did not want again to risk their independence gained through much suffering.

Therefore, in a favorable situation from military point of view, the Polish side in Art. 1 of the Treaty of armistice in Riga actually recognized the UkrSSR, and in Art. 2 undertook to refrain from any interference into the internal affairs of the RSFSR and the UkrSSR, and also agreed to include in a future peace treaty the obligation not to create or support organizations aimed at overthrowing the state or social order of the other party, as well as organizations that assume role of the government of the other party.

Shortly after Riga Peace Treaty of March 18, 1921, on which the Ukrainian diplomacy had no influence at all, virtually cancelled the Treaty of Warsaw of 1920 (the Polish-Ukrainian Agreement), although Poland declared about it officially only in 1923 .

**The Conclusions.** Thus, the Ukrainian-Polish military and political alliance appeared to be fragile and being under pressure of insurmountable foreign and domestic political factors first formally, and then actually disintegrated. It appeared to be somewhat late and without assistance of the Entente states was unable to resist the stronger Bolshevik Russia.

At the same time, the Warsaw Treaty of 1920 was of great importance not only for the Ukrainian people, who, due to the help of Poland, continued the armed struggle for the independent UPR till the end of 1921. It can be certainly assumed that if it were not for common Ukrainian-Polish resistance in the summer of 1920, the planned by the Kremlin campaign under the slogan of the ‘export of world revolution’ against Poland, Romania and Germany would have proved to be quite successful and would inevitably have turned into a tragedy for all these countries, and Europe as a whole.

The Baltic states of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania owe much of their independence to the Ukrainian-Polish military and political alliance and its struggle against Bolshevik Russia. Due to the fact that Moscow was weakened significantly by the war with the UPR and peasant uprisings in Ukraine, Poland then also gained the opportunity to strengthen its statehood.

The failure to implement the Ukrainian-Polish Treaty of 1920 led not only to the overthrow of the UPR Directory, but also to the establishment of the Bolshevik occupation regime brought to Dnieper Ukraine on the bayonets of the Russian Red Army. As for the Rzeczpospolita Polska II, the most important lesson of defeat of the 1920 Polish-Ukrainian alliance was the events of September of 1939, when the Rzeczpospolita Polska II collapsed, being torn by the two totalitarian regimes, the German Nazis and the Russian Communists, because at the beginning of the 1920s its politicians neglected the geopolitical formula, which has now become axiomatic: without independent Ukraine, there is no independent Poland.

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**THE POLISH-UKRAINIAN ALLIANCE OF 1920  
IN THE POLISH PUBLIC DISCOURSE DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD**

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the research is to highlight the interaction of political thought and professional historiography, and its impact on the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance interpretation in the context of events of the historical process dynamics. We consider an integral part of our study to describe the discussions on Eastern policy in the Polish society before the conclusion of the alliance. The antagonism between the so-called federalist and incorporationist models, which was observed during the period beginning with the independent Polish Republic formation and ending in the Peace of Riga signing, determined the attitude to the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 during the interwar period. The methodology of the research is based on one of the main methods – content analysis, hermeneutic and epistemological approaches, since a significant part of the sources comprises the press and political journalism. Analyzing the work with texts, the principles developed by Q. Skinner and J. Pocock are considered to be the key ones. Q. Skinner and J. Pocock noted the importance of the context and intellectual atmosphere understanding of the time of writing the text, as well as taking into account the author’s planned recipient of the text. According to the method of the narrative analysis, elaborated by Jerzy Topolski, we single out three components in the texts analytically: logical and grammatical, persuasive, theoretical and ideological layers. We share the principle of relativity of the historical source concerning the knowledge and worldview of a historian. The scientific novelty consists in the following issue: in Ukrainian historiography a comprehensive analysis has been done on the material of the Polish public discourse of the interwar period concerning the attitude to the alliance with the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR), which was concluded on the eve of Kyiv Offensive of 1920. The Conclusions.* *In the article it is stated that during the interwar period the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 did not arouse significant interest both in the Polish public and among historians. Sometimes the alliance was mentioned in the politicians’ memoirs, sometimes it was discussed by the publicists as one of the minor episodes of the Polish-Soviet War. It was written about the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance in general works on the history of Poland or researches on the borders formation after 1918 mainly. Taking into consideration the nature of these works, the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance was described superficially, focusing on the political aspects mainly, for example, Poland’s recognition of Ukraine and border decisions. The genesis issue and various practical realizations of the*

*Polish-Ukrainian cooperation were ignored. The interpretation of the alliance with the UPR depended on the author's political sympathies. J. Pilsudski's concepts supporters wrote about the alliance positively, and it was strongly criticized by supporters of the national democracy.*

**Key words:** *the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920, Pilsudski, Petliura, the Polish-Soviet War.*

## **ПОЛЬСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКИЙ СОЮЗ 1920 Р. У ПОЛЬСЬКОМУ ПУБЛІЧНОМУ ДИСКУРСІ МІЖВОЄННОГО ПЕРІОДУ**

**Анотація.** *Метою дослідження є висвітлення взаємодії політичної думки і фахової історіографії, її впливу на трактування польсько-українського союзу в контексті подій та динаміці історичного процесу. Інтегральною частиною свого дослідження вважаємо характеристику дискусії щодо східної політики в польському суспільстві перед укладенням союзу. Антагонізм між так званими федеративною та інкорпораційною моделями, який яскраво проявився у період від утворення незалежної Польської Республіки до підписання Ризького миру, детермінував ставлення до польсько-українського союзу 1920 р. протягом цілого міжвоєнного періоду.*

**Методологія дослідження.** *Оскільки значну частину джерел становлять преса і політична публіцистика, то основним з методів дослідження є контент-аналіз, а також герменевтичний та епістеміологічний підходи. При аналізі роботи з текстами вважаємо ключовими принципи, розроблені К. Скіннером і Дж. Пококом, що відзначають важливість розуміння контексту й інтелектуальної атмосфери в момент появи тексту, а також врахування планованого автором реципієнта тексту. Відповідно до методики нарративного аналізу, розробленої Єжи Топольським, аналітично виділяємо в текстах три складові: логічно-граматичний, переконувальний та теоретико-ідеологічний шари. Поділяємо принцип релятивності історичного джерела стосовно знань та світогляду історика.*

**Наукова новизна** *полягає у тому, що в українській історіографії здійснено комплексний аналіз польського публічного дискурсу міжвоєнного періоду на предмет ставлення до союзу з УНР, укладеного напередодні Київського походу 1920 р.*

**Висновки.** *У статті зазначено, що в міжвоєнний період польсько-український союз 1920 р. не викликав значного зацікавлення як у польської громадськості, так і серед істориків. Іноді він згадувався у мемуарах політиків, іноді обговорювався публіцистами як один із другорядних епізодів польсько-радянської війни. Писалося про нього головню в загальних працях з історії Польщі або дослідженнях, що стосувались формування кордонів після 1918 р. З огляду на характер цих праць, польсько-український союз описувався поверхово, увага здебільшого акцентувалась на політичних аспектах, тобто на визнанні Польщею України та рішеннях стосовно кордонів. Проблема генези та різних практичних втілень польсько-української співпраці залишались поза увагою. Трактування союзу з УНР дуже залежало від політичних симпатій автора. У схвальних інтонаціях писали про нього прихильники концепції Ю. Пілсудського, рідше негативно він оцінювався симпатиками національної демократії.*

**Ключові слова:** *Польсько-український союз, 1920 р., Пілсудський, Петлюра, Польсько-радянська війна.*

**The Problem Statement.** The Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 is one of the key and very controversial episodes of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921. At the same time, it is an integral part of the Polish-Soviet War, being the formal cause of the Polish offensive in April of 1920. Furthermore, the contradiction of its assessments in both Ukrainian and Polish historiography was determined by the political worldview of the authors. In particular, in the case of Ukraine, the alliance of 1920 with Poland reflected the choice of a pro-European paradigm of Ukraine's development. In the case of Poland, it was an attempt to change the geopolitical structure of Eastern Europe, to divide Russia by means of the national issue. It should be mentioned that the alliance of 1920 was treated no less ambiguously by the Polish society than by the Ukrainian one. The ideas and concepts of the interwar period had a great influence on the Polish political thought development concerning Ukraine during next decades.

Due to the political discussions of the interwar period the Giedroyc–Mieroszewski's conception emerged, and the Polish-Ukrainian relations have normalized. The analyzed issue is also a part of a broader question concerning relations in the Ukrainian-Polish-Russian triangle.

**The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications.** The articles, written by E. Koko (Koko, 1994, pp. 105–113; idem, 1996, pp. 305–316; idem, 1999, pp. 275–291) should be considered the first attempts to summarize and estimate the Polish historiography achievements on the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 and the Polish-Ukrainian relations in the XXth century. The researcher noted that until 1939, in Poland there was an unfavourable atmosphere for the reflections on the Ukrainian aspect of the Polish Eastern policy of 1918 – 1920 (Koko, 1996, p. 305). The theme under analysis was studied in general terms by M. Dutkiewicz, according to whom the historiography of the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 does not have a complete generalization. Analyzing the interwar Polish publications, the researcher stated that more often the issue on the alliance with the Ukrainian People's Republic was raised in memoirs, written mostly by the military, than in historical studies (Dutkiewicz, 2009, pp. 361–372).

The historiography of the interwar period was covered in J. Pisulinski's monograph partially. In his opinion, after the Peace of Riga signing, the Polish policy towards Ukraine was practically not analyzed in researches due to the belief that the Ukrainian issue no longer played a significant role in Polish foreign policy (Pisulinski, 2004, p. 20). J. Legieć noted that during recent years the Polish-Ukrainian alliance issue gained popularity among the researchers (Legieć, 2002, p. 7).

The author of a thorough monograph on the State Center of the UPR in exile, J. J. Bruski believes that despite a large number of works on the alliance of 1920, the theme has not been covered yet (Bruski, 2004, p. 17). According to the author, the attitude to the personality of the Chief Ataman in the Polish public opinion was directly correlated with the attitude to the eastern policy of J. Piłsudski and the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance (Bruski, 2011, pp. 113–132). In his opinion, in the interwar Polish historiography the issue of the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance was not covered broadly in comparison to later periods, when the theme began to interest historians much more.

**The Purpose of the Publication.** The article focuses on the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 estimation by the Polish intellectual and political elites during the interwar period. It should be emphasized that the object of the research is not only professional historiography, but also political journalism, and memoirs. The study is at the intersection of the history of ideas, the history of political thought and the history of historiography. The purpose of the research is to highlight the interaction of these three areas and its impact on the interpretation of the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance in the historical context and dynamics.

Furthermore, we consider an integral part of our study to elucidate the discussions on the Eastern policy in the Polish society before the conclusion of the alliance, as the contradictions between the “federalist” and “incorporationist” models, which appeared during the period beginning with the independent Polish Republic formation and ending in the Peace of Riga signing, determined the attitude towards the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 during the interwar period.

**The Main Material Statement.** The political atmosphere in interwar Poland was characterized by a sharp ideological antagonism between the national democracy representatives and J. Piłsudski's political group. It was the most noticeable on the example of the Eastern policy. In pro-Belweder political circles awareness of the need to establish relations with Ukraine emerged immediately after Poland's independence. At the beginning of 1919, during

the fierce battles for Galicia, in the weekly newspaper "Rząd i Wojsko", in an editorial article it was written that the Ukrainian issue was a priority to Poland. The article proved that Ukraine should be immediately recognized by the entire Polish people as its natural ally. Instead, the reconstruction of Russia was considered to be a great threat to Poland (Strug, 1919, nr 7, pp. 3–4). The newspaper expressed the belief that Russia, "white" or "red", would threaten Poland again after the Ukrainian movement suppression. For the sake of coming to such understanding, it was proposed to compromise with the Ukrainians on the border issue (Ibidem, p.4). The article was written, probably, by T. Galecki, the editor-in-chief, better known under the pseudonym Andrzej Strug, a prominent socialist figure and mason.

In addition, in another publication (Strug, 1919, nr 16, p. 4) it was explained that Poland faced two options of the Eastern policy. The first option was to agree to Great Russia reconstruction. The second one was to support the state-building aspirations of non-Russian peoples of the former empire, primarily the Ukrainian one. Directly related to this was the war for Galicia, which, according to the editorial board, should be ended as soon as possible to turn efforts against a common enemy. Emphasizing that the politicians of Kyiv were more inclined to an alliance with Poland, the editorial board believed that it was worth striving for an agreement with the UPR evading ZUNR, which would give Poland an ally against Russia. The continuation of the war with Ukraine will lead to its division and, as a consequence, to strengthening of Russia. At the same time, the Ukrainian issue would turn into a "Little Russian" issue, which would threaten Poland much more. Another renowned publicist, one of the ideologues of Belweder camp, A. Skwarczyński, argued that it was in Poland's interests to limit Russia to its ethnographic borders. Otherwise, Poland would be a weak entity without much significance to European politics. In addition, A. Skwarczyński emphasized that the whole territory of Ukraine was in a state of continuous uprising against the Bolsheviks, that is why, Poland must give the Ukrainians support and help in a new attempt to build the state (Skwarczyński, 1919, nr 21 pp. 2–4). Paying attention to the fact that the politicians of Dnieper Ukraine considered Russia as the main enemy, while by the Galicians, in contrast, Poland was rated as the main assailant, A. Skwarczyński argued that S. Petliura was ready to conclude an alliance with Warsaw, while Western Ukrainian People's Republic would remain an implacable enemy of Poland (Skwarczyński, 1919, nr 25, pp. 4–5).

The Polish National Democrats took the opposite view. They considered the negotiations with the Ukrainians as a betrayal of the state interests. Their position was to deny the Ukrainian issue completely. The paramount evidence of such kind of view could be traced in the newspaper "Gazeta Warszawska", which convinced the readers that the Ukrainians were politically immature and the newspaper warned against the "Ukrainian adventures" (Kotowicz, 1920, nr 49, p. 6). In March of 1920 Z. Berezowski cautioned that pro-Russian sympathies in Ukraine were much stronger than the pro-Polish ones and the Ukrainians would rather unite in a federation with Russia with their lands up to the San River than make the alliance with Poland against Russia (Berezowski, 1920, No. 70, pp. 1). In his opinion, there was a great risk that Ukraine, liberated from the Bolsheviks by the Poles, would turn to anti-Bolshevik Russia. Z. Berezowski called the policy of creating a buffer state between Poland and Russia "covering with piles of sand", not believing in the stability of the Ukrainian statehood. Moreover, such strategy, according to the National Democrats, would only increase the risk of losing new territories (Berezowski, 1920, nr 71, p. 3).

The belief that support given to UPR posed risks to Poland was a key argument of the incorporationist concept supporters (Lesznowski, 1920, nr 80, p. 1). One of the leaders of



the National Democrats, St. Grabski convinced that attempts to create Ukraine were the renunciation of the territories to which Poland was entitled and which should be included into its possession (Grabski, 1920, nr 115, pp. 1–2.). He paid special attention to the fact that Poland and Russia will be able to make claims concerning Volyn and Podillya to the international community, which will make the final decision on the Polish eastern border. Poland's arguments, in that case, would be looked much more substantiated. If the Poles themselves legalized Ukraine in the international arena, it would become the third claimant to these territories and also to Eastern Galicia. In that case, it would be extremely difficult to repel Ukraine's claims to the "Polish Kresy" (Ibidem). Therefore, according to St. Grabski, the existence of an independent Ukraine was a threat to Poland, not protection.

Hence, on the 21st of March, almost a month before the signing of the treaty between Poland and UNR, it was written in the newspaper "Gazeta Warszawska" that, in addition to all mentioned above, the creation of buffer states also looked to the Entente like the Polish imperialism. Like pro-Belweder publicists, the representatives of National Democracy also made a dilemma to Poland, only in a different way: either to create the strongest possible state with the inclusion of all Polish territories (which included the territories with a fairly small amount of the Polish population), or "stepping on a fantastic path of ideas that will inexorably turn against the territorial integrity of Poland" (Lesznowski, 1920, nr 80, p.1).

The tone of the press, even the one that was hostile to J. Piłsudski, changed to euphoric after the taking of Kyiv on the 7th of May and during the victories at the front (Lesznowski, 1920, nr 126, p. 1). This time, the nationalist press proposed to use the war achievements and not to give the lands conquered by Poland to Ukraine, "not to take the chestnuts out of the fire instead of others, the Ukrainians, who are ready to betray at any moment" (Lesznowski, 1920, nr 127, pp. 1–2). The Ukrainians were once again credited with the political immaturity (Lesznowski, 1920, nr 178, p. 2).

The Ukrainian issue disappeared almost completely from the view of the press during the retreat and intense combat in the suburbs of Warsaw in the summer of 1920. The Polish elites were almost unanimous in recognizing the powers of the UkrSSR and not the Ukrainian People's Republic in negotiations (Lesznowski, 1920, nr 271, p. 5). After the Bolsheviks almost took Warsaw, in the Polish public opinion, which did not understand Piłsudski's Ukrainian policy even earlier, the nationalists' slogans and the mood of peace with the Bolsheviks won finally. At the Sejm debates, almost all deputies spoke about the agreement positively (Lesznowski, 1920, nr 291, p. 3).

Furthermore, mentioned above St. Grabski, a member of the Polish delegation, said that the Riga border was not a compromise line between the Polish and Russian projects, but entirely what the Polish delegation wanted. He stated that even if the Polish delegation wished for greater concessions, the Bolsheviks would agree (J.R. 1920, nr 301, p. 2).

The agreement was also supported by the politicians, who recently expressed support for Ukraine. There were only some politicians, for instance, T. Hołówko, who opposed strongly: he called the Peace of Riga a betrayal of the Ukrainians. In his opinion, a very small effort would be enough to make the Bolsheviks sit down at the negotiation table with the Ukrainian People's Republic delegation (Kedryn, 1933, nr 3, pp. 11–12).

As a result, after signing of the Peace of Riga, a peaceful life began in Poland, the Ukrainian troops were disarmed and interned, and the alliance issue with the UNR disappeared from the pages of the Polish press (Karpus, 2009, pp. 5–18). During the interwar period, the alliance issue was mentioned only in general works or in studies relating to Poland's restored

borders formation. According to E. Koko (Koko, 1996, p. 305), the above-mentioned topic was covered rather superficially. As a rule, the authors, ideologically close to the National Democracy, characterized J. Piłsudski's plans as adventurous and harmful. His failure to support the Ukrainian People's Republic was considered a natural and, most importantly, a successful outcome for Poland. In the intellectual atmosphere of interwar Poland, when the Ukrainian minority was the cause of the domestic political tensions, the above-mentioned issue was not easy to discuss also by Piłsudski supporters, whom the Ukrainians accused of treason. As a result, the first major works on the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 appeared only at the end of the 30s. It is noteworthy and surprising that J. Piłsudski did not mention the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance at all in his book "The Year of 1920" (Piłsudski, 1924).

After S. Petliura's assassination, the interest in the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance increased in May of 1926. T. Hołówko, referring to the events of 1920, called the Chief Ataman a "true friend" of Poland (Hołówko, 1926, pp. 1–2). The conservative Kraków newspaper "Czas" published a very kindly article about S. Petliura, portraying him as a great patriot of Ukraine, a far-sighted and wise politician. In addition, the article also emphasized that the Ukrainian troops "went hand in hand with us in the battle against the Bolsheviks" and "fulfilled their obligations with honor" (Paszkowski, 1926, p. 3).

One of the first studies that concerned the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance, albeit briefly, was a description of the activities of the Third Army, written by J. Stachiewicz, the Chief of the 3rd Department of the General Staff during the Kyiv offensive. The 6th Rifle Division under the command of colonel M. Bezruchko was in the structure of the Third Army (Stachiewicz, 1925). The above-mentioned topic was also briefly covered by A. Przybylski (Przybylski, 1930). The researcher characterized the essence of the Alliance as an exchange of assistance in the liberation of Dnieper Ukraine from the Bolsheviks and Ukraine's renunciation of territories west of the Goryn and Zbruch. Marginally, the theme of alliance with the Ukrainians was raised in the memoirs of M. Lepecki, an officer of the 2nd Legion Infantry Regiment (Lepecki, 1926, p. 112).

It should be mentioned that one of the detailed descriptions of the Ukrainian revolution events of the interwar period was S. Kamiński's book, which represents a point of view typical of the Poles from the "Kresy" territories. He approved Piłsudski's policy but believed that its purpose was to protect the Polish landowners. At the same time, S. Kamiński was very critical concerning the Ukrainian statehood and its leaders, in particular S. Petliura (Kamiński, 1928).

It is worth noting that the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance in interwar Poland was more often the publicists' interest object than the object of professional historians. During almost the entire interwar period, supporters of the federalist conception enjoyed the sponsorship of the authorities. One of their main platforms was the magazine "Biuletyn Polsko-Ukraiński", which grouped around many J. Piłsudski's supporters and on the pages of which the articles of the Ukrainian political emigration representatives were often published (Kravchenko, 2011, pp. 471–480). Its authors often addressed the topic of the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance, analyzing the reasons for its failure. In addition, on the pages of this journal, the Alliance of 1920 began to gain symbolic weight as an attempt to put into practice the Promethean conception (Bruski, 2016). It should be emphasized that the Polish authors often highlighted the Polish mistakes and faults concerning the war failure of 1920. The Ukrainian authors were also free to express their views on the pages of the magazine, often criticizing the Polish policy (Łoś, 1933, p. 5).

The renowned Polish publicist A. Bocheński, discussing with his Ukrainian counterpart I. Kedryn, who accused Poland of treason (Kedryn, 1933, pp. 11–12), claimed that the Poles were made to withdraw from the alliance with the Ukrainians, and the Ukrainians, in turn, were forced to make the alliance without intending to keep to it. Consequently, he believed that Galicia and Volyn issue was too important for Ukraine (Bocheński, 1933, pp. 14–15). In his opinion, without the territorial disputes' settlement, any cooperation between Poland and Ukraine was impossible. The researcher stuck to the same view in his monograph "Between Germany and Russia" in which he noted that the Alliance was doomed to failure because of the Galician issue. A. Bocheński considered the main reason for this in the Ukrainians' obstinacy. If in 1918 or in the first half of 1919 the Ukrainians had dared to compromise on Galicia issue, they would have been able to use their resources in Dnieper Ukraine, which would have been enough to resist the Bolsheviks and the Volunteer Army (Bocheński, 1937, p. 83). The reason for the refusal to support the Ukrainian People's Republic was the military situation in Poland at the end of 1920. A. Bocheński believed that Poland had not been able to continue the war (Bocheński, 1933, p. 15).

W. Bączkowski, one of the most influential figures of the Prometheus movement, put emphasis on the fact that Kyiv offensive was not a manifestation of romanticism or sentiment towards Ukraine, but it was dictated by "dry logic". He denied the arguments of National Democrats about Ukraine's threat to the Polish possession of the "Kresy" territories, noting that it would be much harder to withstand giant Russia's onslaught, which would inevitably seek to possess all the "Rus'" lands, than to resist the onslaught of Ukraine. Moreover, W. Bączkowski argued that the Polish and Ukrainian efforts' unification was the only way for both peoples to refrain from Russia. He appealed to the search of a mutual understanding with the Ukrainians, which, in his opinion, lacked in 1920 (Bączkowski, 1937).

Reflecting on the reasons for the failure in 1920, W. Bączkowski did not skimp in criticism of the Polish side. According to the researcher, Kyiv offensive's organizers were not so much mistaken in their estimation of the anti-Soviet sentiment in Ukraine (which was the most popular explanation for the defeat and a popular argument of the National Democrats) as they did not take into account the Polish landowners destructive activities. "We will not exaggerate much", he stated, "if we claim that the erroneous selfish policy, which lasted for centuries, of equating Polish national interests with the material and materialistic interests of the Polish landowners' (in Polish: *stanu posiadania* – the author) in the East, was the basic reason for Kyiv offensive failure" (Bączkowski, 1937, p. 3). However, W. Bączkowski noted that Kyiv offensive remained as a historical fact and as an idea. The idea turned out to be much cleaner. He expressed the feeling that because of the Polish policy towards the Ukrainians after 1920, the "great legend" could be discredited (Bączkowski, 1937, p. 4). At the same time, W. Bączkowski paid tribute to Lenin's national policy ingenuity, which he called a great trick to save the empire from collapse by taking the responsibility of representing the national interests of the peoples of Russia and creating appropriate republics whose national territories were outside the USSR. This policy, according to his opinion, created the basis for the future accession of these territories to the "state body of Russia" (Bączkowski, 1938).

The Polish nationalists had completely different reflections. Estimating the Ukrainian issue at the negotiations in Riga in more than a decade, one of the main figures of the Polish National Democrats, J. Giertych, believed that the agreement with the Ukrainian People's Republic should not be interpreted other than gaining benefits concerning the Dnieper territories at the cost of renouncing the part of the Polish territory. After the UPR lost its

real force, the Polish delegation did not have to take into account the agreement's provisions with it (Giertych, 1933, p. 20).

R. Dmowski, the leader of the National Democrats, mentioned that Piłsudski's actions raised fears that Poland would bring up the pretender for Eastern Galicia, and that the Ukrainian People's Republic (R. Dmowski himself did not use the acronym UNR on principle, but used the word "Petliura" instead), after becoming stronger, would make claims concerning the disputed territories (Dmowski, 1988, p. 172). The refusal to support Ukraine made the above-mentioned issue disappear eventually.

St. Grabski, in 1935 recalling the negotiations in Minsk and Riga, contradicted his previous assertion that the border defined by the Peace of Riga was optimal for Poland and he pointed out that it was the territorial maximum that Poland could obtain then. Furthermore, St. Grabski argued that if J. Piłsudski had not started the war then, the borders could have been made further east with the help of diplomacy (Grabski, 1932). Thus, the Polish National Democrats' attitude to the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance and to Ukraine, in general, remained unchanged until the end of the interwar period.

The Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 was covered in the most detail by T. Kutrzeba, a close associate of J. Piłsudski. His monograph, which was called "Kyiv Offensive of 1920" (Kutrzeba, 1937) remains relevant to this day. He was convinced that the war with the Bolsheviks and the support of Ukraine was not a situational step, but a well-thought-out strategy concerning geopolitical reformatting of Europe (Kutrzeba, pp. 49–50). According to him, only the geopolitical situation hampered the Polish offensive in Ukraine. The support for the UPR would be a hostile step towards the Volunteer Army, which was supported by Britain and France, that is why, the implementation of this concept could begin only after A. Denikin's defeat (Kutrzeba, 1937, p. 51). The personnel potential of the Ukrainian army, according to T. Kutrzeba, allowed to make optimistic forecasts concerning its further development (Kutrzeba, 1937, p. 82).

T. Kutrzeba tried to be impartial in his assessments and pointed at the Polish side's miscalculations clearly. As a result, he criticized the Polish military leadership, whose majority did not understand the war aims and distrusted the Ukrainian allied forces. This was one of the reasons why Poland did not fully comply with its commitments to supply weapons and ammunition to the Ukrainian troops. T. Kutrzeba noted that taking into consideration even the existing difficulties, the Ukrainian units' supply was unjustifiably slow, thus, hampering the desired rapid increase of the Ukrainian army. However, certain inactivity of the Ukrainian peasants also played an important role (Ibidem).

In addition, T. Kutrzeba analyzing the Peace of Riga results, tried to find the reason for the Polish-Ukrainian plans' failure. He denied that the alleged refusal to support UNR was a disappointment in the state-building forces of the Ukrainians and emphasized their devoted struggle on the common front, he explained the reason for the failure of Poland's inability to wage further war (Ibidem).

Summing up the general outcome, T. Kutrzeba stated that the result of the Alliance turned out to be positive for both Poland and Ukraine. He considered the separate existence of the UkrSSR to be a consequence of joint Polish-Ukrainian actions in 1920: "I dare say that if it was not the Polish-Ukrainian bloodshed for this issue, if it was not Poland's political program of 1920, which was aimed at liberating Ukraine from the Russian rule, maybe Ukraine would not exist today as an independent republic" (Kutrzeba, 1937, pp. 343–344).

In conclusion, it is worth mentioning the far-sighted forecast of the newspaper "Rząd i Wojsko". In November of 1919, after the end of the war for Galicia, the newspaper called for

the full support of the Ukrainian People's Republic. "If Petliura abstains," – it was mentioned in the editorial article, "under such circumstances he will take on the burden of struggle with Russia" [...]. If Petliura falls, no doubt Eastern Galicia will have to be handed over to Russia in fifteen years – which would be a catastrophe for us – because if the Ukrainians can make fair claims against us in Eastern Galicia, Russia will not. [...] But Poland does not implement such a peace programme if it pursues the policy of a common border with Russia, or if it pursues half-hearted, indecisive tactics" (Strug, 1919, nr 40/41, p. 5). The author of those lines miscalculated only for a couple of years, which in the following decades added some persuasiveness of the conception proposed by the Piłsudski supporters.

**The Conclusions.** During the interwar period, the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 was not a popular issue for Polish historians. Sometimes the Alliance was mentioned in the politicians' memoirs, sometimes discussed by the publicists as one of the minor episodes of the Polish-Soviet War. The majority of Polish society did not understand and did not approve of Piłsudski's Ukrainian policy. The public opinion was completely dominated by the National Democracy slogans, which questioned even the existence of the Ukrainian nation, and considered the Ukrainian movement an Austrian intrigue against Poland. The constantly growing Polish-Ukrainian enmity that characterized interwar Poland also left its mark. It is clear that such an intellectual atmosphere complicated the reasoning over the recent history of the Polish-Ukrainian relations significantly. The alliance with the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) was mentioned mostly in generalizing works on the history of Poland or in studies concerning Poland's restored borders formation. Hence, as this topic was described in general terms, the main focus was on Poland's recognition of Ukraine and decisions on borders. Depending on the political preferences of the authors, the Alliance of 1920 was considered either as a wise and far-sighted policy or as a dangerous adventure that only did harm to Poland. The authors, who were associated with the Piłsudski supporters, wrote about it positively, while the authors, who were focused on the National Democracy, wrote about it critically. The opposite approach to the Eastern policy was preserved during the whole interwar period. The first serious historical elaborations of the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance appeared after J. Piłsudski's death. The most important work of that time was T. Kutrzeba's monograph "Kyiv Offensive of 1920". For the first time, J. Piłsudski's intentions regarding Ukraine and Russia were presented widely in it and the motives of his actions were explained. In contrast to earlier works, in which little attention was paid to the alliance with the Ukrainian People's Republic, T. Kutrzeba described it as a cornerstone of the entire Polish strategy in the war of 1920. The work became the most detailed study on J. Piłsudski's Eastern policy during the interwar period.

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**ANTI-RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES OF THE UNION OF GODLESS IN UKRAINE  
(1927 – 1930)**

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the research is to analyze the participation of the Union of Godless in the implementation of the atheist policy of the Bolshevik regime by organizing anti-religious events and involving into them of various categories of the Ukrainian society during 1927 – 1930. The methodology of the research is based on the principles of historicism, scientific character, verification, authorial objectivity, moderate narrative constructivism, as well as the use of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and special historical (historical and genetic, historical and typological, historical and systemic) methods. The scientific novelty consists in the attempt to deepen the characteristics of anti-religious activity of the Union of Godless of Ukraine during the first years of its existence. The Conclusions.* *The Union of Godless was created by the Bolsheviks in order to eradicate a religious world outlook in Ukraine's multinational population. Propaganda activities were an important area of its work. However, the anti-religious propaganda of the union was not regular, it lacked regularity. The uncompromising rhetoric of the Union of Godless encountered a misunderstanding of a large part of the population and provoked a backlash that was to uphold*

religious beliefs. Still, it is necessary to recognize that the achievements in the anti-religious work of the non-religious organization were indeed, however, the results foreseen by its encourages were not achieved by this campaign, since the Bolsheviks did not manage to transform the world outlook of the population of Soviet Ukraine into a purely atheistic one, which was the ultimate its goal.

**Key words:** Union of Godless, anti-religious propaganda, fighting against religion, Ukraine.

## АНТИРЕЛІГІЙНА ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ СПІЛКИ БЕЗВІРНИКІВ В УКРАЇНІ (1927 – 1930 рр.)

**Анотація.** *Мета дослідження* – дослідити участь Спілки безвірників у реалізації атеїстичної політики більшовицького режиму шляхом організації антирелігійних заходів та залучення до участі у них різних категорій українського суспільства протягом 1927 – 1930 рр. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на принципах історизму, системності, науковості, верифікації, авторської об'єктивності, поміркованого нарративного конструктивізму, а також на використанні загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, узагальнення) та спеціально-історичних (історико-генетичний, історико-типологічний, історико-системний) методів. **Наукова новизна** полягає у спробі поглиблення характеристики антирелігійної діяльності Спілки безвірників України протягом перших років її існування. **Висновки.** Спілка безвірників була створена більшовиками з метою викорінення у багатонаціонального населення України релігійного світогляду. Важливим напрямом її роботи була пропагандистська діяльність. Проте антирелігійна пропаганда спілки не була регулярною, їй бракувало систематичності. Безкомпромісна риторика Спілки безвірників нашоувхувалася на нерозуміння значної частини населення та викликала зворотню реакцію, що полягала у відстоюванні релігійних переконань. Та все ж, необхідно визнати, що здобутки в антирелігійній роботі безвірницької організації дійсно були, проте передбачених її натхненниками результатів ця кампанія не досягла, оскільки трансформувати світогляд населення радянської України на суцільно атеїстичний, а саме такою була кінцева її мета, більшовики так і не спромоглися.

**Ключові слова:** Спілка безвірників, антирелігійна пропаганда, боротьба з релігією, Україна.

**The Problem Statement.** An important task of the Communist Party regime in Ukraine was to provide education for a person of a new type, whose views should be fully consistent with Marxist-Bolshevik ideology. In contrast to the numerous religious communities of numerous confession directions operating in the environment of Ukraine's multinational population, the Bolsheviks resorted to the creation of an alternative non-governmental organization, the Union of Godless, whose members were to be persuaded atheists. The strategic goal of this formation was to eliminate the broad layers of population from participating in the activities of cult communities.

**The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publication.** The first attempts to analyze the history of the Union of Godless in the process of growth of the unbelieving movement were made by anti-religious propagandists K. Holbert (Holbert, 1926), I. Rudenko (Rudenko, 1930). Publication of V. Kelembetova (Kelembetova, 1974) was dedicated to the practice of the activities of the Union of Godless in the sense of formation and propaganda of atheism among the population of Ukraine and the USSR, reflecting the tendencies of the research of organized unbelieving movement, characteristic for the 50's – 80's of the XXth century. Among the most recent domestic researches, works of O. Vitrynska (Vitrynska, 2016) and O. Topchyi (Topchii, 2011) took the prominent place, which we relied on while researching the anti-religious activities of the Union of Godless.

**The purpose of the article** is to analyze the participation of the Union of Godless in the realization of the atheist policy of the Bolshevik regime by organizing anti-religious events and involving in them of various categories of the Ukrainian society during 1927 – 1930.

**The Main Material Statement.** The activities of the Union of Godless were aimed at “exposing the exploitative nature of religion, its harmful role in production, culture, life, as well as exposing the counter-revolutionary nature of priests and various religious organizations” (Chefranov, 1930, p. 27).

Units of Union of Godless massively, especially during religious holidays, organized anti-religious activities. The Union of Godless made extensive use of local press, radio, theater and cinema, museums, libraries, and organized lectures, circles, and seminars. Particular importance was given to the introduction of a new Soviet rite – the organization of the communist ceremony baptizing, red weddings, civil funerals, participation in the organization of revolutionary holidays. The Union of Godless promoted natural science, considered the origin of religion, and established the historical and economic basis for its existence. All anti-religious work of the Union of Godless was connected with the struggle for the construction of socialism (Konovalov, 1967, pp. 72–73).

For the “debunking” of religious tenets and positions of the clergy, the godless turned to logic and knowledge. They tried to convince the falsehoods and wrongs of religious beliefs, the inappropriateness of rites and traditions, to substantiate the greed of the clergy and the truth of communist ideology through the achievements of science and a “common sense” (Vitrynska, 2016, p. 177).

The Union of Godless considered it necessary to fight religion not only with a certain religious outlook, but also with a significant social and socio-political factor. Therefore, shortly after their emergence, the Union of Godless units did not want to limit themselves to remote criticism of religion, and began to organize fight against any manifestations of religiosity among the population systematically.

In particular, in Vinnytsia District, the Union of Godless set out the following tasks: to neutralize the religious influence of the clergy on the public life and socio-economic life of the region; ideologically “disarm” religious organizations, circles, opposing them with the Soviet organizations; to assist in the struggle for the Cultural Revolution by engaging workers in active “faithless” work. In this activity, a special role was given to artistic events, reading of anti-religious literature, concerts, theatrical performances and games. Vinnytsia District Council of Godless planned to hold the following anti-religious activities in the years of 1928 – 1929: a district anti-religious seminar for 30 people, a district teacher seminar for 60 people, two inter-district seminars for 60 people; to organize two circles of “rising type” for 25 people; four working anti-religious circles; five peasants; three Polish.

The main method of anti-religious work of the Soviet authorities was campaigning. The godless organized anti-Christmas, anti-Ester, and other campaigns that featured signs of militant ignorance, lack of culture, class restriction, and, in general, failed to respond to declared, by their leadership, the civilized propaganda of atheistic ideas.

Reporting in 1927 on the conduct of a “cultural march and anti-Easter campaign” in the Zaporizhzhya constituency, the party authorities were forced to admit that the carried out work allowed “not quite tactful statements” against believers, even nonsense.

We have a document stating that on February 20, 1928, the Bolsheviks were alarmed that Vinnytsia district failed to promote the main tasks of the Union of Godless among the believing population properly, resulting in no increase of its units. The organization failed to adjust the internal organizational work of godless and to achieve the expected results in the field of anti-religious agitation in the countryside. The state of anti-religious work of the Union of Godless was considered absolutely unsatisfactory in other districts of Podillya.



In fact, the very establishment of the Union of Godless units was carried out without taking into account the principle of voluntariness, because this society was artificially promoted within the population. In addition, the Bolsheviks tried to create as many Union of Godless units as possible, forgetting their quality (Andrushchak, 2016, p. 44).

Often, the tool to overcome “religious prejudice” was a lecture. For example, a doctor from the Dmytriv Medical Center Mr. Kenig visited the village of Ryabukhi in Konotop district and carried out a survey of pupils and the sanitary condition of the school. After giving a report to the villagers, he answered the following questions: “Can a person live without dying? Why aren’t different bacilli spoiling the relics? Is it possible to get infected in the church by kissing the cross?” The doctor answered comprehensive questions, giving examples from life and science. “Medicine with its advice helps the peasant fight terrible diseases and brings to the village anti-religious propaganda”, – village correspondent F. Kovalenko summarized.

Lectures on natural topics were tried to be held in the days of religious holidays. For example, in the village Brytany in Nizhyn Region people were informed that a lecture “Plants and Animals” would be read at the Christmas holidays, during it their structure in a microscope would be shown. A local village correspondent, nicknamed “Nezamozhnik”, wrote: “Our peasants did not believe when anyone said that plants and animals consist of individual cells. If anyone starts to say that this is proven by science, they would only smile in disbelief”. A full school of peasants gathered and brought a microscope from Mynive Technical College. The peasants viewed through it the structure of the plant leaf, the structure of potatoes, meat, examined the blood. The students of the technical school explained everything. Then the peasants spoke much about the various achievements of science” (Topchii, 2011, pp. 179–180).

