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ЗМІСТ

Микола ОЛІЙНИК РИМСЬКИЙ ВІЙСЬКОВИЙ ДИПЛОМ ЯК ІСТОРИЧНИЙ ДОКУМЕНТ	8
Ярослав АНДРУСЯК ПРОТИСТОЯННЯ МІЖ ОСМАНСЬКОЮ ІМПЕРІЄЮ ТА СВЯЩЕННОЮ РИМСЬКОЮ ІМПЕРІЄЮ В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНО-СХІДНІЙ ЄВРОПІ ТА ПОЗИЦІЯ ЧЕСЬКОЇ ШЛЯХТИ (КІНЕЦЬ XV – 30-ті рр. XVI ст.)	23
Фергад ТУРАНЛІ ЗЕМЛІ УКРАЇНИ ЯК ВАЖЛИВИЙ ЧИННИК У РОЗВИТКУ ТОРГІВЕЛЬНИХ І ГЕОПОЛІТИЧНИХ КОНТАКТІВ ЗА ДАНИМИ АРАБОГРАФІЧНИХ ПИСЕМНИХ ДЖЕРЕЛ	35
Світлана КАГАМЛИК ЯК МОСКВА КОЛОНІЗУВАЛА КИЄВО-ПЕЧЕРСЬКУ ЛАВРУ. НОВІ СТОРІНКИ ДО ІСТОРІЇ УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ДРУКАРСТВА ДРУГОЇ ПОЛОВИНИ XVIII ст.	54
Леся СМУТОК, Ярослав ЛИСЕЙКО ІНКОРПОРАЦІЯ ШЛЯХТИ В ГАЛИЧИНІ ДО РИЦАРСЬКОГО СТАНУ АВСТРІЙСЬКОЇ ІМПЕРІЇ У КІНЦІ XVIII – ПОЧАТКУ XIX ст.	65
Марія КАЗЬМИРЧУК ЄВРЕЙСЬКЕ ЗЕМЛЕВОЛОДІННЯ ТА МІЖНАЦІОНАЛЬНІ ВІДНОСИНИ У КИЇВСЬКІЙ ГУБЕРНІЇ НАПРИКІНЦІ XIX – НА ПОЧАТКУ XX ст.	72
Інна ЛЕВЧЕНКО, Мінас АРАКЕЛЯН СТАТУТ ТОВАРИСТВА ПО ДОГЛЯДУ ЗА БІДНИМИ ЄВРЕЙСЬКИМИ ДІТЬМИ У КОЛОМИЇ (1908): ІСТОРИКО-ПРАВОВИЙ АНАЛІЗ	80
Дмитро БОНДАРЕНКО ПАДІННЯ РОСІЙСЬКОЇ ТА АВСТРО-УГОРСЬКОЇ ІМПЕРІЙ, БІЛЬШОВИЗМ, МОНАРХІЧНА КОНТРРЕВОЛЮЦІЯ ТА ФОРМУВАННЯ НОВИХ СИСТЕМ МІЖНАРОДНИХ ВІДНОСИН У ЦЕНТРАЛЬНІЙ ТА СХІДНІЙ ЄВРОПІ (1918 – 1920 рр.)	93
Наталія ГОРОДНЯ ПОВОСННЕ ВРЕГУЛЮВАННЯ 1919 РОКУ І УКРАЇНА	104
Олег ЄГРЕШІЙ, Руслан ДЕЛЯТИНСЬКИЙ РЕПРЕСИВНА ПОЛІТИКА ПОЛЬСЬКИХ ОРГАНІВ ВЛАДИ ПРОТИ ГРЕКО-КАТОЛИЦЬКОГО ДУХОВЕНСТВА У 1919 р.: МЕТОДИ ТА ОСОБЛИВОСТІ	117
Руслана ДАВИДЮК, Андрій ЖИВ'ЮК ТЕАТРАЛЬНЕ МИСТЕЦТВО ЯК ФОРМА САМОРЕАЛІЗАЦІЇ НАДДНІПРЯНСЬКИХ ПОЛІТИЧНИХ ЕМІГРАНТІВ У ВОЛИНСЬКОМУ ВОЄВОДСТВІ (1920 – 1930-ті рр.)	128
Джоанна МАРШАЛЕК-КАВА, Сергій КУДІНОВ, Сергій КУЗНІЧЕНКО УВЕДЕННЯ НАДЗВИЧАЙНОГО СТАНУ В СРСР У ПЕРІОД НІМЕЦЬКО-РАДЯНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ (1941 – 1945 рр.)	136
Андрій ХАРУК, Ігор СОЛЯР ПРОПАГАНДИСТСЬКО-ІДЕОЛОГІЧНЕ ЗАБЕЗПЕЧЕННЯ СЛОВАЦЬКИХ ВІЙСЬК В УКРАЇНІ НА ПОЧАТКОВОМУ ЕТАПІ НІМЕЦЬКО-РАДЯНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ	149

Роман МИХАЛЬЧУК “SMALL DEATH JOBS”: РОЛЬ ПРИМУСОВО ЗАДІЯНИХ ЦИВІЛЬНИХ ОСІБ В НАЦИСТСЬКИХ ПЛАНАХ ЗДІЙСНЕННЯ ГОЛОКОСТУ В ГЕНЕРАЛЬНІЙ ОКРУЗІ “ВОЛИНЬ-ПОДІЛЛЯ” (НА МАТЕРІАЛАХ ЯХАД-ІН УНУМ).....	157
Павло ТКАЧУК, Леонід КРИВИЗЮК ОРЛОВСЬКА НАСТУПАЛЬНА ОПЕРАЦІЯ (12 ЛИПНЯ – 18 СЕРПНЯ 1943 р.): ЗДОБУТКИ ТА ПРОРАХУНКИ КОМАНДУВАННЯ ЧЕРВОНОЇ АРМІЇ ЩОДО ЗАСТОСУВАННЯ БРОНЕТАНКОВИХ ТА МЕХАНІЗОВАНИХ ВІЙСЬК	166
Сергій СЕГЕДА, Дмитро ВЕДЕНЄСВ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЯ ТА ФУНКЦІЇ РОЗВІДУВАЛЬНИХ СТРУКТУР ЗАКОРДОННИХ ЦЕНТРІВ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ НАЦІОНАЛІСТИЧНИХ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЙ В УМОВАХ МІЖБЛОКОВОГО ПРОТИСТОЯННЯ У СВІТІ (1945 – 1950-ті рр.)	186
Юлія СИТНИК, Олександр СИТНИК ВІДРОДЖЕННЯ МОВНО-НАЦІОНАЛЬНОГО САМОУСВІДОМЛЕННЯ УКРАЇНЦІВ ДОНЕЧЧИНИ В УМОВАХ “ПЕРЕБУДОВИ” ТА У ПЕРШІ РОКИ НЕЗАЛЕЖНОЇ УКРАЇНИ	196
Людмила ПРИЛУЦЬКА РОЗВИТОК “MEMORY STUDIES” ТА ДИНАМІКА ІСТОРИЧНОЇ ПАМ’ЯТІ В НЕЗАЛЕЖНІЙ УКРАЇНІ З ПОГЛЯДУ НОВІТНЬОЇ ЗАХІДНОЇ ІСТОРИОГРАФІЇ	208
Наталія ЗАЛЄТОК МОДЕЛІ БАЛАНСУ МІЖ РОБОЧИМИ ТА СІМЕЙНИМИ ОBOB’ЯЗКАМИ В НОРВЕГІЇ НАПРИКІНЦІ ХХ – НА ПОЧАТКУ ХХІ ст. У КОНТЕКСТІ ГЕНДЕРНОЇ РІВНОСТІ.....	220
Юрій ОФЩИНСЬКИЙ ОЦІНКА ВІЙНИ НА ДОНБАСІ ВЧЕНИХ І КОЛИШНІХ ПОЛІТИКІВ НА СТОРІНКАХ ГАЗЕТИ “THE NEW YORK TIMES” (1 БЕРЕЗНЯ 2014 – 11 ЛЮТОГО 2015 рр.).....	230

РЕЦЕНЗІЇ

Анатолій КУЗЬМІНСЬКИЙ, Ірина ПАТЕН ГАЗЕТА “ДІЛО”: ЗДОБУТКИ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ БІОГРАФІЧНОЇ БІБЛОГРАФІСТИКИ (рецензія на: Курилишин, К. (2015 – 2019). Часопис “Діло” (Львів, 1880 – 1939 рр.): матеріали до біобібліографістики. Дрогобич: Коло, 2015. Т. 1: 1880 – 1889 рр., 640 с.; 2016. Т. 2: 1890 – 1894 рр., 608 с.; 2017. Т. 3: 1895 – 1899 рр., 712 с.; 2018. Т. 4: 1900 – 1904 рр., 824 с.; 2019. Т. 5: 1905 – 1909 рр., 768 с.).....	245
Віталій КОРОЛЬ ГЕТЬМАНАТ 1918 р. ЧЕРЕЗ ПРИЗМУ ІСТОРІЇ УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ЧИНОВНИЦТВА Рецензія на монографію: Дегтярьов С. Державні інституції та чиновники періоду гетьманату П. Скоропадського (нарис з історії органів влади й управління Української Держави 1918 р.): монографія. Суми: СумДУ, 2018. 168 с.	251
Олег МАШЕВСЬКИЙ, Ольга СУХОБОКОВА УКРАЇНСЬКІ МІГРАНТИ У ПОВОЄННІЙ ЗАХІДНІЙ НІМЕЧЧИНІ Рецензія на монографію: Олена Подобєд. Українська планета ДіПі: культура та повсякдення. Житомир: Вид. О. О. Євенок, 2018. 396 с.....	254

CONTENTS

Mykola OLIYNYK THE ROMAN MILITARY DIPLOMA AS A HISTORICAL DOCUMENT	8
Yaroslav ANDRUSYAK THE OPPOSITION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THE POSITION OF THE CZECH SZLACHTA (THE END OF THE XV th – THE 30-ies OF THE XVI th CENTURY)	23
Ferhad TURANLY UKRAINE’S LANDS AS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE AND GEOPOLITICAL CONTACTS ACCORDING TO THE DATA FROM ARABOGRAPHIC WRITTEN SOURCES.....	35
Svitlana KAGAMLYK HOW MOSCOW COLONIZED KYIV-PECHERSK LAVRA. NEW PAGES TO THE HISTORY OF THE UKRAINIAN PRINTING OF THE SECOND HALF OF THE XVIII th CENTURY.....	54
Lesya SMUTOK, Yaroslav LYSEYKO SZLACHTA INCORPORATION IN GALICIA TO KNIGHTHOOD OF THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE AT THE END OF THE XVIII th – BEGINNING OF THE XIX th CENTURIES	65
Mariia KAZMYRCHUK JEWISH LANDOWNERSHIP AND INTERETHNIC RELATIONS IN KYIV GOVERNORATE AT THE END OF THE XIX th AND THE BEGINNING OF THE XX th CENTURIES.....	72
Inna LEVCHENKO, Minas ARAKELIAN STATUTE OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE CARE OF POOR JEWISH CHILDREN IN KOLOMYIA (1908): HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS.....	80
Dmytro BONDARENKO THE DOWNFALL OF THE RUSSIAN AND THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRES, BOLSHEVISM, THE MONARCHIST COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND THE FORMATION OF NEW SYSTEMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, 1918 – 1920.....	93
Nataliya GORODNIA THE POST-GREAT WAR SETTLEMENT OF 1919 AND UKRAINE	104
Oleg YEHRECHII, Ruslan DELIATYNSKYI THE REPRESSIVE POLICIES OF THE POLISH AUTHORITIES AGAINST THE GREEK CATHOLIC CLERGY IN 1919: METHODS AND FEATURES	117
Ruslana DAVYDYUK, Andriy ZHYVYUK THEATER ART AS A SELF-REALIZATION FORM OF NADDNIPRYANSHCHYNA POLITICAL EMIGRANTS IN VOLYN VOIVODESHIP (1920 – 1930-ies)	128
Joanna MARSZALEK-KAWA, Serhii KUDINOV, Serhii KUZNICHENKO IMPOSITION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IN THE USSR DURING THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR (1941 – 1945).....	136
Andriy KHARUK, Ihor SOLIAR THE SLOVAK TROOPS IN UKRAINE PROPAGANDIST IDEOLOGICAL SUPPORT AT THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR.....	149

Roman MYKHALCHUK “SMALL DEATH JOBS”: THE ROLE OF FORCED CIVILIAN PERSONS IN THE NAZI PLANS OF THE HOLOCAUST IN THE GENERAL DISTRICT OF VOLYN-PODILLIA (ON THE MATERIALS OF YAHAD-IN UNUM).....	157
Pavlo TKACHUK, Leonid KRYVYZIUK OREL OFFENSIVE OPERATION (12 July – 18 August, 1943): SUCCESS AND FAILURES OF THE RED ARMY COMMAND REGARDING THE ARMORED AND MECHANIZED TROOPS USE.....	166
Serhii SEHEDA, Dmytro VIEDIENIEIEV ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF FOREIGN CENTERS OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS UNDER CONDITIONS OF THE WORLD INTERBLOCK CONFRONTATION (1945 – 1950-ies).....	186
Julia SYTNYK, Olexander SYTNYK REVIVAL OF A LANGUAGE NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UKRAINIANS OF DONETSK REGION UNDER CONDITIONS OF “PERESTROIKA” AND DURING THE FIRST YEARS OF INDEPENDENT UKRAINE	196
Lyudmyla PRYLUTSKA THE “MEMORY STUDIES” DEVELOPMENT AND THE HISTORICAL MEMORY DYNAMICS IN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE FROM THE VIEW OF THE MODERN WESTERN HISTORIOGRAPHY	208
Nataliia ZALIETOK THE MODELS OF WORK-LIFE BALANCE IN NORWAY AT THE END OF THE XXth CENTURY – THE BEGINNING OF THE XXIst CENTURY IN THE CONTEXT OF GENDER EQUALITY.....	220
Yuriy OFITSYNSKYI THE ESTIMATION OF THE WAR IN DONBAS BY SCIENTISTS AND FORMER POLITICIANS ON THE PAGES OF THE NEWSPAPER <i>THE NEW YORK TIMES</i> (MARCH 1, 2014 – FEBRUARY 11, 2015).....	230
REVIEWS	
Anatoliy KUZMINSKYI, Iryna PATEN THE <i>DILO</i> NEWSPAPER: ACHIEVEMENTS OF UKRAINIAN BIOGRAPHICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY (review of: Kurylyshyn, K. (2015 – 2019). Chasopys “Dilo” (The <i>Dilo</i> newspaper) (Lviv, 1880 – 1939): materials on biobibliography. Drohobych: Kolo, 2015. Vol. 1: 1880 – 1889, 640 pp.; 2016. Vol. 2: 1890 – 1894, 608 pp.; 2017. Vol. 3: 1895 – 1899, 712 pp.; 2018. Vol. 4: 1900 – 1904, 824 pp.; 2019. Vol. 5: 1905 – 1909, 768 pp.).....	245
Vitaliy KOROL HETMANATE OF 1918 THROUGH THE PRISM OF UKRAINIAN BUREAUCRACY HISTORY Monograph review: Degtyarev S. State Institutions and Officials of the Period of P. Skoropadsky's Hetmanate (Treatise on the History of the Authorities and Governance Bodies of the Ukrainian State in 1918): Monograph. Sumy: SSU, 2018. 168 p.....	251
Oleh MASHEVSKYI, Olga SUKHOBOKOVA UKRAINIAN IMMIGRANTS IN POST-WAR WESTERN GERMANY Review on the monograph: Olena Podobied. Ukrainian planet DP: Culture and Everyday Life. Zhytomyr: Publ. O.O. Yevenok, 2018. 396 p.....	254

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THE ROMAN MILITARY DIPLOMA AS A HISTORICAL DOCUMENT

Abstract. *The purpose of the article is to analyze and characterize the Roman military diploma as a historical document. The research methodology consists in the use of general scientific methods and principles: a comparative and historiographical analysis, systematization of scientific literature, research works and documents; the principle of historicism, systematicity, scientificity and objectivity. The scientific novelty: on the basis of a wide range of the researches for the first time in the Ukrainian historiography the significance of the Roman military diploma as a historical document has been characterized; the prospects of the study of diplomata militum as the sources for the study of the Roman influences on the territory of ancient Ukraine have been elucidated. The Conclusions. During many years the researches in the field of epigraphics, including the study of military diplomas, became an important component in the reconstruction of the personnel of the Roman auxiliary units – auxilia, the names of these units, and helped reproduce some other aspects of functioning related not only to the military history. This refers to the administrative apparatus of the Empire, in particular, in addition to the then ruling emperor, in the diplomas the names of consuls, the governor of the province and the commanders of these military units are recorded; you can also trace the stages of their career – cursus honorum. Analyzing these documents, we can determine the status and place of retired servicemen in their residence places after the honorary resignation (honesta missio), to trace the stages and nature of the Romanization of the provinces owing to the quantity of diplomas found and the information about the retiree's family. It has been also noted that the Roman military diplomas from the territory of Ukraine can be an important source for studying some aspects of the history of ancient Ukraine. Nowadays, many issues related to the Roman military diplomas remain not analyzed. For instance, the place of publishing of the imperial constitutions (tabula aenae (aerae)), from which the diplomas were copied, has not yet been identified. The place the diplomas were stored has not been identified either. It is unknown why bronze documents were stopped issuing in the IIIrd century and what are the reasons for their appearance on the territory of the Ukrainian lands. Despite all these gaps, many aspects of this issue have already been studied and this gives us the opportunity to look in a new way at the functioning of such a complex part of the Roman state mechanism as the Roman army.*

Key words: Roman military diploma, document, auxiliary troops, emperor, veterans.

РИМСЬКИЙ ВІЙСЬКОВИЙ ДИПЛОМ ЯК ІСТОРИЧНИЙ ДОКУМЕНТ

Анотація. *Мета дослідження* полягає в аналізі та характеристиці римського військового диплома як історичного документа. **Методологія дослідження** полягає у використанні загальнонаукових методів та принципів: порівняльного та історіографічного аналізу, систематизації наукової літератури, розвідок та документів; принципу історизму, системності, науковості та об'єктивності. Одним із найважливіших у дослідженні методів, яким ми послуговувалися, став метод міждисциплінарного підходу, адже вивчення і аналіз історичного документа неможливий без звернення до таких наукових дисциплін, як військова історія, соціальна історія, археологія, історичне документознавство та епіграфіка. **Наукова новизна:** на основі широкого кола досліджень уперше в українській історіографії охарактеризовано значення римського військового диплома як історичного документа; виділено перспективи дослідження *diplomata militum* як джерел до вивчення римських впливів на території давньої України. **Висновки.** Багаторічні дослідження вчених у галузі епіграфіки, зокрема вивчення військових дипломів стали важливою складовою для реконструкції особового складу римських допоміжних з'єднань – *auxilia*, назв цих підрозділів, а також сприяли відтворенню деяких інших аспектів функціонування, пов'язаних не тільки з військовою історією. Тут мається на увазі адміністративний апарат Імперії, зокрема, окрім правлячого на той час імператора, у дипломах зафіксовані імена консулів, намісника провінції та командувачів цих військових одиниць; також можна прослідкувати щаблі їхньої кар'єри – *cursus honorum*. Тож ці документи, які були насправді завіреними копіями імператорських наказів (*epistula missoria*), а отже правовими документами, є цінним джерелом не тільки для військових істориків. Вони дозволяють нам вивчати різноманітні аспекти соціальної історії – систему комплектування допоміжних підрозділів, з яких підвладних племен і народів набиралися воїни у *auxilia*, преторіанську гвардію, *equites singulares*, флот та міські когорти. Досліджуючи ці документи, ми можемо визначити статус і місце відставних військових у місцях їхнього проживання після почесної відставки (*honesta missio*), прослідкувати етапи та характер романізації провінцій завдяки кількості знайдених дипломів та зазначеної там інформації про сім'ю відставника. Також зазначено, що римські військові дипломи з території України можуть стати важливим джерелом для вивчення деяких аспектів історії давньої України. На сьогодні дуже багато питань, пов'язаних з римськими військовими дипломами, залишаються відкритими. Наприклад, дотепер не ідентифіковане місце публікації імператорських конституцій *tabula aenea* (*aer-ae*), з яких копіювалися дипломи та де вони зберігалися. Достеменно невідомо, чому припинили видавати бронзові документи в III ст. та які причини їх появи на території українських земель. Незважаючи на усі перелічені лакуни, багато аспектів заданої проблематики вже вивчено, і це дає нам можливість по-новому подивитись на функціонування такої складної частини римського державного механізму, як римське військо.

Ключові слова: римський військовий диплом, документ, допоміжні війська, імператор, ветерани.

The Problem Statement. A scientific research of the Roman military diplomas began only in the XXth century and this is a fairly new direction in Latin epigraphy. The value of these documents consists in the fact that they are made of metal and there is the date marked on them. This gives historians many advantages in the study of the Roman military diplomas, because other epigraphic documents were dated infrequently. Nowadays in Ukraine collecting, discovery and analysis of these poorly-studied documents are dictated by new trends in a modern historical science. After all, at present the focus is not on prominent historical figures or events, but on individual people, not always famous, their destinies and feelings. They are the main object of the study now. In this research, these are retired soldiers, whose part of life was recorded on bronze tablets. We put a special emphasis on the significance of the Roman military documents to the Ukrainian history. More of them were found in Ukraine than in the territory of some border Roman provinces, which were native

for the majority of veterans. The classification and systematization of *diplomata militum* is important not only for the study of the history of ancient Rome, the history of the Roman army, but also for a regional history.

The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications. Thanks to the works of V. Bezdrabko, the Ukrainian scientist, a specialist in document science, we could reveal the concept of “a historical document” and the history of its formation, outline its place among a large number of types of sources (Bezdrabko, 2017a). The researcher emphasizes that the intensive development of archeology in the XIXth century renewed antiquity studies and gave impact to the birth of a new science – epigraphy. Thousands of found Latin inscriptions, including *diplomata militum*, included into a scientific circulation, made it possible to study them on an original, clearly documented basis (Bezdrabko, 2011, p. 157). V. Bezdrabko also indicates that the documents are an important source of information about a person, place or event, an important component of a historical methodology. The researcher singles out a special role of external interdisciplinary borrowings (Bezdrabko, 2017b, p. 6).

The issues considered by us began to be studied in detail and comprehensively only in the second half of the XXth century, although the inscriptions from the first diplomas found were collected in Volume 3 “*Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*” in 1873 (Nadvirniak, Pohorilets, Nadvirniak, 2016, p. 171). The published volumes with the copied inscriptions from military diplomas (RMD) appeared owing to the meticulous work of M. Roxan during 1978 – 2003 (Roxan, 1978; Roxan, 2009; Roxan, 2009a; Roxan, & Holder, 2003). This researcher travelled a lot in Europe, contacting local historians, who provided her with the information she needed to publish works on new found diplomas (Breeze, 2003). At the present stage the most fruitful in this direction are P. Holder – a co-author with M. Roxan of the 4th part of the Roman Military Diplomas (Holder, 2006), as well as as well as German scientists A. Pangerl and W. Eck. The first one is the founder of an English-language site “<http://www.romancoins.info>”, one of the sections of which – “Roman Military Diploma On-Line” concerns the subject of Roman military diplomas (Pangerl). W. Eck is an epigraphist and nowadays he is the most authoritative researcher of Roman diplomas. His scientific achievements are impressive – more than 800 works on epigraphy, much part of which is devoted to Roman military diplomas (Eck, 2004; Ek, 2008). The significance of diplomas for the study of Praetorian units and auxiliary detachments was outlined by G. L. Cheesman (Cheesman, 2012, pp. 27–29), I. Łuc (Łuc, 2004, pp. 144–145), N. Fields (Fields, 2006, pp. 53–54). A. Ivantchik and O. Pogorilets study the military diplomas found in the Ukrainian lands (Ivantchik, & Krapivina, 2005; Ivantchik, Pogorilets, Savvov, 2008). They publish the articles with the information about diplomas in professional journals. They consult with the British and German colleagues. This year O. Pogorilets plans to publish a monograph on military diplomas found on the territory of Ukraine. This need arose due to a large number of diplomas found mainly by “black archaeologists”. Thus, over the last decade, more than ten such finds were discovered only in one Khmelnytsky region (Oliylyk, 2019). The first one, a pioneering one in this direction is the publication devoted to the description and systematization of the available information base of the diploma finds on the territory of Ukraine and Moldova (Nadvirniak, Pohorilets, Nadvirniak, 2016). O. Nadvirniak is the coordinator of the project “*Terra Amadociae*”, in which Europe’s leading epigraphists study the influences of the Roman Empire on the course of historical processes during the first centuries of the new era in the territories north of the Danube and Taurida (Pohorilets, & Nadvirniak, 2018, p. 144).

The Purpose of publication – the author of the article wants to characterize the Roman military diploma as a historical document and to illustrate the role it played in the process of Romanization in the Roman Empire.

The Statement of the Basic Material. One of the features of a modern historical science is its plunging into an interdisciplinary space from the framework of one academic science, as the research issue cannot be limited and implemented in the framework of one discipline (Bezdrabko, 2017a, p. 13). This type of a historical document, the Roman military diploma, is of no exception. Thus, its study, for example, requires the so-called “flow” from source studies to such special historical disciplines as epigraphy, chronology and textology, or the “flow” from historical document studies or from archeology to military or social history. What is understood under the very concept “a historical document”? First of all, it is the source that evaluates and ascertains a historical fact, contains some information about a person, describes an event, reveals its essence and raises the question about the document’s authorship. It can also serve as a primary source. Let’s try to understand whether the words *militaria diplomata* correspond to these definitions?

A Latin word *diploma* originates from Greek word *δίπλωμα*, which denotes “double folded”, i.e. actually – “a manuscript on a folded scroll”. This term began to be used in Rome to describe an official, sealed letter written by a magistrate or a private person with a legal authority. According to a decree issued by the Senate, about which Suetonius mentioned, diplomas were given a legal force only when they were three times laced and then sealed (Suet. Nero. 17). Among the components that made it official there were the following ones: the name of the official, who issued it, such as the Emperor, the date and the names of witnesses – citizens of Rome necessarily (Lenderling, 2019). The presence of seals confirmed that the diploma was a true, certified copy – *epistula missoria* (in Latin “a letter to sender”) of an original legal document (*Lex data*) (Le Boek, 2001, p. 339). Thus, diplomas were legal documents from the very beginning and the best proof of this fact is their registration in the form of a double document. It is also worth remembering that these were certified copies of the imperial constitutions granted by the ruler of privilege through a specific documentation, but the very definition of “the Roman military diploma” (*diplomata militaria*) is a modern interpretation of this document (Ek, 2004, p. 31, 54; Watson, 2014, p. 145).

Despite a large number of diplomas preserved till nowadays, these documents show only a tiny part of those that existed before. For instance, in 1873 T. Mommsen knew about 57 military diplomas (Ivantchik, & Krapivina, 2005, p. 197; Kozlenko, 2013; Nadvirniak, Pohorilets, Nadvirniak, 2016, p. 171). In 1914, the British historian G. L. Cheesman in his work mentions 70–80 diplomas known at that time (Cheesman, 2012, p. 27). In 1955, 189 copies of diplomas were contained in Volume XVI “*Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*”. In 2003, about 650 copies of bronze documents were published in consolidated editions. In 2004 W. Eck had already about 700–800 copies, of which about 730 were published (Eck, 2008 p. 1123; Ek, 2004, pp. 29, 31). Nowadays according to the electronic resource “The Roman Military Diploma On-Line”, the number of finds already exceeds 1 200, although most of them are in a fragmentary form (Pangerl). According to the estimates, in the I–III centuries between 250 000 and 300 000 diplomas were issued, and possibly more. But even this approximate figure suggests that these documents should not be considered as a special gift, as some researchers try to prove persistently. After all, a special gift, if it is presented to such a large number of people, inevitably loses its exclusivity. According to W. Eck, the diplomas were the daily norm to the Roman army and the granting of the Roman citizenship to the

soldiers of the auxiliary troops was a routine occupation of the Roman military administration and the Emperor (Ek, 2004, pp. 31, 34–35).

We should also pay attention to an uneven finding of the military diplomas in the Roman Empire. Most of the findings of these documents were found in the territory of the former border provinces – *Moesia Inferior*, *Moesia Superior*, *Dacia*, *Pannonia Inferior*, *Pannonia Superior*, *Raetia*, *Mauretania Tingitana* and *Britannia* (Ek, 2004, p. 55; Nadvirniak, Pohorilets, Nadvirniak, 2016, p. 171; Pangerl). That is, the Thracian-Lower Moesian territory was the most fruitful concerning the findings of the military diplomas. This fact suggests the following: a significant proportion of those veterans, who came from the Danube provinces and served far from their place of birth, returned home (Ek, 2004, p. 55; Scheuble, 2009, p. 293; Pangerl). This fact is confirmed by the analysis of the owners' names, written on these documents, in which the Thracian cognomens dominated (Nadvirniak, Pohorilets, Nadvirniak, 2016, p. 175; Pogorilets, & Savvov, 2007, p. 5).

Interesting is the problem of the diplomas findings in the territory of the European Barbaricum, in particular, outside the Roman Empire, where the diplomas are found only in the territory of Ukraine and Moldova. One of the phenomena of these findings consists in the fact that till nowadays the legionary diplomas in such numbers were not found outside the Roman Limes in Europe. Until recently, only two cases of the Roman military diplomas findings were recorded, namely in the Northern Black Sea region, where the Roman military units were stationed (Nadvirniak, Pohorilets, Nadvirniak, 2016, p. 174). We have already noted that Rome was interested in locating its garrisons on a barbaric territory. Rome was especially interested in the waterways of the Dniester, the Buh and the Dnieper rivers. This interest included not only the military political component, but also trade and economic one (Oliylyk, 2018, p. 58). But the main task of these military contingents was to protect the territory of the allied cities –Tire, Olbia and Chersonese. During the last decade, due to the widespread use of metal detectors, the findings history of these documents continues outside the ancient centers of the Northern Black Sea, which are traditionally associated with the Roman military presence. About 23 fragments of the diplomas of different preservation state were found. Most of them are found in the water corridor of the Middle Dniester, the Southern Buh basins and their tributaries. Taking into account the number of findings and their locations, the Ukrainian scientists reject the assertion of an accidental location of the diplomas in South-Eastern Europe, in particular, as military trophies or a crowbar of non-ferrous metals. Nowadays it is clear that all these facts raise more questions than give clear and convincing answers and require a further research involving new sources into scientific circulation – both written and material. The basis is formed for rethinking the existing source base, it provides grounds for making certain adjustments to the essence of understanding the political, economic, ethno-cultural contacts of the Roman Empire and the Eastern European Barbaricum (Nadvirniak, Pohorilets, Nadvirniak, 2016, pp. 174–175).

Diploma was not only a demonstration of the victory of the owner, who spent much of his life on campaigns and on the battlefield, but *diploma* also showed a special connection between the Emperor and an ordinary soldier, because the document originated from the Emperor personally, who provided *beneficium* and *diploma* was delivered from Rome. At that time the veteran could confirm his higher status, his position owing to the Decree of the ruler. The veteran could demonstrate his affiliation with the community of Rome. In fact, this was the integration policy of the Roman state, which found its concrete embodiment in these documents (Ek, 2004, p. 55).

The Roman military diploma is represented by two rectangular bronze plates, the size of which could vary from 10 to 12 centimeters in width and from 16 to 21 centimeters in length, depending on the period. It consisted of two bronze plates attached to each other and connected by metal rings, sealed and with the same inscription carved twice (Konkoli, 2000, p. 223). To make one diploma from 550 to 1800 g of bronze had to be used. If for the entire period of diplomas existence their number reached 300 000 pieces, it required about 150 tons of bronze. This bronze was better in quality than that one used for coins engraving, and its value reached 40 000 sesterces per ton (Eck, 2008, pp. 1124–1125, 1128). The diplomas, which date back to the early period, were thicker and heavier, and the inscriptions carved – more thorough and clear. Under the rule of Antoninus Pius, the quality of diplomas began to get worse (Ivantchik, & Krapivina, 2005, p. 199). The diplomas issued later were sometimes made of previously-used bronze plates, and the original text could be viewed through a re-inscription (Pangerl). The plates were connected with each other with a wire or lace through a pair of symmetrical holes in the centre (Konkoli, 2000, p. 223). The joint was sealed with seven seals, protected by a metal cover composed of three plaques; the diploma was inserted into a wooden frame (Kozlenko, 2013; Pangerl; Petrechko, 2009, p. 72). The inscription, engraved on the surface of both tablets, was a certified copy of the imperial decree on a honorary resignation (*constitutio*) (See further – *M. O.*). The inscriptions on both surfaces of *tabella I* coincided, but the direction of the text on the inside was perpendicular to its direction on the outside. The text inside the diploma was, of course, inaccessible for reading. Such double carving of the text of the imperial decree on the diploma was necessary to exclude the possibility of forgery. As the text inside of the diploma was inaccessible for reading and it was not necessary to open the diplomas too often, its quality began to get worse. Beginning with the epoch of the Emperor Trajan, the text on the outside of the plates was of a high-quality, the inscriptions on the inside of the diploma became more inconvenient to read, and their content was increasingly reduced. The text on the inside was carved in a sloppy cursive – italics, and in some cases it was difficult to be read (Pogorilets, & Savvov, 2007, p. 2). This process of a poor quality of text writing abruptly stopped in 153 approximately, after which all diplomas again began to be written with the full text and all necessary care (Ivantchik, Pogorilets, Savvov, 2008, p. 47; Kozlenko, 2013). The remains of coloured paints were found on some diplomas, which means that they were decorated (Eck, 2008, p. 1129).

On the second plate (*tabella II*) the names of seven witnesses were engraved on the outside. As for the witnesses, until the years of 73–74 they were comrades of the person, who received benefits. Then, starting from this time, – the administration employees, who were involved in this procedure in an arbitrary manner, and after the years of 133–138 – by seniority (Le Boek, 2001, 340). W. Eck's point of view is opposite, who emphasizes that the witnesses of seals imposition were individuals, not *libertini*, but those individuals, who were born free. W. Eck supports the idea of his compatriot, R. Haensch, the epigraphist, who researched the practice of using seals in documents of the Roman Empire administration. R. Haensch proves that the witnesses were employees of a concession notary's office with a rigid hierarchy, founded on the degree of antiquity, i.e., the period of when employees were witnesses (Haensch, 1996, pp. 463–474). It was from the end of the Emperor Hadrian's reign that there was a strict sequence and regulated order in the selection of witnesses, and the practice of sealing was entrusted not to the imperial *officium*, but to private lawyers, who worked for a fee. This practice was common for earlier times, because comparing the inscriptions of diplomas there can be traced the formation of witnesses circle from the

middle period of Vespasian's reign till the end of Hadrian's reign (Ek, 2004, p. 43). It is unknown for sure: Who paid for issuing of diplomas – the state or the recipients? Judging by W. Eck's argumentation, political and social probability speaks in favour of the fact that the payment for diplomas was made directly from the imperial treasury not from the pockets of soldiers. *Aerarium militare, praefecti* are also excluded, who were responsible only for soldiers' salaries. But it is impossible to determine which branch of the fiscal department was responsible for these expenses (Ek, 2004, p. 44).

During all the period of time, the inscriptions on the diplomas included the same elements: 1) the name and title of the emperor; 2) a list of troops stationed in the province; 3) the name of the legate, who fulfilled the command; 4) the privileges granted upon receipt of resignation; 5) the date of preparation of the diploma on which the text of the constitution was engraved; 8) the name of the recipient of the diploma with an indication of his military unit and a reference to the correspondent column of the constitution text; 9) the place where the original document was posted; 10) the list of seven witnesses, who certified the authenticity of the diploma (Le Boek, 2001, p. 338; Kozlenko, 2013). Below there is an example of a reproduced text of a diploma found in Olbia in August 2004 (in brackets below – the reconstruction of a lost text): [the Emperor Caesar, the son of the divine Hadrian, the grandson of the divine *Traianus Parthicus*, the great grandson of the divine Nerve, T(itus) Aelius Hadrianus Antoninus Aug(ustus) Pius, a high oracle, endowed with the power of the people's tribune for 19 times, the Emperor elected twice, a consul at service for four times, the father of the Motherland, to horsemen and infantry, who served in the five alae, whose names are: *I Gall(orum) et Pann(oniorum), I Gall(orum) Atector(igiana), II Hispan(orum) Arvac(orum), I Vespasia(na) Dar(danorum), I Fl(avia) Gaetul(orum)* and in 11 cohorts, (whose names are) *I Brac(araugustanorum), II Fl(avia) Britton(um), I F]l(avia) /N/u/m/i/d(arum), I Cl(audia) Sugambr(orum) vet(erana), I Lusit(anorum) Cyr(enaica)], II Chalc(idenorum) [sag(ittariorum), I Cilic(um) sag(ittariorum), I Thrac(um) Syr(iaca), I G]erm(anorum), II Br/a[c(ar)aug(ustanorum), I Cisipadens(ium), and are located in] Moe]sia infer(ior) under the command of V[itrasius Pollionus, the legate, who served twenty-five years, as well as sailors, who served] for twenty-six years or more, dismissed in honorary [resignation], whose names are listed below, the Roman [citizenship] to those, who did not [have] it, and the right to marry women [they ha]d, when they were given the citizenship; [if any were unmarried, then with those], they married later, not more [than one man marries one woman]. 6 days before February, [in the consulate [M(arco) Civica Barbar]o and] M(arco) Metilio /R/e/g/u/l/o. [For someone, who served in [Cohort(is) I Cisip]/ade<n>s(ium) under the command of someone. Copied and checked from a bronze plate, which is attached to the wall behind the temple of the divine Augustus near Minerva in Rome]. The finding of each *diploma* gives us new information on various aspects of life in the Roman Empire. This *diploma* was not an exception that allowed us to clarify the names of the legates *Moesia Inferior*, to reconstruct the list of auxiliary units stationed in this province and finally prove the existence of a permanent Roman garrison in Olbia during the reign of Antoninus Pius (the very *diploma* is dated: the year of 157 – *M. O.*) (Ivantchik, & Krapivina, 2005, pp. 199–200, 204–205; Nadvirniak, Pohorilets, Nadvirniak, 2016, pp. 171–172, 177).*

The legal process of issuing the diploma was as follows: 1. The commander of the auxiliary unit lists all the soldiers of his alae or cohort, ready to retire or worthy of citizenship. 2. He sends a list with the names of the soldiers of the legate of the province, in which the soldiers and their units were listed in the *diploma*. 3. The administration of the legate of the

province combines all such requests for that province. 4. The proxies of the legate send this list from the province to Rome. 5. The Imperial Administration in Rome drafts a constitution for this province to grant citizenship to all the veterans mentioned in the list. 6. *The emperor personally approves and grants privileges.* 7. A large bronze plate (*constitutio*) with a list of all the names of veterans engraved on it was placed publicly in Rome (*Romae in muro post templum divi Augusti ad Minervam*). 8. Individual copies of the constitutions, the diplomas themselves, were made in Rome for each veteran with his name. 9. The copies were checked, confirmed, fastened with wire and sealed by seven witnesses. 10. The certified diplomas were sent back to the province to the legate (governor). 11. The diplomas from the administrative center of the province were sent to the commander of the unit, who handed it to its owner or issued by the legate himself (Pangerl).

From a legal point of view, the inscription on the inside of the *diploma* was the original document, the authenticity of which was verified by seven witnesses. But the external, open text of *diploma* had a practical value. The closed nature of the inscriptions protected them from a possible destruction or forgery, as Suetonius wrote about it (Suet. Nero. 17). In that case, if there were doubts about the identity of the holder of the *diploma*, or the content of the privileges granted by the document, the diploma could be disclosed, and the content of both sides of the plate compared with each other. A similar procedure was used to verify the authenticity of other documents (Kozlenko, 2013).

Most of the text of *diploma* was a form that was repeated in each diploma – as in many modern official documents. In each individual diploma, after the stereotypical *diploma* text, only the instructions to the military unit of the recipient changed, i.e., the name of the cohort or alae, the name of the commander of the unit and the name of the person, who should have received the *diploma*; the names of the retiree's wife and children, if any, were added (Ek, 2004, p. 37). It is possible that those, who were engaged in the production of diplomas, and those were individuals, prepared in advance *tabulae* with only the formulaic text to facilitate further work, because there are diplomas, in which one can distinguish between different handwriting scribes for permanent and non-permanent sections (Eck, 2008, p. 1129). This testified to the rationalization of work and could affect the nature of the diploma itself as a legal document, and the legal document required a guaranteed accurate text. Therefore, no abbreviations were found in the first diplomas. This was due to the fact that they were not found in the published constitutions. But from the end of Trajan's reign, more and more abbreviations appeared on diplomas, first on the inside, while on the outside they occurred later. This is due to the fact that in practice, in the life of a veteran, the inner side did not play a significant role, as the outer side a full text was read (Ek, 2004, p. 38–39).

It is obvious that every soldier, who served in the auxiliary units of the Roman army, as well as in the city cohorts, the Praetorian Guard, the cavalry guard of the Emperor's bodyguards (*equites singulares Augusti*) and the navy received a *diploma* and got an honorary resignation (Ivanchik, & Krapivina, 2005, pp. 197–198). We emphasize that the diplomas did not serve as evidence of an honorary resignation (*honesta missio*), as some historians mistakenly write about it (Kozlenko, 2013). Honorary resignation was represented by another document, a kind of certificate or attestation, which would confirm the resignation and it was called *tabula honestae missionis* (CIL. XVI. 1; ILS. 9060; AE. 1980. № 647) (Pangerl). Diplomas testified and confirmed the years of service in the army and the rights and privileges granted – *conubium et civitas Romana* and could be issued to those, who needed them only after the above-mentioned document (Fields, 2006, p. 53). *Honesta missio* came after 25 years of

service for soldiers of auxiliary troops and 26 for sailors (from the IIIrd century increased to 28 – *M. O.*) and veteran non-citizens received two important privileges: the Roman citizenship, which they usually, until the year of 212 did not have, and *conubium*, i.e., the right to a legal marriage (Birley, 1986, pp. 256–257; Le Boek, 2001, p. 116; Petreczko, 2009, p. 75). This also concerned the marriage with women without the Roman citizenship. Granting this right to marriage was a significant privilege, as marriage between citizens and non-citizens was not recognized as legal. And in general, the Roman soldiers were not allowed to marry during the entire period of service (See below – *M. O.*).

Dion Cassius wrote that Claudius granted *conubium* to the soldiers (“... gave the privileges of married people” – *M. O.*) (Dio Cass. 60.24.3). It is from the time of the reign of this Emperor that the first diplomas found are known to us, and in the year of 52 the first document known to us was dated (Keppie, 2018, p. 447; Scheuble, 2009, p. 292). M. Shchetinin, referring to indirect evidences, states about the existence of diplomas already during the reign of Augustus. He refers to the passage of Suetonius, in which the latter, describing the reign of Caligula, mentions the diplomas of the time of Julius Caesar and Augustus. Here is a translation of the quotation: “He rejected granting the Roman citizenship to all, whose ancestors acquired it for themselves and their descendants, except for their sons – only to the first generation did he refer the name “descendants”; and when the diplomas of divine Julius and Augustus were brought to him, he rejected them as obsolete and invalid” (Suet. Cal. 38.1) (Petrechko, 2009, p. 72; Shchetinin, 2003, p. 298). Explaining the ambiguity in Suetonius’ interpretation of the acquired Roman citizenship, M. Shchetinin suggests that under certain circumstances such documentation, which testified to the past acquisition of the citizenship, was revised and partially excluded or wiped out (Shchetinin, 2003, p. 300). This could explain the lack of military diplomas before the Emperor Claudius’s reign. The researcher provides other evidence to support his theory, using epigraphic material – the fragments of preserved inscriptions, which concerned veterans and an excerpt from the Decree of 46 from Trent (ILS. 206) (Shchetinin, 2003, pp. 299–301). Yet a number of authoritative European scholars doubt the possibility of awarding diplomas before the Principality of Claudius (Scheuble, 2009, p. 292). Let’s consider in turn the features of granting privileges to different types of troops, who were awarded with diplomas.

The practice of granting the citizenship to sailors dates back to the time of Claudius. It is probable that the government hesitated until the years of 140 – 145, but in the end it was decided to take half measures – only those, who joined the army and their children were among those, who could hope for the right to be granted the citizenship. It is worth noting that the legionnaires did not receive such documents, except for those, who passed through the Legio I Adiutrix and Legio II Adiutrix, recruited first in the fleet. Because of these differences, the researchers made different assumptions. Y. Le Bohec thinks that diplomas for the Praetorians and auxiliary units were introduced under special circumstances – the war of 68 – 69 for the first ones and the difficulties of a military recruitment for the latter. Other researchers suggested that the rewards for a military service varied according to the hierarchy of military units: the auxiliary troops and sailors received only a *diploma*, the legionnaires had the right to receive some money and land (*praemia*), and the Praetorians received a *diploma* and *praemia*. Be that as it might, granting these benefits was not systematized (Le Boek, 2001, pp. 339–340).

As for the Praetorians, they did not need the Roman citizenship, as the Praetorian cohorts always recruited among the Roman citizens (Ivantchik, Pogorilets, Savvov, 2008, p. 45).

However, another privilege was important for the Praetorians – the above-mentioned *conubium*, and the military diplomas, which are collected in CIL.XVI, and date back to the period from 73 to 134 years. (CIL. XVI. 18; CIL. XVI. 21; CIL. XVI. 81) (Łuć, 2004, p. 145). Another reason for issuing these documents to the Praetorians was Vitellius' practice of recruiting volunteers from the ranks of the Peregrines, not citizens (Łuć, 2004, p. 144). After the defeat, a significant number of these soldiers remained in the service, but in some period of time the process of their release began, which dates back to the beginning of the 70-ies of the Ist century (Tac. Hist. 4.46). Like the rest of the Roman soldiers, they had no right to marry; they did not receive this right even in the year of 197 when Septimius Severus granted this right to legionnaires and soldiers of auxiliary units (Herod. 3.8.4; Dig. 23.2.35, 48.5.12, 49.17.26) (Ivantchik, Pogorilets, Savvov, 2008, p. 46).

It is clear that during the service soldiers had female cohabitants (*coniunx*), and during the first two centuries of the Empire in the inscriptions these "soldiers' wives" appeared under the name "*ucsor*" (Le Boek, 2001, p. 337). Beginning in 197, soldiers could live with them outside the territory of the camp. After retirement, the marriage of veterans to women was recognized as legal, and their children received the Roman citizenship. In addition to the fact that the retired soldiers themselves, their wives and children acquired the Roman citizenship, even the parents of the women with whom the the retired soldiers would marry, could become the Roman citizens. After retirement, the soldiers could settle near the place of service of the military camp or the place of the military boat base, where their wives could live (Suet. Nero. 9; Tac. Ann. 14.27, 31.4–5; ILS. 2460, ILS. 2574) (Cowan, 2004; Le Boek, 2001, p. 145; Petrechko, 2009, p. 75). One such retiree was an unidentified veteran-sailor (*classarius*) of the *classis Misenensis* (*Classis Praetoria Misenensis Pia Vindex*), whose *diploma* was found in Khmelnytsky region in 2016 and which dates back to the year of 142 (Nadvirniak, Pohorilets, Nadvirniak, 2016, pp. 174, 183). To confirm the rights of veteran's children, extracts were made from the original document stating that they were born during their father's military service (*in militia*), their names were engraved on a bronze plaque (*in aere*) and they acquired the same Roman citizenship as and their father (AE. 1910. №75) (Ek, 2004, p. 50; Petrechko, 2009, p. 73). Innovations occurred at the end of 140, when the data on children were no longer taken into account; only in the case of the soldiers of the provincial navy everything remained unchanged. But the findings of 2001 allow us to look anew at the difference between these privileges. They were still received by the children of retirees, but only if they were born before their parents joined the army. There was another condition – if it was officially announced to the governor. But all the others, who were notified during the service, beginning in the year of 140, were excluded, even the children of units' officers. This action of Antoninus Pius was explained by the prohibition of marriage during the service, and the possible consequence of cohabitation with women – children, were already considered to be born illegally (Le Boek, 2001, pp. 116, 337). That is, granting privileges to such children would be contrary to the fundamental principles of a military law at that time. Moreover, we must not forget about the rule of observing discipline, because despite a human nature or moral principles, the relationship of soldiers with women could shake the foundations of such a sacred deity for the army as *disciplina militaris* (ILS. 3810) (Ek, 2004, pp. 50–51; Le Boek, 2001, pp. 172, 339; Scheuble, 2009, p. 293). As the legal status of the Praetorians, auxiliary soldiers, and navy sailors was different, as were the privileges they received after retirement, the form of the two types of diplomas could be different. But it is worth remembering that all diplomas were made according to the same scheme – with the sectors of the standard legal

text and the sectors of the individual text, and it was the individual text that could differ (see below – *M. O.*) (Ivantchik, Pogorilets, Savvov, 2008, p. 46; Pangerl).

The diploma itself was a copy of the imperial decree (*constitutio*), concluded on behalf of the ruler, i.e., a document, which he certified and approved. It not only listed the sections concerning the document and indicated their commander, but also there were mentioned all the veterans, who resigned, by name (Ivantchik, Pogorilets, Savvov, 2008, p. 46). The Constitutions are known to us thanks to their shortened copies – diplomas, as none of the large bronze plates, on which the text of the constitution was carved, survived till modern period. Nowadays, more than 400 existing constitutions are known, of which diplomas were issued (Pangerl). The Imperial constitutions were issued annually, and sometimes one constitution was addressed to the troops of several provinces, and sometimes several constitutions were issued during one year, addressed to the troops of the same province. The dates of publication of individual constitutions vary considerably in time, although the Praetorian diplomas of the IIIrd century are always dated – January the 7th (Ek, 2004, p. 30). *Constitutio* and *diploma* were inextricably connected, and owing to the latter that we know that large bronze stelae covered the foundations of some *Capitolium*'s monuments (Eck, 2008, pp. 1130–1131). The published text of the constitution – *tabula aenae* (or *aerae*) until the years of 89 – 90 was exhibited exclusively at the *Capitolium*, and later – it was hung on the wall near the statue of Minerva behind the temple of the Divine Augustus. Here they had to be exhibited publicly for some time, and then, as the space for demonstration was filled, they were removed and placed in the archive – *officium* (Ek, 2004, p. 36; Eck, 2008, pp. 1123, 1130). The text of the constitution contained a list of names of those veterans, who resigned. What was the minimum number of diplomas, which referred to one constitution? W. Eck, an authoritative researcher of the military diplomas, determined their approximate number on the example of one such document from the time of Galba. Thus, on December 22, 68 in Rome on *ara gentis Iulia constitutio* was published, carved on three *tabulae aenae*; these tables, according to W. Eck, could be more in number. It is also known that on *ara gentis Iulia* there were at least three *tabulae* of the constitution of Vespasian of April 5, 71. Since such bronze tables consisted of at most 6 columns (*paginae*) with 46 or 50 lines, each of which had a name, we get the names of 829, but most likely 900 veterans (Ek, 2004, p. 30), which were included into the text of the constitution. Thus, the inscription on the diplomas literally reproduced the text of the correspondent constitution, and the differences between the individual documents were insignificant and concerned only the adopted rules of shortening (Kozlenko, 2013). We should note that constitutions issuing took place continuously, though inconsistent with a strict time rhythm and not on certain days during the year. Sometimes several constitutions were issued for the troops of the same province on the same day as, for example, for Syria in 88, and at the same time for different provinces, as for *Britannia* and *Lycia-Pamphylia* in the year of 178 (Ek, 2004, pp. 32–33). However, there is an interval of about 10 years, when diplomas were not issued or almost not issued – this is the period from the year of 168 to 177 (Ek, 2004, pp. 33–34). Scientists identified these causes, and there were several: almost continuous wars with the Germans, epidemics, labour shortages, as well as soldiers shortages, tax arrears and a high military mortality. These facts are confirmed in the sources (SHA. Marc. 21.6). Dismissals were postponed, and granting privileges through a *diploma* was not always necessary. For instance, in the year of 106 Trajan awarded the soldiers *civitas Romana* on the battlefield, and the publication of the constitution in Rome and documenting this event with a diploma took place only in the year of 110 (CIL. XVI. 160) (Ek, 2004,

pp. 35, 50, 53). A similar procedure could have taken place during the crisis of the 70-ies of the II^d century. According to another definition, the lack of bronze as a metal for coinage also affected the lack of diplomas during this period, as they were issued at the expense of the imperial treasury. It is possible that the documents of that time were published on other material, first of all, on *tabulae ceratae* (Ek, 2004, pp. 52–53).

In addition to legal and practical functions, diplomas also played an important ideological role. Since the *diploma* was issued on behalf of the Emperor, on whose name and full title the text began, and it was assigned to a specific person, on whose name the text ended, it served as a material confirmation of the personal connection between the Emperor and each soldier of his army. After all, the acquisition of citizenship remained the exclusive privilege of the supreme ruler. The illusion was created that each veteran was personally known to the Emperor. Each *diploma* “speaks” directly and unambiguously to whom the veterans owed privileges – to the Emperor. This fact, of course, made the military *diploma* not only a legal document but also a subject of prestige (Ek, 2004, pp. 44, 49, 55; Ivantchik & Krapivina, 2005, p. 198; Ivantchik, Pogorilets, Savvov, 2008, p. 47). Military diplomas were one of the main factors in Romanization, because veterans, who served 25 or more years in the army, were a kind of mouthpieces and promoters of the Roman culture in the most remote ares of the Empire. As O. Petrechko noted aptly: “... veterans formed a special social group, which was an important tool of Romanization in the provinces, differed from the rest of the population by significant privileges, mostly a better financial status and the Roman citizenship” (Petrchko, 2009, p. 81). Veterans were a fairly large social group in the Roman society at that time, relatively wealthy and legally privileged, and played a major role in their places of residence, especially in the suburban provinces far from Rome. Being native speakers of Latin, enjoying the right of immunity (I.L.S. 9059) and having a high authority among the local administration due to a long military service, they became translators, heads of rural communities, and in the cities – decurions (D. 49.18.3). Being the part of the local elites, the retirees influenced the judiciary and financial affairs, were responsible for building matters, law and order, as well as the supply of necessary food to the settlements (Łuć, 2004, p. 146). By joining the board, veterans contributed to the municipalization of poorly urbanized regions (Le Boek, 2001, pp. 346, 351, 357). For instance, in Numidia, in Lambesis, they had a special place in the political system of this province, because there functioned a “veteran curia” (CIL. VIII. 18214, 18234) (Le Boek, 2001, p. 357). In Northern Britain until the middle of the III^d century some *vici*, where many veterans lived, had their own economic organization, and in York (*Eboracum*) *canaba* at the military camp acquired the status of a colony at the military camp (Watson, 2014, pp. 151–152). Their children in the future joined the ranks of the legions, “inheriting” the military profession, as it happened, for instance, to the holder of one of the diplomas found in Ukraine, the Praetorian Dribal, veteran’s son of *legio XI Klaudia* (Ivantchik, Pogorilets, Savvov, 2008, p. 51; Nadvirniak, Pohorilets, Nadvirniak, 2016, pp. 172, 177; Le Boek, 2001, p. 343; Petreczko, 2009, p. 75). From the beginning of the III^d century, thanks to the edict of Caracalla (*Constitutio Antoniniana*), when the Roman citizenship was granted to all the free population of the Empire, we can state about the emergence of a kind of a military caste, when men devoted themselves to a military service from generation to generation (Watson, 2014, 146). Beginning with the year of 210, the practice of issuing diplomas to auxiliaries disappeared, and the Praetorians acquired them before the middle of the III^d century. During the reign of Diocletian, the issuance of these documents resumed, and after 311 completely stopped (Kozlenko, 2013).

The Conclusions. Thus, owing to the privileges outlined in the military diplomas, this group of people played a huge role in Romanization and contributed to the spread of foreign cults in the provinces and the Roman citizenship, replenished the administrative apparatus in the area of the Roman Empire. In a broader context, the military diplomas and their holders contributed to the spread of the Roman culture far beyond the Empire, for example, in some Ukrainian lands bordering on the Roman provinces. The Roman military diplomas allow us to outline the political, military, economic and cultural history more broadly – not only of the Roman Empire, but also of neighbouring lands, primarily the European Barbaricum, which included the Ukrainian lands. Studying the places of these documents findings, we can trace the main directions of a political expansion and military colonization of the Roman Empire, their intensity, to detail the processes of Romanization of the population of the conquered and annexed territories. We can gain a deeper understanding of the level of relations and interactions between Rome and its neighbours (Nadvirniak, Pohorilets, Nadvirniak, 2016, p. 170). They are also unique sources for the study of the Roman military law and the history of Roman office work, the main epigraphic sources in the study of the Roman army history of the Principate period.

The conclusion can be drawn that the Roman military diplomas were an important historical document for studying various aspects of the Roman society (political, social, legal and domestic) and the main one of the components of Rome’s military power – auxiliary units and veterans, who came from their ranks, and it means that the Roman military diplomas unconditionally meet the definition of “a historical document”.

Prospects for Further Research. In our opinion, a perspective direction is the further study and systematization of the Roman military diplomas found in Ukraine. In perspective, this may shed light on many unknown aspects of the relationship between Rome and its neighbouring North-Eastern borders and the peoples, who inhabited this territory.

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**THE OPPOSITION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
AND THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
AND THE POSITION OF THE CZECH SZLACHTA
(THE END OF THE XVth – THE 30-IES OF THE XVIth CENTURY)**

Abstract. *The aim of the research is to highlight the problem of the opposition of the Ottoman Empire and the Holy Roman Empire in the Central and Eastern regions of Europe and to reveal the position of the Czech szlachta. The research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, systematic, scientific, author's objectivity, based on historical sources and the chronological and problem principle, as well as on the use of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and special-historical (integrated method of analysis of sources, historical-comparative, historical-descriptive, historical-systemic, terminological analysis) methods. The scientific novelty is that for the first time in Ukrainian historical science an analysis of the role and position of the Czech szlachta concerning the problem of the Turkish threat, through the prism of rule in the Czech kingdom of the Jagiellonian dynasty, has been carried out. The Conclusions.* At the end of the XVth century to the beginning of the XVIth century the international situation in the Central and Eastern regions of Europe was tense. The hostility continued between the leading monarchs of Europe. There was a direct Turkish threat to the Czech kingdom. The Papal state, the Polish kingdom and Moscow principality tried to resist the Turkish aggression. The created anti-Turkish alliance (France, Poland and the Pope of Rome) was little effective. Thus, the Hungarian kingdom, headed by King Louis II of Jagiellon, was forced to resist the Turkish Empire on its own actually. Under such circumstances, Louis II, being a Czech king, sought for support among the Czech classes. Taking into consideration the controversy between the Czech and Hungarian upper classes, it can be argued that the Czech szlachta chose a neutral, expectant position, and the Czech city estate at this stage was ignored and did not provide adequate military support to the king. During that period the cities in the Czech kingdom resisted the Czech szlachta and fought for their rights and privileges. Among the Hungarian estates there were disputes

between magnates and szlachta, which greatly complicated the situation. The unsuccessful policy of the representatives of the Czech and Hungarian Jagiellon dynasty led to the loss of the support among the Czech lords, Hungarian magnates and the representatives of burghers. The culmination of the opposition was the Battle of Mohács (August 29, 1526). The Czech estates (upper classes) didn't try to give the military assistance to the King and concerned only about their own interests, which the Czech szlachta together with the Czech city upper class put above the state interest.

Key words: szlachta, estates, lords, Turkish, Jagiellonian dynasty, Vladislaus II Jagiellon, Louis II Jagiellon, the Czech Kingdom, the Turkish Empire.

ПРОТИСТОЯННЯ МІЖ ОСМАНСЬКОЮ ІМПЕРІЄЮ ТА СВЯЩЕННОЮ РИМСЬКОЮ ІМПЕРІЄЮ В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНО-СХІДНІЙ ЄВРОПІ ТА ПОЗИЦІЯ ЧЕСЬКОЇ ШЛЯХТИ (КІНЕЦЬ XV – 30-ті рр. XVI ст.)

Анотація. *Мета дослідження* – висвітлити проблему протистояння між Османською імперією та Священною Римською імперією в Центрально-Східному регіоні Європи та розкрити позицію чеської шляхти за часів правління Владислава II та Людовіка II Ягеллонів. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на принципах історизму, системності, науковості, авторської об'єктивності, оперті на історичні джерела та хронологічно-проблемний принцип, а також на використанні загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, узагальнення) та спеціально-історичних (комплексний метод аналізу джерел, історико-порівняльний, історико-описовий, історико-системний, термінологічний аналіз) методів. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що вперше в українській історичній науці здійснено аналіз позиції чеської шляхти щодо проблеми турецької загрози крізь призму правління в Чеському королівстві династії Ягеллонів. **Висновки.** На кінець XV – поч. XVI ст. міжнародна ситуація у Центрально-Східному регіоні Європи була напруженою. Тривала ворожнеча між провідними монархами Європи. Виникла пряма турецька загроза для Чеського королівства. Протистояти турецькій агресії намагалася Папська держава, Польське королівство та Московське князівство. Створений антиосманський союз (Франція, Польща, Папа Римський) був малоефективним. Таким чином, Угорське королівство на чолі з королем Людовіком II Ягеллоном було змушене фактично самотійно чинити опір Османській імперії. За таких обставин Людовік II, будучи і чеським королем, шукав підтримку серед чеських станів. Зважаючи на суперечки між чеськими і угорськими станами, можна стверджувати, що чеська шляхта обрала нейтральну, вицікувальну позицію, а чеський міський стан на цьому етапі був проігнорований і не надав належної військової підтримки королю. Саме в цей період у Чеському королівстві міста чинили опір чеській шляхті й боролися за свої права та привілеї. Серед угорських станів відбувалися суперечки між магнатами та шляхтою, що значно ускладнювало ситуацію. Вони так і не змогли дійти згоди і об'єднатися в період небезпеки. Невдала внутрішня політика представників чесько-угорської лінії династії Ягеллонів призвела до втрати підтримки серед чеських панів, угорських магнатів та представників містян. Кульмінацією протистояння з Османською імперією стала битва при Могачі (29 серпня 1526 р.). Чеські стани не надали належної військової допомоги королю і керувалися насамперед власними інтересами, які ставили вище від державних.

Ключові слова: шляхта, стани, пани, турки, династія Ягеллонів, Владислав II Ягеллон, Людовік II Ягеллон, Чеське королівство, Турецька імперія.

The Problem Statement. With the expansion of the Ottomans into the Balkans and the fall of Constantinople in 1453, there was a direct threat of the Turkish invasion to Central and Eastern Europe. First of all, the Ottoman Empire was a danger to the Hungarian, Czech and Polish kingdoms. This danger was facilitated by the escalation of disputes among the heads of European states, the Emperor Charles V and King Francis I, which caused the rapprochement and signing of allied relations between the Kingdom of France and the High Porte (in Turkish – *Babiali*).

The period of reign of the Jagiellonian dynasty in the Czech kingdom (1471 – 1526) was chosen as the chronological boundaries of the study. The representatives of the

Czech-Hungarian dynastic line of Jagiellonians were Vladislaus II Jagiellończyk (Jagiellonian) (1471 – 1516) and Louis II of Hungary (1516 – 1526) (Čornej & Bartlová, 2008, pp. 407, 474, 531). During their reign in the Czech Kingdom, a class-representative model of a public administration was formed, which significantly weakened the king's position and strengthened the position of the Czech upper classes.

The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches. The term “Turkish threat” or “Turkish fear” is widely used in historiography. In a historical science, the problem of struggle against the Turkish aggression is considered in the context of elucidating of the international relations of the leading European states.

In the Czech historical science, some aspects of the outlined issues are found in the works of: F. Palacký (Palacký, 1930; Palacký, 1976), F. Dvorník (Dvorník, 2005), A. Denis (Denis, 1932), J. Macek (Macek, 2001), V. Čechura (Čechura, 2012) and the others.

The four-volume work by J. Macek “Jagiellonian Age in the Czech Lands” should be singled out (Macek, 2001). The third volume is devoted to the problems of the Czech szlachta and cities. The socio-political struggle of the city class with the Czech szlachta is covered.

The researchers paid much attention to the expansion of the Ottomans in the Czech Republic and Hungary. In addition to general works, the problem of the Turkish aggression was reflected in the specific works. The most complete studies of this kind are the monographs and articles by J. Szabó (Szabó, 2006), Z. Vybíral (Vybíral, 2008), A. Mezeiová (Mezeiová, 2005), I. Zombori (Zombori, 2004) and the others. In some parts of the above-mentioned studies the preconditions, course and consequences of the Battle of Mohács in 1526 are described.

Much material about the activities of Vladislaus II Jagiellonian and Louis II Jagiellonian and their struggle against the Turkish sultanate, can be found in the works on the history of Hungary (Picheta, 1947; Tóth, 2001; Zombori, 2006).

In the Slavic studies, some facts of the Czech szlachta activities and its role in the struggle against the Turkish threat are contained in the works of the Russian and Soviet researchers: “History of the Czech Republic” edited by V. Picheta (Picheta, 1947), “History of Czechoslovakia” (Sanchuk, G.E. & Tretyakova, 1956), the monograph by L. Lapteva (Lapteva, 1993) and the others.

It is worth mentioning the works of the Ottoman historians. The fundamental study of the Austrian historian Josef von Hammer-Purgstall “History of the Ottoman Empire” should be mentioned as well (Hammer, 1947). Volume IX is of great interest, in which through the prism of the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire, the problem of the Turkish aggression in the region of Central and Eastern Europe is revealed. The work of the Turkish historian G. İnaldjik “The Ottoman Empire: Classical Age 1300 – 1600” (İnaldzyk, 1998) is in-depth, which due to its original concept has not lost its scientific topicality. Analyzing the work, we note that the author covered almost all aspects of the study of the Ottoman state. The reign of Suleiman I was not an exception. The author reveals the reasons for the battle of Mohács, the problems of confrontation between Charles V and Francis I, the rapprochement of the French with the High Porte, which significantly contributed to the penetration of the Ottoman army into Hungary and Austria. Important information about the above-mentioned events is contained in the work of the Scottish historian-orientalist John Patrick Douglas Balfour, Baron Kinross “The Rise and Fall of the Ottoman Empire” (Kynross, 1999).

In the Ukrainian historical science, it is worth mentioning the research of the team of authors “Essays on the History of the Czech Republic” (Zinko, Kalytko, Kravchuk & Pop,

2017). The authors pay little attention to the reign of the Jagiellonians and their struggle against the Turkish aggression. Some aspects of this issue are elucidated in the works of the Ukrainian historians: L. Zashkilnyak (Zashkilniak, 2001), Ya. Tovtyn (Tovtyn, 2011), O. Zviagina (Zviagina, 2015).

However, in the above-mentioned works, little attention is paid to the role of the Czech estates in the struggle against the Turkish threat. Thus, there are no complex studies on the outlined problem in the Ukrainian historiography.

The source basis for writing our scientific study was the documents published in the collections of works "Sources on the History of Slovakia and the Slovaks" (Pramene k dejinám Slovenska a Slovakov) and "Mohács" (Szabó, 2006; Dvořák, 2005). The collection of documents "The Czech Archive" contains no less important material (Archiv Český) (Palacký, 1872; Dvorský, 1889; Rezek, 1890; Kalousek, 1895). Supporting material is contained in the collections of documents "From Ancient Czech Chronicles" (Ze starých letopisů českých) (Porák & Kašpar, 1980), "Czechoslovak History in Archival Documents" (Československé dějiny v archivních dokumentech) (Kut, 1961) and "History in Documents" (Historie v dokumentech) (Kvirenc, & Kunstová, 2006).

In 1829, F. Palacký published the collection of sources "Ancient Czech Chronicles from 1378 to 1527 or a Continuation of the Chronicle of Przybik Pulkava and Beneš from Horzovice from Ancient Manuscripts". In this collection of sources in a chronological order there are the letters of princes, lords and knights, which contain important political information of an ultraquistic nature. It should be noted that in 1980 the collection was republished and translated from Old Czech into modern Czech by J. Porák and J. Kaspar under the title "From the Ancient Czech Chronicles" (Ze starých letopisů českých) (Porák & Kašpar, 1980).

Important information is contained in Chapters VI, IX, X, and XIV of the Czech Archives, published by F. Palatsky, F. Dvorsky, A. Rezek, and J. Kalousek. In Volume VI, published in 1872, we have analyzed the chapter "Acts and Decisions of Congresses in the Czech Kingdom", which contains the information on the introduction of congresses acts and decisions, laws and decrees that shed light on the political activities of the Czech szlachta (Palacký, 1872). In Volume IX, published in 1889, the chapter "The Letters of Zdenek Lev from Rozhmítal in 1526" is important. (Dopisy Zdeňka Lvy z Rozmítalu in 1526) (Dvorský, 1889). The chapter contains the letters from Mr. Zdenek Lev from Rozhmítal, which cover a political life and the inter-state disputes. The documents contained in Volumes X and XIV, published in 1890 and 1895, (Rezek, 1890; Kalousek, 1895), reveal the political activities of the Czech szlachta and their disputes with the city authorities.

In 1961 the collection of documents "Czechoslovak History in Archival Documents" was published. The collection comprises the document "The Letter of Derdja Doge with an Order to Conduct the Combat against Szlachta in 1514" (Kut, 1961). Analyzing this letter, we learn about the delay of the Czech szlachta in providing a military help to the king.

In 2005 the collection of documents "Sources on the History of Slovakia and the Slovaks" was published under the editorship of P. Dvořák. Volume VII, the chapter "The Turks in Hungary" contains a significant material, in which we find the information about the Battle of Mohács and its consequences (Dvořák, 2005). An important source on the topic of the research is the collection "Mohács", compiled by J. Szabó in 2006. First of all, we were interested in the reports on the Battle of Mohács in 1526 (Szabó, 2006).

In 2006, J. Kvirents and E. Kunstová compiled a collection of materials based on the documents from the early Middle Ages to 1914. In Chapter V we find the documents and

illustrations, which date back to the Jagiellonian period and provide information about the Battle of Mohács (Kvirenc, & Kunstová, 2006).

The purpose of the study is to elucidate the problem of confrontation between the Ottoman Empire and the Holy Roman Empire in the Central and Eastern regions of Europe and to reveal the position of the Czech szlachta.

The Statement of the Basic Material. It is advisable to refer to the term “szlachta”. In the sources of this period it is difficult to find the term “szlachta”. We will not find this term in the legal acts, provincial documents, “The Tovachov Book” or “The Provincial Statute of Vladislaus II”. Instead, we come across the terms: “lord”, “panosh”, “zeman”, “knight” and, etc. The very term “szlachta” comes from Germany and it began to be used in the Czech lands later. Until the XVth century the wealthiest lords and knights were called “szlachta” (Macek, 2001, p. 338; Denis, 1932, pp. 164–176; Starý, 2005, p. 252). In the Ukrainian historical science, in addition to the term “the Czech szlachta”, we also find the use of the terms “the Czech nobility”, “the Czech petty gentry”. However, in the Czech historiography, all the upper classes of the Czech medieval society are called “szlachta”. That is why, the author of this research will use the term “the Czech szlachta”.

At the beginning of the XVIth century there was a direct Turkish threat to the Czech kingdom. Before elucidating this issue, it is necessary to learn about the international situation at the end of the XVth – the beginning of the XVIth century. It should be noted that there was some enmity among the leading monarchs of Europe. The Papal Curia, the Polish Kingdom during the reign of Sigismund I the Old (1507 – 1548), and Moscovia, under the rule of Grand Duke Basil III (1505 – 1533), tried to oppose the Turkish sultanate. However, the latter two were at some enmity with each other and did not want to aggravate relations with the Ottoman Empire (Krymskiy, 1996, pp. 153–157).

Despite a rather peaceful nature of Sultan Bayezid II (1481 – 1512), during 1491 – 1492 the Turks carried out several military actions in the Balkans and laid siege to Belgrade (retreated on July 29, 1491). (Pushkash & Shusharina, 1971, p. 236; Porák & Kašpar, 1980, p. 267). Under such circumstances, in 1500, Vladislaus II joined the alliance with the kings of France, Poland and Pope Alexander IV (1492 – 1503) in the struggle against the High Porte. Despite the anti-Turkish alliance, the Turks remained being dangerous for the Hungarian and Czech kingdoms, as well as for the whole territory of Europe. That is why, in 1514 a crusade against the Turkish Empire was declared in Hungary, but, as we know, it all ended in the uprising under the command of Derdja Doge (1470 – 1514). It should be noted that it was during the uprising that the Czech szlachta expressed their position for the first time. The Czech szlachta reacted to the problems of their king in Hungary very slowly and they were in no hurry to provide some help (Pushkash & Shusharina, 1971, p. 237). This slowness was caused not only by indifference to the problems of the king, but also to the Hungarian estates (upper classes).

An interesting fact is that during the uprising (Kut, 1961, p. 28), Vladislaus II rejected the offer of a military assistance of the Czech cities: “The Hungarian upper class does not want this... such an embassy can harm us” (Macek, 2001, pp. 251–252). This mistake will have serious consequences in the future, as the Czech cities could actually provide military force in the struggle against the Turkish sultanate. Taking into consideration the disputes between the Czech and Hungarian upper classes, it can be stated that the Czech szlachta chose a neutral, wait-and-see attitude, and the Czech urban representatives were ignored at this stage.

A new danger arose in 1521 with the coming to power of the new Sultan Suleiman I the Magnificent or Kanuni (Legislator) (1520 – 1566). Under these circumstances, King Louis II

asked European rulers for help at the congress in Worms (Krymskyi, 1996, p. 160; Cambel, 1986, p. 424; Petrosyan, 2013, p. 67; Zviahina, 2015, p. 74). The idea that the Hungarians could not defeat the Turks dominated among the Czech szlachta. It should be noted that the leading representatives of the Czech szlachta were reluctant to help the King. It can be affirmed that the main reason for the delay in helping the King was his support policy of the city representatives. The King understood the importance of it, but the opportunity to receive a military assistance was already lost. It was during this period that in the Czech Kingdom the cities resisted the Czech szlachta and fought for their rights and privileges (Čechura, 2012, pp. 194–199; Mrva, 2005, p. 7; Zombori, 2004, p. 148).

The circumstances of the Turkish aggression made the Kings Sigismund I, Louis II and Duke Ferdinand I meet in October 1523 in Wiener Neustadt (Zombori, 2004, pp. 149–150; Zombori, 2006, pp. 274–284). One of the questions concerned the Turkish danger. A large crusade against the Ottomans was planned. It is known that the Czech upper classes reacted for the first time, sending the delegation to the Congress on October 21, 1523: Prince Karl of Minsterberg, Chancellor Adam from Hradec, Wojciech from Pernstein, Jan Glaws, a representative of the city, and the others. It should be noted that the records of this meeting on agreements with the Czech upper classes remained a mystery (Palacký, 1930, p. 532).

The Turkish issue became acute after Suleiman I captured quite important fortresses during the summer of 1524, namely: Pětikostelí, Orschowa and Caras-Severin. This success was facilitated by the escalation of disputes between the Emperor Charles V of Habsburg (1519 – 1558) and the King Francis I (1515 – 1547). After Francis I lost the battle for the imperial crown and was taken a prisoner, his relations with the Emperor and the Roman Curia deteriorated considerably. The Turkish sultanate decided to take advantage of this, signing a secret treaty with Francis I and intending to weaken the unity of European monarchs (Иналджик, 1998, pp. 45–46; Новичев, 1963, pp. 86–87; Кинросс, 1999, pp. 190–195).

The inaction of the King and his entourage caused indignation among the Hungarian estates (upper classes). This situation led to the development of disputes between the magnates and szlachta, which greatly complicated the situation. It should be noted that the Hungarian estates (upper classes) were unable to reach an agreement and unite during the period of danger (Palacký, 1930, p. 563).

Under such circumstances, Louis II tried to gather more troops to defend the lands. In particular, his letters to the Czech upper class representatives, the representatives of religious movements and the Pope are known. The ambassador was sent to the Czech lands with a request to provide a military assistance. Lev of Rožmítal (1470 – 1535), the supreme burgrave, immediately announced that this issue must be resolved at the Sejm in Prague (Palacký, 1930, p. 564).

To provide a military assistance to the King the consent of the General Sejm (the main body) was required. The procedure was as follows: the King had the right to summon the General Sejm, and in of his absence (death, departure, etc.) – the governor of the kingdom – the supreme burgrave (*supremus burgravius*). Usually the main issues discussed were the following: the election of a new king, religious issues, military readiness in case of danger, etc. (Vaněček, 1970, pp. 108, 113–114; Vaněček, 1947, p. 143). To do this, it was necessary to summon regional and zemstvo congresses, which gave a permission for a military campaign and elected representatives to take part in the General Sejm. The decision of the Sejm did not require a royal assent. After the decision was made, it was included into zemstvo boards (in Czech – *zemské desky*) and came into force (Markov, 1930, p. 92). As we can see, in the

case of a rapid response to the danger, giving a military assistance was a complex and time-consuming process in terms of organization.

Mr. Lev's letter of June 22, 1526, to his comrade testifies to the mood, which prevailed among the Czech estates (upper classes): "I am sending you the answer given by Prague lords to Mr. Tsetris. We hope that there will be no need to go to the battle against the Turks". (Dvorský, 1889, p. 48). Also on June 28, 1526, he wrote to Mr. Wojciech of Pernstein that the money had been sent from Buda for 4,000 mercenaries, adding: "Why do we need the infantry against the Turks? Let them serve for us. We must defend our lands, so we must be ready". On July 7, 1526, Mr. Lev wrote: "Those, who were present at the Congress in Prague decided to help the King" (Dvorský, 1889, p. 48). Based on the analysis of the letters, it can be stated that the Czech estates (upper classes) were in no hurry to provide a military assistance to the King and were guided primarily by their own interests, which the Czech szlachta together with the Czech city upper class put above the state interest.

As of the first quarter of the XVIth century the richest Czech lords were: Indřich from Hradec, the Rožmberka lords, Jan from Šelmberk, Mykola Tyrčka from Lichtenburg, the lord Kostka from Postupice, Willem from Pernštejna, Indřich from Plavn, the Schwigowski lords, Albrecht Lipsteinsky from Kolovrat, Vladyslav and Jan from Sternberg, the Weitmilnarzhi lords, Zdeněk Lev from Rozhmital (Palacký, 1872, pp. 316–321). Depending on a lord's wealth, it was determined how many soldiers the lord had to make ready for the needs during the war (Macek, 2001, p. 364). The most influential lords (Willem from Pernštejna, Wok from Rožmberk, Peter and Zdeněk of Sternberg) no longer provided a military assistance to the King. This came under the control of vassals: magnates, zemanes, mercenaries (Rezek, 1890, p. 56). Among the duties of vassals was primarily a military service. At the lord's call, the vassal had to appear in the lord's estate with his horse, weapons, supplies. The vassal had to accompany the lord during military activities or hunting. The vassal had to repair fortresses, clean the yards, etc. The vassals were greatly influenced by the lords from Rožmberk, Shvamberg, Indrzhikhov Hradec families. By the way, a military service could be redeemed. Thus, in 1472 zeman Peter of Voikov paid a ransom of 400 zlotykh to Jan from Rožmberk (Kalousek, 1895, p. 209).

As we see, with the establishment of the estate monarchy in the lands of the Czech crown, the upper Czech szlachta no longer provided a military assistance to the King, and the petty szlachta could pay off this obligation. Of course, the King was able to hire troops for large sums of money. In 1526 they managed to hire 1,300 Czech soldiers (zholdners), (from French *solde* – a mercenary), who will take a direct part in the battle of Mohács.

The culmination of the confrontation with the Ottoman Empire was the battle of Mohács (in Hungarian – *Mohács*). The King Louis II had much hope for the Hungarian and Czech troops. He accounted for the Czech and Moravian armies of up to 16 000. However, the military help was less than it was expected. It is known that with the funds sent by the Pope (25 000 ducats), they managed to hire 4 000 of the Czech and German and 1 500 Polish soldiers. The exact number of the Czech troops is not known, it was about 1 300 Moravian soldiers. As for earl Janos Zapolyai, he and his army (about 8 – 10 000 of people) were late for the battle. According to the main version, he is believed to have betrayed the King, but there are speculations concerning the geographical features of the Balkans. It should be noted that there were no exact data on the movement of the Ottoman army. What direction they chose became known only when the Ottoman army crossed the Balkans (the main target was Buda). Thus, Janos Zapolyai defended the way through

Transylvania, not knowing the movement direction of the Ottoman army (Mohach – 1526, 2014, p. 13; Szabó, 2006, pp. 93–94).

The sources give rather poor information about the number of the royal troops. Thus, according to various statistics data, the royal army numbered 25–28 000 (of whom 8 000 were foreigners: the Czechs, the Poles, the Croats, the Serbs, the Germans, the Italians, the Spaniards) soldiers and 53–80 guns. The number of the Turkish troops was 55–65 000 soldiers and 160 guns (Vybiral, 2008, pp. 24–25; Čechura, 2012, p. 206; Mohach – 1526, 2014, pp. 13–14; Szabó, 2006, pp. 93–94; Fučík & Havel, 2003, p. 11). With such a distribution of forces, the Ottomans had a clear advantage.

The battle took place in the afternoon of August 29, 1526 and ended in two hours with the complete defeat of the royal troops, and King Louis II, escaping from the battle field, died (got drowned, crossing the Danube Gulf of Csele-patak (Čechura, 2012, p. 206; Letz, 1995, pp. 30–31; Vybiral, 2008, pp. 73–75; Lapteva, 1993, p. 105; Kvirenc & Kunstová, 2006, p. 93; Кинросс, 1999, pp. 202–203). All the prisoners (about 1 500 people) were executed by the order of Suleiman I. Archbishop of Salkan, Tomori (7 prelates in total), György Zapolyai, Jan Dragfi, Ambrose Sharshen (28 lords and 500 sylachta representatives in total) were killed (Dvořák, 2005, pp. 22–24; Szabó, 2006, pp. 155–156; Dvořák, 2005, pp. 25–26; Szabó, 2006, p. 143; Fialová, 1964, p. 95; Segeš, 1998, p. 193; Mohach – 1526, 2014, p. 27). In two weeks, on September 10, 1526, the Turks captured Buda. It should be noted that the Ottoman troops were stopped only near Vienna (1529) (Krymskyi, 1996, p. 161; Petrosyan, 2013, pp. 69–70).

The defeat at the Battle of Mohács had serious geopolitical consequences. Thus, the majority of the Hungarian petty and middle szlachta supported Janos I Zapolyai (1526 – 1540), and the representatives of the higher szlachta supported Ferdinand I Habsburg (Tóth, 2001, p. 234; Skladaný, 1970, p. 44; Palacký, 1930, pp. 570–572; Tovtyn, 2011, pp. 35–36). The Transylvanian principality (dependent on Turkey) emerged, and the so-called Royal Hungary emerged in the other part of Hungary. Concerning the Czech estates, according to the matrimonial pact of 1515, a representative of the Habsburg dynasty, Ferdinand I of Habsburg (1526 – 1564), was elected to the Czech throne (Baďurik & Konya, 2000, p. 15; Čechura, 2012, pp. 64–80; Galandauer & Honzík, 1987, p. 274). The Czech estates (upper classes) elected a monarch, who was initially forced to secure their rights and privileges and to take care of the security of the lands of the Czech crown.

The Conclusions. Thus, the unsuccessful domestic policy of the Czech-Hungarian line of the Jagiellonian dynasty caused a loss of support among the Czech lords, the Hungarian magnates and townspeople. It was a failure to involve the leading monarchs of Europe into the struggle against the Turkish aggression. The Czech estates (upper classes) underestimated the level of danger and cared more about their own political and economic interests. The evidence of this are the letters of the Czech lords, knights, townspeople. The Czech lords, knights, townspeople had the duty to provide a military assistance to the King only in case of an imminent danger to the Czech kingdom. Louis II, as the King of the two kingdoms, was betrayed by the representatives of his own Czech estates. The Czech szlachta no longer took part in the military campaigns personally, and the petty szlachta could redeem themselves from this duty. However, as the history will show, the consequences of the “Catastrophe at Mohács” was felt later by the Czech kingdom. In the beginning, no significant changes occurred. The Turks were stopped near Vienna and did not invade the Czech lands. The Habsburg dynasty became a hidden threat. Already from the 30-ies of the XVIth century

there were tendencies to the centralization of power. After 1547 there were tendencies to a certain absolutism of power. All this will lead to the confrontation of the Czech estates with the monarch and, as the consequence, the uprising broke out, which led to the defeat, the loss of the Czech statehood and the establishment of absolutism.

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UKRAINE'S LANDS AS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE AND GEOPOLITICAL CONTACTS ACCORDING TO THE DATA FROM ARABOGRAPHIC WRITTEN SOURCES

Abstract. The purpose of the study: to analyse the historical conditions of rising and development of trade routes, as well as the geopolitical processes during 16th – 18th centuries between the countries of the historicogeographic area from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, which are referred to in Arabic and Turkish-Ottoman written sources. Implementation of the set up purpose has been achieved by observing the general theoretical and methodical principles of Historiography and Source Studies aimed at provision of defining the specific features of that development. **The Methodology of the study** is based on the principles of providing the historism, scientific objectivity, a specific historical systematicity, and also on the interdisciplinarity principle and the principle of identification of the authenticity and informational value of the data and facts having been found. While making this study there were applied general historical methods of making a historiographical, terminological, typological and textologic analyses, and also the comparativistics method. **The academic novelty of the study** is perception of the Historiosophy of Ukraine's History in the context of intercivilisational relations demonstrated by setting up in the said historiogeographical area of a great trade route, and primarily the socio-economic and geopolitical processes having taken place in Ukraine during the above said time, as well as that of the military and political situation all along during that period in the Northern Black-Sea Area and the situation in the Crimean Ulus, though the author's interpretation of the historic events while taking into consideration the data available in Arabic and Turkish-Ottoman written sources.

The Conclusions. Studies of Arabic, and particularly Turkish-Osman written sources give us grounds to state that in the Medieval times the port cities of Yumne and Constantinople were important trade markets, particularly the traded goods were transported along the rivers of Dnieper and Danube. But the city managed to keep its importance in the system of the international trading. The importance of

Ukraine's geopolitical situation within the system of international trade relations was accounted for by the fact, that through its territory trade routes were set which provided stable and long-lasting economic relations between the most influential ports and countries of Eastern Europe northwards of the Black Sea. The Baltic cultural and historic region that included the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, was connected with the Black Sea through the territory of Ukraine.

The economic crisis, which lasted in the Ottoman Empire till the beginning of the 17th century, in the Northern Black-Sea Area new political forces emerged which before that had been in the vassal dependence and used by the great states within their own contact zones for a close economic, cultural and military cooperation of the border countries. Those border forces were, from one side – the Crimean Khanate, and from the other side – The Zaporozhian Host. Our study has shown that the Ukrainian problem has always been an actual item in the international policy of the High Porte.

We have studied the original manuscript "A Letter-Order from Turkish Sultan Andulkhamid I to the Kadee of the city of Izmir". The data we have obtained from this document proved the economic relations between the countries located within the above said historicogeographical areals to have been long-lasting, and there have also been identified conditions, in which the trade relations between these countries had been developing, and the routes having been set up through the territory of Ukraine.

Key words: the Scandinavian impact, a trade route, Arabographical sources, the Dnieper, the Black Sea, Lviv, Istanbul.

ЗЕМЛІ УКРАЇНИ ЯК ВАЖЛИВИЙ ЧИННИК У РОЗВИТКУ ТОРГІВЕЛЬНИХ І ГЕОПОЛІТИЧНИХ КОНТАКТІВ ЗА ДАНИМИ АРАБОГРАФІЧНИХ ПИСЕМНИХ ДЖЕРЕЛ

Анотація. *Мета дослідження* – проаналізувати історичні умови виникнення та розвитку торговельних шляхів, також геополітичні процеси між країнами Балтійсько-Чорноморського історично-географічного ареалу XVI – XVIII ст., що згадуються в арабських та османсько-турецьких писемних джерелах. Досягнення поставленої мети реалізується на основі дотримання загальних теоретико-методологічних засад історіографії та джерелознавства з метою забезпечити виокремлення характерних ознак цього розвитку. **Методологія дослідження** базується на принципах історизму, науковій об'єктивності, конкретно-історичної системності, а також на принципах міждисциплінарності, встановлення достовірності та інформаційної цінності виявлених відомостей і фактів. При проведенні цього дослідження були застосовані загальноісторичні методи історіографічного, термінологічного, типологічного, текстологічного аналізу, метод компаративістики. **Наукова новизна** дослідження полягає в осмисленні історіософії історії України в контексті міжцивілізаційних відносин, про що свідчили створення великого торговельного шляху в зазначеному історично-географічному просторі, соціально-економічні й геополітичні процеси, які відбувалися на теренах України в окреслений час, а також військово-політична ситуація впродовж цього періоду у Північному Причорномор'ї та становище Кримського улусу; в автотрєторії пролягали торговельні шляхи, які забезпечували тривалість і стабільність економічних відносин між визначними портами та країнами Східної Європи на північ від Чорного моря. Балтійський культурно-історичний регіон, до якого входила Річ Посполита, був з'єднаний із Чорним морем через територію України.

Висновки. Дослідження арабських, зокрібно османсько-турецьких писемних джерел дає підставу говорити про те, що у Середньовіччї портове місто Юмне і Константинополь були важливими ринками для торгівлі, зокрібно товари для продажу транспортувалися по Дніпру і Дунаю. Але в той же час місто зберегло своє значення в системі міжнародної торгівлі. Важливість геополітичного становища України в системі міжнародних торговельних зв'язків досліджуваного періоду визначалася тим, що через її територію пролягали торговельні шляхи, які забезпечували тривалість і стабільність економічних відносин між визначними портами та країнами Східної Європи на північ від Чорного моря. Балтійський культурно-історичний регіон, до якого входила Річ Посполита, був з'єднаний із Чорним морем через територію України.

Внаслідок економічної кризи, що тривала в Османській імперії до початку XVII ст., у Північному Причорномор'ї виникли нові політичні сили, які раніше перебували у васальній залежності та використовувалися великими державами у межах їхніх власних контактних зон для тісної економічної, культурної та військової взаємодії прикордонних країн. Такими силами були, з одного боку, Кримське ханство, а з іншого боку – Військо Запорозьке. Наше дослідження

свідчить про те, що українське питання завжди було актуальним у міжнародній політиці Високої Порти.

Досліджений нами оригінальний рукописний документ за назвою "Лист-наказ від турецького султана Абдулхаміда I до каді м. Ізміра". Отримані відомості з цього документа свідчать про тривалість економічних відносин, а також умови здійснення торговельних відносин між країнами названих історико-географічних ареалів, шляхи, які простягалися через терени України.

Ключові слова: скандинавський вплив, торговельний шлях, арабграфічні джерела, Дніпро, Чорне море, Львів, Стамбул.

The Problem Statement. The study we have made is relevant, as Arabic and Turkish-Ottoman written sources are important to study historical conditions of the emergence and development of trade relations between the countries of the Baltic and Black-Sea Region. When considering this problem, one should also underline the impact of the Scandinavian countries, particularly those of Norway, on the intercivilisational relations in the North, Central and East Europe and in the Middle East. For example, this factor accounted for setting up a trade route from Constantinople to the Western Baltic-Sea port city of Wolina (Jumne/Jum), that existed in the said period of time of the Medieval history and known as "The route from the Varangians to the Greeks", as it is mentioned by Omelian Pritsak on the ground of the data from Arabic written sources (Pritsak, 1997, 2003, pp. 488–496).

Analysis of the Sources and Recent Academic Studies. The problem of academic studies of related to the historical conditions and development of trade relations was considered in fundamental studies carried out by the following national and foreign scholars: O. Pritsak – "Origin of Rus" (1997, 2003), H. İnalçık – "An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300 – 1914" (1994), V. Beilis – "Al-Idrisi about the ports on the Black Seas and connections between them" (1988), M. Ürekli – "Kırım Hanlığının Kurluşu ve Osmanlı Himayesinde Yükselişi (1441 – 1569)" (1989), Ya. Kalakura – "The state-formation activity of Bohdan Khmelnytsky: the Ukrainian Historiography" (1996), V. Kriukov – "Al-Khuvarizmi about "Sarmatia as the land of the Burjans" and its country-neighbours" (2009), O. Mavrina – "Emergence of the Crimean Khanate in the context of the political situation in East Europe between the end of the 14th century and the beginning of the 15th century" (2004), V. Brekhunenko – "Cosacks on the Steppe Border of Europe": the typology of the Cosack communities for the period of the 16th century – the gist half if the 17th century" (2011), F. Turanly – "The military cooperation between the Crimean Khanate and the Zaporozhian Host in the second quarter of the 17th century" (2019), F. Turanly – "Written Documents on the Black Sea Diplomacy Vector of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky" (2019), F. Turanly – "The Cossack period in Ukraine's history in Ottoman Turkish written sources (the second half of the 16th – the first quarter of the 18th century)", (2016), Y. Öztürk – "Özü'denTuna'ya: Kazaklar-1" (2004), V. Stanislavsky – "Participation of merchants in the dissemination of information and transportation of the diplomatic dispatches between Russia, Ukraine and Turkey at the beginning of the 18th century" (2016) and some other ones.

The Purpose of the Publication. To analyse the data, which we have found in the studied Arabographical written sources, about the historical conditions of the origination and development of trade relations, particular also that concerning the political relations, between the countries of the Baltic and Black-Sea historiographical areal; as well as the socio-political, economic and geopolitical processes that took place on the territory of Ukraine from the second half of the 16th century and the 18th century, and also the military-political situation

during the said period of time in the North Black-Sea Area and the situation of the Crimean Ulus.

The Statement of the Basic Material. It should be noted here that importance of the geopolitical situation in Ukraine for the system of the international trade relations of that time was accounted by the fact, that its territory provided continuous and stable economic relations between the High Porte and East-European countries located northwards of the Black Sea. The Baltic cultural and historical region that included the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was a connection with the Black Sea through the territory of Ukraine. However, river trade routes provided the economic connection of the Upper-Dnieper Area with the Baltic countries, as well as with the lands in the Middle- and Lower-Dnieper Areas, so the trade route from Constantinople to Jumne originated resulting from the activities of the Vikings, and that route connected the Baltic Sea with the Black Sea and promoted to an intensive development of the economic, political and cultural relations between the above said continental areas. This kind of the development of historic events is proved by Arabic and Turkish written documents, which are of much importance for studying the historical relations between the Scandinavian countries, particularly those of Norway, Ukraine and Turkey.

The Ukrainian scholar Yaroslav Kalakura did prove in his study that from the 16th century to the 18th century there was a historical period, which, from one hand, was the time for a formation and functioning of the Cossack-Hetman Ukraine, and, from the other hand, it was the peak in the establishment and development of the Ottoman Empire. Relations between these two states at that time were characterised by not only military invasions, but also by trends to getting mutual understanding and to mutually useful military cooperation and trade (Kalakura, 1996, pp. 151–155).

As for the other possessions of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, the population on those territories (Greeks, Balkan Slavs, Romanians from the Lower-Danube Area, Hungarians, Ukrainians) were mainly Christians. They were called *raya* (رعايا – “raya”) (Devellioğlu, 1993, p. 880) and had to pay to the state a tax set up for them that was called *jizye* (جزية – “jizye”) (Ortaylı, 2002, pp. 345–352; Turanly, 2016, p. 123). From long ago the Black Sea was a water basin which connected East Europe, particularly Ukraine and the Caucasus, with the countries adjoining to shore of the Mediterranean Sea. The connecting part of the grand trade route between the two seas was the water system “Bosphorus Strait – Marmara Sea – Dardanelles Strait”, while the main port city there was the capital of the Byzantine Empire – the city of Constantinople. Proofs of an intensive maritime traffic through the said water system are available in the geographic work “The book of Routes and Kingdoms” (كِتَابُ الْمَسَالِكِ وَالْمَمَالِكِ) written in about 272 Anno Herigao (885–886 Anno Domini) by the Arabic scholar Abu'l-Qāsim ‘Ubayd Allāh ‘Abd Allāh Ibn Khurradādhbih (*Marquart*, 1903, p. 390). For example, in the data concerning “The Strait” (الْمَضِيقُ) and “The Constantinople Strait” (خَلِيجُ الْقُسْطَنْطِينِيَّةِ), that is the Dardanelles Strait and the Marmara Sea together with the Bosphorus Strait, there is said that the mentioned water system “is used for ships to go [down the stream] from the peninsulas of the Al-Khazar Sea¹ and from the localities [adjoining these peninsulas], and go up [the stream] *я нею* from the sea of Syria² to Constantinople” (وَأَسْفُرُ) (تَخْدِرُ فِيهِ مِنْ جَزَائِرِ بَحْرِ الْخَزَرِ وَتِلْكَ التَّوَاجِي وَتَصْعَدُ فِيهِ مِنْ بَحْرِ الشَّامِ إِلَى الْقُسْطَنْطِينِيَّةِ) (Khordadbeh, 1889, p. 216). We add that the goods brought to Constantinople from the Black Sea were transported further southwards the basin of the Mediterranean Sea mainly by Venecian merchants (Heyd,

¹ The Kerch and Taman Peninsulas are meant.

² Ibn Khurradādhbih implied the Aegean Sea.

1879, pp. 124–125). I should be noted that it was “the Al-Khazar Sea, that the ancestors of the Ukrainians called in ‘The Book of Routes and Kingdoms’ as “Kievan Rus merchants” (نُجَارُ الرُّوسِ) supplied to the land possessions of “the Governor of the Byzantine Empire” (صَاحِبُ الرُّومِ) the traditional export goods of the Kievan Rus, and namely – “gentle pelage” (جُلُودُ الْخَزِّ), “fell of black foxes” (السُّودُ جُلُودُ الثَّعَالِبِ), that is furs, and “swords” (السِّيُوفِ). The trade route of Kievan Rus merchants was of much importance in the world trade of that time, and Ibn Khurradādhbih devoted a whole separate chapter to consider this point (Khordadbeh, 1889, pp. 154–155). We also can add that in the work “The Book of a Picture of the Earth” (كِتَابُ صُورَةِ الْأَرْضِ) by a great Arabic geographer of the second half of the 10th century Abu'l-Qāsim Mukhammad ibn Khaukala the capital of the Kievan Rus, the city of “Qayaba” (كَيْابَةَ), that is the city of Kyiv, is mentioned as the main supplier of furs to the land possessions of the Arabic Khakifate (*Haukal*, 1873, p. 281). Therefore, during the 9th c. – 10th c, Kyiv was a big transit centre of trading furs. Though, the trade route “Kyiv → Dnieper Estuary → Black Sea” was only one of the Black-Sea trade communications that reached Constantinople. The book “An entertainment of man tired of travelling around the world” (نُزْهَةٌ الْمُسْتَقَاتِقِ فِي إِخْتِرَاقِ الْأَفَاقِ) by the Arabic scholar of the 12th century Abu Qābdallah Mukhammad ash-Sharif al-Idrisi, where is available information about the trade routes set through the territory of Ukraine, mentions a Black-Sea trade route, which having been set along the western and northern seaside of the Black Sea connected Constantinople with the city of Tamatarkha on the shore of the Kerch Strait (Al-Idrisi, 1891, pp. 855–963; Beylis, 1988, pp. 67–76; Konovalova, 1999, pp. 164–165; Kriukov, 2009, 540 p.). Hence, during the Medieval period of time the city of Constantinople was an important market for trading goods imported by the Black Sea, including also the ones that were transported from the Dnieper and Danube, as well the centre of transiting such goods to the basin of the Mediterranean Sea.

It is clear that under the then political situation it was the Crimean Yurt³, that was the largest obstacle for the implementation of the above said aspirations of the Lithuanian princes. Obviously, the founder of the Crimean Khanate Gaji Melek I (Ruling period: 1420/1421 – 1455) understood all that too. And aiming at provision for himself reliable rears, he tried to support peaceful and friendly relations with the governors subordinated to the Grand Lithuanian Princes. These governors ruled on Ukrainian lands as apanged princes (Ortekin, 1938, pp. 1–10; Ürekli, 1989, pp. 9–11; Miroshnichenko, pp. 172–175; Pilipchuk, pp. 40–62). In addition, Gaji Giray may have taken into account the point, that all the territorial area located between the rivers of Dnieper and Danube along the Black-Sea shore, in the first half of the 15th century was covered with a lot of Lithuanian-Ukrainian fortifications and citadels, among which we think it reasonable to recall such ones, as Olesko Fort, Bar Fort, Kamyanets Fort, Nevytske Fort, Akkerman Fort and Zbarazh Fort. As for the lands located between the rivers of Dniester and Prut are concerned, beginning from 1401 they were parts of the Principality of Moldavia, which captured also Bilhorod, and, consequently, with that also the way out into the Black Sea. In 1454 the territorial possessions of Moldavia included also the town-fortress of Khotyn with its polyethnic, mainly Ukrainian, population (Mavrina, 2004, pp. 57–77; Gulevich, 2014, pp. 4–28).

Therefore, changes in the international situation in the above said region which occurred in the middle of the 15th century significantly impacted the character of relations between Ukraine and the Crimean Khanate; the latter had turned by that time into a powerful state and kept under control vast territories located southwards from the Black Sea. It were

³ “yurt” (Crimean Tatar) – “contry”, “motherland”, “native land” (a hearth).

the conditions of such a historical situation, when the formation of a military-political organisation of a specific social order was taking place in (Scherbak, 1997, 180 p.), and this order was made up from “representatives of the free people that lived on the southern lands of Ukraine and had not any governmental and legal limitations and standards for the population of the said area. In the 15th this social order became known as the one, which was aware of being itself the defender of the Southern Border Area...” (Khalymonenko, 2010, p. 306). Among the people populated the said area the word “Cossack” got expansion as the self-name of the community; this word was of the Turkic origin (Khalymonenko, 2010, p. 306; Scherbak, 1997, p. 21). It should be noted that the process of the formation of Cossackdom as a social phenomenon, being conscious at the same time of the own historical traditions, which were deeply rooted on Ukraine’s lands, during the end of the 16th and the first half of the 17th century reached a high level of the cultural and national enthusiasm of the Ukrainian society (Lepyavko, 1996, pp. 28–29; Scherbak, 1997, p. 6).

It should be noted that the significance of the geopolitical situation of Ukraine in the system of international economic connections at that time was accounted for by the point, that Ukraine’s territory was crossed by trade routes which provided reliable and stable economic relations of the High Porte with the European countries situated above the Black Sea. Indeed, it was through the territory of Ukraine, that the Baltic cultural and historical region, that also included the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, had connections with the Black Sea. For example, the trade routes used for transporting goods northwards and to the north-west from the Black-Sea shore and reverse, went along the rivers of Dnieper, Danube, Dniester and Prut. On seashores of the Black Sea and Azov Sea, not far from the basins of the above said rivers, Turks erected town-fortresses of Kafa, Taman, Azov, Akkerman and Ochakiv, which became important transit centres for existence of the northwards and north-westwards trade of the Ottoman Empire and were very important in the development of trade relations primarily with the East-European (Yakubova, 2011, pp. 93–94; Sereda, 2015, 312 p.). Particularly, the town-fortress of Kafa turned into the most important Turkish port in the East Crimea, from which marine trade routes went both from west to east, and from south to north. This logistic system also incorporated the Dnieper basin, as well as the town-fortresses located both in the delta of the Danube (Kilia), and near the estuary of the Dniester (Akkerman). The marine trade routes provided together the economic connection of the Upper-Dnieper Area with the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and with the lands in the Middle – and Lower Dnieper Areas (Öztürk, 2000, pp. 272, 280; Yağcı, 2013, pp. 507–536). Therefore, the Dnieper was a trade communication that connected the Baltic Sea with the Crimean Peninsula. We note that a lot of archival documents include data proving a meaningful significance of this trade artery for the social-economic development of Ukraine at the Cossack period of time of its history.

However, the purpose for some Turkish fortification structures was only the defense function. For example, of this kind there were fortresses built in the estuary of the Dnieper: Ochakiv on the north of the Dnieper-Buh Liman and Kilburun on the other bank of the liman. It should be noted that the fortresses of Ochakiv and Azov were of special importance for the High Porte in regard of securing protection of the territory of the native state, which was situated northwards from the Black Sea. There are also available data that on the bank of Khodjabey Liman, where nowadays the city of Odesa is located, that is 30 kilometers eastwards from the mouth of the Dniester, the first governor of the Crimean Khanate Gaji Giray (Ruling period: 1420/1421 – 1456) built the town of Khodjabey (Işık, 2008, pp. 55–76).

As for the fortress of Akkerman is concerned that situated in the mouth of the Dniester river, it was actually the most important Turkish customs check-point control, a kind of 'a gate' that regulated the outcome in the Black Sea for the goods imported from the territory of Poland (Chelebi, 1997, pp. 8–17). According to the legal standards and norms provided in the so called "Book of Laws" ("*Kanunnâme*"), bound for this area, particularly, general trade rules were set up for the goods brought from Lviv to be sent to the Black Sea. For instance, to send from this customs check-point to the destination place of each mule and donkey five *akches* were to be paid (Turanly, 2016, p. 92). If to speak about the tariff for sending cattle, the payment was to be four *akches*, while that for two sheep was one *akche*. One *akche* was to be paid in addition for each dozen sheep in favour of the cap or owner of the ship which was going to be used for transporting the respective goods. Sending of smoked (dry) fish from Ochakiv, Kilia and other towns and cities payment of a tax fee was imposed too, while no tax was taken from the person who bought the fish products from Akkerman and then transported those on his own. Besides, the above said Book also has information about the bondmen-prisoners delivered from Kafa, and data about some other goods (OACMRT, Tahrir Defteri, No 483, p. 18). So the Ottoman government formed a special administrative body known as "the Shore Security Service" (يالى آغاليجي – *Yalı Ağalığı*)⁴. The person in charge (Head) of this organisation had to guarantee the military security along the Dniester bank and along the trade route which went from Akkerman to the town of Kamyanets (OACMRT, MD, Cilt 97, p.7/48).

Beginning from the 15th century, in Lviv there were seen merchants who arrived from the city of Bursa. Particularly, some data about merchants from the city of Lviv are available in the Registration Book of the city of Bursa (İnalçık, 1994, pp. 289–290).

It is important to note that at the time when the government of the Polish and Lithuanian Commonwealth was maintaining secure conditions on the trade route, that went from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea along the river of Dniester, the government of the Ottoman Empire preferred to carry out trading with the north through the route "Lviv – Akkerman". We should not in addition that the city of Lviv, beginning from the 15th century, turned into an important centre of the international trade, where merchant representatives of many ethoses – Turks, Italians, Jews, et. c. – made their trade operations. For example, a participation in such trading of an ethnically Jewish merchant, Yakuba by name, and the fact of saving and returning to him his property to his relatives because of the death of that merchant, are proved in a special archival document, and namely it is a message from the sultan to the Polish King dated from 11 December 1577 (OACMRT, MD, Cilt 29, p. 63/151).

Goods produced in Asian countries (they were spices, jewellery, fabrics, decorations, rice, black pepper) were transported through the city of Lviv (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv, f. 52, d. 1, c. 74; Turanly, 2016, pp. 140–141, 571) to the Baltic and Scandinavian countries. In the reverse way there were delivered fabrics of furs, wool, honey, wax, fish, caviar, wheat and other European goods and products. For the Baltic countries the city of Lviv was a kind of "a gate" in the southern direction (İnalçık, 1994, pp. 276–277). It should be underlined that such favourable conditions for the organisation and development of the international trade in the considered geopolitical area were accounted for by stable relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 16th century, which is demonstrated in another Turkish-Ottoman archival document "A Travelling Dispatch" issued by Murad III (Ruling period: 1574 – 1595) to Omara, an agent of Merchant

⁴ Coast Security Service.

Mahmud for the agent to cross Poland travelling to the Moscow's State and receive the money for the goods having been left, the original of which is still kept in Lviv (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv, f. 132, d. 1, c. 127). In general, these facts were important for the socio-economic development of the Cossack Ukraine.

Considering the military-political situation during the 16th century in the Northern Black-Sea Area one should note, that the Crimean Khanate, which was under protectorate of the High Porte, in fact was a powerful military force in East Europe. The point that the authorities of that state formation provided the military capability of its military forces on account of external supplying sources, and this accounted for the permanent invasions of Crimean-Tatar troops onto the territories of Ukraine and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Under the conditions Poland had to respond to the policy of the Ottoman Empire in the Black-Sea Area: to prevent attacks from the side of the Crimean Khanate there were створювалися formed military detachments, in which the majority was made of Ukrainian Cossacks that were Orthodox Christians. From the middle of the 16th century Dmytro Vyshnevetsky initiated down the Dnieper rifts and cataracts the movement "Cossack Brotherhood". This new military-political force became a serious problem in the occupational policy of the Ottoman Empire and Crimean Khanate (Öztürk, 2004, p. 293; Öztürk, 2003, pp. 95–140; Öztürk, 2005, pp. 55–95; Lemerrier – Quelquejay, 1969, pp. 258–279; Berindei, 1972, pp. 338–367). Such a scenario of events, that is the fact of using by Poland Zaporozhian Cossacks in its struggle with the above said states, relations between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the High Porte, which before that had been in the sense of strategy very friendly, changed radically. Polish noblemen who had noticeable domination in the foreign and domestic policy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, began to apply their own ways of protection the economic power of the native state on the territory of the basins of the Dnieper, Dniester and Prut, including also here the Ukrainian lands. Specifically, they managed to implement, beginning from 1550, a strengthened defense line set along the northern bank of the river of Danube (Çakır, 2006, pp. 73, 179–356). Many Turkish-Ottoman archival documents include data about the uprising organised by the Polish noblemen in 1565 against the presence of Turkish military forces, which was supported in Khotyn, Akkerman and Moldavia (OACMRT, MD, № 18, 17/30; OACMRT, MD, No 18, 17/26). In this context other documents tell us about the War Governor of Walachia's note of warning of an uprising in Moldavia, and about his order to provide support to the newly appointed governor of Moldavia (OACMRT, MD, No 18, 17/28; Yücel, 1996, Hüküm 30). Though, the external military-political activity of the High Porte in the Northern Black-Sea Area was negatively affected by the fact, that after the governing of Suleiman I (II) Kanuni a certain decay is was taking place in the economic development of this state.

The economic crisis that lasted in the Ottoman Empire till the 17th century resulted in the Northern Black-Sea Area in emergence of qualitatively new political forces, which before that were in vassal dependence and were used by large states within the limits of their own contact zones for close economic, cultural and military interactions between the bordering countries. These forces were represented, on one hand, by the Crimean Khanate whose position and situation in which was worsening by periodical Crimean-Tatar uprisings and rebellions against the central Ottoman government, while on the other hand, by the Zaporozhian Host, which acted jointly with the Crimean Khanate (Turanly, 2019. The military cooperation... pp. 39–55). It should be noted that Zaporozhian Cossacks that were subordinated to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth also rose against their oppression by the Polish noblemen, in such a way making serious problems for the authorities of that country.

In the first half of the 17th century the government of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth carried out fierce fightings against Cossacks, that ended in the victory of Poles, but that fact did not prevent from the occurrence of a qualitatively new Cossack national-liberating movement in the middle of the said century under the head of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky (Turanly, 2019, *Written Documents...* pp. 61–68).

Therefore, in the middle of the 17th century the Ukrainian Cossacks were a strong military-political force that had a large influence on the development of international relations in East Europe (Orhunlu, 1971, p. 64; Turanly, 2016, pp. 61–68.). Besides it should be added that the Zaporozhian Sich had not only developed economic and political relations with the High Porte and underwent a significant Turkic cultural impact (Dashkevych, 2011, pp. 204–208). While demonstrating its aspiration for liberating the Ukrainian people, the Zaporozhian Sich was at that time a natural ally of the High Porte in its counteraction to attempts of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to maintain its domination in the Northern Black-Sea Area. The political authorities of the Cossack-Hetmanic Ukraine also considered the High Porte as its ally in the national-liberating struggle against the oppression by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It was this coincidence in the foreign political interests of the two said states, that accounted for an important significance of the Ukrainian-Turkish-CrimeanTatar military-political union during the tumultuous events that occurred in East Europe in the middle of the 17th century. We note that the geopolitical role of Ukraine between the middle of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th century, particularly the Ukrainian problem in the international policy of the High Porte, becomes of an especially high importance (Turanly, 2016, pp. 234–422).

But because of losing by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and by the High Porte their power in East Europe, Moscovia increased there its domination. The united efforts of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden in the struggle against Moscovia in the beginning of the 18th century turned out to be also insufficient for the complete stopping the military-political activity of the Moscovian Tsardom because of the availability of serious contradictions between the said enemies of that country. As for the Ottoman Empire is concerned, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Karlovice in 1699, when the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth suffered from devastating invasions from Moscovia, it supported peaceful relations with this state and even helped it. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian problem remained further unsettled, or, in other words, it remained actually important in the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire. That is also supported by the data given in studies of the Ukrainian historian V. Stanislavsky about the active participation of merchants in the transportation of diplomatic correspondence between the Ukrainian Cossack State, Crimean Khanate, High Porte and Moscovia (Stanislavsky, 2016, pp. 25–35).

This conclusion is grounded with the contents of a text from a source material provided in Turkish-Ottoman manuscripts.

Let us continue to consider the touched on problem, particularly the development of trade routes between the countries of the above said historico-geographical areals, which expanded through Ukrainian lands. In this context there are important data obtained from another manuscript “A Letter-Order from Turkish Sultan Abdulkhamid I (Ruling period: 1774 – 1789) to Kadee (Turanly, 2016, p. 538) of the city of Izmir”. This manuscript was written in connection of addressing of the Temporary Charge d’Affaires of the Russian State in Istanbul with a request to the Sultan regarding trade aspects, it is dated from Zilkade Month, 1197 (according to the Islamic Hidjri Calendar (1–10 Zilkade, 1197), that is

28 September – 7 October, 1783 according to the Christian Calendar. This original document is kept in Kamyanets-Podilsky State Historical Museum-Reservation of Ukraine (Kamianets-Podilskyi State Historical Museum-Reservation of Ukraine. Repository, KV-27303, KD-d/p 667)⁵. We were the first to start using this document in academic circulation. If to speak about the typical features of the said document, we have identified the title of the document written in the Turkish-Ottoman language using the Arabic graphics. The document consists of the *Tugra* (Faizov, 1996, pp. 427–434; Turanly, 2016, p. 545)⁶ of the mentioned sultan and 12 lines of a text; the waxed paper with the text of the considered sheet according to the data from the inventory card is approximately 77 cm long and 52 cm wide. Because this order includes financial information, on the back side of the document there is the monogram of the Chief Financier of the state – *Defterdar* / “Defterdâr” (Kütükoğlu, 1998, p.79). When interpreting the text of the said archival document, we paid attention to the fact, that the sultan characterises the *Kadee* poetically too. Particularly, line 1 runs the flowing: “The Kadee of the Moslem judges and the leader of all leaders of the people that worship the one God – the Sovereign Lord, who is the source of solid knowledge and raises the banners of the Shariah and religion; who is the Haeres of knowledge of emissaries and predictors, chosen by the governor’s order and with the help of the Sovereign Lord, *the Kadee* of Izmir (May his amount of education rise still more!)! You are the pride of judges and masters, and also a connoisseur of great knowledge and words. Before starting from Istanbul to Izmir and onto the Mediterranean Sea islands (including those of the Aegean Sea)...”. Such grand respect and respective attitude of the governor to the above said statesman shows a large significance of the latter as the Chief Judge in ruling the Empire, inter alia in settling diplomatic affairs. Then in the said Letter-Order [line 2] the sultan instructs all executive state officials, including also commanders of military units, who are in charge for the customs control and collection of the “*jizye*” tax (Ortaylı, 2002, pp. 345–352; Turanly, 2016, p. 123) from foreign merchants. For instance, the text of the said document includes data of the obligatory reading by state officials the High order of the Sultan called “*Ferman*” (Turanly, 2016, p. 546), and also an addressing of the Temporary Charge d’Affaires of the Russian state, Knight Derkachov, who is Istanbul. The next lines [3, 4] of the document runs, that the respective diplomat delivered the Governor of the High Porte a letter on the problem having been touched upon. In this connection the said Letter runs that Russian traders may not “...neither be made pay the jizye and other taxes twice, if they travel on the territory of the Ottoman Empire, and as well that it is necessary to be friendly with Russian merchants according the conditions and terms of the Treaty on the goods which are to be sold from Russia and from other countries on the territory of their Ottoman Empire at special places for trading such goods. For goods for trading and brought by merchants on lands of the Ottoman Empire, so as to transport such goods onto the territory of Russia and that of other countries, a customs tax shall be paid in the places, where the respective goods were bought, in accordance with the provisions set up in the Tariff Book, in the amount of 3 %, and a receipt shall be given certifying the payment”. This information demonstrates that there were settled problems of Russian


⁵ “A Letter-Order from Turkish Sultan Abdulkhamid I (Ruling period: 1774 – 1789) to Kadee of the city of Izmir”. A photocopy of the original of the said document is attached (See: Appendix 1). Inter alia, the author of this work expressed his personal acjbolegements to the collector of the funds of Kamyanets-Podilsky State Historical Museum-Reservation of Ukraine Ms. Inna Shvets, as well as to the senior official of the Institute for History within the national Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Mr. Vyacheslav Stanislavsky, for their facilitating him in using documewnts from the available funds.

⁶ *The contents of the given tugra*: “Khan Abdulkhamis [I], Son of [Sultan] Alhmed [III], is always the winner”.

traders while they were on the territory of the Ottoman Empire, and that there were set up specific tariff rates for taxing the respective goods. Further the Order [line 5] explains the application of the defined legal standard requirement, an namely: "...after receiving one tax fee the customs officers on the territories through which a merchant travels, the merchant shall not be compelled to pay again customs or other taxes, for example, under the pretext that the merchants have crossed the borders. But, if, contradicting this maintained order, the above said merchants pay the customs tax twice, that shall be returned to the payer...". Moreover, the text of the sultan's letter we have studied informs us of the existence of a treaty between the respective countries. For instance, we find in the next fragment of the document [line 6, 7, 8]: "...Due to the terms and conditions of the Treaty existing between the two states⁷, and in accordance with specific provisions of this Treaty, a Russian merchant by name Belisar Ivanov⁸, so as to make his trading, let us know about his trip through Istanbul to Izmir, and also onto some islands in the Mediterranean Sea (including those in the Aegean Sea too). Hence, it was necessary to observe provisions of the said Treaty properly, and bring no harm to the trader during his travelling and not make him pay repeatedly the customs tax, nor other taxes or fees, particularly the jizye tax, which would be against the terms and conditions of the concluded Treaty, nor make any attacks on the merchant, nor impede that merchant's traveling or trading, nor make any claims to the merchant's dressing elements, and nor practice any other obstacles...". Therefore, the given data makes it possible to speak about a treaty that was associated with the development of economic relations between the said states. The availability of such a treaty was the reason for Sultan Abdulkhamid I to issue the respective Order [line 8, 9, 10], in which he states the obligation to observe the terms and conditions of the mentioned treaty, as well as to guarantee the legal binding of that one in relation of the said Russian merchant, and namely: "...to provide conditions for the merchant to transport his goods, unless those are not illegal, through Istanbul to Izmir and onto some islands⁹. The goods for sale brought from other countries, for example the goods from the Russian state, in the places of their purchase and on the places of organisation of their sale shall be completely taxed, according to the terms and conditions of the said treaty and due to provisions of the Tariff Book relating the customs fee, in the amount of 3%, while the payer shall be given a receipt about having made the respective payment. Afterwards, neither payment of the customs tax while the merchant is travelling on the territory of the empire, nor that of the tax for crossing the borderline, nor that of other taxes or fees, shall be prohibited, particularly that of the jizye tax". The data we have obtained from this fragment of the document demonstrate that only one payment of a certain amount was imposed, a documental confirmation of making that payment being a must. The same legal requirements were also to be applied to traders from other countries, for example to merchants from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

It should be noted that the said Letter-Order included instructions concerning not only provision of the personal untouchability of a foreign trader, when that is travelling within the territory of the Ottoman Empire, but also to respect the dressing of such a merchant and his traditions. For instance, lines 10 and 11 of this document state as follows: "... not bring the merchant any harm and do not interfere with his travelling or making trade operations, do

⁷ The High Porte and the Russian Empire are implied.

⁸ The merchant's name is pronounced like Bisari or Belisary (...Rusya tüccârından Belisarı İvanof nâm...)  possibly *Belisar*.

⁹ The Mediterranean Sea and the Aegean Sea.

not set claims to his dressing, and fulfill properly all the terms and conditions of the Treaty. It was for that purpose, that our *Ferman* was made that reserves to be highly honored”. Further the Sultan warns the Judge that his Letter-Order deserves high honour, and that his instructions shall be fulfilled according to the defined terms and conditions¹⁰. The document has in addition data about obligatory thorough observation of the written requirements and informs of a severe punishment, if the order is not fulfilled. In the end of the Letter the date and place of writing that is indicated – the first decade of the month of Zilcade, 1197, according to the Islamic Hidjri Calendar (1–10 Zilcade, 1197), that is 28 September – 7 October 1783 due to the Christian Calendar. The place of writing the Letter-Order is Istanbul.

The Conclusions. Studies of Arabic and Turkish-Ottoman written sources give grounds to say that the port cities Jumne and Constantinople were important trade markets, particularly for the sale of goods transported by Dnieper and Danube. Istanbul had a special significance in the international trading system. Importance of the geopolitical position of Ukraine in the system of international economic relations was accounted for by that fact, that its territory was used for trade routes, which provided permanent and stable economic relations between important ports and countries of East Europe northwards from the Black Sea. The Baltic cultural and historic regions, that included the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, was connected with the Black Sea through the territory of Ukraine.

The economic crisis, which lasted in the Ottoman Empire till the beginning of the 17th century, in the Northern Black-Sea Area new political forces emerged which before that had been in the vassal dependence and used by the great states within their own contact zones for a close economic, cultural and military cooperation of the border countries. Those border forces were, from one side – the Crimean Khanate, and from the other side – The Zaporozhian Host. Our study has shown that the Ukrainian problem has always been an actual item in the international policy of the High Porte.

We have studied the original manuscript “A Letter-Order from Turkish Sultan Abdulkhamid I to the Kadee of the city of Izmir”. The data we have obtained from this document proved the economic relations between the countries located within the above said historicogeographical areals to have been long-lasting, and there have also been identified the conditions, in which the trade relations between these countries had been developing, and the routes having been set up through the territory of Ukraine.

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¹⁰ The assumption of an interval in line 11 is conditioned by the method of writing handwritten documents for adding the name of the person who is later authorized to deliver this document to the addressee.

The original was written approximately in the second half of the 16th century. The title and the date of writing the document were specified]. [in Turkish-Ottoman]

TsDIA Ukrayiny u m. L'vovi, f. 132, op. 1, spr. 127 “Podorozhna, vydana Muradom III u spravi pereyizdu cherez Pol'schu do Moskovs'koyi derzhavy Omara, ahenta kuptsia Mahmuda, dlia otrymannia nym hroshey za zalyshenyi tovar”. Oryhinal, napysanyi pryblyzno 3 – 13 chervnia 1581 roku za hrystyians'kym litochyslenniam (1 – 10 dnia dzhemazeyilevvela misiatsia 989 roku Hijry). [Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv – **CSHAUL**, f. 132. d. 1. c. 127. A travelling Dispatch issued by Murad III to an agent of Merchant Mahmud for the agent to cross Poland travelling to the Moscow's State Omara and receive the money for the goods having been left. The original was written approximately between 3 and 13 1581 A.D. (1–10 Jemazeyilevvel, 989 Anno Herigao)]. [in Turkish-Ottoman]

T.C. BOA, MD, Akkirman Beyine hüküm ki [Order to the governor Ackerman that], Hicri: 27 Ramazân, sene 972 / Milâdi: 28 Şubat 1565, Nu: 18, 17/30. [in Turkish-Ottoman]

T.C. BOA, MD, Eflak Voyvodasına hüküm ki [Order to the governor of Wallachia that], Hicri: 27 Ramazân, sene 972 / Milâdi : 28 Şubat 1565, Nu: 18, 17/28. [in Turkish-Ottoman]

T.C. BOA, MD, Kamanıçe mollasına hüküm ki [Order to the Mulla of Kamaynets that], Hicri: Receb 1090, Cilt 97, 7/48. [in Turkish-Ottoman]

T.C. BOA, MD, Leh Kralına Nâme-i Hümâyûn [Letter from the Sultan to the King of Poland], Hicri: 21 Şevval 984 / Milâdi: 11 Ocak 1577, Cilt 29, 63/151. [in Turkish-Ottoman]

T.C. BOA, Tahrir Defteri, Kânunnâme-i İskele-i Akkirmân der-Âb-ı Turla ki, hâliya icra olunur [(A Registration and Accounts Book and “A Book of Laws”, which set up and regulated the legal trade relations in the fortress of Akkerman, situated in the estuary of the river of Dniester, including the bay and the port], Nu: 483, 18. [in Turkish-Ottoman]

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
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
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APPENDICES

1) A Letter-Order from Turkish Sultan Abdulkhamid I (Ruling period: 1774 – 1789) to Kadee (Judge) of the city of Izmir



The other side of the document



**A Letter-Order from Turkish Sultan Abdulkhamid I
to Kadee (Judge) of the city of Izmir**
Kamaynets-Podilsky State Historical Meseum-Reservation.
Repository. KV-27303. KD-d/p 667
(a photocopy of the original of the document)

2) Translation of “A Letter-Order from Turkish Sultan Abdulkhamid I to Kadee (Judge) of the city of Izmir”

Tugra

(Khan Abdulkhamid [I], Son of [Sultan] Akhmed [III], is always the Winner):

[Line 1] – “The Kadee of the Moslem judges and the leader of all leaders of the people that worship the one God – the Sovereign Lord, who is the source of solid knowledge and raises the banners of the Shariah and religion; who is the Haeres of knowledge of emissaries and predictors, chosen by the governor’s order and with the help of the Sovereign Lord, *the Kadee* of Izmir (May his amount of education rise still more!)! You are the pride of judges and masters, and also a connoisseur of great knowledge and words. Before starting from Istanbul to Izmir and onto the Mediterranean Sea islands (including those of the Aegean Sea)...”

[Line 2] – Judges and authorised representatives of judges of the countries situated along [Your] way, (May their high amount of education rise still more!), from towns and cities with the governmental administration, that inspire all [our] friends, commanders of Yanissaries, heads of customs controls and collectors of the jizye, as well other commanders and officers (May their power grow!), who are proud of You, after receiving personally this high governmental *Ferman*, shall know that the Temporary Charge d’Affaires of the Russian State, who is now in Istanbul and is one of the leaders of the Christian people and worships the Religion of Jesus, Knight Derkachov

[Line 3] – (May be happy and blessed the end of His life!) has handed me a stamped letter, sent to My High Threshold, that is a source of happiness, so as you would not make Russian people and traders pay the jizye and other kinds of taxes, if they travel through the territory of the Ottoman Empire, and also informing us of the needs to be friendly to those according to the terms and conditions of the treaty on the goods that are to be sold from Russia and other countries on the territory of the Ottoman Empire, particularly

[Line 4] – on the places for selling these goods. The goods that are to be traded with and bought by merchants on lands of the Ottoman Empire so as to transport them onto the territory of Russia and that of

other states, there shall be paid a customs tax on the places where the respective goods were purchased, as it is provided in the Tariff Book, in the amount of 3 %, a receipt shall be given for making such a payment.

[Line 5] – We are explaining to you that after receiving the customs fee one time, customs officers of the territories through which respective merchants travel, shall not compel the latter ones to pay customs or other fees again, for example under the pretext, as if those had crossed the borderlines. But, if, contradicting such a set up order, the respective merchants paid the customs tax for the second time, the paid amount shall be returned.

[Line 6] – There is another point. According to the Treaty, existing between the two states, and due to some provisions of that Treaty, a Russian merchant by name Belisar Ivanov, aiming at making his trading, informs us about his trip through Istanbul to Izmir, as well as onto some islands in the Mediterranean Sea (including islands in the Aegean Sea). Hence, we have to observe provisions of the said Treaty properly

[Line 7] – and neither bring any harm to the merchant during his traveling, nor make him pay the customs or other taxes repeatedly, particularly the *jizye* tax, which would be against the terms and conditions of the concluded treaty, nor attack him, nor interfere with his traveling or with his trade, nor make claims to his uniform or dressing, and nor make him any other blocking actions. The respective merchant addressed me and asked me to issue corresponding instructions on behalf of our sultanate.

[Line 88] – Following this request, I order you to fulfill the terms and conditions of the said Treaty properly. As you are the highest governmental officer, so it shall be provided for the said merchant conditions for his transporting his goods, unless those are not illegal, through Istanbul to Izmir and onto some islands. Goods for sale brought from other countries, particularly ones from the Russian state,

[Line 9] – on the places of their purchasing and on the places organised for selling those ones, shall be completely taxed, according to the terms and conditions of the above said Treaty and approved provisions of the Tariff Book in relation of the customs fee, in the amount of 3%, while the payer shall be given a receipt confirming the payment having been made. After that neither payment of the customs tax may be made when the trader is travelling within the territory of our state,

[Line 10] – nor that of other taxes, particularly the *jizye* tax. It is prohibited from the respective merchant. Do not bring him any harm and do not interfere with his travelling or making his trading business, do not set up claims to his uniform or dressing, and properly fulfill and observe the terms and conditions of the Treaty. That was the purpose, that our *Ferman* has been made for, which deserves high honour. I order that you,

[Line 11] – [space] when receive this Order of Ours, deserving high honour, in the way as I have explained it to you,

[Line 12] – should undertake measures required to provide exemplary observation of this Order of Ours as Our order to exemplarily fulfill your official duties. You should be afraid of failing to do the above said. Bear that well in your mind! And credit our Tugra!

Date of writing: written in Zilkade Month, 1197 according to the Islamic Calendar Hijri (1 – 10 Zilkade, 1197), that is 28 September – 7 October, 1783 according to the Christian Calendar.

The place of writing – Istanbul.

3) Translation of a reviewed text of the document “A Letter-Order from Turkish Sultan Abdulkhamid I to Kadee (Judge) of the city of Izmir”

The archival document in question was written in Turkish-Ottoman in Turkey by Sultan Abdulkhamid I to the Kadee of the city of Izmir in connection with addressing of the temporary Charge d’Affaires of the Russian State in Istanbul, Knight Derkachov, who was in Topkapy Palace in Istanbul, so as to address the Sultan with a request in relation of trade aspects. The Governor of the Ottoman Empire in his Letter-Order instructs the Kadee of the said city, that when the Kadee leaves Istanbul for Izmir or for some islands in the Mediterranean Sea or in the Aegean Sea, the Kadee shall inform the local authorised officials, so that those ones will not make Russian people and traders pay the *jizye* and other kinds of taxes, providing that such people are travelling within the territory of the Ottoman Empire; the Sultan also requires to provide necessary friendly attitude to such travelling people, according to terms

and conditions of the Treaty on the goods which are to be sold from Russia and from other countries on lands of the Turkish Ottoman Empire, particularly on the places of selling the said goods. Goods which are to be sold, but which were bought on lands of the said state, as well the right to transport such goods by merchants to the territory of Russian and onto territories of other states, shall be taxed for merchants on the places, where the respective goods were purchased, according to provisions of the Tariff Book, in the amount of 3%, and an official receipt shall be issued certifying the respective payment having been made. It is said that after receiving the customs fee one time, customs officers of the territories crossed respective trading merchants shall not make the latter ones to pay the customs and any other taxes repeatedly; if any customs or other taxes were received from the respective merchants more than one time, the repeated amounts shall be liable to their returning to the traders. For instance, the considered document runs about the Treaty between the High Porte and Moscovian Tsardom, which dealt with terms and conditions for settling trade relations, including here the provision of free travelling of Russian merchants within the territory of the Ottoman Empire and obligatory observation of the terms and conditions of the said Treaty. Aiming at settling all above said problems, one of the Russian merchants, addressed through diplomatic representatives in Istanbul, the Turkish Government with a request to issue a respective governmental Order in Turkey. The goods for sale brought from other countries, or purchased in Turkey for their sale in other countries, were to be completely taxed on the places of purchasing the respective goods or on the places organised for their sale according to the terms and conditions of the said Treaty and to the approved provisions relating the tax tariffs. After paying the required customs tax one may not require from the trading merchants any repeated customs taxes while such merchants travel within the territory of the Ottoman Empire, particularly the *jizye* tax. The Sultan in the document in question orders to undertake all required measures needed to provide implementation of the respective commission, as well as he warns about the responsibility for failing to fulfill the *Ferman*. This manuscript demonstrates the fact of the existence of diplomatic relations between the above said states, inter alia – the trade relations.

The document was written 28 September – 7 October 1783 in the city of Istanbul.