The method of mass propaganda of the Union of Godless units among workers was the performance of anti-religious people during lunch breaks. They were usually held in the dining room where all the workers who unwittingly attended anti-religious lectures would gather. This method of propaganda had a significant advantage: a large number of workers were able to listen to the reports. In 1930, a group of godless at Tinyakov Kharkiv factory conducted anti-religious activities in the dining room. Initially, this was due to the absence of a special meeting room, but the propagandists soon realized the benefits of this method of work and even after the emergence of a free room continued to work in the dining room (Vitrynska, 2016, pp. 172–173).

One of the forms of work of the Union of Godless units was to conduct mass excursions to the organization which involved large enterprises and major clubs of the area. The excursions involved workers, especially new staff – people from the village and women. A few weeks before the excursion, the workers were informed of the planned event. The Kyiv District Council of the Union of Godless proposed excursions to museums of religious cults, the History Museum, Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, individual monasteries in and outside the city, St. Sophia Cathedral, the anti-religious office of the House of Communist Education and State Farms. During the trip to the farms guides were recommended to prepare reports on the following topics: “Scientifically placed agriculture is not afraid of any accidental disasters”, “Are priests and prayers needed for success in agriculture”, “Heredity and variability in nature and the application of their laws in agriculture economy”, “The role and importance of state farms in rural construction”. Kyiv Regional Council of the Union of Godless advised the rural centers to conduct an agitation campaign concerning “Agricultural Work and the Union of Godless” to involve the peasantry and intelligentsia. The instructions to the units indicated that the main idea of this topic was that religion impeded the development of agriculture, attracted the peasantry to backward technology, and gave rise to belief in supernatural forces

and prejudices related to farming. The rural godless were advised to participate in agricultural meetings and agricultural groups. The godless were called upon to improve the economy by following the instructions of agronomists and thus to prove to the neighbours the error of their religious beliefs (Holbert, 1926, pp. 56–57).

The godless were tasked with eliminating religious influence on economic and social life. The Union was to combat the religious activity of believers and the clergy, in particular to combat organizing fundraisers to improve material status of poor men created on the basis of religion economic associations (sectarian cooperatives, communes), direct and concealed participation of priests in civil associations and events, organization of public dinners, prayer services within the peasant courts, consecration of cattle, apiaries and other agricultural objects.

For this purpose, local Union of Godless units were required that their members take an active part in all levels of community service and, by their own example, demonstrate to the others the benefits of a new way of life and a socialist way of doing business. The godless were to identify the clergy-backed social groups, as well as to identify ways how priests used to pretend the supporters of Soviet power in order to influence the population.

Because in many cases the temple and the priest's premises were a source of propagation of anti-Soviet sentiment, the Union of Godless units had to establish sources of talk and persuade the public of the need to combat the phenomenon. It was believed that by studying the personal composition of religious activists, its past, and its connection with anti-Soviet elements, the unit would enable to manifest itself more active in the case of the decay of the religious community (Postanovy Pershoho Vseukrainskoho zizdu Spilky bezvirnykiv, 1928, pp. 14–15).

Fighting religion, not just “economic expediency”, resulted in the replacement of weeks with what is known as a “continuous week”. O. Yaroslavskyi considered in the article “Transition to the Offensive” the transition to “continuity” as an important “precondition for the displacement of religious ideology” (Slezin, 2005, p. 133). In 1930, godless organization called for the declaration of Christmas as the days of industrialization (Mardershtein, 1930, p. 24). The people of Ukraine were forced to abandon the celebration of religious holidays completely. Easter, the Trinity, and other religious holidays became normal working days. Thus, the struggle for the traditional leisure activities in the village of Markov of Pershotravensky district of the local godless unit began in 1926, but it encountered stiff resistance from the peasants. The Soviet propaganda claimed that the local population tried to damage agricultural machinery and thus prevent the godless from working on Sunday (Rudenko, 1930, p. 65). Even before the introduction of “continuity” throughout Ukraine on the days of church holidays, voluntary Saturday and Sunday works were held. Thus, the center of godless of Ustimivka village in Poltava region, which numbered 220 people in 1929, organized at Easter with the Komsomol members voluntary Sunday work concerning the village adjustment (Kelembetova, 1974, p. 62).

Bolshevik agitators opposed work in favor of developing a country of leisure during religious holidays. To increase the ideological component of the voluntary Saturday and Sunday works and labour in the days of religious holidays, the Soviet leaders set specific goals which money was gained for. In 1930, Mykolayiv Jewish workers in Yom Kippur held voluntary Saturday work; its incomes were transferred to build a “Birobidzhan” aircraft. On the eve of the same holiday in 1931, agitators called to organize a voluntary Saturday work for raising funds for the submarine “Warrior Godless”. The purpose of anti-holiday work was to divert people from performing religious practices by organizing work these days. In 1930, the newspaper “The Godless on the seeding-machine” in Khorol, Poltava province,

stated: “The slogan of the anti-Easter campaign among the collective farmers should be: No collective farm celebrating Easter. No drunken farm worker. For the mass departure of collective farmers in the fields” (Vitrynska, 2016, p. 182).

The work of the Union of Godless also unfolded in an environment of national minorities where certain results were obtained. During 1928, the organization promoted the publication of a German anti-religious journal and the distribution of brochures of atheist content in the Jewish and Polish languages. By engaging in writers’ anti-religious activities, in the same year, the members of the union launched a campaign to discredit Judaism (Postanovy poshyrenoho plenumu vseukrainskoi rady spilok bezvirnykiv 16–19 travnia 1929 r., 1929, p. 115). The Union of Godless initiated the revision of the NKVD instruction concerning the possibility of admission of school children – Lutherans and Baptists to the Confirmation, with a view to its abolition. The members of the union also demanded that the believers and members of the clergy who were involved in the religious teaching of German children would be brought to administrative and criminal responsibility. The Union of Godless demanded that the Soviet authorities establish stricter control over religious communities and denominations that included the German population, and strengthen the oversight of clergy in German villages (Na borotbu z relihiieiu, 1930, p. 18). However, in the overwhelming majority of cases, anti-religious work among the population of ethnic communities under the auspices of the Union of Godless did not become systematic due to the lack of organization of its local units (Antireligioznaya rabota sredi natsionalnostey, 1933, p. 33). In 1930, a mass anti-religious event was held in Dnipropetrovsk with the participation of 12,000 people, many of whom were national minorities. During the campaign, 100 meetings were held and a series of reports on anti-religious content were read. At the same time, the Jewish workers took part in alternative celebrations during the Jewish holidays. They organized the campaign “days of industrialization”, during them the state collected 8 thousand RUB. Some of the money received was sent to Birobidzhan and the rest was transferred to the tractor column. At the same time, the godless raised the issue of the closure of religious buildings. As a result, three synagogues, a cathedral and a church were obliged to stop their activities in Dnipropetrovsk (Voiovnnychi, 1930, p. 35).

**The Conclusions.** The Union of Godless became an alternative civil structure to religious communities, operating in Ukraine. This organization was created by the Bolsheviks in order to eradicate the religious world outlook of the republic’s multinational population. An important area of its work was propaganda activity. However, the anti-religious propaganda of the union was not regular, it lacked regularity. The uncompromising rhetoric of the Union of Godless encountered a misunderstanding of a large part of the population and provoked a backlash that was to uphold religious beliefs. Still, it must be admitted that the achievements in the anti-religious work of the godless organization were indeed, however, the results foreseen by its encourages were not achieved by this campaign, since the Bolsheviks did not manage to transform the world outlook of the population of Soviet Ukraine into a purely atheistic one, which was the ultimate its goal.

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## THE NEWSPAPER PERIODIC'S DISTINCTIVE FEATURES FUNCTIONING IN UKRAINE IN THE 40-ies OF THE XXth CENTURY

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the research is to show the newspaper periodicals' publication and functioning peculiarities in the context of the socio political conditions of the time, to reveal the main topics and content of newspapers in the 40-ies of the XXth century. The research methodology is based on the principles of scientificity, historicism, objectivity, systematicity, specific analysis, taking into account the methodological pluralism, which is relevant to the modern history science. The scientific novelty lies in the fact that the newspaper periodical' publication and functioning specific in 1940 and its role in forming the general socio political atmosphere in society have been analyzed in the context of social, political and economic challenges of the postwar period, taking into account the influence, politicization of life in Ukraine. The Conclusions.* It is identified that the press in the 1940-ies, as well as during the entire Soviet period, played a significant role in the public life of the country. It was the ruling Communist Party that assigned the role of the main propagandist and popularizer of its policy, so even in the conditions of post-war devastation and the economy's recovery, the state sought resources to restore the work of newspaper publishing houses. The periodicals produced and spread information based on the Communist ideology and aimed at shaping the Soviet public opinion. The periodicals of that period had a great influence on various aspects of the economic, sociopolitical and cultural life of the society and implemented quite successfully the press functions defined by the regime: organizational, educational, propaganda, counter-propaganda and sociological functions since newspapers often published articles on sociopolitical and production thematic. Leading themes in the periodicals were the victory in the war; 'the Soviet soldiers' heroism, the 'the Soviet people decisive role and their political vanguard – the Communist Party' in the victory over Fascism, the education of the population in the spirit of the 'Soviet patriotism', the proletarian ideas of internationalism propaganda, the proletarian of the natural and technical sciences achievement' popularization, the struggle against 'bourgeois ideology'. The press assisted the regime in launching ideological campaigns. In particular, slogans of struggle against the 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism', 'cosmopolitanism and Zionism' unfairly criticized many science and culture figures. The Soviet regime maximized the ideological function of the periodical press, focusing its efforts on promoting certain values and campaigning for their support by wiping out the function of the press in the public opinion formation, which was based on information activities.

**Key words:** press, newspaper periodic, ideology, propaganda, agitation, postwar period.

## ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ФУНКЦІОНУВАННЯ ГАЗЕТНОЇ ПЕРІОДИКИ В УКРАЇНІ В 40-і рр. XX ст.

**Анотація.** *Мета дослідження – показати особливості виходу та функціонування газетної періодики у 40-ві рр. XX ст. в контексті суспільно-політичних умов того часу, розкрити основну тематику й зміст матеріалів газетних видань. Методологія дослідження ґрунтується на принципах науковості, історизму, об'єктивності, системності, конкретного аналізу, з урахуванням чинного сьогодні в історичній науці методологічного плюралізму. Наукова новизна полягає у тому, що особливості виходу та функціонування газетної періодики в 1940-ві рр., її роль у створенні загальної атмосфери у суспільстві аналізуються на тлі соціальних, політичних та економічних викликів повоєнного часу, з урахуванням впливу, насамперед, ідеологізації і політизації життя України. Висновки.* Встановлено, що преса в 1940-ві рр., як і взагалі протягом всього періоду існування Радянського Союзу, відіграла важливу роль у житті суспільства як засіб масової інформації, агітації та пропаганди. Саме їй панівна комуністична партія відводила роль головного популяризатора своєї політики, тому навіть в умовах післявоєнної розрухи та відновлення економіки держава шукала ресурси для відновлення роботи редакцій газет. Періодична преса публікувала інформаційні матеріали, які не суперечили панівній ідеології і мали формувати потрібну владі суспільну думку. Періодичні видання мали вагомий вплив на всі аспекти життя суспільства і достатньо успішно реалізували визначені режимом функції преси: організаторську, виховну, пропагандистську, контрпропагандистську і соціологічну, адже на шпальтах газет часто з'являлися матеріали, які висвітлювали суспільні,

політичні і виробничі теми. Лейтмотивом стає тема перемоги у війні, героїзму радянських воїнів, “вирішальної ролі радянського народу та його політичного авангарду – комуністичної партії” в перемозі над фашизмом, формування духу “радянського патріотизму”, пропаганда ідей пролетарського інтернаціоналізму, післявоєнної відбудови, боротьба з “буржуазною ідеологією”. Преса сприяла режиму у розгортанні ідеологічних кампаній. Зокрема, під гаслами боротьби з “українським буржуазним націоналізмом”, “космополітизмом та сіонізмом” на її сторінках було безпідставно розкритиковано багатьох діячів науки і культури. Практично знівельовавши функцію преси у формуванні громадської думки, в основі якої лежить інформаційна діяльність, радянський режим максимально посилив її ідеологічну функцію, зосередивши її зусилля на пропаганді певних життєвих цінностей та агітації на їх підтримку.

**Ключові слова:** преса, газетна періодика, ідеологія, пропаганда, агітація, повоєнний період.

**The Problem Statement.** The periodical press, as a means of mass media, agitation and propaganda, due to its information functions plays an important role in the life of society and is a real force that is able to shape the public opinion concerning important issues on politics, economics and culture. The periodical press analysis of a certain period gives the chance to trace tendencies of the state policy development in the field of information, to make objective representation about the periodical, its maintenance, a direction, tasks.

The Ukrainian party Soviet press, as an ideological instrument of power, first of all, solved the tasks set before it to educate the masses in line with the dominant ideology. In the Soviet concept of the media, the above-mentioned issue was considered exclusively through an ideological prism. The priorities were set only: to inform, explain and interpret events, and, most importantly, to guide the reader. The press was also the main information and communication channel, which contributed to the formation and the national community integrity awareness.

The Ukrainian press was transformed finally into a means of the party Soviet propaganda and agitation as early as the 1930-ies, but during World War II the political and ideological pressure on cultural life was somewhat eased, and in the 1940-ies the Ukrainian society again fell under brutal ideological control. The Soviet regime initiated another wave of ideological campaigns in order to persecute dissidents and repression, as a result of which the entire cultural sphere came under the control of the party state apparatus, and the cultural policy of the government acquired a clear ideological character. An important role in these processes was played by printed periodicals, which contained the main array of public information. The party documents that distorted the picture of spiritual life in Ukraine and unreasonably accused leading scholars, writers, and artists were widely commented on in the editorial and author’s articles.

The periodical press in the post-Soviet information space condemns the obligatory officially, imposed ideology forcibly, which created in the mass consciousness the illusion’s possibility of a complete rejection of the ideology of the mass media. In fact, observing the sometimes excessive politicization of society, we can conclude that the press by its nature can and does have a rigid ideological orientation, depending on the sociopolitical system in which the information product is created. The media often cover the affairs’ state in the world, the social forces’ activities and priorities and the global events’ development, both in their country and in the world.

Hence, the newspaper periodicals publication and functioning peculiarities’ analysis in the postwar years should ensure pluralism in the press and make it impossible for the ideological control by the government and various financial groups, which is an important condition for the society’s democratic development.

**The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications.** It should be mentioned that there is a small amount of research conducted by the Ukrainian press in the postwar period nowadays. In particular, the researcher, S. Shulzhenko analyzed the newspapers of 1947 and 1949, which are stored in the Book Chamber of Ukraine periodicals fund (Shulzhenko, 2011). The scientist, H. Rudyi analyzed the periodicals as a historical source for studying the sociopolitical and cultural life in Ukraine (Rudyi, 2017). Yu. Kahanov, emphasizing the ambiguous influence of the press on the formation of mass consciousness, stereotypes and values, noted that the periodicals contributed to the “broadening of horizons” and performed “educational, informative and entertaining functions” (Kahanov, 2014, p. 223). V. Kononenko and O. Melnychyk studied the party-Soviet press forms and methods of influence of 1945 – 1953 on the sociopolitical and cultural life in Soviet Ukraine, came to the conclusion that the USSR periodicals fully copied the technologies, methods and techniques of the central periodicals, traced the All-Union and the content and form of submission of materials, and the newspapers and magazines materials contributed to the necessary sociopolitical atmosphere formation, influenced the citizens’ behavior, the authorities’ activities at all levels (Kononenko & Melnychyk, 2019, p. 177).

**The Publication’s Purpose.** In this article, the authors are aimed at showing newspaper periodicals publication and functioning peculiarities in 1940-ies and in the context of socio-political conditions of the time, to reveal the newspaper publications’ main topics and content.

**The Main Material Statement.** During the war (from July 1941 to January 1943) only one republican newspaper “For Soviet Ukraine” was published for the population of the occupied territories – the Central Committee of the CP (b) U body and the Verkhovna Rada of the USSR, which was scattered over the occupied territories by planes (Noskina & Maliuk, n. d.). In addition, from 1943, the newspaper “The Soviet Ukraine” began to be published in Ukrainian and Russian instead. Also in Ukraine were published two regional newspapers, which were called “The Voroshylovhradskaya Pravda” and “The Socialist Kharkiv” and 16 district newspapers in the liberated areas of Voroshylovhradskaya and Kharkiv regions (Central State Archives of Public Organizations of Ukraine – CSAPOU, f. 1, d. 70, c. 216, p. 55). Furthermore, the underground party committees of partisan formations also issued newspapers. Of course, the newspapers for which the death penalty was threatened could not be particularly widespread among the population. In 1943, the Military Council of the First Ukrainian Front published the newspaper “For the Honor of the Motherland for the Ukrainian soldiers” (Solodovnyk, 1998, p. 71).

An attempt made by the Ukrainian National Council to publish the legal daily newspaper the “The Ukrainske Slovo”, which defended Ukraine’s independence, during the occupation, ended up with the newspaper’s closure and the editor, Ivan Rohach’s execution. The newspaper “New Ukrainian Word” differed from the “old” in that it was openly collaborative (Solodovnyk, 1998, p. 71).

Front-line newspapers published materials glorifying J. Stalin, condemning that the “Ukrainian-German nationalists – the worst enemies of the Ukrainian people”; the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and other governing bodies orders, decrees on awarding various state decorations; the weapons inspections’ results, both the Soviet and the enemy; photos of soldiers – the Soviet Union heroes; materials on the activities of guerrilla units; reports of the Extraordinary State Commission for the Establishment and Investigation of the Crimes of the Nazi Occupiers; the German soldiers letters to their families, the German prisoners of war views; the Ukrainian writers’ works; articles written by the scholars on the history of Ukrainian cities and other materials (Noskina & Maliuk, n. d.).

In such OUN and UPA newspapers as “The Samostiynyk”, “Za Samostiyny Ukrainu” (For Independent Ukraine), “Do Zbroi” (To Arms), “Zemlya i Vlada” (Land and Power) (published by the Ukrainian National Democratic Party, established at the beginning of 1943 in Western Ukraine) and the others were the OUN and UPA leading bodies’ published resolutions, information about the insurgent battles, the Soviet and Nazi military atrocities. They also revealed the essence of the Bolshevik anti-Ukrainian policy on the territory of Western Ukraine, primarily in connection with the forced collectivization there. The articles were published about the real causes of the famine in Central and Southern Ukraine, about the sadistic crimes of the NKVD. These publications were characterized by the absence of any photographic materials. They were printed in underground printing houses, reproduced on typewriters or copied by hand (Barannyk & Holobutskyi, 2005, p. 628).

The role of the press as a transmitter of social ideas, views, images was extremely important, so even in the post-war devastation and economic recovery, the state sought for resources to restore the newspaper editorial offices’ work. To ensure the publishing management development in Ukraine and the printing enterprises’ reconstruction in cities and districts liberated from the Nazi occupiers, the resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR under the People’s Commissar of the USSR on the 6<sup>th</sup> of November in 1943 the Printing and Publishing Department (Ukrpoligrafvydav) was established in order to provide economic and technical management of book and newspaper publishing houses (except for the publishing houses of the Central Committee of the CP (b) U), as well as all Ukrainian printing enterprises, whose primary task was to ensure the newspapers’ publication (CSAPOU, f. 1, d. 70, c. 216, pp. 59–60).

Furthermore, after the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus was transferred to Kharkiv, an editorial office of the same Russian language republican newspaper, “The Radyanska Ukraina” (“The Soviet Ukraine”), later renamed the “Pravda Ukrainy”, was established on the basis of the republican newspaper “The Radyanska Ukraina” editorial board. Two new republican youth newspapers were also created: “The Youth of Ukraine” and “The Stalin Tribe”, and the republican children’s newspaper, which was called “Zirka”. The total circulation of both party newspapers on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January in 1944 was 140,000 copies, youth newspapers 25,000, and children’s newspapers 10,000 copies. In December 1943, the literary newspaper Literature and Art began to be published in Kharkiv, a body of the Union of Soviet Writers of the Ukrainian SSR and the Arts Department under the SNK of the Ukrainian SSR (CSAPOU, f. 1, d. 70, c. 216, p. 55).

Due to the oblasts liberation process, the regional newspapers’ editorial offices also resumed their work. By the 1<sup>st</sup> of January in 1944, 10 regional newspapers with a total circulation of 101,000 copies were already published in Ukraine (CSAPOU, f. 1, d. 70, c. 216, p. 56).

The main ideological priority of the party bodies was the control of the print media’s editorial policy and their management (Rudyi, 2017, p. 462). The Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the CP (B) U provided all regional newspapers with editors or their deputies, as well as 2–3 responsible editorial staff, and assisted Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Kyiv regional newspapers in creating a printing base (CSAPOU, f. 1, d. 70, c. 216, p. 56).

Considerable work was done to restore district and city newspapers. After all, during the war, the printing base in the cities and districts of Ukraine was destroyed. In particular, out of 188 districts of Kharkiv, Stalin (now Donetsk), Poltava, Sumy and Chernihiv regions in

112 districts printing houses were destroyed completely, and the remaining ones were looted and destroyed (CSAPOU, f. 1, d. 70, c. 216, p. 56).

Regional committees and district committees of the CP (b) U recorded the available printing equipment and its redistribution between districts. At the same time, the Central Committee of the CP (b) U provided the region with portable printing houses (PT-2), which, according to the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of August 25, 1943, it received from Moscow. Also, some districts of Kharkiv and Poltava oblasts were provided with typewriters ("American" and "album") and fonts from Kharkiv printing houses, and those districts where there was no printing base were recommended to cooperate with those districts where such a base existed in order to organize the Soviet Information Bureau and district newspapers messages' leaflets publication (CSAPOU, f. 1, d. 70, c. 216, pp. 56–57).

As a result, with the printing base reconstruction, the number of titles and circulations of newspapers and magazines increase. Thus, by the 1st of January in 1944, in the Voroshilovhrad region (now Luhansk), which had 36 districts, 34 district newspapers were published, and in Kharkiv region (33 districts) – 29 newspapers. In general, as of the 1st of January in 1944, 156 city and district newspapers, 6 transport newspapers and 2 large-circulation newspapers were published in Ukraine at Stalin Kharkiv factories, called "The Comintern" (CSAPOU, f. 1, d. 70, c. 216, p. 57). At the beginning of September 1944, 390 printing houses were established and 165 printing houses resumed their activities (Shulzhenko, 2011, p. 2). In 1945, 879 newspapers and 6 magazines were published in 24 regions of Ukraine (Bokan', Polovyi, 2002, p. 203), of which 28 newspapers were published in Drohobych region (Popp, 2018, p. 149).

As the main information and propaganda tool, the press was to be the mouthpiece of official policy, it informed workers, collective farmers, employees about party decisions, promoted production achievements and the organization of the "socialist construction" (Rudyi, 2017, p. 462), instructed the masses which were urgent in national politics (Koliastruk, 2003b, p. 14). In particular, a number of city and district newspapers of Ukraine were noted for their initiative, efficiency and mass. Thus, the newspaper of Olkhovatskyi district in Kharkiv region "The Kolkhoznoe Selo" (editor Panasenko) was the socialist competition among tractor drivers organizer of both MTS districts. The newspaper took control of the tractor repairs and preparation for spring sowing. At the initiative of the editorial board, "personal books" of tractor repairmen were introduced, in which the indicators of overtime work performed by each worker were entered. The newspaper called it "My help to the front". Every five days, the tractor drivers' performance was covered in a special bulletin. Such extensive mass work has paid off – Olkhovatskaya MTS was the first in Ukraine to implement a plan to repair tractors (CSAPOU, f. 1, d. 70, c. 216, p. 58).

On the pages of the newspaper, called "The Kocheharka", Horlivka MK KP (b) U body and the city council of deputies, such appeals were constantly published as: "Let's revive the former traditions of Horlivka", "Miner cut coal for two, teach the skills of three", "Miners-personnel, share your experience with young people". Hence, from issue to issue, the newspaper called on the population to restore the destroyed mines, widely showed the heroes of socialist labor, their work experience, told how the workers of Donbas are fighting for the revival of the "All-Union stove" (CSAPOU, f. 1, d. 70, c. 216, pp. 58–59).

Along with the old editions, new ones appeared. In particular, in Zakarpattia region such newspapers as "The Flag of Victory", "The Soviet Verkhovyna", "The Socialist Labor", "The Stalin's Way", "Voros zaszlo" began to be published, in Lviv region the following newspapers were issued: "For Soviet Science", "The Soviet Student", in Chernivtsi region – "For Stalin's



cadres”, in Izmail – “The Drumul Stalinist”, “For the Bolshevik pace”, in Dnipropetrovsk region – “The Path to Communism”, in Stalin region – “The Primorsky Collective Farmer”, etc. (Shulzhenko, 2011, p. 2).

In 1947, 909 titles of newspapers were published in Ukraine, which amounted to 99,766 printed units, in 1948 – 926 titles, numbering 111,120 printed units, in 1949 – 921, which amounted to 109,022 printed units (Shulzhenko, 2011, p. 2). At the same time, it should be noted that the press remained one of the sectors of a kind of cultural and political “reservation”, where the Ukrainian language was allowed to function and “thrive” a little more than in the fields of vocational education, public administration, science, production (Solodovnyk, 1998, p. 71). Between 1947 and 1949, about 85% of newspapers were published in Ukrainian, while Russian language periodicals accounted for only one-seventh of the publications. Newspapers printed in minority languages (Polish, Hungarian, Moldavian) ranged from 0,6% to 1,2% (Shulzhenko, 2011, p. 2). Since 1950, 1,192 newspapers were published in Ukraine with a total circulation of 4,6 million, including 3,3 million copies in Ukrainian (about 70 percent). Of course, the all-Union newspapers’ circulation share were printed and distributed in Ukraine weren’t taken into account (Solodovnyk, 1998, p. 71).

If the number of Russian language newspapers in the district centers was small, among the republican ones their share was 25 percent of all publications, and among the regional ones – about 30 percent. In addition, half of the Russian language republican publications were newspapers for young people and adolescents, which were published under the Central Committee of the LKSMM auspices (“Stalin’s Tribe”, “The Young Leninist”). Russian language regional newspapers predominated in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. For example, in Voroshilovhrad region. “Voroshilovhradskaya Pravda” newspaper was published in Dnipropetrovsk region – “Dniprovska Pravda”, in Stalin region – “The Socialist Donbas” and the others. Both regional and district newspapers in the newly created Izmail region were exclusively written in the Russian language. During 1948 – 1949, the district newspapers were also published here in the Moldavian language, in particular, Drumul Stalinist of the Reni RK KP (b) U, “For the Bolshevik Tempo” of the Artsyz RK KP (b) U, and “Leninsky Put” of the Bolgrad RK KP (b) IN. The grassroots newspapers were published mostly in Russian (Shulzhenko, 2011, p. 2).

Since 1949, the following newspapers resumed their publication: “The Kolhospne Selo” (founder – Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus) and “The Soviet Sports” (founder – Committee for Physical Culture and Sports under the Council of Ministers of the USSR). In the post-war period, such newspapers as “The Soviet Education”, “The Soviet Art”, “The Literary Newspaper” (now “The Literary Ukraine”), “The Collective Farmer of Ukraine”, “The Livestock of Ukraine” were published in Ukraine. There were also newspapers of enterprises, organizations, institutions of higher education, the so-called “multi-circulation”, for example: “The Dneprovskiy Metallurg”, “The Zaporizhstal”, “For the Soviet personnel” and the others (Shulzhenko, 2011, pp. 2–3).

If during the war newspapers in their editorials addressed the Ukrainians as the “descendants of glorious and brave Zaporozhian Cossacks”, called to defend Ukraine, to fight for the restoration of a prosperous pre-war life, journalists were allowed to be more or less objective in covering historical events, literary works, culture development, and as soon as the fighting moved from Ukraine to the West, Ukrainians felt a radical change in the attitude of the authorities. The Ukrainian national motives, which until recently sounded in the works of writers and journalists, became the reason for the persecution of the pro-Ukrainian

intellectual elite (Baranyk & Holobutskyi, 2005, p. 628). The open public persecution and accusation of nationalism of the following well-known writers intensified: O. Dovzhenko, M. Rylsky, I. Senchenko, and Yu. Yanovskyi (CSAPOU, f. 1, d. 23, c. 4511, pp. 27–38; c. 4512, p. 10). In particular, O. Dovzhenko was one of the first to feel the onslaught of power – a prominent figure of Ukrainian culture, writer, film director, world-renowned screenwriter, in whose works (“Victory” and “Ukraine on fire”) “there were gross political mistakes of anti-Leninist nature”. At the same time, the Soviet regime sought to subdue completely the work of writers and artists, to direct them in the right political and ideological direction, to regulate the various manifestations of their creative search and activity (Siruk, 2014, p. 159).

According to the central all-Union and republican party press materials, various ideological campaigns were launched (Kononenko & Melnychhyk, 2019, pp. 170, 177). In particular, in 1946, an accusatory campaign was launched against historians whose research contained scientific ideas and theories close to the “bourgeois-nationalist” concept of M. Hrushevskyi, S. Yefremov and the other “enemies”. Scientists M. Korduba, I. Krypyakevych, I. Terlytsky, etc., the author’s team of the first volume of “History of Ukraine” edited by M. Petrovskyi (Siruk, 2016, p. 119) were subjected to devastating criticism. The Ukrainian literary critics involved in writing an “Essay on the History of Ukrainian Literature” were also criticized (Siruk, 2014, p. 159; 2016, p. 119).

Moral and political pressure on the creative intelligentsia became particularly severe in 1947, during the tenure of L. Kahanovych, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, who declared “the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism” the main threat in the republic. In May 1947, the resolution of the Central Committee of the CP (b) U “On Improving the Ideological and Political Education of Personnel” and “On the Struggle against Manifestations of Bourgeois-Nationalist Ideology” was adopted (Siruk, 2016, p. 118). The Central Committee of the CP (B) U condemned works written in the “anti-Marxist spirit” that contained “gross political errors and distortions of a bourgeois-nationalist nature”. After the Central Committee of the CP (b) U resolution “On Political Mistakes and Unsatisfactory Work of the Institute of History of Ukraine of the USSR Academy of Sciences” issued on the 29<sup>th</sup> of August in 1947, the Institute of History of Ukraine was actually destroyed (Siruk, 2014, p. 160). In September 1947, due to L. Kahanovich’s direct instructions, F. Yenevych’s article “On M. Rylsky’s Nationalist Mistakes” was published in the newspaper “The Soviet Ukraine” (Shulzhenko, 2011, p. 3). After all, the very fact of addressing the past of the Ukrainian people, the disclosure of its unique identity was considered a manifestation of bourgeois nationalism (Siruk, 2014, p. 159).

Newspapers continued to “serve” ongoing political campaigns against the “bourgeois nationalism”. For example, Volodymyr Sosiura’s poetry “Love Ukraine” in July 1951 in the newspaper “The Truth” was published an article “Against ideological distortions in literature” (Solodovnyk, 1998, p. 71; Siruk, 2016, pp. 160–161).

Some literary publications accused them of not covering the ruling party’s decisions fully enough, of not explaining their leading role in the development of culture, and of not paying enough attention to the ideological component (Shulzhenko, 2011, p. 3). Yes, the Ukrainian writers, despite the oppression of the regime, did not leave literary work, and the press – to publish them. Hence, in 1947 the newspaper “The Youth of Ukraine” published excerpts from the novel of the then young writer O. Honchar “Blue Danube” and the novel “The Earth is buzzing” (Shulzhenko, 2011, p. 3).

At the end of 1948, another large-scale political campaign was launched – “the fight against cosmopolitanism, contempt for the West”. Moreover, the above-mentioned campaign

was introduced in order to strengthen the cultural and ideological isolation of the country, split the intelligentsia and oppose it to other social groups, strengthen the process of Russification, restore an important factor in the functioning of the totalitarian regime – the image of the internal enemy (Siruk, 2016, p. 119).

Central and local mass media, as the main tools of the Soviet propaganda, provided information support of the system, the Soviet power' policy support in the regions (Popp, 2018, pp. 143, 150). The press published mostly information about party congresses, plenums, the Communist Party's decisions and government resolutions adopted in various spheres of economic and social life, materials about military and labor heroism, news of culture and sports, literary works, etc. Special issues of republican newspapers, prepared by the so-called visiting editions, were devoted to the problems of post-war reconstruction, for example, "The Soviet Ukraine" in Donbas, "The Soviet Ukraine" at "Zaporizhbud", "The Soviet Ukraine" at the Yenakiieve Metallurgical Plant. Also in the columns of newspapers a significant place was given to publications glorifying J. Stalin – the "leader" and "father of all nations". Almost all December issues of 1949 were dedicated to the celebration of its seven decades. In particular, in the 286th issue of the newspaper "The Soviet Ukraine" the article "Celebrating the seventieth anniversary of the birth of Comrade J. V. Stalin with new industrial successes" was published, in the 291st issue – the article "Our people are following Stalin", in the 295th – "The Sun of Our Life" and the others. The celebration of the tenth anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine within one state was also widely covered. Moreover, much attention was also paid to combating various "deviations" from the "general line of the party". This was especially true of artists accused of formalism, nature and cosmopolitanism (Shulzhenko, 2011, p. 3). In particular, after the Central Committee of the CP(b)U resolution's publication on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of May in 1948 "On the state and measures to improve the musical arts in Ukraine" in connection with the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) "On the opera "The Great Friendship" V. Muradeli "was developed campaign to identify "anti-patriotic" groups of "aesthetes" and their "henchmen" (CSAPOU, f. 1, d. 70, c. 1533, p. 55). Thus, "The Literaturna Hazeta" published articles condemning the "formalist anti-people trend" in the works of Ukrainian composers and the activities of musical art institutions (Literaturna Gazeta, May 27, 1948), the "anti-patriotic" group of theater critics and their "henchmen" ("The Literaturna Hazeta" on February 17, 1949) and the others (Shulzhenko, 2011, p. 3). Such Ukrainian composers as B. Lyatoshynskiy, I. Belza, M. Gozenpud, H. Taranov, M. Titz, M. Kolessa, S. Lyudkevych, R. Symovych, and A. Soltys were accused of the pseudo-innovation (Siruk, 2014, p. 160).

Hence, the postwar period of Stalin's rule for the Ukrainian press was largely a continuation of the prewar period. The same practice of incorrect and arbitrary attitude to the events and facts of real history. To communicate certain information, they were not invented but only selected from the point of view of ideology. To confirm the urgent idea, the press chose a trifle from thousands of important facts and inflated it to unnatural proportions, accidentally making it typical when the next ideological and political campaign required it. Important events were downplayed or silenced altogether (especially typical of national events) (Koliastruk, 2003a, p. 58). The same politicization, the glorification of the "father of nations", the political campaigns against the "bourgeois nationalism", and something new emerged: the condemnation of "rootless cosmopolitans". The "pseudoscience" – genetics and cybernetics also received the fair share of criticism (Solodovnyk, 1998, p. 71).

**The Conclusions.** Hence, the press in the 1940-ies, as well as in general throughout the existence of the Soviet Union, played an important role in society as a means of mass

media, agitation and propaganda. It was the ruling Communist Party that gave it the role of the main promoter of its policy, so even in the conditions of post-war devastation and economic recovery, the state sought resources to restore the newspaper editorial offices' work. The periodical press published informational materials that did not contradict the dominant ideology and were to form the public opinion required by the authorities. The periodicals of that time had a significant impact on all aspects of society and implemented the functions of the press defined by the regime successfully: organizational, educational, propaganda, counter-propaganda and sociological, as newspapers often covered materials covering social, political and industrial topics. The leitmotif was the victory's theme in the war, the Soviet soldiers' heroism, "the Soviet people decisive role and its political vanguard – the Communist Party" in the victory over Fascism, the "Soviet patriotism" formation, the propaganda of proletarian internationalism, postwar warfare. The press assisted the regime in launching ideological campaigns. In particular, under the slogans of the struggle against the "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism", "cosmopolitanism and Zionism", many figures of science and culture were unjustifiably criticized on its pages. By virtually nullifying the function of the press in shaping public opinion, which was based on information activities, the Soviet regime maximized the ideological function of the periodical press, focusing its efforts on promoting certain values and campaigning for them.

During the study it was found that further study requires the following issues: features of the functioning of urban, mass and grassroots publications, their material and technical situation, professional staffing, the specifics of subscription and sales, censorship in limiting the printed word and national opinion.

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## WARSAW COUNCIL OF THE UKRAINIAN AUTOCEPHALOUS ORTHODOX CHURCH OF 1944 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the research* is to cover the causes, course and consequences of the Council of Bishops of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) in 1944 on the basis of the source base and historiographical work. **The methodology of the research** is based on the principles of historicism, systematization, scientificity, verification, authorial objectivity, moderate narrative constructivism, as well as the use of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and special historical (historical genetic, historical typological, historical systemic) methods. **The scientific novelty** of the obtained results is determined by the fact that for the first time in domestic and foreign historiography the key decisions of the UAOC Council of 1944 were analyzed, as well as the unpublished archival documents and materials, which were introduced into the scientific circulation. **The Conclusions.** Nine hierarchs took part in the work of the Warsaw Council of the

*Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which established the Synod and adopted the Provisional Regulations on the Administration of the Church. The complexity of the Orthodox hierarchy position in exile was exacerbated by several objective circumstances. First of all, the external factors were unfavorable, which related to the German government. The UAOC episcopate in exile did not allow anybody to organize the Orthodox Ukrainians' church life, concentrated the clergy in one place artificially and forced inaction for more than a year and a half. According to documents, the German officials supported it in the struggle for leadership in the UAOC. Second of all, the Orthodox bishops' low level of education, who were often secular or inexperienced priests, was noticeable. Furthermore, there were diverse reasons, for example, constant internal disputes, different visions of the Church development ways outside Ukraine, interpersonal conflicts that provoked future divisions in the Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the diaspora. Third of all, the Warsaw Council of Bishops of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in 1944 limited itself to the half-hearted decisions on its canonical status and postponed its settlement until the end of the war.*

**Key words:** Orthodox Church, autocephaly, Council of Bishops, hierarchy.

## ВАРШАВСЬКИЙ СОБОР УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ АВТОКЕФАЛЬНОЇ ПРАВОСЛАВНОЇ ЦЕРКВИ 1944 р. ТА ЙОГО НАСЛІДКИ

**Анотація. Мета дослідження** – на основі джерельної бази та історіографічного доробку висвітлити причини, перебіг і наслідки проведення Собору єпископів Української Автокефальної Православної Церкви (УАПЦ) в 1944 р. **Методологія дослідження** спирається на принципи історизму, системності, науковості, верифікації, авторської об'єктивності, поміркованого нарративного конструктивізму, а також на використання загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, узагальнення) та спеціально-історичних (історико-генетичний, історико-типологічний, історико-системний) методів. **Наукова новизна** одержаних результатів визначається тим, що вперше у вітчизняній і закордонній історіографії проаналізовано ключові рішення Собору УАПЦ 1944 р., а також упроваджено до наукового обігу неопубліковані архівні документи та матеріали. **Висновки.** У роботі Варшавського Собору УАПЦ взяли участь дев'ять ієрархів, котрі створили Синод й ухвалили Тимчасове положення про управління Церквою. Складність становища православної ієрархії в еміграції посилювалася кількома об'єктивними обставинами. По-перше, несприятливими були зовнішні фактори, пов'язані з німецькою владою. Понад півтора року перебування єпископату УАПЦ на еміграції вона не дозволяла йому займатися організацією церковного життя православних українців, штучно концентрувала духовенство в одному місці та примусовій бездіяльності. Як свідчать документи, німецькі урядовці підтримували його в боротьбі за лідерство в УАПЦ. По-друге, давався ознаки низький рівень освіти православних єпископів, які часто були світськими особами або недостатньо досвідченими священниками. Постійні внутрішні суперечки, різне бачення шляхів розвитку Церкви поза межами України, міжособистісні конфлікти провокували майбутні розколи в українському православ'ї в діаспорі. По-третє, Варшавський Собор єпископів УАПЦ 1944 р. обмежився половинчастими рішеннями щодо її канонічного статусу й відклав його урегулювання до завершення війни.