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**HOW MOSCOW COLONIZED KYIV-PECHERSK LAVRA.
NEW PAGES TO THE HISTORY OF THE UKRAINIAN PRINTING
OF THE SECOND HALF OF THE XVIIIth CENTURY**

Abstract. *The purpose of the article* – on the basis of newly discovered archival materials, to analyze the complex conditions of book publishing activity of Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra of the second half of the XVIIIth century under pressure from the censorship of the Russian imperial authorities, which led to the ultimate loss of independence of Lavra printing press. **The Novelty of the Research.** *The main source of the research is a non-updated correspondence of the special authorized persons from Lavra monastic fraternity with the rector of Pechersk monastery, who were entrusted with various important cases of a legal, economic, educational character, in particular, to assert the independence of Pechersk printing.* **The Methodology of the Research.** *In the article the method of intellectual networks modelling, which gives an opportunity to look at the Ukrainian cultural world as a structure of intellectual networks, has been used on the materials of the correspondence.* **The Conclusions.** *Thus, the newly discovered archival materials attest to the censorship of the Russian imperial power, which sought to deprive finally Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra of its opposition and originality in book publishing. In order to preserve the ancient freedom of the press, the monastery's management sent to the capital cities of the Russian Empire special authorized persons, who performed the functions of monastic lawyers. The letters of Lavra commissioners to Pechersk Archimandrite Zosym Valkevych attest to their efforts to defend the independence of Lavra printing, in which, however, they could not succeed under conditions of the Russian centralism under the rule of Catherine II. By the act of secularization of the monastery lands in 1786, Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra was subordinated to the direct care of the Metropolitan of Kyiv, to whom the Synod transferred all control over printing in Lavra printing house. In this way, Lavra lost its main right of stauropagia, and Pechersk printing house finally lost its independence in book publishing.*

Key words: *Orthodox Church, Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, Ukrainian printing, Pechersk printing house, Russian imperial power.*

ЯК МОСКВА КОЛОНІЗУВАЛА КИЄВО-ПЕЧЕРСЬКУ ЛАВРУ. НОВІ СТОРІНКИ ДО ІСТОРІЇ УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ДРУКАРСТВА ДРУГОЇ ПОЛОВИНИ ХVІІІ СТ.

Анотація. Мета дослідження: У статті ставиться за мету проаналізувати складні умови книговидавничої діяльності Києво-Печерської лаври другої половини ХVІІІ ст. під тиском цензури російської імперської влади, що призвело до остаточної втрати незалежності лаврського друкарства. **Джерела і новизна:** Головним джерелом дослідження є неактуалізоване листування з настоятелем Печерського монастиря спеціальних уповноважених осіб із лаврської чернечої братії, яким доручалися різні важливі справи юридичного, господарського, просвітницького та іншого характеру, зокрема, відстоювання незалежності печерського друкарства. **Методологія:** У статті на матеріалах листування застосовано метод моделювання інтелектуальних мереж, який дає можливість поглянути на український культурний світ як структуру інтелектуальних мереж. **Висновки.** Нововиявлені архівні матеріали ЦДАК України засвідчують цензурні утиски російських властей, які намагалися остаточно позбавити Києво-Печерську лавру її опозиційності та самобутності у книговидавничій діяльності. Наведені листи лаврських повірених до Печерського архімандрита Зосими Валькевича ілюструють їхні зусилля відстояти незалежність лаврського книгодрукування, які, проте, не могли досягти успіху в умовах російського централізму за правління Катерини ІІ. Попередження про небезпеку, що нависла над Києво-Печерською лаврою з її друкарнею, які звучали у листах лаврських повірених, були цілком резонні. Актом секуляризації монастирських земель 1786 р. Києво-Печерська лавра була підпорядкована безпосередньому догляду Київського митрополита, на якого Синод переклав весь контроль над видавництвом Лаврської друкарні. Тим самим Лавра позбулася свого головного права ставропігії, а Печерська друкарня остаточно втратила самостійність у книговидавничій діяльності.

Ключові слова: Православна Церква, Києво-Печерська лавра, українське друкарство, Печерська друкарня, російська імперська влада.

The Problem Statement. During the 1990-ies, the first decade of the XXIst century a number of scientific studies appeared in the history science, illustrating various spheres of the Orthodox Church activity in Ukraine – church political, spiritual religious, cultural educational; the works that focus on the activity of both individual institutions and church biography. One of the most topical in this area there was the problem of defending the rights and interests of the Orthodox Church in connection with the subordination of Kyiv Metropolitanate to Moscow Patriarchate in 1686, which gains a special topicality nowadays in the context of the Russian military and information aggression. The materials of Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra Fund, which testify to the tense conditions of Pechersk printing house under conditions of the onset of the Russian centralism, are illustrated in this context.

The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications. The history of Ukrainian printing, including book printing in Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, thanks to the works of P. Trotsky, F. Titov, S. Maslov, I. Kahanov, I. Ohienko, J. Isaievych, D. Stepovyk and other scientists, belongs to the sphere of well-studied aspects of a national culture (Trotsky, 1865; Titov, 1916; Maslov, 1925; Kahanov, 1959; Ohienko, 1994; Stepovyk, 2001; Isaievych, 2002). Describing the complex conditions of Pechersk printing house in the XVIIIth century, the researchers mainly singled out the notorious decree of 1720 of Peter I, which deprived Kiev-Pechersk Lavra of the ancient freedom of the press. Less attention was paid to these works during the second half of the XVIIIth century, when after the favourable reign of Empress Elizabeth for Ukraine, there came the reign of Catherine II, a fatal one in all respects for the Ukrainian statehood and the Church.

A thorough analysis of Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra Fund materials in the process of preparation a personal monograph by the author of this article on the history of a cultural and educational activity of the monastery of the XVIIth – XVIIIth centuries gave reason to think that in this sphere there will no longer be something unexpected (Kagamlyk, 2005). However, in the course of further work with the Fund materials on other studies, interesting documents were found out, which reveal the problems that arose in the activity of Pechersk printing press in the 60-ies – in the early 70-ies of the XVIIIth century.


The purpose of the article – on the basis of newly discovered archival materials, to analyze the complex conditions of book publishing activity of Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra of the second half of the XVIIIth century under pressure from the censorship of the Russian imperial authorities, which led to the ultimate loss of independence of Lavra printing press.

The Statement of the Basic Material. Unique in volume (more than 30 000 cases, which exceeds the volume of the rest of the monastic foundations of the CSlAK of Ukraine taken totally), unique in a structural construction (11 separate structural units) and multifaceted information Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra Fund materials were researched, although fragmentally, by F. Titov, D. Vyshnevsky, P. Trotsky, Yu. Lebedyntsev, P. Zholtovsky, V. Shydenko, V. Mordvintsev during various periods of time. At the same time, a considerable layer of documents remained beyond the researchers' attention. It concerns the printing part of the fund, which, in addition to well-researched materials on the organization of printing production in the monastery, the circumstances of individual publications printing, the forms of their distribution, etc., postponed the correspondence of ecclesiastical figures from Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra fraternity, became the main source, used by us in this article.

In one of the latest author's publications, the importance of a thorough study of the epistolary heritage of Ukrainian ecclesiastical elite of the XVIIth – XVIIIth centuries was emphasized. The epistolary heritage of Ukrainian ecclesiastical elite of the XVIIth – XVIIIth centuries reveals the diversity of cultural relationships and the peculiarities of functioning of “mohylianskoho intellectual space” (Kagamlyk, 2018).

It is worth noting that, using the method of intellectual networks modelling, which gives an opportunity to look at the Ukrainian cultural world as a structure of intellectual networks, modern researchers developed the idea of intellectual communities functioning as a means of legitimizing the cultural history of Ukraine (Kolesnyk, 2008). In particular, L. Posokova adapted this method to the activity of the Orthodox colleges as separate intellectual units (Posokhova, 2011). Similarly, this method can be applied to Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra as a separate intellectual environment, on the basis of which the Ukrainian church and secular elite united (Kagamlyk, 2006). According to our observations, one-third of the bishops and abbots of the Ukrainian and Russian monasteries finished the monastic ascension school in Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra (Kagamlyk, 2005, pp. 166–168). Taking advantage of its high status, the dignitaries of Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra fraternity favoured their native monastery in solving its particular issues, including those, related to publishing activity.

This article deals with the correspondence of special authorized persons who, after their monastic celibacy in Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, reached certain administrative positions in the monastery or outside it. These persons, named in the documents by Lavra representatives, actually performed the functions of monastic attorneys in the territory of the metropolitan cities of the Russian Empire, who were entrusted with various important cases of a legal, economic, educational character, in particular, to defend the independence of Pechersk publishing, or at least easing the pressure of Moscow censorship.



Printing House of Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra. Engraving of 1758.

We outline briefly the prerequisites for the processes discussed in this publication. With the subordination of Lavra to Moscow Patriarch on stauropegia rights in 1688, the issue of freedom of the press of Pechersk printing was raised. The imperial diploma for stauropegia demanded that Lavra should have mentioned the tsar and the patriarch in the printed books (Bolhovitinov, 1826, p. 224).

Formally agreeing to send the book to the patriarch for a previous review, Lavra in its printing activities tried to avoid a clerical censorship. Meletius Vuyakhevych, Pechersk Archimandrite, using the influential support of Hetman Ivan Mazepa, openly defended Lavra's independence in printing. In 1692, without the consent of Patriarch, the Liturgy text book was printed, in the preface of which, Lavra did not specify the names of Moscow tsars and Patriarch Adrian. This fact caused a violent dissatisfaction of Patriarch Adrian (Arhiv Yugo-Zapadnoi Rossii, 1872, p. 359; Ohienko, 1994, p. 289). In response, Meletius Vuyakhevych, stating that printing gives Lavra a basic income, requested Moscow Patriarch for permission to continue printing books without a prior consideration and review. However, the top Russian hierarch, although he apologized Meletius's "omission", still insisted on agreeing with him printing of all the books in Lavra (Kagamlyk, 2005, p. 203).

Released on October 5, in 1720 Decree of Peter I caused a number of restrictions on Lavra, which previously enjoyed the freedom of printing. The requirements of the Russian authorities – a full correspondence with the books of the Russian press, obtaining permission to print each individual book, sending signal copies of books for a preliminary consideration of the Synod – made it necessary for the administration of the monastery to choose special authorized persons, whose activities were to be directed to facilitate the control over Lavra printing.

In December 1726, Lavra authorities asked the Synod for permission to print books "at the request of Malorosiyskoho and foreign Orthodox peoples" for a pray in a cell. In response,

the Synod reminded of the need for a full correspondence of the press with similar Russian editions and demanded two copies of the newly printed editions (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv – CSHAUk, f. 128, d. 1 drukarskyi, c. 6, p. 2). Therefore, in 1727 Lavra's authorities sent to St. Petersburg a special commissioner – Isaiah, a Hieromonk of Trubchevsky Cholnsky Monastery, instructing him to seek for easing the control over Lavra printing. Lavra's commissioner presented 2 copies of the newly published “New Testament” in 1725 to the Synod and requested for the approval of the book for sale. The petition of Lavra's representative was successful: the Synod, by decree of November 29, 1727, allowed the sale of this and other books printed in accordance with Moscow models, taking into account the fact that the Synod had no unnecessary troubles, and the monastery – unnecessary expenses and troubles (Opisanie dokumentov i del, 1885, № 327). The responsibility for printing books was entrusted to Pechersk Archimandrite, who had to check the newly printed books thoroughly (CSHAUK, f. 128, d. 1 drukarskyi, c. 105, p. 3).

Next year, in 1728, another commissioner – Lavra's governor, Roman Copa, applied for permission to print and sell books by Lavra that had previously been published in Pechersk printing house and had no Moscow analogues, such as the Prayer books and Akathists, which had been published in Kyiv (Opisanie dokumentov i del, 1885, № 327). In response to this petition, Decree of the Synod of February 21, 1728 was issued, which allowed to print these books on condition that there were no “oppositions” in them (CSHAUK, f. 128, d. 1 drukarskyi, c. 105, p. 4; Opisanie dokumentov i del, 1885, № 327). Thus, Lavra commissioners succeeded in their work – they managed to achieve censorship relief over the book publishing of Pechersk printing house, though temporarily.

However, with the reign of Catherine II, new pressures began on the language and spelling peculiarities of Lavra book publishing. On November 6, 1766 the Synod, noting that since 1728 Kyiv and Chernihiv printing houses did not send any books for the review, forbade printing of any new books, and previous editions always had to be checked with the Russian ones to eliminate any language differences (CSHAUK, f. 128, d. 1 drukarskyi, c. 105, p. 2). After the publication of “The New Testament” book, the Russian authorities were instructed to send to the Synod a register of books, printed in Pechersk printing house, indicating the time of publication, who allowed to print a book, and to submit the copies of the books. This threatened the printing press with a ban on the sale of these books and could cause large losses. Therefore, Lavra authorities decided to involve several commissioners in this case. Thus, in March 1767, Antony Sumnetsky, was sent to Moscow with a command mainly to seek for some relief from the censorship of Lavra printing, though he was also charged with solving other matters (CSHAUK, f. 128, d. 1 drukarskyi, c. 105, pp. 86–88). In the letter, dated from April 12, 1767, A. Sumnetsky reported that the employees of Moscow synodal printing house reviewed the books, printed in Lavra, with a special attention, “with passion” (CSHAUK, f. 128, d. 1 drukarskyi, c. 105, pp. 115–115 ret.). In another letter he added that the case could not be changed for the better (CSHAUK, f. 128, d. 1 drukarskyi, c. 105, p. 119). Another commissioner Iov, a hieromonk, was instructed by Spiritual assembly of Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra to provide information on the possible decision of the Synod in this case (CSHAUK, f. 128, d. 1 drukarskyi, c. 108, p. 15). Despite the unfavourable circumstances and the worsening attitude towards Lavra by the members of the Synod, in which there were virtually no Ukrainians, the commissioners facilitated the adoption of the decree, which authorized the sale of books that were blacklisted, but on condition to continue printing these and other books, which were not published in Moscow printing house, as if the books had

been previously published. Thus, dissatisfaction of Moscow authorities was mainly due to the fact that Lavra tried to avoid censorship and represented the publication of new books in the guise of reprinting the old ones, which was revealed by the synodal reviewers.

Despite the active activity of Lavra commissioners, the “black clouds” over Pechersk printing house became even more dense. In 1767, the Synod found “errors” (differences from Moscow analogues) in the newly published by Lavra “Oktoikh” and “Psalms” (CSHAUK, f. 128, d. 1 drukarskyi, c. 108, 109; RSHA, f. 796, d. 48, c. 545; *Opisanie dokumentov i del*, 1915, № 191). In 1769, the “defective” were the publication of “The Six Days” and “The Bible”, which resulted in a new decree of the Synod with threats of fine and increase in the number of reviewers of printing samples (CSHAUK, f. 128, d.1 drukarskyi, c. 161). In this regard, in January 1770, Zosyma Valkevych, Pechersk Archimandrite, appealed to Lavra commissioner in Moscow, Joseph Tymoshevych, Archimandrite of Moscow Zlatoust Monastery, so that he would investigate the situation concerning Lavra printings and send the copies of the correspondent documents to protect Lavra from possible troubles. In response, J. Tymoshevych wrote that he had made every effort to fulfill this request, but because “the discrepancies were written out in over two hundred notebooks”, he only partially succeeded in writing out “the errors” from “The Six Days”, which he managed to identify with great effort (CSHAUK, f. 128, d. 1 drukarskyi, c. 161, pp. 4–5).

Another commissioner of Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, Varlaam Baranovych, who in 1772 substituted J. Tymoshevych as a rector of Moscow Zlatoust Monastery, was also involved in easing the control of Lavra book publishing. In his letter to Lavra of July 30, 1772 it is shown that, on behalf of the Spiritual assembly, he had to make an acquaintance with A. I. Pelsky, the director of Moscow synodal printing office, in order to speed up the review of Lavra books (CSHAUK, f. 128, d. 1 zagalnyi, c. 350, pp. 12–13).

How difficult the situation was at that time for Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra and the activities of its commissioners it is evidenced with the letter dated February 18, 1770, from one of them, Ahhei Kolosovsky, who was appointed the legislator of the Naval Noble Corps in St. Petersburg. Noting that the “mistakes”, made in the Bible printing, were very dangerous for Lavra at that time, Lavra commissioner informed Archimandrite Zosym Valkevych that in this connection Archbishop of Moscow and Sevsky and a member of the Synod of the Russians, Platon Levshin, “had a quarrel with him”. In particular, the bishop mentioned that he had found 468 mistakes in the Bible, which he marked personally, and that the monks of Lavra should be “punished well” for being warned repeatedly, but they “intentionally printed texts different from Moscow copies” (CSHAUK, f. 128, d. 1 drukarskyi, c. 161, p. 10).

The warnings of the danger that hung over Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra with its printing house, which sounded in the letters of Lavra’s commissioners, were quite reasonable. Empress Catherine II, when preparing the act of secularization, intended to sweep away the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The endless series of censorship decrees of the Synod lasted until 1786. Thus, in 1775, the Synod ordered Lavra to pay the employees of Moscow synodal printing house for checking the books, printed in Lavra, and beginning with 1783 – to send the information of the printed books annually (Kagamlyk, 2005, p. 214).

The censorship pressure concerning Pechersk publishing also affected the fate of Lavra's rector Zosym Valkevych, who, with the help of his proxies, consistently fought for the independence of Lavra printing. After the secularization of the monastery lands (1786) and the conversion of Lavra into a regular monastery, Zosym Valkevych was deprived of his duties as the abbot and sent to Holosiivska Pustyn’ – a third-class monastery, where he was

given a direct leadership. The last freely elected Pechersk Archimandrite “died in Holosiiv Pustyn’ being fired because of blindness” (Kagamlyk, 2005, p. 295).

By the act of 1786, Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra was subordinated to the direct care of Samuel Myslavsky, Kyiv Metropolitan, who at the same time became its rector in the rank of archimandrite. He was entrusted with a direct care of Pechersk printing house. As a result, Lavra lost its primary right of stauropagia, and Pechersk printing house finally lost its independence in book publishing. According to I. Ohienko, “the old All-Ukrainian Academy, which worked so vigorously for the spiritual benefit of its people”, gradually became a branch of Moscow synodal printing house (Ohienko, 1994, p. 311).

The Conclusions. Thus, the newly discovered archival materials attest to the censorship of the Russian imperial power, which sought to deprive finally Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra of its opposition and originality in book publishing. In order to preserve the ancient freedom of the press, the monastery’s management sent to the capital cities of the Russian Empire special authorized persons, who performed the functions of monastic lawyers. The letters of Lavra commissioners to Pechersk Archimandrite Zosym Valkevych attest to their efforts to defend the independence of Lavra printing, in which, however, they could not succeed under conditions of the Russian centralism under the rule of Catherine II.

By the act of secularization of the monastery lands in 1786, Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra was subordinated to the direct care of the Metropolitan of Kyiv, to whom the Synod transferred all control over printing in Lavra printing house. In this way, Lavra lost its main right of stauropagia, and Pechersk printing house finally lost its independence in book publishing.

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The documents

**1767 р., 12 квітня, м. Москва. - Лист блюстителя Ближніх печер
Антонія Сумнецького до Печерського архімандрита
Зосими Валкевича у справі цензури лаврського друку**

Ясне в Богу высокопреподобнѣйшій господине, высокомиловитивій господине отче и пастырю!

Три ордеры, марта от 24 з Лавры отпушеніе, сего априля 6 числа чрез кѣвскаго рейтарина Клименова мною получены, на которіе в покорности моей доношу: По 1-му: газеты, каковы сего года вышли, всѣ оніе при сем посылаются, а чтоб в сей год в Лавру отпушены были, для того в здешней книжной лавкѣ я записался. По 2-му: о Іпатѣвских денгах возможно старательство прилагается и коллегія услужить желает, да просто не отваживается, а сискует благопристойных мѣр потерпѣть до времени совѣтует. По 3-му: вседушно раднѣйшій бы я в удовольствіе святой Лавры полную, как прошеніе гласит, о книгах резолюцію получить, да что дѣлать, книжніе немаліе погрѣшности способы заграждают, смотрѣть ужас ошибки каковы. Святѣйшій Синод опредѣленіе учинил, что печатать против московских книги, по оному и исполненіе навсегда чинить повелѣвает, а виступив с опредѣленія онога ниже думает, милость несказанна, что не штрафуют, да прежніе продавать не дозволяют, а прозбу, чтоб по прежнему печатать, и слышать не хотят, дозволеніе дают какіе хотя величиною книги печатаются болшіе, средніе, маліе, или меншіе, да токмо в оних то класть, что

в осковскіх болших либо малых положено, а что в оних нѣтъ, то отнюдь не вносить, для того те лаврскіе книги [арк. 119 зв.] против московского переслѣдовать и велено, что б по тому переслѣдованію что явится сверхное и в московских небывалое выбросить. И сего синодалного намѣренія да и учиненного уже опредѣленія переломить отнюдь невозможно. Переслѣдованіе оное книг продолжится, как з обстоятелств видно, немалое время может, и чтоб мнѣ напрасно не изживатся великоновгородскій преосвященній в сходство імѣемой быть по смотру резолюціи при партикулярном своем писменном видѣ в Лавру отпускает, с коим отпуском по просухи по его велѣнію я і віехать намѣрен, на что и вашей святынѣ пастырского благословенія прошу. Сего априля 11 числа еще тры ордера получил я з лавры марта от 7 дня пущенніе, причем ящик заидок в дванадцати неболших слойках принял, и на оніе доношу нижайше: 1. В трастную среду з отцем духовником по литургіи Ея імператорскому величеству и Его высочеству я был представлен, поздравленіе ему учинил и при том воскресніе канонники поднесл, за что ея величество и его высочество удоволствій свій оказати соизволили. 2. Инокентіевы непорядочніи поступки и противности великоновгородскому преосвященному мною доволно внушены, изволил сказать то ж, что и в Лаврѣ об нем опредѣлено, сослать на комору в приписній какой монастырь, а іменно виговорил Омбишскій, [арк. 120] а когда он оттоль побежит, нужди нѣтъ, буди сюда явится, то де похватится, его непорядочства и воровство вѣдает. 3. О Владимирской церквѣ, что не строить и парохію к Вознесенской по прежнему причислить в волѣ де отца архимандрита состоит, а чаятелно, что і парохіане о устройки новой церкви усиливат не станут. 4. Синіе краски должен буду купить и з собою привезти імѣю, а нинѣ высокоотческой пастырской милости препоручив себя остаюсь

Ясне в Богу высокопреподобія Вашего высокомилоствитого господина отца и пастиря всепокорнѣйшій послушник іеромонах Антоній

Априля 12 1767 года

Москва.

Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv, f. 128, d.1 drukarskyi, c. 105, pp. 119–120.

1770 р., січня 31, м. Москва. - Лист адвоката Києво-Печерської лаври, архімандрита Московського Златоустівського монастиря Йосифа Тимошевича до Печерського архімандрита Зосими Валкевича у справі цензури лаврського друку
Высокопреподобнѣйшій господин мой архимандритѣ!

Писаніе Вашего высокопреподобія получил я сего генваря 21 дня пріятно, в коем предписывая мнѣ справится о происходящем за типографскіе ошибки слѣдствій, изволите напоминать, дабы я, естли тяжелые окажутся ошибки, прилагал старателство и не допустил, чтоб на Лавру что-либо наведено было в Святѣйшій Синод предосудителное. И как Вашему высокопреподобію извѣстно, что я в исправленіи всѣх поручаемых мнѣ от Лавры комиссій ревностное и усердное по любви своей прилагал всегда старателство, то и в нынѣшнем случаи истошил всѣ средства, однако по важности дѣла пособить никоим образом не можно, ибо чтоб остановить дѣло и уничтожить уже выписанные на бумагу в великом множествѣ ошибки, которые сами по себѣ весьма важны, и которые содержатся в присутственном мѣстѣ под крѣпким храненіем, того учинить как господин директор, так и присутствующіи не могут и не имѣют в том

никакой власти; да и со всѣм моим старательством не мог я от присутствующих, которые суть и пріятели мои, и спросить того, чтоб оныя ошибки мнѣ были и показаны, а объявлен толко мнѣ указ Святѣйшаго Синода, по которому дѣлается изслѣдование и почти уже приведено ко окончанію и упователно в скорости будет в Святѣйшій Синод отослано. Я по искренности моей Вашему высокопреподобию представляю, что сіе по важности своей не толко касается вообще [арк. 4 зв.] до Лавры, но и до нѣкоторых за несмотреніе персон, а дабы Ваше высокопреподобіе могли в том удостовѣриться, то сообщаю при сем с одного того Шестодневника выписанныя ошибки, которые я достал с великою нуждою и тайностію. Из оных, а особливо из касающихся до титула, можете Ваше высокопреподобіе усмотрѣть, какое сіе дѣло требует от вас вниманія и старанія. В дополненіе ж того слышно, что таких же несходств выписано больше двух сот тетрадей из привезенных отцем Антоніем Сумнѣцким книг, из коих и инніе по давности лѣтъ одной толко Лаврѣ вообще, а инніе новѣйшіе и персонално могут быть опасны, впротчем одно благоразсужденіе Вашего высокопреподобія со всѣм обществом да отвратит всякое несчастіе. А я со усердіем моим и истинным высокопочитаніем пребываю

Вашего высокопреподобія, милостиваго моего господина, отца і благодѣтеля покорній слуга Іосиф, архимандрит Златоустовскій

Генваря 31 дня 1770 года.

Из Москвы.

Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv, f. 128, d. 1 drukarskyi, c. 161, pp. 4–5. The Original.

1770 р., лютого 18, Санкт-Петербург. - Лист адвоката Кисво-Печерської лаври, законовчителя Санкт-Петербурзького морського шляхетного корпусу Аггея Колосовського до Печерського архимандрита Зосими Валкевича у справі цензури лаврського друку

Ясне в Богу высокопреподобнѣйшій господин отец архимандрит!
Милостивій мой отец и благодѣтель!

От 12 генваря почтеннѣйшее Вашей святыни письмо и предписанные отцу Златоустовскому архимандриту для пересилки ко мнѣ сто рублей денег я 2 дня февраля имѣл честь получить, но водки на оніе не покупал и не подносил, как потому что от Вашей святыни ничего к членам о том не писано, без какого выда никто ничего и пріимет, так и для того, что недавно пред сим подносил им присланные от Лавры заидки, которых также нѣкоторыи принимать не хотѣли. Хотя и писано об них, и я представлял, что Лавра из своих садов всѣгда имѣет фрукты. Повѣрьте, что весма здѣсь берегутся от взятков не толко в духовных, но и в мирских, однако опослѣ при подносѣ седмичников отважусь поднести и водку, и мнѣ кажется пристойно при таком праздникѣ поздравить их, и презентом сим от Лавры свидѣлствовать почтение. Вашу же святыню прошу, ежели заблагоразсудите, за получением сего нимало немедля прислать к членам поздравительные о прздникѣ Пасхи или отвѣтныя на посланные [арк. 9 зв.] от их преосвященств чрез нарочного куриера письма, и в них вложить хотя [бы] цѣдулки о водкѣ. Иначе бо сумнительно, чтоб была принята, и опасуюсь, чтоб не пропал кошт лаврскій. Удивляюсь, что мои письма, как цѣдулкою объявляти изволите, и по сіе время не получены в Лаврѣ. И сердечно

сожалею, если они пропали, ибо в оных много важного и Лаврѣ нужного. Писал да и чрез надежные, кажется, оказіи послал. На сих днях получен в Синодѣ из Московской типографіи реестр з сообщеніем нашедшихся в лаврском шестодневѣ ошибок, за наступившею масляною и первою недѣлею поста ничего еще по оному не послѣдовало и в представленіи не было. Я тѣх ошибок имѣю у себе копію, подлинно ошибки, сколь в разсужденіи высочайшей особы важные, столь для Лавры весьма опасные, особливо в нынѣшнее время. Сего февраля 14 дня в недѣлю сырную публично при столѣ, в присутствіи преосвященных Псковского и Тверского такие отец Платон произнес рѣчи. Я вам скажу куріозную и удивительную вѣщь, я сего дня поутру, пришедшій к Его высочеству нечаянно спросил, какой сей день недѣли и какое на амбонѣ читается евангелие. Он отвѣтствовал, недѣля сырная и евангелие тотчас сискал, развѣрнул [арк. 10] лаврской печати библию, объявил при том, что он два дня уже прочитал библию и нашел в оной погрѣшностей – четьреста шестдесят осѣм, и оные собственноручными отмѣтил почерками, в которых де не токмо ошибки, но и великие с московскою библиею в разумѣ имѣются несходства. Я могу, сказал отец Платон, испросить ту библию у Его высочества и хорошо б при указѣ синодалном оную послать в Лавру с хорошим репримандом – надобно б де, Лаврѣ, добрую дать финфу и проучить их хорошенко, сами ортографіи не разумѣют, а знающаго из стороны принять не хотят, и когда на этии рѣчи сказал один посторонній человек, хорошо б им приутвердить указом, чтоб впредь исправно печатали, то сказано в отвѣт было то, уже единожды и не дважды это подтверждали, но оны нас не слушают, и не знаю в какую надежду как бы нарочно в противность отменно печатают московским экземплярам, ми принуждены другие принять мѣры, в протчем имѣю сим быть

Ваша святыни вседостойнѣйшій слуга Аггей.

1770 года 18 февраля

С.-Петербург.

Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv, f. 128, d.1 drukarskyi, c. 161, pp. 9 – 10. The Original.

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**SZLACHTA INCORPORATION IN GALICIA TO KNIGHTHOOD
OF THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE AT THE END OF THE XVIIIth –
THE BEGINNING OF THE XIXth CENTURIES**

Abstract. *The methodology of the research is based on the principles of historicism, scientificity, verification, as well as the use of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and special historical (historical-typological, historical-systemic) methods. The scientific novelty is that for the first time the Ancient Rzeczpospolita gentry (szlachta) entry/non-entry issue into the knightly and magnate states of the Kingdom of Galicia within the Austrian Empire was found out, and the explanation concerning the szlachta part absence among the nobility was given. The Conclusions.* After the First of Partition of Rzeczpospolita in 1772, Halychyna became part of the Austrian Empire. A major problem was the incorporation of the former Rzeczpospolita szlachta into the Austrian Empire. The Imperial Patent of 1775 defined the legal basis for the confirmation of the nobility. Subsequently, the patent was supplemented by other regulations designed to streamline the process. The successful completion of the confirmation of the nobility was marked by the receipt of a document – the legitimation. The nobility could only take full advantage of their privileged rights after the legitimation fit into the special books,

the nobility metrics. However, such a procedure was optional. As a result, some part of the nobility did not fit in (did not intabulate) their legitimacy in the nobility metrics. The presence of unintabulated legitimations raises an important question about the relationship between issued legitimations and extant ones. There is reason to believe that some of the legitimation has been lost. The scale of losses cannot be calculated. The above-mentioned situation explains why some of the nobility did not confirm the nobility status, but fully benefited from their privileged position and did not feel offended.

Key words: *szlachta, Galicia (Halychyna), legitimation, confirmation of nobility.*

ІНКОРПОРАЦІЯ ШЛЯХТИ В ГАЛИЧИНІ ДО РИЦАРСЬКОГО СТАНУ АВСТРІЙСЬКОЇ ІМПЕРІЇ У КІНЦІ XVIII – ПОЧАТКУ XIX ст.

Анотація. Мета дослідження – проаналізувати правові підстави nobilitації шляхти Галичини австрійського періоду. З'ясувати масштаби nobilitації серед колишньої шляхти Давньої Речі Посполитої та прояснити причини відсутності вказаної шляхти серед nobilitованих. **Методологія дослідження** базується на принципах історизму, науковості, верифікації, а також на використанні загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, узагальнення) та спеціально-історичних (історико-типологічний, історико-системний) методів. **Наукова новизна:** уперше актуалізоване питання виходження/невходження шляхти Давньої Речі Посполитої до рицарського і магнатського станів королівства Галіції у складі Австрійської імперії та запропоноване пояснення відсутності серед nobilitованих частини шляхти. **Висновки:** Після першого поділу Речі Посполитої у 1772 р. Галичина відійшла до складу Австрійської імперії. Чільною проблемою стала інкорпорація колишньої річпосполитської шляхти до складу Австрійської імперії. Імператорський патент 1775 р. визначав правові засади підтвердження шляхетства. Згодом вказаний патент доповнювався іншими нормативними документами, покликаними оптимізувати процес. Успішне завершення підтвердження шляхетства знаменувалося отриманням документу – легітимації. Сповна користати зі своїх привілейованих прав шляхта могла лише після того, як легітимація вписувалася (інтабулювалася) до спеціальних книг – шляхетських метрик. Утім така процедура не була обов'язковою. Як наслідок, частина шляхти не вписувала (не інтабулювала) свої легітимації до шляхетських метрик. Наявність неінтабульованих легітимацій актуалізує важливе питання про співвідношення між виданими легітимаціями та тими, що дійшли до нашого часу. С підстави стверджувати, що частина легітимацій були втрачені. Масштаб втрат обрахувати неможливо. Відтак це пояснює, чому частина шляхти нібито не підтвердила шляхетство, однак сповна користалася зі свого привілейованого становища і не почувала себе скривдженою.

Ключові слова: *шляхта, Галичина, легітимація, підтвердження шляхетства.*

The Problem Statement. The Ancient Rzeczpospolita gentry incorporation into the nobilitated state of Russia, Austria, and Prussia after the three partitions of Poland became an urgent problem of the public life. The success of its solution depended on many factors. There were the following factors the legal settlement, and thus the opportunities to prove their noble origins. In Galicia (Halychyna), which became part of the Austrian Empire, a mechanism was developed for the incorporation of the nobility into the knightly and magnate estates of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria. Due to the actual comparison and analysis of the legal norms and everyday realities, it gave an opportunity to reconstruct the incorporation process comprehensively and to answer a number of important questions: how did the process happen, whether the nobility took full advantage of the opportunities, why some part of the nobility did not receive the legitimacy and probably they received the legitimation but where are the confirmation documents?

The purpose of the article is to analyze all aspects of the Polish szlachta incorporation into the Austrian nobility.

The Analysis of Recent Researches. Numerous Polish historians studied the topic. In particular, K. Slusarek focused on studying the small szlachta of Galicia from the end of

the XVIIIth to the middle of the XIXth century, devoted a separate section to the nobility legitimization and its inclusion in the knighthood of the kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria (Slusarek, 1994). Later on, one more researcher, S. Górczyński, published some results on the above-mentioned issue, who studied the history of the titled nobility in Galicia and the titles' acquisition of counts, barons, princes by representatives of the former Polish nobility (Górczyński, 2009). Finally, the above-mentioned issue can be found present in the reference edition written by I. Smutok, L. Smutok in the introductory section (Smutok I., Smutok L., 2016). However, all these researchers emphasized the legal basis of legitimization. The process of confirming the nobility realities remained out of their attention. Therefore, the question concerning the part of the nobility, who did not receive the identification and how to interpret it, wasn't asked and highlighted.

The Statement of the Basic Material. After the First Partition of Rzeczpospolita in 1772, Galicia (Halychyna) became part of the Austrian Empire. The newly acquired territories were in deep decline, and the local society was in drastic need of the modernization. Hence, the new government regulated the economic, administrative, legal, and social relations in Galicia (Halychyna) immediately and managed to adjust them to Austrian realities.

The nobility issue obtained the prominent place among the worries and troubles, which Vienna had to solve. There were no difficulties formally. The Polish nobility, who lived in the newly annexed territories, retained their social status and joined the Austrian nobility automatically. However, it quickly became clear that in order to incorporate into the Austrian nobility successfully, two tasks had to be solved: first of all, to change the Galician nobility structure by rebuilding it on the Austrian model; second of all, to verify the ancestral and personal composition of this nobility (Slusarek, 1994, pp. 118–137).

Hence, work began on the legal settlement of the above-mentioned problems immediately after the accession of Galicia (Halychyna). According to the patent issued on the 13th of June in 1775, on the regional states' creation in Galicia, all the nobility was divided into two groups (classes): the magnates and the knights. The first included persons, who used the titles of princes, counts and barons, the rest of the nobility was considered to be a knighthood. These titles could be claimed by families, who used the appropriate titles before 1772, or held 'zemsky' governments, in particular, former voyevoda, castellans, crown officials could apply for the county, and county officials (the patent did not specify which ones, but probably it was a question of 'zemsky' khorunzhyi (military rank), 'stolnik', 'łowczy' (Master of the Hunt – was a Polish royal court official), judges, defendants, etc.) – apply for barony title. The same patent introduced a new magnates honorary titles hierarchy (the highest regional: 'okhmistr' (the queen's court manager), marshal, 'podkomorzy', cook, 'łowczy', stableman, falconer, cupbearer, storekeeper) and the knighthood honorary titles hierarchy (regional: archistol, vice-marshal, vice-podkomorzy, miecznik (sword-bearer) treasurer, vice-chamberlain, 'kraychyi', khorunzhyi) (Edita et mandata, 1775, vol. 3, p. 95).

It was necessary to prove the noble origin in order to enter one of the estates. In particular, the applicant had to derive his pedigree on the basis of relevant documents, present the Coat of Arms and certify in the same document that his ancestors lived in the territory of Rzeczpospolita for at least 150 years and owned 'zemsky' estates. Relevant cases were instructed to be considered by a The Commission of Magnates, which was specially created and dealt with the relevant cases, consisted of five people: 1) Count Joseph Vandalin Mniszek, a former Krakow castellan; 2) Count Ignatius Zettner, former Belz voyevoda; 3) Stanislav Potocki, former mayor of Belz; 4) Count Vaclav Jerome Serakowski, Archbishop of Lviv;

5) Count Jan Zamoyskiy (Marcinek, Ślusarek, 1996, pp. 2–5. Górzyński, 2009, pp. 9–81. Górzyński, 1999, pp. 3–58. If the verdict of the decision was positive, the Commission would issue a special document known as the “identification”, which confirmed the noble origin of the person. It was not necessary that all the commission members should be present at the meeting. The three members’ signatures out of its five members were sufficient. It came as no surprise that the case was often considered by two magnates. The Commission granted the request of only 70 – 80 people and issued no more than a hundred identification cards during its activity (1776 – 1783) (Górzyński, 2009, p. 29; CSHAUL, f. 165, d. 6a, c. 20, pp. 30–31; c. 21, pp. 261–262). As a result, the government decided to engage other institutions in the process due to the Commission’s low productivity. In 1782 the city zemsky courts in Lviv, Przemyśl, Halych, Terebovlia, Sanok, Belz, Czchów, Beč, Sandeczy, Pilzno, and Auschwitz received the right to confirm the nobility. The above-mentioned city zemsky courts issued the lion’s share of all the legitimations. Due to the considerable workload, the authorities extended their activity terms regularly, for instance, firstly until the end of 1783, later on until 1786 and finally until the 31st of December in 1788. The Establishment Committee (State Committee) or the Department of Estates (Collegium Statuum), established in 1782, was given to the right to issue legitimations in 1786. Since 1789 The Establishment Committee (Collegium Statuum) became the only authority authorized to consider cases on the confirmation of nobility. The identification process itself lasted until 1817. On the 5th of March in 1817, an imperial patent appeared, which stopped the issuance of legitimations. Since then, the confirmation of the nobility was carried out only with the Emperor’s permission by special privilege (Górzyński, 2009, pp. 33–34).

The legitimations holder had to include (“matriculate”) it in the so-called “noble metrics” or “majestic books” in order to enter the knightly or magnate titles and take full advantage of the nobility’s rights (“Liber generalis novus Majestatis sive Diplomatum Nobilitationum cujusunque Status nec non Rescriptorum et Decretorum Aulicorum”). The “noble metrics” or “majestic books” were introduced in 1782 and were conducted at the State Committee (Collegium Statuum), later on at the National Department until 1921 (CSHAUL, f. 165, d. 6a, c. 19–46).

The enrollment procedure into the noble metrics was neither automatic nor mandatory. However, there was an order according to which, having received the legitimation (identification card), its owner was obliged to enter it in the metrics within 6 months. Although the above-mentioned norm was ignored and people did not keep to it. It is quite complicated to find any obvious reasons for disobeying the norm. Furthermore, the circumstance was unclear to the Department of Estates officials during the 1830-ies and 1840-ies. In addition, such kind of situation was explained in one of the government correspondence the following “on the nobility issue confirmation and the matriculation, which should be considered separately. In order for a party not to be able to have a consequence of its position, it is either forbidden to issue an attestation, or not. That’s why, a person could not ask also for the matriculation” (written in Polish): “o Wydanie szlachectwa a oddzielnie o immatrykulacyę. Dla tego ze strona nie mogła o skutku swey posby czyli jej będzie dozwolone wydanie attestatu, lub ni., dla tego nie mogła prosić razem i o immatrykulacyę”. In the same document “przepisow na to niebyło zadnych, ani żadnego normale” (CSHAUL, f. 165, d. 3, c. 88, p. 3). The government officials were guided by the established practice of their predecessors.

Hence, the nobleman, who was issued the legitimation, could delay the fill in the nobility’s metrics, and this phenomenon was not something unusual. For example, the 12th volume of

the metric was formed from 1784 to 1787, but almost all the several hundred legitimations inscribed in it were issued in 1782 (sometimes in 1783). (CSHAUL, f. 165, d. 6a, c. 30, pp. 1–438). The subsequent volumes also contain numerous legitimations issued by city and zemstky courts. Therefore, the time interval between the documents' publication and their entry with each subsequent volume only increased and ranged from several to several years.

As a result, a category of legitimations emerged, which was not included in nobility metrics under such circumstances. The category of legitimations' existence was no secret to the Department of State. The government officials, while preparing for the publication "The Heraldry with a list of noble Galician and Bukovinian families" (*Poczet szlachty Galicyjskiej i Bukowińskiej*), singled out in it the above-mentioned kind of the identification under the eloquent title: "The appendix to the document confirming the affiliation to the Galician nobility certifies the name of the Nobility, which received the confirmation of the nobility, but made no effort to fill in/enlist the name in the nobility metrics" ("*Dodatek do szlachty Galicyjskiej zawierający nazwiska Szlachty, która otrzymawszy legitymację szlachectwa, o wpisanie teje do metryk nie postarała się*") (*Poczet szlachty*, 1857, pp. 318–335). In total, the appendix contained a list of about three hundred legitimations that were known to the States Department and were the subject to registration. Eventually, the vast majority of them, in fact, was issued by this institution, and the legitimations' draft versions were stored in the materials of the Department of States.

The presence of the non-intabulated legitimations raises the important question of the relationship between issued legitimations and those which were kept unharmed till our present days. It is obvious that there were more issued legitimations. The scale of this phenomenon can be assessed by the example of issued legitimations by the Department of States. In total, this institution during its existence issued more than 1,050 documents confirming the nobility (*Poczet szlachty*, 1857, pp. 1–335). There were 700 legitimations, which were enlisted in the nobility metrics. The rest, which is a third, remained unintabulated and are stored in the archives of the Department of Estates in drafts. The City and zemstkyo courts, endowed with the right to confirm the nobility, during the period of 1782 – 1783, issued about 4,800 legitimations/credentials, inscribed in the nobility metrics (Smutok I., Smutok L., 2016). Extrapolating the preliminary data, it is suggested that more than a thousand such acts were not filled in the nobility metrics. It is impossible to confirm or refute these calculations. After all, the legitimations issued by the city and zemsky courts were not deposited in the archives of these institutions. Moreover, only those surnames that were intabulated to the nobility metrics kept unharmed till the present days and some single copies of those surnames which were not intabulated, can be found in the Department of State Archives. In any case, it can be claimed that some of the legitimations were lost. Obviously, such considerations are too bold and, perhaps, the losses are calculated not by thousands, but they were not also limited to the several dozen legitimations.

The above-mentioned information explains partly why some part of the szlachta did not confirm the nobility allegedly, but took full advantage of their privileged position and did not feel offended. The history of the Krokowski family is the vivid example of such situation. In the second half of the XVIIIth century the above-mentioned situation occurred in several families, in particular, they were: Dominic – Kamenets city judge (1725), chervonogrodskyi swordsman (1729 – 1744), Kamenets 'łowczy' (1744 – 1748), Kamenets zemskyi judge (1748 – 1773), Buz'kyi castellan (1783 – 1785) (Gąsiorowski (Ed.), 1998, p. 213). Dominic's brothers were Toma, 'stolnyk' from Kyiv and Samuel, 'pidstolnyk' from Zhytomyr, who are mentioned

several times in Lviv city acts of the 1760-ies. (CSHAUL, f. 9, d. 1, c. 307, pp. 318–319; c. 308, p. 29; c. 313, p. 208). Toma lived until the beginning of the 1780-ies and had two sons – Adam and Thaddeus, who sold part of the village of Kokhayovychi to Modzalevsky family in 1791 (CSHAUL, f. 166, d. 1, c. 5437; Boniecki, 1908, p. 294). Their contemporary descendant was Bohuslav, either from the Melnytskyi troops or Novokorchynskyi troops, was mentioned for the first time in 1745, he lived until the 1800-ies (CSHAUL, f. 9, d. 1, c. 290, p. 421; f. 149, d. 3, c. 2606). At the turn of the XVIIIth – XIXth centuries there were some written records about two brothers: Joseph and Matthew. Joseph lived until the end of the 1810-ies, Matthew was the pastor in the village of Vyshatychi, died childless in 1797 (CSHAUL, f. 149, d. 2, c. 3656; f. 149, d. 3, c. 2654). There were some records in the Regional Tabula dating back to the 1790 concerning Martin, apparently, the same one who died in 1807 in the village of Moranets and who had three sons, Simon (his brother) got the custody his children (Boniecki, 1908, p. 294. CSHAUL, f. 149, d. 3, c. 2451). Only Bohuslav confirmed his nobility on the 18th of October in 1782 among all his relatives in Lviv Zemstky Court (Smutok I., Smutok L., 2016, p. 230). The identities of other Krokowski family members are unknown. It can be assumed that one of them left Galicia, or, like Dominic, had no sons and, lived to old age, did not need the legitimation. However, there were those who, by the logic of circumstances, inevitably had to confirm their nobility status, but there is no corresponding act, in particular, was Joseph Krokowski. In the 1780-ies and the beginning of the 1790-ies he lived in Lviv and for some time was a clerk of the nobility court (1788 – 1791). Hence, Joseph was well-educated and the knowledge of bureaucratic procedures were enough to handle with the confirmation of his status. He conducted property affairs actively, operating in large sums, which indicated his financial ability to pay for the costs of the identification. During the 1790-ies and 1800-ies, Joseph used acts of the Regional Tabula regularly, which were allowed only to the legitimized gentry. In the mid-1790-ies, Joseph, as one of the creditors, took over dead John Srokowski's lands in the village of Tchaikovychi. Once Joseph appeared among the Tchaikovsky nobility, he from time to time was a witness during the property agreements' conclusion or was writing them himself in the local tabular soil book. His son John and daughters were connected to the Tchaikovsky with family bonds. Hence, he was not standing out from the local nobility, which had the legitimation. After his death, the case of inheritance was heard in the Nobility Court in Lviv, whose powers extended to persons of proven nobility origin (CAHR, f. 309, c. 829, p. 25; CSHAUL, f. 149, d. 3, c. 2654; f. 166, d. 1, c. 3997, p. 12; c. 4027, p. 448; c. 4028, p. 451; c. 4031, p. 175; c. 4551, pp. 220–221; c. 4554, pp. 88–89, 94–95; c. 4556, p. 152; c. 4576, pp. 182–184; c. 4582, pp. 318–319; c. 4594, p. 110; c. 4624, pp. 105–106; c. 4823, p. 13; c. 4977, p. 244; c. 4993, pp. 290–291; c. 509, pp. 47, 348–349; c. 5029, p. 201). Where is Joseph's legitimacy then? Perhaps the answer lies on the surface, in particular, in the tabular book of the village of Tchaikovychi in 1801. According to the excerpt from the decree of Lviv Nobility Court, Joseph Krovovsky heir the legacy of John Srokovsky. The preamble to the document states, inter alia, that the decree issued to Joseph burned down. (CSHAUL, f. 166, d. 1, c. 2258, p. 87). It is possible that other documents burned during the fire, including the legitimation, which was not pre-established in the nobility metrics.

The logical end of this case is the following: in 1848, Joseph's grandsons – Joseph and Alexander appealed to the Department of Estates to confirm their nobility. However, they were denied on the grounds that there were no documents on their grandfather's affiliation to the nobility, which could be found in the nobility's metrics (CSHAUL, f. 165, d. 3, c. 2545, p. 9).

The Conclusions. The legal basis for the Ancient Rzeczpospolita szlachta incorporation into the nobilitated state of the Austrian gentry in Galicia (Halychyna) was quite liberal and allowed to receive the legitimation if there were minimal grounds. However, part of the nobility did not have such a document. As a result, a stereotype was formed about the new government's attempts to limit the nobility's entry into the Austrian knighthood. The explanation for this should be sought in the ratio of issued and preserved to date legitimations. That is, the illegitimate szlachta, in fact, also proved their nobility status and received, although, apparently, not all, the relevant documents, but due to numerous reasons some documents did not manage to be kept till the present days.

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**JEWISH LANDOWNERSHIP AND INTERETHNIC RELATIONS
IN KYIV GOVERNORATE AT THE END OF THE XIXth
AND THE BEGINNING OF THE XXth CENTURIES**

Abstract. *The aim of the article is to analyze possible modes, which were used by the Jews to own a plot of land and estate property in Kyiv Governorate at the end of the XIXth century and the beginning of the XXth century, to explain a negative attitude towards Jewish population by the growing struggle for the landownership based on the archival sources. The research methodology of the article is based on general historical methods such as typological and statistical; as well comparative and structural analyses have been used by the author. The Scientific Novelty.* The article is the first attempt to discover the modes and schemes to own a land property by the Jews, who tried to avoid the law restrictions of the Russian Empire, and to explain other ethnical groups' negative attitude towards the Jewish population in Kyiv Governorate by means of getting a land property, which was a symbol of freedom and welfare. This problem is especially urgent nowadays, when the issue of the moratorium on the sale of an agricultural land is actively discussed in Ukrainian society and the slogans are avoided to prevent the loss of a national heritage. **The Conclusions.** At the end of the XIXth century and the beginning of the XXth century Kyiv Governorate was a field of struggle between the representatives of different ethnic groups, among which the Jews were the most active. Their amount was growing in the governorate and representatives of the Jewish people dominated in commercial and industrial circles. This negative image was amplified by the attempts of the Jewish people to avoid limitation of rights, especially, prohibition on landownership. Having funds, the Jews were discriminated by the law of the Russian Empire. However, certain representatives of the Jewish people, who found flaws in the law, bought the lands in Kyiv Governorate. The analyzed documents illustrated that there were two ways to do this. The first way was to draw up a lease arrangement under nominee name from the Christians. Another way was to become a new landlord using a lease arrangement on a manor estate or land in case of debts or death of a previous owner.

Key words: *the Jews, landownership, Kyiv Governorate, the Russian Empire, legislation, interethnic relations.*

ЄВРЕЙСЬКЕ ЗЕМЛЕВОЛОДІННЯ ТА МІЖНАЦІОНАЛЬНІ ВІДНОСИНИ У КИЇВСЬКІЙ ГУБЕРНІІ НАПРИКІНЦІ XIX – НА ПОЧАТКУ XX СТ.

Анотація. Мета дослідження – полягає в аналізі способів набуття євреями землі та нерухокої власності в Київській губернії наприкінці XIX – на початку XX ст., спробі дати пояснення негативного ставлення до євреїв через розгортання боротьби за землеволодіння, використовуючи при цьому архівні джерела. *Методологія дослідження* ґрунтується на загальноісторичних методах, зокрема, використанні методів історизму, порівняльного аналізу, структурного та типологічного методів, а також статистичному методі. *Наукова новизна* полягає в тому, що у статті на основі архівних та опублікованих джерел розкриваються способи та схеми набуття земельної власності євреями, які намагалися уникнути законодавчих утисків у Російській імперії. Робиться спроба пояснити негативне ставлення представників інших етнічних груп до євреїв у Київській губернії крізь призму здобуття ними землі, яка здавна символізувала свободу та багатство. Особливо актуальною ця проблема є на сучасному етапі, коли в українському суспільстві активно обговорюється питання відміни мораторію на продаж землі сільськогосподарського призначення та лунають гасла недопущення втрати національного надбання. *Висновки.* Отже, наприкінці XIX – на початку XX ст. Київська губернія стала ареною зіткнення інтересів представників різних етносів, серед яких активними були євреї. Кількість єврейського етносу зростала, а його представники переважали у торговельних та економічних колах, особливо купецько-лихварського стану. Негативному ставленню до євреїв сприяли їхні спроби у різні способи уникнути законодавчих обмежень. Особливо гострим було питання набуття земельної власності євреями. Володіючи значними капіталами, євреї наштотувалися на законодавчі обмеження владних органів Російської імперії, але в імперському законодавстві знайшли шпарину щодо права володіння землею і отримали можливість придбати її у Київській губернії. Існує чимало архівних документів, які переконливо доводять, що існувало два способи отримання землі у власність євреями. По-перше, укладання орендних угод на ім'я підставної особи, яка була християном. По-друге, укладання формальної орендної угоди на придбання маєтку або землі. Уклавши такі угоди, євреї мали можливість згодом отримати маєтки у повну власність завдяки боргам або смерті власника.

Ключові слова: євреї, землеволодіння, Київська губернія, Російська імперія, законодавство, міжнаціональні відносини.

The Problem Statement. Nowadays, the acute issue of the moratorium on cancelling the sale of an agricultural land is being actively discussed in the Ukrainian society, and the slogans are heard to prevent the loss of a national heritage. That is why, the lessons from the history are quite topical in order not to repeat making mistakes of the past, taking into account modern realities. In the Russian Empire at the end the of the XIXth and at the beginning of the XXth centuries, as well as nowadays, the issue of landownership remained very acute, and there was a ban on a landownership for a certain category of the population. There is a considerable amount of actually unpublished and almost unanalyzed archival material that makes it possible to expose the land deals that allowed to avoid breaking the laws of the Russian Empire that forbade the landownership. The disclosure of such land deals, the distribution of which could not be stopped until the collapse of the Russian Empire, can be useful for the elaboration of a modern legislation. In addition to it, the absolute inactivity of the government in stopping the land deals, as evidenced by the historical example of the Russian Empire, contributed to the growing tension in the national issue.

Kyiv Governorate (province) in the Russian Empire is an example of the dynamics and clashes of different national interests. Among the inhabitants of the province were the Jews, who stood out not only in number, but also in a socio-economic activity. This fact troubled the government of the Russian Empire, who tried to restrict and control the actions

of the national minorities. The governmental policy concerning the residence in the Russian Empire of different nationalities and their beliefs was rather rigid, especially concerning large ethnic communities – the Jews and the Poles, who were competing with the Russians. As for the Jews, there were a number of restrictions in the Russian Empire, including the so-called “line of habitation” and all sorts of prohibitions, including landownership. Many unpublished archival sources are preserved about the ways, which the Jews used to avoid these discriminatory measures.

The Analysis of Recent Researches. A number of recent works have been devoted to the national and land issues in the Russian Empire. It is impossible to analyze all the scientific researches on this subject due to the limited volume of the article. The amount of researches on this issue is increasing every year, because landownership problems remain acute and topical. Thus, the works of A. Humeniuk focus on the most acute for the Ukrainian lands national and social issues in the towns in the XIXth – XXth centuries (Humeniuk, 1993). The works of A. Kappeler deal with the analysis of the influence of national issues on the history of the Russian Empire (Kappeler, 2000). Nowadays, the scientists address actively to the problems of entrepreneurship in the Russian Empire, highlighting the national and property problems. Thus, O. Donik investigates the merchants' activity in the Russian Empire, in particular, highlighting the Jews and their entrepreneurial initiatives in Kyiv region (Donik, 2008). Foreign researchers, in particular I. Potkina, pay attention to the legal aspects of the Jewish entrepreneurship (Potkina, 2009). In the socio-economic studies, which contain the data on the Kyiv Governorate of the post-reform years, in one way or another, there is information about the Jewish population. However, in these works, the attempts of the Jews to free themselves from economic and legal constraints in Kyiv Governorate were not investigated separately. In 2014, the article written by A. Borodii, was published, where an attempt was made to analyze the main directions, forms and methods of the Jewish participation in agrarian relations on the Right Bank (Borodii, 2014). In the article the attention is paid to the statistics of “latent” landownership of the Jews, but does not fully disclose the scheme of the Jewish land deals in Kyiv province. More over, the author paid little attention to the national contradictions and their aggravation in Kyiv Governorate precisely against the background of the agrarian issue.

The Purpose of the Research. The purpose of this article is to analyze, using the archival sources, the ways the Jews from the Kyiv Governorate used to become the owners of the land and property of predominantly impoverished nobles at the end of the XIXth – beginning of the XXth centuries. It is also necessary to explain the negative attitude towards the Jews by the deployment of the struggle for landownership.

The Statement of the Basic Material. The national composition of Kyiv Governorate population was diverse. The Jews were the third largest ethnic group after the Ukrainians and the Russians, who in the mid-XIXth century together comprised about 91% of the urban Right Bank population (Humeniuk, 1993, pp. 81–84). In 1887, in Kyiv Governorate there were more than 300 000 Jews, comprising about 13% of the total population of the Kyiv Governorate (Mozgovoij, 1887, pp. 58, 59). As compared to them, the groups of the Poles, the Germans, the Belarussians, the Czechs and the Tatars comprised 2,66% in the census of 1897 (Chornyj, 2001, pp. 12, 13, 26). Kyiv hubernia was considered to be densely populated. According to the the statistical data there were 220 inhabitants per settlement in 1885 – 1887, while the average number was 143 per one settlement in the Russian Empire. The most densely populated were the southern districts of Kyiv province, Cherkasy, Kaniv and Lypovets counties (povits). Kyiv Governorate consisted of 12 counties, 11305 settlements,

of which there were 12 cities (1 provincial, 109 towns, 7146 independent settlements and 4038 adjacent settlements). In 1888 the total amount of the population was about 2,5 million people, of whom about 400 000 there were urban residents (Kievskij Gubernskij Statisticheskij komitet & Mozgovej, 1888, pp. 46, 47, 56, 57). In 1895 the population of Kyiv Governorate increased to 3,5 million people (Kievskij gubernskij statisticheskij komitet, 1895, pp. 364–367). According to statistics, the population growth increased at a rapid rate and it was the most significant among the Jews (Mozgovej, 1887, p. 7).

Due to a government policy that prevented the Jews from settling outside cities and towns, most of the Jews were urban dwellers. The majority of the Jews lived in towns (146,6 000), in cities (112 000), and in villages there lived only 50 000. As compared to other nationalities, there were 30,2% of the Jews in the cities and 34,1% – in the towns. Most of the Jews lived in Berdychiv county, where they comprised 1/3 of all residents or 30%, in Vasylykiv county – 16%, in Kaniv, Radomyshl and Skvyra counties – 12%, in Kyiv, Zvenyhorod and Lypovetsk counties – 10% and in Uman county – 8% (Mozgovej, 1887, p. 59). For example, in Uman in 1881, there were 19812 Jews of 24489 inhabitants (Polovcov, Without a year, pp. 3, 4, 10), and Berdychiv was the home to 74879 people, of whom 64425 (86%) were the Jews (Donik, 2008, p. 55). In such cities as Kyiv, Berdychiv, Vasylykiv, Zvenyhorodka, Kaniv, Lypovets, Radomyshl, Skvyra, Uman, Tarashcha, Cherkasy, Chyhyryn 4972 Jews belonged to the privileged classes, 141164 Jews – to the burghers (Kievskij gubernskij statisticheskij komitet, 1895, pp. 364–367).

At the end of the XIXth century Kyiv Governorate was included to the zone of the Jewish settlement, but they were not allowed to settle in Kyiv. The ways to avoid these restrictions were the following: baptism and adoption of basic ideological postulates or passing an educational course. During the reign of Mykola I, the main ideological triad was established in the Russian Empire: Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality. S. Uvarov, Minister for National Education, emphasized: “Without love for the Faith of ancestors, the people, as well as the private person, must perish; to weaken the Faith in them, is the same as to deprive them of blood and to tear out the heart ...” (Shevchenko, 1995, p. 71). A similar ideology developed at the legislative level, when the representatives of other ethnic groups received certain privileges, accepting its basic postulates. In 1861, the right to settle outside the residency zone was granted to persons with higher education, and from 1879 – to the representatives of medical professions (Donik, 2008, p. 30).

In 1876, the Jews were only allowed to stay temporarily outside the settlement zone to assert their rights in court or in commercial matters. With the permission of the police, the Jews had the right to extend the stay in this or that town for 6 weeks. With the permission of the governor, they stayed for up to two months. The Jews were given the opportunity to live in Kyiv being engaged in service, in commerce, cart service, purchase, treatment or education. This right had such professional groups of the Jewish population as doctors, nurses, mechanics, wineries workers, craftsmen and artisans with their families (CSHAUK, f. 442, d. 646, c. 183, pp. 3, 4). Getting education allowed the Jews to come to Kyiv with their family. In 1881 the Jewish merchants of the first guild were given the right to reside in the city with their families (Polovcov, Without a year, p. 48). In 1889 the Jews were granted the right to settle, having a special permission of the governor or governor-general, i.e., the local government. The change of status of the Jews took place in 1903, when they were allowed to live outside the settlement zone, and the Minister for the Interior Affairs was granted the right to expand the list of settlements for the Jews' permanent place of residence (Potkina, 2009, p. 67).

At the end of the XIXth century the Jews of Kyiv Governorate were traditionally engaged in a trade-intermediary activity, a small scale production and usury. In 1862 there were about 2,5 000 of the Christians-merchants in Kyiv province, and the Jews-merchants – 20 000 of people (CSHAUK, f. 442, d. 41, c. 2a, p. 14). In 1897, 1/3 of the Jews worked in industry, 3 – 4% in agriculture, 40% in commerce, the rest – in the administrative apparatus as civil servants, military men, priests. According to other data, 63.72% of the Jews were engaged in trade and credit operations in Ukrainian lands (Lazans'ka, 1999, p. 169). Among rich and influential Jewish entrepreneurs, we should mention the Ginsburg and Brodsky, wealthy burghers of Kyiv – H. M. Rosenberg and V. H. Ginzburg (Zaets, 2004, p. 68). In Berdychiv, among the influential Jews there were the surnames of Glasberg, Lytvak, Ritakh, Baron and Katsnelson (Donik, 2008, pp. 79, 80). The Jews-entrepreneurs could gain the state support by gaining the status of merchants of the 1st guild and achieving the recognition of their own business, useful for the county (Potkina, 2009, p. 80).

There were many Jews among the great bourgeoisie of Kyiv province. They were the owners of trading firms, houses, shops, banks and pawnshops with a significant capital (Kruhliak, 1994, p. 79). The Jews were famous and influential bankers of Kyiv province. In the second half of the XIXth century, in Ukraine private pawnshops belonged to the Jews. These profitable commercial establishments made millions of profit owing to Jewish executives (Kazmyrchuk, 2007, p. 33). Many Jews were engaged in a small-scale trade, factoring, and commissioning. There were many Jews at the market places in Kyiv (CSHAUK, f. 442, d. 646, c. 183, pp. 3, 4).

All ethnic groups were inferior to the high positions of the Jews in the entrepreneurship of Kyiv province. The Jews were inferior to the activity of the representatives of other ethnic groups in agriculture. The attempts to involve the Jews in agriculture had no results in Kyiv province, as indicated by the governor of Kyiv in 1870 (CSHAUK, f. 442, d. 51, c. 376, p. 3). In the countryside, there were some closed communities with orthodox Jewish culture and a minimal contact with the outside world. The imperial authorities did not object to the land ownership of the Jewish farmers, the members of the Jewish community (Komarnits'kyj, 2009, p. 41). In 1885, more than 20 agricultural Jewish communities of Kyiv Governorate owned about 3,000 d. of land in Kyiv, Berdychiv, Vasylykiv, Chyhyryn and Radomyshl counties. The plot of land per Jew in the community ranged from 0,3 d. up to 2,2 d. (Mozgovoj, 1887, pp. 24, 25).

Despite the rapid entrepreneurial activity of the Jews, in almost every report of ministers and governors-general of Kyiv Governorate at the end of the XIXth – beginning of the XXth centuries, there was the Jews' general characterization as idlers and exploiters (CSHAUK, f. 442, d. 532, c. 202, pp. 5–6). Thus, in 1878 the governor of Kyiv made a peremptory statement about the inability of the Jews to farming and the exploitation of the peasantry due to the temporary lease of land or property in the village. The scheme of exploitation, described by the governor, consisted in the following: the Jews settled in a particular village and rented a large local estate, thereby gaining power over the peasants, who were economically dependent on the tenant. The Jews-tenants were able to take advantage of the peasants' credit needs, collecting high interest rates in spite of the damage to the agriculture. According to the governor's opinion, the tenant Jews made the most of all the rented property, destroying the local population at the same time (CSHAUK, f. 442, d. 532, c. 202, p. 5). Nevertheless, since 1870, the Polish landowners had an official permission to lease the land to the Jews (CSHAUK, f. 442, d. 51, c. 376, p. 4). At the end of the 70-ies of the XIXth century more than 220 Jews rented the land in Kyiv province, the total area of which was more than 160 000 desiatyn and was estimated at more than 740 000 rubles per year. In 1878 Kyiv governor noted the massive lease of land by landowners

to the Jews and expressed grave fears about the future of these leasehold estates (CSHAUK, f. 442, d. 532, c. 202, pp. 5, 7). According to the materials of the city council in 1878, 1879 and 1880, 60 Jews of the town of Skvyra purchased a real estate. In 1876 Cherkasy city government informed about 290 Jews of landowners, whose number was growing. Thus, in 1877 there were already more than 310, and in 1880 – 320. There was a similar statistics in other towns, in particular in Uman, Zvenyhorodka and Chyhyryn, where during 1878 – 1880 the Jews acquired more than 50 estates and plots of land (Polovcov, p. 34).