**Ключові слова:** Православна Церква, автокефалія, Собор єпископів, ієрархія.

**The Problem Statement.** The religious factor had a powerful influence not only on the spiritual life of Ukraine, but also on the Ukrainian nation-building and state-building processes. Such kind of infer can be made due to the evidence, in particular, the synchronicity of the intensification of the autocephalous movement in Orthodoxy and the national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people. During World War II, the Orthodox Church was persecuted by both the Communist and the Nazi totalitarian regimes severely. The Autocephaly, which was never officially proclaimed, was seen by the leaders of the National Church Movement as an instrument of the Ukrainian people's de-imperialization and spiritual liberation. The offensive operations of the Red Army and the expulsion of the invaders from Ukraine forced part of the Orthodox clergy, especially the episcopate, to evacuate to the West. The hierarchs,

who were forced to cooperate with the occupiers, were afraid of repression by the Soviet authorities rightly. At the same time, the German factors continued to view the Church as a potential means of moral and psychological influence on the Ukrainian population and the anti-communist propaganda instrument.

**The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches.** The works written by I. Vlasovskiy, S. Savchuk and Y. Mulyk-Lutsyk, V. Pashchenko, O. Lysenko, Y. Voloshyn, V. Hordiyenko, N. Stokolos and Father Tymofiy Minenko and other authors were vital for the history of Orthodoxy study during the Second World War. The newly discovered source materials by the authors of this article make it possible to reveal in more detail the circumstances of the Warsaw Council of Bishops of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in 1944.

**The Publication's Purpose.** The authors set out to highlight the preconditions, course and consequences of the Council.

**The Main Material Statement.** According to the sources of the occupation administration, as well as the Nazis decision, Warsaw became a place of the Orthodox clergy concentration from Ukraine, both autocephalous and autonomous (Raporty, 1987, p. 722, 751). At the same time, the Nazi authorities treated the emigrant bishops as the "government's guests" and planned to use them in the anti-Soviet propaganda (Sziling, 1988, p. 91). In addition, all of them, together with their relatives and friends, were under Metropolitan of Warsaw Dionysius Valedynsky's care. The total number of the Orthodox hierarchs from the East and their entourage was about 200 in June 1944. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church representatives were given the opportunity to use the central Metropolitan Cathedral of Saint Mary Magdalene in Prague for the worship, where the Ukrainian parish operated and was headed by Archpriest Pavel Pashchevskiy from Volyn. At the same time, the autonomists were offered a less prestigious cemetery church of Saint John Climacus in Wola district (Warsaw) (AAN, RGG, sygn. 430, p. 53; Heyer, 1953, p. 223). As a result, living together in Warsaw exacerbated the intra-church conflicts between Bishops, who had different political orientations, levels of education, and spirituality. In addition, most of them had great ambitions.

The first emigration Council of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, chaired by Metropolitan Polycarp Sikorskiy, was held in Warsaw from the 11<sup>th</sup> of March to the 8<sup>th</sup> of April in 1944. It was attended by nine hierarchs, who established the Synod and adopted the "Temporary Regulations on the Administration of the Holy Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church" (Vlasovsky, 1998, pp. 273–274; Smyrnov, 2019, p. 401).

Due to the newly discovered meetings' protocols, it was possible to reproduce the course of the Council and the decisions taken at it. During the first meeting on the 11<sup>th</sup> of March in 1944, Metropolitan Polycarp "sincerely called on all members of the Council to unite, show solidarity and avoid such statements that could bring unrest and damage the work of the Council" (AWMP, sygn. 1151-RII-6D). Obviously, such fears of the chairman were not unfounded, as during the subsequent meetings among the bishops various misunderstandings arose repeatedly. The technical secretaries' duties were performed by lawyer Ye. Tyravskiy, as well as priests Yu. Shumovskiy and B. Yakovkevych. On the same day, the Commissions were set up to draft a declaration to the authorities and a draft conciliar message. Two days later, the Council approved a draft declaration of the episcopate to the German authorities, authored by Bishops Mstyslav and Polycarp.

At the regular meeting of Bishops held on the 21<sup>st</sup> of March in 1944, the Council of Bishops presidium establishment issue was considered. Bishop Mstyslav suggested that Metropolitan Polycarp could be considered the future Council of Bishops Chairman, and

insisted on the need to elect a secretary of the Council from among the bishops, rather than the technical staff. The hierarchs agreed with the proposals and elected Archbishops Ihor and Hennadyi as the Council Vice-Presidents, and Bishop Plato as Secretary. Bishops Sylvester and Mstyslav drew attention to the importance of forming a Synod, which should consist of three bishops. It was decided to elect a commission consisting of Bishops Mstyslav, Sylvester and Plato to work out a detailed project for the organization of the Synod and the Chancellery of the Council. In addition, an important issue for him was the financial situation discussion concerning the evacuated Ukrainian clergy. As the participants of the meeting were aware of their inability to take care of all refugee clerics and members of their families, it was decided to ask the German authorities for help with housing, money, food, clothing and footwear. The preparation of a special memorial was entrusted to Archimandrite Dosipheus. The future chancellery of the Council was to register them, and “the future Synod will take care of assigning the evacuated clergy to pastoral work in the implementation of spiritual and religious care for the faithful, refugees from Ukraine, as well as hindering the clergy, who need better pastoral training” (AWMP, sygn. 1151-RII-6D).

At the same time, Bishop Mstyslav was instructed to work out a draft memorial to the German administration for the spiritual and religious care of the Ukrainian workers in Germany, which he did not develop for unknown reasons. In addition, during the meeting, the Bishop noted that “Warsaw does not seem to respond to the residence of Ukrainian Bishops: the lack of adequate facilities for bishops and their scattering throughout the city and the inability not only to send but also to attend services and other”. All members of the Council agreed with the above-mentioned opinion and decided to instruct Bishop Mstyslav to “start talks with the German authorities on the issue of changing the location of the Ukrainian episcopate, for which to issue him a letter of authority” (AWMP, sygn. 1151-RII-6D).

On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of March in 1944, Bishop Mstyslav announced that he had a conversation with the head of the church affairs department in the government of the Governor-General in Krakow, Dr. G. A. Wilden, who decided to consult with official Berlin and asked to write a letter from the UAOC to the authorities. The need for the resettlement of the clergy was also recognized by the Warsaw occupation authorities: “Given the various political and religious influences, Warsaw does not seem to be a proper place for the fugitive bishops. It would be more desirable to move the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church fugitive Bishops to a more remote place” (Raporty, 1987, p. 770). The Council approved and sent a memorial to the Governor-General requesting another location, such as Carlsbad, but the problem was not resolved (UHECA, UAOC records, box 2, folder 4). The Council also approved a draft memorial for the clergy’s financial aid, supplementing it with a request to facilitate communication with the evacuated clergy in the Governor-General’s Office and in Germany.

According to the protocol of Part 5 issued on the 24<sup>th</sup> of March in 1944, the Commission headed by Bishop Hennadyi proposed for consideration to the episcopate a draft of the conciliar archpastoral message “To the Reverend Clergy, Devout Monasticism and God-Loving Faithful in Ukraine and Beyond Ukraine” approvals were sent for approval to the German authorities to obtain permission for distribution (AWMP, sygn. 1151-RII-6D). In the appeal, the Council called on the faithful to be courageous and keep their faith in the face of a new Bolshevik offensive. “The destiny of the Cross, which has come to You again, our Long-suffering People, filled our hearts with sorrow, because we know that faith in God will again be the cause of persecution and persecution by atheist communists, which for 23 years they closed Your holy churches, turned them into clubs, theaters, cinemas, or even destroyed

them altogether; the relics of saints, insults and other Christian saints were publicly despised; all Christian shrines were abolished; they accused You of all kinds of infidel-blasphemous magazines-books, and forbade all kinds of religious publications; introduced anti-religious upbringing of young people, brutally persecuted all religiously inclined...”.

The Council of Bishops, continuing to take care of the clergy and being the faithful to the UAOC, called on them to pray with constant prayers “...merciful Lord, to stop punishing us for our iniquities...”, to be ready at the right time to defend Mother Ukraine, to gather around “...of its Ukrainian Church, which would unite the whole Ukrainian people into one with the concrete of spiritual unity”. In addition, the hierarchs asked not to believe the godless Bolshevik propaganda to ensure religious freedom, to inform the world community by all means about the threat posed by Communism to the Christian culture. The message ended up with the assurance that “...the Lord will not forget us to the end, that a miracle will happen and the Resurrection will come – Ukraine will be resurrected” (Zinkevych, Voronyn, 1987, pp. 765–769). It is symbolic that in the above-mentioned appeal, not a word was mentioned about A. Hitler or the German authorities, although without the occupying factors’ consent such messages did not appear. Probably, the pro-Nazi agitation of the Church was not so important for the Nazis as it was for the anti-communist agitation.

On the 25<sup>th</sup> of March, the Council of Bishops approved a draft memorial for the Orthodox refugees’ spiritual and religious care, prepared by Bishop Ihor. Addressing Governor-General H. Frank, the UAOC episcopate requested the following: “1. To allow the Ukrainian clergy to attend large gatherings of the Ukrainian refugees systematically to perform services and other religious services. 2. To assist the clergy in the means of communication. 3. To provide the Council of Bishops with information on the location of large clusters of the Ukrainian refugees” (UHECA, UAOC records, box 2, folder 4). However, the Nazi leaders were in no hurry to grant permission for the pastoral care of the Orthodox Ukrainians.

At the Council of Bishops, considerable attention was paid to the liturgical books’ translation and publication issues, the Ukrainian church songs revival, as well as the clergy education. The specially created commission was instructed to review the translations of the evening and early services, liturgy and other acts prepared by the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw.

In addition, a Statutory Commission consisting of Bishops Hennadiy, Sylvester, Mstyslav and Plato was set up to draft the UAOC Statute as a temporary act until the local Council was convened in case of return to Ukraine. At the meeting on the 30<sup>th</sup> of March, the Bishops continued to consider the drafts of the “Provisional Regulations on the Holy Council of Bishops of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the Synod and the Chancellery of the Holy Council”, developed by Bishops Mstyslav and Polycarp. It was decided that the Statutory Commission would work out and bring in a single version of the document for consideration. Apparently, there was initially only one project developed by Bishop Pereyaslavskiy, but it provoked a long discussion and apparently did not suit Metropolitan Polycarp. Taking advantage of M. Skrypyk’s absence due to illness, on the 4<sup>th</sup> of April P. Sikorskyi secured the adoption of his position. At the same time, there was a discussion among the Soborians about the correct usage of the word “autocephalous” in the name of the Church: “It was clarified that the Ukrainian Church actually has autocephaly and has been guided by this principle in its life, and later, when peace comes, with the help of God and the love of the Universal Orthodox Church it will legally enter the family of the Holy Autocephalous Churches as their full sister” (AWMP, sygn. 1151-RII-6D).



According to the “Provisional Regulations on the Administration of the Holy Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church”, the highest governing body of the local Council was the Council of Bishops, which consisted of all current bishops. The Metropolitan Administrator represented the UAOC in foreign relations and performed the duties provided for the first bishop of the region to the local Council. The executive body of the Council of Bishops was the Holy Synod, which consisted of the Metropolitan Administrator as the Council Chairman, his deputy, and three ruling Bishops, who were elected for one year. The Synod’s manager served as Secretary and Head of the Chancellery (UHECA, UAOC records, box 2, folder 4).

On the 6<sup>th</sup> of April in 1944, the people of Sobor approved the Council’s Easter message text, prepared by Bishops Ihor and Mstyslav. At the same meeting, the composition of the Synod as the executive body of the UAOC Council of Bishops was approved: Metropolitan Polycarp – Chairman, Archbishop – Hennadiy, Deputy Archbishops – Nikanor and Ihor, and Plato, who was later elected secretary. In addition, the participants of the Council expressed their gratitude to Metropolitan Dionysius and decided to commemorate his name by the bishops of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church during the services (AWMP, sygn. 1151-RII-6D).

Furthermore, Bishop Mstyslav Skrypnyk raised the issue concerning the status of vicar bishops and proposed to approve the granting of the title of archbishop to Bishops Mykhailo Khoroshyi and Hennadiy Shyprykevych at the end of the meeting. The Council decided that all Bishops should have the responsibilities of the rulers and responded positively to the second initiative. As a result, on the 8<sup>th</sup> of April in 1944, the Bishops completed their work by approving a draft memorial to the Governor-General concerning the spiritual and religious care of Ukrainian workers in Germany. After that, the Bishops together with the evacuated clergy celebrated a prayer of thanksgiving in Saint Mary Magdalene Cathedral.

As for the German authorities, they monitored the Orthodox Ukrainians’ life in Warsaw closely. A number of sources published by the Russian researcher M. Shkarovskyi clearly record the existence of two groups of bishops in the Church: Dionysius – Polycarp and Mstyslav. In particular, in a memorandum issued on the 15<sup>th</sup> of May in 1944, a German official wrote the following: “The opposition against Dionysius – Polycarp, led by Bishop Mstyslav, also seeks the independence and autonomy (autocephaly) of the Ukrainian Church. But it wants this in close agreement with the German government, as it expects the Ukrainian issue to be resolved only in Germany. Mstyslav believes that the issue of the canonical independent Ukrainian Church is of secondary importance. Moscow itself would have little reason to speak out with a canonical justification against the independence of the Ukrainian Church since at one time it also confronted Byzantium with a *fait accompli*. Only German consent is important in order to have the necessary support of the population. Mstyslav is sharply opposed to Moscow’s centralism, but advocates loyal communication with the Russian element in Ukraine” (Shkarovsky, 2003, pp. 106–107).

A note from the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Regions on the organization and leadership of the UOC, issued on the 15<sup>th</sup> of May in 1944, described Metropolitan Dionysius’ church plans: “One of Dionysius’ previous reports to the ministry even suggested that the Moscow Patriarchate should be replaced by the Kyiv Patriarchate. So, there was also a desire for Orthodox unity, but with the center in Kyiv instead of Moscow. The fact that the Russian Dionysius “harnessed himself to the sleigh” of Ukrainian nationalism can be explained only by his personal ambition” (Shkarovsky, 2003, p. 106). As a result, the Metropolitan of Warsaw began to lose the favor of the German authorities, who decided to look for a replacement.

Hence, the documents from the German authorities suggested that in the struggle for leadership in the UAOC they supported Bishop Mstyslav, who easily found common ground with their government officials because he was “much more diplomatic and agile than Hilarion, he is easier to adapt to circumstances and knows the limits of what is possible”. His position in Moscow is clear. He is just as clearly in favor of the Ukrainians. For him, the only question is how to make Ukraine a respected member of the European community of nations over time. It is characteristic that Mstyslav would be more easily recognized by the Ukrainian bishops as head than by Hilarion”. In a report issued on the 16th of May in 1944, K. Rosenfelder, the head of the church policy group at the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Regions, emphasized: “In my opinion, only Mstyslav Skrypnyk is suitable for leading the Ukrainian Church among Ukrainian bishops” (Shkarovsky, 2003, pp. 108, 111).

Metropolitan Hilarion Ohienko aroused less confidence in the Nazis and was seen only as a candidate for the post of head of the Orthodox Church in the Governor-General. “His ecclesiastical and political goal is to elevate Kyiv to a Ukrainian ecclesiastical metropolitanate headed by a patriarch ...”, German sources said – Hilarion also believes that the Orthodox Churches in the Governor-General’s Office, Belarus and Lithuania should be in canonical dependence on the Kyiv Metropolitan or Patriarch ... Hilarion’s appointment is expedient only if Ukraine pursues a policy of self-government in order to create further political autonomy, otherwise Hilarion will soon become unbearable. I consider it expedient to replace Dionysius in Warsaw with Hilarion at the right moment in order to tear him away from the Ukrainian soil”(Shkarovsky, 2003, pp. 107–108). According to M. Shkarovsky, the latter idea was received positively by the leadership of the Governor-General.

The apogee of the conflict between the two bishops, who competed for leadership in the Church, reflected in Metropolitan Polycarp’s letter to Bishop Mstyslav issued on the 31<sup>st</sup> of May in 1944. M. Skrypnyk was brought to court with a ban on worship and speaking on behalf of the UAOC (UHECA, Metropolitan Mstyslav papers box 1, folder 6). As Bishop Mstyslav enlisted the support of the German authorities, he did not recognize the canonical sanctions imposed by Metropolitan Polycarp. The Nazis made considerable efforts to quell the conflict of hierarchs, but they did not succeed for a long time. Only on the 20<sup>th</sup> of June, Bishop Pereyaslavskiyi, in the presence of other hierarchs, read a letter of apology for his incorrect statements to the administrator (UAA, MC, box 101, item 1966).

The UAOC episcopate attached great importance to establishing contacts with the Ecumenical Orthodoxy. Feeling responsible for the fate of the Orthodox Ukrainians in exile, on the 27<sup>th</sup> of April in 1944, the episcopate appealed to the leaders of the autocephalous Churches to “temporarily take over the spiritual care of our spiritual congregation within your Church”. It should be noted that the UAOC considered itself to be under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate through the Metropolitan of Warsaw and denied any interference in Ukrainian affairs by Moscow (UHECA, Metropolitan Nikanor papers, box 25, folder 1). Unfortunately, at that time the world Orthodox community ignored the above-mentioned appeals and was not ready to help the Ukrainian Church.

The resonant event was the reception on the 11<sup>th</sup> of May in 1944 by Governor-General H. Frank of 17 Orthodox bishops of autocephalous and autonomous orientation in the Wawel of Cracow. Traditionally, hierarchs declared their loyalty and gratitude to the German authorities for their assistance (Raporty, 1987, p. 786). In response, the Governor-General stressed the importance of the UOC for European culture and solemnly promised on behalf of Hitler protection from the Reich, emphasizing: “I accepted you, firmly believing in the

victory of the German Wehrmacht. You will return to your churches again” (Shkarovsky, 2007, p. 125).

Due to the rapid advance of the Soviet troops, the episcopate left Warsaw on the 29<sup>th</sup> of July. Owing to the efforts of Bishop Mstyslav, who was authorized by the administrator to “petition the German authorities to move the UAOC episcopate with its surroundings to another settlement”, the entire hierarchy and part of the clergy were evacuated through Krynica and Bratislava to Germany (UHECA, Metropolitan Mstyslav papers, box 1, folder 6).

Hence, the Bishops aspired to have a local Ukrainian Orthodox Church, constantly used the term “UAOC”, but did not dare to ask Metropolitan Dionysius to grant autocephaly. Given the realities of the German occupation, this seemed unlikely. Therefore, the bishops limited themselves to half-steps and postponed the settlement of the canonical status of the UAOC until the end of the war. Addressing the bishops on the 8<sup>th</sup> of April in 1944, the Metropolitan of Warsaw emphasized the importance of the patriarchal tomos of 1924 for the constitution of the UAOC: lands. The tomos, separating the Ukrainian Church from the constant claims of the church center in Moscow and connecting it – through me – with the whole Orthodox Ecumenical Church until the convening of the All-Ukrainian Local Council and the final canonical autocephaly of this Church, is the basic canonical act that already allows this Church to enjoy certain exclusive rights, and automatically de facto introduces the Ukrainian Church into the large family of autocephalous Orthodox Churches” (AWMP, sygn. 1151-RII-6D).

**The Conclusions.** In conclusion, we can say that the complexity of the Orthodox hierarchy position in exile was exacerbated by several objective circumstances. First of all, the external factors were unfavorable, which related to the German government. The UAOC episcopate in exile did not allow anybody to organize the Orthodox Ukrainians’ church life, concentrated the clergy in one place artificially and forced inaction for more than a year and a half. The most active participant in the First Council of Bishops of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in exile was Bishop Mstyslav, who constantly initiated consideration of topical issues of the Church’s development. According to documents, the German officials supported it in the struggle for leadership in the UAOC. Second of all, the Orthodox bishops’ low level of education, who were often secular or inexperienced priests, was noticeable. Furthermore, there were diverse reasons, for example, constant internal disputes, different visions of the Church development ways outside Ukraine, interpersonal conflicts that provoked future divisions in the Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the diaspora. Third of all, the Warsaw Council of Bishops of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in 1944 limited itself to the half-hearted decisions on its canonical status and postponed its settlement until the end of the war. The subsequent emigration councils of the UAOC in the second half of the 1940-ies needed to be studied in more detail.

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**THE VISTULA-ODER OFFENSIVE OPERATION (January 12 – February 7, 1945):  
ARMORED AND MECHANIZED TROOPS – THE MAIN POWER  
OF SUCCESS DEVELOPMENT**

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the research is to investigate the armored and mechanized troops' combat employment during the Vistula-Oder offensive operation and their contribution to operational art development in the theory and practice of dispersal and large enemy groups destruction. The research methodology is to use a set of methods: dialectical, analytical, historical, biographical, comparative. The methodological approach made it possible to analyze retrospectively the large mobile formations (unit) improvement employing methods while engaging into battle of mobile groups of armies and fronts and during dispersal and large enemy groups destruction, which took place as a single process. As well as the mobile groups' employment during the battle for the tactical zone of the enemy's defense. The scientific novelty of the results is a comprehensive analysis of the process of preparation and conduct of the offensive operation of the two fronts with the use of four tank armies, due to the lack in domestic historiography of special historical generalizations on certain topics within these chronological limits. An objective assessment of the importance of the Vistula-Oder offensive operation for the development of the military art in operations for their massive use of rapid and maneuverable nature, which led to the*



dispersal of the enemy group into parts and their rapid defeat. **The Conclusions.** The Red Army offensive from the Vistula to the Oder was a model of the largest strategic offensive. It developed almost without pauses with an average daily rate of 25 – 30 km per day, and tank armies – up to 70 km. The armored and mechanized troops made a significant contribution to the success of the operation. The tank armies, individual tank and mechanized corps were the main force for the development of success and were a powerful vanguard of the 1<sup>st</sup> UF and 1<sup>st</sup> BF, which operated at a significant distance from the combined arms forces. The armored and mechanized troops' combat employment's peculiarity was the use of two tank armies in one operational direction, which increased the strength of the strike groups of the fronts.

**Key words:** the Vistula-Oder offensive operation, front, tank army, corps.

### **ВІСЛО-ОДЕРСЬКА НАСТУПАЛЬНА ОПЕРАЦІЯ (12 січня – 7 лютого 1945 р.): БРОНЕТАНКОВІ ТА МЕХАНІЗОВАНІ ВІЙСЬКА – ОСНОВНА СИЛА РОЗВИТКУ УСПІХУ**

**Анотація. Мета дослідження** – дослідити бойове застосування бронетанкових і механізованих військ під час Вісло-Одерської наступальної операції та їх внесок у розвиток оперативного мистецтва з теорії і практики розчленування і знищення крупних угруповань противника. **Методологія дослідження** полягає у використанні сукупності методів: діалектичного, аналітичного, історичного, біографічного, порівняльного. Означений методологічний підхід дав змогу ретроспективно проаналізувати удосконалення способів застосування великих рухомих з'єднань (об'єднань) під час введення у бій рухомих груп армій і фронтів та в ході розчленування і знищення великих угруповань противника, яке відбувалося як єдиний процес. А також використання рухомих груп під час бою за тактичну зону оборони противника. **Наукова новизна** одержаних результатів полягає у комплексному аналізі процесу з підготовки і проведення наступальної операції двох фронтів із застосуванням чотирьох танкових армій, що зумовлено відсутністю у вітчизняній історіографії спеціальних історичних узагальнювальних праць з визначеної тематики у вказаних хронологічних межах. Дано об'єктивну оцінку значення Вісло-Одерської наступальної операції для розвитку воєнного мистецтва в операціях щодо їх масованого застосування зі стрімкого і маневреного характеру, що призвело до розчленування угруповання противника на частини і швидкого їх розгрому. **Висновки.** Наступ військ Червоної армії від Вісли до Одери став зразком найбільшої стратегічної наступальної операції. Вона розвивалася практично без пауз з середньодобовим темпом 25–30 км на добу, а танковими арміями – до 70 км. Значний вклад у досягнення успіху в операції внесли бронетанкові і механізовані війська. Танкові армії, окремі танкові і механізовані корпуси були основною силою розвитку успіху і виступали потужним авангардом 1 УФ і 1 БФ, які діяли на значному відриві від загальновійськових армій. Особливістю бойового застосування бронетанкових і механізованих військ є залучення двох танкових армій на одному оперативному напрямку, чим примножили силу ударних угруповань фронтів.

**Ключові слова:** Вісло-Одерська наступальна операція, фронт, танкова армія, корпус.

**The Problem Statement.** During the Belarusian and Lviv-Sandomierz offensive operations in the summer of 1944, the Red Army (CHA) troops defeated large strategic Wehrmacht groups on the central section of the German-Soviet front and reached the border of East Prussia to the Narva River (right tributary of the Vistula).

The troops of the 1<sup>st</sup> Belarusian Front (1 BF) (Commander, G. K. Zhukov, the Soviet Union Marshal, was appointed on the 16<sup>th</sup> of November in 1944), operating in Warsaw direction, captured two bridgeheads on the left bank of the Vistula: near Magnuszew and south-west of Puławy. And the troops of the 1<sup>st</sup> Ukrainian Front (1 UF) (Commander, I. S. Konyev, the Soviet Union Marshal), advancing on Lviv-Sandomierz direction, captured a large bridgehead near Sandomierz.

Hence, the Red Army troops withdrawal on the Vistula and the capture of bridgeheads on the left bank of the river created favorable conditions for the offensive in Poznan and Breslau areas (Platonov, 1958, pp. 96–97).

It should be mentioned that Hitler's command paid special attention to the most dangerous for Germany Warsaw-Berlin direction. In order to cover it between the Vistula and the Oder to a depth of 600 km, seven defensive lines were prepared for a long and persistent struggle.

The Red Army troops were replenished with the personnel, military equipment and armaments (PMA) and prepared thoroughly to capture copies of the defensive lines of the German troops built on the ground (Ustinov, 2012 p. 503).

In January at the beginning of 1945, the strategic groups creation was completed. The most powerful was in the direction of the main blow, in particular, in the band, which consisted of the 1<sup>st</sup> BF, 2<sup>nd</sup> BF and 1<sup>st</sup> UF. In the area of 550 km, which accounted for about 25% of the total German-Soviet front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command rate concentrated 45% of personnel (p), 70% of tanks and self-propelled artillery (icomotive artillery), 43% guns, mortars and warplanes that were part of the active army. The group of mobile troops was especially strong. It consisted of five tank armies out of six, ten separate tank armies (ta) and mechanized corps (mc) out of nineteen. This significantly determined the high maneuverability of troops and the dynamism of offensive operations (Russian archive, 1999, p. 20).

**The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications.** Not only historians but also ordinary citizens will always be interested in the German-Soviet War topic, it is still relevant and remains the subject of scientific research by the scientists from different countries. The historiography of the problem of studying the martial arts of the warring parties occupies an important place, as it is quite broad and multifaceted. One of the most numerous is the Soviet historiography and dozens of scientists and researchers covered the issue (Gareev, 1990; Zhilin, 1986; Krivosheev, 1993; Losik, 1979; Lototskii, 1970; Portugalsky, & Runov, 2010; Portugalsky, 2010; Pospelov, 1962; Rotmistrov, 1963; Stokov, 1966; Ustinov, 2012; Shekhovtsov, 1979). The work "The Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War" in four volumes, conducted by the USSR Ministry of Defense General Staff of the Military Science Department of the Military History Department staff, which was previously classified as secret, deserves serious attention. Volume 4 (Platonov, 1958), deals with the preparation and conduct of the Vistula-Oder offensive operation of the 1<sup>st</sup> BF and 1<sup>st</sup> UF troops and its impact on the martial arts development. In addition, it is vital to note the massive use of armored and mechanized troops, which gave the offensive a rapid and maneuverable nature. Contributing to the rapid breakthrough of the pre-prepared defense, showed the high art of organizing relentless pursuit to great depths with the forcing of a number of rivers and the capture of large bridgeheads of operational importance.

However, Liddel Hart B., the English military historian, had also quite interesting and opposite opinion concerning the issue (Liddel Hart, 1999). Infantry General of the Army of the Third Reich K. Tippelskirch (Tippelskirch, 1999) in his book, which was written on the basis of personal experience and materials provided by former Wehrmacht generals and officers, gave an important place to the German war with the Soviet Union. Describing the main operations on the Eastern Front, he pointed to the main causes of failures in the war and regarded A. Hitler as the culprit.

A number of works are devoted to the tank troops (Katukov, 1974 *Sovetskie tankovyie voyska 1941 – 1945*, 1973; Rotmistrov, 1972; Radzievskii, 1977), as a kind of troops, which during World War II became extremely powerful, which was entrusted with the major operational tasks. V. Daynes works (Daynes, 2009; Daynes, 2010) were devoted to the armored troops of the Black Sea Fleet, which revealed their history and development, gave an in-depth analysis of their organization, training and combat use of the tank armies during the

German-Soviet War in major operations. Detailed research carried by D. Shein (Shein, 2007; Shein, 2009) was devoted to the battle route of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Guards Tank Army, one of the first tank armies in the USSR, which passed from Kozelsk to Berlin and Prague. Consequently, the combat operations' analysis in which the army took part, gave us the opportunity to trace the stages of the tank troops management formation.

Furthermore, the prominent Soviet military figures' memories of personal origin sources and especially the direct participants holds an important place in the historiography of the problem, as their data allow to reveal the Red Army activities at the operational and strategic levels (Zhukov, 1983; Katukov, 1974; Krainyukov, 1977; Yakubovsky, 1975). The side view of the enemy was described in the German generals and officers memoirs of (Guderian, 2001; Mellentin, 2005; Hans, 2008).

Additionally, the modern historiography analysis devoted to the period of hostilities during the Vistula-Oder operation can be found in the operational planning documents worked out by the Red Army command in the autumn of 1944 reflected in the 1st BF combat logs (CAMD RF, f. 223, op. 2356, ref. 685) and 1<sup>st</sup> UF (CAMD RF, f. 236, op. 2673, ref. 2521 (2539); 1<sup>st</sup> Guards Tank Army (CAMD RF, f. 299, op. 3070, ref. 813); 2<sup>nd</sup> Guards Tank Army (CAMD RF, f. 307, op. 4148, ref. 369); 3<sup>rd</sup> Guards Tank Army (CAMD RF, f. 315, op. 4440, ref. 647). Volume 16 (5–4) of the Russian Archive (1999) contains documents and materials that reveal the methodology of decision-making, planning, comprehensive preparation and conduct of strategic and major frontline operations in 1944 – 1945.

In domestic historiography, the research was mainly devoted to the events that took place in Ukraine (Hrytsiuk, 2010; Hrytsiuk, 2015; Kidon, 2018; Panchenko, 2005), and events outside it and a particular type or kind of troops were virtually absent.

**The purpose of the publication** is to investigate the combat use of armored and mechanized troops during the Vistula-Oder offensive operation and their contribution to the operational art development in the theory and practice of dismemberment and large enemy groups destruction.

**The Main Material Statement.** The Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation of the 1<sup>st</sup> BF and 1st UF troops was carried out with the the 2<sup>nd</sup> BF left wing troops support and the 4<sup>th</sup> UF right wing. The purpose of the operation was to defeat Army Group "A", complete the expulsion of the enemy from Poland and create favorable conditions for a decisive strike on the capital of the Nazi Germany, Berlin.

The plan of the operation involved the task of the main forces of the 1<sup>st</sup> BF and 1<sup>st</sup> UF powerful deep strikes from the Vistula bridgeheads, the enemy group's dismemberment, its destruction by units and the rapid offensive development in Poznan and Breslav directions (Rotmistrov, 1963, pp. 443–444).

During the period from the 25<sup>th</sup> of November to the 3<sup>rd</sup> of December, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command rate gave directives to the fronts to prepare operations in the East Prussian and Warsaw-Berlin areas with a period of readiness for the offensive – on the 20<sup>th</sup> of January in 1945 (Russian archive, 1999, pp. 174–175, 177–178), and on the 29<sup>th</sup> of December approved operations' plans for troops of 1<sup>st</sup> UF and 1<sup>st</sup> BF (Russian archive, 1999, pp. 185, 187).

On the 6<sup>th</sup> of January, in connection with the great failure of the Anglo-American troops in the Ardennes, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom W. Churchill addressed J. V. Stalin with a request to provide them with urgent assistance by the Red Army on the offensive "on the Vistula front or somewhere else". The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command

rate postponed the start of the Vistula-Oder operation to the 12<sup>th</sup> of January (Portugalsky, & Runov, 2010, pp. 5–10).

In order to achieve the goal according to the plan of operation on two fronts, one of the largest offensive groups during the war was created consisting of: all-military armies – 16, air armies (AA) – 2, cavalry corps (CC) – 3, artillery divisions breakthrough (ad) – 12, anti-aircraft artillery divisions (zenads) – 18, artillery brigades (artillery) – 99, guards heavy mortar brigades (g. hmbr) – 6, fortified areas (FA) – 3, etc.

In addition, the groupings of tank troops 1<sup>st</sup> BF and 1<sup>st</sup> UF numbered: tank armies (TA) – 4, individual tanks – 5, individual mechanized corps (MC) – 1, individual tank brigades (TBR) – 7, individual tank regiments (TP) and self-propelled artillery regiments (SAP) – 67.

These formations and associations numbered more than 2,200,000 men, 36,400 guns and mortars, 6,464 tanks and self-propelled artillery regiments (SAP), and 4,772 aircraft (Platonov, 1958, p. 98). It should be noted that the supply of land lease played an important role in ensuring the Red Army. In 1944 the Soviet Union received 5,877 aircraft, 3,332 tanks, and 3,122 guns (CAMD RF, f. 35, op. 11325, ref. 530, p. 63).

It was the largest group of tank troops in the entire German-Soviet War to conduct a single offensive operation. Up to 70% of tanks and self-propelled artillery regiments (SAP) were in tank armies and corps, which were intended for the development of the offensive after the breakthrough of the enemy's defenses, the rest were used for direct support of infantry (DSI) (Sovetskie tankovyie voyska, 1973, p. 241).

English military historian Liddell Garth B. emphasized that due to the increased production of its own tanks, the Red Army increased the number of tank and mechanized corps to develop success. At the same time, the growing number of Joseph Stalin tanks increased the striking power of the Soviet troops. These tanks were fitted with 122-mm guns (the "tiger" tanks had 88-mm guns), and they had thicker armor than the "tigers" (Liddell Hart, 1999, p. 697).

Against the troops of the 1<sup>st</sup> BF and 1<sup>st</sup> UF acted Army Group "A" (from the 26<sup>th</sup> of January – "Center", Commander – Colonel-General J. Harpe, consisting of: the 9<sup>th</sup> Army (A), the 4<sup>th</sup> Tank Army (TA) and the main forces 17 Army). In lane the 1<sup>st</sup> BF defended the 9<sup>th</sup> Army, the 1<sup>st</sup> UF – the 4<sup>th</sup> Tank Army (TA) and 17 Army. The three armies of the Wehrmacht included the following: divisions – 28 (including tank – 4 and motorized – 2), brigades – 2, infantry battalions (ib ) – 4–5. The troops of Army Group "A" numbered up to 400 thousand people (including the rear), more than 4,103 guns and mortars, 1,136 tanks and assault guns, supported from the air 1,050 aircraft of the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet (AF). In the zone of the future offensive, the ratio of forces and means was in favor of the troops of the Red Army: personnel – 5,5: 1, guns and mortars (without anti-aircraft) – 8,6: 1, tanks and self-propelled artillery regiments (SAP) – 6: 1, aircraft – 4,5: 1 (Platonov, 1958, p. 98).

The Vistula-Oder offensive operation can be divided into two stages. The first (January 12–17) was a breakthrough of the enemy's strategic defense front in a zone of about 500 km, the main forces of Army Group "A" were defeated, and conditions were created for the rapid development of the operation to great depths. The second (January 18 – February 3) the troops 1<sup>st</sup> BF and the 1<sup>st</sup> UF with assistance on the flanks of troops the 2<sup>nd</sup> BF and the 4<sup>th</sup> UF during the rapid pursuit of the enemy defeated the enemy's reserves, advancing from the depths, captured the Silesian industrial area and went on a wide front to the Oder, capturing a number of bridgeheads on its west bank. As part of the Vistula-Oder operation, the 1<sup>st</sup> BF conducted Warsaw-Poznan operation, and the 1<sup>st</sup> UF conducted the Sandomierz-Silesia frontline operation (Daynes, 2010, p. 236).

*Sandomierz-Silesian offensive operation (12.01 – 3.02.1945)* was carried out by the 1<sup>st</sup> UF in cooperation with the 1<sup>st</sup> BF in order to defeat Kielce-Radom group of the enemy, liberate the southern part of Poland, reach the Oder, capture bridgeheads on its left bank and create favorable conditions for conducting operations in Berlin and Dresden areas (Daynes, 2009, p. 535).

Tasks for the 1st UF troops were defined in the directive № 220271 Headquarters of the Supreme High Command rates on the 25<sup>th</sup> of November in 1944. Defeat in cooperation with the 1st BF Kielce-Radom group of the enemy, no later than 10-11th day of the offensive to seize the border Piotrkow, Radomsko, Czestochowa, Zawiercie, Mechow, Bochnia. Further develop an offensive in the general direction of Kalit. The main blow by forces of five all-military armies, two tank army (TA), four mechanized corps to strike from the Sandomierz bridgehead in the general direction on Khmilnyk, Malogoshch, Radomsko.

According to some resources, the tank armies were used in order to develop success after a breakthrough in the main direction (Russian archive, 1999, pp. 174–175).

Such an attack posed an imminent threat to the enemy's rear, which opposed the 1<sup>st</sup> BF, and this greatly facilitated the advance of troops to Poznan, as well as keeping all Silesian industrial facilities intact. J. Stalin personally emphasized the preservation of their commander to the 1st UF (Portugalsky, 2010, p. 69).

The task of the troops of the front was proved by the commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> UF by directive № 001472 (490) / op on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of December in 1944 the 4<sup>th</sup> Tank Army (Commander – Colonel-General D. D. Lelyushenko) to make a breakthrough in the area of 13 A. According to the issued directive, the troops were supposed develop the offensive rapidly in the direction of Pierzhchnica, Piekoszow, Rodoszyce, Rozprza, destroy the retreating enemy and the advancing reserves, take the path of retreat of the enemy's Kielce-Radom group. In the area of Lodz to enter into the combat interaction with the troops of the 1<sup>st</sup> BF.