The Jews got the opportunity to buy the estates in the province of Kyiv owing to the estate owners' debts. Thus, the Jews-tenants Mordko Pysmenyi and Itsko Pysmenyi loaned the landlord Earl J. Krasysky more than 28 000 rubles. Under the terms of the lease agreement, they had the right to own a part of the estate in Khrestynivka of Lypovetsky county for 10 years, which previously belonged to J. Krasysky, However, J. Krasysky could not pay the already existing huge debt of more than 80 thousand rubles, that is why his property was transferred to the creditor Jews, in particular, the property became the property of Mordko Pysmenyi and Itsko Pysmenyi (CSHAUK, f. 442, d. 183, c. 433, pp. 1–7). In the same way, for the debts of the 1980-ies of the XIXth century, but after the death of the owner, the estates in Motyzhyn and Pliakhtianysia of Skvyra county also became the property of the town resident, A. Ferdman, a Jew. Their owner, General Savysky, did not have enough time to pay him for the debts, and therefore his property (factories, livestock, land, buildings) became the property of a Jewish burgher (CSHAUK, f. 442, d. 536, c. 52, pp. 1, 26).

Among the negative characteristics of the Jews in the society there were the following ones: the seizure of all crafts, the thirst for profit by cheating the labourers, the deception of honest citizens. Thus, in 1866, Martin Olshansky, Podilsky nobleman, complaining about the fraud, made by the Jews F. Zynkler and I. Lyapis from Nemyriv, Vinnytsia merchant Moshho Woinan, justified their guilt, claiming that the tricks of the Jews had been known for a long time (CSHAUK, f. 442, d. 180, c. 256, pp. 1, 5). The “abnormality” of relations between the Christians and the Jews was noted by the governor of Kyiv in 1870, because the Christians treated the Jews with contempt because of the stereotypes about the Jews as dishonest people. According to the governor's opinion, these stereotypes were supported by some Jews, united and willing to help one another, but the Jew treated the rest of the population dishonestly (CSHAUK, f. 442, d. 51, c. 376, p. 3).

At the beginning of the XXth century L. I. Brodsky, a well-known Jewish representative, made a special report on the Jews and agriculture at the meeting of Kyiv Provincial Committee. He declared the change in attitude towards the Jewish issue in the Russian Empire. L. Brodsky believed that the times when the activities of the Jews were considered harmful had already passed (Kievskij gubernskij komitet, 1903, pp. 57, 62). However, at the beginning of the XXth century, along with the vision of the Jews as the exploiters, another negative definition – the revolutionaries – began to be applied to them (SAKR, f. 2, d. 222, c. 215, p. 29).

As a result of the negative opinion about the Jews, the property of the Jews was burned and numerous pogroms were registered in the Records of the events of Kyiv Governorate during different years. Unknown intruders robbed shops and set fire to Jewish factory property in Kyiv. Some Jewish pogroms had to be suppressed by troops, in particular in Smila, in May 1881 (CSHAUK, f. 442, d. 663, c. 2 (vol. 2), pp. 75, 89, 104). The pogroms also took place in the towns of Trypillya, Obukhiv, Hermanivka, Bila Tserkva, Hostomel (Komarnits'kyj, 2009, p. 54). A. Kappeler considered the pogroms to be the motivation factor to the Russian government to impose sanctions on the Jews and to strengthen the position of the Russian entrepreneurs (Kappeler, 2000, p. 199).

In 1882, the Jews were banned from renting real estate outside cities and towns. However, many estates of Kyiv Governorate were still transferred to the Jews' property. The problem consisted in the following fact: the prohibition concerned the leases of immovable property made in the name of the Jews, so the agreements began to be made involving fake persons among the Christians with whom the Jews had a deal. Thus, the real lease deal was masked. Another way of acquiring landownership by the Jews was to make a formal agreement that was not officially certified. In this case, the landowner and the tenant Jew did not advertise the existence of the lease agreement, but they were limited to a verbal agreement. At the end of the XIXth century the Jews made deals with fake persons, concerning various real estate properties. Later on the land was acquired by making the same procedure. Thus, in 1862, in the name of the State Advisor A. M. Shostakovsky, Felix Ihnaryov, a Jew, registered a powerful steam-sugar plant, which had six hydraulic presses, in one of the villages of Tarashchansky county (CSHAUK, f. 486, d. 5, c. 437, pp. 28, 29). This method of acquiring landownership became so popular among the Jews that in 7 years the Governor-General of Kyiv had to apply to the Ministry of Finance to ban the formal agreements. Even a fine of more than 800 rubles for not making official leases did not scare the Jews, because it was appealed in court (CSHAUK, f. 442, d. 543, c. 297, pp. 6, 7).

The Conclusions. Thus, at the end of the XIXth – at the beginning of the XXth century Kyiv Governorate became an arena of interests clashes of different ethnic groups representatives, among which the Jews were the most active in the industry. Their number in Kyiv Governorate grew steadily and was predominant in the cities and towns. The representatives of the Jewish ethnic group prevailed in trade and economic circles, most of them among the city merchant-usury stratum. This fact caused the following situation: during the crisis among the population dominated the negative image of cunning Jews, who raised a high percentage on loans, as well as the image of greedy and lazy Jews, who did not work, moreover. They were allegedly persecuted by the authorities, and therefore they were beyond the law, they were strangers. The negative attitude towards the Jews was facilitated by their attempts to avoid legal restrictions in various ways. The issue of landownership by the Jews was especially acute.

Possessing a significant capital, the Jews encountered the legal restrictions in the Russian Empire, where only the Christians had significant preferences. A large proportion of the Jews were engaged in business and commerce, but there were also those, who did not want to put up with social injustice. They found a gap in the legislation system of the Russian Empire concerning the right to own land and the Jews were able to acquire it in Kyiv Governorate in various ways. There are many archival documents that conclusively prove that there were two ways of obtaining a plot of land for Jewish ownership. Firstly, making agreements on leasing with a fake person of a Christian origin. Secondly, making a formal leasing agreement for obtaining an estate or a plot of land. By making such agreements, the Jews were subsequently able to obtain the estates in a full ownership because of debts or death of the previous owner.

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STATUTE OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE CARE OF POOR JEWISH CHILDREN IN KOLOMYIA (1908): HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS

Abstract. *The purpose of the article is to publish and analyze the Statute of the Society for the Care of Poor Jewish Children in Kolomyia (1908) as a source for the history of this Society and the legal culture of the Jewish community in the eastern cities of Eastern Galicia in the early 20th century. The research methodology – principles of scientific, objectivity, historicism, methods of external and internal critique of sources. The research novelty is that the Statute of the Society for the Care of Poor Jewish Children in Kolomyia (1908) was first published and analyzed as a historical and historical-legal source. The Conclusions. Thus, the Statute of the Society for the Care of Poor Jewish Children, which was formed in Kolomyia in 1908, is supposed to have been concluded by the Jewish lawyer H. Landau. After approval by the Governor, the Society published its Statute, which consisted of 29 articles. This document is known to researchers, but has never been published or analyzed as a historical and legal source. It is stored in the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv. The Statute had a*

bifunctional purpose, as it regulated the activities of the Society and the “Okhoronka” formed by it. Articles of the Statute can be divided into three groups: 1) the purpose and material principles of the Society and the “Okhoronka”; 2) tasks, rights and responsibilities of the members of the Society and the “Okhoronka”; 3) structural-organizational and managerial aspects of activity of the Society and the “Okhoronka”. We consider the Statute to be an important historical source for the history of Jewish public organizations of charitable orientation in Eastern Galicia, the history of Kolomyia in the early 20th century, as well as the history of domestic legal thought. The document is published in the original language (Polish) in compliance with the necessary archaeological requirements.

Key words: The Society for the Care of Poor Jewish Children, “Okhoronka”, Eastern Galicia, Kolomyia, assimilation, Jewish community.

СТАТУТ ТОВАРИСТВА ПО ДОГЛЯДУ ЗА БІДНИМИ ЄВРЕЙСЬКИМИ ДІТЬМИ У КОЛОМІЇ (1908): ІСТОРИКО-ПРАВОВИЙ АНАЛІЗ

Анотація. Мета статті – опублікувати та проаналізувати статут Товариства по догляду за бідними єврейськими дітьми у Коломії (1908) як джерело до історії зазначеного Товариства та правової культури єврейської громадськості повітових міст Східної Галичини початку ХХ ст. **Методологія дослідження** – принципи науковості, об’єктивності, історизму, методи зовнішньої та внутрішньої критики джерел. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що уперше публікується Статут Товариства по догляду за бідними єврейськими дітьми у Коломії (1908) та здійснюється його аналіз як історичного та історико-правового джерела. **Висновки.** Отже, Статут Товариства по догляду за бідними єврейськими дітьми, яке утворилося в Коломії 1908 р., припускаємо, було укладено єврейським юристом Г. Ландау. Після затвердження Намісництвом, Товариство надрукувало свій Статут, який складався з 29 статей. Цей документ відомий дослідникам, але жодного разу не публікувався та не аналізувався як історико-правове джерело. Він зберігається у Центральному державному історичному архіві України у Львові. Статут мав біфункціональне призначення, оскільки регламентував діяльність Товариства та утвореної ним охоронки. Статті Статуту умовно можна поділити на три групи: 1) мета і матеріальні засади функціонування Товариства й охоронки; 2) завдання, права і обов’язки членів Товариства і охоронки; 3) структурно-організаційні та управлінські аспекти діяльності Товариства та охоронки. Вважаємо Статут важливим історичним джерелом до історії єврейських громадських організацій харитивного спрямування у Східній Галичині, історії Коломії початку ХХ ст., а також до історії вітчизняної правової думки.

Ключові слова: Товариство по догляду за бідними єврейськими дітьми, охоронка, Східна Галичина, Коломія, асиміляція, єврейська громада.

The Problem Statement. In the late 19th – early 20th century the Jewish community of Eastern Galicia underwent significant modernization changes. They were marked not only by the influence of Zionism, but also by the emergence and spread of numerous charitable Jewish public organizations. In many Galician cities with Jewish communities, various societies were formed to help poor Jewish families, children, and the elderly. Similar processes affected the Ukrainian and Polish national communities of Eastern Galicia, but the distinction of the Jewish version of modernization was the struggle between isolationists (traditionalists, orthodox) and assimilators. The latter advocated the integration of Jews into the social environment (mostly Polish) through secular education, active participation in socio-political, social and cultural life. It was the assimilators who were at the origins of many Jewish non-governmental organizations in Galicia, including the Society for the Care of Poor Jewish Children, founded in Kolomyia in 1908. Its Statute, which, incidentally, was written and published in Polish, is the subject of our archeographic and legal analysis.

The Analysis of Research and Publications. The Society for the Care of Poor Jewish Children in Kolomyia in 1908 came under the lens of Ukrainian scholars, especially

researchers of the history of Kolomyia: V. Hrabovetskyi (Hrabovetskyi, 1996), S. Andriyshyn (Andriyshyn, 2003), L. Vaigel (Vaigel, 2008), I. Monolatiij (Monolatiij, 2003; Monolatiij, 2010). Interesting memories from the life of Kolomyia and the county in the 20th century were collected in the two-volume collection *Kolomyia ta Kolomyishchyna* (Romanenchuk, 1988; Savchuk, 2008), although they focused mainly on the past of the Ukrainian community of the city. A considerable layer of research is devoted to the system of child custody in Galicia. In particular, in 2002 the 16th volume of the collection *Galicia and its Heritage* was published, which revealed the processes of formation and development of the network of orphanages in the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria (Meissner, 2002). The Polish scientists (Siedlaczek, 1998; Łapot, 2011) have conducted important research on this problem. In general, in these works, the activities of the Society for the Care of Poor Jewish Children in Kolomyia were hardly mentioned or described rather briefly. The Statute of this Society has not yet been the subject of archeographic research. It should be noted that in modern Ukrainian archeography the attention to this type of documents as statutes is growing. In this area, we should note the publications of M. Haliv and O. Nevmerzhytska (Haliv & Nevmerzhytska, 2018) and E. Kazan and T. Otradnova (Kazan & Otradnova, 2019).

The purpose of the article is to publish and analyze the Statute of the Society for the Care of Poor Jewish Children in Kolomyia (1908) as a source for the history of this Society and the legal culture of the Jewish community in the eastern cities of Eastern Galicia in the early 20th century.

The Statement of the Basic Material. The Statute of the Society for the Care of Poor Jewish Children in Kolomyia (hereinafter – the Society) is in the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv (Fonds 178: State School Council, description 1, case 5942, pp. 1–5). It was published by the Society in the printing house of A. Kisilevskyi in Kolomyia immediately after the approval by the Imperial-Royal Governorate of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, which took place on 2 May 1908 (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, p. 5942, p. 1a). The publication contains not only the Statute, but also a list of members of the Society and a list of members of the Jewish “Okhoronka Yubileina” – a shelter (orphanage) for Jewish children, created by the Society on the occasion of the state anniversary – 60 years of reign of the Austro-Hungarian Emperor Franz Joseph I (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, pp. 5v–8).

As of 1908, the Society had 201 members, most of whom were women (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, pp. 6–7). It is important that families joined this public organization. For example, the members of the Society were Isaac Freyer and his wife Mina, Baruch Beiser and his wife Emma. The Society also included a relative of the well-known Ukrainian and at the same time Jewish publisher Yakiv Orenshtain – Ruzia (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, p. 6v). The Board of the Society was headed by Dr. H. M. Landau, a lawyer from Kolomyia. His deputy was Anna Trakhtenberh, the treasurer was Pavlina Gules, and the secretary was Sameul Sheirman. At the same time, the “Okhoronka Yuvileina” Board was formed, headed by Karolina Schiller and her deputy, Antonia Milhromova Berger. The treasurer of the “Okhoronka” board was Dora Waller, the secretary was Franciszek Bibring (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, p. 5v). The founding members of the “Okhoronka” were Anna Bretler, Pavlina Gules, Eva Kokhn, Dr. H. M. Landau, Stefan Veis, Solomn Marmorosh, Karolina Seidman, Helena Shor. Among the institutions that provided support to the orphanage were the Kolomyia branches of Credit Bank, Halych Commercial Bank, the Export and Commission Bank for Trade and Agriculture, the Industrial Society of Loans and Savings, etc. A total of 84 members were members of the “Okhoronka” (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, pp. 7v–8).

We should note that at the time of approval of the Statute (2 May 1908), the “Okhoronka” has not yet been formed. On 15 October 1908, the head of the “Okhoronka”, K. Schiller, wrote a letter to the State School Council in Lviv (hereinafter – SSC) requesting permission to open the “Okhoronka” on 1 November of the same year. She assured that 32 children would be admitted to the shelter and asked to hand over the management of the institution to Sofiia Rosentkhal, who had experience working at the Froebel kindergarten in Frankfurt am Main. In addition, she was to be assisted in her work with children by two assistants (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, pp. 10v-11). Instead, SSC asked the Kolomyia District School Council (hereinafter – DSC) to find out whether this institution met the requirements of the ministerial rescript of 22 June 1872, and to determine the qualification level of the head of the “Okhoronka” and her assistants. Therefore, on 1 December 1908, the DSC in a letter assured the SSC that the “Okhoronka” met the requirements of the said rescript, the material support of the institution was quite sufficient, the house met the requirements, and from 1 May 1909 a house with a garden would be rented for the “Okhoronka”. Officials also confirmed the sufficient qualifications of the head of the “Okhoronka” and her assistant (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, p. 9). Therefore, there were no obstacles to the activities of the “Okhoronka” and, we assume, the SSC gave permission for its implementation.

Analyzing the Statute of the Society, we should note that its feature is a bifunctional purpose, as it regulated not only the activities of the Society, but also its subordinate institution – the above-mentioned “Okhoronka” for “abandoned, neglected and homeless Jewish children in Kolomyia”. Usually in the Austro-Hungarian Empire in general and in Galicia in particular, public organizations and certain social institutions formed by them had separate statutes. The analyzed document consists of 29 articles. Conditionally, they can be divided into three groups: 1) the purpose and material principles of the Society and the “Okhoronka”; 2) tasks, rights and responsibilities of the members of the Society and the “Okhoronka”; 3) structural-organizational and managerial aspects of activity of the Society and the “Okhoronka”.

The purpose and objectives of the Society are set out in paragraphs 1–3 of the Statute. According to them, the purpose of the Society is to supply poor Jewish children of local folk, special and other schools with clothing, footwear and teaching aids. In addition, the Society aimed to maintain the “Okhoronka” (orphanage) combined with the “Zakhoronka” – a kindergarten that operated on the Froebel system. Revenues for these purposes were supposed to be formed from four sources: a) contributions and donations of members of the Society; b) donations from third parties; c) income from various performances, concerts, parties, which were supposed to be organized to raise funds; d) donations and funds recorded under wills (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, p. 2). The amount of membership fees was outlined in paragraph 3 of the Statute. The members of the Society had to pay 4 Austrian crowns a year. To maintain the “Okhoronka”, the formation of a “Jubilee Fund” was initiated, to which ordinary members of the Society had to pay at least 12 crowns, active members – 24 crowns, founding members of the Society – 50 crowns, and protectors – 100 crowns annually (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, pp. 2–2v).

The main tasks, rights and responsibilities of members of the Society are outlined in paragraphs 3–6. The Statute, in fact, introduced three categories of members of the Society: ordinary, protectors and honorary members. It is true that the founding members of the Society were mentioned twice in the Statute, but the document did not single out their rights and privileges, so it is inexpedient to classify them as a separate category of members.

A regular member of the Society could be any person who, upon joining the organization, would pay annual membership fees (the entire amount at once or in quarterly installments). Persons who distinguished themselves by their activities for the development of the Society could receive the title and rights of protectors. An honorary member could be someone who would make a significant monetary or material donation for the benefit of the Society. Ordinary members were admitted to the “Vydil” Society (government, board), and protectors and honorary members were appointed by the General Meeting of the Society. Withdrawal from the Society became possible in two cases: 1) subject to the submission of an application and payment of a six-month quota of membership fees (2 crowns), starting from the date of withdrawal; 2) subject to relocation from Kolomyia. The same members who owed membership dues for the year were automatically expelled from the Society, but were not released from the obligation to pay dues (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, p. 2v). All members had equal rights to participate in the activities of the Society, but with some restrictions: only those members of the Society who paid for the needs of the orphanage at least 12 crowns per year had the right to vote in “Okhoronka” cases (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, p. 2v). Therefore, the Society had a certain “material qualification” for the full rights of members of this organization.

The rights of the members of the Society were also affected by paragraph 28 of the Statute, which regulated the settlement of disputes between members. Certainly, there were disputes concerning the Society. The statute provided for the formation of an “amicable court” consisting of members of the society who were not related to the parties to the case. Each side elected one judge, and they, in turn, elected a third one. All three judges elected a Chairman from among themselves. The Statute forbade appeals against the verdict of the “amicable court”. At the same time, it provided for the possibility of forming a court from persons who were not members of the Society, provided that the “amicable court” could not pass a verdict within 30 days (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, p. 5).

Structural-organizational and managerial aspects of activity of the Society and “Okhoronka” were regulated by paragraphs 7–29 of the Statute. The highest governing body of the Society was considered to be the “Vydil” (government, board). The current affairs were handled by the so-called “Directorate”, which was an integral part of the “Vydil”. Members of the society were elected to the “Vydil” regardless of gender, and a special quota was introduced for women – at least 14 members were to be members of the board. The “Vydil” consisted of 24 members and 6 deputies, who were elected annually by the General Meeting. In addition to these 30 people, the board included rabbis of Kolomyia and teachers of the Jewish religion (the “religion of Moses”) who worked in the city’s schools (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, pp. 2v–3). The latter, by the way, may not have been members of the Society. Therefore, the Statute set a precedent for the introduction into the governing body of the Society of persons who, in fact, had no obligations to this organization. However, in paragraph 9 of the Statute it was fixed a rule according to which the “Vydil” could work without a rabbi and teachers of religion, if the latter did not want to join it (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, p. 3).

The procedure for electing the “Vydil” was two-stage: the General Assembly elected 12 members (of whom at least 2 were women) and 3 deputies. Later, the members of the Society, who contributed significant funds to the “Jubilee Fund” of the “Okhoronka” elected a special “Vydil of Okhoronka” (12 members and 3 deputies – all women), which was a full member of the “Vydil” of the Society (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, p. 3). Thus, the main

management body of the Society automatically gained control over the management of the “Okhoronka”. The “Vydil” decided all cases concerning the Society, except for those that belonged to the competence of the General Meeting.

The members of the “Vydil” elected a chairman, a deputy and a treasurer, four shafars (collectors of material values) and a secretary from among their members. All these officials formed the so-called “Directorate”, which was considered the executive body. Similarly, the “Vydil of Okhoronka” elected a chairman, a treasurer, a secretary, and four shafars, who together constituted the “Directorate of Okhoronka”. In cases that required immediate resolution, the “Directorate” could act independently, but at the next meeting of the “Vydil” it was obliged to justify its decisions and measures (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, p. 3). Paragraphs 12–15 governed the responsibilities of the Directorate members. The Chairman represented the Society in foreign relations, chaired the meetings of the General Meeting, the “Vydil”, the “Directorate”, headed the administration, signed the assignments, and monitored the decisions implementation of the management bodies of the Society. In the absence of the Chairman, his powers were exercised by his deputy. The Chairman of the “Vydil of Okhoronka” had similar powers, but she did not have a deputy. The responsibilities of the treasurer were to control the funds of the Society, to ensure cash payments for the appropriations signed by the Chairman, and to draw up a financial report at the end of the year. The shafars kept non-monetary donations (“naturalia”), purchased the necessary clothes and other items, and distributed them in accordance with the decisions of the “Vydil” (or “Directorate”). The secretary wrote the minutes of the meetings of the General Meeting, the “Vydil” and the “Directorate”, kept correspondence, the list of members of the Society, prepared the agenda for the meetings, kept the documentation of the Society in order. The powers of the treasurer, shafars and secretary of the “Vydil of Okhoronka” were similar (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, pp. 3–3v).

Meetings of the “Vydil” and the “Directorate” were supposed to be convened if necessary at the request of the Chairman (or his deputy). During the meetings, in accordance with the Statute, the founding members and protectors of the Society had the same voice as ordinary members. The presence of the Chairman (or his deputy) and six members of this body was necessary for the validity of the decisions of the “Vydil”. Instead, the validity of the decisions of the “Directorate” was conditioned by the presence of the Chairman (or his deputy) and two of its members. Decisions in both bodies were made by a majority vote of the members present at the meeting. In case of an equal distribution of votes, the draft decision advocated by the Chairman was adopted. All source documentation, especially letters, had the right to be signed by the Chairman and the secretary of the Society, but the documentary obligations to third parties were signed by the Chairman (or his deputy), the secretary and one member of the “Vydil”. Similar rules applied to the “Vydil of Okhoronka” (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, pp. 3v–4).

The following paragraphs of the Statute (paras. 19–27) regulated the procedure for convening, holding meetings of the General Meeting of the Society, defined its powers. The General Meeting was convened through announcements in local periodicals or by sending personal messages. Meetings were divided into ordinary (regular) and extraordinary. The regular meeting of the Meeting was to take place in December each year. Instead, an extraordinary meeting could be convened by the “Vydil” or 20 members of the Society. The day of the General Meeting and the agenda should have been announced at least eight days before (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, p. 4). The powers of the General Meeting included:

analysis of the activities of the “Vydil” for the last administrative year; approval of the report on the financial activities of the Society; election of two auditors to clarify the state of finances; approval of the Society’s budget for the next administrative year; determination of the direction of the Society’s activity; election of chairmen (and their deputies) and members of the “Vydil” and the “Vydil of Okhoronka”; election of protectors and honorary members; consideration of proposals of members listed on the agenda; consideration of complaints against the “Vydil”; making changes to the Statute; decision-making on the dissolution of the Society. The subjects of consideration of the General Meeting could be only those issues that were submitted to the “Vydil” in writing no later than 14 days before the meeting. A draft amendment to the Statute could be included in the agenda only with the support of 20 members. Only those issues for which it was convened could be considered at an extraordinary meeting of the General Meeting. The General Meeting could make decisions only if at least 50% of the members of the Society who lived in Kolomyia were present at the meeting. In case of equal distribution of votes on a certain issue, the decision was considered not adopted. The issue of dissolving the Society could be approved by at least 2/3 of the members. The statute also provided for the convening of a regular meeting of the General Meeting, if at the current meeting the members of the Society could not resolve a particular issue (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, pp. 4–4v).

The last paragraph of the Statute was traditional for this type of legal documents and provided for the conditions of dissolution of the Society. At the last meeting of the General Meeting it was necessary to decide on the fate of the Society’s property. If, for some reason, such a decision could not be adopted, the Statute provided for the transfer of the Society’s property to the Jewish kagal of Kolomyia as a fund to help the poor (CSHAUL, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, p. 5).

In general, the Statute of the Society did not always consistently define the powers of members. On the one hand, all members of the public organization had equal rights; on the other hand, the largest donors received additional rights to address issues of the “Okhoronka”. Mentions of the “founding members” or “founders” of the Society were also incomprehensible. On the one hand, the Statute respectfully mentioned this group; on the other hand, it did not have any defining rights regarding the Society. In addition, the norms outlining the formation of the “Vydil” seem to be somewhat contradictory. In our opinion, it was not entirely logical to include the “Vydil of Okhoronka” in its entirety in the “Vydil”. The Statute did not address the issue of legal relations between the Chairman of the “Vydil” and the Chairman of the “Vydil of Okhoronka”. The latter, apparently, was only an ordinary member of the “Vydil”, although it could count on the status of Deputy Chairman of the “Vydil”. A significant drawback of the Statute is the lack of declaration of tasks in relation to the purpose and content of the upbringing of Jewish children in the “Okhoronka”. It is known that children’s shelters were also educational institutions that ensured the formation of certain (often moral, religious and national) values in children. However, the drafters of the Statute bypassed this issue in silence.

The Conclusions. Thus, the Statute of the Society for the Care of Poor Jewish Children, which was formed in Kolomyia in 1908, is supposed to have been concluded by the Jewish lawyer H. Landau. After approval by the Governor, the Society published its Statute, which consisted of 29 articles. This document is known to researchers, but has never been published or analyzed as a historical and legal source. It is stored in the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv. The Statute had a bifunctional purpose, as it regulated the activities of the

Society and the “Okhoronka” formed by it. Articles of the Statute can be divided into three groups: 1) the purpose and material principles of the Society and the “Okhoronka”; 2) tasks, rights and responsibilities of the members of the Society and the “Okhoronka”; 3) structural-organizational and managerial aspects of activity of the Society and the “Okhoronka”. We consider the Statute to be an important historical source for the history of Jewish public organizations of charitable orientation in Eastern Galicia, the history of Kolomyia in the early 20th century, as well as the history of domestic legal thought. The document is published in the original language (Polish) in compliance with the necessary archaeological requirements.

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The document

STATUT
“Towarzystwa opieki nad ubogimi dziećmi żydowskimi”
wraz z “Ochronką Jubileuszową”
w KOŁOMYI

§ 1.

Towarzystwo opieki nad ubogimi dziećmi żydowskimi z siedzibą w Kołomyi ma na celu:

- a) zaopatrywanie żydowskich ubogich dzieci miejscowych szkół ludowych, wydziałowych i innych w odzież, obuwie i przybory naukowe;
- b) utrzymywanie ochronki połączonej z ogródkiem froeblovskim dla dzieci poniżej wieku szkolnego.

§ 2.

Środków do tego dostarczają:

- a) wkładki i świadczenia członków;
- b) datki osób trzecich;
- c) dochody z urządzonych na ten cel zabaw towarzyskich, przedstawień, koncertów i t. p.;
- d) darowizny i zapisy.

§ 3.

Członkiem czynnym może być każda osoba, która przystąpiwszy do towarzystwa, zobowiąże się do rocznego datku najmniej w kwocie lub wartości 4 Kor. z góry, lub w ratach kwartalnych.

Celem utworzenia oddzielnego funduszu jubileuszowego na utrzymanie ochronki, opłacają oddzielnie członkowie czynni, którzy wyraźnie gotowość poparcia tej fundacji oświadczą, a to zwyczajni najmniej 12 K. rocznie, czynni wspierający najmniej 24 K. rocznie, założyciele najmniej 50 K. rocznie, protektorowie najmniej 100 K. rocznie.

W sprawach tej ochronki jubileuszowej, mają prawo przemawiać i głosować na zgromadzeniach i posiedzeniach jedynie członkowie, którzy dla specjalnych celów tej ochronki najmniej kwotą 12 K. rocznie się przyczyniają. – W sprawach ogólnych opieki mają prawo przemawiać i głosować na zgromadzeniach i posiedzeniach członkowie wkładki 4 Kor. rocznie uiszczający.

§ 4.

Osoby, które nadzwyczajną swą działalnością, lub hojnością do rozwoju i wzrostu towarzystwa się przyczynią, utrzymują tytuł i prawa protektorów. – Członkiem honorowym może być każdy kto znacniejszym datkiem do zasilenia zasobów towarzystwa się przyczyni.

§ 5.

Członków przyjmuje Wydział, członków honorowych i protektorów mianuje walne zgromadzenie na wniosek wydziału.

§ 6.

Wystąpienie z towarzystwa jest możliwe:

a) w razie wypowiedzenia atoli za złożeniem wkładki na pół roku z góry od dnia wystąpienia licząc;

b) z powodu przesiedlenia się z Kołomyi. – Kto do roku bez usprawiedliwienia zaległych wkładek nie uiszczy, będzie wykreślony z listy członków, co jednak nie uwalnia go od obowiązku uiszczenia zaległości.

§ 7.

Sprawami towarzystwa kieruje wydział, a w jego zastępstwie dyrekcja. – Sprawami ochronki kieruje specjalny wydział ochronkowy w tym celu wybrany.

§ 8.

Do wydziału wybrani być mogą tylko członkowie towarzystwa a to bez względu na płeć, atoli najmniej 14 członków musi być z liczby członkiń, o ile wystarczy liczba kobiet do towarzystwa należących.

§ 9.

Wydział składa się z 24 członków i 6 zastępców, których rokrocznie wybiera walne zgromadzenie, oraz rabina miejskiego i nauczycieli religii wyznania mojżeszowego przy szkołach publicznych w Kołomyi, którzy wchodzi w skład wydziału bez wyboru. Gdyby ostatni, to jest rabin i nauczyciele religii mojżeszowej do wydziału należeć nie chcieli, natenczas wydział bez nich funkcjonować będzie.

Wybór odbywa się w ten sposób, że najpierw ogół wybiera 12 członków (z tych najmniej 2 panie) i 3 zastępców, następnie członkowie którzy popierają fundusz ochronki jubileuszowej, wybierają specjalny wydział ochronkowy z 12 członków i 3 zastępców wyłącznie panie (o ile liczba ich wystarczy; w razie niewystarczania co do brakującej reszty panów).

§ 10.

Do zakresu działania wydziału należą wszystkie sprawy z wyjątkiem tych które walnemu zgromadzeniu są przekazane.

Sprawy dotyczące się wyłącznie ochronki jubileuszowej należą oddzielnie wyłącznej do kompetencji specjalnego wydziału ochronkowego.

§ 11.

Wydział wybiera ze swego ogólnego grona przewodniczącego, zastępcę przewodniczącego i skarbnika, 4 szafarzy i 1 sekretarza, którzy wraz z przewodniczącym tworzą dyrekcję będącą organem wykonawczym. – Specjalny wydział ochronki jubileuszowej wybiera przewodniczącą, oddzielną skarbniczkę, sekretarkę i 4 szafarki, które razem stanowią dyrekcję ochronki jubileuszowej.

W wypadkach niecierpiących zwłoki wstępuje dyrekcja w atrybucje wydziału, winna atoli swoje zarządzenia na najbliższym posiedzeniu wydziału usprawiedliwić.

§ 12.

Przewodniczący zastępuje towarzystwo na zewnątrz, przewodniczy walnym zgromadzeniom, posiedzeniu wydziału i dyrekcji, kieruje administracją, podpisuje asygnaty, czuwa nad wykonaniem uchwał walnego zgromadzenia, wydziału i dyrekcji.

W razie nieobecności lub przeszkody te same prawa przysługują zastępcy przewodniczącego. – Posiedzeniami specjalnego wydziału ochronkowego kieruje tegoż przewodnicząca, ona kieruje administracją, podpisuje asygnaty, czuwa nad wykonaniem uchwał walnego zgromadzenia, wydziału i dyrekcji.

§ 13.

Skarbnik przechowuje fundusze towarzystwa i wkładki pieniężne, uskutecznia uchwalone wypłaty za asygnatą przewodniczącego, układa z końcem roku bilans i preliminarz; analogiczne obowiązki ciąży na skarbniczce specjalnego wydziału ochronkowego.

§ 14.

Szafarzy przechowują datki w naturaliach, zakupują potrzebną odzież i inne przedmioty i rozdzielają je stosownie do uchwał wydziału, względnie dyrekcji za asygnatą przewodniczącego; analogiczne obowiązki ciąży na szafarzach specjalnego wydziału ochronkowego.

§ 15.

Sekretarz spisuje protokoły walnych zgromadzeń i posiedzeń wydziału i dyrekcji, załatwia wskazane mu korespondencje, utrzymuje spis członków, przygotowuje porządek dzienny dla posiedzeń wydziału, dyrekcji i dla walnych zgromadzeń oraz utrzymuje w porządku akta; analogiczne obowiązki ciąży na sekretarce specjalnego wydziału ochronkowego.

§ 16.

Posiedzenia wydziału i dyrekcji odbywają się w miarę potrzeby na wezwanie przewodniczącego, względnie tegoż zastępcy, względnie przewodniczącej specjalnego wydziału ochronkowego.

W obradach wydziału mają założyciele i protektorowie głos równy jak członek wybrany i będą zawiadomieni o każdym posiedzeniu.

Założyciele i protektorowie zamiejscowi winni wskazać osobę w Kołomyi zamieszkałą, której to zawiadomienie ma być doręczone.

§ 17.

Do prawomocności uchwał wydziału ogólnego lub specjalnego wydziału ochronkowego potrzebną jest obecność przewodniczącego, względnie tegoż zastępcy i przynajmniej 6 wydziałowych.

Do prawomocności uchwał dyrekcji konieczną jest obecność przewodniczącego lub zastępcy jego i dwóch jej członków.

W obu ciałach zapadają uchwały większością głosów.

W razie równości głosów staje się uchwałą to zdanie za którym się oświadczył przewodniczący.

§ 18.

Do ważności zobowiązań w obec osób trzecich potrzeba podpisu przewodniczącego, względnie tegoż zastępcy, jednego członka wydziału i sekretarza względnie przewodniczącej, skarbniczki i sekretarki specjalnego wydziału ochronkowego odnośnie do spraw ochronki. – Inne pisma wychodzące z Towarzystwa podpisuje przewodniczący i sekretarz, względnie przewodnicząca i sekretarka wydziału ochronkowego odnośnie do spraw ochronki.

§ 19.

Obwieszczenia będą ogłaszane plakatami w miejscowych pismach peryodycznych lub też w drodze zawiadomienia osobistego.

§ 20.

Zwyczajne walne zgromadzenie odbędzie się w grudniu każdego roku; wydział ogólny może atoli zwołać także zgromadzenie nadzwyczajne, które także na pisemne, cel i powody wskazujące żądanie 20 członków zwołane być musi.

§ 21.

Dzień walnego zgromadzenia i porządek dzienny ogłosi wydział ogólny na 8 dni naprzód w sposób właściwy.

§ 22.

Walne zgromadzenie załatwia następujące sprawy:

- a) bada czynności wydziału za ubiegły rok administracyjny;
- b) załatwia rachunki z administracji funduszków towarzystwa po wysłuchaniu opinii rewidentów rachunkowych i udziela absolutorium wydziałowi;
- c) wybiera dwóch rewidentów do zbadania przyszłych rachunków;
- d) uchwała preliminarz na następny rok administracyjny;
- e) wskazuje wydziałowi kierunek i sposób działania, wybiera przewodniczących, wydziałowych i zastępców;
- f) mianuje protektorów i członków honorowych;
- g) załatwia wnioski członków na porządku dziennym będące;
- h) rostrzyga zażalenia przeciw wydziałowi wniesione;
- i) zmienia statut;
- k) orzeka o rozwiązaniu towarzystwa.

§ 23.

Przedmiotem obrad walnego zgromadzenia mogą być tylko te wnioski, które najpóźniej 14 dni przed zgromadzeniem do wydziału pisemnie zgłoszone zostały, a jeżeli dotyczą zmiany statutu, przez 20 członków są poparte.

§ 24.

Nadzwyczajne walne zgromadzenie załatwia tylko te czynności dla których zwołane zostało.

§ 25.

Do powzięcia uchwały na walnym zgromadzeniu potrzeba obecności najmniej 1/2 części członków.

Przy obliczaniu służy za podstawę liczba członków w Kołomyi zamieszkałych. – Do prawomocności uchwały postanawiającej rozwiązanie towarzystwa potrzebną jest obecność 2/3 części członków.

§ 26.

Gdyby walne zgromadzenie dla kompletu do skutku nie przyszło, odbędzie się następujące zgromadzenie, które bez względu na ilość obecnych członków o wszystkich sprawach z wyjątkiem sprawy rozwiązania towarzystwa decydować może. To drugie walne zgromadzenie może także być zapowiedziane na ten sam dzień o późniejszej godzinie.

§ 27.

Na walnym zgromadzeniu zapadają uchwały większością głosów członków obecnych. W razie równości głosów uchwała upada.

Do uchwalenia jednak rozwiązania towarzystwa potrzeba przyzwolenia 2/3 części członków obecnych.

§ 28.

Spory wyniknąć mogące ze stosunków stowarzyszenia między członkami, oraz między członkami a stowarzyszeniem, względnie tegoż organami rozstrzyga sąd polubowny złożony z członków towarzystwa niewiązany żadnymi przepisami co do sposobu rozpoznania sprawy. Każda strona wybiera jednego sędziego, ci zaś trzeciego, a wszyscy trzej między siebie przewodniczącego.

Przeciw wyrokowi sądu polubownego nie ma odwołania. Gdyby strony sędziów nie wybrały, lub wybrani sędziowie do 30 dni wyroku nie wydali, rozstrzygają rzecz sędziowie przez wydział z poza jego grona wybrani, którzy, jeżeli rozchodzi się o spór pomiędzy członkami a towarzystwem, z poza grona członków towarzystwa powołani być muszą.

§ 29.

W razie rozwiązania towarzystwa, uchwali ostatnie walne zgromadzenie, na jaki cel majątek towarzystwa ma być użyty.

Wola fundatorów co do pojedynczych części majątku towarzystwu danego nie może być zmieniona.

Gdyby uchwała w tym względzie z jakichkolwiek przyczyn nie zapadła, lub gdyby towarzystwo faktycznie istnieć i działać przestało, wówczas pozostały majątek przechodzi w zarząd Zboru izraelskiego w Kołomyi jako fundusz dla wsparcia ubogich.

The historical source: Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Lviv, f. 178, d. 1, c. 5942, pp. 1–5.

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THE DOWNFALL OF THE RUSSIAN AND THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRES, BOLSHEVISM, THE MONARCHIST COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND THE FORMATION OF NEW SYSTEMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, 1918 – 1920

Abstract. *The aim of this article is to analyze the processes of the revolutionary disintegration of the Empires and the emergence of Bolshevism and the monarchist counter-revolution in the former Russian Empire and Austro-Hungary, as the historical phenomena. The research methodology is based on Leopold von Ranke's and John Tosh's principles of historical study, Pitirim Sorokin's and Oskar Jaszi's revolution theories, Max Weber's theory of state power, as well as theories of international relations, etc. The scientific novelty of this article is the analysis of the phenomena of Bolshevism and the monarchist counter-revolution against the background of the dissolution of the Empires and change of the international order after the First World War. The Conclusions.* The monarchist counter-revolution in Central and Eastern Europe emerged in Russia, Finland, and Hungary as a response to Bolshevism. The factors of the emergence of the monarchist counter-revolution were the following: the existence of strong monarchist traditions in the societies, the presence of the charismatic political and military leaders with monarchist views, and international military support (intervention) from the neighboring monarchies (the German Empire, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Kingdom of Romania). The peak of the monarchist counter-revolution in the former Russian Empire took place during the Brest-Litovsk system of international relations, where Germany played the dominant role. Consequently, the defeat of Germany in the First World War automatically led to the collapse of the Brest-Litovsk system and the monarchist counter-revolution in Russia. Although, the monarchist counter-revolution won in Hungary due to the Romanian intervention but the Kingdom of Hungary remained without a king because of the Allies' pressure. So the monarchist Brest-Litovsk system was replaced by the republican Versailles systems (in Eastern European case – Tartu-Riga system).

Key words: the Downfall of the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchies, the Dissolution of the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian Empires, Bolshevism, the Russian and the Hungarian Soviet Republics, the Monarchist counter-revolution in Central and Eastern Europe, The Kingdom of Finland, Regent Baron Karl Gustaf Mannerheim, the Kingdom of Hungary, Regent Miklós Horthy, the Ukrainian State, Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, the Almighty Don Host, Ataman Petr Krasnov, the Brest-Litovsk and the Versailles Systems of International Relations.

**ПАДІННЯ РОСІЙСЬКОЇ ТА АВСТРО-УГОРСЬКОЇ ІМПЕРІЙ,
БІЛЬШОВИЗМ, МОНАРХІЧНА КОНТРРЕВОЛЮЦІЯ
ТА ФОРМУВАННЯ НОВИХ СИСТЕМ МІЖНАРОДНИХ ВІДНОСИН
У ЦЕНТРАЛЬНІЙ ТА СХІДНІЙ ЄВРОПІ (1918 – 1920 рр.)**

***Анотація. Мета дослідження** – аналіз процесів революційного розпаду Імперій та виникнення більшовизму і монархічної контрреволюції як історичних феноменів в колишній Російській імперії та Австро-Угорщині. **Методологія дослідження** базується на принципах історичного аналізу Леопольда фон Ранке та Джона Тоша, теоріях революції Путирима Сорокіна та Оскара Яси, теорії державної влади Макса Вебера, а також теоріях міжнародних відносин тощо. **Наукова новизна** полягає у вивченні феноменів більшовизму та монархічної контрреволюції на тлі розпаду імперій та зміни міжнародного порядку після Першої світової війни. **Висновки.** Монархічна контрреволюція в Центральній та Східній Європі виникла в колишній Росії, Фінляндії та Угорщині як відповідь на більшовизм. Факторами виникнення монархічної контрреволюції були наступні: наявність міцних монархічних традицій у успільствах, наявність харизматичних політичних та військових лідерів з монархістськими поглядами та міжнародна військова підтримка (інтервенція) з боку сусідніх монархій (Німецька імперія, Королівство Швеція, Королівство Румунія). Пік монархічної контрреволюції в колишній Російській імперії спостерігався під час Брестсько-Литовської системи міжнародних відносин, де Німеччина відіграла панівну роль. Отже, поразка Німеччини у Першій світовій війні автоматично призвела до краху Брестсько-Литовської системи та монархічної контрреволюції в Росії. Водночас монархічна контрреволюція перемогла в Угорщині завдяки румунській інтервенції, проте Королівство Угорщина залишилося без короля через тиск з боку Союзників, що не бажали реставрації Габсбургів. Так, монархічну Брест-Литовську систему було замінено республіканською Версальською системою (у Східноєвропейському випадку – Тарту-Ризькою).*

***Ключові слова:** Падіння Російської та Австро-Угорської монархій, розпад Російської та Австро-Угорської імперій, Більшовизм, Російська та Угорська радянські республіки, Монархічна контрреволюція у Центральній та Східній Європі, Королівство Фінляндія, регент барон Карл Густав Маннергейм, Королівство Угорщина, регент Міклош Горті, Українська Держава, гетьман Павло Скоропадський, Всевелике Військо Донське, отаман Петро Краснов, Брест-Литовська та Версальська системи міжнародних відносин.*

The Problem Statement. The period of 1917 – 1920 in Central and Eastern Europe was characterized by a series of events and controversial processes, such as the revolutionary collapse of the Russian Empire and Austro-Hungary and the formation of the new nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe, the emergence of Bolshevism as a new challenge to the international relations, and the monarchist counter-revolution as a response to Bolshevism. All the above-mentioned processes occurred against the background of the final stage of the First World War and the establishment of the new world order.

It is only natural that as a result of the downfall of the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian Empires, the dynastic statehood was substituted by the nation-state, whereas, in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, Bolshevism suddenly emerged, as a new historical phenomenon, and tried to replace the nation-state by Soviet class state, i.e., the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat. In the new states of Central and Eastern Europe, the only national counter-revolution under effective international support could stop the enlargement of Bolshevism. In this regard, the monarchist counter-revolution was more effective in societies with monarchical traditions (Finland, Hungary). However, we should take into account the international circumstances and influence of the Great Powers on the newly independent states. For instance, if Germany during the Brest-Litovsk system of international relations supported the monarchical form of government in new states, then the Allies during the

Versailles system, on the contrary, preferred to establish the republican regimes in Central and Eastern Europe.

The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches. First attempts to explain the origin and the trends of the revolution were made by Pitirim Sorokin (Sorokin, 1925) and Pavel Milyukov (Milyukov, 1927) in Russia, and by Oszkár Jászi (Jászi, 1924) in Hungary. In both countries, the peak of the revolution was related to the Bolsheviks coups and the establishment of the so-called Soviet power.

The Bolshevik revolution strived for expansion beyond the geographical boundaries of the nation to rebuild the world as a whole. It should be noted that the successful Bolshevik coups took place in Russia (November 7, 1917), Finland (January 27, 1918), Hungary (March 1, 1919) and Bavaria (April 7, 1919), and also Soviet power was established by the invasion in the following states: Ukraine (several times in 1918, 1919, 1920), Don (1918 and 1920), Latvia and Slovakia (for a short time in 1919). In this regard, the Bolsheviks even invented the concept of the so-called “export-revolution”. The Bolsheviks’ main goal was to destroy all nation-states and create the World Soviet Republic through the “export of revolution” or “triumphal march of Soviet power”. Thus, Soviet Russia became the base for the World revolution. The first analysis of Bolshevism as an international danger was conducted by Pavel Milyukov (Milyukov, 1920).

The counter-revolution process was analyzed by Nikolai Golovin (Golovin, 2011), Arsenyi Zajcov (Zajcov, 2006), Ernest von Wahl (von Wahl, 1936; von Wahl, 1937), Pavel Milyukov (Milyukov, 1927), Sergey Melgunov (Melgunov, 1929), Oskár Jászi (Jászi, 1924).

The very term *Monarchist counter-revolution* was invented by Leon Trotsky, and, initially, it had a pejorative meaning concerning some Russian Whites (Admiral Alexander Kolchak, General Nikolai Yudenich, General Eugene Miller) (Trotsky, 2015, p. 68). However, historians use this term to define a specific part of the White movement, which was eager to restore the monarchy (Ioffe, 1977; Zimina, 1989). Furthermore, Valentina Zimina and Yuri Grazhdanov used the term “*Germanophilic Monarchist Counter-revolution*” to define the restoration regimes in the Ukrainian State, the Almighty Don Host, the Crimea, the Baltic Duchy in 1918 (Zimina, 1989; Grazhdanov, & Zimina, 1997). Indeed, there were two types of the Russian monarchist movement of 1918 after the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty: the Germanophilic which tried to restore the monarchy in Russia through the German political and military support (for example, General Peter Krasnov, Prince Anatol von Liven, Duke Nicolas von Leuchtenberg, etc.) and the Ententophilic which relied on the Allies (for example, Generals Eugene Miller and Nikolai Yudenich, Admiral Alexander Kolchak, etc.).

The Publication’s Purpose. This article focuses on thinking afresh about the dissolution of the Empires and revolution-counter-revolution process and Anti-Bolshevik struggle in Central and Eastern Europe, or more precisely, in Russia, Finland, Ukraine, Don, Hungary, under the circumstances of the transformation of international relations from the Brest-Litovsk to the Versailles system (1917 – 1920).

Statement of the Basic Material. World War I became a final factor in the collapse of dynastic statehood in Central and Eastern Europe, videlicet, the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian Empires. In both cases, the abdication of the Emperor led to the disintegration of the Empire according to the principle of national self-determination: the nation became an object of loyalty and sovereignty instead of the throne (Malahov, 2005, pp. 30–37; von Wahl, 1937, pp. 8–9). For the nations, the abdication of the emperor automatically meant an exemption from the oath of allegiance to the throne (Zajcov, 2006, pp. 13, 34; von Wahl,

1937, p. 11). Generally, during 1918 – 1919 the collapse of both the above-mentioned Empires led to the formation of 33 new states on the territory of the former Russian Empire (January 1918) (Pipes, 1991, pp. 514–515) and 12 of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy (November 1918). Furthermore, some parts of the territory of the former Empires were retroceded to the neighboring kingdoms such as Romania, Serbia, and Italy.

The disintegration of the Russian Empire (from 1 September 1917 – the Republic) de facto was realized by the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, issued by the Council of People's Commissars on 2(15) November 1917, i.e. by the new central government and took place after the abdication of the Emperor on 2(15) March 1917 and before the Armistice in Brest-Litovsk on 15 December 1917. In Austro-Hungary, on the contrary, the dissolution of the Empire occurred on 28–31 October 1918 (De Daruvar, 1974, pp. 67–68), i.e., before the abdication of the Emperor on 11 November 1918 and the Armistices (Padua on 3 November 1918 and Belgrade on 13 November 1918). The disintegration of the Empires was anchored in international law: the Russian – the Brest-Litovsk Treaty on 3 March 1918, and the Austro-Hungarian – the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye on 10 September 1919 and the Trianon Treaty on 4 June 1920.

Indeed, coming to power in Russia on 7 November 1917, and in Hungary on 21 March 1919, the Bolsheviks proclaimed the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., they attempted to establish a class-state instead of the nation-state. More precisely, according to the Bolsheviks' doctrine, the working class should become an object of loyalty instead of the nation. In Vladimir Lenin's opinion, unconditional self-determination should be only the right of the proletariat (Pipes, 1997, pp. 42–43, 45), because the concept of nation is related to capitalism, consequently, a nation should disappear in socialism. Another clear example of the Bolshevik's approach toward the national self-determination issue was demonstrated by Christian Rakovsky during the Russian-Ukrainian Peace Conference in Kiev (May-August 1918). He stressed that the Russian Federative Soviet Republic was founded on the base of self-determination of Worker's Soviets (councils), not by nations. Thus, Soviet Russia recognized the right of self-determination only for the working class, therefore the territory of the Soviet Russian Republic could be spread wherever the Soviet power was established (Lupandin (Ed.), 1999, pp. 19, 37–38, 44, 63–70, 296).

Thus, the Bolsheviks' main goal was to destroy all nation-states and create the World Soviet Republic (Milyukov, 1925, pp. 185–187; Şişcanu, 2010, pp. 146–147). However, at the first stage, they were forced to comply with national demands and formally recognize the self-determination of nations, but then, at the second stage, they planned to enlarge the Soviet rule to the neighboring “bourgeois” and “counter-revolutionary” states (Diner, 2008, pp. 66, 77–78) through the so-called “export of revolution”. So, Soviet Russia and Soviet Hungary became the main threat to the World order after the end of the Great War. For example, Finland and Romania were enunciated by Leon Trotsky and Vladimir Lenin as “the territories of the Russian revolution” (Gromyko & Hvosťov (Eds.), 1959, pp. 66–67; Lebedev (Ed.), 1971, pp. 17, 20), and the Russian troops encamped there were the so-called driving forces of Bolshevism's proliferation (Hitchins, 2011, p. 99; Svechnikov, 1923, pp. 39–40; Jussila, Hentila, & Nevakivi, 1995, p. 106; Lebedev (Ed.), 1971, pp. 13–14). As Maria, the Queen of Romania, noted: “*Bolshevism is the main threat at the present moment*” (Lebedev (Ed.), 1985, p. 190–191). A similar statement was made by Pehr Evind Svinhufvud, the head of the Finnish government in April 1918: “*The Finnish government considers Bolshevism as a threat not only to Finland but also to the whole world, therefore, it is inclined to oppose the Bolsheviks in Russia...*” (Holodovsky, 1975, p. 8).

Generally, the Bolsheviks' export of revolution amounted to the aggression against the neighboring states according to the classical scheme: undermining nation statehood from within by the so-called "Soviets" and "revolutionary committees" to make a coup d'état in the capital (for example, in Finland) or even in large provincial centers (in case of Ukraine, it was Kharkov), then "providing international military support" from Soviet Russia. For example, the so-called Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic was proclaimed on 27 January 1918, after the capture of Helsinki, by the Bolsheviks, who were reinforced by the Russian garrison and the Baltic Fleet. The power of the "Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic" was extended only to the southern regions of the country in which the Russian troops were deployed and existed only due to military aid from Soviet Russia.

The Commander-in-chief of the so-called Finnish Red Army (former lieutenant colonel of the Russian Imperial army) Mikhail Svechnikov remarked in his memoirs that the Finnish White Guard waged the war against the Russian 42nd Corps and the sailors of the Baltic Fleet, and the resistance of the Finnish Red Guard came to a naught after the Russian troops' withdrawal (Svechnikov, 1923, pp. 39–105, 107–108). Moreover, the Reds were compelled not only to repel attacks from the front, but also to suppress the insurrections in the rear, and the Finnish Red Guard was not adapted to this aim (Svechnikov, 1923, p. 111). At the same time, the Commander-in-chief of the Finnish White Army, Regent of the Kingdom of Finland, Baron Karl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim remarked: "*If we did not rise to the fight in 1918, Finland would at best become an autonomous region of the Soviet Union without any national freedom, any real statehood and we would not take stand among free nations*" (Mannerheim, 1999, p. 135). Indeed, the Bolsheviks planned to include Finland to "the federation of Soviet republics" (Jutikkala & Pirinen, 1974, p. 216).

In Central and Eastern Europe, the monarchist counter-revolution was brought about as a response to Bolshevism, primarily in Russia and Hungary. The factors of the emergence of the monarchist counter-revolution were as follows:

- Existence of the state's monarchical traditions, for example in Russia, Finland and Hungary;
- Presence of the charismatic political and military leaders with monarchical views: such as General Baron Karl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, General Peter Krasnov, General Pavlo Skoropadsky, Admiral Miklós Horthy. Some new states with republican forms of rule became the bases of the monarchist counter-revolution in Russia (for instance, the Ukrainian State, the Almighty Don Host, Estonian Republic);
- International support from other monarchies, conducted by interventionist forces, for example, the German and the Austro-Hungarian Imperial troops in the former Russian Empire in 1918, and the Romanian Royal troops in Hungary in 1919.

The main difference between the monarchist counter-revolution and the republican one was the desire to restore the pre-revolutionary order, while the republican counter-revolution sought to establish a new form of government employing the Constituent Assembly, which had to be elected on the principle of universal suffrage. For example, Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky and Ataman Peter Krasnov repealed all revolutionary laws, adopted not only by the Bolsheviks but also by the Provisional Government of Russia. They denied the very idea of the Constituent Assembly. In Finland, Svinhufvud's government went further by repealing not only revolutionary legislation but even the Constitution of 1809 and restoring the Constitution of 1772. At the same time, the Russian White government of Admiral Alexander Kolchak acted under the slogan of the election of the Constituent Assembly.

If the Bolsheviks usually seized power in capitals of the states, the monarchist counter-revolution used to emerge on the periphery, for example, Vaasa in Finland, Szeged in Hungary, Omsk in Russia.

In general, the monarchist counter-revolution in the new states of the former Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires should be classified by two types: *the classical or national royalism*, i.e. the desire to retain the monarchy by either restoring the existing dynasty or choosing a new one to legitimate the new nation-state, as clear examples, Hungary in 1920 and Finland in 1918 before Mannerheim's Regency, and *the "export-monarchism"*, i.e. the desire to overthrow Bolshevism and to restore the monarchy in a neighboring state, for example, Germany in 1918 and Finland during Mannerheim's regency in Russia. Even the republican states such as the Ukrainian State, the Almighty Don Host, Estonian Republic tried to restore the monarchy in Russia (Mannerheim, 1999, pp. 177–178; Meri, 1997, pp. 118–119, 124–126, 128; Krasnov, 1991, pp. 215–216, 218, 220–223; Skoropadsky, 1994, pp. 11, 13, 15, 17, 27–28, 105–106; Ahtamzjan, 1963, pp. 99–100, 125, 139, 159; Kirby, 1979, p. 56; Zajcov, 2006, pp. 130, 132, 140, 148; Kenez, 1971, pp. 135, 140, 144–147, 162, 219–220, 238–240, 272).

As history had shown, in Finland, Latvia, and Estonia, the monarchist counter-revolution dominated during the first stage of the struggle against Bolshevism (the Kingdom of Finland (9 August 1918 – 17 July 1919) and the Grand Duchy of Livonia or the Baltic Duchy (12 April – 28 November 1918)), which then lost to the republican forces. As a result, the republics were proclaimed: in Latvia by the Declaration of Independence on 18 November 1918, in Estonia by the reaffirmation of the Manifesto of Independence on 15 May 1919, and in Finland by the adoption of new Constitution on 17 July 1919.

However, as it turned out, the uncompromising position of the Russian White's government, especially Supreme Ruler Admiral Alexander Kolchak, on the issues of recognition of the new states' independence and the delimitation of new frontiers forced the Finnish and Estonian troops to call a halt to their offensive towards Petrograd (Nelidov (Ed.), 1929, pp. 87, 93, 97–98, 100, 113–114, 117, 119–121, 135, 137–140). Thus, the restoration of the old regime in Russia did not take place. Furthermore, Finland and Estonia consented to the Soviet peace proposal (Vlasov & Vlasova, 2005, pp. 138–139). As Colonel Ernest von Wahl noted, the Russian White Forces, who showed the imperial and the great power's views, lost the Civil War against Bolshevism because of their unwillingness to recognize the new political reality after the collapse of the Russian Empire (von Wahl, 1937, pp. 12, 41, 54, 56).

The victory of the counter-revolution and the transition to the regime of restoration in each country had some particularities. For instance, after the Reds were defeated in Finland the Sejm proclaimed the Kingdom of Finland according to the Constitution of 1772 on 18 August 1918 and elected Prince Friedrich-Karl von Hessen-Kassel as a King of Finland Fredrik Kaarle on 9 October 1918. However, as a result of the defeat of Germany and the pressure from the Entente Fredrik Kaarle was forced to abdicate on 12 December 1918. Thus, the Kingdom remained without a king until the new Sejm adopted the republican Constitution on 17 July 1919. During this period General Baron Karl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim functioned as a Regent of the Kingdom of Finland (Ahtamzjan, 1963, p. 101; Mannerheim, 1999, pp. 142–143, 145–147, 151; Jussila, Hentila, & Nevakivi, pp. 124–125; Puntila, 1975, pp. 112–113).

After Ukraine was liberated from the Bolsheviks by the German and the Austro-Hungarian troops General Skoropadsky's coup d'état was effected in Kiev on 29 April 1918. General Pavlo Skoropadsky was elected as the Hetman, and on that day Ukraine was titled

as the Ukrainian State instead of the Ukrainian People's Republic. The Hetman's foreign policy course was aimed towards the restoration of the monarchy in Russia. Especially it was demonstrated by the Manifesto on 15 November 1918.

During the peak of the Anti-Bolshevik war, the Don Krug (a quasi-parliament) elected General Peter Krasnov as the Ataman on 16 May 1918 and proclaimed the independence of Almighty Don Host on 18 May 1918 (Krasnov, 1991, pp. 191–198). Ataman Peter Krasnov continued the war against Bolshevism for the restoration of the monarchy in Russia.

Thus, restoration in Finland and Don was held by own forces. While, in Ukraine and Hungary, the counter-revolution was brought by bayonets of interventionist troops: the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians in Ukraine and the Romanians in Hungary.

It was the Entente pressure that forced two kingdoms (Finland and Hungary) to exist without their kings. In Finland, after the defeat of the German Empire in the First World War King Friedrich Karl abdicated on 12 December 1918 as a representative of the German (Hessen-Kassel) dynasty. On the same day, the Finnish parliament elected General baron Karl Gustaf Mannerheim, the Commander-in-chief of the Finnish National Army, as a Regent of the Kingdom of Finland (Mannerheim, 1999, pp. 142–143, 145–147, 151; Jussila, Hentila, & Nevakivi, 1999, pp. 124–125). The situation in Hungary was quite different: King Karl IV did not abdicate from the Hungarian throne, but he was faced with the strong opposition of the Entente to see any representative of the Habsburgs as the Hungarian legitimate sovereign (Ormos, 1990, pp. 334, 339, 343–344, 372). Finally, on 1 March 1920, the National Assembly elected Vice-Admiral Miklós Horthy, the Commander-in-chief of the Hungarian National Army, as a Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary (De Daruvar, 1974, p. 79; Horthy, 2000, pp. 130–131; Szilassy, 1971, p. 71).

It should be noted that the armed units of the Russian counter-revolution were formed on the territories of the above-mentioned states (the Kingdom of Finland, the Ukrainian State, the Almighty Don Host, the Baltic Dukedom (then the Estonian Republic)). However, in addition we should note another factor of the monarchist counter-revolution such as the interventionist power. For example, in the case of Russia and Ukraine, it was Germany, and, in the case of Hungary, Romania can be considered as such a power. Germany failed to restore the monarchy in Russia, while the restoration of the monarchy in Hungary took place due to the victory of the Romanian troops over the Hungarian Red army since the Hungarian Whites were very weak to operate effectively against the Reds (Bernad&Kliment, 2015, pp. 32, 34; Preda&Prodan, 2012, pp. 148, 156–157).

Generally, the defeat of the monarchist counter-revolution in Russia related to the defeat of Germany in the First World War. The Day November 11, 1918, Colonel Arseny Zaitsov called “the mourning day of the Russian counter-revolution”, since “the Armistice Day did not become the beginning of the world struggle against Bolshevism” (Zajcov, 2006, pp. 333–334). Pavel Milyukov also drew attention to the fact that the victory of the Entente did not allow to defeat the Reds (Milyukov, 1927, 16, 75). Such statements made sense because the pressure of the Allies led to King Friedrich Karl's abdication and to the downfall of two new states (the Ukrainian State and Almighty Don Host). The Allies also prevented Karol IV to return to his throne and Archduke Joseph Augustus to occupy the throne.

Thus, the culmination of the monarchist counter-revolution in Russia was during the Brest-Litovsk system of international relations, where the German Empire played a dominant role and tried to retain its influence in the Baltic-Black Sea region by the creation of new monarchies, ruled by the German dynasties: the Kingdom of Finland (King Friedrich Karl

von Hessen-Kassel), the Kingdom of Lithuania (King Wilhelm von Urach), the Baltic Duchy (Regent Adolf Friedrich Duke von Mecklenburg-Schwerin), and other buffer states between Germany and Soviet Russia under the German protectorate, such as the Ukrainian State, the Almighty Don Host. In contrast to Germany, the leading powers of the Entente, primarily France, Great Britain, and the United States, linked the recognition of the independence of the new states with the republican form of government, which, in turn, opposed the attempts of the restoration in Russia. For example, the Kingdom of Finland during the period of Karl Gustaf Mannerheim's regency before the proclamation of the republic had actively supported the Russian monarchical forces, but with the adoption of the new Constitution and proclamation of the republic, the country's policy in the "Russian question" changed: the government agreed to the proposal of Soviet Russia to conclude a peace treaty.

As a result of the defeat of Germany in World War I the Brest-Litovsk system in Central and Eastern Europe was replaced by the Versailles system (or the Riga-Tartu system in the case of Eastern Europe). There were several essential differences between these systems. Firstly, the Brest-Litovsk system was unipolar with one center of power – Germany, while the Versailles system was multipolar with France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, and the USA as leading powers, and is based on the concept of Cordon Sanitaire (with regional key powers such as Finland, Poland, and Romania) against two Soviet states: Russia and Hungary (Kisinger, 1997, pp. 216, 290). Secondly, the ideology of the Brest-Litovsk system was conservatism and monarchism, while the ideology of the Versailles system was liberal democracy and republicanism. Thirdly, Germany as the only center of power was forced to squander its military potential to provide security to the buffer-states, which were more likely objects than subjects of international relations. Consequently, the defeat of Germany during the First World War automatically led to the destabilization and the collapse of the Brest-Litovsk system and, as a result, the enlargement of Bolshevism, that is why it was necessary to establish Cordon Sanitaire. The Versailles system demonstrated the absence of one superpower, and it prompted France and Britain to reinforce the defensive potential of the States of Cordon Sanitaire by providing military and technical support, for instance, Britain – to Estonia and Latvia, and France – to Poland and Romania (Hiden, Made, & Smith (Eds.), 2008, p. 17). As a result, new regional centers of power appeared claiming the role of independent units of international relations: Finland and Romania became the flanks of Cordon Sanitaire (the so-called shields for the Scandinavia and the Balkans), Poland was a center (shield of Central Europe). Thus, Finland occupied the most important strategic position in the Baltic and had the military potential for the occupation of Petrograd and the restoration in Russia in 1918 – 1919 (Holodovsky, 1975, p. 4). Romania fought Bolshevism on two fronts and was the key state of Cordon Sanitaire (Torrey, 2011, pp. 255, 334; Macmillan, 2003, p. 128).

The Brest-Litovsk Peace Agreement did not lead to real peace and stability of international relations in Eastern Europe. The main threat to international security was Bolshevism. That is why, to eliminate this threat, Germany considered the possibility of restoration of the monarchy in Russia under the conditions of retaining of the Brest-Litovsk system. In so far as the Russian monarchist counter-revolution developed in the territories occupied by Germany and in the newly independent states, oriented towards Germany (the Kingdom of Finland, the Ukrainian State, and the Almighty Don Host), the defeat of Germany in the First World War automatically led to the collapse of the Russian monarchist counter-revolution and the renunciation of the German dynasties in Finland and Lithuania.

The conclusions.

1. The First World War did not only lead to the downfall of the dynastic states in Central and Eastern Europe such as the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian Empires but also to the emergence of Bolshevism as a new threat to World Order;

2. Russia and Hungary became the bases for Bolshevism enlargement;

3. The Monarchist counter-revolution emerged as a reply to Bolshevism and to restore the international order and security of new states;

4. One of the important factors of the Monarchist counter-revolution was an intervention from the neighbor monarchies, for example, Germany to Russia and Romania to Hungary;

5. The peak of the Monarchist counter-revolution in Russia took place during the Brest-Litovsk system with the dominant role of Germany;

6. After the defeat of Germany, the Brest-Litovsk system of international relations was replaced by the Versailles system. The Allies' support to the Russian Republican Whites, whose slogan was "Unified and Indivisible Russia", led to the collapse of the monarchist counter-revolution in Russia, and, as a result, to the survival of the Bolshevik regime. Moreover, some new states (the Ukrainian State and the Almighty Don Host) lost their independence and disappeared from the map of Europe. Under these conditions, new regional powers (Finland and Romania) became the flanks of Cordon Sanitaire;

7. If in Finland the counter-revolution won due to its forces, in Hungary, the counter-revolution was carried by Romanian intervention because of the weakness of the Hungarian Whites.