Furthermore, the troops were supposed to capture the border of the river Charna Nida at the end of the second day of the operation, go to the area of Bobzha, platform. Rykoshin, Nepahluv and contribute to the blow from the northwest of parts 13 A and 3 guards tank army in order to invade Kielce.

At the end of the third day of the operation, the troops were supposed to go to the area of Rodoszyce, Chermno, Mnin, advanced detachments to seize the crossings across the Pyltysia River in the area of Sulejów, Przedbuż, then to reach the area of Piotrkow, Rozpsz, Gożkowice, and by side and reconnaissance detachments to capture road junctions: Konske, Zharnuv. During the offensive to maintain combat interaction with the right flank units of the 3rd Guards Tank Army.

The troops the 3rd Guards Tank Army (Commander – Colonel-General t/v PS Rybalko) was supposed to introduce a breakthrough in the area of 52 A, in particular, to develop rapidly the offensive in the direction of Duzha, Andrzejów, Wloszczow, Radomsko. One corps was supposed to lead in the second echelon of the army on the ledge on the left. The task of the army was to destroy the retreating enemy, to destroy its respective reserves, to prevent the enemy from occupying the prepared defensive lines on the rivers Nida and Pyltysia. The next day they were to go to the area Zarchisce-Duje, Oksa, Naglovice, Andrzejów.

On the third day of the operation, they were obliged to seize Kruzhel, Secemin, and Modzheve districts, and the advanced detachments were due to capture the crossings on the Pyltysia River in Mosty and Kontsepol sections. In the future, the troops were given the order to capture the area of Radomsko, Plavno, Cadów. From the border of the Pyltysia



River, send a strong side detachment to Czestochowa, as well as to conduct reconnaissance to Wodzisław, Szczekociny, and Lelów, establishing combat interaction with 31 TA 5<sup>th</sup> Guards Tank Army (CAMD RF, f. 236, op. 2673, ref. 2521, pp. 45–52).

On the 12<sup>th</sup> of January, at 5 o'clock, the reconnaissance began. The advanced battalions attacked the enemy after a 15-minute artillery barrage. As a result, they captured the first trench quickly, the second met with fierce resistance from the enemy. At 10 o'clock the artillery preparations for the attack began. At this time, BT tanks occupied the starting positions in the infantry battle formations, advanced detachments of tank armies and corps advanced into the starting areas 3 km from the front line. The aviation training was not conducted due to poor visibility conditions. At this time, the last raid was inflicted, after which the infantry and tanks went on the offensive. Hence, advancing rapidly the troops moved into the depths of the enemy's defenses by 6 – 8 km, but before the third position met resistance (Lototskii, 1970, p. 307). In order to complete the breakthrough of the tactical zone of defense quickly and the defeat of the enemy's operational reserves at 14 o'clock were introduced the 3<sup>rd</sup> Guards Tank Army (6 gv. Tk, 7 gv. Tk, 9 mc, 16 sabr, 57 gv. Otp) and the 4<sup>th</sup> TA (6 gv. Mc, 10 tk, 93 tbr), and also the 4<sup>th</sup> Guards Tank Army (Commander – Lieutenant General t / v P. P. Poluboyarov), 25 TA (Commander – Major General t / v Ye. I. Fominykh) and the 31<sup>st</sup> TC (Commander – Major General t / v G. G. Kuznetsov). As the weather improved, they were supported by the 2<sup>nd</sup> AA aircraft (Daynes, 2009, p. 536).

Before the operation in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Guards Tank Army numbered 921 tanks and self-propelled artillery regiments (SAP) (CAMD RF, f. 315, op. 4440, ref. 647, pp. 10–11; ref. 565, p. 2). In order to strengthen the army of Colonel-General D. D. Lelyushenko was added two heavy regiments “IS-2” and several regiments of self-propelled artillery (SAP). There were 680 units in total in the army (Kostiuchenko, 2004 p. 440).

By the 13<sup>th</sup> of mid-January, the tank and general armies had completed the breakthrough of the main defensive line, and in several areas and the second line, and the advanced detachments of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division went to the river Nida at a depth of 30 km, from the course forced it, capturing several bridgeheads (Rotmistrov, 1963, p. 452).

After forcing Nida the 6<sup>th</sup> Guards Tank Army and the 7<sup>th</sup> Guards Tank Army continued the offensive in the western and northwestern directions in order to perform the immediate task, to capture the crossing and the bridgehead on the west bank of the Pylыtsia River. During the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> of January 9 mechanised corps remained on the west bank of the Nida in the area of Brzegi-Motkowice, providing access to the west bank of the Nida troops 52 A. The army command feared that the enemy forces of its operational reserves (16 TD, 17 TD and 20 MD) will be able to organize a strike along the river Nida in order to cut off the main forces of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Guards Tank Army between the Nida and the Pylыtsia, met the troops of 52 A, advancing to the river Nida at pre-prepared positions on the west bank of the river (Shein, 2007, p. 259).

The advanced detachments of the 4<sup>th</sup> TA, which broke away about 15 – 20 km from the main forces of the army, crossed the Charna Nida River and a counterattack ensued with the advanced units of 24 enemy tanks. Advanced detachments of the first echelon corps – 16 mbr and 63 GTA attacked the enemy in the flank and rear. With decisive action, they disrupted the organized exit of the 24<sup>th</sup> TA connections to the planned deployment line. The enemy was forced to enter the battle of its main forces not simultaneously but sequentially.

The Commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> TA units, in particular, the 10<sup>th</sup> Guards Tank Army, 6 mechanized corps in interaction with the 6<sup>th</sup> Guards Tank Army and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Guards Tank Army carried out the maneuver, inflicted flank blows on the 17<sup>th</sup> tank division (TD) of the enemy,

which was defeated after a fierce battle on the 13<sup>th</sup> of January. With the approach of 16 TD, it was also chained 49 MBR from the front in the area of Radomice. The main forces of the 4<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> of January struck on the right flank of the 16<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. The next day, the remains of 24 TK were surrounded and destroyed in the area south of Kielce. The enemy lost up to 180 tanks and assault guns, and a combination of the 4<sup>th</sup> TA – about 130 tanks and self-propelled artillery regiments (SAP). The defeat of a large group of Wehrmacht in an extremely short time helped the 1<sup>st</sup> UF troops of the left-wing successfully develop an offensive in Krakow direction, and the 1<sup>st</sup> BF troops using the moment of counter battle struck a powerful blow at the enemy from Magnuszew and Puławy bridgeheads (Radzievskii, 1977, pp. 137–138).

German General K. Tippelskirch described what was happening the follows: “The blow was so strong that it repulsed not only the divisions of the first echelon but also large enough mobile reserves ... Front 4 TA was torn to pieces ... enemy tank formations ... made a comprehensive maneuver on Kielce” (Tippelskirch, 1999, p. 686). And the former colonel-general of the Wehrmacht's tank troops G. Guderian (Chief of the General Staff since July 1944) stated that the breakthrough was successful, and the enemy penetrated deep into our defense, and on January 13 successfully expanded the breakthrough west of Baranov in the direction of the Ring North. The 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Guards Panzer Armies of the Cha entered the battle. On this section of the front, the enemy concentrated thirty-two SD and eight tank corps. This was the strongest group of forces and means during the whole war on a minimally narrow section of the front. (Guderian, 2001, pp. 535–536, 552).

According to the combat report № 0014 and the operational report № 0013 on the 13<sup>th</sup> of January, the 1<sup>st</sup> UF captured 900 prisoners in two days of fighting. 40 tanks and self-propelled artillery regiments (SAP) were destroyed, 379 guns, 116 tanks, about 1,000 cars, ammunition depots, etc. were seized (CAMD RF, f. 236, op. 2673, ref. 2521, pp. 101, 114).

According to the decision of the commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> UF to the defeat of a group of Wehrmacht troops in the area of Kielce joined 3<sup>rd</sup> Guards Tank Army and 13A, as well as 25 tank corps and part of the forces of the 4<sup>th</sup> TA. Supported by aircraft during on the 14 and 15 of January, defeated the enemy and at the end on the 15<sup>th</sup> of January captured Kielce (Platonov, 1958, pp. 133–134).

In Czesochowa's direction, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division TA, 52A and the 5<sup>th</sup> Guards Tank Army troops. And pursuing the enemy, they advanced 25 – 30 km and forced the Pilytsia River. The courageous actions of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Panzer Battalion (TV) (Commander – Major S. V. Khokhryakov) of the 54<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division deserve special attention 3<sup>rd</sup> Guards Tank Army, being in the main detachment quickly moved forward, bypassing the enemy's strongholds, skillfully maneuvering on the battlefield, destroying the enemy in its path. Hence, 31 tank corps, operating in the offensive zone of 5 Guards Tank Army forced the river Pilytsia and captured the bridgehead on its left bank, and 59A in interaction with the 4<sup>th</sup> Guard Tanks Army continued the offensive on Krakow (Pospelov, 1963, pp. 71–72).

At the end of the day on the 17<sup>th</sup> of January, the troops of the 1<sup>st</sup> UF defeated the main forces of the 4<sup>th</sup> TA and in cooperation with the 4<sup>th</sup> UF defeated 17A of the enemy, advanced 150 km and completed the next task 4–5 days ahead of schedule (Daynes, 2010, p. 434).

The achieved successes created favorable conditions for the development of the offensive on Wrocław and for the attack on the flank and rear of Krakow Wehrmacht group (Platonov, 1958, p. 135).

As a result of the fighting on the 17<sup>th</sup> of January, the troops of the front occupied 910 settlements, including the cities of Wierzbno, Sulehów, Kamieński, Skała, Wolbrom,

and Pylytsia. During the day, more than 3,000 captured Germans were taken prisoner, including the headquarters and commander of 17 Tank Divisions – Colonel Brooks, as well as 200 guns, up to 50 tanks, etc. (CAMD RF, f. 236, op. 2673, ref. 2521, p. 176).

The Red Army troops' rapid deep breakthrough was a complete surprise to the Wehrmacht leadership. General I. Harpe, accused of the catastrophe on the Vistula, was removed from command of Army Group A and replaced by General F. Scherner; General T. Busse was appointed commander of 9A instead of the removed General S. Luttwitz (Shekhovtsov, 1979, p. 75).

In order to thwart the enemy's plan, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command rate on the 17<sup>th</sup> of January (directive № 11 006) clarified the plan of further actions 1 UF – to develop an offensive on Wrocław, no later than on the 30<sup>th</sup> of January to reach the Oder and capture the bridgeheads on its left bank, no later than on the 20<sup>th</sup> – 22<sup>th</sup> of January to capture Krakow, then to advance in the direction of the Dombrowski coal basin (Russian archive, 1999, pp. 190–191).

The commander of the front, without delaying the preparation, after receiving the directive gave the order to conduct further hostilities (Krainyukov, 1977, p. 415), (directive № 0024 / op) ordered the troops 3<sup>rd</sup> Guards TA and 4<sup>th</sup> Guards TA pursue the enemy rapidly, smash the reserves, rear, headquarters, so as not to give the enemy the opportunity to occupy and gain a foothold on the prepared defensive lines on the eastern border of Germany. Troops of the 4<sup>th</sup> TA were invited to seize the Ravich and Trachenberg frontiers by the end of the day on the 25<sup>th</sup> of January. In the future, be ready to force the Oder to the northwest of Wrocław (Kireev, 1976, p. 96).

The Wehrmacht command withdrew its remnants 4 TA and 17 A (up to eight divisions, including one tank) to the west, seeking to organize the defense of the Silesian industrial area (Platonov, 1958, p. 153).

In addition, while carrying out the task, the troops of the right-wing of the 1<sup>st</sup> UF developed a rapid offensive in the direction of Wrocław. On the left-wing of the army 59 A, 60 A and 4<sup>th</sup> guards Tank Army on the 19<sup>th</sup> of January captured Krakow. In the area of Keben part of 6 mechanized corps on the 25<sup>th</sup> of January forced the river and captured the bridgehead to 30 km along the front and up to 15 km in depth. The troops 4 TA, pursuing the enemy, on the morning on the 24<sup>th</sup> of January, went to the Oder ((Daynes, 2010, p. 435).

The troops' 3<sup>rd</sup> guards Tank Army on the 18<sup>th</sup> of January, the offensive resumed. On 19<sup>th</sup> of January, 55 guards Tank Army 7 guards Tank Army, 53 guards Tank Army 6 guards Tank Army in cooperation with compounds 52 A occupied Wielun. 91 guards Tank Army 9 mechanized corps interaction with 69 mbr up to 12 hours. On the 19<sup>th</sup> of January, Osyakuv took over. After the 91<sup>st</sup> guards Tank Army captured the bridgehead on the left bank of the Warta River and held the crossing (CAMD RF, f. 3442, op. 1, ref. 81, p. 35). And at noon on the 20<sup>th</sup> of January took possession of Zlochev (CAMD RF, f. 3442, op. 1, ref. 81, p. 35). And at noon on the 20<sup>th</sup> of January took possession of Zlochev (CAMD RF, f. 315, op. 4440, ref. 647, p. 71).

Furthermore, the German command did everything in its power to keep Silesia, a powerful military industrial base. Fierce battles broke out on the approaches to it. The advance of the 1<sup>st</sup> UF troops slowed down. On the night of the 20<sup>th</sup> – 21<sup>st</sup> January, the commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division TA received information about strong enemy resistance on the former German-Polish border.

The commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> UF on the 21<sup>st</sup> January returned to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Guards Tank Army. And to the south and set a task: to strike along the eastern bank of the Oder, to capture Oppeln and cut off the enemy's escape routes to the river. The troops of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Guards Tank

Army executing the order inflicted a flank blow on the enemy group, which acted before the 5<sup>th</sup> Guards Tank Army. And the rapid exit to the Oppeln area cut off the communications of the Silesian enemy group. The Red Army troops hovered over the entire enemy group in Silesia, which forced the Wehrmacht command to hastily withdraw troops in front of the 5<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Platonov, 1958, p. 154). During the day, the troops of the front advanced up to 30 km, in the depths of Germany – 23 km (CAMD RF, f. 236, op. 2673, ref. 2521, p. 9, 10 (t. 2)). And on the 23<sup>rd</sup> January, they captured the city of Oppeln. By their actions, the tankers contributed to the rapid exit to the Oder in the 5<sup>th</sup> Guards Tank Army. And, which after the crossing consolidated the achieved success.

As a result, rapid maneuver of the 3<sup>rd</sup> guards Tank Army and to the south and the blow to the enemy's rear was unexpected for the German command, and this forced to send against the tank army significant forces from Silesian group.

After the liberation of Oppeln 3<sup>rd</sup> guards Tank Army received a new task with a swift blow in the direction of Bischofstal, Nicholas to go to the rear of the main Silesian group and by the end on 24<sup>th</sup> of January to capture the area of Rybnik, Nicholas, and then attack Yavozhno, to meet troops 59 A, and part of the forces the east bank of the Oder in the direction of Rybnik and prevent the approach of enemy reserves from the west and southwest (Rotmistrov, 1963, p. 463).

Moreover, the 7th Guards Tank Army overcoming the fierce resistance of the enemy on the north bank of the river Klodnitsa, occupying Bischofstal, crossed the river and about 2 hours. On the 25<sup>th</sup> of January, he continued his movement in the direction of Rybnik, and at 9 p.m. Gleiwitz took possession on the 24<sup>th</sup> of January. The 7th Infantry Division was able to reach Rybnik only on the morning of the 27<sup>th</sup> of January, and the 9th Infantry Division met fierce resistance from the enemy, was forced to stop. The current situation forced the commander of the 3rd Infantry Division to enter into battle the second echelon (6th Infantry Division), which was tasked with reaching the western outskirts of Katowice.

Despite the resistance of the enemy, on the 27<sup>th</sup> of January, they managed to occupy the area of Mykolayi, Vyry, with a 9 mechanized corps connection. Due to the vigorous actions of the mobile troops, the roads through which part of Silesian group left the encirclement were blocked. In order not to damage the industrial area, the commander of the 1st UF decided to leave the passage for the enemy so that he could go to the south and southwest, where it was planned to defeat him in open combat. For three days the troops of 3<sup>rd</sup> guards Tank Army destroyed certain groups of the enemy in the areas of Rybnik and Nikolay. Hence, on the 30<sup>th</sup> of January by order of the commander of 3<sup>rd</sup> guards Tank Army began the withdrawal of the 6<sup>th</sup> guards Tank Army and the 7<sup>th</sup> guards Tank Army from the battle in the Gross Strelitz area began to put the mat unit in order ((Daynes, 2010, pp. 437–439).

On the morning of the 25<sup>th</sup> of January, the advanced units of the 4th TA crossed the Oder and, after a fierce battle, captured the northern outskirts of Keben. Later, artillery and part of the 6th Infantry Division tanks were transferred to the bridgehead. At the end of the 28<sup>th</sup> of January, the main forces of the corps, in cooperation with the 13 A formations, overcame the enemy and reached the frontier of Bredelwitz, Queisen, Deisklau, and Hochbauschwitz. Hence, on the 29<sup>th</sup> of January at the site 6 mechanised corps crossed the 10<sup>th</sup> guards Tank Army went on the offensive, during the fierce fighting together with the 147th Rifle Division (RD) 13 A occupied Steinau (Daynes, 2010, p. 505).

The offensive of the 1st UF forces forced the enemy to retreat hastily through the abandoned passage. On the 29<sup>th</sup> of January, Silesian industrial area was completely cleared of German troops (Lototskii, 1970, p. 314).

Thus, the 1st UF troops defeated 4 TA and the main forces of the 17A Wehrmacht, in cooperation with the 1<sup>st</sup> BF and the 4<sup>th</sup> UF liberated the southern regions of Poland, including Silesian industrial area and moved the fighting to the territory of Germany.

The Sandomierz-Silesian operation is an example of a deep front operation. The troops of the 1st UF advanced 400–500 km. Success was achieved through the massive use of forces and means, which contributed to a powerful blow during the breakthrough and the development of the offensive to great depths with the forcing of a number of rivers.

The tasks for the troops of the 1st BF to conduct the Warsaw-Poznan operation were defined in the directive № 220275 VGK rates on the 28th of November in 1944. The immediate task of the front: to defeat the Warsaw-Radom group of the enemy and no later than 11–12th day of the offensive to capture the border Łódź. Further, develop the offensive in the general direction of Poznan. The main blow by the forces of four general armies, two TA, one KK to strike from the bridgehead on the river Pyltsia in the general direction on Białobrzegi, Skierniewice, Kutno. Part of the forces (at least one army and one or two TC) to advance in a northwesterly direction in order to break through the enemy's defenses in front of the right-wing of the front and with the assistance of 2 BF defeat the Warsaw group of the enemy and capture Warsaw.

The second blow was planned to be struck by the forces of two armies, two tank corps and one KK from the bridgehead southwest of Pulawy in the direction of Radom, Tomaszów, and Łódź. Part of the forces to attack in the direction of Shidlovets, towards the blow of the 1<sup>st</sup> UF in order to interact with the latter to defeat the Kielce-Radom group of the enemy (Russian archive, 1999, pp. 177–178).

Taking into account the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Commander of the 1st BF decided to strike the main blow from the Magnushev bridgehead with forces of 61 A, 5<sup>th</sup> Shock Army (ShA), 8 Guard Army, 3 Shock Army (ShA), the 1<sup>st</sup> Guard Tank Army (Commander – Colonel-General t / v M. Ye. Katukov), the 2<sup>nd</sup> Guards Tank Army (Commander – Colonel-General S. I. Bogdanov) and KK in the direction of Kutno.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Guard Tank Army received the task of the operation on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January: “A rapid exit to the northern bank of the Pyltsia River, and later to the river Bzura in the area of Lowicz to ensure the 1<sup>st</sup> BF success from the encirclement and destruction of the Warsaw group of the enemy: to destroy enemy reserves their connection with the besieged Warsaw group. With the withdrawal of the army in the area of Kutno to take a starting position for the development of the offensive on Poznan” (Katukov, 1974, p. 340).

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Guards Tank Army after forcing troops of the 5<sup>th</sup> Shock Army (ShA) river Pyltsya, was tasked to cross the river and enter the breakthrough in the area: Gniejewice, Goszczyn, striking the rear of the Warsaw group of the enemy, in the general direction of Mszczonow, Zyrardów, Sokhaczew, Gostytin and capture the following territories: on the first day – Oddzial, Zhirarduv, Volya Penkoshevskaya, and with strong advanced detachments (AD) to capture airfields and crossings across the river Bzura (near Sokhachev), on the second day – Kirshteinov, Rybno, Zakshev, Dembuvska; on the third day – Sanniki, Guri, Gostynin, Strzelce, Luszyn. In the future – to attack Koval, Brzeszc-Kujawski, Radzejow, Inowroclaw (CAMD RF, f. 307, op. 4148, ref. 369, pp. 2–3).

On the 14<sup>th</sup> of January, troops of the 1st BF went on the offensive. From the Magnushevsky and Pulavsky bridgeheads, after 25 minutes of artillery training of all artillery of shock groups, 22 advanced battalions and 25 infantry companies went on the offensive. The combat reconnaissance with such powerful artillery support was used for the first time. Advanced



battalions for two hours of combat wedged into the enemy's defense for 2 – 3 km. Using the achieved success, the 1<sup>st</sup> BF Commander introduced the main forces into battle (Rotmistrov, 1963, p. 455).

On the first day of the offensive, troops advancing from the Magnushev bridgehead wedged themselves into the enemy's defense up to 12 km. In parts of 26 Guards Rifle Corps (RC) 5 Guards Shock Army captured a 60-ton bridge across the Pylыtsia River, which was later crossed by tanks of the 2nd Guards Tank Army (9 Guards Tank Army, 12 Guards Tank Army, 1 mechanized corps, 6 Guards Tank Army). There were 840 tanks and self-propelled artillery regiments (SAP) in the army (CAMD RF, f. 307, op. 4148, ref. 369, p. 2).

To develop the achieved success, 11 tank corps (Commander – Major General T / V I. I. Yushchuk) and 9 tank corps (Commander – Lieutenant General T / V I. F. Kyrychenko) were put into battle. Overcoming the enemy's resistance, the 69 A and 33 A troops, in cooperation with the tank corps, broke through the tactical defense zone at the end of the day and advanced 22 km. BP tank groups played an important role in breaking through the enemy's defenses. For example: only in one 69 A per 1 km of the front the number of tanks and self-propelled artillery regiments (SAP) was 312 SD 42 units, 134 SD 23, 274 SD 36, 77 sd – 15 (Losik, 1979, p. 105).

On the morning of the 15<sup>th</sup> of January, the German command, seeking to stop the troops of the Red Army, brought into battle from its reserve the main forces of 40 tank corps, which were defeated and repulsed (Lototskii, 1970, p. 309). On the 15<sup>th</sup> of January, at a depth of 15 km, it was put into action in the 8th lane and the 1<sup>st</sup> Guards Tank Army (8 mechanized corps, 11 Guards tank army, 64 Guards Tbr, 19 sabr, 11 Guards Vtp) (Gareev, 1990, p. 16) and was tasked to develop an offensive on Łódz, and later on Poznan (Zhukov, 1983, p. 179).

By the end of the day, the advanced units of the army had advanced to a depth of 25 km and captured the crossing over the Pylыtsia River in Sokul area. Hence, the 8<sup>th</sup> Guards Tank Army used the success of the tankers and by the end of the day fought on the front Bialobrzegi, Mokrosek, (excl.) Edlinsk, (excl.) Stanislawice.

11 tank corps 69 A in interaction with 25 armed corps by the end of the day broke into the eastern outskirts of Radom, advanced units of 9 tank corps, which was introduced in the strip 33 A, also approached the town of Radom.

During the two days of the offensive, the 1st BF strike groups broke through the enemy's tactical defense zone to its full depth and defeated the troops of the 8th Army Corps (AC), 56 Tank Corps and 40 Tank Corps. The breakthrough reached up to 30 km in the area of the Magnuszew bridgehead and 50 km in the Pulawy bridgehead. By the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> of January, the breakthrough areas on the bridgeheads merged.

According to the 1st BF Commander's decision, the main efforts of the front troops were focused on completing the defeat of the main forces of the 9 A enemy and the development of the offensive in Łódz direction (Platonov, 1958, pp. 140–141).

The troops of the 1st Guards Tank Army developing the offensive in the western direction, they repulsed the enemy and went to the Pylыtsia River for up to 20 hours. On the 16<sup>th</sup> of January, the main forces crossed the river and captured the Nowe Miasto (CAMD RF, f. 299, op. 3070, ref. 813, p. 33).

On the 16<sup>th</sup> of January from the bridgehead on the river Pylыtsya was put into battle 2<sup>nd</sup> Guards Tank Army (Strokov, 1966, pp. 476–477). At the end of the day, the main forces of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Guards Tank Army went to Sokhachev in the rear of Warsaw group of the enemy and cut off his escape to the west. The tank armies were supported from the air by pilots of 16 AFs.

The tank armies successful actions contributed to the liberation on the 17<sup>th</sup> of January by the troops of the 1st Army of the Polish Army, 61 A and 47 A, the capital of Poland – Warsaw. All-military armies after overcoming the tactical zone of defense and the introduction into battle of the 1<sup>st</sup> Guards Tank Army and the 2nd Guards Tank Army sought to expand the breakthrough front and quickly eliminate the enemy's hotbeds of resistance. And in order to prevent separation from the tank armies, they were followed by mobile units from the tank units that supported the infantry previously (Daynes, 2010, p. 243).

On the sixth day of the offensive of the 1st BF troops and on the fourth 1 UF, an operational breakthrough of the enemy's defense was made at the front 500 km and to a depth of 100–160 km. The troops of the fronts defeated the main forces of Army Group A, seized large industrial centers and important strongholds of the enemy's areas: Warsaw, Radom, Kielce, Radomsko, Czestochowa, and so on. Thus, favorable conditions were created for the rapid development of the operation at great depth and at a high rate (Platonov, 1958, pp. 143–144). Given the rapid development of the operation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command rate clarified the tasks of the fronts on the 17<sup>th</sup> of January. As a result, the 1<sup>st</sup> BF received the task to seize the border Bydgoszcz-Poznan not later than on the 2<sup>nd</sup>–4<sup>th</sup> February (Zhukov, 1983, p. 184).

At the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> of January, the 1st BF Commander, assessing the situation, ordered the tank armies and individual tank corps and armed corps to enter the line of Tork, Kolo, Warta as soon as possible, to anticipate the reserves in capturing the prepared lines of defense. The tank armies and tank corps were due to reach the specified border no later than in three days. Hence, the 1<sup>st</sup> Guard Tank Army left a slight cover from the side of Łódź and moved the main forces to the west rapidly. The shore of the Warta River. The 9 tank corps and 11 tank corps to bypass Łódź from the south, also to advance on the river Warta, and to capture Kochatkysh with advanced parts. The cavalry corps to follow the tank troops (CAMD RF, f. 299, op. 3070, ref. 813, p. 37).

The troops of the 1<sup>st</sup> Guards Tank Army continuing the offensive in the west and north-west. pursuing scattered the enemy's groups, on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of January they fought for the city and the fortress of Poznan. The next day, the main forces went to the frontier: Klein, Glenin, Ovinskaya, Tsavada, Ratay (east bank of the Warta River), destroyed the enemy, prepared a crossing over the Warta River for the tankers. The units that crossed the river decided to cut the roads in order to prevent the enemy's departure from the Poznan area to the north, south and south-west (CAMD RF, f. 299, op. 3070, ref. 813, p. 52).

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Guards Tank Army continued the offensive, broke the enemy's resistance on the west bank of the river Bzura, on the 18<sup>th</sup> of January crossed the river developed a rapid offensive in the north-west direction and up to 17 hours after fighting more than 30 km, they captured a large settlement and a railway and highway junction of roads – Lovych, large n.p. Kernozya, Lyushin, Lazniki, Osmolin, Sanniki (CAMD RF, f. 307, op. 4148, ref. 369, pp. 16, 18).

The pace of persecution increased. After overcoming the third (guard) defensive line in the east, the tank armies reached the fourth (Poznan) by the 22<sup>nd</sup> of January. The next day 2<sup>nd</sup> Guards Tank Army with the 2<sup>nd</sup> guards KK mastered the city of Bigdosh. The tank armies broke away from the general army up to 100 km, and from their supply bases – up to 350 km (Lototskii, 1970, p. 311).

The 2nd Guards Tank Army in the area of Shubin and the 1<sup>st</sup> Guards Tank Army in Poznan area were forced to stop due to lack of fuel. During this time, they were approached by general armies.

The Wehrmacht troops at all costs sought to stop the Red Army's troops offensive in Berlin direction. From the 23rd of January, 1st Infantry Division and the 2nd Infantry Division

troops were conducting intense battles in order to break through the Poznan defensive line, the Pomeranian shaft and the Mezeret UR for several days (Daynes, 2009, p. 544).

The 1<sup>st</sup> BF troops continued a successful offensive. On the 28<sup>th</sup> of January connection the 2nd Infantry Division on the move overcame the fortifications of the Pomeranian Wall. On the morning of the 31<sup>st</sup> of January, the advanced detachment of 1 mechanized corps (219 TBR) reached the Oder north of Kustrin, near Kinitz.

After heavy fighting on the 29<sup>th</sup> of January, the 1st Infantry Division troops overcame the Odra River, entering the German territory. The advanced detachment of the 11<sup>th</sup> Guards Tank Army (44 GV TBR), went to the Oder and captured the bridgehead on its left bank near Heritz. With the approach to the river of all military armies the 1<sup>st</sup> Guards Tank Army and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Guards Tank Army were withdrawn from battle and regrouped on the right-wing of the front, where they took part in the defeat of the Pomeranian enemy group (Daynes, 2010, p. 343).

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of February, the 1<sup>st</sup> BF troops continued the offensive, on the right flank fought fierce battles with the enemy, who defended zealously, in the center went to the Oder, part of the forces forced the river and fought to expand the bridgehead, breaking the left flank against the enemy areas, the advanced units of mobile troops reached the east bank of the Oder, southeast of Frankfurt (CAMD RF, f. 223, op. 2356, ref. 685, p. 25).

In early February, the fiercest fighting took place on the Oder River. By the 3<sup>rd</sup> of February, the troops of the front (5 UA, 8 Guards Army, 69 A and 33 A, 1st Guards Tank Army and the 2nd Guards Tank Army) reached the Oder River in the strip from Ceden to the Glogau district (demarcation line with the 1<sup>st</sup> UF). The struggle for the expansion of bridgeheads on the Oder was extremely intense. The enemy carried out 5 – 7 counterattacks daily with force from a company of up to two battalions each. And all this was complicated by the temporary advantage of the enemy in the air, due to the lack of airfields near the Oder River for the Red Army aircraft.

With the 1st BF troops withdrawal on the Oder River and the capture of bridgeheads on its left bank, its frontline operation was successfully completed.

These were extremely difficult times for the German command. There was a lack of material and human resources, the divisions were turned into combat groups. “Elderly people and boys aged 14 and 15 are being driven to Volkssturm conscription stations. The last reserves?” The losses of only 21 tons from the 6<sup>th</sup> of June in 1944 to the end of January in 1945 reached 15 thousand (Hans, 2008, pp. 378–379).

The Red Army troops defeated groups of Wehrmacht troops covering Berlin area. To stop the 1st UF and 1st BF offensive, the German command was forced to abandon offensive operations against Anglo-American troops in the West and sent 29 divisions and 4 brigades to Poland, but this did not save the enemy from a crushing defeat (Zhilin, 1986, pp. 264–265). A total of 35 divisions were destroyed during the lightning operation, and 25 suffered heavy losses. The Red Army losses amounted to only 193,125 people, of which 43,251 – irreversible, tanks and self-propelled artillery regiments (SAP) – 1,267, the average daily – 56 (Krivosheev, 1993, pp. 213, 372).

In his memoirs about the events of early 1945, former Wehrmacht general Friedrich von Mellenthin, describing the Red Army’s actions during the offensive in Poland, does not hide his emotions “It is impossible to describe everything that happened between the Vistula and Oder in the first months of 1945. Europe has known nothing like this since the fall of the Roman Empire” (Mellentin, 2005, p. 413).

480 formations and units of the Black Sea Fleet were awarded the honorary titles of Warsaw, Łódz, Krakow and others. The 4 TA for the stability and courage shown by

the personnel, and skillful execution of combat missions was renamed into the Guards (Rotmistrov, 1972, p. 105).

**The Concussions.** The Red Army offensive from the Vistula to the Oder was a model of the largest strategic offensive operation. It developed almost without pauses with an average daily rate of 25 – 30 km per day, and tank armies – up to 70 km.

The Vistula-Oder operation was characterized by a decisive form of combat operations – inflicting powerful frontal strikes on various sections of the front, carried out at considerable depths and at high speeds, and this allowed to quickly break through the enemy's defenses, dismember his strategic group and destroy each. At the same time part of the troops of the fronts through the rapid development of a breakthrough in the flanks reliably provided the main forces of the flanks from the north and south.

Armored and mechanized troops made a significant contribution to the success of the operation. Their widespread use added to the offensive actions rapid and maneuverable. The introduction into battle of several powerful mobile groups at the beginning of the offensive led to the dismemberment of the enemy group into parts and their rapid defeat. The tank armies, individual tank and mechanized corps were the main force for the development of success and were a powerful vanguard of the 1<sup>st</sup> UF and the 1<sup>st</sup> BF, which operated at a significant distance from the all-military armies.

The tank corps were put into battle on the first day of the offensive, used to complete the breakthrough of the mainline of defense, which provided a high rate of overcoming the tactical zone of the enemy's defense. Tank armies of the 1st UF were put into battle on the first day of the operation before the third position of the mainline of defense, and the 1st BF – on the second or third day after the breakthrough of the tactical zone. The peculiarity of the combat use of armored and mechanized troops is the use of two tank armies in one operational direction, which increased the strength of the strike groups of the fronts. Especially the tankers showed themselves in the pursuit of the enemy.

The tank armies of three-corps had a two-tier structure, and two-corps – in one echelon, allocating strong reserves. Their introduction was planned in a strip of 12-16 km by four routes. Separate tank corps were built in two echelons with the allocation of reserves. The launch was planned on two routes in the 6-7 km lane. In the tank armies, the advanced detachment as a part of the reinforced TBR was allocated from each corps of the first echelon, and the tank army was separated from the individual tank army. Mobile groups were created in those armies in which the tank armies did not operate.

The BP tanks played an important role in increasing the striking power of infantry units. Their density was the 1<sup>st</sup> UF 21, and the 1<sup>st</sup> BF – 25 units on 1 km of the front. The use of BP tanks had its own peculiarities. According to the requirements of Order № 325 issued on the 16<sup>th</sup> of October in 1942, individual tank formations and units were used centrally, and in this operation tanks and self-propelled artillery regiments (SAP) were added to the infantry battalions. The individual tanks were assigned to the infantry platoons. Such use of BP tanks became possible due to their increase and acquisition of skills of commanders of infantry units.

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## TRAINING OF DIPLOMATIC STAFF IN THE VISEGRAD GROUP STATES (V4) (1991 – 2004): PRECONDITIONS FOR FORMATION

**Abstract.** *The purpose* of the study is to reveal the preconditions for the formation and development of diplomatic systems and training of diplomatic personnel in the Visegrad Group states (V4) in 1991 – 2004. **The Research Methodology.** The research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, objectivity, system, science, as well as the use of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and special historical (historical and typological, historical and systemic) methods. **The scientific novelty** consists in the fact that for the first time in the Ukrainian and foreign science the preconditions for formation of diplomatic systems and training of diplomatic personnel in the Visegrad Group states (V4) (1991 – 2004) have been considered in organic unity; the groups of external and internal factors have been singled out, which influenced these processes; the peculiarities of the formation and development of diplomatic systems and training of relevant specialists in each of the Visegrad Group states (V4) have been analyzed. **The Conclusions.** The singled out factors that influenced the formation and development of diplomatic systems and diplomatic personnel training in the Visegrad Group states (V4)

(1991 – 2004) are conditionally grouped into external ones (macro-factors: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the communist regime, the acquisition of independence and sovereignty by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the organization of diplomatic services of these states, strengthening one's own image at the international level, participation of the states in international structures, international policy, EU educational initiatives, etc.) and domestic (meso- and micro-factors: the socio-political situation in the Visegrad Group states (V4), the development of the diplomatic service, the foreign policy course of the state, the official policy of Visegrad and the Bologna system, the national educational policy of each of the states, the appropriate regulatory framework, the development of higher education in each of the states, educational systems in the Soviet Union and in Ukraine, where specialists in international relations were also trained, foreign language education as a priority public policy, etc.). These groups of determinants are interconnected and form a complex system that programmed the creation of diplomatic services, the development of diplomatic education in the Visegrad Group states (V4).

**Key words:** the Visegrad Group states (V4), Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, diplomatic system, training of diplomatic personnel.

### ПІДГОТОВКА ДИПЛОМАТИЧНИХ КАДРІВ У ДЕРЖАВАХ ВИШЕГРАДСЬКОЇ ЧЕТВІРКИ (1991 – 2004 рр.): ПЕРЕДУМОВИ СТАНОВЛЕННЯ

**Анотація.** Мета дослідження полягає у розкритті передумов становлення та розвитку дипломатичних систем і підготовки дипломатичних кадрів у державах Вишеградської четвірки (V4) у 1991 – 2004 рр. **Методологія дослідження.** В основі методології дослідження лежать принципи історизму, об'єктивності, системності, науковості, а також використання загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, узагальнення) та спеціально-історичних (історико-типологічний, історико-системний) методів. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що вперше в українські та зарубіжній науці розглянуто передумови становлення дипломатичних систем та підготовки дипломатичних кадрів у державах V4 (1991 – 2004 рр.) в органічній єдності, виокремлено групи зовнішніх та внутрішніх чинників, які впливали на ці процеси, проаналізовано особливості становлення та розвитку дипломатичних систем та підготовки відповідних фахівців у кожній з держав V4. **Висновки.** Виокремлені чинники, які впливали на формування та розвиток дипломатичних систем та підготовку дипломатичних кадрів у державах V4 (1991 – 2004 рр.), умовно згруповано в зовнішні (макрочинники: розпад Радянського Союзу, падіння Берлінської стіни, крах комуністичного режиму, набуття незалежності та суверенітету Польщею, Чехословаччиною, Угорщиною, організація дипломатичних служб цих держав, зміцнення власного іміджу на міжнародному рівні, участь держав у міжнародних структурах, міжнародна політика, освітні ініціативи ЄС тощо) та внутрішні (мезо- та мікрочинники: суспільно-політична ситуація в державах V4, розвиток дипломатичної служби, зовнішньополітичний курс держави, офіційна політика Вишеграду та Болонська система, національна освітня політика кожної з держав, належна нормативно-законодавча база, розвиток вищої освіти у кожній з держав, освітні системи в Радянському Союзі і в Україні, де теж готувалися кадри фахівців з міжнародних відносин, іншомовна освіта як пріоритетна державна політика тощо). Ці групи детермінант взаємопов'язані і творять складну систему, що програмувала створення дипломатичних служб, розвиток дипломатичної освіти у державах V4.

**Ключові слова:** Вишеградська четвірка, Польща, Чехія, Словаччина, Угорщина, дипломатична система, підготовка дипломатичних кадрів.

**The Problem Statement.** In Ukraine, in the field of international relations, qualitative changes take place, which have put on the agenda the need to find the ways to modernize diplomatic services and improve the diplomatic staff training. Theoretical study of the scientific problem formulated in the title of the article revealed a number of contradictions between: the need to develop international cooperation against the background of an unstable

socio-political and socio-economic situation and the need to improve the system of training competent diplomatic personnel who are able to perform professional duties qualitatively; challenges and needs, which the modern globalized world puts forward to specialists in international relations, and the insufficient level of professional competence of specialists in international relations; the need to study the foreign experience of training diplomatic personnel and the lack of its systematic study and generalization in the domestic educational theory and practice, etc.

Under such circumstances, it is useful and necessary for Ukraine to study the experience of creating diplomatic systems, training of diplomatic personnel in the Visegrad Group states (V4) (1991 – 2004), which ensured the successful development of the member states, their active advancement on the path of integration into the EU and NATO.

**The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches.** At the beginning of the XXIst century in Ukraine and abroad there appeared some studies on the problems of historical formation and development of the Visegrad Group states (V4) (Moroz, 2005; Ukraine, 2010; Hotkova, 2012; Shishelina, 2014), their international activities (Kish, 2012), in particular relations with Ukraine (Serhiienko, 2012; Ukraine, 2010), the problems of political socialization of the youth of the Visegrad Group states (V4) are studied (Stelmakh, 2015) and the others. However, the experience of the Visegrad Group states (V4) in the training of diplomatic personnel has not been the subject of researches, which actualizes writing of this article.

**The purpose** of the article is to analyze the preconditions for the formation and development of training of diplomatic personnel in the Visegrad Group (V4) in 1991 – 2004 in terms of its topicality and prospects for use in Ukraine.

**The Main Material Statement.** The Visegrad Group (V4) – unification of Central European states (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) with a rather limited institutional structure. Its formation was announced by the leaders of the three post-socialist countries Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, and Jozef Antala at a meeting on February 15, 1991 in the Hungarian city of Visegrad (Declaration, 1991), where a joint declaration on the desire to integrate into European structures was signed (Visegrad Group, 2004, p. 112, 114). The collapse of the Soviet Union and liberation from the communist regime motivated the leaders of these states to intensify mutual cooperation in the region in order to establish in the international arena, security and socio-economic and cultural development (The Visegrad Group, 1993).

The state-building processes and qualitative changes in the geopolitical situation of the Visegrad Group states (V4) led to complex processes of creation and development of their own national diplomatic services, which in turn actualized the need to provide them with qualified personnel. The creation of national systems for the training of diplomatic personnel in the Visegrad Group (V4) is a complex and dynamic process that has more than a quarter of a century of history, marked by stages of evolutionary change that continue to this day. This was due to the openness of this system, which responds quickly to the nature and changes in both domestic policy and its foreign policy, the international situation, the challenges of globalization, and other factors. We define three levels of determinants of the process of training diplomatic personnel in the Visegrad Group states (V4) of the period under analysis. They are characterized by a number of stable and variable macro-, meso- and micro-factors, which together reflect the diversity of foreign policy, socio-political, socio-economic, cultural and educational life and emphasize the impact of these spheres of public life on the development and modernization process of the system of training of diplomatic personnel in the Visegrad Group states (V4), and hence the formation of diplomatic systems.

Macro-factors include global, well-established determinants, which under any changes and challenges determined the main vectors and strategy of training systems formation in the field of international relations. The main goal is to train personnel capable of ensuring the national interests and security of the Visegrad Group member states by maintaining peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation with members of the international community in accordance with generally accepted principles and norms of international law; implementation of a foreign policy course aimed at the development of political, economic, humanitarian, scientific, and other relations with other states, international organizations; protection of the rights and interests of citizens and legal entities abroad; promoting the stability of the international situation of each state, raising its international prestige, carrying out other tasks in accordance with current legislation, etc.

In the aspect of foreign policy of the states the following macro-factor had a significant influence on the system formation of diplomatic personnel training of the Visegrad Group states (V4), as cooperation with the world and European structures, organizations and institutions, first of all the UNO and its structures (UNESCO, IAEA, WHO, UNICEF), European Union, the NATO, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA), etc. It is important to note that as early as in 1951 (the year of signing of the Treaty of Paris) there was a need for a coordinated external representation of the European Community (EU). In 1954 the European Commission's External Relations Service was established. Conventionally, the history of the development of the EU diplomatic structures can be divided into two major stages: the first covers the 1950s and the 1990s, when the EU carried out economic diplomacy mostly, as there was no other type of diplomatic activity here; the second stage, which began in 1997, continues to this day, associated with the Treaty of Amsterdam and the crystallization of European institutions and structures. At the beginning of the first period, a non-profit semi-autonomous institution was created – European Cooperation Agency (EEA), which had an impact on the formation of pan-European diplomacy (Acheson Papers), the task of the EEC was to select the heads of missions in the associated member states, their staff and management, etc. Since 1965 (the time of establishment of the Commission of the European Communities (CES)), 21 EEC offices were opened in the associated countries to provide assistance offered under the Yaounde Conventions of 1966 – 1975 of European Development Fund. By 1973, 320 people were already working in the EEC offices. In 1972, the CES delegation became the first EU mission to the United States. The first missions, which usually carried out non-diplomatic activities, were guided by rather limited mandates and had a minimal political profile (Carta, 2012, p. 61). This experience of diplomatic activity was later used in the process of building the system of diplomatic education of the Visegrad Group states (V4).

The member states of the Visegrad Group (V4) established relations with key subjects of the world community. According to the Polish researcher K. Szczepanik, the Republic of Poland (RP) is a member of more than 40 international organizations, established cooperation with more than 190 countries, during 1995 – 2005, the number of embassies increased from 90 to 97, consulates general – from 60 to 141, honorary consulates – from 159 to 186, which is a total of 327 consular offices – structures operating in other countries but not in international organizations (Szczepanik, 2005, p. 225). The increase in the number of diplomatic and consular missions in the world updated the training of diplomatic personnel for them. This led to the establishment of the Diplomatic Academy at the Ministry of Foreign



Affairs of the Republic of Poland on October 16, 2002 (Szpak, 2009, p. 135). This trend is typical of other Visegrad Group states (V4).

In general, the key goals and objectives of international policy of the Visegrad Group states (V4) coincided, they were determined by the priority areas of foreign policy, the nature of international relations between them, as well as with neighbouring European and other states, traditions of the state formation, the fact of the presence or absence of the concept of foreign policy of the state, political elite, etc. Researchers, for example, note that until 2012, Poland did not have a proper documentation of the concept of foreign policy (Priorytety, 2012). Nevertheless, the RP played a leading role in the Visegrad Group (V4). According to the Polish researcher R. Zemba, it was Poland that contributed to the development of the “new Europe” significantly, unification of Europe. Poland pointed the way to liberation from the communist regime, deprivation of the Russian presence, declared changes in democratic power, the priority of democratic values, paved the way for these changes in the East, etc. (Zieba, 2015). These and other areas became a priority in the training of diplomatic staff (Meshalskyi, 2013, pp. 47–51).

An important prerequisite for the formation and development of the system of training of diplomatic personnel of the Visegrad Group states (V4) was the creation of a regulatory framework based on relevant international and national acts. During the period under study, its formation developed in line with the Europeanization of higher education, including diplomatic, which as a result of fundamental ideological, structural changes soon highlighted the need for approval and participation in the Bologna Process, in particular the academic mobility of students. This was the focus of the Maastricht Agreement adopted on February 7, 1992 (P. 8, Art. 126), which provided for the possibility of free movement of teachers and students in the European educational space; substantiated the terms of study; aimed at learning the languages of the countries-participants, establishing close ties regarding the exchange of experience; obtaining information on the development of education in the EU member states; determined the procedure for a mutual recognition of diplomas, etc. (Treaty, 1992).

Implementation of the standards of the Bologna system was facilitated by the hard legislative activity of the Visegrad Group leadership (V4). For example, in 2002 in the Slovak Republic a number of documents regulating the development of education were adopted (Law “On Higher Schools” (№ 131/2002) (Zakon, 2002), Resolution of the Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic “On the Credit System of Education” (Vyhlaska, 2002), Law “On the State Language of the Slovak Republic” (Zakon, 1995), Law “On Languages of National Minorities” (Zakon, 1999), two basic conceptual documents – the Concept of further development of higher education in Slovakia in the XXIst century (2000 p.) (Uznesenie, 2000) and “Millennium...” National Education Programme in the Slovak Republic for the next 15–20 years (Konceptiarozvoja vychovy a vzdelavania v Slovenskej republike na najblizsich 15–20 rokov) (Milenium, 2002), and the others which not only outlined the strategy for the development of the national system of higher education, including diplomatic, but also Europeanized it: consolidated the functioning of three types of higher education institutions (public (verejné), state (štátne) and private (súkromné)) (Zakon, 2002, p. 1462), ensured the functioning of the higher education system in terms of integration into the European educational space, structuring the list of educational programmes, specialties, introduction of the credit system of training in the Slovak Republic during 2002 – 2003 (Resolution of the Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic “On the Credit System of Education” (Vyhlaska, 2002), which gave European content and democratic character to the domestic system of training of diplomatic personnel, enabled students to choose training courses, to build their own educational trajectory, aimed

at the formation of professional competencies, contributed to the development of partnerships with higher education institutions and research institutions of other countries, participation in joint international projects and programmes, etc.

Thus, in the field of diplomatic education, professing the “principle of complementarity” meant that, according to current EU documents, the content of education, the organization of the educational process, etc., was the prerogative of each state. European structures are responsible for supporting and complementing national educational initiatives to strengthen the “spirit of Europe” (Treaty, 2002), in particular to improve the quality of education (Chapter 3, Article 149) through the development of the European dimension in education, through the teaching of foreign languages, starting from the lower grades; development of open and distance learning; development of the professional training system (Chapter 3, Article 150), development of information and experience exchange on general problems of vocational training in the EU member states, etc. (Treaty, 2002). A key stage in the development of the system of diplomatic training in the Visegrad Group states (V4) was the accession to the implementation of the proposals of the European document “Memorandum on Lifelong Learning” in 2000, which outlines the provisions of lifelong learning in all areas of education. European qualification rules for the lifelong learning of young people and adults make it possible to obtain education, retrain, to raise their professional level to all comers, to compare and recognize qualifications obtained formally and informally in the EU member states, to be mobile and flexible in an ever-changing world (Memorandum, 2000). All this accelerated the process of improving the system of training of diplomatic personnel, outlined a new concept and strategy for the development of diplomatic education – lifelong learning, which the Visegrad Group states (V4) implement at the present stage of their development successfully. In the field of public administration, in the field of education, including diplomatic, in the Visegrad Group states (V4) there are qualitative changes: transition from centralized management of education to more open decentralized forms of its manifestation (The European Dimension, 1991), profile ministries, state governments hand over the part of their powers and functions to local authorities, municipalities, etc. (Dzierzgowska, 2001).

Meso-factors in the form of state policy of the Visegrad Group states (V4), the socio-economic situation of the Eastern European region determined the external influences, the general background, the nature of relations and dictated the next challenges for the formation of diplomatic services. This was manifested in the state regulatory framework, the nature of interethnic relations, the macroeconomic situation, other social conditions and challenges that determined the content and priorities of the training system. As this issue is well covered in the scientific literature (Lukianova, 2017; Moroz, 2005; Eshtvanikova, 2004; Skrzydło, 2007; Stemplowski, 2007), we will dwell on certain aspects of this problem. These aspects include, first of all, the legislative framework for the development of the education system for the training of specialists in the field of international relations, which provided not only diplomatic missions of the states abroad, but also the highest level of public authorities, regional and local authorities, research institutions, organizations, analytical centres, etc. (Surmacz, 2015). Activities in the field of the system of diplomatic education were regulated by the “internal” legal framework. This factor needed a qualitatively new content, because all diplomatic structures of the period of “communist history” of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary were dependent on the Kremlin ideologically, consistent with its policies, the Soviet ideology. All diplomatic structures became a kind of institution to support and implement the initiatives of the Soviet Union. According to the Polish researcher E. Novakowski, diplomatic

institutions of this era had a minimum of independence, which led to the demoralization of foreign service, the inability of official authorities to form their own foreign policy concept and strategy (Novakovskiy, 2009).

According to the analysis of the source base, it should be noted that at the beginning of the 90s of the XXth century the concept of foreign policy was not developed in these countries, that is why, the development of the diplomatic service was regulated by current state documents. Relevant ministries belonged to the state structures and their activities were regulated by laws on the state authorities. On the example of the RP – this is Art. 32 of the Law “On Public Administration” (Ustawa, 1997), according to which the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland takes care of the relations of the Republic of Poland with other states and international structures (p. 1.1); representation and protection of Poland’s interests abroad (p. 1.2); coordination of the foreign policy of the Republic of Poland (p. 1.3); representation and protection of the rights of Polish citizens and the Polish people abroad (p. 1.4); cooperation in the spheres of social development (p. 1.5); formation of the international image of Poland (p. 1.6); public and cultural diplomacy (p. 1.7), etc. (Ustawa, 1997).

Law on the Diplomatic Service of the Republic of Poland (Ustawa, 2001) was adopted only on 27 July of 2001, the RP, like other European states, in the organization of diplomatic activities was guided by a number of international instruments, including the Vienna Convention (1961), the UNO Charter (1965), Paris Charter for New Europe (1990) and the others. In addition, at the beginning of the 1990s future diplomats (based on the signing of separate documents and the introduction of a number of international programmes that were aimed at integrating higher education institutions into the world educational university space) had the opportunity to participate in European educational programmes for youth – Erasmus, LingWa, TEMPUS, Comet, Petra, Iris, Fors and the others (Meshalskiy, 2013, pp. 47–51).

As an intermediate conclusion, it should be noted that the process of establishing diplomatic services and training in international relations was complex in the Visegrad Group states (V4). However, not as critical as some researchers point out. Generalized and synthesized analysis of this work allows us to state that it is the educational traditions of the Soviet period in the form of educational institutions, which trained diplomatic personnel and were located not only in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, but also in the Soviet Union, including Ukraine, and became a factor that ensured the creation and development of diplomatic services independent of the communist regime of young European states, which had both positive and negative impact on this process. Thus, during 1944 – 1990 at Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv there were trained about 3,5 thousand international specialists, a significant part of whom were foreigners (Huberskiy, Baranov, & Borynets, 2006, pp. 21–22). To train foreign citizens in October of 1960, the first faculty in the USSR was opened at the University, which was located in a new building equipped with modern material and technical base. During the functioning the faculty for foreign citizens, which became the part of the Ukrainian Institute of International Relations, it trained about 15 thousand students from more than 100 countries, including the states from Central and Eastern Europe (Huberskiy, Baranov, & Borynets, 2006, pp. 15–18), such as Vasyl Hrivna – the Ambassador of the Slovak Republic, Ferenc Kontra – the Ambassador of the Republic of Hungary and many others (Instytut, 2019).

Micro-factors outline the interrelated educational environment, mechanisms, means of training diplomatic staff, higher education system, retraining and professional development of specialists in international relations. In the system of diplomatic personnel training the feature

of changes was a radical change in foreign language education of the Visegrad Group member states (V4). After the end of World War II (during 1945 – 1989) the main (first) compulsory foreign language for study was exclusively Russian at all educational levels (it has been studied since the 2nd grade, other languages – from the 4th or 5th grade), since 1960, one of the modern foreign languages, German, English, French, and Spanish, had been introduced into the curricula of the last two years of primary school. Thus, the Russian language was dominant, and the role and place of other modern languages in the curricula of primary and secondary education in this “communist region” were secondary (Ernestova, 2007).

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in the Visegrad Group states (V4) other European languages began to be studied actively, there were classes with in-depth study of foreign languages. There was a problem of training / retraining of foreign language teachers, which was resolved, inter alia, by inviting foreign representatives from the British Peace Corps, the French Alliance, the Spanish Embassy, and the others to teach, the use of educational programmes of the British Council, the Goethe Institute, etc., which affected the system of training of diplomatic personnel, led to the changes in the language repertoire of future diplomats. The establishment of the Center for Modern European Languages in Graz in 1994 and other events gave impact to active changes in the education of the Visegrad Group states (V4), transformation processes at all levels of foreign language education, including the involvement of the Czech Republic and Hungary into the EU pilot project on the implementation of the European Language Portfolio, etc. Globalization educational processes led to variability, personality-oriented and competency-based approaches to the formation of a diplomat, development of new educational standards, improvement of professional training and retraining of diplomatic personnel, in particular in the field of their language training.

Since the reform of education, culture, science was not a priority at the beginning of the 90's of the XXth century, it hindered the process of forming diplomatic systems and training diplomatic personnel (Cerych, 1997). Each of the Visegrad Group states (V4) had common formation and development features of the training system of diplomatic personnel, as well as its own trends characteristic of this process. Such a difficult way was taken by the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, which, most of all the Visegrad Group states (V4), were in dire need of a national diplomatic system formation. Despite somewhat different socio-political, socio-economic, cultural and educational conditions, which determined the training of diplomatic personnel, each of the countries created a special department of administration (MFA), which organized relations with the international environment, developed high requirements for the professional profile of a diplomat. These and other principles of training diplomatic staff are clearly written in the legislation of these countries (Sprava, 1994; Statut, 1993).

Thus, since 1993, the creation of a national higher diplomatic education and the real formation of the state structures in response to the challenge posed by the newly created state began in the Slovak Republic (Statut, 1993). In a very short time, a system of the state apparatus was established, based on the ideas of parliamentary democracy, openness, and publicity. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic was not created from scratch, the experience and resources of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Slovak Republic were used. The experience of public administration in the Czechoslovak Federation was used as well. The classic Western European model the diplomatic service was the key one. Despite the fact that during the 90s of the XXth century the SR experienced serious staff problems, recently current staff policy has stabilized owing to the creation of its own system of training professional diplomats. However, the drawback

is the lack of staff in the Slovak Republic, not a very wide network of missions and the number of diplomats abroad (Eshtvanikova, 2004).

The SR was able to develop its own strategy for the development of education, which came a long way: from Madarization-Sovietization to the return to national principles and nowadays the education strategy corresponds to the European level (Radek, 2008). According to the data of the researcher of development of higher education in SR M. Radek (Radek, 2008, p. 14), the education system developed upwards, quite dynamically. For example, in 1993 there were 67,194 students of higher education institutions in the Slovak Republic, in 9 years the number of students almost doubled: 2002 – 136922 people, which, among other things, testifies to the desire of the Slovaks to improve their educational level, the dynamism of the development of higher education institutions, including diplomatic, modernization of the educational system and more. According to the Bologna Declaration (1999) (Sprievodca, 2006; TheBolognaDeclaration, 1999), in all Visegrad Group states (V4) in the system of diplomatic education introduced a two-cycle (Bachelor's and Master's) levels of training of future diplomats, the credit system (ECTS), monitored the quality of educational services (common criteria for assessing the quality of education), developed academic mobility in order to implement integrated training programmes, implementation of scientific research, created conditions for employment of graduates of the faculties of international relations and other faculties that trained diplomatic personnel in the EU countries, etc.

The strategy for the development of foreign language education adopted in the Visegrad Group states (V4) became one of the leading factors in reforming education, improving the quality of diplomatic training in the PR, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Hungary, and the successful operation of diplomatic services. Using the example of Hungary as one of the most successful countries in the development of foreign language education, we will briefly illustrate briefly how effective were European strategies for modernizing education, Pan-European recommendations on language education for the system of diplomatic training, updating the content and forms of education. According to the researchers J. Kuti and E. Morvai, in Hungary during its stay in a socialist camp, a foreign language education declined, as evidenced by the Census of 2001 (Kuti, & Morvai, 2002). 2001 should be considered a turning point in the improvement of a foreign language education in the Visegrad Group states (V4), according to the decision of the European institutions (UNESCO, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and the European Commission) it was declared the European Year of Languages. In this regard, in 2003, Hungary adopted and launched a strategy for the modernization of a foreign language education, which is designed for the future (Language Education, 2002; Language planning, 2005). Such a state strategy gave impetus to the rapid reform of education, including the system of training diplomatic staff. Thus, according to the Census of 2001 in Hungary, during ten years of Hungarian independence (from 1990 to 2000) the number of people who studied modern European languages doubled (Kuti, & Morvai, 2002). The strategy for the development of foreign language education in Hungary was enshrined in the National Curriculum of the Ministry of Education in 2003 (NationalCoreCurriculum, 2007), where the key objective was the formation of foreign language communicative competence of the individual, raising the foreign language education of Hungary to the level of developed European countries in the shortest possible time. This affected the quality of the future diplomat training of the new generation positively, especially the polyglot specialist.

**The Conclusions.** The state-building processes and qualitative changes in the geopolitical situation of the Visegrad Group states (V4) led to complex processes of creation and development



of their own national diplomatic services, which in turn highlighted the need to provide them with qualified personnel. The creation of national systems for the training of diplomatic personnel in the Visegrad Group states (V4) is a complex and at the same time dynamic process, which has more than a quarter of a century history, marked by stages of evolutionary change that continue to this day. Three levels of determinants of the process of training diplomatic staff in the Visegrad Group states (V4) of the study period are identified. They are characterized by a number of stable and changing macro-, meso- and micro-factors, which together reflect the diversity of foreign policy, socio-political, socio-economic, cultural and educational life and emphasize the impact of these spheres of public life on the development and modernization of the system of training of diplomatic personnel in the Visegrad Group states (V4), the formation of diplomatic systems, which continue to this day. This experience is a good guide for Ukraine, which is also taking steps towards integration into the European educational space.

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**REFORMATION DOCTRINE AND POLITICAL VALUES:  
HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS  
(On the example of late protestantism in Ukraine)**

**Abstract.** *The purpose the research is to determine the characteristics of political ethics in the reformation doctrine using the example of late Protestantism history in Ukraine. The research methodology is based on: general scientific methods (analytical, synthetic, paradigmatic, holistic), general historical (system chronological, historical and comparative), sociological method (content analysis). The scientific novelty consists in the fact that for the first time there has been made the attempt of a comprehensive analysis of the external factors influence on the political ethics of Protestants on the history example of the Protestantism in Ukraine during the 20th – beginning of the 21st century in modern Ukrainian historiography and philosophical science. The Conclusions.* The Reformation Doctrine was formed 500 years ago. It passed the test of time during this period. Having examined political ethics as a separate component of the doctrine, the authors of the article came to the conclusion that its key points were formed during the period of early Protestantism and have remained unchanged up to this day. Expressive specificity is the reaction to the historical conditions of existence and demonstration of



*ethno-confessional differences. Genesis of Protestants in Soviet Ukraine is an example. Referring to the biblical thesis “All authority comes from God”, the Protestants accepted all the slogans of the Soviet power. At their congresses, they even approved a military service. Afterwards the atheistic experiment in the Ukrainian SSR gained momentum and the representatives of theomachistic authorities resorted to repressions, in the society with a dominant hostile worldview believers tried to use various survival strategies starting with the insistent demands of communities registration ending with sit-in strikes and emigration attempts to “any non-socialist country”. The Christians came to the conclusion that power from God also serves a good cause. The Protestants in modern Ukraine entered a political life slowly. Evangelical Christians most clearly demonstrate solidarity with public sentiments (participation in the Orange Revolution, the Revolution of Dignity, chaplaincy service). In the modern Protestant milieu, a blind submission to any authority is questioned therefore changes are made to pacifist sentiments and prerequisites for the formation of socio-political theology arise. Of particular values are the categories of truth, freedom and responsibility (which is the manifestation of ethno-confessional differences), and non-cult services are organized in compliance with orthodoxy and orthopraxy.*

**Key words:** reformation doctrine, political ethics, late Protestantism, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, modern Ukraine, orthodoxy, orthopraxy.

## РЕФОРМАЦІЙНА ДОКТРИНА І ПОЛІТИЧНІ ЦІННОСТІ: ІСТОРИКО-ФІЛОСОФСЬКИЙ АНАЛІЗ (на прикладі історії пізнього протестантизму в Україні)

***Анотація. Мета дослідження** – на прикладі історії пізнього протестантизму в Україні визначити особливості політичної етики в реформаційній доктрині. **Методологія дослідження** спирається на методи: загальнонаукові (аналітичний, синтетичний, парадигмальний, холістичний); загальноісторичні (системно-хронологічний, історико-порівняльний); та соціологічний (контент-аналіз). **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що вперше в новітній українській історіографії і філософській науці зроблена спроба комплексного аналізу впливу зовнішніх чинників на політичну етику протестантів на прикладі історії протестантизму в Україні ХХ – початку ХХІ ст. **Висновки.** Реформаційна доктрина була сформована 500 років тому. За цей період вона пройшла випробування часом. Дослідивши окрему складову доктрини – політичну етику, автори статті дійшли висновку, що її ключові тези були сформовані в період раннього протестантизму і залишаються незмінними до сьогодні. Виразні специфічності є реакцією на історичні умови існування та проявом етноконфесійних відмінностей. Прикладом слугує буття протестантів у радянській Україні. Посилаючись на біблійну тезу “всяка влада від Бога”, протестанти сприйняли всі гасла радянської влади. На своїх з’їздах вони висловили бажання навіть проходити службу в армії. Згодом, коли атеїстичний експеримент в УРСР набрав обертів і представники богоборчої влади вдалися до репресій, віруючі намагалися використати різні стратегії виживання в суспільстві з панівним ворожим світоглядом: від наполегливих вимог рестрації громад до оголошення сидячих страйків і намагання емігрувати в “будь-яку несоціалістичну країну”. Так, християни дійшли висновку, що та влада від Бога, яка слугує добрій справі. Протестанти в сучасній Україні повільно включилися до політичного життя. Християни віри євангельської найбільш виразно демонструють солідарність із суспільними настроями (участь в Помаранчевій революції, Революції Гідності, капеланському служінні). У сучасному протестантському середовищі піддається сумніву сліпе підпорядкування будь-якій владі, вносяться зміни в пацифістські настрої, виникають передумови до зародження соціально-політичного бозослов’я. Особливою цінністю для нього є категорії правди, свободи і відповідальності (що є проявом етноконфесійних відмінностей), а позакультове служіння організоване із дотриманням ортодоксії та ортопраксії.*

**Ключові слова:** реформаційна доктрина, політична етика, пізній протестантизм, Українська Радянська Соціалістична Республіка, сучасна Україна, ортодоксія, ортопраксія.

**The Problem Statement.** The study of modern Ukrainian evangelical Protestants ethics is a topical objective for a comprehensive and systematic religious analysis in order to

understand better the place and role of the Protestant Church in the formation of a civil society in Ukraine. The discussion of ethics issue cannot be considered in isolation from theology, because the latter determines the ethical norms that guide Christians of any denomination. Since the Ukrainian Protestants functioned in an atheistic totalitarian state for a long time – 70 years, the developed eschatological theology could not but affect the formation of a passive mood for the society transformation. At the same time, this eschatological orientation made Protestants be very jealous of the ethical teachings, which permeate the entire New Testament. The evangelical Protestant environment has an impact on the society by its mentality, formed on the biblical and ethical categories of honesty, truthfulness, justice, conscientiousness in work, responsibility.

**The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications.** The lack of researches on this issue is explained by the complexity of theoretical generalizations on the problem of the connection of political values and the Reformation doctrine of different historical periods in relation to global Protestantism. At the same time, during almost three decades of a religious freedom period in Ukraine, a number of works were published, which are of a fundamental importance for understanding the nature and directions of social and cultural changes in the evangelical environment of Ukraine. S. Sannikov, M. Cherenkov, R. Soloviy, M. Mokiyyenko, V. Liubashchenko and Yu. Reshetnikov made a significant contribution to the study of various aspects of transformations in evangelical Protestantism. The processes that take place in the field of politics, education, social activities, military service are studied by V. Yelensky. The achievements and problems faced by the churches during the years of the Ukrainian state independence were analyzed in the works of P. Yarotsky and L. Filipovych comprehensively.

However, there are few separate works that focus on the Protestant ethics of evangelical Protestants in Ukraine. To this number of works one should include the monograph “Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Ostmodernism” of M. Cherenkov, the Ukrainian theologian and philosopher, and V. Bachinin, the Russian sociologist. In the monograph the authors analyze the ethical challenges faced by evangelical Protestant churches in Russia and Ukraine.

A collective monograph written by 19 foreign and domestic scholars, politicians and pastors, edited by Roman Sheremet and Olha Romanenko, “The Reformation: Europe’s Success and a Chance for Ukraine”, highlights the impact of Reformation processes on Western Protestant ethics and possible influences on the formation of the Protestant ethics in Ukraine, the importance of which (ethics) is, in the opinion of the authors, significant and topical for the state-building processes and a successful development of social institutions.

In the article “Protestant Ethics in the Socio-Political Context of Ukraine: from Max Weber to Ukrainian realities” Konstantyn Teteriatnikov, a researcher, analyzing the work of M. Weber “Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism”, pays special attention to the issue: what needs to be done for the Protestant ethics to become an influential force for changing the society in the Ukrainian realities.

The article by H. Hololob, a theologian-apologist, “Was the Early Church Pacifist?” deals with the study of pacifism. The ethical problem of the relationship between the Church and the state is reflected in the article by V. Korenevych “The Relationship between the Christians and the State in the Light of the Commandment “do not kill”. This problem, but from a different angle, is covered in another article – “Theology and Practice of Non-Violent Resistance of Martin Luther King”, written by V. Zadorozhny.

**The purpose** of the study is to determine the peculiarities of political ethics in the Reformation Doctrine on the example of the history of late Protestantism in Ukraine.

**The Main Material Statement.** In our opinion, ethical concepts that serve as identification markers of modern Protestantism, with all its specifics, passed the test of time: influenced by worldview paradigms of different historical epochs, and thus a certain transformation, the Protestant moral rules were formed in early modern times. Despite the generally accepted view in the scientific literature that the Protestants are the most dynamic religious movement, modernized in the spirit of the contemporary era, we have come to the conclusion that it is more correct to state that we follow the norms of the Protestant morality.

The article focuses on the evolution of political ethics in the Reformation Doctrine, which professed evangelical Protestantism in Ukraine in the XXth – at the beginning of the XXIst century; the influence of external factors on the Protestant ethical norms, the defense of the Christian values during the period of trial by atheistic ideology (on the example of the USSR); a socio-political activity of the Ukrainian Protestants during the Revolution of Dignity. Such a philosophical and historical digression determines the fundamental constants of the Protestant ethics.

The study of the late Protestants history in the Soviet totalitarian state with a dominant atheistic (hostile) worldview clearly demonstrates this. The “litmus test” is the believers’ interpretation of the thesis “all power is from God”, which will show the comparison of the Reformation doctrine and political values.

For the Ukrainian representatives of late Protestantism – mainly: Evangelical Christians-Baptists (ECB), Seventh-day Adventists (SDA), Evangelical Christians or Pentecostals (EC) – the time until the end of the 1920s is called “the Golden Decade”: the state focused its militant steps on Orthodoxy, which embodied the former imperial system; the took advantage of the economic successes of the Protestant communities and started controlling the quantity of Baptists, Pentecostals and Adventists.

From 1924 to 1926, the Protestant churches organized congresses, assemblies, meetings, etc., at which they proclaimed the recognition of the Soviet power and oriented fellow believers to a peaceful existence in the state. Thus, in September of 1924, the First Provincial Meeting of Christians of the Evangelical Faith took place in Odesa. In the protocol of the meeting there was defined the need for a “sincere” attitude to the Soviet power, to support it “not because of fear, but in good conscience” (CSASBGAU, f. 5, c. 197, p. 49). At the 1st All-Union Congress of the Union of the Evangelical Faith Christians (1927) the need for loyalty to the new government was emphasized, otherwise believers would be “declared unworthy of the Christian title” (CSASBGAU, f. 5, d. 3, c. 1057, p. 25) (the directions of Evangelical Christians-Baptists and Evangelical Christians existed in the USSR separately until the end of the 1940s).

The Christians are known to defend the ideas of a religious pacifism, they do not take up arms and refuse to take an oath. Thus, the Ukrainian Baptist churches were formed under the influence of Anabaptists, who kept to the principles of pacifism, that is why, this position is quite strong for many Ukrainian Baptists. Since 1926, the law “On Compulsory Military Service” had been extended in the USSR. In the law there were specifically addressed requirements for the believing part of the population regarding the army service, in particular, – a compulsory military service could be replaced by other duties: in peacetime it was a community service, in wartime – the work in teams to provide service to the rear (CSASBGAU, f. 5, d. 3, c. 1053, pp. 86–87; SAZR, f. 324, d. 1, c. 202, p. 121). The state controlling authorities noted that the representatives of the CEB, the SDA and some others recognized the conscription as necessary (CSASBGAU, f. 5, d. 3, c. 1053, p. 31). Thus, there

was no conflict between the Protestants and the authorities over their refusal to serve in the army during the 1920s.

Since the end of the 1920s, the situation in Soviet Ukraine had become more complicated for the Protestant believers: preaching had been the subject to a comprehensive control (it was a direct interference in the internal life of religious communities), prayer houses were closed en masse, a wave of arrests of religious cults began. This is how the atheistic experiment gained momentum.

After the end of World War II, believers experienced all the cruelty of the regime. Some of them were accused of refusing to mobilize and collaborating with the Nazi authorities. Lawsuits against “traitors to the Fatherland” were used by Soviet ideologues for atheistic purposes: for a long time in literature and the press, mentioning the Protestants, the authors pointed at the “pro-fascist sentiments of sectarians”. Thus, the broad sections of the population were instilled with an artificially distorted image of the believer: the “illiterate, secret buzuvir”, who, by virtue of its existence, did harm to the Soviet state.

Gradually, the totalitarian state determined the religious denominations, which were granted permission to exist (to register). Accordingly, some believers were outlawed and entered the so-called religious underground. Such religious groups, being in the field of view of the commissioners of the Council for Religious Cults under CM of the USSR in UkrSSR, were not the object of study, the materials on them were transferred to the state security authorities (CSAPAU, f. 1, d. 24, c. 12, p. 206). At the beginning of the 1960s, the Council identified 25 cults that were not the subject to registration, including: Pentecostals, Adventists-reformists, Pure Baptists, Evangelical Christians, Pentecostal Sabbaths, etc. (CSAPAU, f. 1, d. 24, c. 5488, p. 18).

It is noteworthy that the supervisory authorities even identified a “common denominator” of the religious underground. The most dangerous features were considered: refusal to participate in a public life of the country, refusal to attend cultural and educational institutions, refusal to ask for a medical help, refusal to participate in elections, refusal to join collective farms. Such allegations can be confidently refuted to the majority of Protestants, who tried to adapt to the current conditions. The severity of governmental decisions was related to the totalitarian state’s attempt to establish control over all spheres of life and to overcome an alternative worldview.

Believers not only of forbidden cults, but also of those permitted by law, were deprived of the opportunity to perform religious rites. This position of the church was interpreted by the governing bodies as “establishing a real control” over the activities of religious associations. The atheist state resorted to artificial measures to unite related cults (in 1945 – Pentecostals with the Union of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, whose alliance proved to be completely unviable). The activities of the Evangelical Christian-Baptists Church were strictly controlled and regulated by government agencies; the Christian-Baptists were extremely limited in making independent decisions. This led to the situation when disobedient communities formed an alternative church with a governing body, the Council of Churches of the ECB (1965). After vain demands for establishing a government commission to persecute the faith in the USSR, the leaders of such nonconformist communities were repressed.

Step by step, the opposition “the atheist state – the Protestants” took chronic forms and lasted for the entire Soviet period.

During the 1960s, unregistered Protestant communities continued to try to legalize activities, Pentecostals and schismatic Baptists even petitioned the government and the

Central Committee of the CPSU. At the same time, there appeared the first claims for radical methods of struggle (hunger strikes and sit-ins) to meet the demands (CSAPAU, f. 1, d. 24, c. 5991, p. 195). Thus, there came the time for reaction of Protestants, who found themselves on the brink of extinction, and the Christian thesis of “all authority comes from God” needed to be commented.

The Secret Congress of Evangelical Christians (in 1948, Dniprodzerzhynsk) became a counterweight to the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists. The “Dogmas of Christian Belief of Evangelists” were approved, which were a response to the state’s refusal to register it. It was stated in the Dogmas that relations with the Soviet state and public organizations were impossible. Such decision was perceived by the governing bodies of the state as “anti-Soviet”; as a result, members of the asset were repressed. The next step – the organization and holding of the Fraternal Assembly (in 1956, Kharkiv) (the state bodies declared this meeting an illegal congress). The participants of the meeting approved new provisions concerning the attitude to the Soviet legislation: general military service, the prohibition of believers to bring up children in a religious spirit and other requirements of the state were declared, which were contrary to the Word of God (SADR, f. 6463, d. 2, c. 20, pp. 74–78).

The organizational work of Protestant leaders, on the one hand, contributed to a special intensification of missionary work in the second half of 1956 and at the beginning of 1957, which was a direct disobedience to the state. On the other hand, – in contrast to the state measures, isolationist tendencies intensified in the Protestants environment (prayer meetings were held in absentia), participation in the public life of the country was more and more often declared a “sinful deed”. The content of the sermons guided the believers to abandon cultural and educational institutions, listening to the Soviet radio programmes, reading fiction (Archival Subdivision of the USBU in Zaporizhia Region, c. p-13278, vol. 1, p. 55).

Another step of disobedience to the state in order to meet the religious needs of the Soviet believers was the attempt to establish contacts between fellow believers from abroad. Religious literature appeared in the UkrSSR illegally; believers tried to join listening to radio programmes broadcast from abroad (“Bible Lectures” (the USA), “Echoes of Youth” (Canada), etc.). Those activities violated the state regulations. To isolate the Soviet believers from the world religious movements, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the UkrSSR adopted a resolution “On Intensification of the Struggle against Foreign Religious Propaganda” (1977). The Soviet researchers, analyzing religious radio broadcasts, accused foreign Protestant centers of anti-communism, “psychological diversion” and even the existence of a “religious opposition” to socialism (Rotovskii, 1988, pp. 164–168).

Since the end of the 1970s, analyzing the situation in the Protestant community, the term “religious extremism” had been increasingly used by the authorities. Illegal actions included: refusal of believers to participate in elections, calls to pray for “prisoners of conscience”, organized religious education for children, refusal of conscripts from Protestant families to take the military oath. Believers of illegal Pentecostal groups, supporters of “the Council of Churches of the ECB”, also protested against the communist upbringing of youth and atheist propaganda, demanding recognition of the right to “conduct not only atheistic but also religious propaganda” (CSAPAU, f. 2, d. 14, c. 1726, p. 19).

Totalitarian methods of combating religion turned religious communities into reservations. Thus the point of no return had been passed, the Protestants moved to the next level of resistance. In the 1980s, the CBE underground episcopate declared registration a “blatant violation of the Word of God”; the decision in this regard stated that the state laws should be



obeyed only when they serve “good glory and for the Lord” (CSAPAU, f. 1, d. 25, c. 2403, p. 37). d Such sentiments indicate an obvious fiasco of the atheistic ideology in counteracting the religiosity of the population. Thus, in 1970 – 80 researchers at the Center for the Study of Religion and Communism (Keston Institute), studying the problem of the survival of religion under the conditions of its suppression by the communist leadership, used the terms: “catacomb churches”, “religious protest”, “religious renaissance” rightly.