8. The restored monarchies of Finland and Hungary existed without their kings because of the pressure from the Allies.

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THE POST-GREAT WAR SETTLEMENT OF 1919 AND UKRAINE

Abstract. *The aim of the research is to answer the question why the Ukrainian national state did not obtain the international support and assistance after the Great War, though a national self-determination was one of the guiding principles of the new international settlement. The research methodology is based on the global history approach and a study of primary sources, such as the documents of Paris Peace Conference, a diplomatic correspondence, and the works of the participants and contemporaries of the Conference. The scientific novelty of the article consists in developing and upgrading the previous conclusion concerning the Great Power's position on Ukraine in 1919, based on a set of new available primary sources and the global history approach. The research puts discussions and decisions of Paris Peace Conference on Ukraine into a wider international context and considers the interests of different international actors, not only Ukraine, to avoid a national bias. The Conclusions.* *The author argues that the Ukrainian nation state did not fit in the Principal Powers' strategic considerations of the post-war period, namely, addressing the Bolshevik westward expansion, restoring Russia's legitimate authority and unity, and a shaping of the European security system. Moreover, after the Bolsheviks' rule was established in the Ukrainian territory of the former Russian Empire, Great Powers did not believe that Ukrainian national institutions were viable. Secondly, the territorial conflicts between the new states, including Poland and Ukraine, demonstrated that the principle of a national self-determination was hardly implemented, and it did not ensure the primary goals of the post-Great War settlement. Though the Principal Powers sought to find a fair solution to the Eastern Galician issue, finally their strategic considerations prevailed over the principle of a national self-determination.*

Key words: *Post-Great war settlement, 1919, Paris Peace Conference, national self-determination, Ukraine, Directorate, Eastern Galicia.*

ПОВОЄННЕ ВРЕГУЛЮВАННЯ 1919 РОКУ І УКРАЇНА

Анотація. *Мета дослідження* полягає у тому, щоб відповісти на питання, чому українська національна держава не отримала міжнародної підтримки і допомоги після закінчення Першої світової війни, хоча національне самовизначення було одним з основних принципів повоєнного врегулювання. **Методологія дослідження** оснований на принципах глобальної історії й критичному

аналізі історичних джерел, передусім документів Паризької мирної конференції, дипломатичного листування, робіт учасників і сучасників конференції. **Наукова новизна** статті полягає у розвитку і вдосконаленні попередніх висновків щодо позиції великих держав-переможниць у Першій світовій війні до України в 1919 р. на основі впровадження у науковий обіг нових історичних джерел і застосування принципів глобальної історії. Обговорення на Паризькій мирній конференції питань, що стосувалися України, розглядаються у ширшому міжнародному контексті з урахуванням інтересів різних міжнародних гравців, не лише України, щоб уникнути національної упередженості. **Висновки.** Українська національна держава не відповідала повоєнним стратегічним розрахункам великих держав, що включали протидію більшовицькій експансії на захід, відновлення легітимної влади і єдності Росії та формування нової системи європейської безпеки. Щобільше, після встановлення на українській території колишньої Російської імперії влади більшовиків вони не вірили в життєздатність українських національних інституцій. По-друге, територіальні конфлікти між новими державами, включаючи Польщу й Україну, продемонстрували, що принципи національного самовизначення було важко реалізувати на практиці, а їх реалізація не забезпечувала основних цілей повоєнного врегулювання. Хоча великі держави намагалися знайти справедливе вирішення східногалицької проблеми, але їхні стратегічні розрахунки врешті взяли гору над принципами національного самовизначення.

Ключові слова: *повоєнне урегулювання, 1919, Паризька мирна конференція, національне самовизначення, Україна, Директорія, Східна Галичина.*

The Problem Statement. On January 18, 1919, the Peace Conference was opened in Paris to make peace and to establish a new, more just and secure world order. Like other nations that had emerged at the territories of the disintegrated empires, the two Ukrainian republics, founded at the territories of the former Russian Empire and Austria-Hungary, sent their representatives to Paris to obtain international recognition and the Great Powers' support. Just three days after the official opening of the Conference, they solemnly proclaimed their unification into a single Ukrainian national state – the Ukrainian People's Republic. Most of all, the Ukrainians believed in the principle of a national self-determination, proclaimed by the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and adopted by the Entente Powers. However, the Ukrainian national state did not obtain any international support and assistance.

The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches. The research is based on a study of the documents of Paris Peace Conference, such as the proceedings of the Supreme War Council, the Council of Ten, the Council of Four, and the Council of Foreign Ministers, and diplomatic correspondence, and the works of the participants and contemporaries of the Conference.

In the numerous academic works, related to the post-Great War regulation and published internationally, the case of Ukraine was largely neglected or presented briefly in the context of the Russian and Polish issues (Alston, 2006; Listikov, 2011; Biskupski, 2015). The contemporary Ukrainian historians studied mostly the Ukrainian diplomatic activities in Paris (Datskiv, 2009, 2016; Holovchenko, 2017; Mashevskiy, 2017, 2018), and usually from Ukraine's national perspective. However, the international context of 1919 is extremely important, as it provides a background for better understanding of the Great Power's position on Ukraine (Gorodnia, 2019, Turchenko, Turchenko, 2019).

The Publication's Purpose. This paper focuses on answering the question why the Ukrainian national state did not obtain the international support and assistance after the Great War though a national self-determination was one of the guiding principles of the new international settlement. The author seeks to develop and upgrade previous conclusions on the issue, and to shift the discussion above the Ukrainian-speaking academic environment.

This research is based on the global history approach, which offers to put the issue of the Great Powers' decisions on Ukraine into a wider international context and consider the

interests of different international actors, not only Ukraine, to avoid a national bias. The paper investigates into the discussions and decisions of Paris Peace Conference on Ukraine during its major stage, in January – June 1919, and it focuses on Ukraine as a single unit, contrary to the often applied regional approach.

The Statement of the Basic Material. At the end of the Great War, the Ukrainian authorities faced a very complex situation. After the government of Ukrainian Central Rada signed the separate Brest-Lytovsk treaty with the Quadruple Alliance, the Entente nations broke any relations with Ukraine, which they established in November 1917 – January 1918. The territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic and, since April 1918, the Ukrainian State was occupied by the German and Austrian troops, and the Entente nations regarded the Ukrainian national state as their satellite. They did not recognize independence of Ukraine and considered it a result of German's intrigues to disintegrate Russia. To escape the negative consequences of the cooperation with Germany and its allies, on November 14, 1918, Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky proclaimed a new course for Ukraine to enter the federation with Russia after the victory over the Bolsheviks. The decision was caused by the Ukrainian diplomats' contacts with the Entente representatives and their information that the victorious nations supported Russia's revival and encouraged Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky to cooperate with the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces (Doroshenko, 2002, p. 408; Shemet, 1920, p. 75).

After Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky issued Federation Declaration, the Entente Powers seemed to favour cooperation with him in order to establish a strong legitimate government in Russia and to stop the Bolshevik expansion, which was expected to recommence after the end of the Great War and the withdrawal of German troops from Ukraine. In late November and December 1918, P. Skoropadsky was supported by the Allies' Ministers at Jassy (Jași), Romania, via a series of joint telegrams they sent to Paris and to other capitals. They believed that the present system of government in Ukraine "should be supported as it represented the only organization, which could at present be utilized against Bolshevism" (FRUS, 1918, Russia, Vol. 2, 1932, p. 702). Besides, it provided opportunities for the reestablishment of order and the reorganization of Russia.

Indeed, the new course enabled P. Skoropadsky to establish relations with General Anton Denikin and other leaders of the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces for the joint efforts against the Bolsheviks. The Ministers supported Skoropadsky's request for the immediate sending of Allies' delegates to Kyiv and their battalions to Kyiv and Odessa, and the immediate occupation of the railroad to Odessa at the points of Zhmerynka and Birczula. They also sent their special delegate, the French Consul in Odessa Emil Henot, to Kyiv (FRUS, 1918, Russia, Vol. 2, 1932, p. 701).

On December 12, the U.S. Acting Secretary of State Frank Polk wrote that the Allied Powers other than the United States had issued a statement suggesting that the order in Ukraine should be restored by lending friendly support and assistance to the Hetman's government. In his understanding, British and French troops were sent to Sevastopol and Odessa for this purpose (FRUS, 1918, Russia, Vol. 2, 1932, p. 703).

In the middle of December 1918, an Allied military mission (mostly of French and Greek troops) arrived at the ports of Odessa, Mykolaiv and Kherson to provide assistance to the local anti-Bolshevik forces. The Ukrainian authorities were expected to cooperate with the White Voluntary Army of General Denikin and to create joint anti-Bolshevik military forces. However, by the time of the Allies arrival, the Hetman had been overthrown in an uprising organized by the Dyrectoria, which was a proponent of Ukraine's independence.

The Dyrectoria, which managed to create a large army under Symon Petliura's command and proclaimed reestablishment of the Ukrainian People's Republic, sought its participation in the post-war Peace Conference to obtain international recognition and support. On December 29, 1918, Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian People's Republic issued the law to send an Extraordinary Diplomatic Mission to Paris to be a delegation on the Peace Congress (The Central State Archive of Supreme Authorities and Governments of Ukraine, f. 3696, d. 1, c. 6, pp. 2, 3). After proclamation of unification of the Ukrainian People's Republic and Western Ukrainian Republic, they composed a united delegation to Paris. However, the Ukrainian representatives were not admitted to the Conference.

According to Volodymyr Vynnychenko, the only argument and the only tool of the Ukrainian delegation were the Fourteen Points by Woodrow Wilson, specifically those concerning a national self-determination (Vynnychenko, 1920, p. 410). Indeed, three articles of the Fourteen Points related to the Ukrainians directly or indirectly, namely, VI on Russia, X on Austria-Hungary and XIII on Poland. However, they did not promise any support to the Ukrainian independent state. Such provision related only to Poland, which should "include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish population" (Wilson, 1918). In the case of Russia, the reference to "the independent determination" related to the Russian Bolshevik authorities, but not the nations of the former Russian Empire. The analysis of the Fourteen Points also reveals the fact that they provided the Ukrainians of the former Austria-Hungary with better opportunities for their national self-determination than the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire, who were not provided with such opportunities. The issues discussions, related to the Ukrainians, at the Peace Conference corresponded to these Fourteen Points' provisions.

Though the research groups, established by France, Great Britain and the United States to prepare for the post-War regulation, indeed used the concept of a national self-determination, the substance of the concept lacked precision. As a result, during the Peace Conference, the Great Powers used its different interpretations to suit their own purposes and to argue their points better, which hampered their collective decision-making. Besides, it quickly became clear that a national self-determination could not be taken as the sole guiding principle of the world settlement. Moreover, it was not clarified how to apply it as a practical political concept (Prott, 2014, p. 744).

The explanation why Ukraine was not suggested as a participant of the Conference is provided with the Skeleton Draft of Peace Treaty with an Appendix of the Powers to be its signatories, prepared by the U.S. research group Inquiry in December 1918. The document contained the major criteria for the admission to the Peace Congress. Besides being a belligerent nation, its government had to be recognized by the United States and the Allies. The government had to possess control over the situation in the country. It had to be a legitimate power and to have an authority to represent the views of the whole society, given by the Constitutional Assembly. Finally, it had to be a power able to implement the decisions of the Congress (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 1, 1942, p. 306). The Ukrainian authorities lacked all these characteristics.

Ukraine's peace treaty with Germany and its Allies in Brest-Lytovsk, and the victorious powers' support of Russia's unity were also important factors. The Ukrainian People's Republic was considered a part of Russia, which had been one of the major Entente Powers during the war. For that reason, the victorious nations, foremost France and the U.S., rejected the independence of nations of the former Russian Empire and promoted the idea

of the Russian Federation. However, what they needed most of all was stable and legitimate governments to implement the resolutions of the Peace Conference.

The information about the army under S. Petliura's command was very contradictory in the European capitals and in Washington. For example, in some telegrams from Romania, S. Petliura was called a Bolshevik or supported by the Bolsheviks (FRUS, 1918, Russia, Vol. 2, 1932, pp. 704–706). At the meeting on January, 16, 1919 in Paris, the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George stated that in Ukraine, where the Allies “had supposed a firm Government had been established... an adventurer with a few thousand men had overturned it with the greatest ease” (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 3, 1943, p. 582). According to the information he obtained, the insurrection had a Bolshevik character, and its success made it clear that “the Ukraine was not the stronghold against Bolshevism” that it had been imagined.

Similar information was provided by the former Danish Minister in Petrograd Harald de Scavenius at the meeting on January 21. In his words, “the Bolsheviks tolerated Petliura, because the troops supporting him were largely Bolshevik. The result of his rule had been identical with that of Bolshevik rule in Great Russia” (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 3, 1943, p. 640).

As the Allied and Associated Powers did not understand the character of the Directorate, they did not trust the Ukrainian authorities, especially as they obtained negative information about them from the Russians and the Poles. As Marshal Foch stated at the meeting of the Council of Four on March 19, 1919, he was not sure on what terms the Allies were with the Ukrainians, “were the latter friends or enemies” (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 411).

After the Ukrainian delegation was not admitted to the Conference, it stayed in Paris and communicated with the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers by means of notes and memoranda, and unofficial meetings. The Great Powers regarded two Ukrainian states, founded at the territories of the former Russian Empire and Austria–Hungary, as parts of the Russian and Austrian legacies, and therefore, as parts of the Russian and Polish issues.

In 1919, the Russian problem included two major issues. Firstly, it was the restoration of peace and legitimate government in Russia. The Great War was not considered ended while Russia remained at war. Secondly, it was a question of dealing with the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks' westward expansion was the major danger to the fragile armistice with Germany. Besides destabilization of a domestic situation in different countries under the slogan of “world revolution”, there was a possibility that the Russian Soviet and German Socialist governments would cooperate and the hostilities would recommence. In Marshal Foch's opinion, the Allies could lose the war if they did not find the appropriate decision to the Russian problem. That would happen if Germany managed the problem according to its own interests, or if anarchy disseminated further (Seymour, 1944, c. 259).

At the beginning of the Conference, the Principal Powers had two different approaches to the Russian problem. One of them was presented by Great Britain, and supported by the United States. Another approach was promoted by France and supported by Italy.

The leaders of Great Britain and the United States doubted that the Bolsheviks' advance could be checked by arms and were inclined to reach some kind of compromise between different Russian political groups, including the Bolsheviks. On January 3, 1919, the British government initiated to invite representatives of various Russian governments, including the Soviet government, to Paris to explain their position and to discuss conditions of a permanent settlement after they suspend hostilities at all fronts for the duration of the peace negotiations (FRUS, 1919, Russia, 1937, p. 3). The initiative was a response to the peace proposal of the Russian Bolshevik government, dated December 23, 1918 (FRUS, 1919, Russia, 1937, p. 1).

After the discussion on January 21–22, the leaders of the Principal Powers decided that the representatives of different Russian factions would meet their emissaries at the Island of Prinkipo in the Marmora Sea on February, 15. As a precondition for the meeting, their troops had to refrain from aggressive actions outside their own territory.

Only the Moscow Bolshevik government did accept the proposal to participate in the Prinkipo Conference (FRUS, 1919, Russia, 1937, pp. 39–42). However, it did not stop its offensive at the fronts. Moreover, until February 15 the Bolshevik Red Army had made the heaviest attacks. According to General Alby's report on February 15, in Ukraine they advanced rapidly and had taken Kyiv, Kharkiv, Ekaterynoslav, a large part of Donetsk region. The Ukrainian national contingents had mostly dispersed or gone over to the Bolsheviks, and the Dyrectoria was about to take refuge in Galicia (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 12).

Other parties, including the Ukrainians, did not accept the Prinkipo proposal. The note from the Head of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission to Paris H. Sydorenko, dated February 10, stated: "The Ukrainian Government cannot take part in the conference ... unless the Bolshevik Government of Russia cease its military operations against the Republic of Ukraine... and also ... remove all its military forces from the Ukrainian front" (FRUS, 1919, Russia, 1937, pp. 69–70).

The rejection of the Prinkipo Conference by national governments and Russian anti-Bolshevik forces caused a negative reaction of the Principal Powers. On February 14, they had to admit that the Prinkipo proposal failed, and began to consider other options of dealing with the Bolsheviks. The British government increased its assistance to Russian anti-Bolshevik forces, especially under the command of General Denikin and Admiral Kolchak (Gorodnia, 2019, p. 66).

From the very beginning, the French government agreed on the Prinkipo proposal reluctantly, only to save the Allies' unity. It maintained two views on the Russian policy. The first approach suggested uniting all anti-Bolshevik forces available to supply them with money, arms and military support and to organize their joint army to fight with the Bolsheviks. The second approach proposed establishing a strong barrier, or "cordon sanitaire" between Russia and Europe.

The Entente troops, which arrived at the Ukrainian ports to provide assistance to the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces, had to deal with the Dyrectoria as the de facto government of Ukraine. After some hesitations, the French military command (General Philippe d'Anselme and Colonel Henry Freydenberg) began to negotiate unofficially with the representatives of the Dyrectoria in Odessa, and later in Birzula. The negotiations lasted from the middle of January until the end of March 1919. In February 1919, when the Ukrainian army retreated under the Bolsheviks' attacks and lost a significant part of its territory, the French requirements included establishing the protectorate of France over Ukraine (Gorodnia, 2017, p. 92). The Ukrainian army desperately needed assistance, therefore, after sharp political debate the demand was accepted on February 17 (Khrystiuk, 1922, pp. 102–103.).

On February 25, the Chief Commander of the Allied Forces Marshal Foch proposed a plan of warfare against Russian Bolshevism, which, however, was not accepted. According to it, the necessary troops could be obtained by mobilizing the Finns, the Poles, the Czechs, the Romanians, the Greeks, and the available Russian pro-Ally elements. Then, they should be placed under a joint command. He also proposed to constitute a chain of independent states of the Finns, the Estonians, the Poles, the Czechs and the Greeks to enable the Allies to impose their demands on the Bolsheviks (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, pp. 123–124).

In fact, the matter of negotiations between the French military command and the Dyrectoria correlated with the proposal. The command was interested only in the Ukrainian army as one of anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia. However, a support of the Ukrainian national state was not considered. According to H. Freydenberg, the question had to be decided at Paris Peace Conference (Margolin, 1934, p. 124).

Another approach of dealing with the Bolsheviks, which was promoted by France, suggested establishing a strong barrier, or “cordon sanitaire”, to separate Russia from Europe, especially Germany. The key component of the barrier was a strong Poland. As early as January 12, 1919, at the meeting of the Supreme War Council, Marshal Foch initiated to strengthen Poland to separate Germany and Russia, and to stop the Bolsheviks’ expansion to the West. However, on W. Wilson’s proposal, the decision was postponed until the Allied and Associated Powers agreed on a general policy on Russia (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 3, 1943, p. 472).

After the Prinkipo proposal failed, the French government enforced its politics of setting up a barrier between Russia and Europe, and increased its support to Poland, particularly in the Polish-Ukrainian military conflict for Eastern Galicia, a territory of the former Austria-Hungary.

The Supreme Council of the Conference began discussing the Eastern Galician issue on January 21, 1919, when Colonel House received a letter from the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland I. Paderewski. In the letter, he asked the Principal Powers to send a collective note to the Ukrainian Dyrectoria with a demand to stop military operations in Eastern Galicia and to evacuate Boryslav oil district. He also asked to send the Inter-Allied Commission to Warsaw to study the situation and to provide Poland with assistance in the form of weapons and ammunition (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 3, 1943, p. 663).

During the discussion of I. Paderewski’s letter, Marshal Foch proposed sending Polish “Blue” army under the command of General Haller, which was formed in France from Polish volunteers and former prisoners of war, to Russian Poland to defend it against the Bolsheviks. However, the proposal was not accepted. According to British delegates, it was difficult to get the Poles to accept a restricted program and to limit their actions to the protection of indisputable Polish territory against invasion from outside. Instead, the Polish government used the interval between the cessation of war and the decisions of the Peace Conference to claim districts outside Russian Poland, to which in many cases they had little right (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 3, 1943, pp. 673–674).

From the very beginning, while dealing with the Eastern Galician problem, the Great Powers had to address several important issues: firstly, to end the Polish-Ukrainian war; secondly, to provide the Eastern Galician population with the opportunities to realize their rights for a national self-determination; thirdly, to stop the Bolsheviks’ westward expansion, fourthly, to keep the Germans from resumption of military actions and, finally, to prevent establishment of cooperation between the Russian Bolsheviks and German Socialists, who possessed power after Wilhelm II’s abdication. We will focus on the key arguments that determined the Principal Powers’ decisions on the multifaceted problem.

First of all, Eastern Galicia was considered a part of Polish (not Ukrainian) issue. In late January, the Council of Ten established two commissions for Polish Affairs. One of them, the Inter-Allied Committee for Poland, headed by Joseph Noulens, was sent to Warsaw to study the situation and to provide the Polish government with advice. It had to warn the government against adopting an aggressive policy towards the neighbouring peoples and to make efforts to bring the current hostilities to an end (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 3, 1943, p. 839).

The second commission, namely the Committee for Polish Affairs under the presidency of Jules Cambon, had to work in Paris.

On February 15, the same day when the failure of the Prinkipo proposal was admitted, the president of the Conference G. Clemenceau informed the Council of Ten that the Germans attacked the Poles on a wide front. The Inter-Allied Committee of Warsaw requested to send General Haller's division to Poland with the shortest possible delay (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 65). On February 21, the Principal Powers officially recognized I. Paderewski's government. At the next meetings, they discussed the ways of transporting Haller's Army to Poland. On March 11, they decided to appoint French General Paul-Prosper Henrys as the Chief of the Staff to the President of the Polish Republic to take command over the Polish military forces (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 317).

In Eastern Galicia, on February 24 the truce between Poland and Ukraine was reached under the mediation of the Inter-Allied Commission, headed by General Joseph Barthélemy. The demarcation line ("the line of Barthélemy") left Lemberg (Lviv) and Drohobycz oil fields to Poland. The Ukrainians held it as inadequate to the military situation, and broke the truce agreement in four days after it was signed. In the middle of March, the Ukrainian army seized the railroad Lemberg–Przemysl. It was expected that Lemberg would fall soon. According to J. Noulens' dispatches, "the very existence of Poland was in question" (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 380).

At the meeting of the Supreme War Council on 17 March, Marshal Foch proposed to transfer the Polish troops from France and Odessa to Lemberg immediately to defend the city from the Ukrainian army, and to strengthen them by the Romanian army. According to him, the scheme meant not only the continuation of the policy of "the creation of an independent Poland, and its support when threatened", but also a creation of a nucleus of resistance against the Bolsheviks and a constitution of the most solid barrier against Bolshevism in Poland and Romania (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 383).

D. Lloyd George argued that Haller's army had to defend Poland, however, no decision was reached that Lemberg should belong to Poland. He favoured using all sources of persuasion to bring about the temporary settlement of the dispute between the Poles and the Ukrainians in the same way as it had been done in the case of Teschen (between the Poles and the Czechs). In his words, S. Petliura was fighting against the Bolsheviks, but "now it was proposed to destroy him" (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 382). According to his information, the Bolsheviks were gaining ground everywhere in Ukraine, and were pressing on towards Odessa. As a result, the grain district fell into their hands. Finally, the Supreme War Council decided to enjoin, through the Warsaw Commission, the Ukrainian government to accept an armistice (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, pp. 385–386).

On March 19, the Council of Ten discussed two main options in dealing with the Ukrainians, namely, the use of force or all moral authority of the mediating Powers to impose their terms of armistice. Marshal Foch could not find any explanation to the phenomenon of the Ukrainian successful offensive in Eastern Galicia, except that the Ukrainians were in agreement with the Bolsheviks. D. Lloyd George, instead, suggested that the Ukrainian troops attacking Lemberg were composed of the local population, who fought to establish their independence. In his opinion, the majority of the population in Eastern Galicia was Ukrainian, and the country should, therefore, be attributed to them, unless very cogent reasons to the contrary existed (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, pp. 410–411). J. Cambon argued that not only the ethnological principle had to be taken into account, but also economic and strategic requirements that the

new Polish State were capable of life (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 414). President Wilson also considered necessary to satisfy the economic and strategic needs of Poland, its frontiers with Germany being his major argument (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 419).

The Inter-Allied Commission in Warsaw recommended military action against the Ukrainians. However, the Council of Ten finally approved Dr. R. Lord's suggestions to use diplomatic means, and to transfer the case under the direct authority of the Supreme Council of the Conference. It was agreed to build the truce upon the existing military status quo. That meant that the city of Lemberg and the Lemberg–Przemysl railway should be secured for Poland, and the Ukrainians should keep the oilfields that were in their hands (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, pp. 407–408).

The Ukrainian delegates in Paris met the decision enthusiastically, and accepted the conditions of the truce on March, 22. The Polish government did not reply to the proposal, because it accepted only the armistice based on 'the line of Barthélemy'. G. Sydorenko believed that it was the first victory of Ukraine at the Conference that happened because America took charge of the initiative of recognizing Ukraine (CSASAGU, f. 3696, d. 2, c. 280, p. 147).

Meanwhile, the successful Bolshevick offensive threatened the Allies' troops in southern Ukraine. On March 25 and 27, the Council of Four discussed the question of their evacuation, and decided to support Romania, which was threatened by the Bolsheviks, instead of keeping Odessa. On April 4, British-French protocol was signed, according to which the French government rejected the agreement with the Directorate and renewed relations with the leaders of the Volunteer Army. The Ukrainian army having lost its territory (of the former Russian Empire), the French militaries lost any interest in cooperation with it.

However, the Ukrainian diplomats in Paris believed that France decided to support Ukraine against the Bolsheviks in Eastern Galicia instead of the Black Sea coast. In May, they asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France to send a military mission to the territories under Ukrainian control to provide assistance to the Ukrainian army. The issue was discussed until late summer, but the mission was never sent (Margolin, 1934, pp. 145–147).

In April, the Council of Four agreed to establish an Inter-Allied Armistice Commission and addressed a telegram to I. Paderewski to persuade him to reach agreement with the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 5, 1946, p. 785). The Commission began its work at the end of April under the presidency of General Louis Botha. The Polish delegates and Ukrainian representatives were invited to several meetings of the Commission, though separately. The Ukrainian representatives accepted the terms of the armistice as they had been formulated by the Commission, with several minor objections. The Polish delegates, including I. Paderewski, referred to the struggle of Poland against Bolshevism in the eastern frontier, and a constant fear of a German attack from the west, and considered it necessary to build up a continuous eastern front which would allow a junction of the Polish and Romanian troops (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 5, 1946, p. 786).

On April 26, the president of the Commission on Polish Affairs J. Cambon reported to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Poland's boundaries. It considered several options, including the establishment of an independent state in Eastern Galicia or an autonomous state under the control of the League of Nations, and the partition of Eastern Galicia between Poland and Ukraine. However, the Commission suggested that any of these options might result in the extension of the Russian frontier to the Carpathians, because Russia would undoubtedly extend its grip upon a weak Slav State. It was proposed to consider the political advantage of establishing a common frontier between Poland and Romania while securing a local autonomy

for Eastern Galicia. The U.S. Secretary of State R. Lansing agreed and recommended considering the question not only from the ethnic, economic and strategic point of view, but also from all other standpoints (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, p. 625).

On May 12, the Armistice Commission submitted an unofficial draft of the armistice agreement to the contending parties. The Ukrainians accepted it and the Poles rejected. On May 15, Haller's army launched the general offensive at the Ukrainian front, in spite of the fact that, while being in Paris, I. Paderewski promised President Wilson to prevent Haller's army from taking any part in the warfare against the Ukrainians (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, 1946, p. 196).

Since May 17 till June 5, the Council of Four discussed the military operations of the Haller's army in Eastern Galicia and the measures to stop them. W. Wilson proposed to withdraw the representatives of Poland from the Peace Conference if it continued fighting (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 5, 1946, pp. 676–677). D. Lloyd George advocated the stoppage of food and munitions to Poland as a means of bringing the fighting to an end (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 5, 1946, p. 706). Two telegrams were sent to the Head of the Polish State General Pilsudski to warn him about the negative consequences of Haller's offensive in Eastern Galicia to Poland. However, the leaders of the Principal Powers considered important not to suggest even a superficial idea that I. Paderewski was not being supported.

In I. Paderewski's telegram to President Wilson, which was discussed by the Council of Four on May 19, he blamed the Ukrainians for the violation of the truce, and argued that any resistance of the government to satisfy the demands would cause a revolution in Poland. Though he was ready to resign, he believed that the action would not improve the situation (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 5, 1946, p. 713).

According to General Botha's recommendations, on May 21 the Ukrainian delegates (G. Syderenko, V. Paneyko, M. Lozynsky, and D. Witowsky) were invited to speak at the meeting of the Council of Four. It was the only time that the representatives of Ukraine were heard by the Supreme Council of the Conference. Their major arguments were the principle of self-determination and the fight with Bolshevism. They also claimed for a complete national independence for a united Ukrainian State (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 5, 1946, pp. 776–779).

The same day, in discussion with British representatives, French General Le Rond argued that the continuous front, from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea, was essential for Poland's safety against Bolshevism and there was a gap in the line, namely, the Ukrainian front, where communications were passing through between Lenin in Russia and Bela Khun in Hungary. If the Poles overthrew I. Paderewski and no other government could be established, the only alternatives were either to starve the Poles or to force them to become the Bolsheviks. President Wilson also believed that any extreme measures against Poland would lead to the downfall of the Paderewski government, and Poland would become Bolshevik and anarchic (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 5, 1946, pp. 780–781).

As a result of the discussion, on May 27 a telegram from the President of the Conference was sent to General Pilsudski, and its copy to General Haller, to stop the offensive in Eastern Galicia (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, 1946, pp. 70–71). The Supreme Council warned General Pilsudski that the Principal Allied and Associated Governments would not furnish Poland with supplies or assistance any longer if the Polish authorities were not willing to accept the guidance and decisions of the Conference (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, 1946, pp. 63–64). On May 28 General Pilsudski answered by a letter that offensive against the Ukrainians was General Haller's complete responsibility and a result of the Diet's support (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, 1946, p. 129). The same day G. Clemenceau informed the Council of Four that the Polish offensive against

the Ukrainians was successful (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, 1946, p. 83). The Council agreed to see I. Paderewski on the subject at once. However, he returned to Paris to discuss the issue only on June 5.

I. Paderewski claimed the whole territory of Galicia for Poland. He tried to convince the Supreme Council that the Ukrainian-speaking population of Galicia was not Ukrainians, but “the Ruthenians in Galicia”, who had a government other than the Dyrectoria (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, 1946, p. 196). He also argued that in case of any essential changes in what had been already granted to Poland, he would immediately resign, and there would be a revolution in Poland (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, 1946, pp. 197–198). D. Lloyd George accused Poland in imperialism and oppressing other nations. However, after sharp debates he finally admitted that he and I. Paderewski had been very good friends and he only wanted the Poles to not annex foreign population. As for the Ukrainians, in his words, he saw a Ukrainian only once. “It is the last Ukrainian I have seen, and I am not sure that I want to see any more” (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, 1946, p. 200).

When the Polish offensive in Eastern Galicia stopped, a quite different strategic situation had been established. On June 12, the Council of Four discussed a line between Poland and Ukraine. As far as the situation in Eastern Galicia was considered similar to Upper Silesia, the same course was suggested to adopt, namely, to hold a plebiscite (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, 1946, pp. 353–354).

The Foreign Ministers discussed the settlement in Eastern Galicia at the meetings of June 18 and 25. Finally, it was decided to authorize Polish troops, including Haller’s army, to extend their operations up to the River Zbrucz (a border with the former Russian Empire) and to establish a temporary Polish civil government in Eastern Galicia. The government had to preserve the autonomy of the territory and the political, religious and personal liberties of the inhabitants as far as possible. In some period, not fixed in the resolution, plebiscite had to be held in Eastern Galicia for the ultimate self-determination of the inhabitants as to their political allegiance (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, 1946, pp. 838–839, 851–852). The Council of Four approved the decisions on June 25 and 27.

The Supreme Council of the Conference returned to the Eastern Galician issue in September 1919. Meanwhile, a catastrophic situation at the fronts made S. Petliura to seek for cooperation with Poland at the expense of Eastern Galicia (Lozovyi, 2018, pp. 153–154). On November 21, the Principal Powers approved a compromise decision to grant Poland a 25-year mandate in Eastern Galicia and to provide the Ukrainian population with a wide political and cultural autonomy. However, in 1923 Eastern Galicia was included into Poland and its autonomy was never implemented.

The Conclusions. First of all, the Conference did not consider the Ukrainian issue as a separate integral case. It was considered as a part of Russian and Austrian–Hungarian legacies and, therefore, integrated into other issues, mostly Russian and Polish ones. Secondly, the Entente Powers and the United States never raised the question of Ukraine’s recognition and support.

The post-Great War international environment was not favourable for the Ukrainian nation state. It did not fit in the strategic considerations of the Principal Powers that included addressing the Bolshevik westward expansion and the possibility of Germany resuming hostilities against the victorious nations. The leaders of the Principal Powers trusted the Prime Minister of Poland I. Paderewski and did their best to save his government. At the same time, they did not trust the Ukrainian leaders, and they did not believe that the Ukrainian national institutions were viable.

Though the Principal Powers sought to find a fair solution to the Eastern Galician issue, their strategic considerations prevailed over the principle of a national self-determination.

Finally, the territorial conflicts between the new states with heterogeneous ethnic composition, including Poland and Ukraine, demonstrated that the principle of a national self-determination was hardly implemented. Moreover, its implementation did not ensure the primary goals of the post-Great War settlement, namely, lasting peace, international stability and the Principal Powers' national security.

Prospects for a further research include a study of primary sources related to the negotiations between the Ukrainian diplomats and the Principal Powers' delegates in Paris in May-August 1919, particularly concerning the possibilities of Petliura-Denikin cooperation, and the purchase of the military stocks from the U. S. Liquidation Commission.

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THE REPRESSIVE POLICIES OF THE POLISH AUTHORITIES AGAINST THE GREEK CATHOLIC CLERGY IN 1919: METHODS AND FEATURES

Abstract. The Publication’s Purpose. In the article we try to find out the methods and features of the repressive policies of the Polish authorities against the Greek Catholic clergy in 1919. **The research methodology** is based on the principles of historicism, systematization, scientificity, objectivity, use of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and special-historical (historical-genetic, historical-typological, historical-systemic) methods. **The research novelty** is that a substantive analysis of the repressive policies features of the Polish authorities against the Greek Catholic clergy during 1919 is done; the reasons for the change in the tactics of Polish government structures in relation to the Greek Catholic clergy since the end of 1919 are clarified. **The Conclusions.** Thus, the repression of the Polish authorities against the Greek Catholic clergy during the second half of 1919 reached significant proportions. This is explained, first of all, by the expressive state position of the clergymen majority of the WUPR era. Finally, the Polish administration in Galicia failed to completely subordinate the GCC

to the interests of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and to create a category loyal and obedient to the state from the Greek Catholic clergy. The methods of repressive policies of the Polish authorities during 1919 underwent a kind of transformation – they were initiated as accidental killings (before the occupation of the region by the Polish army in July 1919) and only as the incorporation of Galician-Ukrainian lands grew into mass arrests and internment; it is this change in methods that determines the peculiarities of repression at this time (1919), compared with the following period (before 1923). In fact, from the end of 1919, Polish governmental structures changed their tactics towards the Greek Catholic clergy. Apparently, the appeals of the Apostolic Nuncio, as well as numerous collective and individual appeals by Greek Catholic hierarchs and Ukrainian public figures, forced the occupying power to end mass repression, and arrests have since been used only in some cases. Since then, confinement (house arrests) of fathers will be more practiced. At the same time, the thesis that Polish government agencies would arrest priests from the end of 1919 only if they pursued anti-government policies would require a comprehensive review and further study of the government's policies towards the GCC clergy during 1920. Conclusions on the topic would either confirm or refute the above thesis.

Key words: Greek Catholic clergy, Polish authorities, repressive policies, Apostolic Nuncio, internment, confinement.

РЕПРЕСИВНА ПОЛІТИКА ПОЛЬСЬКИХ ОРГАНІВ ВЛАДИ ПРОТИ ГРЕКО-КАТОЛИЦЬКОГО ДУХОВЕНСТВА У 1919 р.: МЕТОДИ ТА ОСОБЛИВОСТІ

Анотація. Мета дослідження полягає у з'ясуванні методів і особливостей репресивної політики польських органів влади проти греко-католицького духовенства у 1919 р. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на принципах історизму, системності, науковості, об'єктивності, використання загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, узагальнення) та спеціально-історичних (історико-генетичний, історико-типологічний, історико-системний) методів. **Новизна дослідження** полягає в тому, що здійснено предметний аналіз особливостей репресивної політики польських властей проти греко-католицького духовництва впродовж 1919 р.; з'ясовано причини зміни тактики польських урядових структур у ставленні до греко-католицького духовництва з кінця 1919 р. **Висновки.** Репресії польських органів влади проти греко-католицького духовенства впродовж другої половини 1919 р. досягнули значних масштабів. Це пояснюється виразною державницькою позицією більшості священнослужителів доби ЗУНР. Методи репресивної політики польських властей упродовж 1919 р. зазнали своєрідної трансформації: були започатковані як випадкові вбивства (до повної окупації краю польською армією у липні 1919 р.) і лише в міру інкорпорації галицькоукраїнських земель переросли в масові арешти та інтернування; саме ця зміна методів визначає особливості репресій в зазначений час (1919 р.), порівняно із наступним періодом (до 1923 р.). З кінця 1919 р. польські урядові структури змінюють тактику у ставленні до греко-католицького духовництва – відтоді більше практикуватимуться конфінування (домашні арешти) отців. Апелювання Апостольського Нунція та численні колективні і поодинокі звернення греко-католицьких ієрархів та українських громадських діячів змусили окупаційну владу припинити масові репресії.

Ключові слова: греко-католицьке духовенство, польська влада, репресивна політика, Апостольський нунцій, інтернування, конфінування.

The Problem Statement. According to the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), His Beatitude Sviatoslav Shevchuk, modern society “lives in a world of monologues”, cannot dialogue and cannot hear another person. At the same time, according to the priest, dialogue is a “crucial element of human culture” that should be found in oneself. These considerations formed the basis of Sviatoslav Shevchuk's new book *Dialogue Heals Wounds*, the presentation of which took place during the autumn of 2018 in different parts of Ukraine. A peculiar message of the book is an invitation to listen to another in order to be heard (Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, 19 September 2018). The clergyman also paid

considerable attention to Ukrainian-Polish relations in historical and modern dimensions and, in particular, the place of the UGCC clergy in the context of relations between the two peoples. Probably, according to S. Shevchuk, in order to better understand each other it is worth not hiding the historical truth, but boldly proclaiming and interpreting contradictory episodes with the hope of resolving them under the care and with the help of the Lord God.

Following the reasoning of the head of the UGCC, in our opinion, there are many “sharp angles” regarding the place of the Greek Catholic clergy in the context of Ukrainian-Polish relations during the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (WUPR) and the first years after Polish rule in Galicia. Domestic scholars have proved that the clergy of the Greek Catholic Church (GCC) (as the church was called in the interwar period) took an active part in building Ukrainian statehood during the existence of the WUPR. To a large extent, this is why the higher clergy and a significant part of the lower ones have been persecuted by the Polish authorities since July 1919, when the GCC found itself in a new socio-political configuration.

The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications. The problem of the Polish authorities’ attitude to the Greek Catholic clergy has repeatedly been the subject of research by Ukrainian researchers. We should highlight, in particular, the work of scientists: Vasyl Marchuk (Marchuk, 2001; Marchuk & Pylypiv, 2000), Vitalii Perevezii (Perevezii, 1998; Perevezii, 2004), Mykhailo Haikovskiy (Haikovskiy, 2001), Ihor Pylypiv (Pylypiv, 2011), Orest Krasivskiy (Krasivskiy & Pylypiv 1997), Ruslan Deliatynskiy (Deliatynskiy, 2005; Deliatynskiy, 2011; Deliatynskiy, 2017) and others. Most of them focused on the repressive policies of the Polish authorities towards Ukrainians in Galicia during 1919 – 1925, however, in our opinion, the researchers did not make an emphasis on the fact of 1919.

The Publication’s Purpose. In the article we try to find out the methods and features of the repressive policies of the Polish authorities against the Greek Catholic clergy in 1919.

The Statement of the Basic Material. From July 1919, the GCC was placed in new socio-political circumstances, as the government of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth imposed a state of emergency in Eastern Galicia, which was lifted only in 1922. Soon the Polish government abolished the Galician Sejm and the regional division, the entire system of self-government, appointed elders and divided Galicia into three voivodeships. It was forbidden to use the names “Galicia” and “Ukrainian”, they were replaced by the names “Eastern Lesser Poland” and “Rusyn”.

As early as May-June 1919, the Polish occupation authorities made the first arrests and assassinations of Greek Catholic priests. However, the first manifestations of repression did not yet have the character of a system, but rather occurred due to the chauvinistic mood of individual soldiers of the Polish army. On 13 June 1919, the parish priest of Monastyriska, Fr. Zacharii Podliashetskyi and his colleague Fr. Adalbert Halibei. They were shot dead by a Polish cavalry patrol on the way from Komarivka to Nyzhniv. Polish special services testified to the “sabotage” of Ukrainian shepherds who tried to warn Ukrainian soldiers stationed in Nyzhniv. At the same time, if A. Halibei was previously a field chaplain of the Ukrainian Galician Army (UGA) (Radevych-Vynnytskyi, 1994, p. 39), then Z. Podliashetskyi was killed because his sons served in the UGA. On 22 May 1919, on the denunciation of J. Werstein, the leader of the Polish underground in Stryi (Pelenska & Babiuk, 1975, pp. 187–188), a Polish field court arrested and ordered the execution of the parish priest of the village of Zawadów, Stryj County, Fr. Ostap Nyzhankivskiy because, according to Polish law enforcement agencies, he hid weapons at home (Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie (AAN), zesp. 322, sygn. 5335a, k. 393).

On 22 June 1919, many Greek Catholic priests from different parts of Galicia were deported to Lviv Prison Bryhidky without a guilty plea: Fr. Anatolii Dolynskyi, Fr. Ivan Halibei from Ustia-Zelene, Fr. Mykola Niklych and others. Soon priests also came to Bryhidky: Fr. Stefan Kuchkuda from Peremyshliany, Fr. Pryima and Fr. Vynnytskyi from Zaliztsi (now – Zboriv district of Ternopil region), Fr. Ivan Koroliuk from Chernelytsia of Peremyshliany region, Fr. Pavlo Oliinyk and Fr. Stepan Mokhnatskyi from Terebovlia. On 10 September 1919, the parish priest of Sambir, Fr. Franz Rabii, who spent three months in prison but was eventually released due to baseless allegations. Fathers were usually kept in inappropriate conditions, they complained about the lack of food, illness (Fr. P. Oliinyk fell ill with typhus): “Prisoners sleep without a canopy and haylofts, filth crosses all boundaries” (Recent Arrests, 1919, p. 2).

There were a total of 612 priests in the Bryhidky prison, 200 of whom were later confined; 175 fathers were tortured in Polish prisons, many of whom appeared in a Polish field court. Among the internees we will name the canon from Przemyśl Fr. Konstantyn Bohachevskyi, later, from 1924 – the first exarch, then metropolitan for Ukrainian Greek Catholics in the United States (Blazejowskyj, 1995, p. 601). The parish priest of Kamianka Strumylova, 73-year-old Fr. Mykhailo Tsekheleskyi, was first interned in the first half of June 1919 and later confined in Lviv, where he remained until December 1919. Among those interned there were the priest Andrii Bentsyn from Stryi Sambir and the 90-year-old consistory adviser Berezovskyi (*State Archives of Ternopil Oblast*). (SATO), fonds 231, description 1, case 325, p. 15).

On 27 June 1919, some priests were imprisoned in the town of Stryi. On 10 July of that year, in completely unsuitable conditions (prisoners were placed in a freight train), priests were transported to the Na Zasanie prison camp in Przemyśl. In the camp, priests were often denied worship, confiscated money, linen, blankets, soap, and sugar. Often in the presence of Polish officers, priests were beaten and subjected to moral torture (*Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv (CSHAUL)*, f. 408, d. 1, c. 47, pp. 3, 8).

The conditions for transporting priests on the way to the prisoner camp in Strzalkowo near Poznan were not better (the train was overcrowded, people were restricted in food, fathers were deprived of personal belongings, watches, clothes and shoes were confiscated; former field chaplain Ivan Halibei was robbed). There was no warm water in the camp in Strzalkowo, typhus was spreading, and cases of dysentery became more frequent, which caused the illness of fathers Vasyl Sen and Franz Novak. The priests themselves lived in unsuitable conditions – in underground barracks, they slept on a bare shed without straw.

In total, there were 15 fathers from different parts of Galicia in the camp in Strzalkowo: Fr. Mykola Konrad from Ternopil, Fr. Vasyl Dubytskyi and Fr. Mykhailo Osadets from Berezhany, Fr. Mykola Simenovych from Stryhantsi, Fr. Volodymyr Sterniuk from Pustomyty, Fr. Ivan Halibei (UGA field chaplain), Fr. Antin Tverdokhlib from Krakivets, Fr. Andrii Dolnytskyi from Siveriany, Fr. Hryhorii Muzychka from Zhuravno, Fr. Antin Siretskyi from Liatske-Shliakhetske, Fr. Mykhailo Bula from Rozsokhy, Fr. Mykola Yanovych from Khotyn (now within Kalush), Fr. Osyp Mytsak from Trostyanets near Dolyna, Fr. Mykhailo Osidach from Wietlin (now the territory of Poland), Fr. Pavlo Dzhulynskyi from Kalush; as well as three theologians from Lviv – Mykola Markiv, V. Svystun and the above-mentioned Vasyl Sen (CSHAUL, f. 408, d. 1, c. 47, p. 2).

Most of the repressed clergy were charged with politics. Thus, Fr. Panteleimon Horodetskyi was accused of sabotaging conscription into the Polish army, Fr. Vasyl Hordynskyi – of “inciting against the Polish people”. Priests Mykhailo Kril and Panteleimon Shpilka were

accused of “participating in the Ukrainian uprising of 1918” and “allowing gangs to operate” in the Sianoch region (State Archive of Lviv Region (SALR), f. 1, d. 14, c. 1551, p. 4). Fathers Symeon Hrebenuik, Viacheslav Zbudovskiy, Hryhorii Kovch, Ivan Kosovych, Ivan Pisetskyi and Illia Chornodolia were interned for participating in the work of state institutions of the WUPR and belonging to the UGA (Lebedovych, 1963, pp. 81–86). The priest of Sanok Fr. Omelian Konstantynovych was accused of “hostile contacts with Russian secular and spiritual intellectuals in Lviv” (Archiwum Panstwowe w Przemyslu (APP), zesp. 23, sygn. 171, k. 2, 3, 9).

There was also persecution at Lviv Greek Catholic Theological Seminary. In mid-September 1919, the Polish authorities made a condition for Bishop Josyf Bocian and the rectors of the seminary to leave the seminary for three days. Bishop J. Bocian was temporarily forced to move to the monastery of the Basilian Sisters, in addition, the Polish authorities refused to provide a grant for the seminar (Demolition of the Theological Seminary, 1919, p. 1). The issue of discrimination against the Greek Catholic Theological Seminary provoked a discussion between the Ukrainian newspaper *Nova Rada* and the Polish newspaper *Gazeta poranna*. Ukrainians, in particular, emphasized that they would continue to “protest against the requisition of the house with all their might” (Case of the Ukrainian Theological Seminary, 1919, p. 2).

The repression also affected the activities of the Stanislaviv Theological Seminary. As early as March 1919, the Polish government abolished the state subsidy from the religious fund for theological seminaries, forcing the bishops to close them indefinitely, and then occupied their premises for the needs of the army (Niva, 1921, part 5. p. 163; Bulletin of Stanislaviv Dioceses, 1920, parts I–III, p. 5). In addition, the arrests of the vice-rector Fr. Avksentii Boichuk, professor of theology Fr. Dr. Vasyl Baran and six theological students of theological seminary. By the way, in 1919, according to the Ivano-Frankivsk historian Vasyl Marchuk, 24 priests were deported from Stanislaviv Voivodeship (Marchuk & Pylypiv, 2000, p. 212). In total, 87 clergymen were arrested in the Stanislaviv diocese during 1919 – 1920, including Kryloshan chapters, professors and students of theological seminaries, catechists, parish priests and nuns (Deliatynskiy, 2017, p. 100).

The high clergy of the Greek Catholic Church strongly protested against the arrests of clergy. On 24 August 1919, the 27th Conference of Greek Catholic Bishops took place in Przemyśl, at which the text of the protest against the actions of the Polish army in Eastern Galicia to the World Conference in Paris was adopted, as well as a letter to the Ukrainian ambassador in Paris Count Mykhailo Tyshkevych. The text of the protest, in particular, had the following: “The desecration of our churches is taking place, numerous killings without explanation of the civilian population (including five priests), who did not do anything against the Polish army. Mass arrests of innocent people are taking place all over the country, more than 200 priests have been imprisoned, and the faithful are deprived of sacred secrets and spiritual care” (Kravchuk, 1997, p. 55). Bishops of the Greek Catholic Church also protested against the closure of Ukrainian cultural, educational and economic institutions, the banning of Ukrainian publications by Polish authorities, the dismissal of Ukrainian officials and teachers, restrictions on the use of the Ukrainian language, etc. On behalf of the Ukrainian bishops, the text of the protest was signed by Metropolitan Andrii Sheptytskyi on 27 August 1919.

Greek Catholic bishops also sent a letter of protest to the Apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw. The letter, in particular, read: “In four prisons in Pikulychy, prisoners lie in the mud on the floor, naked or in torn, dirty shirts without blankets, without any care, and without light at

night. It is common for five to ten of them to die in one day. It also happens that the corpses lie with the sick and dying for two days until they are buried” (Kravchuk, 1997, p. 57). The hierarchs stressed that the choice of metropolitans and bishops, as well as the appointment of priests to pastoral positions, do not fall within the competence of the Polish authorities, which often arbitrarily decide whether or not to appoint priests.

On 26 August 1919, the Greek Catholic bishops issued a Pastoral Message to the clergy and the faithful, in which, in particular, they noted: “The Almighty liked to send us new hard sufferings. ... Polish troops occupied the whole region. God knows how much our poor people had to endure. Thousands of innocent civilian casualties in prisons are dying of plague or starvation and enduring unspeakable physical and moral suffering. It seems that the whole nation is said to be at a loss” (Pastoral Epistle... 1919, p. 3). However, the text of the message was confiscated by the Polish security authorities (Confiscated Message of Our Bishops, 1919, p. 1).

On 17 November 1919, Bishop H. Khomyshyn of Stanislaviv issued an order to the eparchial clergy “On the matter of some changes in the text of church services”, which regulated the order of prayer for secular authority. Given the repression of the Polish administration of the region against the Greek Catholic clergy, the bishop warned against refraining from glorifying the Polish government (Delyatynskiy, 2011). On 2 November 1919, Bishop H. Khomyshyn wrote a letter to Lviv District General Administration, in which he asked for the illegal and unjust removal of priests from the Stanislaviv diocese (Yehreshii, 2001, p. 13).

Polish special services tried to monitor the degree of resonance of the pastoral message of the bishops to Galician-Ukrainian society. On 14 October 1919, K. Haletskiy, the general delegate of the Polish government in Lviv, instructed all the elders in Galicia to monitor the reaction to the letter of the Greek Catholic clergy due to the “political platform” of the letter (the introductory part of the letter, in his opinion, sought to attack the Polish army). The high-ranking official, in particular, was interested in the way in which priests could acquaint the faithful with the text of the pastoral letter (SATO, f. 14, d. 4, c. 501, p. 1). According to the gendarmerie accomplices of Chortkiv district in Ternopil region, Fr. Snihurovych took an active civil position, who on 4 November 1919 in Bilyi Potik village during the release from the pulpit, noted “that the Russian people should adhere to the line of their faith” and did not change the Eastern rite to the Western one. According to Polish police accomplices, the words of the parish priest of Ulashkivtsi village during a sermon in the local church should be taken as a “hint not to change the rite”; there is the priest’s uncertainty of the village Yahilnytsia. At the same time, in the town of Chortkiv, the villages of Shmankivchyky, Dzhuryn and Zvyniach of Chortkiv deanery, Greek Catholic priests did not make political statements when addressing the faithful (SATO, f. 14, d. 4, c. 501, pp. 2, 4, 6).

According to Polish special services, Greek Catholic priests in the villages of Zahiria and Lesko near Sanok and Kryvche, near Przemyśl, gave no reason to “doubt their credibility and interfere in politics”. Instead, in Przemyśl itself, priests of the Eastern rite were more familiar with the text of the Pastoral Message of the Bishops, which was motivated primarily by the politicization of the city and frequent visits to Przemyśl by Ukrainian public figures from Galicia, including Lviv. According to Polish informants, priests risk being influenced by people with “dubious reputations”. However, sharp campaign statements were not made by Greek Catholic priests and monks (Archiwum Panstwowe w Krakowie (APK), Oddzial III, zesp. 120/II, sygn. 23, p. 95).

At the same time, the Polish authorities could not ignore the protest mood of the Greek Catholic bishops. This is made clear by the letters of officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to employees of the Ministry of the Interior of Poland dated the end of October 1919, which also corresponded to the Ministry of Religions and Education of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In the letters, the addressees stated that it was not worth ‘teasing the opinion of Rome’ in the interests of Polish state, because “human rights missions may become more frequent”, which, in turn, could affect Poland’s international prestige (APK, Oddzial III, zesp. 120/II, sygn. 23, k. 93). (It is about the legal status of Eastern Galicia as part of Poland, which at that time was uncertain – O.Ye.; R.D.).

It is probably the intervention of the then Apostolic Nuncio to Poland, Aquile Ratti, who, despite the dissatisfaction of the Polish government and society, succeeded in the trial and, finally, the release of many arrested Greek Catholic priests and monks (Hentosh, 1997, p. 14; CSHAUL, f. 146, d. 8, c. 5065, p. 6; Kravchuk & Haiova, 1999, pp. 700–701). In particular, on the initiative of A. Ratti and Bishop of Stanislaviv H. Khomyshyn, Fr. Ye. Teslia, priest of Korolivka, Tovmatskyi deanery, was released (Kravtsiv, 1975, p. 913). Addressing the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Apostolic Nuncio said that the arrests of the Greek Catholic clergy threatened “serious consequences because the population, especially people deprived of spiritual care, remain ignorant of the basic principles of individual and social life and are actively negatively influenced” (CSHAUL, f. 146, d. 8, c. 5065, p. 6).

In October 1919, a deputation consisting of Father L. Kunytskyi, as well as Y. Lohinskyi and O. Hotskyi appeared before the famous Polish patron Count Rostworowski with a request for help to interned and confined Ukrainian clergy. The count promised to facilitate the release of Ukrainian priests as much as possible (Deputacya w sprawie konfinowanych księza gr. kat., 1919, p. 3). Ukrainian public figures sent similar petitions to Polish officials, including elders.

Apparently, the appeals of the Apostolic Nuncio, as well as the collective and isolated appeals of the Greek Catholic hierarchs, forced the occupying authorities to end mass repression, and since then arrests have been used as a means of influence only in some cases. Polish officials claimed that priests should be arrested only in cases where a Greek Catholic minister pursued an anti-state policy, “viciously resisting the Polish nobility”. This fact, in their opinion, should have been indicated in the relevant reports. In turn, officials from the Ministry of Religions and Public Education of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in letters to the elders of Nowy Sącz, Gorlice and Hrybiv counties, pointed to the need for more meticulous and “flexible” biographies tracking of fathers suspected of anti-government activities, a clearer separation – which of the fathers should be placed under house arrest (confined), who should be interned, and who should be arrested. The official stressed that the clergy “should read sermons from the pulpit and praise God, and not interfere in politics and disturb public peace”. In addition, it was necessary to trace the contacts of priests of the Greek Catholic Church of the elders of Nowy Sącz, Gorlice and Hrybiv, as well as Greek Catholic fathers from the city of Krakow with Ukrainian figures in Eastern Galicia, including Lviv. According to the Polish official, such ties could only exacerbate Ukrainian-Polish coexistence in these regions (APK, Oddzial III, zesp. 120/II, sygn. 23, k. 93).

In December 1919, following an order from the Polish Minister of the Interior, representatives of the Lviv presidium issued an order to all lords and police directors of Lviv and Krakow to decide within 14 days on confined and interned priests in their voivodeships. According to the official, the confined should be escorted home without hindrance, because

“they are worthy of God’s service”. State intervention is required “only by corrupt officials who have ruined themselves with new punishments”. However, such priests should be brought to justice only if proven guilty. They need to demand Polish citizenship, conduct audits of those who spread “the mood of independence from Poland”, etc. According to the Polish secret services, a special commission should also be set up to develop a register of persons released from internment, to collect data on the behavior of priests during and after their release from internment camps. At the same time, the official insisted on releasing the internees before Christmas (AAN, zesp. Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego, sygn. 928, k. 12).

Due to the intervention of the Apostolic Capital, Polish law enforcement agencies were forced to reconsider their attitude towards the Greek Catholic clergy at the end of 1919 in the prison camp in Strzalkowo. The Human Rights Commission, accompanied by a foreign mission from Warsaw, heard the complaint and the captured priests were soon moved to above-ground barracks (CSHAUL, f. 408, d. 1, c. 47, pp. 2, 3). And on 2 January 1920, the clergy were finally released from the camp.

Many priests were released from custody in late 1919, or internment was replaced by confinement. After 7 days of punishment, Father V. Hordynskyi was confined in Bohorodchany, and on 24 December 1919, he was released. Father P. Horodetskyi, who was in Lviv for four months, was soon confined at the parish in Zhuraky, and later released from supervision in December 1919 (State Archives of Ivano-Frankivsk region (SAIFR), f. 2, d. 1, c. 181, p. 53). We mentioned above Fr. O. Konstantynovych, who was first confined in Lviv on the basis of the governorship presidium rescript of 18 December 1919, to be released from house arrest and sent to his parish in Sanok for permanent residence (APP, zesp. 23, sygn. 171, k. 2, 3, 9). The release of interned clergy was slow, but in the early 1920s only a few of the arrested priests remained in the camps (Kravchuk & Haiova, 1999, pp. 700–701).

The Conclusions. Thus, the repression of the Polish authorities against the Greek Catholic clergy during the second half of 1919 reached significant proportions. This is explained, first of all, by the expressive state position of the clergymen majority of the WUPR era. Finally, the Polish administration in Galicia failed to completely subordinate the GCC to the interests of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and to create a category loyal and obedient to the state from the Greek Catholic clergy.

The methods of repressive policies of the Polish authorities during 1919 underwent a kind of transformation – they were initiated as accidental killings (before the occupation of the region by the Polish army in July 1919) and only as the incorporation of Galician-Ukrainian lands grew into mass arrests and internment; it is this change in methods that determines the peculiarities of repression at this time (1919), compared with the following period (before 1923). In fact, from the end of 1919, Polish governmental structures changed their tactics towards the Greek Catholic clergy. Apparently, the appeals of the Apostolic Nuncio, as well as numerous collective and individual appeals by Greek Catholic hierarchs and Ukrainian public figures, forced the occupying power to end mass repression, and arrests have since been used only in some cases. Since then, confinement (house arrests) of fathers will be more practiced.

At the same time, the thesis that Polish government agencies would arrest priests from the end of 1919 only if they pursued anti-government policies would require a comprehensive

review and further study of the government's policies towards the GCC clergy during 1920. Conclusions on the topic would either confirm or refute the above thesis.

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**THEATER ART AS A SELF-REALIZATION FORM
OF NADDNIPRYANSHCHYNA POLITICAL EMIGRANTS
IN VOLYN VOIVODESHIP (1920 – 1930-ies)**

Abstract. *The purpose of the article is to analyze the Dnieper (Naddniproianshchyna) political emigrants' influence on the Western Volyn region theatrical life: from the mobile theater troupes spread to the VUT creation, which facilitated their adaptation and promoted creative self-realization. The methodology of the research is based on the historical, cultural chronological methods, as well as the analysis and systematization methods, which made it possible to consider Volyn Ukrainian Theater mobile troupes appearance conditions, to trace their relations with the Polish authorities, the repertoire features and the importance of creativity for the national consciousness of the local Ukrainian population. The prosopography method was applied in order to find out the artists' names. The scientific novelty of the article is the introduction to the scientific circulation of the new archival documents, the interwar periodicals, which made it possible to show the Dnieper (Naddniproianshchyna) political emigrants' influence on the interwar Volyn theatrical life development. The Conclusions. The Ukrainian political emigrants became fully involved in the cultural and artistic activities, realized their talents and skills in the theater and amateur work, after the revolution defeat of 1917 – 1921 in*

the territory of Volyn Voivodeship. In the first half of the 1920-ies, mobile theaters became a means of embodying the creative aspirations of the artists and the golden opportunity to earn a living. The commencement of the "Volyn experiment" by voivode H. Yuzevskiy, M. Pevnyi's and other artists, who came from Naddniprovyanshchyna relocation to Lutsk caused the VUT establishment, which during the 1930-ies of the XXth century kept the national spirit, Ukrainian traditions, the way of life and culture. The establishment of Bolshevik power in the region in 1939 led to the total control over the cultural life of the region, including the theatrical arts.

Key words: mobile theater troupes, Volyn Ukrainian Theater, Ukrainian political emigrants, Volyn Voivodeship, Second Polish Republic.

ТЕАТРАЛЬНЕ МИСТЕЦТВО ЯК ФОРМА САМОРЕАЛІЗАЦІЇ НАДДНІПРЯНСЬКИХ ПОЛІТИЧНИХ ЕМІГРАНТІВ У ВОЛИНСЬКОМУ ВОЄВОДСТВІ (1920 – 1930-ті рр.)

Анотація. Мета дослідження. У статті проаналізовано місце і роль міжвоєнної української політичної еміграції у театральному житті Волинського воєводства. Доведено, що, незважаючи на побутові труднощі, емігранти вирізнялися громадсько-політичною та соціокультурною активністю, а театральна діяльність була як способом заробітку, так і можливістю творчої самореалізації. **Методологія дослідження** базується на історико-культурному, хронологічному методах, а також методах аналізу і систематизації, що дозволило розглянути умови появи мандрівних труп, Волинського українського театру, прослідкувати їх взаємини з польською владою, особливості репертуару та значення творчості для національної самосвідомості місцевого українського населення. Метод просопографії знадобився для з'ясування імен артистів. **Наукова новизна** статті полягає у введенні до наукового обігу нових архівних документів, міжвоєнної періодики, що дало можливість показати вплив наддніпрянських політичних емігрантів на розвиток театрального життя міжвоєнної Волині. **Висновки.** З ініціативи діячів української революції 1917 – 1921 рр., що змушені були емігрувати на територію Другої Речі Посполитої і поселилися у Волинському воєводстві, значно активізувалася театральна діяльність, яка у 20-х роках акумулювалася у поширенні мандрівних театральних труп, гуртків при товаристві "Просвіта", а у 30-х роках виявилася у створенні та діяльності Волинського українського театру. Цей період ознаменований неоднозначним ставленням польської влади до українського театру, формуванням репертуару, поширенням української вистави у віддалених куточках регіону.

Ключові слова: мандрівні театральні трупи, Волинський український театр, українські політичні емігранти, Волинське воєводство, Друга Річ Посполита.

The Problem Statement. Owing to the Bolshevik takeover of power and the Ukrainian National Democratic Revolution defeat in 1917 – 1921, the Ukrainian political emigration emerged. Numerous military and civilian emigrants moved to the interwar Poland. After gaining their artistic experience in the internment camps, they activated the theatrical life in Volyn Voivodeship and created a number of the mobile theatrical troupes. The Polish authorities caused difficulties and obstacles for the Ukrainians theatrical life, forbidding the plays' production, controlling the repertoire. At the same time, the Dnieper region theatrical figures established Volyn Ukrainian Theater (VUT), which defined the artistic development of the region in the 1930-ies.

The purpose of the article is to analyze the Dnieper (Naddniprovyanshchyna) political emigrants' influence on the Western Volyn region theatrical life: from the mobile theater troupes spread to the VUT creation, which facilitated their adaptation and promoted creative self-realization.

The Analysis of the Recent Researches. There are diverse academic researches dedicated to the coryphaeus (luminaries) of Ukrainian theater and the organizers of the

theatrical affair in Ukraine, but the interwar theater life history during the interwar Volyn, and even more the Dnieper peoples' involvement, remains unresearched in the contemporary historiography. In the first informative publication on the emigrants' cultural work written by Symon Narizhnyi, their activity in Volyn Voivodeship is mentioned briefly (Narizhnyi, 1942). Some theatrical life details are described in the following edition: "Our Theater. A Book of Ukrainian Theater Art Figures of 1915 – 1991", two volumes of which were edited by the literary critic Hryhor Luzhnytskyi (Luzhnytskyi, 1975), but there is also little material on Western Volyn. The theatrical life in Volyn Voivodeship is reflected in some works written by modern Ukrainian scholars, including Olena Bonkovska, who studied the theater in Western Ukrainian lands (Bonkovska, 2008), Volyn Ukrainian Theater (VUT) was studied by Sophia Stepaniuk (Stepaniuk, 2008), Ruslana Davydiuk dealt with the Dnieper emigrant' socio-cultural practices (Davydiuk, 2016) and the others. The specifics of the theatrical art development in the interwar Volyn, as well as the Ukrainian political emigrants' importance in this process, remains insufficiently researched, the source base of the article was mainly the archival documents and the interwar periodical press materials.

The Statement of the Basic Material. The theater has always been an integral part of the social, cultural and artistic life of the society. In the 1920-ies, the amateur theater movement in Volyn Voivodeship was associated with "Prosvita" musical and dramatic sections activities, as well as with the travelling theater troupes proliferation. Petro Zadorozhnyi-Zadonskyi, the Naddnieper worked as Kovel's "Prosvita" artist-director. In 1922, the emigrant Viktor Staroschuk (theatrical alias Dolnyi), who performed in amateur groups and Mykola Sadovskyi's theater, returned to the theatrical life. During the UNR Army retreat, he stayed in Rivne, then moved to Lutsk, where in January 1927 he headed the "Ukrainian Artists Society" at the local "Prosvita".