We believe that during the 1970s such protest took the form of both covert and open confrontation. For example, in the Pentecostal environment during this period, dissatisfaction with the active process of atheism of the population manifested itself in the emergence of emigration sentiments (in the USSR, this process began in 1977), that took an organized form (CSAPAU, f. 1, d. 25, c. 1508, pp. 4, 47). Believers stated that they were “prisoners of the Soviet government”, which did not comply with international agreements. The punitive authorities, in response to such disobedience of believers, used the infamous methods of “mental violence” (when dissenters were forcibly taken to psychiatric hospitals). Dnipropetrovsk Protestants openly reported to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the World Health Organization and other international organizations in the document “Facts and Only Facts”. The fight against dissent in Soviet Ukraine was described in detail by them in the “Request for Help Statement” addressed to the UN Human Rights Committee, to the heads of 35 states, who signed the Final Act of the Helsinki Agreement. An “Open Letter” was also prepared and sent to the President of the United States; statements of “Requests for Help” sent to the US political organizations (SADR, f. 6465, d. 2, c. 26, pp. 67–85).

The leaders of the Pentecostal movement sent the statement to the Central Committee of the CPSU, the United Nations, and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, emphasizing the lack of constitutional freedoms, the ban on prayer meetings and imprisonment for faith. The statement emphasized the requirement to allow believers to leave the USSR freely (SADR, f. 6465, d. 2, c. 37, p. 219). Biographical references of believers, persecuted in Soviet Ukraine, were sent abroad (CSAPAU, f. 1, d. 25, c. 2403, pp. 37–38). At the end of the 1970s, the Baptists joined the wave of emigration, and some of them made categorical demands: if they were not allowed to leave the USSR, they would demand renunciation of the Soviet citizenship (CSAPAU, f. 1, d. 25, c. 1887, p. 32).

The totalitarian state reacted to such steps by repressions. This, in turn, did not stop the Protestants: emigration sentiment remained unchanged during the 1980s. In 1987, a new wave of emigration among believers arose. In order to help them leave the country in an organized way, they created an “initiative group – the Christians for leaving the USSR” (CSAPAU, f. 1, d. 25, c. 3329, p. 24).

Thus, the period of the existence of the Protestants in atheistic Soviet Ukraine was the period of trial: the Protestants recognized the Soviet power during the 1920s, tried to legalize their activities during the prewar and postwar period; feeling the flywheel of repression, they went underground; having lost hope of being able to profess the faith, they became the opposition to the existing system (went on hunger strike, tried to emigrate to a “non-socialist country”, sent letters to international organizations in order to tell the truth about the life of believers in an atheistic country).

The period of Ukraine’s independence was the time of free Protestant service renewal. It is noteworthy that during this period the universal values of the Protestants, which were formed during the Reformation, were clearly manifested: the national consciousness manifestations, the absence of dogmatic restrictions on human thought, intellectual culture, spiritual freedom,

autonomy of the individual, individualism, anthropocentric norms, the concept of autonomy of a secular and spiritual rule. At the same time, the strategic goal of the Protestants of that period and modern Protestants is called “the improvement of Christianity”. These ethical norms are the bridge between early and modern Protestantism, as well as a common denominator for various Protestant denominations. At the same time, it is necessary to note the peculiarities in ethics, which time imposed (modernization processes, persecution of believers during the Soviet period), and ethnic specifics. Let us consider the following peculiarities in detail on the example of non-religious activities of modern Ukrainian Protestants.

The age-old desire for freedom of the Protestants found expression in gaining freedom in independent Ukraine largely. In this context, it should be noted that Ukraine has conditions for different types of freedoms; the Protestants are “not drawn” into the orbit of the political game. On the one hand, they are not focused on political circles, on the other hand, – they have no preferences in power. Therefore, freedom and truth are the two ethical categories which, as recent events over the past five years have shown, are the key principles in the ethics of the Ukrainian Protestants.

The Revolution of Dignity of 2014 was one of the best expressions of the Protestant ethics of the Ukrainian Protestants. The Maidan became the time and space where orthodoxy intertwined with orthopraxis for the Protestants. The Protestant Church performed several missions on the Maidan. The mission of preaching was one of the most important missions seen by the Protestant churches. The Protestants, as “people of the Book”, were seriously motivated to convey the idea of a God-reborn man. Awareness of the issues that without the change of worldview, without reconciliation with God, it is impossible to begin to build a truly free and prosperous country, motivated the Protestants to preach the Gospel, especially at the time when the society, being in a high tension, was waiting for changes. The holistic approach on which the evangelical Protestant worldview is based must have the right sequence, the violation of which will not lead to any results. The primary thing for Evangelical Protestants is always the reformation of a man, which consists in the liberation from the cause of all that hinders healthy spiritual development. And only the change of people, according to Evangelical Protestants, will change the political, economic, tax, environmental systems and everything.

At the end of the 1990s, the Protestant activity in the country’s political life increased markedly. The year of 2004 was a landmark year for the Ukrainian society. Historians and philosophers emphasized that at that time the most expressive solidarity with the public mood was shown by the Christians of the Evangelical Faith, Evangelical Christians-Baptists were much more cautious, and Seventh-day Adventists remained distanced from the public slogans. The Revolution of Dignity and the Russian-Ukrainian war became a powerful lever of influence on the worldview of the Ukrainian Christians, who spoke with slogans of freedom and justice against the current system at the Maidan. For the Ukrainian society, the Maidan “resurrected” many moral themes, for which the Protestants were well prepared throughout their history and living practicing faith. It should be noted that the specified moods of the Christians of the Evangelical Faith, Evangelical Christians-Baptists and Seventh-day Adventists preserved their features during the revolution of 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity. The focus on success, which is a Protestant business card, became a motivating lever to support the revolutionary slogans for Ukraine’s movement by the model of developed democracies. The active involvement of the faithful into the chaplaincy service demonstrated the desire to defend the country clearly.

For the Protestant ethics, responsibility, truth, conscience, were always a high virtue in both family and public life. Therefore, various manifestations of imitation in the society – justice, democracy, education, manipulation of consciousness by means of the media make the Ukrainian Protestants “join” a social activity as disagreement with untruth. The presence of all these virtues testifies to the vitality of the Church, its conformity to evangelical ideals.

The category of truth became a special value to the Ukrainian Protestants during the Revolution of Dignity. The very defense of the truth was one of the main motives for the participation of the Protestant Church at the Maidan. At the present stage, the Ukrainian Evangelical Protestantism is becoming a unique phenomenon in comparison with Western and Russian Protestantism. According to Bishop M. Panochko, the head of the Union of the Christians of Evangelical Faith, – “Western Protestantism lost its power precisely because it lost its truth. The property of the Church is to influence. To influence, you must have the truth. The church is strong when it is true” (Spys, 2020). Other Protestant leaders share the same view. V. Antoniuk, the head of Eastern Church of Evangelical Christians-Baptists said: “The power of the church – always to be on the side of truth, regardless of government” (Antoniuk, 2014). H Komendant, a former head of Eastern Church of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, a head of the Bible Society, said: “We must be salt to the world around us, a reminder of the truth” (Komendant, 2014, p. 119).

M. Panochko defined the events that took place in the Ukrainian society during the Revolution of Dignity, first of all, as a spiritual struggle. “Devaluation of the truth, – the senior bishop of the Church of Christians of Evangelical Faith of Ukraine emphasized, – became the reason for a fake society emergence” (Spys, 2020).

Freedom has always been a special value to the Ukrainian Protestants. The desire for various kinds of freedom, including freedom from Russia, from an unjust corrupt government, from the ideological legacy of the USSR, was too important for the Ukrainian Protestants after a long period of persecution. However, the unifying force at the Maidan for the Protestants was not only freedom “from”, but also freedom “for”. It was freedom “for” that became a good foundation for the large-scale celebration of the 500th anniversary of the Reformation, during which Evangelical Protestants declared themselves as the united Protestant Church, remaining multi-religious at the same time. The celebration of the “R – 500”, when the Protestants not only talked about achievements but also reflected on the history lessons and revised their activity, coincided with the post-Maidan times, still full of faith in building a new, truly independent state. Freedom “for” set new tasks – to reformat thinking from local to global – to go beyond the boundaries where your church is, to a wider space – the state. In other words, to engage with the society as a whole, not just the part of it.

Freedom and responsibility are the ethical categories through the prism of which the Ukrainian Protestants reconsider their future ministry. The new political situation, which arose in the Ukrainian society in 2014 – 2015, is also imposed with the challenges of a contradictory postmodern world with various crises – political, economic and environmental. The categories of freedom “for” and responsibility require joint projects and ways to implement them, which one church is unable to do. These factors create the need to form a number of theologies that will certainly make adjustments to the Protestant ethics in Ukraine.

The Jubilee Year of the Reformation, the loyalty of the authorities, and the expectations of the Ukrainians for change after the Revolution of Dignity enabled the Ukrainian Protestants to try to influence the birth of a new Ukrainian society by bringing the Protestant ethics into various spheres. This is evidenced by the numerous activities that were carried out, involving

to some extent various public institutions – city councils, universities, libraries and deputies. It was in the year of “R – 500” that the Protestants attracted attention and invited well-known public figures, parliamentarians, professors, and preachers from the Western world to our country in order to acquaint various social institutions with the Reformation ideas on which the Protestant ethics was formed. The idea of acquainting the Ukrainian social institutions with the success of Western society, formed on the basis of the ethics of the Protestants, is fully illustrated by the collective monograph: “Reformation: Europe’s Success and a Chance for Ukraine”. The monograph is written by 19 foreign and Ukrainian authors. The monograph is a kind of attempt of the Ukrainian Protestant elite to push the Protestant community to the importance of developing a public theology. The authors of the monograph emphasize those Biblical principles, the introduction of which is necessary for changes in various spheres of the Ukrainian society: the institution of the state formation, economic, legal system, the institution of family, the medical field. One of the key principles that the Ukrainians must learn are: the rule of God’s law, the priority of the value of the individual as a personality, the establishment of a clear limit of government interference in people’s lives, the introduction of professional ethics, which consists in the thesis: “one should serve (not rule) his people first and foremost with love” (such theses sound consonant with the early Protestant ones).

Numerous discussions of theologians, leaders of various parachurch organizations and the position of pastors of the Ukrainian Protestant community at conferences, on the Internet and at Sunday services sermons – M. Cherenkov, R. Soloviy, S. Sannikov, Ya. Lukasik, V. Bozechko, K. Teteriatnikov, H. Komendant, A. Kaliuzhny, D. Horenkov, M. Panochko, V. Antoniuk, M. Romaniuk and many others indicate that nowadays the Protestant Church in Ukraine, perhaps not fully aware, more intuitively, joined the formation of a public theology, which would pay more attention to the relationship between the Church and the society. Until nowadays, the absence of a public theology could not form a number of positions in the ethics of the Ukrainian Protestants. This factor makes the Ukrainian Protestant ethics very different from Western Protestant ethics. Public theology involves considering issues that are quite controversial in the Evangelical Protestant environment due to various factors – the formation of communities or entire unions by different traditions (for example, Calvinist and Arminian in Baptism), which formed, respectively, a different view on many issues. Such issue is the pacifist question of the Church’s participation in a political life (this question is seriously influenced by historical factors – the faithful of the “new” Baptist or Pentecostal communities, who are free from fear of persecution, sincerely believe that the Church must not only have a dialogue with politicians, but also be among them and influence actively; unregistered communities, on the contrary, take a position of distance from politics; *personal* – for example, “old” communities, led by a young pastor whose theological education was influenced by Western theology, may have a moderate attitude toward the Church’s involvement in politics; *regional* factors (communities from Western Ukraine with a clear national position are more active in a political life than communities from the south of Ukraine).

However, the formation of a public theology in the Protestant environment is very slow due to the lack of a clear understanding of how the Church, interacting with the society, should not merge with it, but rather be a voice of conscience for the society, a pillar and affirmation of truth. The vast majority of the Protestants have fear – how to serve the society not to become a servant. Evangelical Protestantism in Ukraine, although not a direct descendant of the European Reformation, sees its roots in the European Reformation.

The fear, of course, that hinders the development of new methods and forms of cooperation with the society cannot be seen as a positive phenomenon, but the slogan of the Reformation “The Unchanging Gospel to the Changing World,” which was announced by S. Sannikov, a leading and extremely authoritative theologian in the Ukrainian Protestant community, in the year of the 500th anniversary of the Reformation, is an expression of the worldview and, at the same time, the definition of the vector of a large cohort of believers of the Evangelical Protestant movement in Ukraine (Sannikov, 2015, p. 216).

It is worth emphasizing that for the first time in the history of functioning in Ukraine during the Revolution of Dignity, the Protestants felt the attitude to themselves as full-fledged equal citizens. This certainly raised their faith in Ukraine as a homeland where their orthodoxy and orthopraxis would be in demand. Awareness of the revision of socio-political thinking – from nihilism in relation to the world – to an active position in the socio-political life of the country, raised the question: “Is there any authority from God?” If not, how should Christians behave? In other words, in the Ukrainian Protestant environment there are preconditions for the emergence of socio-political theology.

The state when the socio-political consciousness of Christian Protestants was “unlocked from the biblical energy system”, the Ukrainian Protestant theologian, Doctor of Philosophy Mykhailo Cherenkov, defined as degradation for the Protestants (Cherenkov, 2015, p. 154). Why did this happen? M. Cherenkov draws an important conclusion that the thesis “there is no power but God’s power” explains the principle of a hierarchical subordination, which was established by the Creator to maintain order in the worlds (both spiritual and social, and natural). But not every person in power follows spiritual norms. If there are many such violations, then “distorted political systems-deviants” may arise, where the government becomes a God-fighting weapon. From such power “comes nothing but evil. So the Christians have no reason to claim that this kind of power is from God” (Cherenkov, 2015, pp. 147–148). At the same time, there are still many fears of the communist totalitarian era in the Ukrainian Protestant community. This sometimes results in a blind obedience to any authority that the Protestants inherited since the Soviet period, particularly in the postwar Soviet period, when, as the Ukrainian researcher O. Panych writes, the state and power became symbolic images of the “other” in the evangelical religious worldview of Christians-Baptists” (Panych, 2016, p. 58). However, this state creates a dichotomy for the Protestants with their freedom-loving nature. At present, a number of theological works, numerous statements in interviews with the Protestant leadership, show that the difficult intertwining of the categories of truth, freedom and responsibility is no longer so complex and confusing. Bishops, teachers, and theologians instill in believers an understanding that the Christians are exempt from the moral obligation to obey the state when biblical laws are distorted.

According to many authoritative Protestant ministers, the Church cannot stand aside from the political life of the country, as it cannot but react to untruth. The great temptation in the ethical plane of the modern church is to allow oneself to be manipulated. V. Boechnko, bishop of the Church of Christians of the Evangelical Faith, is convinced that the First Apostolic Church was also involved in politics when it was persecuted by the authorities, but the church did not compromise with the authorities. “It was resistance. It was politics”, – said the bishop (Boechnko, 2014, p. 49).

The pastor of the New Life Baptist Church, A. Kaliuzhnyi, in an interview, expressed the position of many Protestants as follows: “If the people do not like the state steps, then it is “criminal to remain silent”, we need to talk about it “whatever it costs us” (Kaliuzhnyi, 2014, p. 641).



Modern Ukrainian researcher H. Trehub notes that such a cohort of Protestants was formed, “who are the part of a civil society and a new Ukrainian political nation” (Trehub, 2017, p. 121). However, it is difficult to determine the percentage of those Protestants who are neutral in the society, including politics, and those who are active. But content analysis of the Protestant media, materials from the Internet resources reveal that the Protestants, who believe that the theology of apoliticalness is a theology of fear, are more and more numerous.

The Revolution of Dignity and the modern Russian-Ukrainian war forced the Protestants to return to rethinking the issue of the relationship between a Christian and the state in the light of the commandment “do not kill”. Analysis of the Bible books through the prism of this issue – Deuteronomy and Romans, secular law (Articles 115 and 36 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, Art. 97 of the Charter of the garrison and guard services of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, etc.), some works of European Protestants (Henri Didon, Ulrich Eckmann, Richard Hayes) give the Ukrainian theologians reason to change the pacifist sentiments of the Protestant environment. Such changes are based on the conclusion that the commandment “do not kill” applies only to those who are motivated by a personal malicious decision – to take a person’s life or commit it through negligence. Such murder is called criminal. Other murders, during which the actions of one person threaten the life of another person to prevent a serious crime currently committed by the latter, are not criminal (Korenevich, 2014, pp. 111–112). Thus, step by step, the Ukrainian Protestants overcame the isolationist position and apoliticalness that were artificially formed during the totalitarian era. Nowadays they are an important ethno-confessional segment of the society with clearly defined ethical rules.

**The Conclusions.** With the emergence of Protestantism, clear worldview ideas and ethical norms of this religious trend are formed, which will become the leading ones for the next centuries. The historical path, ethno-confessional specificity add differences without changing the fundamental Protestant principles. Proof of this fact is the history of Protestantism in Ukraine. After conducting a historical and philosophical analysis of the Reformation Doctrine and political values on the example of the history of late Protestantism in Ukraine, we concluded that dominant in the worldview of the Protestants are universal Christian values, such as: spiritual freedom, anthropocentrism, intellectual culture, etc. They remain unchanged for centuries, despite political realities. At the same time, the biblical instruction “Let every man be subject to the highest authority: for there is no authority but God and those existing powers are established by God” is interpreted by believers, based on the understanding that the state laws should be obeyed only when they serve “Good glory and for the Lord”. This is clearly demonstrated by the history of late Protestantism in the UkrSSR.

Democratic processes and recent events in Ukraine (the Revolution of Dignity, modern Russian-Ukrainian war) gave impetus to the actualization of some principles of ethical teaching, namely: the relationship between a Christian and the state, a Christian and the society, a Christian and politics. An important task in the context of democracy and freedom for the ethics of modern Evangelical Protestants is to understand the vocation, which can be a serious lever of influence on the Ukrainian society. All this requires the creation of a number of theologies – public, political theology, labour theology, education, which have not yet been formed in the Ukrainian Evangelical Protestant theology for objective and subjective reasons.

**Prospects for Further Research.** Historical and philosophical analysis of the Reformation doctrine can be carried out on the basis of a comprehensive study of various ethical aspects, taking into account the ethno-confessional specifics of European Protestantism, with the involvement of sources of a foreign origin.

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## NETWORK RESEARCH AND CLASSIFICATION OF MILITARY HISTORY MUSEUMS IN UKRAINE

**Abstract.** *The purpose* of the research – to study the network of military history museums in Ukraine and to systematize the institutions of the modern military history museum network. **The methodology of the research** was formed by using the general scientific principles of systematics, historicism and laws of logic, which helped to search for sources of information, its selection, classification, systematization and analytical processing. The methodological and statistical tools used make it possible to research the military history network objectively and to propose a classification of its institutions. **The Scientific Novelty.** On the basis of extensive statistics, the institutions of the modern military history museum network have been systematized. The features of classification of state museums, museums in the system of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, at educational institutions of the sphere of management of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine have been elaborated. The correlation between the military history and other state museums of Ukraine by regions and the relation between the military history and other state museums of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol

have been analyzed. **The Conclusions.** In independent Ukraine, the issue of the use of knowledge about its history is highly relevant. In its decision one of the leading places is occupied by military history museums. The network's research and classification of military history museums remain debatable and need further analysis. However, one of the key features of the classification should be the profile and typology of the museums. The lack of a separate record of military history museums made it difficult to find the necessary information, which was limited by collecting information from official sources of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine system and data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine.

**Key words:** military history museum, classification of museums, network of museums, branch of the museum.

## ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ МЕРЕЖІ ТА КЛАСИФІКАЦІЯ ВІЙСЬКОВО-ІСТОРИЧНИХ МУЗЕЇВ В УКРАЇНІ

**Анотація. Мета дослідження** – дослідити мережу військово-історичних музеїв в Україні та здійснити систематизацію закладів сучасної військово-історичної музейної мережі. **Методологія дослідження** вибудовувалася із застосуванням загальнонаукових принципів системності, історизму та законів логіки, що сприяло пошуку джерел інформації, її відбору, класифікації, систематизації та аналітичній обробці. Використаний методологічний та статистичний інструментарій дав змогу об'єктивно дослідити військово-історичну мережу та запропонувати класифікацію її закладів. **Наукова новизна.** На основі широкого використання статистичних даних здійснено систематизацію закладів сучасної військово-історичної музейної мережі. Розроблено ознаки класифікації державних музеїв, музеїв у системі Міністерства оборони України, при закладах освіти сфери управління Міністерства освіти і науки України. Проаналізовано співвідношення між військово-історичними та іншими державними музеями України за регіонами та співвідношення між військово-історичними та іншими державними музеями України в Автономній Республіці Крим і м. Севастополь. **Висновки.** У незалежній Україні вкрай актуалізоване питання використання знань про свою історію. У його розв'язанні одне з провідних місць займають військово-історичні музеї. Дослідження їх мережі та класифікація залишаються дискусійними й потребують подальшого аналізу. Однак однією з ключових ознак класифікації має стати профіль і типологія музеїв. Відсутність окремого обліку військово-історичних музеїв ускладнило пошук необхідної інформації, який був обмежений збором відомостей з офіційних джерел системи Міністерства культури України та даних Державної служби статистики України.

**Ключові слова:** військово-історичний музей, класифікація музеїв, мережа музеїв, філія музею.

**The Problem Statement.** A significant number of museums have separate museum institutions: branches, departments and sectors, which are not often located in cities, towns and villages where the main museum operates. For example, the National Military History Museum of Ukraine (Kyiv) has 7 branches operating in Vinnytsia (Military History Museum of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine), Ivano-Frankivsk (Museum of “The Heroes of the Dnieper”), Lutsk (Volyn Regional Museum of the Ukrainian Army and Military Equipment), Pobuzsky, Holovanivskyi district, Kirovohrad region (Museum of Strategic Missile Forces), Odesa (Central Naval Museum of Ukraine), Poltava (Museum of Heavy Bomber Aviation), the village of Pamiatne, Chernihiv region (Kruty Heroes Memorial Complex).

The state services do not register them as separate museum institutions, only the main museum is included into the statistical records as a museum unit. Thus, the total number of museums in Ukraine according to statistics is 574 units in 2017 (Zaklady, 2018, pp. 10, 18, 19); the number of branches – 18, the number of departments and sectors – 795 (Zaklady, 2018, p. 43).

Thus, in reality, not 574, but 1 487 state museum institutions operate in the whole country (Statystychnyi shchorichnyk, 2015). At the same time, the state services did not take into account the museums located in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

**The Analysis of Recent Researches.** The study of the network of military history museums in Ukraine was carried out on the basis of official sources, including the lists of museums and reserves of the system of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine (Derzhavni muzei Ukrainy, 2014), the data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine and official websites of museums (Muzeini zaklady, 2014) and reserves (Zapovidnyky, 2014). The formation of museum catalogues was carried out by collecting information from official sources of the system of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine and the data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. This fact revealed gaps in the recording of many statistics and found out that there are still no special comprehensive thorough works in Ukraine devoted to the study of the network and classification of military history museums. The topicality of the research was caused by the absence of comprehensive thorough works on the network of museums.

The purpose of the article is to study the network of military history museums in Ukraine and to systematize the institutions of the modern military history museum network.

**The Main Material Statement.** Objective analysis of the network of military history museums of modern Ukraine is impossible without their classification, i.e., grouping of museums by features that are essential for the organization and development of the museum network and for all museum activities. The main categories of museum classification include the profile and typology of museums (Ravikovich, 2001, p. 273). The profile of the museum means its specialization, which determines the composition of the museum collection; the principles of museum funds acquisition; the topics of exposition and educational work, i.e., the connection of museum activities with the profile discipline. This is a specific field of science, technology, production, culture, art. It is a profile discipline that determines the research activities of museums and their diversity, gives each museum an individuality that distinguishes it not only from museums of another profile, but also from other museums of the same profile (Ravikovich, 2001a, p. 121).

All military history museums are a subgroup of history museums, i.e., their specialization is based on a military history – a branch of historical science that studies the causes, course, driving forces and consequences of wars (armed local conflicts), the development of martial arts, thought and army building in a chronological order. Such special historical disciplines as military historiography, archeography, archeology, source studies, statistics, biography, etc., are subordinated to it (Nikishin, 1997, pp. 37–55).

At the same time, the need to optimize the activities of museums is becoming increasingly apparent. The tool that allows you to identify ways to improve the activities of museums, as mentioned above, is the classification. As a result of the analysis of the state museums network of Ukraine, 111 military history museums of Ukraine were identified, of which 7 – in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, 9 – in Sevastopol, which are currently under occupation by the Russian Federation. But we do not exclude them from the classification catalogues, taking into consideration the fact that these museums were created in Ukraine. Their names and subordinations are currently indicated, according to official websites. Their localization was established according to regions:



Kyiv city – 6  
Vynnytsia region – 4  
Volyn region – 3  
Dnipropetrovsk region – 4  
Donetsk region – 2  
Zhytomyr region – 1  
Transcarpathian region – 0  
Zaporozhye region – 4  
Ivano-Frankivsk region – 8  
Kyiv region – 4  
Kirovohrad region – 1  
Luhansk region – 1  
Lviv region – 12  
Mykolayiv region – 4  
Odesa region – 6  
Poltava region – 2  
Rivne region – 2  
Sumy region – 4  
Ternopil region – 3  
Kharkiv region – 4  
Kherson region – 0  
Khmelnysky region – 3  
Cherkasy region – 6  
Chernivtsi region – 1  
Chernihiv region – 9  
Autonomous Republic of Crimea – 7  
Sevastopol – 9

According to the administrative and territorial division of Ukraine it was found out by means of a comparative analysis of the of military history museums network that the leader in the number of museums in this profile is Lviv region, which has 12 military history museums. Along with the leader – Chernihiv region and the city of Sevastopol, which hold 9 museums. Seven military history museums operate in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and 6 museums are located in Cherkasy, Odesa regions and the city of Kyiv. Regions such as Kherson and Zakarpattia do not have any military history museums at all.

In Ukraine, military history museums comprise 6,3% of the total number of the state museums – 94 out of 1,487. In two regions – Zakarpattia and Kherson – there is no profile subgroup under analysis. The largest percentage of military history museums in Mykolaiv region – 18,2%; but such a high percentage is relative, as the museum network in the region is very small – only 22 museum institutions, 4 of them – military history. Next are Odesa region – 15% (6 out of 40 institutions), Volyn region – 13% (3 out of 23), Cherkasy region – 9,5% (6 out of 63), Lviv region – 9,2% (12 out of 23) ), Ivano-Frankivsk region – 9,1% (8 out of 88) and Kharkiv region – 7% (4 out of 57). In other regions, the percentage of military history museums is much lower. The result of the analysis of the museum network of Kyiv, which includes 323 institutions, of which only 6 are military history museums, i.e., 1,9%, seems unexpected. This is the lowest figure in Ukraine. The corresponding percentage for all other regions reaches 2,5% and above.

Large differences in percentage in different regions allow us to conclude that the analytical work of responsible management structures in the museum industry is almost not carried out. Regions are provided with powerful educational institutions unevenly.

Let us analyze the state military history museums of Ukraine according to their type:

1. Museums of general military history of Ukraine – 4 (3,6%);
2. Museums related to certain branches of military affairs and science – 35 (31,5%);
3. Museums according to the type of armed forces and types of troops – 9 (8,2%);
4. Museums of history of separate military divisions – 5 (4,5%);
5. Memorial museums – 28 (25,4%);
6. Museums-monuments – 2 (1,8%);
7. Diorama museums and panorama museums – 3 (2,7%);
8. Fortress museums – 3 (2,7%);
9. Castles-fortresses – 3 (2,7%);
10. Museums of military educational institutions – 0 (0%);
11. Museums-arsenals – 1 (0,9%);
12. Military history museums-reserves – 18 (16,3%).

According to the proposed classification according to the type, museums of general military history of Ukraine are represented by 4 institutions, which make up 3,6% of the total number of the state military history museums of Ukraine. Among them are the National Military History Museum of Ukraine (Kyiv), Volyn Regional Museum of the Ukrainian Army and Military Equipment (Lutsk, Volyn Region), and the others.

The typology of museums related to certain branches of military affairs and science is the most numerous and has 35 museum institutions, which make up 31,5% of the total number of the state military history museums in Ukraine. Typical representatives of such museums are the Museum of the History of the Zaporozhian Cossacks (Zaporizhzhia, Zaporizhzhia region), the Museum Complex “Cossack Glory and Military Equipment” (Yuzhnoukrainsk, Mykolayiv region) and the Museum of the History of Korsun-Shevchenkivska Battle (Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy, Cherkasy region).

Museums classified according to the type of armed forces and the types of troops are represented by 9 institutions (8,2%). Such museums include: the Military History Museum of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Vinnytsia), the Museum of Heavy Bomber Aviation (Poltava) and the Central Naval Museum of Ukraine (Odesa), the Museum of Strategic Missile Forces (the town of Pobuzke, Kirovohrad region) and the others.

Museums of the history of individual military units are represented by 5 (4,5%) institutions. The examples are the following: the Military History Museum of the Southern Operational Command of Ukraine (Odesa) and the Museum of the Guards-Shyronintsi (the village of Taranivka, Kharkiv region).

In the classification memorial museums occupy the second place and number 28 units, which is 25,4% of the total number of the state military history museums of Ukraine. Representatives of memorial museums are the Museum of the Hero of the Soviet Union V. Poryk (Poryk village, Khmilnytskyi district, Vinnytsia region) and R. Shukhevych Memorial Museum (Tyshkivtsi village, Horodenkivskiy district, Ivano-Frankivsk region). The majority of memorial museums are located in Lviv region: Historical and Memorial Museum of Colonel E. Konovalts (Zashkiv village, Zhovkva district), Museum of General-Cornet of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army R. Shukhevych (Lviv), Petro Sahaidachny Museum, Sambir district), Museum of S. Bandera's family (Stryi), Museum-memorial of Hetman of Ukraine I. Vyhovskiy (the village of Ruda, Zhydachiv district) and the others.

Golden Gate Museum (Kyiv) and Werewolf headquarters, the historical and memorial complex in memory of the victims of fascism (Vinnytsia region) are represented by museums-monuments, which is only 1,8%. The typological group of museums-dioramas and museums-panoramas includes 3 museums (2,7%): diorama “Battle for the Dnieper” (Dnipro), museum-diorama “Battle for the Dnieper near Pereyaslav and the creation of the Bukrin bridgehead in the fall of 1943” (Pereyaslav-Khmelnyskyi, Kyiv region) and the diorama “Storm of Izmail” (Izmail, Odesa region).

Fortress museums and fortress castles are represented by 6 institutions (2,7%). Fortress museums: the National Historical and Architectural Museum “Kyiv Fortress” (Kyiv), Museum “Citadel of Baturyn Fortress” (Baturyn, Bakhmatsky district, Chernihiv region), Kerch Fortress (Kerch, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea), Sudak Fortress Museum (Sudak, Autonomous Republic of Crimea), “Mykhailivska Battery” Military History Complex (Sevastopol, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea); and the castles-fortresses include the art-historical sector “Zhovkva Castle” (Zhovkva, Lviv region).

Arsenal Museum (Lviv) is the only representative (0,9%) of the “arsenal museums” type.

Military history museums-reserves are represented by 18 institutions (16,3%). The most typical representatives of this museums type include: “Khortytsia” National Reserve (Zaporizhzhia), “The Battle for Kyiv in 1943” National Museum-Reserve (Novi Petrivtsi village, Vyshhorod district, Kyiv region) and “Piatnychanska Vezha” Museum-Reserve (Piatnychany village, Zhydachiv district, Lviv region), “Ternopil Castles” National Reserve (Ternopil region).

According to the typological classification, there are no state museums of military educational institutions in Ukraine.

During recent decades, the Ukrainian researchers in the field of military history reviewed the achievements of military history in recent years conceptually, reinterpreting important military events for the national history. In order to have a better understanding of the state military history museums network in terms of the achievements of domestic military history historiography, the authors did a typological classification of the studied network according to one of the social functions of museums – the function of documentation (Karpov, 2017, p. 400). The classification the purposeful reflection in the museum collection with the help of museum objects of those processes and phenomena in nature and public life that the museum studies in accordance with its place in the museum network and the profile of the museum (Karpov, 2015, p. 33).

Museums are systematized on a chronological and thematic basis in accordance with the military history of Ukraine.

Analyzing the state military history museums of Ukraine according to chronological periods of military history of Ukraine, it should be noted that the National Military History Museum of Ukraine is the only museum in Ukraine that documents the entire military history of Ukraine comprehensively, and Volyn Regional Museum of Ukrainian Army and Military Equipment (Lutsk, Volyn region) studies the Ukrainian army from the moment of its creation to the modern period.

The largest number of military history museums in Ukraine is dedicated to the period of World War II. There are 45 of them, which is 41,3% in relation to 111 state military history museums of Ukraine (excluding the National Military History Museum of Ukraine and Volyn Regional Museum of the Ukrainian Army and Military Equipment). Representatives of such museums are the National Museum of the History of Ukraine in Second World War II, Memorial complex (Kyiv), Museum of the Great Patriotic War (Donetsk), diorama museum “Battle for the Dnieper near Pereyaslav and the creation of the Bukryn bridgehead in the fall of 1943” (Pereyaslav-Khmelnyskyi, Kyiv region), Museum “Underground Partisan

Movement in Mykolayiv Region during the Great Patriotic War of 1941 – 1945” (Mykolaiv), Museum “Kharkiv Region in the Great Patriotic War of 1941 – 1945” (Solonytsivka town, Derhachiv district, Kharkiv region) and the others.

The second largest group includes museums that study the creation of the modern Armed Forces of Ukraine and the participation of Ukrainian peacekeeping missions under the auspices of the United Nations (1991 – 2014). There are 23 such institutions (21,1%). These are the Military History Museum of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Vinnytsia), the History Museum of the National Academy of Border Troops named after B. Khmelnytsky (Khmelnysky), Museum of Heavy Bomber Aviation (Poltava), Central Naval Museum of Ukraine (Odesa), etc.

There are 18 (16,5%) military history museums that reflect the military history of the Ukrainian Cossacks. Among them: “Khortytsia” National Reserve and the Museum of the History of the Zaporozhian Cossacks (Zaporizhzhya), the Museum of the History and Development of the Ukrainian Cossacks (Odesa), the State Historical and Architectural Reserve “Khotyn Fortress” (Khotyn, Putilsky district, Chernivtsi region), the Museum of the Hetmanate (Kyiv), Petro Sahaidachny Museum (Lviv region) and the others.

8 museums (7,3%) study the history of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (1942 – 1954), in particular the Museum of the General Cornet of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army R. Shukhevych (Lviv), the Museum “Roman Shukhevych's Underground Headquarters” (Kniahynychi village, Rohatyn district, Ivano-Frankivsk region), Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Museum of Liberation Struggle Named after S. Bandera (Ivano-Frankivsk) and the others.

The War for Independence of Ukraine 1917 – 1921 is represented in 5 museums (4,6%): Museum of the Liberation Struggle of Ukraine (Lviv), Historical and Memorial Museum of Colonel E. Konovalets (the village of Zashkiv, Zhovkva district, Lviv region), Memorial complex “In Memory of the Heroes of Kruty” (Pamiatne village, Borzhyansky district, Chernihiv region), etc.

In conclusion, it should be noted that in Ukraine there are no specialized military museums of many periods of the country's military history, such as the era of the Old Ruska state and Galicia-Volyn principality; Grand Duchy of Lithuania; the period of World War I; the insurgent movement in Soviet Ukraine and many other topics were not covered. In addition, there are very few memorial military museums and museified monuments of military history. Thus, the network of military history museums needs a more thorough analysis of its quantitative and qualitative characteristics, research on its forecasting, which should be the part of economic planning and cultural management.

The State Military History Museums of Ukraine are only a small part of the network of the profile subgroup of military history museum institutions. It includes several other groups: museums at educational institutions of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine; departmental museums, i.e., those that operate in the field of other departments, including the military, various sectors of the economy, etc.; public museums and private museums. The only one of these groups is registered, albeit in an outdated list; these are museums at educational institutions under the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine: as of January 2011, the number of such educational museums was 4,576 (Kataloh muzeiv, 2011). Among these museums, 1,114 are military history museums, which accounted for 24,3% of the total number of institutions in this group. There has been carried out the comparison of quantitative indicators of military history and other museums of management sphere of the specified ministry according to the administrative and territorial division of Ukraine. It gives grounds to speak about the great role that was given to the studied typological group in the education of a young generation.

The lack of up-to-date data does not allow to do a complete and reliable analysis of the museums network at educational institutions. But, taking into consideration the fact that such a large network of military history museums was formed during the time of independent Ukraine (as of 2011), we can compare the number of its institutions (1,114) with the number of state institutions (111) of the same typological group (as of 2014). The first group is 10 times more numerous than the state museums network. There are almost no lists of museums of other groups, in fact they are beyond the state registration.

A significant part of military history museums forms a network of departmental museums in the system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. According to the Law of Ukraine “On the Armed Forces of Ukraine”, the Armed Forces of Ukraine is a military formation, which, in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine, is responsible for the defense of Ukraine, protection of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability (Zakon Ukrainy, 1992, p. 108).

The direct management of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is exercised by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Organizationally, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are divided into three types (Land Forces, Air Forces, the Navy) and two separate types of troops (Assault Troops) and forces (Special Operations Forces), as well as other military authorities that are not the part of certain types of troops.

The departmental network of museums of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, in which there are 66 such institutions, was selected for analysis. According to administrative characteristics they are divided into 12 groups. The National Military History Museum of Ukraine and 7 of its branches, in fact – 8 museum institutions, are subordinate to the Department for Military Education, Science, Social and Humanitarian Policy of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine reports.

The Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have 26 museum formations under their command, including 14 military museums and 12 rooms of combat traditions.

The Air Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine takes care of 18 museums, of which 2 are military museums and 16 are rooms of military traditions.

A small group of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – the Navy – manages 3 museum formations, which include 1 military museum and 2 rooms of military traditions.

The General Directorate of Communications and Information Systems of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine consists of the Museum of Communications Troops (Poltava) and the Museum of the Military Institute of Telecommunications and Informatization named after Heroes of Kruty (Kyiv).

The Main Department of Moral and Psychological Support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine manages the military history museums of the 58th (Lviv) and 59th Officers' Houses (Odesa).

Museums of military traditions function in two military units subordinated to the Armament of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Ivan Cherniakhovsky National University of Defense of Ukraine has a museum of this famous educational institution. The People's Museum of Military Glory operates as a separate structural subdivision of Zhytomyr Military Institute named after S. Koroliov.

The Central Intelligence Agency of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine maintains and develops its own museum.

Military unit A3817 (Sambir), subordinated to the Main Directorate for Operational Support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, also has its own museum of military traditions.

The cabinet of the military medicine history was set up at the Main Military Medical Clinical Center in Kyiv.



The museums of the Ministry of Defense can be classified according to the scale of activity:

- 1) museums of general military history of Ukraine;
- 2) museums related to certain branches of military affairs and science;
- 3) museums according to the types of armed forces and types of troops;
- 4) museums of history of separate military divisions;
- 5) museums of military educational institutions.

The first group of museums engaged in the study and promotion of the general military history of Ukraine includes 4 military history museums. This is, primarily, the National Military History Museum of Ukraine (Kyiv), Museum “Heroes of the Dnieper” (Ivano-Frankivsk), Volyn Regional Museum of Ukrainian Army and Military Equipment (Lutsk), Memorial Complex “In Memory of the Heroes of Kruty” (Pamyatne village, Chernihiv region).

The second group of museums related to certain branches of military affairs and science is represented by 3 museums: the Museum of Strategic Missile Forces (Pobuzke town, Holovanivskiy district, Kirovohrad region), the Museum of Heavy Bomber Aviation (Poltava) and the Cabinet of military medicine history of the Main Military Medical Clinical Center (Kyiv).

The third group (according to the type of armed forces and the types of troops) is represented by 5 museums: the Central Naval Museum of Ukraine (Odesa), the Military History Museum of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Vinnytsia), the Museum of the 58th House of Officers (Lviv), the Military History Museum of the 59th House of Officers (Odesa) and the Museum of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (Kyiv).

The fourth group of museums – the history of individual military units – is the largest. It consists of 47 museum formations, including 14 military museums and 33 rooms of military traditions. According to the analysis of the organizational subordination of military history museums of the fourth group of museums there is the following information:

- there are 11 museums in the Land Forces (military units A0409, A3091, A2167, A1815, A1671, A1556, A2331, A3283, A4239, A0665, A1978) and 12 rooms of military traditions (military units A0998, A1769, A1671, A3817, A05, A1546, A1604, A1405, A0553, A0508, A2042, Separate Artillery Brigade 44);
- in the Air Force – only 1 museum of combat traditions of military unit A0704 and 16 rooms of combat traditions (military units A2656, A1620, A2800, A2171, A2183, A4465, A0800, A1215, A1356, A1451, A4608, A2860, A4623, A0780 A4324, A1880);
- in the Navy – also 1 museum of combat traditions of military unit A3163 and 2 rooms of combat traditions (military units A2802, A2062);
- The armament of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is represented by 2 rooms of military traditions (military units A2920, A1352);
- The Main Directorate for Operational Support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is represented by 1 room of military traditions of military unit A3817.

The fifth group – the museums of military educational institutions – includes 7 institutions: the Museum of the National University of Defense of Ukraine named after Ivan Cherniakhovsky (Kyiv), the Museum of History of the Military Academy (Odesa), the Museum of History of the National Academy of Land Forces named after Hetman P. Sahaidachny (Lviv), the Museum of Combat Traditions of the Military Institute of Tank Troops of the National Technical University “Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute” (Kharkiv), the Museum of Kharkiv National University of the Air Force named after I. Kozhedub

(Kharkiv), the Museum of the Military Institute of Telecommunications and Informatization named after the Heroes of Kruty (Kyiv) and the People's Museum of Military Glory of Zhytomyr Military Institute named after S. P. Koroliov (Zhytomyr).

In accordance with the order of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine dated on 10.07.2019 No. 374 “On approval of the Instruction on the organization of military museums, museums (rooms) of military traditions in the Armed Forces of Ukraine” (Order of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 2019), military museums with their own staff are legal entities. Such museums include the National Military History Museum of Ukraine and its branches.

Other military history museums of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, which operate in military units (institutions, organizations), are not legal entities and are divided into full-time staff (created as separate structural units) and freelance (operating on a voluntary basis). Freelance museums can be created without making changes to the organizational and staff structure of the military unit (institution, organization) by the decision of the relevant commanders (chiefs).

The staff military history museums of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, which function in military units (institutions, organizations) and are not legal entities, include 11 divisions:

1. the Museum of the History of the Military Academy (Odesa).
2. the Museum of History of the National Academy of Land Forces named after Hetman P. Sahaidachny (Lviv).
3. the Museum of Combat Traditions of the Military Institute of Tank Troops of the National Technical University “Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute” (Kharkiv).
4. the Museum of Kharkiv National University of the Air Force named after I. Kozhedub (Kharkiv).
5. the Museum of the Military Institute of Telecommunications and Informatization named after the Heroes of Kruty (Kyiv).
6. the Museum of Communications Troops (Poltava).
7. the Museum of the 58th House of Officers (Lviv).
8. the Military History Museum of the 59th House of Officers (Odesa).
9. the National Museum of Military Glory of Zhytomyr Military Institute named after S. Koroliov (Zhytomyr).
10. the Museum of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (Kyiv).
11. the Museum of the National University of Defense of Ukraine named after Ivan Cherniakhovsky (Kyiv).

47 military history museums in the system of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine have the status of freelance and work on a voluntary basis.

The National Military History Museum of Ukraine and its branches are legal entities, therefore, in accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On Museums and Museum Affairs” and the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 03.11.2010 No. 1007 “On Amendments to the Regulations on the Museum Fund of Ukraine”, their stock collections are an integral part of both the Museum Fund of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Museum Fund of Ukraine.

**The Conclusions.** Thus, the military history museums are worthy multipliers of the struggle traditions of the Ukrainian people, bearers not only of true ideas about its military past and indelible history of Ukraine, but also the projection of the future development of the state. Unfortunately, nowadays the relevant state services do not keep separate statistical reports and records of the military history museums in Ukraine, which complicates their search, preservation and development.

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## MILITARIZATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS IN OCCUPIED CRIMEA (2014 – 2019)

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the study is to try to determine the nature and specifics, forms and subjects of the educational process militarization in annexed peninsula attracting materials from open sources (information resources of the Russian Federation authorities, occupation authorities of the Crimea, materials of the Regional Human Rights Center, the Crimean Human Rights Group, Helsinki Human Rights Union, ZMINA Human Rights Center, NGO Almenda Civic Education Center, online publications, etc.). Research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, systematic, scientific, authorial objectivity, the use of general scientific (dialectical, method of analogies, analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, comparative), interdisciplinary (methods of philosophy, political science, social psychology, synergetic, statistical analysis, contextual analysis), historical (retrospective, problem-chronological, discourse analysis, methods of “detection”) methods of research. The scientific novelty is that the essence, peculiarities, forms and subjects of the educational process militarization in the annexed Crimea by the Russian Federation during 2014 – 2019 have been found out on the basis of attracting open source materials. The Conclusions.* It is noted that the transformation of the Crimeans

social life over the last five years is primarily related to the militarization of the educational process, sports and culture. The occupying power organizes various activities among children and young people for this purpose: games, competitions, excursions, competitions on military subjects, organizes paramilitary children's camps, cultural mass events, lectures, conferences, theatrical performances, creates special militarized educational classes, lessons and meetings of military and patriotic, spiritual and patriotic education, etc. The most ambitious of such militant activities are the various military sports and military patriotic games. It is stated that the substantive policy of the educational process militarization in the annexed Crimea is aimed at: first, the active propaganda of the service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including the contract; secondly, to educate a large army of potential carriers and defenders of the "Russian world"; third, to cultivate violence and war.

**Key words:** militarization of the educational process, occupied Crimea, paramilitary units, military and patriotic education, military training, military propaganda.

## МІЛІТАРИЗАЦІЯ ОСВІТНЬО-ВИХОВНОГО ПРОЦЕСУ НА ТЕРИТОРІЇ ОКУПОВАНОГО КРИМУ (2014 – 2019)

**Анотація.** Метою статті є спроба, залучивши матеріали з відкритих джерел (інформаційних ресурсів органів влади Російської Федерації, окупаційної влади Криму, матеріалів Кримської правозахисної групи, інтернет-видань тощо), визначити сутність та особливості, форми і суб'єкти мілітаризації освітньо-виховного процесу анексованого півострова. **Методологія дослідження** спирається на принципи історизму, системності, науковості, авторської об'єктивності, на використання загальнонаукових (діалектичного, методу аналогій, методу аналізу й синтезу, індукції та дедукції, компаративного (порівняльного)), міждисциплінарних (методів філософії, політології, соціальної психології, синергетичного, статистичного аналізу, контекстуального аналізу), історичних (ретроспективного (історико-генетичного), проблемно-хронологічного, дискурс-аналізу, методу "виявлення" (detection)) методів. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що на основі залучення матеріалів відкритих джерел з'ясовано сутність, особливості, форми і суб'єкти мілітаризації освітньо-виховного процесу анексованого Російською Федерацією Криму впродовж 2014 – 2019 рр. **Висновки.** Зазначено, що трансформація громадського життя кримчан упродовж останніх п'яти років пов'язана передовсім з мілітаризацією освітньо-виховного процесу, спорту й культури. З цією метою серед дітей і молоді окупаційна влада проводить різноманітні заходи: ігри, конкурси, екскурсії, змагання на військову тематику, організовує воєнізовані дитячі табори, культурно-масові заходи, лекції, конференції, театралізовані вистави, створює спеціальні воєнізовані заклади освіти і класи, проводить уроки і зустрічі військово-патріотичного, духовно-патріотичного й патріотичного виховання тощо. Наймасштабнішими серед таких мілітарних заходів є різноманітні військово-спортивні й військово-патріотичні ігри. Констатовано, що змістовно політика мілітаризації освітньо-виховного процесу анексованого Криму спрямована, по-перше, на активну пропаганду служби в збройних силах Російської Федерації, у тому числі й контрактної; по-друге, на виховання численної армії потенційних носіїв і захисників "Русского міра"; по-третє, на культивування насильства і війни.

**Ключові слова:** мілітаризація освітньо-виховного процесу, окупований Крим, парамілітарні формування, військово-патріотичне виховання, військова підготовка, військова пропаганда.

**The Problem Statement.** Russian statehood in all its forms (the Moscow kingdom, the Russian Empire, the USSR, the present-day Russian Federation) was and still remains imperial in its internal essence and external manifestations throughout its existence. One of the basic characteristics of imperial Russian statehood is that for the empire, unlike the traditional nation state, there are no clear state borders, the imperial space is permanently extended to where there are carriers of the imperial idea. Therefore, the idea of armed defense of the rights of compatriots in other countries seems natural in terms of its imperial essence.

The consequence of the expansionist policy and the achievement of the corresponding victories is not only the inclusion in the common space and turnover of material and human



resources in the empire, but first of all the formation of relevant human material, a large army of defenders of the empire and “Russian world” – an authoritarian regime and universal Orthodoxal space built by the Kremlin’s bureaucracy.

**The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches.** There is a significant shortage of publications in national science and journalism devoted to clarifying the nature, defining features, forms and subjects of the educational process militarization in the occupied Crimea by the Russian Federation (2014 – 2019). Some aspects of the announced problem have been touched upon in numerous publications by Russian author O. Stepanov (Stepanov, 2010), Ukrainian researchers and human rights activists H. Koinash, O. Okhredko, O. Skrypnyk, I. Sedova (Koynash, 2019; Okhredko, 2018; Skrypnyk, Siedova, (Eds.), 2017). An urgent problem announced in our study is increasingly being echoed in the countries of the world, as evidenced by the resolution on “The Problem of Militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine), as well as parts of the Black and Azov Seas” adopted in December 2019 by 63 countries at the UN General Assembly (Militarizatsiya Kryma, 2019). The draft resolution was prepared by 39 countries, the most active of them are the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, the Baltic countries, Hungary, Bulgaria and the others.

**The Purpose of the Publication.** The purpose of the study is to try to determine the nature and specifics, forms and subjects of the educational process militarization in annexed peninsula attracting materials from open sources (information resources of the Russian Federation authorities, occupation authorities of Crimea, materials of the Regional Human Rights Center, the Crimean Human Rights Group, Helsinki Human Rights Union, ZMINA Human Rights Center, NGO Almenda Civic Education Center, online publications, etc.).

**The Main Material Statement.** Since the main tasks of the present Russian Federation is to strengthen statehood and its own geopolitical position in today’s rapidly changing globalized world, and to recognize the right of the Russian Federation to participate in the process of making key decisions for Eurasia at least, it is now in dire need of the human material, with appropriate psychology and values, the defenders of a personalized authoritarian political regime built by the Kremlin bureaucracy. This human material is programmed rigidly for the love of the state and the willingness to sacrifice life for its next ideocratic project in the realities of the Russian imperial state.

Putin’s authoritarian regime, realizing that it may lose enormous human resources, begins to return to the system of military and patriotic education, which effectively functioned in the USSR, updating it in line with the challenges of the times. First of all, in 2010, at the suggestion of the Prime Minister of that period of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, the initial military training in the upper classes of general educational institutions was restored as a necessary measure in connection with the reduction of service on the conscription from two years to a year. It is clear that the forms of military and patriotic upbringing of children and youth introduced in the Russian Federation extended to the Crimean peninsula occupied by it in 2014. The occupation of the Ukrainian Crimea by the Russian Federation resulted in the transfer of the state administrative apparatus and all policy directions on the annexed peninsula. According to the data of the Crimean human rights group, the transformation of the social life of the Crimeans is primarily due to the militarization of education, sports and culture. Kharkiv human rights activist Halyna Koinash is rightly concerned that “militarization serves a specific purpose and the danger posed by propaganda together with a “military and patriotic activity” cannot be underestimated” (Koynash, 2019).

Aggressive military propaganda is carried out through special state programmes financed not only by the federal budget, but also by the state (including paramilitary) organizations. Since the end of March of 2014, the Russian Federation has been implementing the strategy on education and upbringing of children and young people in Crimea (Strategiya razvitiya vospitaniya v Rossiyskoy Federatsii na period do 2025 goda, 2015), since April of 2014 – special state programmes “On Patriotic Education of Russian Citizens”. Now the state programme “On Patriotic Education of the Citizens of the Russian Federation for 2016 – 2020” is being implemented in the Crimea. It states that one of the goals of the programme is the military and patriotic education of the Russian Federation citizens and the formation of positive motivation among young people for military service (Gosprogramma po patrioticheskomu vospitaniyu RF, 2015). In December 2014 the concept of patriotic and spiritual and moral education of the population in the Republic of Crimea appeared and a large number of documents for its implementation (Okhredko, 2018).

In the field of general school education, sports and culture, the introduction of militarization is mainly due to the so-called military and patriotic education (Militarizatsiya zakhvatyvaet detey, 2018; Kruglogodichnoe voennoe vospitanie shkolnikov, 2019). The number of “landmark dates” associated with the gallant military past is steadily increasing, and each such date is marked by military staging, concerts and parades, with the mandatory presence of Russian military, representatives of the Russian or “Crimean” Cossacks, veterans and military participants in the Eastern Ukraine. In the context of “military and patriotic education”, each school hosts thematic lessons and events, relay races (for them they came up with the name – military and applied sports), which glorify the Russian army. All these activities are carried out with the involvement of “militias” involved in the war crimes against Ukraine who share memories of their “exploits” in the battles against enemies of the Russian state.

For realization of the educational process militarization tasks, formation of mobilization moods in the younger generation of the Crimea, the following forms of educational work, which have been successfully tested in the USSR, are widely used – organization of exhibitions of military equipment by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, holding special concerts for the purpose of propaganda of the service in the promotion of the service children and youth representatives of military commissariats special (“military and patriotic”) lessons focused on preparation for military service, participation of troops metalworkers in the organization of various children’s events (for example, dedicated to the Defender of Motherland Day), designed to promote service in the Russian army, holding various competitions, games, and relatively new – the creation of specialized classes (cadet and Cossack) with military education, solemn ceremonies institutions of the occupied Crimea, meetings of senior students with local military and patriotic organizations, regular holding of “the Crimean Cossack Union” the children’s Cossack games “the Cossacks Fun”, broadcasting videos of military exercises on the military-funded TV channel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation “Zvezda”, parades and exhibitions in the Crimea, holding festivals on military topics. Children from the Crimea are organized to take part in military and patriotic events organized by the Russian authorities on the territory of the Russian Federation. All these measures are aimed not only at militarizing the consciousness of the Crimean youth, but also at forming its Russian self-identification.

Earlier, the Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine to the Crimea, Borys Babin, stated that the temporarily occupied territory of the peninsula had become a “zone of continuous militarization”, and children of all ages were involved in the process of “common

warfare”. In the occupied Crimea there is a “system of involving children in paramilitary structures”, which “begins at kindergarten”. He stressed that “initial military training is absolutely compulsory and covers the vast majority of children”, otherwise, if children are shunned, “they will simply not be allowed to study at school, and parents will have huge problems with the Russian special services” (*Militarizatsiya zakhvatyvaet detey*, 2018).

The leading subjects of the educational process militarization in the annexed Crimea are, of course, the bodies of the central and local authorities of the Russian Federation, public organizations, educational establishments, political parties and more. The main executors of the state programme “On Patriotic Education of the Citizens of the Russian Federation for 2016 – 2020” are the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation, the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs (also known as Rosmolodez (in Russian: Росмолодежь) which literally means the Russian youth). It acts as the only profile national body of state power whose activity is entirely focused on the formation of youth policy. A list of 15 organizations that are the part of the Federal Register of Youth and Children’s Non-Governmental Organizations, which are supported by the state, is published on Rosmolodez website. Among them there is the NGO “Knight Association” (*Ustav organizatsii “Assotsiatsiya Vityazey”*, 1992). This organization also operates in the Crimea (*Otchet o provedenii v Krymu sportivnogo prazdnika*, 2016).

The programme of military and patriotic education of children and youth of the annexed Crimea is implemented by local authorities actively. The long-lasting imperial tradition has given rise to and relies on the special links of the imperial center with the national elites who are in fact delegated the function of intermediaries in managing their autonomy on behalf of the center (*Kudriachenko*, 2017, p. 266). Thus, the Ministry of Education of the Crimea on its official site contains information on the work on military and patriotic education of children and young people and budgetary expenses for it. Representatives of local authorities take care of various competitions, games (all-Crimean military and patriotic game “Zarnitsa”) (*Soobshchenie Minobrazovaniya Kryma o provedenii igry “Zarnitsa”*, 2016); the Crimean Republican military sports game “Pobeda” (*Prikaz o provedenii igry “Pobeda” v Krymu*, 2016), festivals on the military theme.

The Crimean law enforcement agencies are an important subject of the educational process militarization. For example, on April 30, 2016, the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea held a military and patriotic action dedicated to the celebration of the 71st anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War (German-Soviet War). During the rally, 150 junior students participated in the “dedication to the small defenders of Russia”, the event was also attended by the Russian military (Video: *Natalya Poklonskaya posvyatila shkolnikov v “Malenkie zashchitniki Rossii”*, 2016). N. Poklonskaya, who was a “prosecutor” of the Crimea at the time, created the “Little prosecutors” choir, where children, including younger school age, dressed in a military uniform, perform songs about the war. In turn, the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB of the Russian Federation) creates in the occupied Crimea military and patriotic clubs, in which children are introduced to the work of the FSB of the Russian Federation in order to popularize the service in this power structure.

The Crimean educational institutions are undoubtedly the main subject of systematic work on the militarization of youth consciousness. Military departments are opened at higher educational establishments (on the basis of Sevastopol State University and the Crimean Federal University named after V. I. Vernadsky); in general education – specialized classes

with military bias (cadets and cossacks) began to open as well (Obrazovanie v Krymu, 2018). Even though the Russian society has been convinced that war is a man's business for a long, the current government is trying to change that stereotype. Thus, in the 2017/18 academic year, 36 students were enrolled in the cadet class: 18 boys and 18 girls. And on February 25, 2018, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation S. Shoigu at the first All-Russian Youth Patriotic Forum "I – Young Army" declared that the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation plans to open a Cadet School for girls in Sevastopol (Obrazovanie v Krymu, 2018).

The occupation authorities of the Russian Federation have created special budgetary institutions of the Crimea subordinated to the relevant federal organizations. One of them is the Regional Center for Preparation for Military Service and Patriotic Education (also known as the Crimea Patriot Center), established on April 03, 2015. The Crimea Patriot Center organizes youth sports competitions in military and applied sports for children and young people, where training skills are mastered, throwing grenades and knives at the target, dressing and taking off a military-grade suit and gas mask, overcoming the obstacle course, performing special sports exercises (Soobshchenie o spartakiade po voenno-prikladnym vidam sporta, 2016).

The Federal State budgetary institution the Crimea Patriot Center is a subordinate agency of the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, whose projects are aimed at asserting the views on the "legitimacy" of the Crimea annexation in the Crimean society. It is also involved in military propaganda at the Russian State Military Historical and Cultural Center under the Government of the Russian Federation (Russian: Росвоенцентр, Rosvoencenter; lit. Russian War Center). The charter lists the center's main tasks as conducting memorial services; propaganda and media coverage of materials that reveal the heroic history and combat traditions of the Russian army and navy; promotion of military-patriotic education of youth (Ustav Rosvoentsentra, 1997).

The state-public organization "Russian Military Historical Society" conducts activities in the occupied Crimea aimed at militarization of public life, including the educational process. A considerable number of actions correlates with the victory in the Great Patriotic War ("Victory Alley", "Victory Lilac", "Victory Forest"), requiems, rallies, sports competitions, ceremonies, etc., are held (Informatsiya o meropriyatiyakh RVIO, 2016).

The branch of the state NGO "Voluntary Association for Assistance to Army, Air Forces and Navy" (Russian abbreviation – DOSAAF) does not stay away for military propaganda among children and youth. One of its main activities is to prepare young people for service in the armed forces of the Russian Federation. A regional unit of the Russian DOSAAF started operating in the Crimea since September 29, 2014. DOSAAF Crimean branch is a co-organizer of various paramilitary events for children and young people. One of them, "Race of Heroes", was held in Crimea on June 18, 2016 at the Russian Navy Black Sea Fleet range "Angarsk" (Soobshchenie o meropriyatii "Gonka geroev" v Krymu, 2016).

Various events promoting the service in the army of the Russian Federation and aimed at "legalizing" the occupation and creating a positive image of military and paramilitary formations, are being held by cultural institutions in the occupied Crimea (Skrypnyk, Siedova, 2017, pp. 29–30).

Many non-governmental organizations of the Crimea are also active agents of military-patriotic education of young people. Some of them operated on the peninsula before the occupation (for example, the Union of Monarchists of Russia), other militant organizations began to be established in the Crimea since April 2014. Some of them are affiliates of the Russian NGOs. For example, on March 16, 2015, a branch of the Union of Paratroopers of the

Crimea was formed in Yalta. On October 6, 2016, the organization together with the Union of Paratroopers of the Russian Federation held a military and patriotic relay race, during which the youth mastered the skills of handling weapons, got acquainted with the basics of military service (Statya: “V Krymu proshla voenno-patrioticheskaya sportivnaya estafeta”, 2016). As part of the project of All-Russian organization “Combat Brotherhood” every year (since 2015) in the village Novoozerne occurs youth patriotic camp-forum “The Crimea. Donuzlav” (V krymskiy patrioticheskii lager priekhali deti iz Donbassa, Sirii i Pridnestrovyya, 2015), which also involves the youth of the unrecognized Donbass republics (V krymskiy patrioticheskii lager priekhali deti iz Donbassa, Sirii i Pridnestrovyya, 2015; Delegatsiya iz LNR otpravilas v molodezhno-patrioticheskii lager-forum “Krym-Donuzlav–2018”, 2018).

Interregional biker’s NGO “Night Wolves” received a state grant of 12 million rubles for the implementation of the project “All-Russian Patriotic Youth Center “Patriot” in Sevastopol” (Soobshchenie o pobede v grantovom konkurse gospodderzhki NNO proekta “Park Patriot”, 2015). Night Wolves regularly organizes mass events of militaristic and anti-Ukrainian orientation for children and young people in place of the planned park in Sevastopol (Skrypnyk, Siedova, 2017, p. 31).

Using the experience of working with children in the USSR, children’s organizations are being created in the present Russian Federation, and the authorities have tried to implement them into the state system. Vladimir Putin created the “The Russian Movement of Schoolchildren” by the decree of the President of the Russian Federation in October of 2015. New organization uses the organizational form of a former pioneer organization. As of September 2016, 200 pilot schools have been operated and this movement is now actively spreading. However, it was still not the direction that would allow the credible support for the authoritarian Russian authorities. Therefore, in January of 2016, as the part of the state programme “The Russian Movement of Schoolchildren”, the Russian Defense Minister S. Shoigu initiated the creation of a new movement – the all-Russian military and patriotic social movement Young Army (Russian: Юнармия, Yunarmia). The initiative was readily supported at all levels and very quickly started to be drawn up by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, DOSAAF and the Central Army Sports Club (Russian abbreviation CSKA).

On July 29, 2016, the Unitarian Movement received state registration, and since then organizational structures have been established throughout the Russian Federation (85 Russian regions), including the occupied Crimea. Thus, a children’s paramilitary organization has emerged that has outward signs of a democratic union, however, in closer examination, it is another state militarized structure that works with children and youth (Sayt Yunarmii RF, 2016). Different military exercises using real weapons and military equipment, camps and rallies are carried out within the framework of the social movement. Volunteer and community activities have swept the country. The activities of the Young Army look somewhat like modernized Soviet military-sports movements (“Zornitsa”, “Orlyonok”), honorary guard at the Eternal Flame of Glory, etc. The organization has become a large-scale social movement directly involved in the militarization of the minds of children and adolescents (Rezultat rossiyskoy voennoy propagandy v okkupirovannom Sevastopole, 2017). Representatives of the Crimean Regional Unit of the Young Army use the infrastructure of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, CSKA and DOSAAF to conduct paramilitary activities under the auspices of the movement.

O. Okhredko, an expert, noted some features comparing the Young Army units activities in the Russian Federation and in the occupied Crimea: firstly, the percentage of the involved



children is much higher in the Crimea; secondly, there is a significant activity of the state occupation bodies in the life of the Young Army; thirdly, the Young Army activities are fully funded by the state and large funds are allocated for this purpose; fourthly, one of the main tasks of the Crimean Young Army is to eradicate the Ukrainian mentality and to form an enemy image of Ukraine; fifthly, the Russian authorities have a special focus on the Crimean Young Army unit (Okhredko, 2018). Children and youth of the occupied peninsula are regularly sent to military and patriotic, military and historical camps both in the Crimea and in the Russian Federation. Usually, such camps are funded by the Russian budget (Publikatsiya: “V Simferopole startovala aktsiya “Georgievskaya lentochka””, 2016).

Political parties of the Russian Federation (in particular, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the United Russia) take an active part in the propaganda of war and the militarization of the educational process, despite the fact that the activities of the Russian political parties in educational institutions are prohibited by the Law on Education, the Law on Political Parties prohibits the interference of political parties in the educational process of educational institutions. The Russian political parties' involvement in the militarization of the children and youth minds also contradicts the “Convention on the Rights of the Child” (Skrypnyk, Siedova, 2017, p. 33; Konventsiya o pravakh rebenka, 1989).

Various militarized formations (“People’s Militia” of the Crimea, “The Crimean Cossack Union”, etc.) carry out purposeful work on militarization of public consciousness and especially of youth and children. The first Cossack school was founded by Yalta Cossack unit in the village Beloglinka, Simferopol district in 2004, the occupation authority in the Crimea opened the first Cossack class with 36 pupils in the annexed peninsula at Simferopol Lyceum №10 in September 2016 (Okhredko, 2018).

They contribute actively to the creation of a positive attitude of the Crimean children and youth to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and religious organizations (first of all, the Russian Orthodox Church). Representatives of the clergy, along with members of the military and paramilitary groups, take part in various events, ceremonies and actions involving children and youth (Skrypnyk, Siedova, 2017, p. 33), conduct paramilitary Orthodox camps on the peninsula (Soobshchenie o lagere pravoslavnykh razvedchikov v Krymu, 2016), organize excursions on military issues for students. By “mixing” elements of religion into the events, they preach to children the idea that being a Russian military is a sacred affair.

A special place in the system of the educational process militarization is occupied by cadet schools. The system of the Soviet Suvorov and Nakhimov schools continued to operate in the post-Soviet states after the USSR collapse. Power structures (Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Emergency Situations, Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) began to create their own Suvorov schools in the Russian Federation starting from the 90s of the 20th century, similar schools are established throughout the country under the authority of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation. One of the leading institutions of this type in the occupied Crimea is the Federal State Educational Institution “Sevastopol Presidential Cadet School” (established in March 2014). Private educational institution “The Crimean Cossack Cadet Corps” was licensed by the Russian Federation for educational activities in November of 2015. The militarization of the educational process is also carried out by classes under the care of military, security structures, paramilitary units of the Russian Federation. In addition, the Russian invaders reformed the Ukrainian military educational establishments on the annexed peninsula. For example, in February of 2015, the Council of Ministers of the Occupied Crimea transformed

the Crimean Republican boarding school with enhanced military and physical training (opened in 2001) into the State Budgetary General Institution of the Republic of Crimea “Cadet Boarding School “The Crimean Cadet Corps”” (Okhredko, 2018). However, such activity in the occupied territory is prohibited by Art. 51 of the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.

Based on the official status of the Crimea as occupied territory, the Russian and local occupation authorities have violated humanitarian law by carrying out military propaganda among juvenile residents, preparing them for service in the Russian army. In violation of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 “On the Protection of Civilians during the War” and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted on 17 July 1998, the Russian Federation (as the occupying State) calls the Ukrainian citizens to join the occupation armed forces. The part of the Ukrainian citizens mobilized into the armed forces of the Russian Federation are forcibly transferred from the Crimea to the territory of the occupying country (Doklad o situatsii s pravami cheloveka v Ukraine, 2019). The persistent proposals to the residents of the annexed Crimea to continue their service in the Russian Armed Forces on a contractual basis is an important component of the information and propaganda influence of the Russian Federation. Using not only criminal and administrative legislation, economic pressure, but also informational resources, propaganda, militarization of the educational process, the Russian occupation power urges residents of the Crimea who are Ukrainian citizens to serve in their armed forces and paramilitary auxiliary units.

The Conclusions. A meticulous analysis of the present reality in the occupied Crimea allows to state that the policy of the educational process militarization in the annexed Crimea is directed to the following: firstly, the active propaganda of the service in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, including contract; secondly, producing a large army of potential carriers and defenders of the “Russian World”; thirdly, promotion of the violence and war. The promotion of service in the army and the general militarization of the children and young people minds are carried out by the de facto education system of the Russian Federation operating in the Crimea.

Proposed in 2012 by the President of the Russian Federation concept of the “historic Russia” as a polyethnic state-civilization in its synthesis with the well-known thesis about the nation-state model crisis clearly indicates that the Russian state and political elite have not resigned themselves and will not soon accept the need to recognize the Ukrainians of the “other”, not identical with the Russians, subject of history and inter-civilizational dialogue. Obviously the Russian Federation under Putin’s presidency will continue ramping up its efforts to involve Ukraine (primarily in a non-peaceful way) in its own sphere of influence, to confirm Ukraine’s membership in “historic Russia”. That is why school youth of the annexed Crimea will continue to be in the focus of the aggressor country political elite attention.

The militarization of the child’s consciousness, education, way of life looks like the main ideological way of the current power of the Russian Federation. Militarization activities take many forms, the most extensive of which are various militar and sports, military and patriotic games. They are organized at both local and national levels in different regions of Russia and the Crimea. The ultimate and desirable for the authorities result of such work is the formation of a cult of war, tolerance of violence, superficial and aggressive attitude towards the states and peoples that do not support the idea of “Russian world”. Moreover, children and young people of the Crimea are exclusively bound by “the Russian” identity, and ties with Ukraine as a country of their birth and citizenship are broken.

The tasks of militarization of the educational process on the annexed peninsula are inextricably linked with the actions of the Russian military, representatives of other law enforcement agencies, with the functioning of paramilitary units that purposefully transform the Crimea from a resort into a military base and a point of the permanent threat in the region. Obviously, after the liberation of the occupied Crimea, Ukraine will face the problem of children

and youth readaptation, especially those who participated in the Young Army movement and have been under the permanent pressure of militaristic, anti-Ukrainian propaganda.

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## РЕЦЕНЗІЇ / REVIEWS

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## CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL PARADIGM OF NATIONAL UNIVERSITY "OSTROH ACADEMY"

**Review of: Ostroh Academy: History and Modernity of the Cultural and Educational Center / ed. by I. Pasichnyk, P. Kraliuk, D. Shevchuk and the others. 3rd ed. Ostroh: Ostroh Academy National University Publishing House, 2019. 720 p.**

## КУЛЬТУРНО-ОСВІТНЯ ПАРАДИГМА НАЦІОНАЛЬНОГО УНІВЕРСИТЕТУ "ОСТРОЗЬКА АКАДЕМІЯ"

**Рецензія на: Острозька академія: історія та сучасність культурно-освітнього осередку / ред. І. Пасічника, П. Кралюка, Д. Шевчука та ін.  
Вид. 3-тє. Острог: Видавництво Національного університету "Острозька академія", 2019. 720 с.**

In 2019, a voluminous encyclopedic publication "Ostroh Academy: History and Modernity of the Cultural and Educational Center" was published within the project "Support



and Promotion of the 25th Anniversary of the Revival of the National University “Ostroh Academy” – the successor of the first higher education institution in Eastern Europe” with the support of “The Ukrainian Cultural Foundation”.

Ihor Pasichnyk, Rector of “Ostroh Academy” National University, Hero of Ukraine, Doctor of Psychology, Professor, honored scientist of public education of Ukraine, became the chairman of the editorial board consisting of ten highly respected scientists and teachers. The encyclopedic publication was reviewed for publication by M. Zhulynsky, Academician of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Director of Taras Shevchenko Institute of Literature of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and O. Fedoruk, Academician of the National Academy of Arts of Ukraine, Doctor of Arts.

In general, the content of the encyclopedic publication is very streamlined and logical, in a two-part form, on the principle of “history (the past) – present (the present)”. If the first part concerns the coverage of Ostroh Academy activity in the XVIth – the XVIIth and the study of the personalities involved into its activity, the second part reveals the basic principles of the institution at the present stage, the specifics of its educational, scientific and educational work.

The edition under review begins with “The Foreword” of the “duet” of authors – I. Pasichnyk and Peter Kraliuk, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, Honored activist of Science and Technology, in eleven languages: in addition to the Ukrainian original. There is the translation of the “Introductory Word” into English, German, French, Spanish, Polish, Swedish, Lithuanian, Crimean Tatar, Chinese, Hebrew and Arabic (pp. 4–48).

In the “Introductory Word” there is emphasized the important role of Prince Vasyl-Konstantyn Ostrozky (1526/1527 – 1608) – a cultural and political figure, a philanthropist, owing to whom Ostroh Academy was founded in 1576 – the first high school in Eastern Europe, one of the first permanent printing houses in Eastern Europe was opened, the Ostroh Bible and numerous liturgical books, theological treatises, polemical works, primers, etc., were published in the Slavic language. (pp. 4, 5). The activities of Ostroh Academy contributed to the rise of education, cultural progress, the establishment of international contacts: “Ostroh Academy gave impetus to the development of Greek studies, biblical studies, Slavic philology not only in Ukraine, but also in the Orthodox Slavs... Ostroh Academy influenced the development of education and culture not only in Ukraine but also in Eastern Europe significantly” (pp. 5, 6). The authors note that after the death of Prince V.-K. Ostrozky, the academy began to regress, until the cessation of activities in the 30’s of the XVIIth century. Its revival began during the period of independent Ukraine, after the appearance of the Decree No. 158/94 of April 12, 1994 of the President Leonid Kravchuk “On the Establishment of Ostroh Collegium”.

Rector I. Pasichnyk made a significant contribution to the development of Ostrohiana – educational, cultural and scientific. In the preface he identified strategic directions and prospects for the development of educational, scientific and innovative activities of the institution as a modern educational complex, which passed “from a specialized educational institution under the care of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy to a full-fledged university” (p. 6), which trains specialists in many specialties – history, law, economics, political science, philosophy, Ukrainian and foreign philology, international relations, public administration, national security, document science and information activities, psychology, primary education, country studies, religion, journalism, public health. According to President Leonid Kuchma’s Decree No. 1170 / 2000 of 30 October 2000, the university was granted a national status.

It is very valuable that the Academy positions itself not only as a powerful research center, but also as an important cultural and educational institution, which houses the academy

museum, art gallery, a room-museum of the women's school (1865 – 1923), a room-museum of a writer and statesman, Count Dmytro Mykolayovych Bludov (1785 – 1864), the cellars of the former Capuchin monastery are exhibited, old prints and iconography exhibitions are regularly held, and etc. The authors of the Foreword called Ostroh Academy "a pilgrimage place for people who honour Ukrainian national shrines" (p. 7), thus emphasizing its important spiritual and educational significance, as the institution aims "to educate high moral citizens for whom the Ukrainian idea – not an empty phrase, but a determinant of a national self-consciousness" (p. 7).

After the Foreword, the encyclopedic materials compiled by forty-one authors are arranged in an alphabetical order. They are devoted to the historical conditions of Ostroh Academy, the genealogy of the Ostroh family, coverage of the biography and activities of iconic figures of the Ukrainian nation – ascetics in the field of history, art, literature, philosophy, theology, etc. In encyclopedic materials great emphasis is laid on the study of sacred themes, iconography, historical monuments, descriptions of cultural and spiritual shrines and religious centers, socio-cultural artistic environment of Ostroh during the XVIth – the XVIIth centuries, etc. The multi-religious nature of cultural and religious contexts is noteworthy. It is positive that after the encyclopedic part there is a list of abbreviations of names of archives, museums, academic institutions, libraries, serial editions, etc. (p. 609).

The second part of the encyclopedic publication is devoted to the latest cultural and educational development of Ostroh Academy, and it contains 52 articles of forty-two researchers. It begins with four articles by Dmytro Shevchuk, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, Vice-Rector for scientific and pedagogical work of the National University "Ostroh Academy": "Academic Council of the National University "Ostroh Academy", "Rectorate", "Honorary Doctors and Honorary Professors of the National University "Ostroh Academy" (*Doctor Honoris Causa*)" and "Honorary Academicians of the Ostroh Academic Brotherhood" (pp. 625–632).

In accordance with the structure of the educational process, organized within the framework of state standards of higher education, this book details the activities of faculties (institutes) and departments: *the Faculty of the Humanities* (M. Karpovets), which includes the Department of Journalism (Z. Hodunok, N. Kruhlyk), the Department of Cultural Studies and Philosophy (J. Yankovska) and the Department of the Ukrainian Language and Literature (Z. Shostiuk); *the Faculty of Economics* (L. Kozak), which includes the Department of Economic and Mathematical Modeling and Information Technology (N. Ivanchuk), Department of Economic Theory, Management and Marketing (N. Ivanchuk) and Department of Finance, Accounting and Auditing (N. Ivanchuk); *Educational and Scientific Institute of Law named after Ioniki Malinovsky* (S. Ishchuk), consisting of the Department of State and Legal Disciplines (S. Ishchuk), the Department of Criminal Law (S. Ishchuk), the Department of Theory and History of State and Law (S. Ishchuk) and the Department of Civil Law Disciplines (S. Ishchuk); *Faculty of International Relations* (A. Atamanenko), which includes the Department of History named after M. Kowalski (V. Trofymovych, M. Blyzniak, A. Atamanenko), the Department of Regional Studies (S. Rudko) and the Department of International Relations (T. Sydoruk); *the Faculty of Political Information Management* (V. Lebediuk), consisting of the Department of Public Health (I. Hushchuk), the Department of Documentation and Information Activity (H. Okhrimenko), the Department of Political Science and National Security (V. Lebediuk) and the Department of Psychology and Pedagogy (O. Matlasevych); *the Faculty of Romance-Germanic Languages* (I. Kovalchuk),

which includes the Department of English Philology (A. Khudoliy), the Department of the English Language and Literature (O. Kostiuk), the Department of Indo-European Languages (V. Polishchuk) and the Department of International Language Communication (H. Kraichynska). The work of the Department of Physical Education (D. Shevchuk), the educational and scientific center of distance learning (D. Shevchuk), the scientific library of Ostroh Academy (Yu. Kotsiuk) and the international cooperation of the institution (E. Balashov) are analyzed as well.