The founder of the dramatic group at Ostroh "Prosvita", the emigrant Mykola Shuhayevskyi, staged plays by Ukrainian authors and wrote his own plays. There were the directors' courses in Rivne "Prosvita". Petro Zinchenko, the Naddnieper, whose graduates were in charge of the drama clubs in the villages and towns of the county, was conducting the lessons. There were even the theater group, the choir, the string orchestra in the UNR Army's internment camp, the labour settlement was located at the sugar plantations of Babyn village, Rivne povit (district) and was headed by Yevhen Biletskyi, the UNR Army General-Chorister. The performances and concerts served not only the leisure time activity but also made it possible to obtain funds for the needs of immigrants, replenish the cash aid (Samoorhanizatsiia ta hromadske zhyttia ukrainskoi emihratsii v Polshchi, 1926, pp. 13–14).

Volodymyr Savchenko-Bilskyi, the UNR Army General-Cornet (General-Khorunzhyi) never abandoned his admiration – theater, that's why, he organized numerous Ukrainian plays in Sarny. Andriy Dubynovskyi, ataman's Volodymyr Oskilko former adjutant, having some experience in theater management in internment camps, arranged the drama groups in the villages near Rivne. (Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSA SSU, Rivne), f. 5 (R), d. 1, c. 5219, p. 43). In general, the level of the amateur theater group's development depended on the activity and creative desires of the initiators of such groups.

The mobile amateur troupes, which were established by the emigrants from the Dnieper Ukraine (Naddnipryanshchyna) were the most widespread form of the theatrical life during the 1920-ies. The artistic level of these groups was low, as there were few professional actors there. At the same time, such a mobile form of the theatrical practice led to the Ukrainian word spreading even in the remote villages of the region, and also made it possible to earn a living for the troupes.

The teams, which consisted of 15–40 people carried on the process of changing the actors, the directors, who moved from one troupe to another. This, on the one hand, deepened the artists' mutual influence, but on the other hand, indicated the complexity of the conditions and the difficulty of the activity. The actors were forced to sew costumes on their own, to draw scenery for unpretentious household scenes. It was required to receive the concession in the voivodship or in 'starostvo' (the village elder) in order to organise a troupe. As a result, the concessionaire was appointed as the theater director. Such permission gave the opportunity to work in the territory of the respective administrative unit (Luzhnytskyi (red.), 1975, p. 14).

After the the UNR State Drama Theater evacuation from Kamianets-Podilskyi city, the part of the actors settled down in the Western Ukrainian lands, hence, becoming the part of the Second Polish Republic (Second Commonwealth). In the summer of 1921 the renowned director Oleksandr Zaharov moved to Lutsk, but after a few months, due to the "Ukrainian Conversation Society" invitation, he moved to Halychyna (Galicia) with his wife, performer Maria Morska. (Luzhnytskyi (red.), 1975, pp. 22–23).

In 1920 the actors, who came from Naddniprolyanshchyna (the Dnieper Ukraine) organized a theater in Kovel, which was headed by Theodora Rudenko. In May 1922, this troupe was reorganized into the Ukrainian Naddniprolyanshchyna (Dnieper) Theater. The theater was increasing quantitatively and organizationally, that's why the artists performed in Polish various cities. The troupe composition remained stable for a long time, the natives from Kyiv region: Theodora Rudenko and her husband Nazar Obidzynskyi created the theater's nucleus. Nazar Obidzynskyi was in charge of the administrative work. Agatha Andriyiv-Lubaska, T. Rudenko's mother and a native of Kamianets-Podilskyi gained considerable popularity as the performer (State Archives of Rivne region) (SARR), f. 30, d. 2, c. 557, p. 4). Travelling, the theater staged mostly historical, folk performances (Desiata richnytsia isnuvannia Ukrainskoho Naddniprolyanskoho Teatru u Polshchi, 1932, pp. 25–26).

The Ukrainian Naddniprolyanshchyna (Dnieper) Theater under Olha Mitkevych's guidance, which was established in the internment camps, continued its activity in Volyn. The Ukrainian Naddniprolyanshchyna (Dnieper) Theater also toured around Poland. Subsequently, a troupe led by Nina Boyko emerged from this team (SARR, f. 156, d. 2, c. 167, p. 22).

Mykola Aydariv, an actor at the UNR branch State Theater in Mohylov, a native of Kharkiv, founded the "Renaissance" ("Vidrodzhennia") Theater in Lutsk in 1922, having broken away from the I. Kogutyak's Ukrainian Movable Drama Theater (created in 1920 in Stanislaviv and supplemented by M. Sadovskyi's Theater actors) (Luzhnytskyi (red.), 1975, p. 22; Narizhnyi, 1942, p. 312). There were numerous actors in the Renaissance Theater troupes, in particular, the M. Aydariv's wife Maria; Opanas Karabynevych, a native of Vinnytsia, who worked at the internment camp in Czestochowa; Yuriy Kononov, a native of Kyiv, the UNR Army centurion and an actor at the Shypyorno Camp Theater (Kononiv, 1992, p. 713) and the others. M. Aydariv's troupe was also travelling with the Ukrainian-language performances, staging historical and domestic character plays (Hastroli trupy Poltavchanka, 1932, pp. 22–23).

Mykola Komarovskyy's, Hryhoriy Berezovskyy's theatrical collectives worked in the Voivodship fruitfully. The theater "Ray" ("Promin") under Mykola Komarovskyy's guidance staged the following performances: "Night on Ivan Kupal" written by M. Strytskyi, "Zaporozhets by the Danube" written by S. Hulak-Artemovskyy and the others. In February 1924, there were 11 artists in the above-mentioned theater troupe (SARR, f. 30, d. 2, c. 557, p. 17 v). In 1928 H. Berezovskyy, a former actor and the director of M. Sadovskyi's theater

in Katerynoslav and his wife Marta Avsyukevych-Berezovskyi headed the dramatic circle at “Prosvita” in Kremenetsk. Actually, H. Berezovskyi invented and was the first, who applied the light effects in the theatrical practice (Yuvilei artysta Berezovskoho, 1935, p. 6).

Mykola Orel-Stepnyak, the People's Theater director of “Prosvita” in Lviv, having lost his concession to the theater activity in the Eastern Galicia (Halychyna), moved to Volyn in May 1926. He established the theater bureau at Lutsk “Prosvita” and later organized a theater (State Archives of Ivano-Frankivsk Region (SAIFR), f. 2, d. 1, c. 597, p. 38). Naddnipryanshchyna wandering theaters under I. Horodnychoho-Ohorodnykova and R. Buhayov-Poltavchenko guidance travelled with the performances on everyday and historical subjects through Volyn Voivodeship villages. (Hastroli trupy Poltavchanka, 1932, p. 6).

The Polish authorities controlled the theatrical troupes' performances, carried out the systematic inspections and imposed bans. In Volodymyr povit the village elders even checked A. Karabinevich's travelling troupe artists' documents. The result was the eviction of two artists, who came from Naddnipryanshchyna –one actor was sent to Kalish, the other to Ternopil. The Ukrainian Central Committee Attempts to protect the artists were futile, only after the personal appeal to the voivode, the eviction decision was overturned. However, after the tour was over, the police continued to conduct searches at the local Ukrainian activists' homes (Volodymyrivshchyna, 1928, p. 4).

During the first interwar decade, despite its successes, the Ukrainian theatrical troupes were smaller than the corpses of other nationalities, which is explained by both the government policy and the material difficulties. In addition, the Polish administration tried to isolate Volyn's cultural space from Galicia's influences. The main opposer of such a policy was Volyn Voivode Henryk Yuzevskyi, who was consistently implementing the idea of the “Sokal Border” (Davydiuk, 2016, p. 516).

The number of travelling troupes decreased after the VUT establishment. The VUT was headed by Mykola Pevnyi, a native of Poltava region, the UNR Army centurion. After receiving his theater education at Raihoff's drama courses in Petrograd, before the revolution, he worked in various theater troupes, later on, organized an amateur group at the Kalish internment camp. The VUT foundation day is considered to be on the 18th of November in 1928 when at the 10th-anniversary celebration dedicated to Lutsk “Prosvita”, the actors played an act of the historical play, which was called “Hetman Doroshenko” written by L. Starytska in the city theater (Stepaniuk, 2008, pp. 320, 325). The composition of the theater remained stable for a long time, up to 25 artists, increasing to 30 people in 1939. The peasants were the main contingent of the audience, so the prices for performances were low – varied from 50 hr. up to 1 zł. 50 hr. (Pevnyi, 1936, p. 2). The artists' financial situation was not easy: because of the low pay for the performances, they often had to look for the additional earnings (Staryi teatral, 1929, p. 3).

In Lutsk at the village elders (starosta) conference, the financial assistance to the theaters was discussed on the 4th of November in 1931. Voevoda Yuzevskyi noted that the Ukrainian theater can apply for “certain quotas” only if the “state center” value is acquired. At the same time, more categorical opinions were heard at this conference: Dubenskyi headmaster assured that it was necessary to “limit the influx of foreign Ukrainian theaters to Volyn” (State Archives of Ternopol region (SATR), f. 2, d. 3, c. 59, p. 2 v). However, the VUT had the authorities' support, for example, Volyn Voivodship Administration Self-Government Department allocated about 18 thousand PLN for the needs of the theater annually (State Archive of Volyn Region (SAVR), f. 200, d. 1, c. 2, p. 57). In 1935, the Ministry for Religion and Public Education allocated 1 thousand zł. monthly grants for the theater (SARR, f. 478,

d. 1, c. 3, p. 30 v). However, these funds were not enough, so the theater tried to make money on its own.

Traditionally, VUT dated performances to the prominent Ukrainian historical dates or individuals. The critics and the public have been uneasy about the theater's repertoire based on the domestic plays. The artists staged the following performances: "Sorochynskiy Yarmarok (Fair)", "Nataalka Poltavka", "Christmas Night", "Oy Ne Khody, Hrytsyu", "Martyn Borulya" and the others. There were some thoughts concerning to revise the repertoire, to eliminate the "hoppachyna" (Buty chy ne buty, 1936, p. 3). M. Pevnyi explained: "We have a repertoire with which the easiest way to approach the soul of a Ukrainian peasant, that is, household and historical" (Zahalni zbory teatralnoho tovarystva, 1939, p. 5). However, in some places the theater also resorted to the European repertoire. On the 21st of November in 1937 the comedy "Dark Spot" written by M. Kadelburg was played for three acts in Lutsk (O. K., 1937, p. 4).

VUT often travelled, usually starting the theatrical season in September with a play at "Ridna Khata" premises in Lutsk. During the 6-month "Volyn" tour, from December 24, 1936 to June 28, 1937, the theater visited 6 counties, staged 133 performances, which were attended by 27 226 spectators. (Podorozh Volynskoho Ukrainskoho teatru po Volyni, 1937, p. 3). It was quite difficult to tour, as the troupe actors had to carry even the smallest things with them. Sometimes they travelled by trains, by cars, but mostly by water because of the poor roads' conditions and the cheapness of this type of transport.

Volyn Ukrainian Theater Society (VUTS) took care of the theater, the founding meeting of which was held in Lutsk on January 3, 1932 on the basis of the statute approved on November 7, 1931. (SAVR, f. 200, d. 1, c. 2, p. 53). VUTT brought together the representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, who were not indifferent to the theatrical and musical arts. The Board of Directors of the Society consisted mainly of Naddniprolyanshchyna natives – emigrants: Mykola Maslov was the Chairman, Oleksandr Kovalevskyi was the Deputy, Oleksa Almazov was the Treasurer. The members of the Board were Vasyl Halushka, Teodor Lovetskyi, Mykhailo Tyravskyi, and the others (SAVR, f. 200, d. 1, c. 1, pp. 7, 16).

During the second half of the 1930-ies, separate amateur groups continued their activity in Volyn Voivodship. Among other ascetics, there also was Vitaliy Yurchenko, who in 1930 managed to escape from the Solovetskyi camps and settled down in Lviv. After he moved to Volyn in 1936, he worked in Korets, Rivne, Zdolbuniv, took the floor with abstracts, substantiating the role of the theater in the national consciousness development. His practical activity as the head of a drum club in Zdolbuniv was successful. In the povit amateur collectives' competition, the drama circle, which staged the play-satire "Generalna Proba" ("General Trial") written by Yurchenko, received a diploma of the 1st degree (Konkurs dramatychnykh hurtkiv na Zdolbunivshchyni, 1939, p. 3).

In 1939 the Bolshevik's power establishment in the Western Ukraine territory in September caused a fundamentally different situation for the theatrical art development. The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) bodies purged the personnel, fired the "alien people", and the Soviet Ukraine theaters artists' involvement led to the total control establishment over the cultural life of the region, including the theatrical art (Zhyviuk, 2011, p. 29). At that time, many former artists left the Bolshevik-controlled territory, and many were arrested. Mykola Pevnyi's fate remains unknown, VUT director, quite possibly that he was shot in Bykivnia.

The Conclusions. The Ukrainian political emigrants became fully involved in the cultural and artistic activities, realized their talents and skills in the theater and amateur

work, after the revolution defeat of 1917 – 1921 in the territory of Volyn Voivodeship. In the first half of the 1920-ies, mobile theaters became a means of embodying the creative aspirations of the artists and the golden opportunity to earn a living. The commencement of the “Volyn experiment” by voivode H. Yuzevskiy, M. Pevnyi’s and other artists, who came from Naddniprovyanshchyna relocation to Lutsk caused the VUT establishment, which during the 1930-ies of the XXth century kept the national spirit, Ukrainian traditions, the way of life and culture. The establishment of Bolshevik power in the region in 1939 led to the total control over the cultural life of the region, including the theatrical arts.

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**IMPOSITION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY
IN THE USSR DURING THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR (1941 – 1945)**

Abstract. The purpose of the research is to analyze the special aspects of imposition and implementation of the state of emergency within the USSR during the German-Soviet War (1941 – 1945).

The methodology of the research is based on the principles of scientificity, historicism, authorial objectivity, the use of general (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and special historical (historical-genetic, historical-typological, historical-systemic) methods. **The scientific novelty** is the reconstruction of the process of the state of emergency imposing during the German-Soviet War 1941 – 1945 based on the analyzed documents. **The Conclusions.** It has been found out that the State Defense Committee (GKO), which became the main military-economic center of the USSR and ensured the process of mobilization, creation of new military units and switch of economy and agriculture to a war footing, played a pivotal role in the realization of the state of emergency. The priority was given to the mass evacuation of valuable property and population, the establishment of new enterprises manufacturing military goods. It has been illustrated in the research that the Soviet government used emergency measures for manufacture intensification through increasing working hours, production standard and calling citizens for labour service. The attention was drawn to the formation of local emergency bodies, such as the commission for urban defense, which were tasked with mustering defense of settlements, maintaining order and bringing provocateurs, spies and hostile agents to the Military Tribunal. It is proved that GKO activities across the Ukrainian lands liberated from the Nazi invaders didn't contribute to the stabilization of the lives of the people, taking into account deportations, "cleans" and creation of the conditions for a man-made famine of 1946. It has been noted in the research that imposition of the state of emergency was an important element for the restructuring of the Soviet system of government and public administration in the context of wartime. And the GKO with its exclusive powers in all areas of the social and political life of the country, economy, agriculture and transport was the main body developing and implementing the state of emergency.

Key words: the German-Soviet War, State Defense Committee, state of emergency, military facilities, state of siege.

УВЕДЕННЯ НАДЗВИЧАЙНОГО СТАНУ В СРСР У ПЕРІОД НІМЕЦЬКО-РАДЯНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ (1941 – 1945 рр.)

Анотація. Мета дослідження – аналіз особливостей введення та реалізації надзвичайного стану на теренах СРСР у роки німецько-радянської війни (1941 – 1945). **Методологія дослідження** спирається на принципи науковості, історизму, авторської об'єктивності, використання загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, узагальнення) та спеціально-історичних (історико-генетичний, історико-типологічний, історико-системний) методів. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що на підставі зібраних документів виконано реконструкцію процесу введення надзвичайного стану у період німецько-радянської війни 1941 – 1945 рр. **Висновки.** Встановлено, що особливу роль у реалізації режиму надзвичайного стану зіграв Державний Комітет Оборони (ДКО), який став головним військово-господарським центром СРСР та забезпечував проведення мобілізації, створення нових військових частин та переведення економіки та сільського господарства на військовий лад. Особлива увага приділялася масовій евакуації матеріальних цінностей, населення, створенню нових підприємств із виробництва воєнної продукції. Показано, що радянська влада використовувала надзвичайні заходи інтенсифікації виробництва шляхом збільшення робочого часу, норм виробітку та залучення громадян до трудової повинності. Акцентується увага на створенні надзвичайних місцевих органів на зразок комісій з оборони міст, на які покладалися завдання щодо організації оборони населених пунктів, реалізації заходів охорони порядку та притягнення до суду Воєнного трибуналу провокаторів, шпигунів та ворожих агентів. Доведено, що діяльність ДКО на звільнених від німецько-фашистських загарбників землях України не сприяла стабілізації життя населення з огляду на проведення депортацій, "чисток" та створення умов для появи штучного голоду 1946 р. Констатовано, що введення надзвичайного стану було важливою ланкою в перебудові системи влади і державного управління СРСР в умовах воєнного часу, а основним органом розробки і реалізації заходів надзвичайного стану став ДКО з виключними повноваженнями в усіх сферах суспільно-політичного життя країни, економіці, сільському господарстві та транспорті.

Ключові слова: німецько-радянська війна, Державний Комітет Оборони, надзвичайний стан, військові об'єкти, стан облоги.

The Problem Statement. The research elucidates the features of the state of emergency taking place across the Soviet territory during the German-Soviet War. The interest in this problem is not random due to the socio-political situation existing in modern Ukraine. This refers to the aggression of the Russian Federation, attempts of some political groups to destroy the Ukrainian statehood and to intensify crisis phenomena in the social and political life, economy and other areas. One of the means for countering such phenomena is the imposition of special period or state of emergency which must ensure public safety, the functioning of the state authorities, enterprises, and organizations. At the same time, it is important to mark that theoretical issues of the history of the emergency state is an underexplored problem which requires in-depth study. In this regard, there is a need to turn to historical experience and to study the special aspects of the operation of martial law during the German-Soviet War (1941 – 1945).

The analysis of sources and recent researches shows that the issue of imposition of the state of emergency was considered by historians, lawyers, policy analysts, public administration experts. Among them, particular attention is paid to the works of D. Bondarenko (Bondarenko, 2005), T. Vronska, O. Lysenko and O. Shandra (Vronska, Lysenko & Shandra, 2017), A. Wood (Wood, 2004), V. Hrynevych (Hrynevych, 1991), D. Glantz (Glantz, 2001), O. Deryugin (Deryugin, 2007), M. Koval (Koval, 1999), A. Limanskaya (Limanskaya, 2015), R. Overy (Overy, 1998), I. Patrilyak (Patrilyak, 2016), G. Roberts (Roberts, 2006), O. Cherepanova (Cherepanova, 2005), etc. The particularity of these works is a fragmentary consideration of the history of the state of emergency during the German-Soviet War as the above researches were devoted to the development of more general problems. As a result, this issue needs more thorough and systemic study.

The purpose of the article isto analyze the features of imposition and implementation of the state of emergency in the USSR during the German-Soviet War (1941 – 1945).

The Statement of the Basic Material. The outbreak of the German-Soviet War necessitated the essential changes in the activities of public and administrative authorities of the USSR. There was a need to reorganize the functioning of state authorities, to switch economy and the agricultural sector to a war footing, to mobilize the population, to provide the army with military equipment, food-stuffs, other auxiliary aids and to ensure effective performance of all enterprises.

One of the means for the solution of the above task was the imposition of the state of emergency through which the re-organization of the activity of the defense industry, transport and all material and military resources of the country was carried out. The decision concerning the imposition of the state of emergency was adopted according to Art. 49 (n) of the Constitution of 1936, which authorized to proclaim martial law in separate localities or throughout the USSR in the interests of the defense of the state or for the purpose of ensuring a public order and state security. Based on this constitutional provision, the Decree of the Supreme Council of the USSR as of June 22, 1941 “On Martial Law” was adopted.

The issue of the imposition of the state of emergency in that historical period was considered by Soviet scientists very briefly, but there were some best practices of such pre-revolutionary lawyers as V. M. Gessen, I. A. Shendzykovskiy, V. F. Deriuzhynskiy. For example, Ya. M. Magaziner stated that the government imposes the state of emergency when the current legislation can't combat crisis phenomena (Magaziner, 1911, p. 56).

In the regions where martial law was proclaimed, all functions of the state authorities in the sector of defense, maintenance of public order and national security were delegated to the

councils of front lines, armies, military districts, and in case of their absence – to command authority of military formations. As para. 1 marked, all local authorities, establishments, organizations and enterprises were obliged to provide resounding support to military leaders through using powers and means for defense needs and keeping public order. In O. O. Deryugin’s opinion, the feature of the state of emergency taking place in the USSR during the German-Soviet War was the delegation of the state powers of emergency nature related to all areas of the social life (Deryugin, 2007, p. 47). Thus, according to para. 3 of the Decree, the military authorities were granted the right to involve citizens in labor service to carry out defense activities, security of critical objects, deployment of military units and establishments, as well as to proclaim transport and cartage obligation for military purposes.

In order to keep the public order and security, military authorities could take the following measures: to regulate the working hours of establishments and enterprises; to hold some sessions, meetings; to organize a transport-pedestrian movement in particular places; to impose a curfew; to organize entry and exit of the population in the areas proclaimed martial law; to evict socially dangerous people from the territory proclaimed martial law. In addition, the military authorities were empowered to issue the decisions obligatory for the entire population and to fix an administrative penalty in the form of imprisonment for up to 6 months or fine of up to 300 karbovanets for their violation; to give instructions to the local bodies, governmental organizations and to demand from them unconditional and immediate execution (fig. 1).

In general, the Decree delegated all powers in the area of maintenance civic order and security to the military authorities that often caused the malpractice and infringement of the citizen’s rights. As D. V. Bondarenko marks, a wartime situation resulted in the emergence of such phenomena as breach of orders, abandonment of workers and servants of their duties, under-performance of workdays by kolkhoz members and deliberate non-delivery of radio receivers (Bondarenko, 2005, p. 12).




Fig. 1. Powers of the military authorities during the state of emergency according to the Decree of the Supreme Council of the USSR as of June 22, 1941

The Decree strengthened the criminal liability for crimes committed by military servants; for the avoidance of performance of general military service duty; for illegal purchase, sale

and possession of weapons, as well as theft of weapons. According to the war law (para. 6), perpetrators were subjected to a criminal liability for the failure to execute instructions and orders of the military authorities and for the crimes committed in the localities proclaimed the martial law. The military authorities were additionally granted the right to submit cases of speculative trading, gross misconduct and other crimes for consideration by military tribunals if a command group deemed it necessary under the circumstances of martial law.

The fact that the Decree contained the Law as of August 7, 1932 “On the Protection of Public (Socialist) Property”, which tragically remained in the national memory entitled “The Law of Five Spikelets”, generates interest. As V. V. Halunko states, the world history can’t find the more insidious, inhumane, anti-human official document under which hungry children aged twelve, who were caught at corn field collecting as little as a handful of spikelets, were subjected to imprisonment for 10 years, and adults were sentenced to shooting death for that sort of offence (Halunko, 2008, p. 47). According to the scientist’s data, 55 thousand people were convicted under that law, 2110 of them – to the extreme penalty.

The imposition of the state of emergency required the deployment of armed forces that caused a need to mobilize the population. A complex of measures designed to complete the army up to the authorized war strength was conducted based on the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR “On the Mobilization of Men Liable for Call-Up...” as of June 22, 1941 (Sbornikzakonov, 1956, pp. 213–215). The action uptook place in Leningrad, Baltic, West, Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Oryol, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Ural, Siberia, Volga, North Caucasus and Transcaucasian military districts. Men liable for call up who were born from 1905 to 1918 inclusively, i.e. men of the most energetic age – from 22 to 36 years, were subjected to mobilization. The performance of such activity in the context of the Soviet system had some special aspects: a large scale and high rates of mobilization of designated military personnel; mobilization of women to rear-based units of the Red Army; deployment of a voluntary movement in the form of divisions of the people’s volunteer corps; quick creation of combat formations.

The Nazi Germany was thoroughly preparing to attack the USSR and many diversion units, which had crime partners among the locals, were acting at the frontier. Consequently, the next step for ensuring the state of emergency was the adoption of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR as of June 22, 1941 “Regulation on Military Tribunals in the Localities Proclaimed Martial Law and Combat Areas”. The Decree facilitated the procedure of holding liable and reduced the terms for considering such cases. The military tribunal took up the case for 24 hours without involving defense counsels, witnesses’ testimony were rarely heard, and citizens didn’t have the right to appeal against decisions. The tribunals’ judgments came in force since the proclamation and were implemented promptly for 3 hours. Commanders and military councils of districts, front lines and armies were authorized to suspend the execution of the judgment on the death penalty. A similar document had been adopted as of 22.11.1917 in the form of the Decree “On Court No 1” approved by the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Russia where by the Military Revolutionary Tribunals had been established to hear cases of espionage, outrages, robberies, sabotage and hooliganism.

Under the framework of the imposition of combat activities, there was a need to take emergency measures through increasing output of military goods that was implemented by switching economy to a war foot. The motto of such actions was a slogan: “Everything for the front! Everything for Victory!”. To realize the ideas, it was adopted the Decree of the

Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR “On the Working Hours of Workers and Employees during War Time” as of June 26, 1941. That document stipulated the cancellation of weekends and holidays, introduction of the obligatory overtime work, engagement of child labor, and arbitrary departure of the workplace was equated to desertion and considered as a crime, which meant punishment and referral of a case to the Military Tribunal.

On the first days of the war, the Red Army suffered crushing defeats in the Baltics, Belarus and central Ukraine: the Nazis seized Kaunas – June 23, Vilnius – June 24, Minsk – June 28, Bobruisk – June 29, Lviv – June 30. The Regulation of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks (TsK VKP (b)) No. 825 created the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR consisted of S. K. Tymoshenko (Chairman), H. K. Zhukov, J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. Ie. Voroshilov, S. M. Budonnyi, N. H. Kuznetsov. The body of command control couldn’t establish the connection with military forces and wasn’t informed about actions at the front. The beforementioned fact is proved by the book of H. K. Zhukov, which states that on June 29, 1941, J. V. Stalin twice visited the People’s Commissariat of Defense and Headquarters of the High Command in person, and both times he reacted very sharply to the situation in the western strategic direction (Zhukov, 2002, p. 101). Under such conditions, the need to create more effective center, which should manage armed forces and economic sectors in the context of the emergency state, arose. That circumstance was caused by a catastrophic situation at the front in the form of a blockade of the Soviet troops in the area of Bialystok and Minsk which faced the main bodies of the Western Front. As O. Isaev notes, according to the German data, 300338 of Soviet soldiers felt prisoner of two mousetraps, and according to the Soviet sources, about 200000 of military servants were captured that confirmed major losses of the Red Army during the first days of the German-Soviet War (Isaev, 2005, p. 125). The State Defense Committee (GKO) established on June 30, 1941 was that kind of the body. Its orders, directives and decrees had a status of the wartime laws including obligatory and unconditional execution by all state, the Soviet bodies without exceptions. The body was primarily headed by S. K. Tymoshenko and later by J. V. Stalin, and it consisted of V. M. Molotov (Deputy Chairman), K. Ie. Voroshilov, H. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beria, from February 1942 – A. I. Mikoian, M. O. Voznesenskiy and L.M. Kahanovych. The State Defense Committee didn’t have its executive office and exercised control through the executive offices of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and TsK VKP(b): draft decrees and orders were elaborated by the relevant people’s commissariats and offices, and paperwork was conducted by the special sector of the Central Committee of the Party. The Soviet historical literature mainly studied the activities of GKO as a body secured the implementation of defensive measures during the German-Soviet War, but as the Ukrainian historian I. K. Patryliak states, the government organized a devastating artificial famine, carried out massive deportations, exiles, “cleanings” based on the GKO Resolutions (Patryliak, 2016, p. 178).

When establishing GKO, it was used the historical experience of the alike body which had been operating during the Civil War entitled the Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defense (SRKO) formed by the Resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee as of November 30, 1918. The agency had been the special military and economic center of the Soviet Russia controlling the activities of the Revolutionary Military Council, other military agencies, sectors of economy and transport. According to A. A. Fomin, the consideration of the history of the Soviet Russia permits highlighting three types of the state of emergency:

1) martial law at the front; 2) martial law at “peaceful” regions”; 3) the state of emergency which could be imposed in any region of the country (Fomin, 2006, p. 25).

One of the elements of the German military doctrine was the use of massive bombings to weaken and destroy the enemy’s defense. Such tactics significantly helped the German army to win in Poland, Belgium, France and Yugoslavia. It is clear that the experience was used in the war against the USSR when aircraft of the German air fleets inflicted massive attacks on the positions of the Soviet troops. Consequently, during the first hours of the war, there were bomb attacks on Minsk, Zhytomyr, Sevastopol, Kaunas and Kyiv, which were bombed 5 times on June 22, 1941. The Nazis dropped 90 blast and incendiary bombs on the Ukrainian capital. Thus, it caused the urgent need to prepare the population for military actions and civil defense that was realized through the Resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union as of 02.07.1941 No.1812 “On General Obligatory Preparation of the Population for Air Defense”, which engaged all citizens aged 16 to 60.

Simultaneously with military advance, the German command was taking ideological measures aimed at misguiding the population of the USSR. To fulfill the assigned task, they used various means: leaflets, radio broadcasts, spreading rumors, appealing to bear arms against Bolsheviks authorities in different cities of the country. With a view of the prevention of negative influence on the population, information on the retreat of the Red Army, the following documents were adopted under the framework of the realization of the state of emergency. It referred to the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR as of July 6, 1941 “On Liability for Spreading Rumors at War Time Causing Anxiety of the Population” whereby criminal liability in the form of imprisonment for up to 5 years was established for such actions. Subsequently, according to the letter of the People’s Commissariat, shooting death was introduced if the actions involved calls for the subversion of the current state system”. As M. V. Belanyuk states, the success of the Wehrmacht, from the standpoint of the Soviet government, required neutralizing and performing counterpropaganda, so the information must be classified for the population (Belanyuk, 2011, p. 135). At the same time, the decree neglected the human rights because the law didn’t clarify the concept “rumors,” which could be understood as citizens’ opinion on some issues. In other words, the interpretation of the term provided fertile ground for the penal staff of the USSR of that time. The further step was the Decree of GKO No. 37 “On Measures for Strengthening Political Control of Post and Telegraph Correspondence” which established military censorship that was entitled to withdraw citizens’ letters, any correspondence and to bring addressers to responsibility. Another step was the Decree as of 25.06.1941 No. 1750 “On Delivery of Radio Receivers and Radio Transmitters by the Population”. As S. A. Vaupshasov notes, after the liberation of the territory from the Nazi invaders, people who had radios and informed the population about the victories of the Red Army were awarded the Order of the Great Patriotic War II degree (Vaupshasov, 1961, p. 78).

In the early phases of the war, the activities of public authorities took place under the conditions of a mass evacuation of valuable property and population. To solve the above tasks as well as to stand against spies and saboteurs, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the merger of the People’s Commissariat of State Security of the USSR and the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR into the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD) was adopted. According to T. Iu. Stepanov, that kind of decision afforded to focus on the fight against the hostile agency and crime, to strengthen protection of a public order (Stepanov, 2010, p. 256).

To perform intelligence work in the rear of the Red Army, the German military intelligence service “Abwehr” actively involved such national and social groups as prisoners of war, defectors and others. Trainees of those institutions entered Soviet territory with reconnaissance and sabotage missions to carry out insurrection activities at the front line and in the rear of the Red Army. Taking into account the need to react against the actions of invaders, GKO adopted the Decree No. 433 as of August 8, 1941 “On the Protection of the Most Important Industrial Enterprises” whereby the supreme authority obliged NKVD to participate in strengthening the protection of such facilities.

In the context of the state of emergency, the Soviet leadership decided to fully involve all workers of the country in the defense actions and consequently, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR as of December 26, 1941 “On the Responsibility of Workers and Employees of Military Industry Enterprises Unauthorized Departure of Enterprises” was adopted. The document stated that the unauthorized departure of workers and employees from enterprises of the specified industries, including evacuated ones, should be considered as desertion, and persons guilty of unauthorized departure (desertion) should be punished by imprisonment for a term from 5 to 8 years. As the prominent English scientist Newton Scott writes, the foundation of the Soviet model of the state of emergency was the use of lawlessness, violence, terror and threats to family members, who become hostages of the Soviet system (Newton, 2015, p. 67).

During the first period of the war, there was a critical situation with the provision of troops with weapons, ammunition, supplies and other equipment. As a result of the retreat of the Red Army, losses of weapons and ammunition were severe in the first months of the war. According to the data provided by M. I. Meltyukhov, in the Baltic, Byelorussian, and Kyiv districts, several thousand wagons of ordnance supplies gathered in the district warehouses were lost during 10 days of the war. There were 6838 wagons of weapons and ammunition, incl. 442 wagons of artillery ordnance, 5814 wagons of ammunition, 181 wagons of small arms, 401 wagons of various ordnance materials at 17 blown-up warehouses of the mentioned districts (Meltyukhov, 2008, p. 67). To preserve military equipment, GKO adopted the Resolution No. 1379 as of 03.03.1942 “On the Protection of Military Equipment of the Red Army in War Time”. Liability for thievery, willful damage, loss, leaving unattended, violation of the precautions of storage of military supplies, weapons, tactical equipment was introduced. Taking into account the diversity of activities of the public authorities during the state of emergency, they were systematized (table 1).

Taking into account heavy losses of the Red Army and the necessity to make up for them, the Decree of GKO “On Universal Compulsory Military Training of the Citizens of the USSR” was issued on September 7, 1941. The reason for drafting the document was heavy losses of the Red Army as according to M.V. Filimoshin’s data, they amounted to 5187200 people killed or dead from wounds for 1941 – 1945. During the first period of the war, the Red Army lost 3.9 million people, of whom almost 2.8 million were taken prisoner, and the total loss of that period was estimated at 11285000 people (Filimoshin, 1999, p. 95). Thus, to prepare the reserve force for the Red Army, GKO approved to introduce a compulsory military training of male citizens of the USSR aged 16 to 50 years from October 1, 1941. Foremost, conscripts born in 1923 and 1924 and military reservists (among the untrained) under the age of 45 were covered. Training organization was entrusted to the People’s Commissariat of Defense (GKO) and its local agencies. As a part of GKO of the USSR, it was formed the Central Department of Universal Military Training (Vsevobuch) and Vsevobuch agencies in

districts and regional (krai and republican) military commissariats. Local party organizations were offered to carry out in-service training. In years of the war, a total number of citizens undergone the universal military training was 9862 people.

Table 1

Normative legal acts designed to regulate the state of emergency during the German-Soviet War

Document title	Date
Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On Martial Law"	22.06.1941
Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "Regulation on Military Tribunals in the Localities Proclaimed the Martial Law and Combat Areas"	22.06.1941
Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR "On the Working Hours of Workers and Employees during War Time"	26.06.1941
Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union No.1812 "On General Obligatory Preparation of the Population for Air Defense"	02.07.1941
Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR "On Liability for Spreading Rumors at War Time Causing Anxiety of the Population"	06.07.1941
Decree of GKO No. 37 "On Measures for Strengthening Political Control of Post and Telegraph Correspondence"	06.07.1941
Decree of GKO No. 433 "On the Protection of the Most Important Industrial Enterprises"	8.08.1941
Decree of GKO No.690 "On Universal Compulsory Military Training of the Citizens of the USSR"	17.09.1941
Decree of GKO No.1379 "On the Protection of Military Equipment of the Red Army in War Time"	03.03.1942
Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union "On Procedure of Involvement of Citizens in Labor Service in Wartime"	10.08.1942
Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR "On the Imposition of Martial Law at Sea and River Transport"	9.05.1943
Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR "On Invalidation of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council on Proclamation of Martial Law in Specific Localities of the USSR"	25.09.1945

In the summer of 1942, there was a critical situation due to the entrapment of a large group of the Soviet troops near Kharkiv that caused the crushing defeat of the South-Western front, losses of military hardware and ammunition. To increase the manufacture of military goods, the Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union No. 1353 as of 10.08.1942 "On Procedure of Involvement of Citizens in Labor Service in Wartime" was adopted. From the perspective of the development of historical studies, the fact that a similar resolution was in force in the time of the Civil War is of interest. Thus, the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense had adopted the Resolution "On Natural, Labor and Cartage Duty" as of November 19, 1919 whereby all male citizens aged from 35 to 50 and females aged from 18 to 40 had been subjected to the labor duty for storage, loading and unloading of fuel.

With a view to extend martial law to the transport sector, which played important role in providing the front with necessary supplies, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR as of May 9, 1943 "On the Imposition of Martial Law at Sea and River

Transport” was adopted (Sbornikzakonov, 1956, pp. 213–215). Thus, all 14 shipping lines, 51 sea ports, 27 ship repair factories and other enterprises of the industry were mobilized to resist the enemy. In the course of the war, about 200 ships of the North-West River Shipping Line were mobilized to the Navy and re-equipped into combat ships, auxiliary hospital and ambulance vessels. More than two-thirds of the combat ships of Ladoga warship flotilla consisted of the re-equipped troopships of the North-Westbasin and near 500 ships were assembled in Tuapse port to muster defense of Novorossiysk. Detached forces of ships of mobilized and rapidly armed tug-boats, passenger ships, boats and barges managed to develop a wide variety of activities in a short time: to assist military units, to get troops cross rivers, to contribute to the evacuation of the population and valuable objects. Another part of the Navy vessels was directly engaged in the naval operations to provide such embattled bases as Odesa, Sevastopol, Kerch with service ammunition or to maintain the evacuation of wounded and civilians. Based on the above document, the river fleet of the USSR transferred to the military river flotillas and partially provided transport support for all internal waterways of the Soviet Union. According to the Decree, all employees were equated to mobilized soldiers and subjected to the requirements of military discipline prohibiting arbitrary dismissal from work and stipulating strict responsibilities.

A distinctive feature of the history of the development of the state of emergency during the German-Soviet War was the fact of operating of the Supreme Council of the USSR and its Presidium – the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR, as well as people’s commissars and agencies, republican and local authorities. In practice, such a situation caused the doubling of activities of the mentioned authorities; however, GKO carried out defense management through ongoing public authorities. The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR made major decisions of the wartime concerning the state building, formation of new government agencies, organization and structure of the armed forces, ratification of the international agreements, military activities. At the same time, it worth noting that Chairman of the Supreme Council of the USSR, some members of the Council of People’s Commissars formed a part of Politburo and GKO, so practically they managed to agree upon the decision-making mechanism.

The institution of representatives, special committees, councils and commissions, which were functioning almost in 60 cities of the country to solve the most important problems, to accomplish mobilization plans, to organized the evacuation of people and enterprises, were formed under GKO. Such committees were composed of the secretary of regional committee or municipal TsK VKP(b) as chairman, chairmen of the relevant executive committees, representatives of a military command, head of the NKVD office and the others. In some cases, it was established special committees, for example, emergency control body – Defense Committee of Leningrad under the leadership of A. A. Zhdanov, which was formed on July 1, 1941. Similar bodies were created in other cities but entitled differently – defense headquarter, Committee for Defense Affairs, Committee for Defense Activity etc.; however, in that historical period, a form of defense committees, which were subsequently generalized and fixed in the GKO decrees, were created. According to V. A. Hrynevych, after the liberation of Ukraine, the experience of activities of the Defense Committees was used when establishing the People’s Commissariat of Defense of the Ukrainian SSR, which was entrusted to control the formation of military reserves, to provide the deployed troops with food and to maintain their military training (Hrynevych, 1991, p. 33).

The concepts “martial law” and “state of siege” differ in the content; for example, A. E. Lunev considers the state of siege as a type of martial law the imposition of which

is associated with some factors as well as special specific conditions (Lunev, 1961, p. 58). During the German-Soviet War, the following cities were in the state of siege: from August 8, 1941 – Odesa, from October 20, 1941 – Moscow, from October 26 – Tula, from October 29 – the Crimea. The Decree of GKO as of October 19, 1941 “On the Imposition of the State of Siege in Moscow and Surroundings Areas” marked that from October 20, 1941, street traffic from 24.00 till 5.00 was forbidden, and strict measures for order maintenance in the city and suburban areas were introduced. Violators of the regime were allowed to be held liable with subsequent case referral to the Military Tribunal, and provocateurs, spies, enemy agents, who call for disorderly conduct – to execute on the spot.

The study of the state of emergency shows that in Moscow such its form as the state of siege was introduced by the GKO decree and in other cities – by the decree of local Defense Committees. In early August of 1941, Odesa was entirely ringed by Hitler’s army and thus, the Decree of the Defense Committee “On the Introduction of the State of Siege” was adopted on August 8, 1941.

In general, one can determine that the special state is a form of martial law with exceptional restrictions on the rights of citizens, their involvement in defense activity, bans on moving from one workplace to another and restrictions on travel and correspondence. In O. V. Cherepanova’s opinion, the imposition of the state of emergency played a critical role in the national defense, military training and patriotic education of the young population and its training for military service (Cherepanova, 2005, p. 41). The annulment of martial law in the USSR after war termination was gradual. The first step was the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR as of July 7, 1945 “On Amnesty in Connection with the Victory over Hitler’s Germany”, which canceled all unset administrative fines and unenforced administrative penalties stipulated by para. “a” of Art. 4 of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR as of June 22, 1941 “On Martial Law”. Martial law was abolished in most parts of the country by the adoption of the Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR as of September 25, 1945 “On Invalidation of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council on Proclamation of Martial Law in Specific Localities of the USSR”.

The Conclusions. The imposition of the state of emergency was a crucial element in the rebuilding of the government system and public administration of the USSR under the conditions of martial law, and its practical implementation was the creation of GKO on June 30, 1941, which generated a new government system. The authority body adopted regulatory acts that became the laws of wartime and were subjected to obligatory and unconditional execution. The restructuring of the governance system for the state of emergency during the German-Soviet War (1941 – 1945) was conducted at two stages: 1) a change within the central authorities; 2) a change within the regional ones. At the country level, in the early days of the war, it was established the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR subsequently transformed in the State Defense Committee (GKO) with exclusive powers in all area of the domestic social and political life, economy, agriculture and transport sector. The activities of the regional authorities under the conditions of the state of emergency were performed according to the GKO decrees and aimed at solving the assigned tasks.

Historical events related to the retreat of the Red Army, heavy loses of troops and property as well as the need to run mobilization, defense training of the population, change of working conditions, strengthening of the protection of military facilities, responsibility for spreading

rumors causing anxiety of the population and responsibility for avoidance of mobilization influenced the content of the adopted GKO decrees.

The issue of imposition of different forms of the state of emergency was solved by the local Defense Committees which were formed to stand against the Nazi invaders. They were obliged to maintain order in the cities, to involve the population in defense activities, to form new military units and to secure the manufacture of military goods.

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THE SLOVAK TROOPS IN UKRAINE PROPAGANDIST IDEOLOGICAL SUPPORT AT THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR

Abstract. *The purpose of the research is to analyze the main theses of Slovakia's ideological and propaganda preparation for the war against the USSR and to evaluate the effectiveness of this training. The methodology of the research is based on the principles of objectivity, historicism, as well as the use of methods of analysis, synthesis, generalization. The scientific novelty is that for the first time in the Ukrainian historiography of World War II the features of the propaganda-ideological support of the Slovak troops in Ukraine in 1941 were found out. The main theses of Slovak propaganda have been examined and its effectiveness has been evaluated on the basis of official and unofficial documents. The Conclusions.* Unlike Germany's allies such as Romania and Finland, Slovakia had no territorial claims on the USSR. The only motive for participating in the war was a commitment to allied duty. Therefore, Slovakia's entry into the German-Soviet war required thorough propaganda and ideological training. It relied on several basic points: loyalty to allied duty to Germany; protection of the Slovak state against the aggressive plans of the Bolsheviks; protecting Christianity from atheistic Bolshevism;

the liberation of the peoples of the USSR from under Bolshevik tyranny; nurturing the best of military traditions. Their effectiveness in the early stages of the war was quite high. This was facilitated by the military chaplains' activities, who enjoyed considerable authority among personnel. Also, the Slovak soldiers were able to see clear confirmation of some above-mentioned theses in the Ukrainian lands (the Soviet punitive bodies victims' mass graves, spoiled religious buildings, etc.). In many localities the Slovaks were hailed as the liberators. This had a strong impact on the soldiers' moral and psychological state. The army, at least in the initial stages of the war, managed to keep away from the common-law and pro-communist sentiments in Slovak society. This was facilitated not only by appropriate ideological and advocacy support, but also by the removal of unreliable elements enrolled during mobilization.

Key words: *propaganda and ideological support, World War II, Slovakia, Ukraine, army.*

ПРОПАГАНДИСТСЬКО-ІДЕОЛОГІЧНЕ ЗАБЕЗПЕЧЕННЯ СЛОВАЦЬКИХ ВІЙСЬК В УКРАЇНІ НА ПОЧАТКОВОМУ ЕТАПІ НІМЕЦЬКО-РАДЯНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ

Анотація. *Мета дослідження* – проаналізувати основні тези ідеологічної та пропагандистської підготовки Словаччини до вступу у війну проти СРСР та оцінити ефективність цієї підготовки. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на принципах об'єктивності, історизму, а також використанні методів аналізу, синтезу, узагальнення. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що вперше в українській історіографії Другої світової війни з'ясовано особливості пропагандистсько-ідеологічного забезпечення словацьких військ в Україні у 1941 р. На основі офіційних та неофіційних документів розглянуті основні тези словацької пропаганди та оцінена її ефективність. **Висновки.** На відміну від таких союзників Німеччини, як Румунія та Фінляндія, Словаччина не мала територіальних претензій до СРСР. Єдиним мотивом участі у війні була відданість союзницькому обов'язку. Тому вступ Словаччини у німецько-радянську війну потребував ґрунтовної пропагандистсько-ідеологічної підготовки. Спиралась вона на кілька основних тез: вірність союзницькому обов'язку перед Німеччиною; захист Словацької держави від агресивних планів більшовиків; захист християнства від атеїстичного більшовизму; визволення народів СРСР з-під більшовицької тиранії; плекання кращих військових традицій. Ефективність їх на початковому етапі війни була досить високою. Цьому сприяла діяльність військових капеланів, які користувались значним авторитетом серед особового складу. Також словацькі вояки мали змогу побачити наочні підтвердження деяких з перелічених тез на українських землях (масові поховання жертв радянських каральних органів, сплюндровані культові споруди тощо). У багатьох населених пунктах словаків вітали як визволителів. Це мало сильний вплив на морально-психологічний стан вояків. Армію, принаймні на початковому етапі війни, вдалось вберегти від поширених у словацькому суспільстві русофільських та прокомуністичних настроїв. Цьому сприяло не тільки відповідне ідеологічно-пропагандистське забезпечення, але й видалення з її складу ненадійних елементів, призваних під час мобілізації.

Ключові слова: *пропагандистсько-ідеологічне забезпечення, Друга світова війна, Словаччина, Україна, армія.*

The Problem Statement. In addition to the German troops, the Allied armies – Romania, Hungary and Slovakia – also participated in the fighting of the German-Soviet War on the territory of Ukraine. The participation of each of them in the war required appropriate ideological justification and advocacy training. The situation in Slovakia was particularly difficult in this regard. Given the lack of territorial claims on the USSR and the Russophile sympathies prevalent among Slovak society, the propaganda-ideological preparation of the population and the army for war against the Soviet Union required special approaches. This aspect of World War II history has so far been neglected by the Ukrainian researchers. However, it is of considerable interest, since the Slovak troops at the initial stage of the German-Soviet war acted precisely on the territory of Ukraine. The effectiveness of the

propaganda-ideological treatment largely determined not only their fighting qualities but also their attitude to the local population.

The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches. The Slovak troops' propaganda-ideological support issue at the initial stage of the German-Soviet War has not yet been the subject of a comprehensive study. However, some of its elements are considered in the works conducted by the Slovak researchers. The publications written by P. Mičianik should be noted for the material completeness (Mičianik, 2004; Mičianik, 2007). His work depicts in details the organizational aspects of the Slovak army's involvement in hostilities, as well as partially reflects security issues, including propaganda and ideology. S. Kliment and B. Nakládal's research focuses mainly on the Slovak's army organization and armaments, but they hardly pay attention to the ideological and propaganda aspects. (Kliment & Nakládal, 2003). The works written by I. Baka, J. Bysrtický are more balanced in this respect (Baka, 2008; Bysrtický, 1999). Z. Katreba's articles on Slovakia's preparation for war, including the ideological propaganda, also deserve attention (Katreba, 2000a; Katreba, 2000b).

In order to analyze the role of key figures in the military and political leadership of Slovakia, the authors considered biographical studies on Ferdinand Čatloš (Marjina, 1996) and Alexander Mach (Vnuk, 1991).

The advocacy's effectiveness assessment and the ideological support measures made on the basis of the memoirs of Slovak servicemen (Belko, 1965; Sokolovský, 2007). The Slovak publications of the German-Soviet War period are also used, dedicated to participation in this war (Gajdos-Breza, 1941; Cincik & Doránsky, 1943).

The Purpose of the Article. In the research, we aim at analyzing the main points of Slovakia's ideological and propaganda preparation for the war against the USSR and to evaluate the training's effectiveness. For this purpose, we have considered both official documents of the Slovak military-political leadership and the soldiers' unofficial testimonies, who participated in hostilities in the territory of Ukraine.

The Statement of the Basic Material. Slovakia's entry into the war against the USSR in June 1941 was an act that is difficult to find a rational explanation for. Unlike Germany's allies such as Romania and Finland, Slovakia had no territorial claims on the USSR. The only motive for participating in the war was a commitment to allied duty. The Slovaks distinguished a relatively small contingent, based on two connections – the Moving Division (initially the group and the brigade) and the Security Division. At the initial stage of the war, they operated in Ukraine.

The Slovak's population psychological preparation for the war began in the spring of 1941, following the German attack on Yugoslavia and Greece. The Light-masking regimes were introduced throughout the country, and the construction of the bomb shelters began. These measures were explained by the possibility of bombing Slovakia with Yugoslav or British aviation (Katreba, 2000b, pp. 50–51). On the 18th of June, part of the reservists were enrolled to serve, and on the 22nd of June (the day of Germany's attack on the USSR), a covert mobilization began (Katreba, 2000a, p. 88). On the same day, the Slovak Armed Forces were fully alerted, and the Minister of National Defense, the General I Rank Ferdinand Čatloš, ordered the formation of the Moving Group (literally – the Rýchla Group, that is, the “Quick Group”), which was to take part in the war against the USSR (Mičianik, 2004, p. 49; Kliment & Nakládal, 2003, p. 83).

It should be noted that the position of the Slovak authorities on the country's entry into the war against the USSR was not straightforward. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

of Slovakia, Vojtech Tuka, was known for his pro-German views, but President Jozef Tiso was more moderate. Not thrilled with the idea of the country joining the war was Defense Minister Ferdinand Čatloš (Marjina, 1996, pp. 679–680). In the end, V. Tuka managed to convince Ferdinand Čatloš. The main argument here was the need to maintain a favorable attitude of Germany. Tuka noted that when Hungary enters the war earlier than Slovakia, the Slovak authorities will lose the chance to return (with German support) the part of Hungary occupied by Hungary. The above-mentioned argument also proved to be decisive for President Tiso. The authorities (Tuka, Čatloš, President Tiso) discussed the issue up till the 23rd of June (Mičianik, 2007, pp. 48–49). Hence, the mobilization was already in process, but the final decision on entry into the war wasn't made. Finally, at noon on the 24th of June, 1941, Slovak Interior Minister Alexander Mach read an address on the radio signed by President J. Tiso, Prime Minister V. Tuka, and Defense Minister F. Čatloš: "The Slovaks, citizens of the Slovak Republic, listen! In full solidarity with the Greater Germanic Reich, the Slovak people take their part in the European's culture defense. Some parts of our army crossed the Slovak's Republic borders in order to join Germany's belligerent army" (Mičianik, 2007, p. 51). V. Tuka used the adage "voluntarily enters the war" in the original text of the appeal. President J. Tiso insisted on superseding the word "joining", eloquently hinting that the entry into the war was under Germany's pressure. In addition to it, there was no record concerning Slovakia's declaration of war to the USSR. Due to the above-mentioned fact, Tiso managed to avoid the violation of the law that required the Parliamentary's approval of the declaration of war. One more interesting fact is that the Parliament of the USSR did not declare the war to Slovakia, but only took into consideration the fact of Slovakia's involvement in hostilities.

Taking everything into account, it is obvious that the quoted statement traces one of the main points of Slovak propaganda: the war broke out in order to protect the European culture, and it was the the Slovak people's duty to participate in the struggle. At the same time, it was not enough to counterbalance the strong Russophile sentiment and Slovakia's Communist Party influence. As a result, there were diverse inscriptions on the fences and walls of the houses, for instance: "Long live Russia!", "Long live Stalin!" in Brezni, Zharnovitsa, Nova Banya and a number of other cities and towns. Furthermore, the anti-war postcards were distributed by communist centers (Gebhart & Šimovček, 1984, pp. 69–73). The so-called "preventive" detention of Slovakia Communist Party supporters (1,100 people) on the 21st of June did not avert this activity. Even the Minister of Internal Affairs, A. Mach acknowledged that the action was carried out mainly to meet the demands of the Germans. Within two or three weeks, most detainees were released (Vnuk, 1991, pp. 298–299).

The Slovak military-political leadership tried to separate the Russian people and the Bolsheviks in order to overcome the problem of Russophilism. The order issued by F. Čatloš on the 24th of June in 1941 is a vivid example of the above-mentioned situation. In particular, it noted: "The Red Bolshevism, which enslaved the great Russian people and, under the cover of false slogans about equality, bloodily oppresses even the most primitive demands of personal and religious freedom, wanted to conquer Europe in order to assert its authority over the Jewish red commissioners" (Cincik & Doránsky, 1943, p. 28). Further, Čatloš emphasized that the war broke out neither against the Russian people nor the Slavic people, but against the Bolsheviks. In the new Europe, Čatloš assured, the Russian people will find their future.

An important illustration of propaganda narratives was President Tiso's speech delivered on the 30th of June in 1941 to Slovak troops who were leaving for Ukraine. (Mičianik, 2007, pp. 56–57). The main theses of the speech were the following:

- Slovakia was in proper place concerning the European peoples' defense line against the Bolsheviks;
- the Bolsheviks sought to turn Slovakia into a desert without God, without culture and without morality;
- the war is a crusade against the Bolsheviks for God and the people.

The crusade's motto proved to be quite apt in propaganda as it made it clear that Slovakia had no material or territorial incentives to enter the war. In addition, it found its response among the Slovaks, most of whom belonged to the Catholic Church. It should be noted that the church, in general, had a significant impact on the political and social life of Slovakia. Hence, it comes as no surprise that some researchers define the political order of this state as "clerical fascism" (Szabó, 2018, p. 892). The Bishop Military Curate, Michal Buzalka, also commented on the issue the following: "... we are concerned about preserving the most precious treasures of our national life: faith, the Christian Catholic Church, and independence; in short, the heritage of our fathers, St. Cyril and Methodius..." (Mičianik, 2007, p. 57). And the Minister of Internal Affairs, A. Mach in his address criticized the Slavophiles – the USSR's supporters: "The argument about the Slavism? Comrades, we are not talking about the Slavism here. If we cared about the Slavism, we would have had to wage a war against the Bolshevism a long time ago". In addition to the Russian people, A. Mach's speech also mentioned the Ukrainians, who also suffered from the Bolshevism. (Mičianik, 2007, p. 57).

Another propaganda's slogan popular with the military elite was the following "the Third War against the Bolsheviks". The First was the war in the Czechoslovak Corps in Siberia (1918), the Second was the war against Red Hungary (1919), and the war against the USSR was to become the last, decisive victory over the Bolshevism. The appeal to the military traditions associated with the name of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik, one of the organizers of the Czechoslovak Legion during the First World War and the First Minister of Defense of Czechoslovakia, Slovak nationality, played an important role (Juriček, 1990, pp. 152–156). General Čatloš appealed to his figure eagerly as just like Štefánik, F. Čatloš was not only a Slovak by nationality but also the Evangelical Protestant by religion (in Catholic Slovakia, Protestants were a minority). In one of the articles, Čatloš pointed out the following: "Štefánik's posture against the Bolshevism is relevant today" (Mičianik, 2007, p. 58).

All the heralded theses echoed by the soldiers and officers, but their effectiveness varied. The propaganda slogans, which appealed to the religious sentiments and motivated for the home protection, were best perceived. The researcher, P. Mičianik quotes Slovak soldiers' series of quotations taken from the letters and diaries at the initial period of the war: "We understand what we are fighting for. We, the Slovaks, are struggling to fulfill our primal aspirations for freedom, free national life, fighting for a dignified place among the peoples of Europe..."; "In this gigantic battle, the Slovak nation knows that it is fighting for the victory of Christianity over the dangers of Communism, which seeks to capture the whole world"; "The war against the Bolshevism is morally and Christianly justified" (Mičianik, 2007, pp. 67–70).

The propaganda's evidence effectiveness may be the Slovak soldiers' behavior in captivity. For example, the shooter F. Khlubik, who was captured on the 22nd of July in 1941 near Lypovtsi, questioned in response to a question as to why he was fighting against the "Russian brothers", stated that the Slovaks were fighting "against the Bolshevism, which crippled the great Russian people" (Mičianik, 2007, p. 127).

The propaganda's theses on the Bolshevik's regime inhuman nature were confirmed in practice – of what the Slovak soldiers saw on the territory of Western Ukraine. Already in

the first town on the territory of the USSR, Kirov, the Slovak soldiers saw a monastery, transformed into a barracks. The church had a club. The statues of the saints were thrown into the courtyards, used as shooting targets, and were replaced by the Bolsheviks' "gods" busts – Marx, Lenin, Stalin (Gajdos-Breza, 1941, pp. 32–34). And while in the territory of Western Ukraine it was still possible to find some cult buildings that were used for their intended purpose, after the Slovaks crossed the old Polish-Soviet border, they almost did not come across the existing churches. As a result, those pictures were painfully perceived by religious Slovaks and clearly showed the anti-religious nature of the communist ideology.

The Slovak soldiers were shocked and depressed due to the thousands of the Soviet punitive bodies victims' sight in Drohobych, Sambir, Dobromyl, Lutsk, who were executed before the Red Army's retreat. The above-mentioned information was reported even in the publications of the Communist period. For example, in the memoirs "Zápisník z východného frontu" published in 1965, their author J. Belko depicted the picture that the Slovak soldiers found in prison in Drohobych: "...corpses were everywhere: women, men, young, old ... The frost sent a shiver down the spines when we saw the mutilated human bodies" (Belko, 1965, p. 15). Thereafter, however, it was indicated that the tragedy was a matter of the Germans, what else could be expected from a publication issued in the time of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The contemporary researcher P. Mičianik quotes an archival document, a military diary of one of the Slovak units, which depicted a sight caught by the Slovaks in the Salina tract near Dobromyl: "The civilian population met us weeping. Men were killed by the communists, as were some women. They cut off their heads, their hands, and their eyes. The skin was removed from the bodies and dumped into the salt mine. There were 1080 of them killed" (Mičianik, 2007, p. 156).

It should be noted that the positive perception of the propaganda slogans among the Slovak servicemen in the territory of Ukraine was not entirely complete. L. Sokolovský's memoirs are illustrative in this context. Recalling the early days of the war, he pointed out that among the Slovak soldiers there was a quiet hatred towards the Germans and a reluctance to fight against the "Russian brothers". According to Sokolovský, the reservists' influence was considered to be the main reason for this phenomenon as they enrolled to the army from the reserve. When the reservists were sent home, the soldiers served as conscripts during 1939 and 1940, which remained active in Ukraine mostly, and discipline was restored. L. Sokolovský emphasized the military chaplains' significant contribution, who not only performed the worship but also fulfilled the functions of the "educational officers". The military chaplains gave clear explanations to the soldiers concerning the need to fight against the Bolshevism effectively (Sokolovský, 2007, p. 100). Taking into consideration the above-mentioned, the decision made by the Slovak military-political leadership to limit the number of troops, deployed to participate in the war against the USSR, seems quite justified. At the outset of the campaign, an Army Group (essentially an Army Corps) was sent to the terrains of Ukraine as a part of two full-fledged divisions, two separate artillery regiments and a number of other units, as well as a mobile unit – the Moving Group (deployed in a brigade). Their total number exceeded 50 thousand people. However, at the turn of July and August in 1941, there remained two separate divisions: the Security Division and the Moving Division. The Security Division consisted of four infantry battalions in two regiments, while the divisions of the Army Group had nine battalions in three regiments. The personnel of the Security Division comprised of 8.9 thousand of people, compared to 14 thousand people, who served at the Army

Group Division. (Bysrtický, 1999, pp. 29–30). The Moving Division had about the same organization (8,500 people served). The paramount difference was the fact that the Moving Division was fully motorized, it had nearly 1300 cars and motorcycles (Mičianik, 2007, pp. 191–192). Hence, reducing the number of the Slovak military contingent significantly (35,000 servicemen returned to their homeland), they managed to get rid of a significant part of the unwanted elements and increase its combat capability. (Baka, 2008, p. 54). On the other hand, the need for reservists' demobilization was determined by economic factors. Since the declaration of independence, the problem of labor shortages, caused by the Czechs' departure and the industrialization, has gradually escalated in Slovakia (Tišliar, P., Šprocha, B. & Škorvanková E., 2019, p. 91).

In general, the Ukrainians had the favorable attitude towards the Slovak army in the summer of 1941, as they did not regard the Slovaks as an occupation power (Gajdos-Breza, 1941, p. 23). Moreover, Drohobych's newspaper "Vilne Slovo" ("Free Word") wrote the following: "The Slovak army is not an occupation army in Ukraine. The Slovaks' struggle with the Bolsheviks has a universal character. The Slovaks' attitude towards the Ukrainians is cordial and brotherly" (Mičianik, 2007, p. 165). The Slovak units' command emphasized in their issued orders that the local population should see the Slovak soldiers as the Bolshevik yoke liberators. At the beginning of the campaign, numerous attempts were made to segregate the prisoners of war – separating the Ukrainians from other nationalities and liberating the Ukrainians, but soon such kind of practice was banned by the German command. At the same time, it was required to prosecute those civilians strictly, who assisted the Red Army – by hiding them, providing food or civilian clothes (Pejs, 2009, pp. 80–83).

The Conclusions. Slovakia's entry into the German-Soviet War required thorough propaganda and ideological training. It was based on the several main points:

- duty of loyalty to the allied Germany;
- the Slovak's state protection from the Bolsheviks' aggressive plans o;
- the Christianity protection from the atheistic Bolshevism;
- the USSR peoples' liberation from the Bolshevik tyranny;
- nurturing the best military traditions in the spirit of General MR. Štefánik.

These theses were consistently articulated in speeches, orders, and articles of the country's leadership, first of all by President J. Tiso and National Defense Minister F. Čatloš. Their effectiveness in the early stages of the war was quite high. Due to the military chaplains' activities, who enjoyed considerable authority among personnel, the effectiveness was ensured on the one hand. On the other hand, the Slovak soldiers were able to see the clear pieces of evidence of some above-mentioned theses on the Ukrainian lands (the Soviet punitive bodies mass graves' victims, spoiled religious buildings, etc.). In many localities, the Slovaks were hailed as liberators. It had a strong impact on the moral and psychological state of the soldiers. The army, at least in the initial stages of the war, managed to keep away from the Russophiles and pro-communist sentiments in the Slovak society. Owing to Slovak's appropriate ideological and advocacy support the following situation was facilitated but also by the unreliable elements' removal, who were enrolled during mobilization.

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**“SMALL DEATH JOBS”: THE ROLE OF FORCED CIVILIAN PERSONS
IN THE NAZI PLANS OF THE HOLOCAUST IN THE GENERAL DISTRICT
OF VOLYN-PODILLIA (ON THE MATERIALS OF YAHAD-IN UNUM)**

Abstract. The purpose of this research is to analyze the role of the civilians (“small death jobs”) in the Holocaust on the example of the General District “Volyn-Podillya” as a separate administrative entity of the Reich Commissariat Ukraine. The research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, objectivity, multifactoriality. The research has been carried out due to general scientific (analysis, synthesis, generalization) methods, and special-historical (historical-typological, historical-systemic) methods. The oral history method played important role. The scientific novelty is that for the first time in the Ukrainian historiography, the role of civilians (“small death jobs”) in the Nazi plans to carry out the Holocaust during the enforcement of the functions required by the occupiers has been analyzed. The study is based on the analysis of previously unintroduced scientific materials (Yahad-In Unum’s oral history interview, Paris, France) and characterizes a particular region during the Nazi occupation of the Reich Commissariat Ukraine – the General District “Volyn-Podillya”. **The Conclusions.** Thus, civilians – forcibly workers involved into the murder of the Jews – became the Nazi service personnel in the implementation of Holocaust plans. Once being in the grip of the Nazi reality, these people were forced to perform their functions. Often fellow villagers, neighbours of the victims of the occupiers, the tragedy of the Holocaust had many psychological consequences to many of them, which influenced physical condition and health. Until recently, attention to the role of civilians (“small death jobs”) has been on the margins of the research due to the lack of information in official documents and it has become more possible for analysis with the use of an oral-historical approach, eyewitness testimonies, a large video collection, which is included, in particular, into the Yahad-InUnum archive. Despite the fact that the functions of “small death jobs” and their role in the implementation of the Holocaust practices has been considered on the example of the General District “Volyn-Podillya”, the results of the study, of course, have much broader significance for a general understanding of the problem of the Nazi-occupied Eastern Territories, where the civilians were made to do such forced work.

Key words: Holocaust, “smalldeathjobs”, Volyn-Podillia, Yahad-In Unum, video testimony, oral history.

**“SMALL DEATH JOBS” : РОЛЬ ПРИМУСОВО ЗАДІЯНИХ
ЦИВІЛЬНИХ ОСІБ В НАЦИСТСЬКИХ ПЛАНАХ ЗДІЙСНЕННЯ
ГОЛОКОСТУ В ГЕНЕРАЛЬНІЙ ОКРУЗІ “ВОЛИНЬ-ПОДІЛЛЯ”
(НА МАТЕРІАЛАХ ЯХАД-ІН УНУМ)**

Анотація. Мета дослідження – аналіз ролі цивільних осіб (“small death jobs”) у здійсненні Голокосту на прикладі генеральної округи “Волинь-Поділля” як окремого адміністративного утворення Райхскомісаріату Україна під час німецької окупації. **Методологія дослідження** базується на засадах історизму, об’єктивності, багатфакторності. Дослідження здійснено завдяки загальнонауковим (аналіз, синтез, узагальнення) методам, та спеціально-історичним (історико-типологічний, історико-системний). Важливу роль відіграв метод усної історії. **Наукова новизна.** Уперше в українській історіографії здійснено аналіз ролі цивільних осіб (“small death jobs”) в нацистських планах здійснення Голокосту під час примусового виконання потрібних окупантам функцій. Дослідження виконано на основі аналізу раніше не введених до наукового обігу матеріалів (усних свідчень організації Яхад-ІнУнум, м. Париж, Франція) та характеризує окремо взятий регіон під час нацистської окупації Райхскомісарату Україна – генеральну округу “Волинь-Поділля”. **Висновки.** Цивільні жителі – примусово забрані працівники, задіяні в процесі вбивства євреїв стали обслуговуючим персоналом нацистів у здійсненні планів Голокосту. Опинившись в лежачих нацистської дійсності, ці люди змушені були виконувати покладені на них функції, часто будучи односельцями, сусідами жертв окупантів. Трагедія Голокосту обернулася для багатьох з них психологічними наслідками, що впливали на фізичний стан та здоров’я. Досі увага до ролі цивільних осіб (“small death jobs”) була на маргінесі досліджень через брак інформації в офіційних документах і стала більш можливою із застосуванням у дослідженнях усної історичного підходу, свідчень очевидців, велику відеокolleкцію яких містить, зокрема, і архів Яхад-Ін Унум. Незважаючи на те, що функції “small death jobs” та їхня роль у здійсненні практик Голокосту розглянута на прикладі генеральної округи “Волинь-Поділля”, результати дослідження, безумовно, мають набагато ширше значення для загального розуміння поставленої проблематики на окупованих нацистами східних теренах, де подібні примусові роботи/практики змушено було виконувати цивільних жителів.

Ключові слова: Голокост, “small death jobs”, Волинь-Поділля, Яхад-Ін Унум, відеосвідчення, усна історія.

The Problem Statement. Yahad-In Unum (Paris, France) is an organization, which seeks for the Nazi victims’ mass graves with the help of the witnesses, who observed the Jews and Roma murders during World War II in 8 countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Poland, Romania, Moldova, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). The organization was founded in 2004 in France by the Catholic priest Fr. Patrick Desbois, Yahad-Inunum (meaning ‘together’), managed to identify about 2.4 thousand places of mass shootings and today the organization’s video collection contains about 7 thousand units.

The archive’s video evidence differs in the degree of the informativeness, but they have a common structure: the respondent’s personal data, his social origin, the story of the coexistence of Jewish and non-Jewish population during the interwar period, the depicted events during the war – the Holocaust, the information about the places of the Jewish detention in ghettos and their mass shootings, the role of the military and the civilians in this process. In addition, the respondents, who were interviewed, showed the places they were telling about (the territory of the former ghettos, the places where the Jews were shot, the memorials that appeared during the Soviet era and during the period of independent Ukraine) and expressed their own judgments.

The scientific achievements of the above-mentioned oral history collection give us the golden opportunity to put emphasis on its powerful potential in the Holocaust research, due to

the exclusive information, which could not be found in other sources. The German and Soviet documents may not always fully cover the process of involving civilians in the Holocaust as such information is displayed in the official documents rarely. Hence, the stories provided by victims, witnesses and perpetrators are considered to be the main sources which cover such facts to the fullest. As a result, Fr. Patrick Desbois noted the category of forced laborers among the local population in the implementation of Holocaust plans – “smalldeathjobs” (literally – “small deadly works”). Fr. Patrick Desbois calls these people an “invisible group” that was one of the main discoveries of the Yahad-InUnum project (Desbois, 2013, p. 96). The above-mentioned group of people were under the Nazi control and were forced to perform their functions in the Holocaust.

The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches. The research is based on the works written by Fr. Patrick Desbois (Desbois, 2011; Desbois, 2013; Desbois, 2018) (French researcher, priest), which disclose the information about the above-mentioned category of people, which was found during the collection of evidence of “The Holocaust by Bullets” in the Eastern Europe (oral interview, recorded on video). The source base of the publication was the organization’s archives video testimonies concerning the territory of Volyn-Podillya. In particular, on the example of Yahad-In Unum videos, there are 3 conditional groups of the eyewitness testimonies: the indirect witnesses, who did not see the murder but heard about it from the stories of others; the direct witnesses who were present at the time of the murder; the “Smalldeathjobs” – the people, who were forced to work at the scene of a murder (Desbois, 2011, pp. 101–102). The testimony provided by the “smalldeathjobs” is the most valuable because these people not only saw the process but also to some extent participated in the process itself. In addition, valuable sources of research were the documents of the State Archives of Rivne region, in particular, Kostopil Gebitkomisar Lenert’s order to provide people with the paths followed by the Jewish columns and whose task was to collect and bury the Jews, who were shot during the escape (SARR, f. r. 29, d. 1, c. 22, p. 49). Another important archive is the State Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), where, in particular, in the criminal case of Khaim Sigal, 4 volumes of the Holocaust witnesses, who buried the executed Jews, provided some details on the campaign (SSASSU, f. 5, c. 67436, vol. 1–4).

There are still few works in the Ukrainian historiography that would cover the “smalldeathjobs” issue thoroughly. One of the scientific investigations written by Ivan Kapas about the ghetto, which was located in Dubrovtsytsya, is based on the materials of Khaim Sigal’s archival and criminal case. It mentions the Jews graves’ diggers, who witnessed the murder. Thus, according to the testimony of Peter Nashor, Philip Rock and Peter Elk, it is known that the massive shootings took place in two cemeteries, located in Dubrovtsytsia (Kapas, 2012, p. 84). Later on, after the war, these witnesses helped to establish the Jews probable burial place (Kapas, 2012, p. 86). Another research written by Roman Mykhalchuk, is based on eyewitness accounts of the Mizoch Holocaust, analyzes the facts of the forced use of the “smalldeathjobs” by the occupiers for their own purposes. Thus, Mizoch residents and the residents of neighboring villages were forced to bury graves at the site of the Jews murders in October 1942 (Mykhalchuk, 2017, p. 268).

The purpose of this research is to analyze the role of the civilians (“small death jobs”) in the Holocaust on the example of the General District “Volyn-Podillya” as a separate administrative entity of the Reich Commissariat Ukraine. **The topicality** of the choice of this region for the analysis of these processes is explained by the fact that the above-mentioned areas played an important role in the functioning of the Reich administration in the occupied

eastern territories. Numerous main Reich Commissariat Ukraine institutions were situated in this region. Moreover, the city of Rivne was the Reich Commissariat Ukraine center, the headquarters of the main quartermaster and economic department of “South” Army Group, the headquarters of the Wehrmacht rear units in Ukraine, the Central Issuing Bank of Ukraine, the German Supreme Court. In 1943, the region occupied the first place in the Reich Commissariat, and the second most populous. The Jewish community made up 60–80 % of the population of large cities.

The Problem Statement. Fr. Patrick Desbois with the phrase “smalldeathjobs” calls those people, who were involved in forced labor at the scene of the murder (Desbois, 2011, pp. 101–102). Therefore, the attention will be focused on the persons’ role involved in the execution place (digging and burying graves, bringing victims to execution sites, etc.), as well as the other functions when they were not in the direct contact with the victims (sorting, transportation, Jews property sale). The above-mentioned works were performed by force.

It should be noted that the oral testimony is a subjective source that requires the critical approach. While conducting the scientific research, it is vital to determine the reliability of the research by mutual comparison, the cross-case analysis application. The cross-case analysis method assumes that quotes, which are taken from interviews and the information contained in them are subject to “linking” with the information from other sources, which is the essence of the cross-criticism and analysis (Hrinchenko, Rebrova, & Romanova, 2012, p. 180).

The genocide implementation was the main spur for the use in this process not only the direct killers but also the auxiliary personnel, picked up from the civilians as service personnel. Such people were requisitioned to perform ancillary functions in the Holocaust by force. Patrick DesBois discovered more than 20 types of such work, which were done by “smalldeathjobs” (Desbois, 2013, pp. 96–97). The most popular jobs among them were the gravediggers before the execution, pits’ diggers after the victims’ murder, the carriers of people to the execution place, and so on. Sometimes the functions of such persons at the time of the shooting were quite specific. For example, in Stara Syniava, a witness recalled seeing her 16-year-old neighbor Ivan bringing the ammunition and wine in boxes on a sleigh. The German drank wine from a bottle there and performed massive shootings (YIU, Testimony 861UK. Stara Syniava). In addition, after the victims’ murder, their property remained, as a result, it had to be sorted, if necessary cleaned of blood and dirt, later on the property should have been collected and sold. The above-mentioned work was performed in whole or in part by this category of the civilians.

The “smalldeathjobs” involved the civilians, mostly the settlements’ residents, where the Jews (neighbors) were exterminated, as well as the Soviet prisoners of war and prisoners of the Nazi prisons. They were neither police officers nor collaborators. In general, it was young men and women, children or teenagers who were taken from home by armed men to perform work (Desbois, 2011, p. 109). Thus, by involving these individuals, the penal authorities made a rational approach to the cause of the victims’ extermination, while using human resources free of charge as free labor.

The orders on the need to perform a particular job in the hierarchy were sent vertically. For example, in Kostopil, during the Jews extermination on the 26th of August in 1941, Lehnert, the Commissioner in a telephone message, addressed to Kostopil City Administration, noted that the roads on which the Jewish columns were going should be provided with the helping hands (people) as their task was to collect and bury the Jews, who were shot during the escape (SARR, f. r. 29, d. 1, c. 22, p. 49).

According to the order, which was issued on the same day, Kostopil City Council Head, F. Stepaniuk, appointed Matsyuk, Zakharchuk, Yaslovskiy, Trofimchuk, and Prokopyuk as the commissioners and those responsible for the case. Their task was to determine the required number of people immediately in order to collect and bury the Jews' dead corpses, shot during the escape in certain areas (SARR, f.r. 29, d. 1, c. 22, p. 48). And those people (the performers) were already engaged in a specific job.

In Dubrovysia, Petro Nashoru testified that he and his fellow villagers had been made to dig graves to bury the Jews. Thus, in August 1942, he received a written order to come to the town council of Dubrovysia. There he saw his fellow villagers Peter Los, Philip Rock, Mark Korzhyk and other residents. According to the order of Vasyl Havrylchuk, the head of the administration, they went, together with the police, headed by Khaim Syholenko, to the old Jewish cemetery. The task of Peter Nashor was to dig a big hole, and Khaim Syholenko ordered Peter Los, Philip Rok and Mark Korzhyk Sigolen to collect all the corpses of the Jews at the territory of Dubrovysia (SSASSU, f. 5, c. 67436, vol. 2, p. 280).

In general, the need to do certain types of work for the civilians was reported by lower-level representatives of the local administration. These could be heads and commissioners of various levels, heads of villages, sergeants, burgomasters, sometimes police, gendarmerie.

It depended on the local government and its representatives what kind of work and its amount should be done by a particular person. That is why, one person could dig graves, another person – bury the bodies, another one – bring victims to the place of execution, distribute and pack victims' clothes, etc. However, according to the available sources, most often these functions were combined and their wide range had to be performed by the same people. For instance, in Sernyky, a man bore the murder of the Jews' first dug holes before the shooting, then buried the bodies of the Jews after the shooting, and then loaded and transported the Jews' belongings. Together with him, the same work was done by other people and horses. There was about a dozen of men (YIU, Testimony 544UK. Sernyky).

By hiring the civilians, they could be warned in advance. For instance, in the evening they were told to come for doing the next day's tasks, but this was often spontaneous. Such cases are recorded in many settlements. For instance, in Kozhan-Horodok anyone was chosen for burying the Jews, who came across: "Who stands in the street – come here". Thus, about a dozen of people was involved in such work. They followed the column of the Jews to the place of execution at a distance of 50 m (YIU, Testimony 185B. Kozhan-Horodok).

In Mizocha, such work was avoided by teenagers, who came from a nearby village and accidentally saw killing in October 1942. The boys were detained by security police and were ordered to wait until the Jews were shot so that they could bury the Jews' dead bodies. However, in some period of time teenagers managed to escape and avoided doing such work (Mykhalchuk, 2017, p. 268).

Such types of work could take from several hours to two or three days. In the case of works related to the Jewish property, the term could be longer (for a month, as it is recorded in the testimony). Also, often it was not a one-time action, because this event required to be involved for several days. For instance, in Tuchyn, a man who buried the Jews' dead bodies, had to go and do the same job the next day again. (YIU, Testimony 1387UK. Tuchyn). A witness from Mikashevychi (near Brest) recalled that her brother had been told to go to work with a shovel. He was not at home for all night. He came back in the morning. He was allowed to go home, being told that if necessary, he would be called again (YIU, Testimony 235B. Mikashevychi (Brest)). In Dubrovysia, a few days after the execution of the Jews,

the same diggers were made to do such work again. At first, by the order of the commandant Sygolenko, men were made to dig holes, then they were allowed to go home. But after the murder of 40 Jews, the men were made to return to the murder place and to bury the Jews' dead bodies (Kapas, 2012, p. 102).

Despite such physically and morally difficult, dirty work, women were also made to do that kind of work, not only men. The compulsion to work for girls and women is explained by the fact that during the Nazi occupation there were not enough men, because they were on the fronts, in the underground, etc. For instance, near Pinsk, where the pits were dug near the airport, women were involved into the process of digging took part in this process (YIU, Testimony 176B. Halevo (Pinsk)).

It happened that the residents had no idea, why they were doing earthworks –digging holes, because the preparation for the shooting was a top secret. Therefore, even the diggers sometimes did not know the purpose of the dug holes, as noted by witnesses in Orynyn (YIU, Testimony 642UK.Orynyn), Minkivtsi and other villages. For instance, in Minkivtsi, people who were taken away and made to dig graves, were not allowed to leave the place of digging for a long time, so that they would not tell anyone about their work. And in order to conspire the process of digging graves, they were taken away at night (YIU, Testimony 684UK. Minkivtsi).

Sometimes security guards and police sometimes supervised the process of digging graves by civilians. But often there was no control. For instance, in Kozhan-Horodok, after the execution of the Jews, 10 – 15 people with shovels were ordered to bury the Jews' dead bodies. When the group began work, there were no Germans, no police, no guards. They did everything themselves (YIU, Testimony 188B. Kozhan-Horodok).

It was common practice to use the work of prisoners of war. Often civilians –residents of the region together with them did the work related to "smalldeathjobs". The detention and concentration of captive prisoners generally took place in big cities. For instance, in Rivne, a centre of Reich Commissariat, where in November 1941, 17,5 thousand of the Jews were killed, there worked a group of prisoners of war and civilians at the place of killing. According to the witness, who did the work, the police forced him to drive to the place of execution and transport the dead bodies to the pit. In total, there were 6-7 such carts. Along the road the dead bodies were of those Jews, who were shot when they tried to escape. The man's task was to transport the bodies, and the task of the prisoners of war was to load the bodies on the cart, dump them in a pit, and then to bury (YIU, Testimony 1416UK. Rivne).

The work of this category of civilians was not officially paid. Such people were simply taken away for a while, and then released. But unofficially, sometimes the reward could be. It all depended on the initiative of the local authorities. A witness from Balyn noted that those, who buried the Jews, could take the Jews'clothes, they were told to take the Jewish things. (YIU, Testimony 649UK. Балин). In Tuchyn one of the diggers was given the victims' clothes. There was a jacket that was suitable for his son, in which there was the money (a banknote – five). However, as the son Mykola noted later, he threw away the jacket because the acquaintance of the neighbour recognized it and Mykola was ashamed (YIU, Testimony 1387UK. Tuchyn). In Starokostiantyniv, according to a witness, women, who checked the clothes of the murdered Jews, were given it as a payment. The process itself lasted for a long time, about a month (YIU, Testimony 865UK. Starokostiantyniv).

Some of the diggers dared to take things. It is known that in Varkovychi the men, who buried the killed Jews, took their things (YIU, Testimony 1396UK. Varkovychi). However,

this practice was dangerous, because it was possible to receive a severe punishment. For instance, in Sernyky, when loading the Jewish clothes, one worker took a jacket and put it on. This was noticed by a German, so the man had to be shot for such an act. He was not killed because the commandant of Sernykyv asked not to kill the man, who turned out to be his relative (YIU, Testimony 545UK. Sernyky).

Some people, who fulfilled completed the work, dared to take things on their own. It is known that in Varkovychi the men who buried the killed Jews took their things (YIU, Testimony 1396UK. Varkovychi). However, such kind of practice was dangerous, due to the severe punishment, which could be imposed. For example, in Sernyky, when loading the Jewish clothes, one worker took a jacket and put it on. As a German noticed that fact, the man had to be shot for such an act. The worker managed to get away with it owing to the commandant of Sernyky, who asked for man and turned out to be his relative (YIU, Testimony 545UK. Sernyky).

In some cases, the diggers managed not only to get the Jewish things, but also to give other residents the opportunity to do so. According to the witness, the diggers told other people that they could take the Jewish things and properties in Chetvertnia (YIU, Testimony 1475UK. Chetvertnia). The above-mentioned situation was depicted in the testimony provided by the eyewitnesses repeatedly, but in general they should be classified as the exceptions. After all, the victims' clothes, things and all other property belonged to the state and the occupying authorities after their death, hence, it was a crime to distribute them to the civilians. Therefore, such cases could be only informal or semi-official.

The part of the studied category of people was lucky to avoid contact with dead bodies. Among them could be those, who were forced to fence the ghetto (YIU, Testimony 181B. Lakhva), who transported the Jews, who were alive to the execution place (for example, it is known from the stories about Lanivtsi) (YIU, Testimony 821UK. Lanivtsi), Vyshnivets (YIU, Testimony 841UK. Vyshnivets). It was also possible to avoid contacting the dead while carrying out forced work in the ghetto when after their elimination the people were forced to go to the building and take out the property, clothes, etc., which were then taken away by the occupiers (YIU, Testimony 839UK. Vyshnivets). For example, in Brest in 1942, the residents were driven into the ghetto and forced to put things, which were found there, in boxes. Then they were taken to the local market and sold. It is worth highlighting that the property (clothes) was sold in closed boxes, so people did not know what they were buying. However, such things were sold and the price per unit ranged from 5 to 20 marks (YIU, Testimony 161B. Brest). According to the fact, there was one man in Vyshnivets, who took the clothes at the place of the Jewish execution, took their property to the big Jewish house, and then sold them separately (YIU, Testimony 841UK. Vyshnivets).

The murder process involvement and death surveillance had a negative impact on people's psychological health. Mental disorders and anxiety occurred in both the killers and their victims (if they survived). There were many cases of emotional shock in the civilians, who witnessed some horrific events while working on forced labor (“smalldeathjobs”). Psychological disruptions in this group often occurred immediately after the procedure (burying the dead, carrying the dead bodies to the pits, observing the murder process, etc.). There were also some cases when everything that people had seen, haunted them all their lives.

In addition to it, performing the above-mentioned functions turned out to be the psychological stress for “smalldeathjobs” workers, as they dealt with the Nazi victims, who were often their fellow villagers, neighbors, friends. Sometimes the victims could be close friends or relatives.

Moreover, in most cases, the diggers knew the victims, whom they had to bury after some time. For example, when the Jews were shot in Tuchyn, a dozen men, who were assigned to fill the pit with earth after the massive shooting, were sitting and waiting at a distance of 5 m from the execution's place. The victims and the diggers recognized each other. They were acquaintances, sitting next to each other and talking, waiting for their turn. And before the death, the Jews asked their friends (the diggers) to light a cigarette with the following words: "The Kostyuk Brothers, let me smoke, I'll smoke before the death at least" (YIU, Testimony 1387UK. Tuchyn). Later on, the Jew shook hands with Kostyuk (the digger) and went to be shot.

It was even more depressing to observe the victims, who were tortured. Thus, in Sernyky, the witness buried alive in graves about 10% of the Jews, who were not killed in the massive shooting (YIU, Testimony 544UK. Sernyky).

It was morally difficult to deal with the dead bodies, even the adult men could not withstand the psychological stress. When the murdered Jews' bodies were transported to the ravine in Richytsia, the carrier was frightened and ran away when he saw the murdered Jew. When he was asked why he did so, the carrier replied that the horse was scared (YIU, Testimony 1389UK. Tuchyn).

If we analyze women's behavior, then obviously their emotional experiences were even more impressive, and the effects of psychological stress were stronger. Thus, an eyewitness from Kozhan-Horodok testified about a woman, who was forced to bury the Jews. When she returned after such work, she was laying down for a long time, unable even to drink or eat (YIU, Testimony 189B. Kozhan-Horodok). Another case of psychological distress was mentioned by a witness about his brother from Leletintsi, who transported the Jews to the execution's place and then took their belongings to Felshtyn. According to the sister, when the brother returned, he was so exhausted from the deaths and murders he saw that the family no longer hoped that he would live. She said about him the following: "He was ill-conditioned... He was so gangling, he was so weak that the world could not see him. He had a bad experience... We thought that he would hit the dust, as he was emaciated" (YIU, Testimony 647UK. Pavlykivtsi (Khmelnysk)).

Taking everything into consideration, it is not surprising that when the authorities came for the civilians and forced them to complete such jobs, people tried to protect young family members from possible stress, because they knew how it could affect on their health. Women did their best to protect their husbands, mothers – children. So when the police came to one family in Tuchyn in order to bury the dead bodies, his wife summoned all her strength and asked them not to the husband, instead she suggested taking the old man (obviously his father or father-in-law) be taken, because he had already seen the blood. The woman received the response that they did not care (YIU, Testimony 1387UK. Tuchyn).

The Conclusions. Thus, civilians – forcibly workers involved into the murder of the Jews – became the Nazi service personnel in the implementation of Holocaust plans. Once being in the grip of the Nazi reality, these people were forced to perform their functions. Often fellow villagers, neighbours of the victims of the occupiers, the tragedy of the Holocaust had many psychological consequences to many of them, which influenced physical condition and health. Until recently, attention to the role of civilians ("smalldeathjobs") has been on the margins of the research due to the lack of information in official documents and it has become more possible for analysis with the use of an oral-historical approach, eyewitness testimonies, a large video collection, which is included, in particular, into the Yahad-InUnum archive.

Despite the fact that the functions of “small death jobs” and their role in the implementation of the Holocaust practices has been considered on the example of the General District “Volyn-Podillya”, the results of the study, of course, have much broader significance for a general understanding of the problem of the Nazi-occupied Eastern Territories, where the civilians were made to do such forced work.

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**OREL OFFENSIVE OPERATION (12 July – 18 August, 1943):
SUCCESS AND FAILURES OF THE RED ARMY COMMAND REGARDING
THE ARMORED AND MECHANIZED TROOPS USE**

Abstract. *The purpose of the study is to reveal the contribution to the development of the operational art of mass use during offensive operations of tank armies and corps as mobile groups of fronts and armies, respectively. The research methodology is to use a set of methods: dialectical, analytical, historical, biographical, comparative. This methodological approach made it possible to retrospectively analyze the use of large tank formations, units during the Red Army offensive operation, during the breakthrough of a strong deep-seated enemy defense, which has not been in any previous operation since the beginning of the German-Soviet war. The scientific novelty of the obtained results lies both in the formulation of the problem and in the complex approach to its solution, which is due to the absence in the domestic historiography of special historical generalizing works on the specified subject within the specified chronological limits. The Conclusions.* During World War II the armored troops were the main striking forces while conducting ground operations. The authors continue to explore the role of the armored troops in the delivery of front and army operations. The article focuses on the research of the large armored formations use during the Red Army offensive operation, as the

only operation of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts, a crucial component of the Battle of Kursk at the breakthrough of the heavily defended enemy's positions, that hadn't occurred yet in any operation since the beginning of the German-Soviet War. The approaches to strategic and operational planning, peculiarities of implementing ideas of the Supreme Command concerning employment of three tank armies and seven separate tank brigades in one offensive operation as well as the errors committed in the decision making process of Orel offensive operation have been analyzed. In the research, the war art of the Supreme Command has been examined on the background of Orel offensive operation that was preplanned, unlike Moscow and Stalingrad strategic attack campaigns, which were planned during the defensive operations, even before the start of the Battle of Kursk. Consequently, Orel offensive operation has been studied in the frame of the whole Battle of Kursk. It was not perfect due to the structure of the field staff (headquarters) as well as its preparation and cohesion. The study focuses on the investigation of the armored troops operations during the combat, the use of the separate armored and mechanized corps, which were firstly used as mobile armies and armored armies – leading front formations, which gave impact to the development of martial arts. That was the first operation of the Red Army since the beginning of the German-Soviet War, when three tank armies were involved into one attack campaign operation. The first experience of efficient exploitation of the self-propelled artillery regiments in order to support the advance of tanks and infantry has been also emphasized.

Key words: Orel offensive operation, the Supreme Command Headquarters, front, tank army, tank corps, brigade, enemy.

ОРЛОВСЬКА НАСТУПАЛЬНА ОПЕРАЦІЯ (12 липня – 18 серпня 1943 р.): ЗДОБУТКИ ТА ПРОРАХУНКИ КОМАНДУВАННЯ ЧЕРВОНОЇ АРМІЇ ЩОДО ЗАСТОСУВАННЯ БРОНЕТАНКОВИХ ТА МЕХАНІЗОВАНИХ ВІЙСЬК

Анотація. *Мета дослідження* – розкрити внесок у розвиток оперативного мистецтва масованого застосування під час наступальних операцій танкових армій і корпусів у якості рухомих груп фронтів і армій відповідно. **Методологія дослідження** полягає у використанні сукупності методів: діалектичного, аналітичного, історичного, біографічного, порівняльного. Зазначений методологічний підхід дав змогу ретроспективно проаналізувати застосування великих танкових об'єднань, з'єднань під час проведення військами Червоної армії наступальної операції та здійснення прориву міцної глибокоошелюнованої оборони противника, якої ще не було в жодній попередній операції від початку німецько-радянської війни. **Наукова новизна** одержаних результатів полягає як у постановці проблеми, так і у комплексному підході до її вирішення, що зумовлено відсутністю у вітчизняній історіографії спеціальних історичних узагальнюючих праць з означеної тематики у вказаних хронологічних межах. **Висновки.** Під час Орловської наступальної операції (12 липня – 18 серпня 1943 р.) вперше від початку німецько-радянської війни масово було застосовано великі танкові з'єднання – три танкові армії, сім окремих танкових корпусів, сім танкових бригад, двадцять сім танкових полків і п'ятнадцять самохідно-артилерійських полків в одній наступальній операції, що дало можливість домогтися переломних результатів, які мали вирішальне значення для наступного ходу війни. Танкові армії стали основним засобом розвитку успіху фронтів, а танкові і механізовані корпуси – загальновійськових армій. Особливістю застосування танкових бригад було те, що вони не дробилися і не додавалися стрілецьким полкам, а діяли на напрямку головного удару стрілецької дивізії, що суттєво збільшувало силу удару.

Ключові слова: Орловська наступальна операція, Ставка ВГК, фронт, танкова армія, танковий корпус, бригада, противник.

The Problem Statement. The situation on the German-Soviet front in July 1943, as a result of the development of the Soviet counterattack in Orel direction, for the Supreme Command Headquarters (hereinafter – SCH) there were favourable conditions for the transition to the Soviet counterattack in Orel and Belgorod-Kharkiv directions.

Without the liquidation of Orel ledge, which was heavily fortified by the German army, any advance of the Red Army troops westward on the entire German-Soviet front was impossible.

The topicality of a military-historical research of Orel attack campaign as a component of the Battle of Kursk, during the war, which was imposed by the Russian Federation in 2014, is of a theoretical and practical significance for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and should be taken into account during training in military schools for the development of a theoretical and practical base aimed at improving the forms and methods of modern operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The counterattack of the Soviet troops in the area of Kursk Arc (in German – *Kursker Bogen*) includes two offensive operations: Orlovsk (“Kutuzov”) of Western front (WF) (a commander – Colonel-General V. D. Sokolovskiy), Bryansk front (BF) (a commander – Colonel-General M. M. Popov) and the Central front (CF) (a commander – Army General K. K. Rokossovskiy) (July 12 – August 18, 1943) and Belgorod-Kharkiv front (“Commander Rumyantsev”), Voronezh and Steppe fronts in cooperation with the South-Western Front (August 3-23, 1943).

The Analysis of Recent Research and Publications. The historiography of the problem concerning the combat use of tank troops is extremely wide and multifaceted. The research on the consideration of the combat experience in Orel attack campaign as the part of the Battle of Kursk is reflected in the Soviet historiography (Strokov, 1966; Rotmistrov, 1963; Goncharov, 2006; Koltunov, & Solovev, 1970; Losik, 1979; Istoriya B i MV SA, 1953). The Battle of Kursk in the Soviet historiography is considered as one of the three main decisive battles of the German-Soviet War (the previous two – Moscow and Stalingrad). The Soviet historians studied the Battle of Kursk more objectively.

In the Soviet historiography the first research on the Battle of Kursk Arc is the article by M. Talenskii (Talenskii, 1943). The author, quoting the German General K. Dietmart, emphasizes the following: against the principles of a military strategy it is more profitable to give the initiative to the enemy and wait for a good opportunity to attack. As it is confirmed in practice, this was the strategy of the military leadership of the Red Army. He attributes the defeat of the German troops in the Battle of Kursk to the heavy defeat of the German troops near Stalingrad. Weakened so much that 2-3 blows from the East and the West will be enough to defeat it. That is actually a tracing of J. Stalin's words (Stalin, 1949). As well as the words of the author I. V. Parotkin (Parotkin, 1944).

The History of the Great Patriotic War in 6 volumes is the first official Soviet work in which a separate chapter was devoted to the Battle of Kursk. In this work there are no figures that characterize the forces and means of the Red Army during the Battle of Kursk. The authors of the book illustrated a very idealized picture of the actions of the Red Army in this battle, never criticizing the fundamental decisions of the Supreme Command.

In general, all scientific works devoted to the course of the war are marked by ideological stamps of the totalitarian era. The best of them, in our opinion, is “History of World War II” in 12 volumes (published in 1973 – 1982), (Solovyev, 1976), which contains huge scientific historical material.

Despite the ideological postulates and pre-programmed conclusions, the works of the Soviet researchers of these years were marked by considerable facts and contained much material on the tank troops. The best of them are, first of all, the works of H. A. Deborin (Deborin, 1958), the collective monograph “World War II” edited by Lieutenant-General S. P. Platonov, Major-General M. G. Pavlenko and Colonel I. V. Parotkin (Platonov, Pavlenko, & Parotkin, 1958).

Much useful information can be drawn by omitting the ideological stereotypes from other Soviet scientific literature, in which there are discussed the military theoretical views on the

use of tank troops and the participation of tank formations in the summer campaigns of 1943 (Platonov, 1958; Zhilin, 1958; Radzievskii, 1977; Lototskii, 1970).

The researches of modern historians from the end of the XXth century contributed to the study of the history of the tank troops development and use (Daynes, 2009; Daynes, 2010; Bukeyhanov, 2013; Shein, 2007; Shein, 2009).

In foreign historiography you can find the ideas of military theorists on the combat use of tank troops during campaigns operations (Manshteyn, 1999; Mellentin, 2005; Myuller-Gillebrand, 2002).

An important place among the sources of the research on the use of the tank troops are participants' memoirs, reminiscences of the hostilities (Bagramyan, 1977; Zhukov, 1983; Rokossovskiy, 1988; Shtemenko, 1975).

The article is also presented by the archival materials of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation concerning the martial art of using armoured and mechanized troops in Orel attack campaign (Russian archive: (1996). *The Great Patriotic War: Supreme Command Headquarters: Documents and materials: 1942. T. 16 (5-2)*. Moscow: TERRA, 624 p.; The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (CAMD RF), f. 148a, d. 3763, d. 139 (ref. 143); f. 500, d. 12462, ref. 794; f. 16: d. 4440, ref. 33 (d. 1073, ref. 5, d. 1073pp., sp. 5); f. 315, d. 4440: ref. 38 (ref. 39, c. 20); f. 62, d. 329, ref. 23; f. 208, d. 4440, ref. 20; f. 418, d. 10695, ref. 117).

In the domestic historical science, the analyzed problem was raised but it did not find its proper coverage on armoured and mechanized troops in Orel attack campaign. First of all, the events were analyzed, which took place on the territory of Ukraine during the liberation of the Ukrainian territory from the aggressor (Hrytsyuk, Lysenko, Pylyavets, & Sydorov, 2015).

During the solution of the scientific problem, the authors considered comprehensively the massive use of armoured and mechanized troops of the Red Army in one offensive operation. The authors systematized and analyzed the role of armoured and mechanized troops during the breakthrough of the enemy's defenses and the development of success after the breakthrough independently and in cooperation with all-military units.

Orel attack campaign enriched the theory and practice of martial arts with new techniques and methods of armed struggle, as evidenced by the numerous sources and scientific works, memoirs and popular literature.

The aim of the authors of the article is to investigate the combat use of the tanks and tank troops during the Red Army counterattack in Orel direction near Kursk Arc (in German – *Kursker Bogen*) and the contribution to the development of operational art of a mass use of three tank armies and individual tank corps as mobile groups of fronts and armies, respectively.

To achieve the goal of the study, special methods of military history and general scientific methods were used.

The Statement of the Basic Material. The plan of Orel offensive operation was worked out in advance, even before the German command conducted Operation “Citadel”. Its main task was to create and deploy strategic reserves for the successful implementation of attack campaigns to eliminate Orel and Belgorod-Kharkiv wards and in future – liberation of the left bank of Ukraine.

The Supreme Command Headquarters (SCH) monitored closely changes in the situation in Kursk Arc, promptly responded to the changes. Between May 8 and 20, 1943, the timing of the beginning of the Wehrmacht offensive was changed by A. Hitler three times, and each

time the Soviet command responded in a timely manner, giving the necessary orders to the fronts, warning them of the time of a possible enemy offensive (CAMD RF, f. 148a, d. 3763, ref. 139, p. 184), and on July 2 the SCH informed the fronts of the final dates (July 3–6) of the transition of the German troops to the attack (CAMD RF, f. 148a, d. 3763, ref. 143, p. 164).

During the defensive battle, the attempts of the German command to surround and destroy more than a million of the Red Army units failed. The Red Army aircraft in a tense fight gained dominance in the air. The Wehrmacht's offensive strategy was defeated. However, these results for the Red Army (hereinafter – RA) were achieved at a high cost. During Kursk Strategic Defense Operation (July 5–23, 1943), the irretrievable losses of the Central, Voronezh, and Steppe Fronts amounted to 70 330 soldiers, and totally – 178 000. The fronts lost 1 614 tanks and self-propelled artillery units (SAU), 3 929 guns and mortars, 460 combat aircraft (Krivosheev, 1993, p. 188, 370).

According to Erich von Manshteyn: “In general, the situation left no doubt that the enemy will sooner or later try to achieve decisive success in the area of the Army Group “South”, and possibly also on the southern flank of the Army Group “Center” by offensive including Orel Arc” (Manshteyn, 1999, p. 513).

The peculiarity of the Red Army's counterattack was that it was carried out simultaneously with the defensive operation in the southern part of Kursk ledge, which lasted until July 23.

Before the counterattack of the Red Army troops, Tank Army 2 (hereinafter referred to as “TA”) and Army 9 (hereinafter – A) of the Wehrmacht's Army Group (37 divisions, including 10 tank and motorized) functioned on Orel bridgehead, numbering 600 000 of soldiers, 6 000 guns and mortars, about 1 000 of tanks and guns and more than 1 000 of aircraft. The main part of the German army group was concentrated in the southern part of Orel bridgehead, which fought against the troops of the Central Front. The German command focused a great deal of effort on strengthening the bridgehead. A deep positional defense was created with some elements of a long-term fortification (body armor – “crabs”) (Stokov, 1966, p. 418).

For the troops of the Western Front, Briansk Front and Central Front, the territory of Orel strategic bridgehead of the German group was extremely unfavourable for the attack. The rivers were natural obstacles that flew mainly from the South to the North, and some from the North to the South. The Germans used them to the maximum for the arrangement of defensive lines and cut-off positions. Water obstacles maximally contributed to the conduct of defensive operations and greatly complicated the offensive actions of the Red Army troops. It was a very well-fortified bridgehead of the German troops group (Rokossovskiy, 1988, p. 218).

The composition of the Red Army group for Orel offensive operation was the following: the Western Front – Guard Army 11 (hereinafter – GA), Army 50 and Army 11, Tank Army 4 (from July 18), Guard Cavalry Corps 2 (hereinafter – CC) (from July 18), Air Army 1 (hereinafter – AA); Briansk Front – Army 3, Army 61 and Army 63, Guard Tank Army 3 (from July 14), Air Army 15; the Central Front – Army 13, Army 48, Army 70, Guard Tank Army 2, Tank Corps 9 and 19 (hereinafter – TC), Air Army 16.

Before the attack campaign, only the Central Front had a Tank Army (TA 2) (a commander – Lieutenant-General O. G. Rodin). The strategic reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, for conducting Orel attack campaign in the direction of the actions of the three fronts, included: Guard Tank Army 3, Tank Army 4, Army 11, Tank Corps 25 and Cavalry Corps 2. Guard Tank Army 3 (a commander – Lieutenant-General P. S. Rybalko) was sent to Briansk Front on July 14, and this army entered the battle on July 19. Tank Army 4 (a commander – Lieutenant-General V. M. Badanov) was included into the Western Front

from July 18, and was introduced into battle only on the 15th day of the operation (July 26). The introduction into battle of Guard Tank Army 3 and Tank Army 4 was due to the fact that before the operation, the formation of the armies was only completed – the first one – in the territory of Plavsk, and the second one – near Moscow. Besides, it was not possible to define in advance precisely the term the Red Army troops counterattack near Kursk (Russian archive, 1996, pp. 180–181).

The idea of the operation “Kutuzov” of the Soviet command was to surround the enemy group, dismember and defeat it in parts by striking of the three fronts in one direction at Orel from the North, the East and the South (Rotmistrov, 1963, p. 252).

The troops of the fronts received the following tasks:

The Western Front by the troops of the left wing, consisting of Army 50 and Guard Army 11, – to break through the enemy's defenses southwest of Kozelsk and together with Briansk Front troops to surround and destroy the enemy in Bolkhov area.

In the future, developing the attack on Khotynets, to prevent the withdrawal of the enemy from Orel area to the west and in cooperation with the troops of Briansk Front and the Central Front to destroy the enemy.

Briansk Front troops, consisting of Army 3, Army 61, Army 63 and Air Army 15, and from July 14 Guard Tank Army 3, to strike two blows: one blow – from the area northeast of Bolkhov in the direction of Bolkhiv – to surround and destroy, in cooperation with the troops of the Western Front, the enemy groups in Bolkhov area and then attack Orel from the North; the second blow – from Novosil to Orel district, covering the city from the North and South.

The troops of the Central Front – on the right flank (A 13, A 48, A 70) to attack in the direction of Kromy and further to the North in order to seize Orel from the South and in cooperation with the troops of the Western Front and Briansk Front to defeat the enemy groups on Orel ledge (Platonov, 1958, p. 255).

In his memoirs K. K. Rokossovsky, Marshal of the Soviet Union, mentions that he did not agree with the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the plan of Orel operation and emphasizes that the plan of the operation was to fragment the enemy group and destroy it in parts. However, it was not taken into account that such actions excessively disperse our forces. In his opinion, it would be more appropriate to inflict two major powerful blows from the North and South on Briansk on the basis of Orel ledge. But for this it was necessary to provide time for the regrouping of the Western Front and Central Front troops. An excessive haste was made, which was not caused by the current situation. As a result, the troops in the important areas fought without a sufficient training and a rapid throw did not work. The operation became long-lasting. Instead of surrounding and defeating the enemy, we, in fact, only pushed him out of Orel ledge, and the fact that the German troops were on Orel bridgehead for more than a year and managed to create a strong, deeply echeloned defense was not taken into account (Rokossovskiy, 1988, p. 218).

As if acknowledging the mistake of the Supreme Command Headquarters and confirming the words of K. K. Rokossovsky, G. K. Zhukov, Marshal of the Soviet Union, recalls that the attack of the Western Front and Briansk Front developed too slowly, and later, analyzing the reasons for the slow pace of the events, we concluded that the main mistake was that the the Supreme Command Headquarters was in a hurry to move to the counterattack and did not create a stronger group in the left wing of the Western Front, which, moreover, during the battle had to be seriously reinforced. Briansk Front troops had to overcome a deeply echeloned defense with a frontal strike, it was better that Guard TA 3 entered battle not on

Briansk Front, but on the Western Front together with Guard Army 11 (Zhukov, 1983, p. 70).

Before the operation, armored and mechanized troops in the strike groups of the three fronts consisted of TA 2, Guard TC 1, 1,5 (Bagramyan, 1977, p. 206), 9, 19, 20 (CAMD RF, f. 148, op. 10695, ref. 117, p. 23) and TC 25, seven separate tank brigades (TBr), 27 separate tank regiments (hereinafter – TR) and 15 self-propelled artillery (hereinafter – SAR) regiments. For the first time during the German-Soviet war, tanks of a direct infantry support (hereinafter – DIS) joined the infantry divisions (hereinafter – ID) of the first and second echelons (Zhukov, 1983, p. 132).

The use of armored and mechanized troops was distributed as follows: separate tank brigades and regiments were planned to be used for the DIS, centrally, in the directions of the main strikes of the infantry corps and divisions. The DIS tank groups also included self-propelled artillery regiments, which were to move behind the tanks in the second echelon. The tanks suppressed the enemy's firepower and ensured the unimpeded attack of the infantry, and the SAU supported the tanks with the fire of their guns. And all tank corps, except TC 25, were included in the mobile groups of armies, TC 25 (a commander – Major General t/v F. G. Anikushkin) were the reserve of the Western Front. Tank Army 2 was the mobile group of the Central Front (Daynes, 2009, p. 389).

Therefore, before the operation, the group of troops of the Red Army outnumbered the enemy twice in soldiers, three times in artillery, 2,3 times in tanks and 2,7 times in aviation (Platonov, 1958, pp. 255–257; Rozanov, schematic 25). To conduct Orel operation, the Supreme Command Headquarters concentrated significant forces: about 1 300 000 soldiers, more than 21 000 guns and mortars, 2 400 tanks and SAU (according to other data, there are significant differences in the number of tanks and SAU – 3 400 (Gerasimenko, 2010, p. 169) and 3 314) and more than 3 000 combat aircraft. The average density was more than 6 tanks and SAU per 1 km (Bukeyhanov, 2013, p. 18). They were opposed by a hostile group of 600 000 soldiers, more than 7 000 guns and mortars, about 1 200 tanks and assault guns, and more than 1 100 combat aircraft (Solovyev, 1976, pp. 158–159). The Wehrmacht command had high hopes of the new tanks “Tiger”, “Panther”, and “Ferdinand” assault guns, which outnumbered the Red Army tanks in armament and armor.

On the morning of July 12, after a powerful aviation and artillery attack (Pospelov, 1961, p. 277), which lasted for about three hours, the troops of the Western Front and Briansk Front started the attack simultaneously in Bolkhiv and Orel directions, and from July 15 – the troops of the Central Front, concentrating their main strike in Kromsk direction. For Guard Army 11 (a commander – Lieutenant-General I. Kh. Bagramyan) of the Western Front and Army 61 (a commander – Lieutenant-General P. A. Belov) of Briansk Front it was the beginning of Orel-Bolkhiv attack campaign (July 12–30, 1943).

Before the attack campaign, the combat reconnaissance was carried out simultaneously in all the areas of the breakthrough of the Western Front and Belorussian Front troops. The reconnaissance battalions of Guard Army 11 (VIZ 1967, No. 11, p. 46), according to other data 280 tanks and SAU (Bukeyhanov, 2013, p. 50) rapidly attacking the enemy on the night of July 12, captured his first position.

The combat order of Guard Army 11 consisted of three echelons (Goncharov, 2006, p. 313). The first echelon was intended to break through the enemy's defensive line and ensure the introduction into battle of the second echelons of corps and army. It was formed to be the strongest. The first echelon consisted of three infantry Guards Corps (hereinafter – IGC) (six infantry divisions), reinforced by three tank brigades, two tank breakthrough regiments,

two self-propelled artillery regiments and eight engineering battalions. It was supported by aircraft and most of the artillery (including the artillery of the second echelon) and Guards mortar units. To develop the success of the breakthrough the second echelon was assigned, which included four infantry divisions (which belonged to the second and third echelons of infantry corps) and Guard tank brigades. The third echelon included Tank Corps 1, Tank Corps 5 and the infantry division – the reserve of the army commander (which remained under his direct control) and was intended to increase the development of the breakthrough and strike success in depth.

The mobile group of the army included Tank Corps 1 and Tank Corps 5. The infantry (riflemen) divisions were reinforced by DIS tanks. The tank brigades with infantry on armor fought as advanced detachments of infantry corps (Bukeyhanov, 2013, p. 64). The introduction into battle of the second echelons of infantry corps and TC 5 (a commander – Major General M. G. Sakhno) provided for the completion of the breakthrough of the main defense line and advance into the depth of the enemy's defense 8–10 km forward.

To ensure the breakthrough of the first position of the main defense line was the commander of the army provided for the use of assault groups in advance. The assault groups included 8-10 specially trained servicemen, who were armed with anti-tank grenades, explosives and thermal substances, etc. The assault detachments were formed in the specially fortified areas of the enemy, in the regiments – as a part of a rifle battalion reinforced by a sapper squadron and a flamethrower platoon, and in the battalion – a rifle squadron reinforced by a sapper platoon and a flamethrower division, to which machine guns, mortars, anti-tank guns and also tanks and SAU were added (Bukeyhanov, 2013, p. 57).

According to the decision of I. Kh. Bagramyan, Lieutenant-General, on the morning of July 13, TC 1 was put into the battle (a commander – Lieutenant-General V. V. Butkov) in the line of Guard Infantry Division 8, which accelerated the breakthrough of the second defense line of the German troops. And the part of the forces of Guard Army 11 together with TC 5 developed attack bypassing Bolkhov, and the second part with TC 1 – in the direction of Vuzke, Khotynets (Rotmistrov, 1963, p. 254). During the battle, the loss of TC 1 was: 10 tanks were destroyed and 13 received combat damage (Bukeyhanov, 2013, p. 100). Separate tank regiments and brigades were used for DIS during the breakthrough of the tactical zone of the enemy's defense (Koltunov, 1970, p. 192).

TC 1 after the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone developed the attack. As an advanced detachment of the brigade there fought TBR 159 that pursued the enemy with its vanguard (tank battalion). After reaching Popovo, the reconnaissance from the advanced detachment encountered reconnaissance battalion 192 and MP 52 of TD 18 of the enemy troops. At this time, the main forces of the 1st TC approached the northern outskirts of Rzhavka (about 12 km north of Popovo).

To destroy the enemy during the counter-battle in cooperation with the tank brigades of TC 5 (neighbour on the left), the commander of TBR 159 made a decision (approved by the corps commander): to defeat the TD 18 units of the enemy, which were advancing in columns. To inflict the main strike on the flank in the direction of Melekhovo, Shvanovo, and the auxiliary strike – by the machine-gun battalion in the direction of Petukhivka, Sopovo. In the reserve, the brigade commander assigned a rifle platoon reinforced with tanks.

TBR 159, acting in a close cooperation with the brigades of Tank Corps 5, attacked the enemy's flank, ahead of the enemy in the deployment. As a result of the sudden strikes from the front and to the flank the enemy's columns of Tank Division 18 were dismembered, losing

a significant part of the artillery, and the tanks began a chaotic retreat in a southern direction along the Vytebet River.

During the battle, 5 tanks and assault guns, 17 guns and mortars were destroyed and about 115 soldiers of the enemy were killed. This clearly demonstrates that during the counter-battle the success was achieved due to the prejudice of the enemy in inflicting fire damage and deployment, having the initiative, skillful use of terrain for maneuver (Losik, 1979, pp. 171–172).

The transition of the Red Army troops in Orel area to the attack made the German command regroup the troops and transfer the part of Army 9 troops from Kursk direction to strengthen the grouping in Orel area. From 12 to 18 July, four tank divisions (2, 9, 18, 20) and 10 motorized divisions (hereinafter referred to as MD) were transferred from Army 9 to reinforce Tank Army 2. As well as seven divisions from other parts of the front, including three tanks (Daynes, 2009, p. 265). Although these troops suffered heavy losses, this was a significant support for the grouping of troops on Orel bridgehead. To lift the spirits of its soldiers, the German command united Army 9 and Tank Army 2 troops, which occupied Orel area under the single command of Colonel-General Walter Model, removing Colonel-General R. Schmidt from the command of Tank Army 2. A. Hitler appointed W. Model to the most problematic areas of the front. W. Model was particularly successful in defensive battles and was considered the most experienced and unsurpassed master of defense among the top generals of the Wehrmacht and was nicknamed “Hitler's Firefighter” (Rokossovskiy, 1988, p. 218).

Tank Corps 1 and Tank Corps 5 continuing to develop a breakthrough to the southeast, breaking the resistance of the German Tank Division 18 (TD) forcing the river Vytebet cut the road Bolkhov-Khotynets, south of Vuzke. This is confirmed by the data taken from the intelligence report of the headquarters of the Army Group “Center” (CAMD RF, f. 500, op. 12462, ref. 794, pp. 16–17). About 150 enemy tanks opposed the tank corps of the Red Army, supported by a large number of aircraft, trying by counterattacks to recapture the Bolkhov-Khotynets road. At the end of July 19, tankers of Guard Army 11 bypassed Bolkhov from the west and south-west and, wedged deep into the enemy's position more than 70 km and posed a threat to the main communications that connect Orel and Bryansk (Sovetskie TV 1941 – 1945, 1973, pp. 133, 134).

Under difficult conditions, the attack on the Volkhov troops of Army 61 BF developed. At the end of July 12, the army troops intervened in the enemy's defense northeast of Volkhov on a 12-km section of the front to a depth of 3 to 7 km. The task of the breakthrough of the enemy's defenses to the full tactical depth was not accomplished. During the battle, TBR 68 lost 13 tanks (CAMD RF, f. 418, d. 10695, ref. 117, p. 15). The density at the breakthrough site was 18,6 tanks and SAU (Bukeyhanov, 2013. p. 79).

On July 13 in the offensive zone of Army 61, Tank Corps 20 was put into the battle (a commander – Lieutenant-General I. G. Lazarev). Tank Corps, together with the infantry units, broke through the enemy's strong defenses and repulsed the counterattacks of the German Tank Division, which was sent from Orel-Kursk direction. At the end of the day, the Soviet troops captured a strong point of defense of the enemy northeast of Volkhov – the village of Kryvtsevo and several others. But in general the progress was negligible. And the troops of Army 3 and Army 63 on the first day of the attack could not break through the main defense line of the enemy and were able to wedge into the defense of the enemy to a depth of 6-7 km only at the junction line of the armies (Koltunov, 1970, pp. 212–213).

On the second day of the attack at noon Guard Tank Corps 1 was introduced into battle

(a commander – Lieutenant General M. F. Panov). By this time, the enemy had drawn up fresh forces, including TD 8, but by the end of July 13 the enemy's defenses had been broken through. The Troops of Army 3 and Army 63 advanced in the direction of the main strike to 15 km and expanded the breakthrough to 25 km along the front line (VIZ 1963, No. 8, p. 67).

According to the decision of the commander of the Central Front, the troops of Army 13, Army 48, Army 70 and Tank Army 2 were to reach the frontier by the end of July 17: Nagorny, Preobrazhenske, Shamshin, Novopolevo, Rozhdestveno, Kamyanka, Veselyi Posyolok, Leb-edykha, Voronets, Morozykha, Katomki. In the future, to develop the attack in the direction of Gorokhovo, Filosofovo, Ploske, Nesterovo (Russian archive, 1996, pp. 166–167).

The main task was entrusted to Army 13 and Army 70, which were reinforced by Tank Corps 9 (a commander – Lieutenant General temporarily S. I. Bogdanov) and Tank Corps 9 (a commander – Major General temporarily I. D. Vasylyv). According to the commander's decision it was planned to enter into battle Tank Army 2 after reaching of Army 13 the border Soglasny, Buzuluk, Shyroke Boloto, Saborovka. The unities and units of TA 2 were given the task to strike the main blow in the direction of Snova, Senkovo, Gremyachevo and to capture by the end of July 17 the area of Olgino, Gnylusha, Shusherovo and further to attack in the direction of Nikolske, Nesterovo (Platonov, 1958, p. 388).

In Briansk Front zone, the troops of Army 61, in cooperation with Tank Corps 20, completed the breakthrough in the enemy's defenses on July 18 and, advancing to 20 km, threatened the bypass of Bolkhov from the south-east. According to an excerpt from the intelligence report of the headquarters of the Army Groups “Center”, the German command was extremely concerned: “It should be expected that the enemy, based on the success achieved, will continue to draw up fresh forces in order to surround and destroy all German troops on Orel ledge” (CAMD RF, f. 500, d. 12462, ref. 794, pp. 16–17).

To develop the attack and accelerate the breakthrough of the enemy's defenses on July 19, Guard Tank Army 3 was introduced into the battle (731 tanks and SAU (serviceable – 713) and in cooperation with the infantry units, breaking through the enemy's defenses on the river Oleshnya, advanced 8-10 km (CAMD RF, f. 16, d. 4440, ref. 33, pp. 4). In the fierce battles, the army of P. S. Rybalko lost many tanks and other equipment. According to G. K. Zhukov it would have been better if Tank Army 3 had entered into the battle not on Briansk Front but together with the army of I. Kh. Bagramyan (Zhukov, 1983, p. 70).

And already at 2.00 on 20.07.1943 the commander of Guard Tank Army 3 received a new task: on the morning of July 20, to strike in the direction of Protasove, Otrada, and by the end of the day to cut the road and railway Mtsensk – Orel and, developing the attack on July 21 at Mtsensk from the south, together with Army 3 to complete the defeat of Mtsensk enemy group and liberate Mtsensk. After completing this task Tank Army 3 was to attack to the south in order to cut Mokhove-Orel railway and to help Army 63 in its reaching the Oka River, and later to cut Orel-Kursk railway and seize the city of Orel. In case of unfavourable conditions for the seizing Orel, to move to the west in the direction of Kromny (Russian archive, 1996, p. 180).

The next evening, forcing the river Oka in the area of Vidrada Tank Army 3 captured the bridgehead. This event created favourable conditions for Briansk Front attack. On the same day Tank Army 3 of Briansk Front captured Mtsensk (CAMD RF, f. 16, d. 1073, ref. 5, pp. 343–356). In the future Tank Army 3 turned to the South, to Stanovyi Kolodiaz, in the zone of Army 63. To attack in the new direction, the army commander used his second echelon: Tank Corps 12 and Tank Brigade 91, and the attacking corps in the first echelon

took their places behind them. Such a regrouping was appropriate and justified. P. S. Rybalko repeatedly practiced this in the future during simultaneous actions in several sometimes opposite directions. In the given example Guard Tank Army 3 acted in opposite directions not simultaneously but sequentially. The regrouping of the army troops was carried out correctly by the commander. In his memoirs, S. M. Shtemenko, Army General speaks quite seriously about the commander of Guard Tank Army 3. S. M. Shtemenko emphasized that P. S. Rybalko always acted clearly according to the plan approved by the Supreme Command Headquarters and Guard Tank Army 3 performed its tasks with honour. The actions of the army influenced the development of the attack of Briansk Front troops and played a significant role in the successful completion of the entire operation to defeat the enemy on Orel ledge (Shtemenko, 1975, pp. 236–237).

On July 24 the unities of Guard TA 3 occupied Stanovyi Kolodiaz, and the troops of Army 3 and Army 63 of Briansk Front reached the banks of the Oka and Optukha rivers, i.e., reached the front edge of the rear line of the enemy's defense, which covered the approaches to Orel from the East.

On the morning of July 25, Lieutenant General P. S. Rybalko gave the army unit the task to start the attack. Tank Corps 12 – to attack from the border of Afanasyevka, Debezhevo in the direction of Khotetovo, Stanovyi Kolodiaz and by the end of July 25 to reach the border of Khotetovo, Stanovyi Kolodiaz, Mykhailivka, Pylativka, and to capture the airfield near Hrachivka (CAMD RF, f. 315, op. 4440, ref. 39, p. 5 stars). Mobile Corps 2 was given the task to attack from the border of Debezhevo, Rozbigaevka in the direction of Yeropkino, Khotetovo, Stanovyi Kolodiaz and at the end of the day to reach the border of the river Stish, and Tank Corps 15 – to attack in the second echelon behind Tank Corps 12 (CAMD RF, f. 315, d. 4440, ref. 38, pp. 6). During the attack, the units of Tank Corps 12 and Mobile Corps 2 were forced to storm the defense due to the unpreparedness of Army 63 infantry units and, overcoming the enemy's defenses, reached the frontier of Durnovo, Dovhe, Yeropkino, and Khotetovo on July 26 (CAMD RF, f. 315, d. 4440, ref. 20, p. 14; ref. 38, p. 6).

At the end of the day on July 19, Tank Corps 1 and Tank Corps 5 of the Western Front bypassed Bolkhov from the West and South-west, deeply wedged into the enemy's defenses, making a threat to its main communications, which connected Orel and Briansk (the most important railway line for the German group) (Daynes, 2010, p. 301). At that time, the troops of Guard Army 11 advancing to the territory depth for 70 km and widening the breakthrough to 150 km along the front covered the left flank of Volkhov group of the enemy from the West and South-West, and the right flank of this group was represented by the troops Army 61 of Briansk Front, advancing to the territory depth for 20 km.

In an effort to prevent the encirclement of its group, the German command hastily threw reinforcements, including the tank divisions, and launched a powerful counterattack. Guard Army 11, notwithstanding the enemy's attack, was forced to take defense measures (Rotmistrov, 1963, pp. 54–255).

Analyzing the situation, the commander of the Western Front introduced Army 11 into the battle (a commander – Lieutenant General I. I. Fedyuninskyi) (Koltunov, 1970, p. 218). Army 11 was sent to the front from the Supreme Command Headquarters reserve for reinforcement and was given the task to attack in the direction of Khvastovychi, Tank Corps 25 – to develop the attack in the direction of Znamenske. During the fierce battles in five days Army 11 and Tank Corps 25 were able to advance into the territory depths of the enemy's defenses only for 15 km, but their activity attracted the majority of the German

troops in this area, and this activity helped Guard Army 11 in repelling the enemy's counter-attacks (Rotmistrov, 1963, p. 255).

On June 25 in the action zone of Guard Army 11 there was Tank Army 4 sent from the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters (consisting of Tank Corps 11, Ural Volunteer Tank Corps 30 and Guard Mobile Corps 6 – 652 tanks and SAU) (Sovetskie TV 1941 – 1945, 1973, p. 136). Guard Corps 2 was also sent to the hostilities zone of Guard Army 11 (a commander – Major General V. V. Kriukov). By involving them into the battle, the commander of the front tried to intercept the railway and Orel-Bryansk road and by the part of the forces in cooperation with Army 61 to isolate and destroy the enemy group in Bolkhov area (Istoriya BTV, 1953, p. 285). After arriving in the war zone Tank Army 4 had little time (1 day) to prepare for the hostilities. The time limit left it impossible to prepare sufficiently for the task and to organize interaction between the corps and military units. Moreover, it was under the intense strikes by the enemy's aircraft (Rozanov, 1958, p. 267). With the involvement of Army 11 and Tank Army 4, the Supreme Command Headquarters was late (Zhukov, 1983, p. 70). This became the main reason for the troops of the Western Front to fail at fulfilling the task of increasing of the first echelon strike in time and the completion of the encirclement of Volkhov and Orel enemy groups (Rotmistrov, 1963, p. 256).

The situation in which there were the German troops on Orel bridgehead became increasingly difficult. E. von Manshteyn's last attempt to break through to Kursk from Belgorod by the forces of the attack group of the Army Group “South” also ended in failure. From July 16, the German troops were forced to begin retreating to the positions they held before the beginning of the attack.

Field Marshal E. von Manshteyn's, in his memoirs, confirms the decision of the German command to move to the defense in Kursk direction and on the entire Eastern Front until July 19 and connects it with the beginning of the Soviet soldiers attack in Donbass and the OKH order to transfer of Tank Corps 2 SS and two tank divisions from the army group “South” to the army group “Center” (Manshteyn, 1999, p. 514). As of July 28, 1943, Orel group of the German troops, after the transfer of tank, motorized, and infantry divisions from other parts of the front, numbered about 800,000 soldiers (Myuller-Gillebrand, 2002, p. 658).

The troops of Tank Army 4 were tasked to break through the heavily fortified defenses of the enemy and by the end of July 26 to advance to the territory depth for 60 km. I. Kh. Bagramyan, Lieutenant-General, the Commander of Guard Army 11, noting that having experience in overcoming strong deep-tiered defenses, doubted whether it was reasonable to bring into the battle such a large number of tanks without proper training. I. Kh. Bagramyan warned that the Red Army could suffer unjustified losses of tanks. He suggested using the tank army in Khotyn direction, where the conditions were better for tank operations and the direction became decisive. But the commander of the Western Front left his decision unchanged, especially since he was supported by the commander of Tank Army 4 V. M. Badanov (Bagramyan, 1977, pp. 235–236).

The subsequent events confirmed the erroneous decision of the commander of the Western Front and the rightness of General I. Kh. Bagramyan. The troops of Tank Army 4 together with Guard Army 11 had to break through the four lines of the enemy defense prepared in advance, densely saturated with firepower, manpower and barriers. On the first day, Tank Corps 11 and Mobile Corps 6 suffered heavy losses of combat vehicles, mainly caused by the fire of hidden in the ground and camouflaged tanks and the enemy's anti-aircraft guns. And only the introduction into the battle of Ural Volunteer Tank Corps 30 changed the sit-

uation. The unities of Tank Army 4 went to the railway Orel-Bryansk, creating favourable conditions for the attack of Army 61 of Briansk Front, which on July 28 liberated Bolkhov (Daynes, 2010, p. 468).

On July 30, Tank Army 4 was transferred to Briansk Front according to the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, retaining the previous task and the attack directions, and on August 3, Tank Army's 4 main forces crossed the Nugr River and grouped to develop the attack to bypass the enemy's Orel group from the North-West (Bukeyhanov, 2013, p. 211).

As a result of Bolkhov-Orel front attack campaign, the left wing of Guard Army 11 of the Western Front and the troops of Army 61 of Briansk Front, in cooperation with Army 11 and Army 50, combating to the west, expanded the breakthrough of the enemy's defenses on the front to 90 km, advancing in the south-western direction for 80 km (CAMD RF, f. 208, d. 4440, ref. 20, pp. 462–463).

At that time, the commander of the Central Committee continued to make attempts to reach Kromny area and on the morning of July 25 resumed the attack. Army 70 overcoming the resistance of the enemy moved in the direction of Chuvardino. The next day, General K. K. Rokossovsky put into the battle Tank Army 2, which received the task by the end of July 26 to be in the area of Krasna Roshcha, Hnezdylovo, Chuvardino (Daynes, 2009, pp. 394–395). The enemy, consistently defending itself on prepared positions, put up fierce resistance and detained the troops of Tank Army 2 and the units of Tank Corps 9 and Tank Corps 19 of the Central Front. On July 26, at 24 o'clock Guard Tank Army 3 was transferred into the operational subordination of the commander of the front to hasten the events of the troops advance (Russian archive, 1996, p. 181).

At the same time Guard Tank Army 3 was severely weakened as a result of heavy fighting on Briansk Front, where it suffered heavy losses (Shein, 2007, pp. 114–115).

By the end of July 27, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front, with the support of aircraft of Army 16, broke through the intermediate line of the German group defense and advanced for 35–40 km. The enemy, being under the attack of the the Red Army, began to withdraw the troops, which were in front of the left wing of Briansk Front and the right wing of the Central Front. To succeed, the commander of the Central Front on the morning of July 28 put into battle Guard Tank Army 3 on the left flank of Army 48. Lieutenant General P. S. Rybalko was given the task to break through the enemy's defenses on the Mala Rybnitsya River and reach the border of Khmeliova, Sebyakino, Korovye, Boloto, Horki (15–20 km north of Kromna). (CAMD RF, f. 315, d. 4440, ref. 20, pp. 19–20). At the end of the day on July 28, Guard Tank Army 3 reached the border of Filosofovo (20 km east of Kroma) – Kalynnyk – Annensky Lozovets, but the enemy in the area of Filosofovo struck a number of powerful counterattacks in some parts and forced them to retreat to the right bank of the river. And at 21 o'clock Army units continued the offensive in cooperation with Army 48 infantry units, but the enemy's resistance grew. By the end of the day on July 29, no success had been achieved, with the exception of separate Tank Brigade 91, which seized Filosofovo and the nearby Mala Rybnitsa crossing (CAMD RF, f. 315, d. 4440, ref. 20, p. 21). Late in the evening, the commander of the Central Front ordered that on the morning of July 30 Army 48, simultaneously with Guard Tank Army 3 resumed offensive battles in the former directions, but, having met a strong fire resistance of the enemy, the armies did not succeed and at the end of the day fought on the frontiers, which had been occupied before. On the night of July 30, the enemy launched three counterattacks in the Apukhtin area (18 km to the West of Zmiivka). All counterattacks were repulsed (Russian archive, 1996, p. 179). Having a large

shortage of tanks, Guard Tank Army 3 was unable to influence the successful development of the front attack significantly.

Army General K. K. Rokossovsky analyzing the actions of Guard Tank Army 3 understood that the army soldiers had not yet recovered from a heavy fighting on Briansk front. Therefore, all the efforts of tankers were in vain to overcome the resistance of the enemy. To avoid unjustified losses, he appealed to the Supreme Command Headquarters to withdraw Guard Tank Army 3 in reserve (Rokossovskiy, 1988, p. 277).

In connection with the preparation of Smolensk offensive operation, according to the decision of the the Supreme Command Headquarters, Army 11, Guard Army 11, Tank Army 4, Tank Corps 1 and Guard Corps 2, which were the part of the left flank of the Western Front, were transferred to Briansk Front. From that moment on, the end of Operation “Kutuzov” was relied entirely on Briansk and Central fronts (Bukeyhanov, 2013, p. 228).