The great scientific, historical and cultural value is noted of the old prints of the XVIth – the XIXth centuries from the fund of rare editions of the book collection of the university, which is a modern automated library and information center, including: “Chasoslov z misiatseslovom” (Pochaiv, 1759), “Kyiv-Pechersk Paterik”, “Apostol” (Lviv, 1654), “*Annales Ecclesiastici*” (Cologne, 1624), etc., and the others, the collection “Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire”, beginning with the “Conciliar Law” of 1649 and ending in 1913, 50 volumes of the “Encyclopedic Dictionary” by F. Brockhaus and I. Efron and the others (pp. 685–686).

It is emphasized that the institution provides training for bachelors, masters, candidates of sciences (doctors of philosophy) and doctors of sciences in many areas in full-time, part-time and distance forms. The authors of the book emphasize that Ostroh Academy is a powerful modern scientific and educational center, because there are specialized scientific councils for the defense of PhD and doctoral dissertations, scientific and practical conferences, seminars, symposiums, congresses, round tables, scientific readings, workshops and presentations are held, professional collections, journals, monographs are published, textbooks and teaching aids, certified programs, scientific circles, clubs and societies, master classes, internships, exchange of student programs, competitions of student works, business games (modeling of negotiations, meetings), sports contest “Health”, etc. It is commendable that Ostroh Academy provides academic and student mobility in numerous international projects (Tempus, Erasmus+, DAAD, OAED, IREX, UNDP, IRF, ACTR/ACCELS and the others), cooperates with 80 (!) foreign academic and educational institutions, scientific societies, foundations, etc.

In general, various articles and materials of the encyclopedic publication are marked by thoroughness, comprehensive coverage of the socio-cultural context of history and the current stage of the National University “Ostroh Academy”. The majority of the researches concerns the restoration of historical memory, historiography, and the process of reviving Ostroh Academy as the first higher education institution in Eastern Europe. In particular, the priority research interests of the Department of History include ostrohan, historiography of the history of Ukraine, socio-economic, source and historiographical aspects of the development of historical regions, national liberation struggles and church life, the Ukrainian-Polish relations, the Ukrainians from abroad and their history, etc. (p. 656). It is noted that the university organizes numerous national and patriotic events for students and teachers.

Evidence of the historical memory preservation of different peoples and an active civic and cultural position is the successful operation of a number of centers, laboratories and departments at Ostroh Academy<sup>1</sup>. In the encyclopedic publication the functioning of

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<sup>1</sup> In particular, there is a Center for National Security Studies; Center for Social Research; Center for Certificate Programmes and Trainings; Research Center “Institute of Practical Psychology and Psychotherapy”; Scientific and Practical Laboratory “Psychosocial Support and Rehabilitation of Victims of War”; Center for Political Studies; “Human Ecology and Public Health Research Center”; Research Laboratory “Laboratory of Cognitive Psychology”; Scientific and practical laboratory “Strategic Communications Studio”; Workshop of a practical psychologist, scientific circle “School of Gender Parity. Gender and We”; Scientific circle “Documentation Studies and Information activities: the Study of Modern Communication Processes”; Literary studies, etc.

the "Museum of History of the National University" "Ostroh Academy" is described in details (A. Heleniuk) with more than 1,5 thousand exhibits, the research center "Institute for Research of the Ukrainian Diaspora" (A. Atamanenko), Research Center for the Study of Scientific, Educational, Social and Political Heritage of the Academician of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, a native of Ostroh Ioniki Malinovsky (V. Popeliushko, O. Herasymchuk), Center for the Study of the Heritage of the Princes of Ostroh (I. Teslenko), Center for Islamic Studies (M. Yakubovych), Center for Political Studies (Yu. Matsievsky), Center for Social Research (V. Lebediuk), Center for Judaism (D. Tsolin), Laboratory of Gender Studies (M. Petrushkevych), Research Laboratory of Christian Ethics, Psychology and Pedagogy (V. Zhukovsky, S. Vlasova), Lexicographic Laboratory "Ostroh Neographer" (V. Maksymchuk), Cultural and Art Center (J. Bondarchuk, H. Handzilevska), Center for European Studies, etc. It is significant that at the Department of Cultural Studies and Philosophy, which studies culture in the horizon of stable and temporal identities, among other things, the annual scientific conference "Problems of Cultural Identity in the Situation of Modern Dialogue of Cultures" is held (p. 637).

The authors of the encyclopedic publication emphasize that an important page in the spiritual and social life of the institution belongs to the students, teachers church of St. Fedir Ostrozky (V. Zhukovsky), to the Brotherhood of Students of Ostroh Academy (B. Mykhalchuk), Ostroh Club of Free Intellectual Communication of Youth, the "Catharsis" Students and Teachers Theater, Ostroh City Center of the Federation of Debates of Ukraine, Students and Teachers research laboratory "School of Political Analysis "Policy"", etc. It is also important that owing to the public information analytical agency "Ostroh. Info", Laboratory of journalistic skills *J. Lab* (the head – R. Shulyk) – "creative hub of informal media education, coworking space" (p. 635) and "OstRadio", students of the Academy can implement their own media projects, compile a professional portfolio, take an active part in "socio-, nation- and state-building processes" (p. 635) both at the regional and national levels.

It is significant that there is an active student government – student council, which includes a secretariat and six committees (scientific, information, fundraising, volunteering, sports, cultural and mass work), annual camps are held in 10 prominent historical sites "Following the Footsteps of the Princes of Ostroh", International Festival of Social Advertising, Festival of Public Speaking to draw attention to important social topics, all-Ukrainian competition of essays in English, all-Ukrainian Internet Olympiad in English, all-Ukrainian Olympiad "Young Bible Scholars"<sup>2</sup>, all-Ukrainian festival-competition "Teacher of the Year of Religious Spiritual and Moral Subjects", etc. (p. 662, 666).

The description of the infrastructure of the architectural complex of Ostroh Academy (B. Novak, A. Heleniuk), the consideration of the participation of the staff of the institution in volunteering (R. Kalamazh) are written on the final pages of the encyclopedic publication and the section on the records of the institution (O. Kostyuchenko, L. Kasiyanenko), because the University "Ostroh Academy" set 10 records registered in the Book of Records of Ukraine, one – recorded in the Guinness Book of Records<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> On April 27, 2017, during the Xth Olympiad "Young Bible Scholars", the prayer "Our Father" was read in 24 languages, 310 people took part in the event. It is registered in the Book of Records of Ukraine as "Reading the prayer "Our Father" in the largest number of languages" (p. 701).

<sup>3</sup> The records of the institution include: the largest written honoring of the history of the Ukrainian song (June 16, 2011), the most massive performance of poetic works by Taras Shevchenko in the form of a poetic marathon (October 1, 2013), a non-stop poetic marathon dedicated to the 200th anniversary of Taras Shevchenko's birthday

In the encyclopedic publication, which is characterized by volume and thoroughness in the coverage of the material, illustrative materials are used from the funds of the National Library of Ukraine named after V. I. Vernadsky, there are presented photographs and prints, reproductions of ancient icons and sculptures, engravings and portraits that have significant scientific significance and cognitive function.

The encyclopedic publication has important scientific, encyclopedic reference and practical value. It is written for the humanities of a broad profile – historians, art critics, culturologists, teachers, literary critics, theologians, local historians and the others.

At the current socio-cultural stage of development, Ostroh Academy, as a powerful cultural and educational center with a high academic reputation, on the one hand, continues to preserve and multiply pre-established traditions, and on the other hand, – demonstrates the successful implementation and realization of modern educational standards, improves the quality of education, applies innovative technologies and approaches in the educational and scientific process, joining the European educational community successfully.

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(March 18, 2014), the most popular reading of the Bible texts by students and pupils (May 15, 2014), the most massive honey tasting (November 1, 2016), the longest performance of Christmas carols (January 28, 2017), reading of the prayer “Our Father” in the largest number of languages (April 27, 2017), continuous reading of poetry in the Ukrainian language (June 13, 2018), the broadest representation of Christian religious denominations in Ukraine and secular creative groups in glorification of Newborn Jesus Christ (January 26, 2019), simultaneous meeting on the platform of the institution of higher education of the diplomatic corps and employees of foreign diplomatic and consular missions representatives from the maximum number of countries (23.02.2019) (p. 713, 714).



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**ABOUT A LONER IN SOLITUDE**

**(Review: Hyrych Ihor. Viacheslav Lypynsky: The Farmer and the Soldier (The relation between the democratic and the conservative in his historiosophy). Kyiv, 2019. 310 p.)**

**ПРО САМІТНИКА У САМОТНОСТІ**

**(Рецензія на: Гирич Ігор. В'ячеслав Липинський: хлібороб і жовнір (Співвідношення демократичного і консервативного в його історіософії). Київ, 2019. 310 с.)**

Modern monographs devoted to V. Lypynsky were replenished by a new monographic study, "Viacheslav Lypynsky: The Farmer and the Soldier (The relation between the democratic and the conservative in his historiosophy). K.; 2019, 310 p.". The author of the study is a well-known Kyiv scholar Ihor Hyrych. The figure of Viacheslav Kazymyrovych Lypynsky has long attracted the scholar with his extraordinariness, his challenge not only towards the social environment in which he grew up and matured as a scientist, but also towards the powerful spirit in a sick body. Numerous source publications, analytical articles of I. Hyrych, and as a result – a reviewed monograph – all this significantly add to forming a wholesome portrait of a key ideologist of the Ukrainian conservatism.

In the title of the monograph, the author used one of the self-description of V. Lypynsky, which prompts the reader to search for an answer to the question: “Why did the main character of the study identify himself as a “farmer and a soldier?”. Throughout the pages, the attentive reader will find the answer and delve into the palette of life events of the main character of the story. Secondly, clarifying part of the title “The ratio of the democratic and the conservative in his historiosophy”, in our opinion, in somewhat constricted manner conveys the essence of what is stated in the study. Because the author tried not only to outline the essence of historiosophical views of Viacheslav Lypynsky as an intellectual, but also to show the context of philosophy of life, the environment of influence on his formation as a person, the connection of events and actions, sources of a creative laboratory. It is also worth emphasizing the successful combination of scientificity with a special manner of presentation, when complex theoretical reflections are transmitted in accessible language. This, in turn, expands the possible readership.

An important component of the coverage of the thinker’s biography is the author’s introductory article. From the first page, Ihor Borysovych brings the reader to the reception of V. Lypynsky’s personality as a Ukrainian statesman. He notes that he was “the first to propose to define the issue of independent Ukraine as the cornerstone of the political struggle of the Ukrainians for national liberation” (p. 7). But the author does not provide the title of the work or the time of such a statement. Enumerating the merits of V. Lypynsky as a historian who was able to rise above belonging to the Polish ethnic group and become a political Ukrainian, I. Hyrych rightly emphasizes the revolutionary nature of the slogan about the need for a political nation. However, the following statement of both the main character of the story and the author, who repeated this opinion without any reservation, is debatable. *It is the awareness of belonging to a certain territory that makes a person a representative of a certain nation: even the currently dominant culture or language does not yet determine that a person is non-Ukrainian.* Thus, Lypynsky expressed the revolutionary belief for the then society that it was a conscious choice that makes a former Maloros, “Rusky”, a Pole or a Jew a Ukrainian” (p. 9). We agree that a person’s conscious choice is decisive in such a complex issue as national identification, but its exclusively territorial component is not decisive, but only locational for a particular person. It can also be a place of action and even self-realization as a person. However, if a person does not share or care about the culture of the people among whom he/she lives, does not know its language cannot fully comprehend the prospects of their own and their descendants within the territory, not to mention belonging to the nation. And the proof of that is the family history of V. Lypynsky. Among those Poles who lived at the territory of Right-Bank Ukraine and had a certain reverence for it and even spoke Ukrainian, they failed to support the Ukrainian independence movement ideologically. This is exactly what Maksym Slavinsky wrote sadly in a review of Kostya Matsievych’s memoirs “The Life of my Contemporary”. “At that time, the Polish community failed to justify its intentions. Its ideological picture appeared much later, in fact, already in exile, in the works of the late V. Lypynsky, especially in his complicated and hot ”Letters to the Brothers-Farmers”. But this ideology came when there was no urgent need for it. “That is, between theoretical concepts and the practice of existence an insurmountable gap of conventions, circumstances and imperfections can be sometimes.

In the Introduction, the author elaborately reviewed the historiography of the issue. He focused on the characteristics of the works of the interwar period more thoroughly. At the same time, it is stated rather briefly about the polemic and critical remarks regarding the

historiosophical heritage of V. Lypynsky by the representatives of the republican democratic Ukrainian state school (p. 12). Modern V. Lypynsky historiography is written filigree, objectively, without bypassing any of the authors and paying tribute to each.

Chapter I “I. Republican Conservative: V. Lypynsky before the Ukrainian Revolution (1917 – 1921)” is quite rich and informative in its content. In this section, the chronology of events in V. Lypynsky’s biography from 1882 to 1917 falls on the outline of events, relationships with different people. For example, to name a few: “V. Lypynsky in 1907 – 1914”, “Itinerary of V. Lypynsky’s Movements”, “Health Problems”, “Workshop (salon) of Maria Trebinska in Kyiv (at the end of the 1890s – 1909)”, “Viacheslav Lypynsky in Geneva”, “V. Lypynsky Educator”, “Nobility in Ukraine” (1909), “Agricultural Work on the Farm “Rusalivsky Chahari” and the others. Ihor Hyrych is a brilliant connoisseur of sources, events, and portrays various images of V. Lypynsky in: relations with Ukrainian figures, in complex psychological states, in writing works and discussions around them, in search of a scientific concept of his own intentions. However, the author’s thesis that the appearance of “Z dziejów Ukrainy” in 1912 “immediately places him (V. Lypynsky – authors) among the most prominent historians of Ukraine” seems somewhat unexpected and substantiated insufficiently for us (p. 40). Neither in principle, nor in the discussions of the then intellectual circles, nor in the receptions of contemporaries, such statement was noticed. Although some changes took place in the scientific life of V. Lypynsky. He was elected a full member (academician) of T. Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv and the Ukrainian Scientific Society in Kyiv.

It is known that in July 1913 V. Lypynsky settled in the estate of his uncle on the maternal line Adam Rokytsky in the village of Rusalivka in Cherkasy region. He lived there for almost a year among the “Ukrainian elements” of the Polish nobility. “Adam Rokytsky presented V. Lypynsky with a lot of land in the Rusalivsky Chahari tract, which is 5 layers away from Rusalivka. Vyacheslav Kazymyrovych received 160 tithes” (p. 42). It was here that he tried to become the farmer who would not only have love of the land and produce on it, but also immerse into relations with the Ukrainian peasantry. However, this experiment did not last long.

In the communication and business circle of V. Lypynsky in the pre-war period were: Vasyl Domanytsky, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Serhiy Yefremov, B. Yaroshevsky. He is published in the Rada newspaper, *Przegląd i Krajowość*. And as I. Hyrych states, – “The figure of V. Lypynsky at this time is becoming not only visible in public circles, but also dangerous for the political agitation of the Polish parties on the Right Bank” (p. 47). Journalistic discussions are gaining wide scope and publicity. The author of the monograph examines in detail V. Lypynsky’s positions on various issues, including such a sensitive issue for both Ukrainians and Poles as the “Lithuanian” question in Poland and in our country” (p. 63), on the territorialism of the meeting and relations with the local population, the imperial whims of the Poles, and etc. Ihor Borysovych also draws attention to the then everyday life of Viacheslav Kazymyrovych, his financial affairs, relations with his father, bohemian lifestyle (pp. 79–80) and characterizes the unrealized intentions and lost works of his character (pp. 92–95).

Chapter II of the monograph is entitled “*Political and ideological background of V. Lypynsky’s activity*”. In this chapter, I. Hyrych tried to answer the question – when exactly V. Lypynsky “became one hundred percent conservative and supporter of monarchical power” (p. 98). In his search, the author turns to comparisons, analogies, opinions of different people who knew V. Lypynsky and contacted him. He considers the relations between Viacheslav Kazymyrovych and the Ukrainian national democracy at the beginning of the twentieth century

and the attitude of the democrats towards V. Lypynsky; relations with Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Yevhen Chykalenko, Andriy Zhuk; relations with the Ukrainian Social-Democracy and Polish political and cultural forces. Due to the saturation of eventful factual material in this section, it sometimes seems that the author's opinion on a particular issue is incomplete.

In Chapter III "Historiosophy of V. Lypynsky in his political journalism" the author analyzes several problems that were actualized in 1908 – 1917 by Vyacheslav Kazymyrovych. First of all, he draws analysis of the political pamphlet "Our Situation in Rus'-Ukraine" (1909), in which V. Lypynsky characterized the Polish public opinion of the time, classifying it into groups: 1) conservative regional (landlord); 2) national democratic (all-Polish); 3) "intellectual" gradual (where Russian cosmopolitanism is combined with feeling for the Ukrainians and 4) regional democratic (p. 140). And although these groups were slightly modified, the directions remained quite unchanged. I. Hyrych quite rightly notes that V. Lypynsky "even before the revolution distinguished between the book-theoretical approach to the Ukrainian question by the clerisy and the deep, genetically rooted instinct of the masses to gain freedom, the militant instinct of resistance to foreign armed forces, which try to stop" (p. 143). The thoughtful reader will be interested in the item "The ratio of class and national. Revolutionary for gaining independence". V. Lypynsky condemned the destructive force of class riots firmly (p. 149), was a supporter of private land ownership and considered the leadership function of the nobility in the Ukrainian society, although he was aware of its small number.

Probably the most relevant of all the questions addressed by V. Lypynsky in the pre-revolutionary period were the concepts of "nation", "territorialism", "independence". I. B. Hyrych believes that "V. Lypynsky's idea of territorialism solved two key tasks of the national cause, which could not be solved by the traditional populist national democratic thought. Firstly, this idea made it possible to overcome the problem of unstructured society in the national sense, because the Ukrainians were declared all the inhabitants of the Ukrainian land, regardless of their ethnic origin, but on the basis of the Ukrainian culture. As a result, the constant mental opposition between the Ukrainians, on the one hand, and the Poles, the Russians, and the Jews, on the other hand, was theoretically overcome.... Secondly, the idea of territorialism solved the problem of building an independent state because in mind it drew the state borders between Ukraine on the one hand, and Russia and Poland – on the other hand. The latter were the main stakeholders in the continuation of Ukraine's colonial status" (pp. 172–173). It is difficult to agree with this opinion because to overcome the unstructured Ukrainian society only by declaring all residents the Ukrainians at the beginning of the twentieth century was not possible. Social unstructuredness, in our opinion, depended not so much on the recognition of the existing social hierarchy at that time as, in the context of modernization changes, on the access to the use of resources (private, public). And since the Ukrainians, the the Poles and the Jews were limited by the empire in their capabilities (of course, each in his own way), respectively, each aimed to care not only about solving their national question within the Ukrainian territory, but mainly – solving their own state building and national independence. For the Ukrainians, such a non-state-imperial resource was cooperation, which allowed not only to buy land, but also to compete with Russian and other assets in Ukraine and invest in cultural and educational work. And thus expand the resources for statehood. And territorialism in itself can solve national issues only "theoretically".

Chapter IV "Vyacheslav Lypynsky during the Ukrainian Revolution and in Exile" immerses the reader in the most turbulent period of life of the Ukrainian intellectual. It was

then that he started active party and political work, joined the creation of the Ukrainian Democratic Agricultural Party, became a diplomat and one of the promoters of the hetman's ideology in the world, cooperated with the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin. The author of the monograph rightly states that the historical study "Ukraine at a Turning Point" (1920) was an outstanding work of V. Lypynsky, which, according to many historians, marked the beginning of state historiography (p. 211).

At the end of the chapter, the author reviews in detail the causes of V. Lypynsky's conflict with Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky and its consequences and summarizes quite succinctly: "V. Lypynsky did not tolerate fundamental compromises, just as he did not tolerate the compromises of the rotten ones" (p. 264).

The last chapter of the book "Letters to the Brothers-Farmers": Ideology, Social Concepts and Messages"" is devoted to the conceptual work of V. Lypynsky, which substantiates the idea of a labour monarchy. As the author notes, "the work itself has a systematic and consciousness forming direction" (p. 267). The reader will find for himself not only the pleasure of the author's vision of the perception of the monarchical idea, but also the reception of it in later times. Fascinated by the object of his research, I. Hyrych could not help but fall under the influence of the powerful intellectual and personal charisma of V. Lypynsky and, in our opinion, somewhat overestimates the resonance of his ideas at that time.

As a summary, it is quite correct to state that I. B. Hyrych coped with the task of "combining both components: factual history and interpretive history" completely (p. 17). Readers will enjoy reading the intellectual biography of an extraordinary individual, a lone hermit, Viacheslav Lypynsky, for whom the struggle and scientific defense of independent Ukraine became the meaning of life.

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**TRANSFORMATIONS OF CULTURE / MEMORY POLICY IN MODERN UKRAINE**

**(review of the monograph: Culture of Memory of Modern Ukrainian Society:**

**Transformation, Decommunization, Europeanization: monograph / O. Hrytsenko, N. Honcharenko, I. Kuznetsova and the others. Kyiv: Institute of Cultural Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2020. 352 p.; 15 illustrations)**

**ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ КУЛЬТУРИ/ПОЛІТИКИ ПАМ'ЯТІ В СУЧАСНІЙ**

**УКРАЇНІ (рецензія на монографію: Культура пам'яті сучасного українського суспільства: трансформація, декомунізація, європеїзація: монографія / Гриценко О., Гончаренко Н., Кузнєцова І. та ін. Київ: Ін-т культурології НАМ України, 2020. 352 с.; 15 іл.)**

In 2020, a group of scientists from the Institute of Cultural Studies of the National Academy of Arts of Ukraine published a monograph "Culture of Memory of Modern Ukrainian society: Transformation, Decommunization, Europeanization". One of the key authors of the book was a well-known scientist, translator, specialist in the field of cultural

policy, memory policy, cultural studies, historian, candidate of technical sciences Olexander Hrytsenko (1957 – 2020).

It should be noted that O. Hrytsenko is the author of many monographs, scientific articles, a participant in numerous scientific conferences in European countries, a connoisseur of several foreign languages. Among his monographs, the greatest attention of researchers, including historians and political scientists, attracted two monographs. The first one – “Memory of Local Production” (2014) – is devoted to the “policy of memory” of the first two decades of independence in two territorially close, but very different cities of Cherkasy region – the historic Zvenyhorodka and Vatutino, which emerged after World War II as a mining village near the coal mine. The second monograph, fundamental work of more than a thousand pages, “Presidents and Memory” (2017), focuses on different approaches to shaping the historical memory of modern Ukrainians professed by Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yushchenko, and Viktor Yanukovich.

The Foreword to the monograph under review was written by Anna Chmil, Doctor of Philosophy. In the Introduction to the monograph O. Hrytsenko emphasized that one of the most necessary and difficult objectives in the context of his research is the definition of concepts. First of all, the scientist cited the opinion of Yuri Shapoval, a historian: “Collective memory, historical memory, cultural memory, social memory, public memory, national memory – these concepts are used by researchers, quite often without finding a common language, without producing one well-established definition. However, it is always about memory as a channel for the transmission of historical experience and a factor in the formation of a national identity”. Based on this definition, O. Hrytsenko comprehended simultaneously the “theory of a cultural memory” of Jan Assmann, the German historian and Egyptologist, in which the key is the distinction between a communicative and cultural memory. According to J. Assman, a communicative memory is an idea of the past, formed in the daily communication of several (three – four) generations of living members of the community. Instead, a cultural memory connects many generations of the community; it is a consequence of the existence of numerous means of preserving information about past experiences, which the community uses to preserve its own way of life, its common identity. This set of “mnemonics” J. Assman calls the culture of memory (*Erinnerungskultur*); it provides an opportunity to revive the way of life (culture) and identity of the community after crises and threats (p. 13).

According to O. Hrytsenko, the model of a collective memory as a system (and not only as a set of ideas about the past, shared by the majority of the community) is fully compatible with the concept of memory culture of Jan Assman. Thus, he proposed a working definition of a collective memory as a system (or subsystem in the complex system of a modern society culture): “Collective memory is a system, the main components of which are: a changing set of ideas about the past that exist in the communication space of the community and are shared by most or at least a significant part of the community / society; subjects of ideas formation about the past (scientific, educational, cultural institutions, authorities, other opinion-making centers of society); infrastructure (institutions, communication channels and practices, mnemonics), which ensures the ability of the society to form, accumulate and store information (knowledge) about common experience, and, if necessary, – to update, rethink, use it for self-preservation, self-regulation and community development” (p. 14).

We should emphasize that one of the results of the memory policy analysis, comprehension of its theoretical and practical aspects is the “Conceptual Model of the Memory Culture of Ukraine” developed by O. Hrytsenko, which shows the complex relationships of basic concepts and interactions between people of different levels (p. 22).

In Chapter I “Post-communist Transformation of Ukrainian Culture and the Interaction of Ukrainian and Polish Historical Discourses” O. Hrytsenko analyzed the transformation of the culture of post-communist countries (including Ukraine in the context of Central and Eastern Europe), outlined the connections and compared the memory cultures of Ukraine and Poland in the historical context. In addition, the researcher considered the issues of historical research as an element of the memory culture, illustrating his reasoning by analyzing views on the interwar period in modern Ukrainian and Polish publications.

In Chapter I, O. Hrytsenko declares the importance of forming the national cultural space of Ukraine for its cultural transformation. He defines the national cultural space as a set of spheres of a socio-cultural activity, which together are able to provide cultural, linguistic, information needs of citizens. He covers the spheres of artistic, cultural and educational, leisure activities (professional and amateur), the air space of electronic mass media, the Ukrainian Internet resources, the national print media market, book publishing and book distribution, other cultural and artistic products and services, as well as related areas – education, science, civil society. The researcher emphasized that the weak integration of certain regions or social groups of Ukraine in the national context, their focus on narrow regional or foreign cultural industries and electronic media deprives the integrity of the national cultural space, makes it vulnerable to external interference (p. 55).

The researcher emphasizes that at present in Ukraine there are no leading positions of the national product in the main markets of cultural and artistic goods (book, film and video, press, music). The Russian entertainment programmes, Russian (and translated into Russian) popular literature, and finally the infamous Russian “pop”, “chanson”, and nowadays – “rap” still occupy a prominent place in the cultural and leisure "diet" of the average citizen of Ukraine. Prolonged violation of the integrity of the national cultural space causes significant differences in value systems, ideological orientations, sources of cultural and social information that arise between the population of certain regions of the country, as well as between large social groups on religious, linguistic and other grounds (p. 56).

Interesting are O. Hrytsenko's arguments about different visions of the Ukrainian and Polish historians on different aspects of the common past of Ukraine and Poland. The researcher noted that the joint work of the Ukrainian and Polish scientists to find unambiguous answers to painful questions was not successful. And this, by the way, is considered normal. Because a scientist is also a member of the society, the son of his people, he grew up in the social historical discourse of his country, and therefore he uses the concepts and ideas formed by that discourse, without noticing it. However, the “national features” of terminology and argumentation are pronounced when the historian addresses a foreign audience accustomed to other terms, stereotypes and evaluative judgments. Because of this, a foreign reader becomes wary of the author's arguments, and this turns into their unconvincingness, and even generates a complete rejection. Even publications aimed at, let's say, building bridges between the Polish and Ukrainian visions of the “difficult issues” of the past, due to their authors' too close belonging to the discursive mainstream of their memory cultures, become another illustration of how mutual empathy between historians of the two countries is getting lower (p. 89).

The author concludes that in the memory cultures of both countries there are elements that are objectively able to generate conflicts between them, but – on condition of their political actualization. For the Polish culture of memory, it is a close connection between the memory of “Volyn–1943” and the myth of “the Polish Eastern Kressy”, deeply rooted in the national culture, containing nostalgic imperialist elements, and the mythologized history

of the “cursed soldiers” of the Army Krayova. Such cultural constructions, positioned at the center of collective memory, hinder the spread of a broader, balanced view of many events in the society, including the bloody ethnic cleansing of 1943 – 1944 (p. 89).

For the Ukrainian culture of memory, such structures-obstacles are first of all formed by populist historiography and strengthened by the Soviet historiography, and therefore deeply rooted in the public consciousness mythology about the times of the ancient Commonwealth in Ukraine as the period of “Polish-noble oppression”, which legitimizes almost any anti-Polish actions (such as the “Uman massacre” committed by Haydamak Zalizniak and Honta), as a just struggle of the people against the mentioned above oppression. A later, ideologically anti-communist, but narratively similar myth about the UPA's armed struggle conveniently rests on the older layer of this mythology, which at the beginning of the XXIst century partially incorporated into the official narrative of the “Ukrainian liberation movement of the XXth century”. The heroic and sacrificial mythology of the UPA, like the mythology of the AK in Poland, is supported by a powerful layer of communicative memory of the population of Galicia and Volhynia, whose traumatic experiences and family memories are closely linked to nationalist underground activities and the Soviet repression against “the Ukrainian nationalists” (pp. 89–90).

O. Hrytsenko notes that in Poland and Ukraine these heroic and sacrificial myths have a considerable audience and from time to time are exploited in the state policy of memory, they are reproduced and affirmed by popular cultures (historical fiction, fictionalized memoirs, as well as films, TV shows and comics), forming an ever-thicker layer of a cultural memory which is increasingly difficult to deconstruct by spreading balanced, less conflicting ideas about the past of the two peoples. Thus, the scholar identifies the causes of chronic conflicts in the Ukrainian-Polish relations over the “difficult issues” of the past. The first reason is the presence of deeply traumatic events in the common past, even relatively recent (there are living witnesses in both countries) and such events the moral and political assessments of their participants, common in Polish and Ukrainian societies, are radically different (“our” – heroes, “their” – villains). The second reason is the presence of numerous and influential groups and even institutions in both countries that formed and cultivated radical narratives about these traumatic events, and consistently sought universal recognition of these narratives as the only acceptable “historical truth”. The situation is complicated with the fact that these radical groups also include those for whom these tragic events form an important part of a personal or family experience, i. e., an important part of their group identities and the communicative memory of the society. Traumatic memory determines the dominance of the “do not give up” instruction in relationships with other social groups. The third reason: the political elites of both countries in their memory policy traditionally consider the priority to solve not those problems that arose in bilateral relations with neighbours, but those that may prevent them from winning the next election. It is obviously impossible to eliminate or neutralize completely any of these causes, and it is quite difficult to limit their negative impact on the Ukrainian-Polish relations significantly. Therefore, to hope that in the nearest future a deep and stable understanding of the two countries and societies in the field of “common history” is possible is at least naive (pp. 90–91).

In Chapter II “Decommunization of the Culture of Memory as a Key Factor in Transformation: Public Policy and Public Reception” O. Hrytsenko analyzes the process of decommunization of the discourse of the state policy and memorial practices about World War II in Ukraine; characterizes the implementation of “decommunization” legislation and monument protection; considers decommunization as a socio-cultural phenomenon.

Analyzing the policy of memory in Ukraine after 2014, O. Hrytsenko singled out several key messages of the new official discourse of World War II: 1) for Ukraine the war did not begin on June 22, 1941, but in September of 1939; it was caused by an agreement between the two criminal regimes; 2) during the war both totalitarian regimes committed mass crimes, neither of them was a “liberator”; 3) during the war, Ukraine suffered greater human losses than the United States, Britain, France and Canada combined; 4) the Ukrainians, as a “divided nation”, fought in many armies, but only in the UPA did they fight under their national flag; 5) we do not celebrate Victory Day using salutes and fireworks, we celebrate Remembrance Day, honoring the participants and victims of the war; 6) “Ukraine will no longer celebrate Victory Day according to the Russian scenario” (President Petro Poroshenko), because today, like 70 years ago, Ukraine is defending itself from aggression (p. 138).

The researcher emphasizes that the decommunized official discourse of World War II revealed several main motives: a) de-Sovietization – rejection of the Soviet mythology of the “Great Patriotic War” and the ideological terminology formed by it; b) European integration – introduction of certain memorial practices, dates, symbols adopted in Europe (May 8, poppy flower, etc.); c) Ukrainization – emphasis on the “Ukrainian dimension” of the war, the participation of the Ukrainian people in the war, its victims and “victories”, the inclusion of the Ukrainian liberation movement in the narrative of World War II; d) actualization – emphasizing the connection between the fight against the Nazi aggression and today's protection of Ukraine from the Russian aggression; inclusion of anti-terrorist operation veterans into the circle of those who should be honoured on May 8 and 9. O. Hrytsenko emphasizes a certain hybridity of the new discourse, partly enshrined in the decommunization legislation, which continues to protect the monuments of the “Great Patriotic War”. O. Hrytsenko considers the preservation of Victory Day on May 9 to be a sign of hybridity and eclecticism of the new official discourse on the war. Some inconsistency in the new discourse led to the introduction of European “anti-heroism” approaches to the memorialization of war, which is not always combined successfully with honouring the “mass heroism” of the people in war, as well as another innovation – the inclusion of “new heroes”, in particular – members of the Ukrainian nationalist movement of the 1940s, in the circle of the honoured ones (pp. 138–139).

At the same time, O. Hrytsenko presented his own interpretation of decommunization as a socio-cultural phenomenon, focusing on the following aspects: the creation of this phenomenon, its regulation and social reception, the identities generated by it, its representation in a cultural communication. In his opinion, the decommunization of 2015 – 2020 in Ukraine took the form of three narratives: “cleansing”, “banderization” and “liberal” (pp. 166–180).

In Chapter III “Reception of Cultural Heritage of the XIXth – XXth centuries in the public consciousness of modern Ukraine” there are covered the works of Oleksandr Hrytsenko, Violeta Demeshchenko, Olena Berehova, Nadiya Honcharenko on honouring the memory and creative heritage of Ivan Franko, Les Kurbas, and the Ukrainian the Sixties, as well as the issue of presenting biographies of the Soviet cultural figures in Ukrainian school textbooks on history. The authors, in particular, note a strong trend of instrumentalization of the state honouring the memory of Ivan Franko, aimed at using the symbolic capital of “Kamieniar” not only in a political struggle, but also in solving local social and economic problems. At the same time, the authors note, firstly, the persistence and rootedness of the Soviet models of honouring the memory of prominent figures and the principles of memory policy; and secondly, the significant inertia of the scientific environment in the (re)understanding of I. Franko's creative and intellectual heritage, the niche nature of attempts not just to “repaint



Kameniar in national colours”, but really rethink his creative and intellectual heritage using modern conceptual and methodological tools (p. 218).

The conclusions of the section on the presentation of biographies of the Soviet cultural figures in the Ukrainian school textbooks on history seem to us to be somewhat simplified and declarative. The author Nadiya Honcharenko, notes that a complete and comprehensive presentation of biographies of cultural figures in textbooks can be an important didactic tool, because reading the biography helps to study the society through the individual: on the one hand – it helps to individualize the historical process, and on the other hand – it deepens the reconstruction of the past by studying the life of the individual. The educational aspect of biographical information is important, which can offer worthy examples to follow. She notes that the presentation of comprehensive information about prominent figures of the past, in particular, cultural figures as bearers and representatives of historical and cultural heritage, could contribute to a better understanding of historical events, especially events and phenomena of the Soviet period (p. 273). In our opinion, these are somewhat superficial and declarative pedagogical theses, which do not deserve the role of generalization in a scientific research.

In Chapter IV “Europeanization of the Culture of Memory in Ukraine through Understanding of Humanitarian Catastrophies” Nadiya Honcharenko focused on the historical and cultural heritage of the Crimean Tatar people in the cultural space of modern Ukraine; Valentyn Riabenky emphasized the drama of the history of Crimea in the modern sense, and Inna Kuznetsova clarified the problem of memory of the Ukrainian society genocide in the XXth century (the Holodomor, the Holocaust, deportations). Nadiya Honcharenko covered the main memory channels of the tragedy of the Crimean Tatars in 1944: scientific research, fiction, television journalism, feature films (including Haytarma, 2012), museums, etc. The researcher noted that nowadays it is critical to spread comprehensive information by other means – the publication of popular science publications in large editions and affordable ones (or free); production of TV programmes representing the historical and cultural heritage of the Crimean Tatar people, with the involvement of scientists (rather than regular chatterboxes – favorites of TV channels); production and distribution of feature films, which should form not only intellectual guidelines, but also emotional reception of the Crimean Tatar issues; translations into Ukrainian and dissemination of works of the Crimean Tatar literature – both classical and modern – in order to form an adequate idea of its history and new tendencies (p. 284).

Valentyn Riabenky, based on Umberto Eco's concept of ur-fascism (1995), in his article tried to prove the existence of ur-fascism in the Russian Federation, demonstrating this by the example of the history of Crimea. He uses the term “communo-fascism” actively, borrowing it from the phraseology of Nobel Laureate Academician I. Pavlov (pp. 320–326). In countering Russia's “hybrid” aggression and in search of mechanisms to reduce its influence, he proposes, to increase military capabilities along with strengthening the country's security sector; to provide, as a priority of the state policy, legislative, tax, financial support for the Ukrainian science, education and culture, in particular – cultural industries (public television, cinema, publishing, exhibition, touring). After all, the development of critical thinking, the introduction of useful educational skills, the dissemination of quality and competitive national cultural product will contribute to the formation of a holistic and powerful information and cultural space of Ukraine, able to protect our compatriots from the propaganda invasion of the Russian Federation (p. 327).

In Inna Kuznetsova's article, the genocidal actions against the Ukrainian society carried out by the Soviet state in the XXth century included not only the Holodomor and the

Holocaust, but also deportations, including the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944. In her opinion, it will be useful to continue the work to establish the truth about Ukraine in the world and to revive the historical memory of the Ukrainians – the creators of the Ukrainian political nation, remembering the views of a scientist and a nobleman Rafal Lemkin. Since hybrid warfare, in addition to information and psychological (facts, information, short-term impact on the consciousness of the society), has a cognitive component (interpretation, identity, self-identification, concepts of the past-present-future, etc.), domestic scientists and experts should be the “first to meet the enemy” – to identify / expose the “new language of Ur-Fascism”, to reject the sporadic, unsystematic, non-conceptual nature of the humanities researches and to propose a methodology for analyzing the construction of a picture of the world in the opposition to the aggression of the Russian Federation (p. 340).

The peer-reviewed monograph is not without certain shortcomings inherent in collective monographs: a certain thematic and semantic eclecticism, inconsistency of conclusions, some journalism, superficiality of the proposed ideas for solving problems.

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## NOTES

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