The enemy, taking advantage of the slow advance of the right wing of the Central Front, hastily withdrew its units to the northern bank of the Kroma River and to the western bank of the Nezhivka River, where it moved to the defense to prevent breakthrough of the Red Army troops in the northern and north-western directions. K. K. Rokossovsky, the Commander of the Front of the General Army, trying to thwart the enemy's plan, ordered Army 48 and Guard Tank Army 3 on the morning of August 1 to resume the offensive and to perform the previously set tasks, and Army 70 and Tank Army 2 simultaneously to go on the offensive and bypass Orel group of the enemy from the South (Daynes, 2009, p. 396).

At the end of the day on July 30, the Central Front troops advanced only to a depth distance of 40 km. J. Stalin, observing the development of events in Orel direction, was dissatisfied with the actions of the commander of the Central Front. At 2.40, on August 1, he sent him a directive: “Recently, due to the offensive of the troops of Briansk and the left wing of the Western Front, the enemy group has got significantly weakened in the zone in front of the Central Front, withdrawing five tank divisions, two motor divisions and up to two or three infantry divisions”.

At the same time, the Central Front was significantly strengthened by tanks, having received Tank Army 3 under the command of Rybalko. “All this led to an improvement in the position of the troops of the front and created favourable conditions for the decisive offensive action. However, these conditions are still insufficiently used by the front command” (Russian archive, 1996, p. 185).

The Supreme Command Headquarters set the tasks for the front commander to immediately prepare and strike a decisive blow immediately with the forces of Army 70 and Tank Army 2 in the direction of Chuvardino, Chervona Roshcha, and Apalkova. At the same time Army 13 had the task to break through the enemy's defenses west of Koroskovo, preparing the conditions for the introduction of a breakthrough of Guard Tank Army 3 until the moment of its concentration.

Guard Tank Army 3 was to locate until August 5 in the area south of Koroskovo with the task of developing success of Army 13 and striking in the direction of Kroma to reduce the enemy's defenses on the west bank of the Oka River and thus help Army 48 move forward.

Subsequently, Tank Army 2 and Guard Tank Army 3 had to be ready to bypass Orel from the West, helping Briansk Front in defeating Orel enemy group and capturing the city of Orel (Russian archive, 1996, pp. 185–186).

Having received the order from the Supreme Command Headquarters, the Commander of the Central Front, taking into account the current situation, clarified the tasks for the front troops: for Army 48 – to stop the attack and get ready for the defense in the positions occupied;

for Guard Tank Army 3 – to withdraw troops from the battle and arrive in the area of Rybnitsya by the morning of August 3 (24–25 km to the southwest);

for Tank Corps 9 from the evening of August 1 to begin the pursuit of the enemy and not give him the opportunity to gain a foothold on the river Kroma (Daynes, 2010, pp. 304–305).

On August 4, Army General K. K. Rokossovsky clarified the task of the troops of the right wing of the front. Army 70 units were to intensify the hostilities, and Tank Army 2 and Tank Corps 9 were to strike at the enemy's rear in the general direction of Kolka, Chervona Yagoda and help Army 70 troops in curtailing the enemy's defenses. The Commander of Guard Tank Army 3 received the task at 13 o'clock to start the attack, forcing the river Kroma in the area of Kolka, Chervona Roshcha, and then to strike in the general direction of Khmelevo, Hnyle, Khotkovo, to cut off the enemy's retreat to the West and South-West from the area of Kroma, Orel, Naryshkino. The Commander of Army 13 was given the task to support artillery fire and to provide a crossing of Guard Tank Army 3 across the Kroma River, further using its success, to move forward rapidly and at the end of the day on August 4 to reach the border of Maryinsky, Chervonyi Orach, Chervona Nyva, Dolzhenki (Daynes, 2009, p. 397).

The order of the Commander of the front was received by the headquarters of Guard Tank Army 3 with a delay. The Army units went on the offensive at 3:30 p.m., on August 4. The troops of Guard Tank Army 3 carried out the offensive under heavy artillery fire and air strikes, only at the end of the day were able to reach the southern bank of the river Kroma, but could not capture the crossing at once. Only the next day at 11 o'clock the motorized infantry units of the mechanized brigades 18, 34 (MBR) of Infantry division mechanized corps (MK) 7 forced the river Kroma near Novotroitsky and captured the bridgehead on the opposite bank, but could not move deeper. The Parts of Guard Tank Army 6 and 7 captured Hlynky, but could not hold the position under a strong enemy pressure and were forced to cross to the southern bank of the river Kroma. Only by the end of the day, on August 5, Tank Brigade 88 of Guard Tank Corps 7 managed to capture the crossing in the area of Kutafino and on the night of August 6 to begin the crossing of tanks to the northern bank of the Kroma river (Daynes, 2010, p. 372).

At this time, the troops of Army 3 and Army 63 of Briansk Front liberated Orel on August 5. The Supreme Command Headquarters, seeking to consolidate the achieved success, by its directive № 30159, ordered Briansk Front commander, on August 6, to focus the main efforts on the rapid capture of Khotynets and Karachev. The Commander of the Central Front was given the task to use Tank Army 2 and Guard Tank Army 3 to strike in the direction of Shablykino in the interaction with the right wing of Briansk Front to destroy the enemy, the troops of which were retreating from Orel to the west. The task was given to involve all Briansk Front and Central Front aircraft to perform this task (Russian archive, 1996, p. 186).

At the beginning of August, the general situation in the area of Orel ledge was characterized by the fact that Briansk Front troops captured the city of Orel, but the Central Front troops were still on the approaches to Kroma until August 4 – Army 13 and Tank Army 2 fought on the bank border of the Kroma River. Analyzing the situation, the Command of the Army Group “Center” understood that due to fatigue and reduced combat capability of the troops it was impossible to stop the attack of the Red Army troops, it was necessary to leave Orel ledge as soon as possible (Bukeyhanov, 2013, p. 249).

In pursuance of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Lieutenant-General P.S. Rybalko was given the task to pursue the enemy in the direction of Khmyliov, Mytske, Shablykino and to capture: Shablykino, Novosiolki, Herasymovo, Volkovo, Robye. The troops of Tank Army

2 – to chase the enemy in the direction of Hnezdylovo, Veselyi Kut, Rabotkovo, Berezivka, Hnezdylivka and capture Rabotkovo, Borodino, Lyse (Shein, 2009, p. 187). But the tank armies failed to accomplish the task. The fierce resistance of the enemy, whose soldiers clung to the accidental, unprepared frontiers, sought to delay the offensive of the Red Army troops and thus to ensure the systematic withdrawal of Orel group, did not allow the Red Army troops to reach the boundaries, specified in the order of the front commander. The low rate of attack of tank formations caused sharp dissatisfaction in the Headquarters of the Central Front.

The Army General K. K. Rokossovsky, in his order to the commanders of the tank armies, expressed dissatisfaction with their actions. He demanded from Guard Tank Army 3, on the morning of August 7 to break through the enemy defense in the area of Krasny Orach, Dolzhenko and, developing the strike to Maslovo, Soskovo, at the end of the day to capture the area of Troitsky, Soskovo, Zvyagintsevo, Maslovo. K. K. Rokossovsky required the use of the tank formations and motorized infantry during the attack in a massive way, not attacking by small scattered groups. He ordered to bring to strict responsibility, even the trial of commanders of the units and formations that do not perform the tasks (CAMD RF, f. 62, d. 329, ref. 23, pp. 234–236).

It should be noted that the orders given by the commander of the Central Command troops for the period from July 30 to August 6 indicate his intention to achieve the fastest fulfillment of the tasks set by the Supreme Command Headquarters.

Were there any accusations against Guard Tank Army 3 fair? The Army units lacked ammunition and artillery. Interaction with motorized infantry units and units was not properly developed. This led the tankers combat without the support of motorized infantry, the tankers independently broke through the enemy's defenses. And the task of tankers was to develop an attack after the breakthrough of the enemy's defenses. After all, the offensive must be carried out with full force, at a high pace, continuously day and night, under all weather conditions, with close cooperation of units of all types of troops and security. The shortcomings of the Central Front headquarters regarding the general management of the operation are viewed. In addition, during the last three days of the hostilities on the banks of the Kroma River, the army losses were: almost 2,5 killed and wounded, 104 tanks and SAU (Shein, 2009, p. 187).

Despite the measures taken, the attack of the Central Command troops was slow. On the right wing, they advanced only for 10 km. The troops of Army 65 and Army 70 with the support of Aircraft Army 16 liberated Dmytrovsk-Orlovsky on August 12. The unit of Army 13 on the same day, having met the organized resistance of the enemy from the west bank of the rivers Vodocha and Lokna, was forced to start the defense.

The advance of the units of Guard Tank Army 3 was slow. The parts of Guard Mobile Corps 7 managed to seize the area of Troitske only at the end of the day on August 9. At the same time Tank Army 6 occupied Khmeliove, and Guard Tank Army 7 was stopped on the outskirts of Soskov. The enemy, relying on a prepared defensive line, made a fierce resistance. At the end of the day, on August 10, Guard Tank Army 3 lost about 60 tanks. The German units of Divisions 383 and 6 also suffered heavy losses and began retreating to the Vodocha River (Daynes, 2010, p. 373).

Large losses of the troops of Guard Tank Army 3 were negatively treated in the General Headquarters of the Red Army. The General Headquarters reacted immediately and sent Directive to the commanders of the Central Front and Guard Tank Army: “According to the General Headquarters, Guard Tank Army 3 in the amount of 110 tanks 10.8 in battles for height 264, 6 lost 100 tanks, that is, in fact, was destroyed by the enemy. That happened

during in the general withdrawal of the enemy and the lack of a prepared defense. At the same time, our tank group was destroyed by the enemy, penetrating only for 2–3 km into enemy's territory, that is, the tank group could have been given all possible help and support. The destruction of such a large number of our tanks within a few hours indicates not only the complete lack of interaction of Guard Tank Army 3 and Army 13, but also the inaction of these commanders, who abandoned the tanks at random without any support. For the report to the People's Commissar for Defense, I ask you to begin investigation and report the results to the General Headquarters Staff".

During the hostilities from July 28 to August 12, the loss of Guard Tank Army 3 troops was 7729 people, including 2061 killed, 350 tanks, 5 SAU, or 42% of the total number of combat vehicles (CAMD RF, f. 315, d. 4440, ref. 33, p. 7). According to other data, the army lost 60,3% of T-34 tanks and 72,9% of T-70 tanks (Daynes, 2010, p. 374). The commander of the Central Front, because of the heavy losses of troops Guard Tank Army 3, decided to withdraw it from the battle and concentrate in the area of Sukhe, Torokhov, Apalkov. At 2 o'clock, on the night of August 12, the army headquarters received an order to subordinate to the Commander of Army 13 (Rokossovskiy, 1988, p. 277).

Guard Tank Army 3 suffered significant losses and according to the Directive of the General Headquarters № 40202 on August 13 (without Guard Mobile Corps 7) Guard Tank Army 3 was withdrawn from the Central Front to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters. All tanks and SAU remained in the Central Front, and Guard Tank Corps 7 years was transferred to Tank Army 2.

This ended the participation of the troops of Guard Tank Army 3 in Orel attack campaign. By September 1, it was planned to add to its staff personnel, tanks, weapons, vehicles and all kinds of supplies

The peculiarities of Guard Tank Army 3 participation in the operation "Kutuzov" were: repeated change of its combat missions; frequent regrouping; making a breakthrough in the enemy defense alone or in cooperation with general armies.

On Briansk Front, the events unfolded as follows. On August 6, Infantry Division 11 started the attack. At the same time, Tank Corps 1 was advancing in the direction of Vysoke. From Peshkovo district the main forces of Tank Army 4 advanced to Melove, bypassing Khotynets from the East, and Tank Corps 25 advanced to Bunina. Together, they defeated Khotynets group of the enemy and liberated Khotynets. Tank Corps 1 developed the attack on Karachev, and Tank Army 4 – further to the South.

By August 18, Briansk Front, Western Front, and Central Front troops had reached the front lines of the pre-established German defensive line "Hagen" and were stopped on the line to the East of Lyudinovo, 25 km to the East of Briansk, to the West of Dmytrivsk-Orlovsk. This was the end of Operation "Kutuzov", during which the troops of the three fronts advanced for 150 km, eliminating the enemy's Orel bridgehead (Daynes, 2010, p. 470). Orel operation lasted for 38 days.

After the end of Orel offensive operation Tank Army 4 did not join the hostilities for a long time.

The results of the Battle of Kursk were quite disappointing for the Soviet Union in terms of the ratio of losses. The total losses of the Soviet troops in Orel operation, according to some calculations, reached 429,890 people, including irreversible – 112,529, sanitary – 317,361; average daily – 11,313 people (Krivosheev, 1993, pp. 188–189), 2 586 танків (Daynes, 2010, p. 308). According to other data, 860,000 people. The total losses of the Soviet troops during the

attack campaign, the Battle of Kursk are calculated at approximately 1,677,000 killed, captured, wounded and sick, as compared to approximately 360,000 in the Wehrmacht troops (Smirnov, 1979, p. 289).

The Conclusions. As a result of Orel operation, the Red Army liquidated Orel bridgehead, inflicting a significant defeat on the Wehrmacht group and pushing its troops into Briansk area. The liquidation of Orel bridgehead of the Germans in July–August 1943 required incredible efforts and enormous sacrifices.

Significant forces of armored and mechanized troops were involved in the counterattack near Kursk. For the first time since the beginning of the German-Soviet war, three tank armies were used, as well as seven separate tank corps, seven tank brigades, twenty-seven tank regiments, and fifteen self-propelled artillery regiments in one offensive operation.

Significant drawbacks were made during the operation. During the preparation for the operation, the Supreme Command Headquarters was hasty in determining the time of its beginning. As a result, the troops went on the offensive without finishing the preparation, no more powerful group was created on the left flank of the Western Front. The troops of Briansk Front had to overcome the deeply echeloned defense of the enemy with a frontal strike. The front-line aircraft could not completely solve the problem of isolating the combat area from the approach of the enemy's operational reserves. As a result, instead of a rapid strike, the operation became protracted. The enemy, in fact, was slowly squeezed out of Orel ledge, which allowed him to regroup the troops and withdraw them in an organized manner from Orel area.

The tank armies became the main means of developing success of the fronts, and tank and mechanized corps – of general armies. But they were often used to break through several enemy defensive lines, which sharply reduced their ability to develop an offensive at an operational depth. Tank Army 2 was used for a frontal strike, and it would be more appropriate to use it on the flank, at the junction between Army 70 and Army 65, which would significantly accelerate the solution of the problems of the Central Front. Quite incompetently there was used Guard Tank Army 3 on Briansk and Central fronts. Often changing the tasks, unjustified by the situation, the army commander was unable to focus on a powerful strike, because the tank corps were scattered on the front. This caused great losses of personnel and tanks in the army. Tank armies were used for the first time in a counterattack without infantry.

Separate tank brigades, regiments and battalions, as well as self-propelled artillery regiments and divisions (from the beginning of Orel offensive operation), which were added to the infantry divisions, were used as tanks of a direct support of infantry in breaking through the enemy's positional defenses, their density increased as compared to Stalingrad Battle – 20 tanks and SAU per 1 km of the front. But during the breakthrough of a highly deep-echeloned enemy defense, such densities were insufficient. The peculiarity of the use of tank brigades was that they were not crushed or added to the infantry regiments, but acted in the direction of the main strike of the infantry division. From the added tanks in the division, an infantry support group was created, which received tasks directly from the division commander.

The supply of artillery to the tank armies during the battle was insufficient due to the lack of army artillery. This was one of the reasons for the significant combat losses of tanks.

Tank armies, tank and mechanized corps were most successful only in close cooperation with all-military units, artillery and aircraft.

In Orel offensive operation, an example was initiated when a brigade (TBR 159), which acted as an advanced detachment and acted in isolation from the main forces of the corps (Tank Corps 1), began the counterattack with operational reserves suitable not only for capture and

retention of a favourable frontier for the deployment of the main forces of the corps, but also in order to force the enemy to deploy their troops prematurely in the combat order, to inflict a strong initial strike, to inflict defeats and to ensure successful combat operations of the corps.

In the perspective of a further research issue, the authors will consider the peculiarities of the use of armored and mechanized troops during the preparation and conduct of Kursk Strategic Defense Operation (July 5–23, 1943).

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**ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
OF FOREIGN CENTERS OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS UNDER CONDITIONS
OF THE WORLD INTERBLOCK CONFRONTATION (1945 – 1950-ies)**

Abstract. The purpose of the research is to find out the organizational and functional features of the intelligence structures of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists foreign centers (1945 – 1950-ies), according to their tasks in the context of the interbloc and socio-political confrontation in the post-war World (during the Cold War). The methodology of the research is based on the principles of historicism and Ukrainocentrism, certain general scientific (analysis, synthesis, systematization) and special-historical (historical-comparative, historical-genetic) methods have been used, which made it possible to investigate the creation and activities of intelligence units of foreign centers of the

Ukrainian Nationalist Organization in connection with the historical events and processes that took place from the mid-1940-ies to the end of the 1950-ies. **The scientific novelty** consists in the fact of the very research on the creation of special intelligence units within the structure of foreign centers of the Ukrainian nationalists during the post-war period, their cooperation with Western special services, and the peculiarities of its personnel with the experience of secret anti-Soviet activities in the USSR. **The Conclusions.** The intelligence activity of foreign centers of the Ukrainian nationalists was one of the least explored aspects of the nationalist movement and the history of national intelligence services. Intelligence training was carried out at the NATO's Special Intelligence Centers. The main way to conduct reconnaissance was to send specially trained teams of emissaries and couriers across the border. According to the strategy of preparation for a possible global conflict with the USSR and the Communist bloc, the intelligence officers were tasked with gathering information about the armed forces and the military-industrial potential of the USSR, the secret anti-communist armed activities, the socio-political situation in the USSR and in the Soviet Union.

Key words: Intelligence, counterintelligence, special operations, the Ukrainian Nationalists Movement, foreign centers of the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), the Cold War, the NATO Special Services, the USSR Special Services.

ОРГАНІЗАЦІЯ ТА ФУНКЦІЇ РОЗВІДУВАЛЬНИХ СТРУКТУР ЗАКОРДОННИХ ЦЕНТРІВ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ НАЦІОНАЛІСТИЧНИХ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЙ В УМОВАХ МІЖБЛОКОВОГО ПРОТИСТОЯННЯ У СВІТІ (1945 – 1950-ті рр.)

Анотація. **Мета дослідження** – з'ясувати організаційно-функціональні особливості розвідувальних структур зарубіжних центрів ОУН (1945 – 1950), зумовлені їх завданнями в обстановці міжблокового та суспільно-політичного протистояння у післявоєнному світі (“холодної війни”). **Методологія дослідження:** застосовано принципи історизму й україноцентризму, низку загальнонаукових (аналізу, синтезу, систематизації) та спеціально-історичних (історико-порівняльний, історико-генетичний) методів, що дало можливість дослідити створення та діяльність розвідувальних підрозділів закордонних центрів організації українських націоналістів у взаємозв'язку з історичними подіями і процесами, що відбувалися з середини 1940-х до кінця 1950-х рр. **Наукова новизна** полягає в дослідженні створення у післявоєнний період у структурі закордонних центрів українських націоналістів спеціальних розвідувальних підрозділів, їх співпраці із західними спецслужбами, особливостей їх комплектування особами, які мали досвід підпільної антирадянської боротьби на теренах СРСР. **Висновки.** Діяльність розвідки закордонних центрів українських націоналістів була одним із найменш досліджених аспектів як минулого націоналістичного руху, так і в історії вітчизняних спецслужб. Підготовка розвідувальних кадрів велася у спеціальних центрах розвідок країн НАТО. Основним способом організації розвідки було перекидання через кордон спеціально підготовлених груп емісарів та кур'єрів. З огляду на стратегію підготовки до можливого глобального конфлікту з СРСР та комуністичним блоком, перед розвідниками ставилися завдання збору відомостей про збройні сили та воєнно-промисловий потенціал СРСР, діяльність збройного підпілля, суспільно-політичну ситуацію в УРСР і в Радянському Союзі в цілому.

Ключові слова: Розвідка, контррозвідка, спецоперації, рух українських націоналістів, закордонні частини ОУН, “холодна війна”, спецслужби НАТО, спецслужби СРСР.

The Problem Statement. In the post-war period, along with the existence of the anti-Soviet resistance movement in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Nationalists' Political Centers abroad emerged, which were aimed at the Soviet power overthrow and Ukraine's state independence restoring primarily, while using all the means available to them at that time.

Among them of utmost importance were the intelligence, counterintelligence, special units' operational and combat activities, which were introduced in the structure of foreign Organizations of Ukrainian Nationalists (first of all, OUN S. Bandera's Foreign Units,

A. Melnyk's Ukrainian Nationalist Party (PUNO), the Foreign Mission of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council). In addition to trying to support the military-political activities of the OUN's armed underground in Western Ukraine, and (from August 1950-ies) to create a long-term perspective – the global war beginning between the NATO bloc and the Warsaw Pact Organization), their own illegal positions to undermine the Soviet power in the Ukrainian SSR, the Ukrainian Nationalists Movement (Ruh Ukrainskyh Natsionalistiv) intelligence units' organization and activity were determined by the need to counter the intelligence and subordinated nationalists, the Ukrainian Nationalists Movement cooperation and its special forces with the foreign countries' intelligence (on the territory and under the control of which they were located) on the backdrop of the Cold War unfolding and the inter-bloc confrontation in the world; of particular importance, which was acquired by reconnaissance and subversive and information-psychological confrontation in the conditions of gradual formation of missile-nuclear parity.

The Ukrainian Nationalists Movement (Rukh Ukrainskyh Natsionalistiv) of foreign units' organizational and functional bases of the intelligence activities in-depth study will contribute to further researches on the Ukrainian military history current problems, as well as the past national and foreign special services.

The Analysis of Recent Researches. For the first time, the Ukrainian Nationalists Movement (Rukh Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv) special units' of foreign centers research began with the operational and official purpose in the closed departmental publications conducted by the KGB officers of the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR, whose works retained their original significance to some extent (Burdyn, Khamaziuk 1955, Shulzhenko, Khamaziuk, Danko 1963). S. Mudryk remains the leading diaspora researcher of the problem (Mechnik, 1919 – 2004), one of the OUN Security Service intelligence leaders (SS), who in a number of books described the organization, forms and methods of activity, the personnel selection and the OUN special forces personnel training during the period of the “Cold War” with a focus on confrontation with the USSR special services (Mechnyk. 1980; Mechnyk, 1989; Mudryk–Mechnyk, 1994).

The Ukrainian Nationalists Movement (Rukh Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv) foreign units' intelligence work was covered in numerous works written by civilian scientists and the KGB intelligence officers of the USSR, who were specialists in counter-propaganda and “the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism critics”, which determined the historiography issue's lacuna tendency (Dmytruk, 1980; Levenko, 1981; Rymarenko, 1968; Rzhczach, Tsurkan, 1988; Topolchuk, 1962; Troshchynskyi, 1983; Cherednychenko, 1978; Chubenko, Tumarkin 1978). The memoirs written by the OUN foreign units' emissaries-intelligence officers, who were captured in the USSR and used in the operative games with the special services of the NATO states in 1951 – 1960 were published as the information and psychological confrontation attributes (Matviienko, 1962; Yaremko, Zhylavyi, Stefiuk, 1962). The issue raised in the article is one of the least explored areas of the National Special Services history and the Ukrainian Nationalists Movement (see: Viedenieiev, 2005; Viedenieiev, Lisov, 2016) and requires the impartial study based on the documentary legacy of the special services.

The purpose of the article is to investigate the foreign OUN centers intelligence structures' organizational and functional peculiarities, determined by their tasks in the two socio-political worlds confrontation situation in the post-war world, based on the political and operational situation of the inter-bloc confrontation era in the post-war world (“the Cold War”).

The Statement of the Basic Material. After World War II, the Ukrainian foreign units were created in connection with the displacement of a large number of fighters for independent sovereign Ukraine beyond the boundaries of ethnic lands and the need for their unification. The basis of the Ukrainian military doctrine of the post-war period was proclaimed “the struggle for the Ukrainian Independent Sovereign State, and in the future – defense by the armed forces and protection of the Ukrainian state and its sovereign life” (Karyi, 1952, p. 11). At that time, the military doctrine was aimed at offensive war rather than defensive war and recognized various forms of war: guerrilla (partisan war), insurgent war, revolutionary war, underground war, regular war, etc., and denied civil war, which was “based on the class struggle, interests of different parties, or groups fighting for power in the country itself” (Karyi, 1952, p. 11).

According to the special instruction issued by R. Shukhevych, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council Chairman, newly created in 1944, the armed underground, which arose from the ideological splicing of the OUN and the UPA, continued the activity in the territory of Ukraine (Seheda, 2012, p. 231). In 1947 the Ukrainian National Council was established with a structural unit of the Military Resource of the Executive Body, M. Kapustianskyi became the first head (Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva, 1994, p. 957). Military Resource – the Ministry of Defense analogue, said the continuation of the UNR Ministry of Defense activity of, initiated by S. Petliura (Z nakaziv resortu viiskovykh sprav, 1958, pp. 4–6). At the same time, there is a definition of functional orientation and organizational construction of special units, the foundations of which were laid in the time of war. At the initial stage (in September 1944 – August 1945), the OUN Special Forces (B) acted as “Foreign Intelligence” under the direction of Ye. Vretsona, and also performed counterintelligence and security functions. It was superseded by the Security Service Referee (State sectoral archive of Security Service of Ukraine – SSASSU, f. 3, d. 186, c. 1, p. 11).

A wide range of tasks in the field of intelligence and counterintelligence activities was determined by the OUN Foreign Units Conference VI (May 1953). Among them in the field of intelligence work were the task of collecting information about Ukraine by processing radio messages, the Soviet and foreign press, data on soviet science, obtaining information about the Soviet army, maintaining ties with the underground forces in Ukraine, training of the “revolutionary action” organizers, military training nationalists in special courses and in the armies of other countries, developing tactics for guerrilla-insurgent actions, etc. (SSASSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 8, pp. 110–111; pp. 299–303). The purpose of such work was to promote a political, economic, social crisis in the USSR, which would result in increased centrifugal forces and a multinational state would collapse, hence, Ukraine would withdraw from the federation (Seheda, 2012, p. 287).

Taking everything into consideration, the Security Service of the OUN Foreign Units main tasks were the following: to collect diverse information about the situation in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), to support the nationalist underground in Ukraine, to protect their environment from the intelligence and subversive activity of the Soviet Union’s intelligence services, and to create their own positions in other Ukrainian organizations abroad, counter-propaganda work (Albom skhem, 196,8 p. 8; SSASSU, f. 13, c. 490, pp. 248–249).

The OUN Foreign units had an extensive structure of cells (there were more than 3 thousand active participants by 1968). The leading core was the Foreign Units Wire (Munich), which included, in particular, the Security Service Referee and other special units.

There is information about the Security Service's existence in the first postwar years in the "Intelligence Abstract", the creation was initiated by M. Lebed in February 1946. Its structure consisted of the following departments:

"The Anti-Bolshevik Peoples and Political Information Department", which the main goal was to acquire intelligence on the territory of the leading European states in order to determine their readiness to start a war against the USSR, to explore the possibilities of cooperation with the anti-Communist forces of the Baltic States and Eastern Europe in the interests of the fight against the USSR;

"The Bolsheviks and their Vassals Department", which in kept touch with the underground forces in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), the "People's Democracy" countries in the OUN's and foreign's intelligence interests;

"The Boyivka (Fighting) Department", which paramount aim was to counteract the reconnaissance and subversion of the enemy, destruct their agents, protect the Wire's (Provod) members.

The referrals' structure acquired more functional branching gradually. According to the Ministry of State Security (MGB), the Soviet Union, there were the following intelligence and information orientation divisions: the Foreign Sector (the courier communication with Ukraine); Foreign Intelligence Referral Reported directly to the Provider Security Council in May 1951 (Burdyn, Khamaziuk, 1955, p. 95).

The Territorial Communications Referral ("K – Z") was an important unit of the OUN Foreign Special Purpose Units. The Territorial Communications Referral maintained contacts with the underground forces in Ukraine, picked up and trained the intelligence emissaries in cooperation with the foreign intelligence, organized the USSR citizens survey who were abroad on the political, social, economic and military aspects of state life (Albom skhem, 1968, p. 8; Sbornyk materyalov, 1974, pp. 35–36).

The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council Leaders asked the Americans to help the Ukrainian agents learn the military affairs, foreign languages, acquire basic knowledge of the radio engineering, prepare them for work in the Red Cross, as well as provide necessary documents, personal weapons, money, typewriters, medicines, medical supplies, clothing, food, and suicide poisoning. In addition, the agents were in need of the secret radio stations in order to communicate in Ukraine

Due to the OUN foreign units referent M. Matviienko, who was the German special service agent firstly, and since 1951 became the Soviet special service agent, (Bukhalo, 2017), the existence of a special secret headquarters for the preparation of the rally at the Territorial Communications and such special unit as "Bohun" became known: The preparation for Throwing Nationalist Armed Groups in the USSR during Special Period (Matviienko, 1962, p. 22).

Since the end of the 1950-ies, after the underground forces' existence illusion disappearance in the USSR and the contacts revival between the Soviet Union and foreign countries (tourism, visits to relatives abroad, business trips, cultural exchange), the emergence of ideological opposition to the regime (dissident movement), the sub-Soviet affairs and the organization of work in the USSR. These units were supposed to organize the study of Soviet citizens during their stay abroad, to transfer nationalist literature to the USSR, to take care of establishing contacts with the ideological and political opposition in Ukraine (Albom skhem, 1968, p. 8; Sbornyk materyalov, 1974, p. 36). Moreover, special units also emerged in individual nationalist organizations controlled by the Foreign Units. There was an intelligence agency

“Astra”, established in early 1948 on the initiative of the ABN “Anti-Bolshevik League of the Liberated Peoples” (SSASSU, f. 13, c. 372, vol. 102, p. 187).

In addition, there were also special units in the structure of the Foreign Mission of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council. Among them, the leading was the Political and Information Service, a special unit with broad competence. At the end of 1945, the Political and Information Service was created at the initiative of the future Chairman of the Board of Referees of the Ukrainian Chief Liberation Council V. Okhrimovych at the plenary (he also headed this unit). The concept of “universal liberation policy” was promoted, the Ukrainian emigration was called for to contribute to the deepening crisis in the USSR, and the western countries were to provide moral, material and military support to the national-liberation movements of the peoples, involving the national movements in the Soviet Union to the above-mentioned purpose (Stetsko, 1976, p. 135). The Political and Information Service implemented numerous tasks from propaganda to conducting intelligence in the environment of other political associations on emigration, preparation in cooperation with the US intelligence of emissaries for exile to the USSR, recruiting Soviet citizens abroad, counter-intelligence protection (Burdyn, Khamaziuk, 1955, p. 127). The publishing house “Proloh” existing at the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council was aimed at studying and analyzing the materials of the open Soviet sources.

In particular, the information about the anti-Soviet emigration political groups’ activities was collected (Banderivtsiv, Melnykivtsiv, the Ukrainian Radical Democrats, the People’s Democrats, the Ukrainian National Council, the Central Leadership of Ukrainian Emigration, as well as Polish, Russian and Georgian Emigration, Kuban and Don lands) inspecting their decomposition from the inside (SSASSU, f. 5, c. 445, v. 4, pp. 21–24).

Furthermore, special units were also created by the Ukrainian Nationalists’ Leader A. Melnyk, the headquarters of which was located in Munich and there were numerous territorial offices situated in Germany, France, the USA, Canada. At the beginning of 1946, the PUN organized in Munich its Regional Office to guide the underground melnykivtski units in Ukraine (“Odynku” (Loners) headed by Ya. Hayvans). By the end of that year, A. Melnyk contacted with the intelligence services of the United States, Germany, and Italy. The department was tasked with establishing reliable channels of bilateral communication with the leaders of Melnyk underground units in the USSR; exploring opportunities for “Odynku” (Loners) participants’ withdrawal and legalization in Western Ukraine; selection of places for illegal printers and radio stations in Ukraine; the spread of the influence of the OUN (M) in the eastern regions of the USSR.

The “Odynku” (Loners) structure included, inter alia, intelligence departments (headed by F.Omentsynskyi), communication department (headed by M. Belychuk) and “boyivka” department (fighters) (headed by S. Kogut). Moreover, the cooperation with foreign intelligence in the field of psychological warfare against the USSR was promoted (SSASSU, f. 13, c. 372, vol. 102, p. 151).

The Ukrainian Nationalists “Provod” (PUN) organizational units, which were left in Ukraine, were trying to be used for intelligence activities. The illegal crossing points were set up in Szczecin, Krakow and the villages of Wólka Orłowska (Poland), Bohumyn, Gustopece (Czechoslovakia) in order to send agents and emissaries to the USSR. In January 1947, with the assistance of the US Special Services in Stamberg, a two-month school of radio-based agents, headed by the US intelligence officer O. Holley, was opened. Dovbenko, PUN arrested emissary, who was brought to the USSR under the guise of a repatriate, testified at

interrogation that M. Beleychuk had sent him to an American intelligence officer to study in a Munich intelligence school. Along with 45 other “melnykivtsi” he was taught intelligence information gathering methods, sabotage and shooting. Detained in 1947 during the defeat of the OUN fight, a native of Solotvyna, R. Bohuslavets, removed to Ukraine via channels of repatriation, reported that he had been selected and sent to the American intelligence unit in Munich by the mentioned PUN member M. Beleychuk for training in Munich. (Burdyn, Khamaziuk, 1955, pp. 95–100).

After the 5th Great OUN Solidarity Meeting (August 1954), the referral’s activity on “the study of the current situation in Ukraine” (A. Zhukovskyi) began to unfold. The above-mentioned division had two divisions: the first specialized in the nationalist literature exile into the USSR through Germany and the Scandinavian countries, and the second – through the countries of Central Europe. In addition, the referral conducted information gathering by interviewing Soviet citizens abroad and analyzing the media (SSASSU, f. 16, op. 1, c. 1, p. 17; Albom skhem, 1968, p. 10).

There were several ways to train officers in emigration: the military faculties’ creation at universities, work in the ex-combatants’ formations with combat experience, training and instruction through printed matter, go into foreign countries’ armies’ service (Seheda, 2012, p. 218). The considerable amount of intelligence work and active cooperation with the special services of foreign countries interested in the mass deportation of the agency to the USSR contributed to the foreign centers and the Ukrainian emigration representatives’ wide involvement as a whole in training at the NATO special educational establishments. Among the educational institutions undergoing reconnaissance and sabotage training, Ukrainian immigrants could be distinguished as follows:

- The American Intelligence School in Kaufbeuren (Germany). The teachers were the US intelligence services’ staff members. The study groups consisted of 5–7 people and accrued knowledge of radio, mine and blasting skills, mastered weapons and hand-to-hand combat for 6–7 months;

- The US Special Command Special School 7712. Since 1946, it operated in the West German cities of Mittenwald and Oberammergau. M. Omelyanovich-Pavlenko, a former UNR Army General was the Chief. The school trained the qualified agents, who were “displaced” for the US intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. The main subjects were Military Affairs, History and Geography of the USSR, Eastern European states;

- The American Intelligence School in Regensburg (Germany, since 1947) was aimed at six-month training for the Political Migrant Agency of the peoples of the USSR. Captain Dublov, Head of the Counter-Intelligence Division in Regensburg, was the Chief;

- The American Special School in Starnberg (Germany, since 1946). The school trained agents-radists. The Chief was a former officer of the SS “Galicia” Division, Vartseba;

- The American Reconnaissance and Diversionary School in Madrid, Toledo (Spain, since 1946). The teachers trained staff members of the OUN (B), who were studying undercover of students at the University of Madrid. Major subjects were Insurgency Organization, Subversive Propaganda, Sabotage and Diversion in cities and in transports;

- The English Intelligence School near Hanover (Germany). The OUN Members headed by S. Bandera mastered reconnaissance, ciphers, mystery, topography, small arms in the guise of military personnel of the United Kingdom Armed Forces for 1–3 months;

- The London Intelligence School. The OUN (B) members were trained as the paratroopers under the cover of the Polish documents for 2–3 months on conspiratorial apartments;

• The American Intelligence School in Munich (Germany). The school educated the OUN (M) intelligence members the following subjects: Military Affairs, Topography, Immersion Methods in the Enemy Official Structures (Burdyn, Khamaziuk, 1955, pp. 104–106).

It is quite clear that the backbone of the special units of foreign centers composed of the OUN and UPA Movement the intelligence and counterintelligence structures' employees in Ukraine, persons who had considerable experience of operational and operational-combat work, conspiracy, or received special training in the respective educational institutions of foreign countries. Such features of the biography provided not only certain experience and qualifications, but also moral and psychological properties, in particular, extremely hostile attitude towards the Soviet regime. Almost all of those involved in special tasks in Ukraine had been further trained in the above-mentioned educational institutions.

The emigrants, who had specific combat experience were involved in intelligence training purposefully. For example, in 1946 – 1947, OUN intelligence leaders in Rome selected 24 UPA and “Galicia” personnel to study at the intelligence school in Madrid. Along with this, the source of recruiting cadets special schools become properly prepared in general and physical relations, patriotic educated youth of the diaspora, who did not participate in military-political events in Ukraine. Preference was given to the “Plast” pupils, which gave not only versatile physical training but also appropriate education. It is known, for example, that at the beginning of 1948 12 High School graduates – the Ukrainians, were selected to study in special schools in Austria (SSASSU, f. 3, d. 186, c. 1, pp. 77–78).

Hence, on the 1st of November in 1948, 41 emissaries of foreign centers were transferred by air or across the border with Poland and Czechoslovakia to the territory of the USSR, who received tasks, in particular, from the USA and England intelligence concerning the collection of the information on the armed forces and the military-industrial complex of the USSR. Two of them died, 35 were detained, 4 were taken to KGB operational development (SSASSU, f. 13, c. 372, vol. 102, p. 109; vol. 42, pp. 221, 347).

In 1951 – 1953, 27 OUN emissaries who cooperated with the British intelligence and 6 from the CIA were neutralized in the USSR and Poland (10 of them were killed, five went to cooperate with Soviet security agencies and were involved in radio games with foreign services and overseas OUN centers). In total, 74 illegals among the Ukrainian nationalists – the foreign intelligence agents, who were abandoned from abroad – were exposed in the post-war period in Ukraine (SSASSU, f. 16, d. 9, c. 53, pp. 77–78).

The range of intelligence tasks was also wide. In addition to collecting information about the underground units and trying to attract its leaders in the competition in the political environment of the diaspora, the intelligence officers received tasks from the intelligence services-curators, dictated by the context of the preparation for the war against the USSR: gathering information about the industrial sites, railways, nuclear facilities and uranium mines, Donbass mines, air defense system, airfields, military bases, ports, eastern Ukraine's industry, radar air defense network in the Carpathian Mountains and sites suitable for landing in raids from war, the mood of the population, etc (SSASSU, f. 6, c. 51997, p. 37; f. 5, c. 445, vol. 2, pp. 136–138; f. 13, c. 372, v. 40, pp. 100–101).

The Conclusions. During the 1945 – 1950-ies, under the influence of the Cold War atmosphere, specialized structures with the intelligence functions stood out as part of the foreign centers of the Ukrainian Nationalists, who worked together with the special services of the USSR opponents to prepare for the future struggle for the independence of Ukraine. According to the authors, the reconnaissance activities of the foreign centers in the period

under review can be divided into two stages. The first of them lasted from 1945 to 1959. Its main features were:

- direct penetration of foreign centers emissaries (graduates of foreign intelligence special schools, and usually agents of the latter) into Ukraine and other USSR states of Eastern Europe illegally;
- attempts to establish the underground units, establish support from the foreign centers, use the opportunities of the Liberation Movement for intelligence and subversive activities;
- attempts to obtain the information necessary to conduct hostilities against the Soviet Union and to establish positions there for sabotage and terrorist activity in a special period.

Later on, the Ukrainian Nationalists' foreign centers abandoned attempts to directly create reconnaissance positions on the basis of the underground units, the illegal aliens of armed groups' deportation to the USSR. Hence the emphasis of the new intelligence activities' tactics consisted in the following:

- the legal communication channels and media usage in order to collect diverse information on defense capabilities and socio-political processes in the USSR and in the Soviet Union as a whole;
- the organizational units' nationalist underground and stable channels of communication restoration in the USSR between OUN foreign centers and their associates in Ukraine;
- broadcasting the undermining propaganda in order to destabilize the Soviet system;
- initiating or supporting the ideological and political opposition to the communist regime with the aim of eroding the latter, reconnecting with the former OUN and UPA Movement members.

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**REVIVAL OF A LANGUAGE NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS
OF THE UKRAINIANS OF DONETSK REGION UNDER CONDITIONS
OF “PERESTROIKA” AND DURING THE FIRST YEARS
OF INDEPENDENT UKRAINE**

Abstract. *The aim of the research consists in elucidating the nature and main aspects of the development of a language identity and national consciousness of the Ukrainians of Donetsk region during the period of “perestroika” and the first years of independence of Ukraine, in the context of modern ethno-national problems. The research methodology is based primarily on the principle of historicism, concretized by the approach to historical phenomena and processes from the standpoint of dynamics, the study of the relationships between them and their interdependence. The use of this principle allows us to study the dynamics of the historical process from the point of view of its past and development trends in the future. A number of general historical methods have been used, namely: comparative-historical, historical comparative studies, retrospective. The latter, in particular, provides for the reconstruction of certain phenomena in the process of the revival of a cultural and national identity*

of the Ukrainians of Donetsk region in the context of "perestroika" and the first years of independent Ukraine. This allows us to construct separate models for the development of a national consciousness in our time, using, at the same time, some historical patterns and traditions. **The scientific novelty** consists in analyzing the process of the revival of a language identity and national consciousness of the Ukrainians of Donetsk region in the context of "perestroika" and the first years of independent Ukraine. This allows us to design individual models for the development of a cultural and national identity under modern conditions. **The Conclusions.** The process of reviving the cultural and national identity of the Ukrainians of Donetsk region in the context of "perestroika" and the first years of independent Ukraine became an interdependent phenomenon with the emergence in Donetsk region of a number of cultural national and socio-political organizations, primarily, Donetsk regional organization of Taras Shevchenko the Ukrainian Language Society. Despite the active process of Russification and denationalization, which has been carried out since the 1930-ies, the Ukrainian identity in Donetsk region still prevailed for some time. However, a targeted Russification policy aimed at destroying the language identity and national consciousness of the Ukrainian, naturally led to the confusion of all the peoples of the Soviet Union on the principles of the so-called internationalism into one, artificially formed, "homo sovieticus". Thanks to public organizations and cultural national societies in Donetsk region at the end of the 1980-ies – beginning of the 1990-ies, the process of Ukrainization of the identity of the region population began. However, a number of factors prevented this. In particular, the predominantly individualistic orientation of ethnic self-expression of the Ukrainians of Donetsk region prevented the widespread development of their language identification and national identity. Also, as a result of a massive Russification and planting of chauvinistic stereotypes, the Ukrainians were deliberately turned into a second-class ethnic mass, the outcasts. The leaders of such a policy were mainly the former party-Komsomol functionaries, who, thanks to connections with criminals and oligarchic circles, reached leading positions in almost all authority structures during the 1990-ies. And, naturally, it was they, who stood at the origins of separatism long before the spring of 2014.

Key words: cultural national identity, revival, the Ukrainians, Donetsk region, independence.

ВІДРОДЖЕННЯ МОВНО-НАЦІОНАЛЬНОГО САМОУСВІДОМЛЕННЯ УКРАЇНЦІВ ДОНЕЧЧИНИ В УМОВАХ "ПЕРЕБУДОВИ" ТА У ПЕРШІ РОКИ НЕЗАЛЕЖНОЇ УКРАЇНИ

Анотація. **Мета дослідження** полягає в з'ясуванні характеру та основних аспектів процесу розвитку мовної ідентичності та національної свідомості українців Донеччини в період "перебудови" та перших років незалежної України в контексті сучасних етнонаціональних проблем. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується насамперед на принципі історизму, що конкретизується підходом до історичних явищ та процесів з позиції динаміки, вивчення взаємозв'язків між ними та їх взаємообумовленості. Використання цього принципу дозволяє дослідити динаміку історичного процесу з точки зору його минулого та тенденцій розвитку в майбутньому. Застосовано низку загальноісторичних методів, а саме: порівняльно-історичний, історичної компаративістики, ретроспективний. Останній, зокрема, передбачає реконструкцію певних явищ процесу відродження мовно-національного самоусвідомлення українців Донеччини в умовах перебудови та перших років незалежної України. Це дає змогу конструювати окремі моделі розвитку національної свідомості вже в наш час, використовуючи, при цьому, деякі історичні зразки й традиції. **Наукова новизна** полягає в аналізі процесу відродження мовної ідентичності та національної свідомості українців Донеччини в умовах "перебудови" та перших років незалежної України. Це дає змогу конструювати окремі моделі розвитку мовно-національного самоусвідомлення в умовах сьогодення. **Висновки.** Процес відродження мовно-національного самоусвідомлення українців Донеччини в умовах перебудови та перших років незалежної України став взаємообумовленим явищем із появою на Донеччині цілої низки культурно-національних і громадсько-політичних організацій, насамперед Донецької обласної організації Товариства української мови імені Тараса Шевченка. Попри активний процес русифікації та денационалізації, що здійснювався від 1930-х рр., українська ідентичність на Донеччині все ж певний час переважала. Однак цілеспрямована русифікаторська політика, спрямована на нищення мовної ідентичності та національної свідомості українців вела до змішання усіх народів Радянського Союзу на

принципах так званого інтернаціоналізму в один, штучно формований, “гомо советікус”. Саме завдяки громадським організаціям і культурно-національним товариствам на Донеччині на рубежі 1980-х – 1990-х рр. почався процес українізації ідентичності населення краю. Однак ціла низка чинників стала на перешкоді цьому. Зокрема, переважно індивідуалістична спрямованість етнічного самовираження українців Донеччини перешкоджала широкому розвою їх мовної ідентифікації та національного самоусвідомлення. Також, внаслідок масованої русифікації та насадження шовіністичних стереотипів, українців цілеспрямовано перетворювали на другосортну етнічну масу, ізгоїв. Ініціаторами такої політики переважно виступали колишні партійно-комсомольські функціонери, які завдяки зв'язкам із криміналітетом і олігархічними колами, впродовж 1990-х рр. досягли керівних посад практично у всіх владних структурах. І саме вони стояли біля витоків сепаратизму задовго до весни 2014 р.

Ключові слова: мовно-національне самоусвідомлення, відродження, українці, Донеччина, незалежність.

The Problem Statement. The problem of preserving the Ukrainian language, a national culture and the development of a national consciousness of the Ukrainians in Donetsk region became one of the defining processes of a national revival that began already during the period of “perestroika” and the first years of Ukraine's independence. However, the inconsistency of this strategic task solving, especially by local and state authorities, led to a number of deformations and drawbacks. In particular, this inconsistency also took place in Donetsk region, where the process of revival of a language national self-awareness of the Ukrainians was actually sabotaged, which in the future became one of the main reasons for the spread of “Russkiy Mir” and separatist tendencies in the region.

The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications. R. Shporluk analyzed the question of the identity transformation of the Ukrainian and Russian nations in the context of their post-imperial transformation (Шпорлюк, 2000). The revival of a language national self-awareness of the Ukrainians of Donetsk region under conditions of “perestroika” and the first years of independent Ukraine was also, to some extent, analyzed in V. Biletsky's works (Biletskyi, 2009a; 2009b), T. Bolbat's works (Bolbat, 2002), S. Kulchytsky's and L. Yakubova's works (Kulchytskyi & Yakubova, 2016), H. Kuromyia's works (Kuromyia, 2002), P. Lavriv's works (Lavriv, 2012), A. Serheyev's works (Serheyev, 2012; 2014), V. Smoliy's, S. Kulchytsky's and L. Yakubova's works (Smoliy, Kulchytskyi & Yakubova, 2016), H. Turchenko's works (Turchenko, 2016), H. Turchenko's and F. Turchenko's works (Turchenko & Turchenko, 2015a; 2015b), F. Turchenko's works (Turchenko, 2009), L. Yakubova's, V. Holovko's and Ya. Prymachenko's works (Yakubova, Holovko & Prymachenko, 2018) and the others. However, there is no special study, which would focus on the revival of a language national self-awareness of the Ukrainians in Donetsk region under conditions of “perestroika” and the first years of independent Ukraine.

The purpose of the article consists in finding out the nature and basic aspects of the of development process of a language identity and national consciousness of the Ukrainians in Donetsk region during “perestroika” and the first years of independent Ukraine in the context of contemporary ethno-national problems.

The Statement of the Basic Material. The rise of a social and political life in Donetsk region at the end of the 1980-ies was caused not only by the process of “perestroika” of the Soviet society, but also by more significant factors that originated from the independence and state-building traditions of the Ukrainian nation. Thus, at the beginning of the XXth century, the national liberation movement was of an utmost importance in the territory of Ukraine. These events became an important ideological and political foundation for the development

of public and political organizations and movements not only in those parts of Ukraine where there were significant traditions of a national liberation struggle and a high level of a national consciousness of the population, but also in a more ethno-politically complex region – Donetsk region.

F. Turchenko drew attention to the fact that the process of “perestroika” in the territory of the USSR caused the beginning of a national revival, increasing interest in the historical past of the people, their language and culture. In October 1989, the Communist Party of Ukraine, trying to take control of these processes, initiated the adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of the Law “On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR”. This document strengthened the state status of the Ukrainian language and guaranteed the equality of the languages of all the peoples living in the territory of Ukraine. At the same time, the Ukrainian language was used in the documentation (Turchenko, 2009, pp. 71–72). It was a real chance to revive their language and national identity for the Ukrainians of Donetsk region.

M. Yuriy, refuting the well-established assertion that independence came to Ukraine only as a result of a happy coincidence of historical circumstances, emphasized that, in fact, independence became the result of the struggle of the generations of the Ukrainian people, and the favourable circumstances of 1990 – 1991 were only the “starting mechanism” of the accumulated energy for self-affirmation. At the same time, these circumstances led to a contradictory nature and revealed the internal weakness of the Ukrainian state, since the peaceful nature of the national revolution was not accompanied by an adequate renewal of the authority structures. (Yurii, 2004, p. 240). Starting from “perestroika” and later during the “Orange Revolution” and after the “Revolution of Dignity” in Ukraine it was extremely difficult to achieve a national development, in particular, in terms of the language and identity. This process was particularly difficult in Donetsk region, which for many decades underwent a deliberate Russification and denationalization.

For a long time, Donetsk region had been a kind of “melting cauldron”, which combined various linguistic, national and religious cultural features and factors. Some cities and towns in the region, such as Mariupol, Starobeshevo, Volnovakha, Amvrosiivka, Donetsk, and Makiyivka, despite the cultural differences, retain the features of this process. Donbass was at the crossroads of a variety of cultural influences: it became the home for migrants from all over the Soviet Union. Often this territory was populated by the former criminal elements, as the Soviet authorities massively sent the latter to the industrial areas of the region (Abdullin & Sytnyk, 2005, pp. 111–112). At the same time, thousands of these criminal elements, as a rule, lacked some educational and cultural level and had an aggressive attitude towards all Ukrainian.

The ethnic processes in Donbass of the XIXth – the XXth centuries can be compared to the “American cauldron”, where detached from the national roots, to a large extent, the lumpenproletariat element was levelled off in terms of an ethnic self-identification (Pasko, Pasko & Korzhov, 2013, pp. 269–270). O. Kuznetsova considers the unification of the Ukrainian and the Russian ethnic groups into a common population structure as a defining feature of the ethno-cultural specifics of Donetsk region, which is of a particular importance to the development of an effective regulating policy of ethno-political relations (Kuznetsova, 2013, p. 84). Therefore, preservation of Ukrainian national identity in Donetsk region remained a serious problem. After all, the process of a national revival, which spread to almost all post-Soviet space from the period of “perestroika”, faced a number of obstacles in various spheres of a socio-political life ((Kulchytskyi & Yakubova, 2016, pp. 285–286). Among the

obstacles, perhaps, the most serious test for the Ukrainian society was the propaganda of “the Russian world”. The latter, in turn, was largely based on the deformation of a historical memory and national consciousness of the Ukrainians (Yakubova, Holovko & Prymachenko, 2018, pp. 125–130).

R. Shporliuk noted that M. Gorbachev, to some extent, provoked a tendency to form a civil society in the USSR. Because the Soviet state, governed by the Communist Party, failed at fulfilling the historic mission it had set for itself (Shporliuk, 2000). Most of all, perhaps, it concerned the “national issue”. After all, the task of forming and sustaining the conception of the “Soviet people” was not solved, but the unsolved task also led to a number of the ethnic conflicts in the USSR at the end of the 1980-ies – beginning of the 1990-ies.

According to P. Goble’s point of view, M. Gorbachev, giving the impact to the development of a civil society, did not even realize the threats that impact had for the very existence of the Soviet Union (Goble, 1987, pp. 98–99). A special contradiction consisted in the probable combination of democracy with the remnants of “an imperial consciousness” in the attitude towards the non-Russian peoples within the USSR. This is despite the fact that “an imperial consciousness” flourished in the Soviet Union even seventy years after the collapse of the Russian Empire (Shporliuk, 2000). It is largely due to the activity of cultural national and public political societies and organizations, in some republics of the Soviet Union, that the process of a national identity revival began in the second half of the 1980-ies.

Beginning in Ukraine, and in particular, in a multinational Donetsk region, at the end of the 1980-ies, the process of a national revival at the beginning of the 1990-ies became an important guarantee of a national state formation (Serhieiev, 2014, pp. 299–300). Since 1988, the rebirth of a national identity and identity had been observed in Donetsk region. At the same time, the socio-political movement gained a certain extend. Thus, in the spring of 1988 the activities of the oppositional civil organizations, in particular the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, became more active. However, unlike in Western Ukraine, the political and national awakening of Eastern Ukraine was slow. There grew some dissatisfaction with the activities of the CPSU leadership, especially the representatives of the local party nomenclature. In the summer of 1988, the first civil protest actions began in Donetsk, but unlike in Western Ukraine, they were small in number and less known to the general public (Bolbat, 2002, p. 77).

At a meeting of Donetsk department of the All-Union memorial historical and educational society on October 21, 1989, after H. Hordasevych’s speech on the poetry and fate of V. Stus, it was decided to address T. Shevchenko the Ukrainian Language Society with a request to organize a meeting in memory of the poet and to collect signatures for the rehabilitation of V. Stus (SADR, f. 6787, d. 1, c. 6, p. 4). It should be noted that during this period T. Shevchenko the Ukrainian Language Society became the leading center in Donetsk region for the revival of a language and national self-awareness of the Ukrainians. This society was considered as the main factor of a national “awakening after half a century of hibernation” of the Ukrainians of the region. This was evidenced by numerous letters from citizens about the support of the project of the “Programme of People’s Movement of Ukraine”, which came to the editorial staff of the newspaper “The Literary Ukraine” from Donetsk region. At the same time, the authors of these letters emphasized the need to extend the activities of T. Shevchenko the Ukrainian Language Society and the People’s Movement of Ukraine in Donetsk. The authors of these letters stated that the Ukrainian language in Ukraine, and especially in Donetsk region, “should not be on the rights of a distant poor relative” (CSAPAU, f. 270, d. 1, c. 23, pp. 17–22).

The development of a language and national self-awareness always depended on education. In the second half of the 1980-ies, certain conditions were created for the Ukrainians of Donetsk region to realize their national right for education in a native language. However, in this realm of problems, there were far more questions than answers to them and ways to solve them. Thus, due to the examination of the activities of the departments for education, schools and pre-school institutions of Donetsk region in 1987, it was noted that in most of the schools the requirements for the programmes for studying History of the UkrSR in the course of History of the USSR were not met. Some teachers did not have a proper understanding of the main methodological directions of work to ensure that the study of History of the UkrSSR was properly linked to the general course of History the USSR. There were also cases when the lessons in History of Donetsk region were not conducted (CSASBPAU, f. 166, d. 15, c. 9329, p. 50).

Since 1989, the activists of Taras Shevchenko the Ukrainian Language Society of Donetsk region tried to bring to life the long-standing goal of the Ukrainians of this region – to restore the activity of a full-fledged Ukrainian educational institution with the latest equipment and a highly qualified teaching staff capable of starting Ukkrainization of the educational system in Donetsk. First of all, in 1990 owing to the initiative and dedicated work of Leonid Hromovyi, Donetsk Ukrainian Secondary School of the Humanities No. 65 was founded. Becoming the head of this educational institution L. Hromovyi set the goal of Ukranianization of the educational system in Donetsk region. His point of view on this matter was the following: in Ukraine as in an independent state, the educational process must be conducted in the Ukrainian language (Fedorchuk, 2009). Later on, similar to Donetsk Secondary School of the Humanities, similar schools began to be founded in Slovyansk, Mariupol, Horlivka and some other towns of Donetsk region (Serhieiev, 2012, p. 90).

During the beginning of the 1990-ies, the newspaper “Skhidnyi Chasopys” played an increasingly important role in the social and political life of Donetsk region, headed by M. Tyschenko as its editor (Mazanov, 2008, pp. 86–87). The newspaper “Skhidnyi Chasopys” was founded in 1992 by T. Shevchenko Donetsk Regional Society of the Ukrainian Language. At first it was a monthly newspaper and later a weekly regional Ukrainian newspaper. Since 1993, its monthly supplement “The Kozatskyi Krai” began to be published (Biletskyi, 2009b, p. 12). Among other things, the purpose of these publications was to foster the national consciousness of the Ukrainians in Donetsk region, as well as to form the general context of an ideological and patriotic upbringing of young people on the basis of historical patterns and traditions of the national liberation struggle of the Ukrainians for their own state.

According to the census of 1989, there were 116 nationalities in Donetsk region. At the same time, the Ukrainians made up 50,7% and the Russians – 43,65%. And according to a survey conducted by the regional statistical office in 1991, 32% – residents of Donetsk region perceived themselves as the representatives of the Ukrainian nation, 25,5% – as the Russians, 36,5% – both the Ukrainians and the Russians (Popov, But, Kuznietsova, 2003, pp. 217–218). That is, despite the active process of Russification and denationalization that took place since the 1930-ies, the Ukrainian identity in Donetsk region prevailed. However, this situation, when slightly more than half of the population of the region was unable to identify their own identity, testified to the natural result of the implementation of a kind of a national policy in the USSR, which, in fact, aimed at Russification and the actual denationalization of all the peoples of the Soviet Union on the principles of the so-called internationalization.

Concerning the national cultural self-identification of the inhabitants of Donetsk region, in the first half of the 1990-ies, the population of this region was largely regarded as Ukrainian-

Russian or Russian-Ukrainian biethnors. Thus, the number of biethnors was about half of all inhabitants of the region, with the gradual increase in the Russian identification. Expectations for the continuation of Ukkrainization, which began in the early 1990-ies, disappeared gradually. At the same time, the number of the Ukrainians in Donetsk region was only 10% versus more than 60% in Ukraine as a whole (Biletskyi, 2009a, p. 57).

For a long time, the policy of Russification was systematically implemented in Donetsk region and the idea of an “all-Ruskyi Mir” was consistently implemented. The period of the end of the 1980-ies – beginning of the 1990-ies marked a gradual recession from the denationalized self-awareness of the Ukrainians in the region. However, it was not easy to get rid of the Soviet stereotypes imposed on the citizens for the decades.

As noted by H. Kuromiy, the miners' strike movement in Donetsk region in 1989 was primarily directed against the branches of the Communist Party. But already in 1991, there was a marked change in the sentiment of Donbas working class, in the direction of support of Ukraine's independence. And already on December 1, 1991, the referendum clearly showed that even russified Donetsk region, in general, supported the independence of Ukraine. In Donetsk region, 76,6% of the region's residents took part in voting. At the same time, 84% of them supported the independence of Ukraine (Kuromiia, 2002, p. 472). Reacting, at a meeting in Belovezhskaya Pushcha on December 7–8, to the results of the referendum on December 1, 1991, which was to confirm the vote for Ukraine's independence, B. Yeltsyn asked L. Kravchuk the following question: “What? Even Donbas voted in favour of Ukraine's independence?”. Answering the question the latter meticulously read the results of voting for each region separately (Vilson, 2004, pp. 277–278). This fact meant that despite the total Russification and communisation, the bulk of Donbas residents illustrated their pro-Ukrainian orientation.

At the same time, P. Lavriv expressed his conviction that day-to-day work on promoting independence remained extremely important. First of all – regarding the development of a national consciousness of the Ukrainians in Donetsk region (Lavriv, 2012, p. 5). After all, the overwhelming majority of the population of Donetsk region in achieving Ukraine's independence saw, first of all, the prospects for improvement in the economic and social spheres of life. But in order to do this, it was necessary to become, firstly, a full-fledged, civilized state. This fact, in its turn, was impossible without a national unity and the achievement of an appropriate level of a national consciousness. Further events in the country, among other things, showed that among the reasons for the economic downturn in Ukraine were: the efferent movement of Donbas from Kyiv, which allegedly ignored Donbas's interests and even “exploited” it, as did Moscow at the time (Kuromiia, 2002, p. 473). Thus, in 1991 the majority of Donetsk region voted for Ukraine's independence. However, the hope and expectations, relied on this prospect, were not justified. At the beginning of the 1990-ies, those people, who considered Ukraine's independence as primarily economic independence, were confronted with a number of socio-economic problems. And for those citizens, who wanted, above all, political independence and Ukkrainization, the realities were too illusory. At the same time, the central government practically removed itself from the solution of cultural and national problems of the region, and for the local authorities the pro-Ukrainian spirit remained alien and unacceptable.

At the end of the 1980-ies – beginning of the 1990-ies the state formation process in Ukraine had a number of peculiarities that distinguished it from similar processes, which took place during this period in the former Soviet Union republics. During the existence of

the Soviet Union, the ethnic and national subcultures were actively formed in Donetsk region. Moreover, criminal elements played a significant role in this process, who, in general, were deprived of some national or ethnic orientation. During this period, ideologically interpreted internationalism contributed to the formation of the equality thesis of all “Soviet people” in the public consciousness. The country with many national cultures, languages, customs began to lose the specific, unique features of the culture of individual peoples, who inhabited it. In some regions, including Ukraine, there was a critical situation in the field of functioning and development of the national language. The collapse of the USSR, significant changes in the economy, culture, social sphere caused changes in views on the national, ethnic, mental characteristics (Kostiuk, 2008, pp. 69–70). Particularly difficult was the perception of the Ukrainian state-building processes in the industrial cities of Donetsk region, where the ideological “treatment” of citizens was particularly stable, which aimed at educating them in the spirit of internationalism and Ukrainophobia (Rozumnyi, 1998, p. 39). At the same time, various theses on the multinationality of Donetsk region, a kind of “symbiosis of Donetsk land, in the territory of which different ethnic groups retain their own language and culture”, “a unique Donetsk character” and “friendship of Donbas peoples” as the basis of Donbass regional identity, began to be cultivated. Therefore, the slogan of “the melting pot” of Donbass was deprived of connection with a real life. In the meantime, anti-Ukrainian sentiments and slogans spread in the information space (Smolii, Kulchytskyi & Yakubova, 2016, pp. 257–258).

H. Turchenko noted that after the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation had to recognize Ukraine’s independence. However, for the leadership of the Russian Federation it was rather a lingering annoyance or a historical anomaly that required correction. As an alternative to the independence of Ukraine, there was proclamation of joining various post-Soviet unions, such as “Slavic Unity”, “Customs Union”, “Eurasian Union”, etc. Similar ideologems, with the use of different means of informational influence, had been implemented among the population of Eastern Ukraine for a long time, in particular, – “Russkyi Mir” and “Novorossiia” (Turchenko, 2016, p. 217). The project of a local autonomy formation to counter Western Ukrainian influences had been spread actively since the beginning of the 1990-ies throughout South-Eastern Ukraine, and especially in the Crimea and Donetsk region. However, according to H. Turchenko and F. Turchenko, even in this region the anti-Ukrainian sentiments did not have a wide support among the population, since the majority of the population of this region, at one time, supported the independence of Ukraine, perceiving it as a unitary democratic republic (Turchenko & Turchenko, 2015b, p. 5). On February 8, 1992, the Congress “For Donbas Revival” was held at Donetsk regional public and political center. At the the Congress, in particular, a coordinating council of the organization was elected, which included, in addition to business leaders and researchers, a number of deputies and leaders of Donbas civic and political organizations. Among other things, there were calls for the federalization of Ukraine, in particular, – the separation of Donbas into the federal land, the formation of a national guard, the members of which were the local residents of the region and subordination of this unit to the local authorities (Tyshchenko, 1992). Later on, the problem of federalization was repeatedly raised in Donetsk region, and, as noted by V. Molodyk, even Switzerland and Germany were taken as an example, but the fact was not taken into account that these federations are based on a high political culture; stable traditions that can be found in a genetic code in every politician, every citizen (Molodyk, 1993, p. 1). Undoubtedly, this was already one of the first attempts to incline Donbass to the path

of separatism. In this case, the greatest threat would be the language national identity of the Ukrainians of Donetsk region.

H. Turchenko and F. Turchenko pay attention to the fact that the oligarchic system, with its subordinate authority structures, hindered the Ukrainian national development (Turchenko & Turchenko, 2015a, pp. 138–139). During the entire period of independent Ukraine, a kind of a criminal conglomerate was formed in Donetsk region with the authorities, the pro-government politicum, and the law and judicial bodies controlled by them. Taking a full advantage of the benefits of Ukrainian independent state, this “conglomerate” was hostile to everything Ukrainian, which ultimately led to the events of 2014 in Donbas. In particular, the beginning of modern Russian-Ukrainian war, which, like the previous Orange Revolution, meant a test of the spirit and national consciousness of the entire Ukrainian nation (Sytnyk, 2017, p. 79).

Back in 1994, simultaneously with the parliamentary and presidential elections and the election of local leaders, the so-called “a local referendum” or “an advisory poll” was held in Donetsk. Since the referendum was not foreseen by the law, this “poll”, among other things, raised the question about the status of the Russian language as a state language. A similar question was addressed to voters concerning the legitimization of a federal status. According to D. Kazanskyi, this referendum was a pre-election move. However, illustrative was the fact that about 80% of the population in Donetsk supported the federalization at that time (Kazanskyi, 2014). This “referendum” became one of the steps towards isolation from the rest of Ukraine.

According to I. Losev, in fact persons without rights (who were initially “on their knees” before the Soviet authorities, and then before the oligarchy, in contrast to all the talks that “no one put Donbas on the knees”) quickly began to consider themselves almost the “highest race” in Ukraine. At the same time, since the beginning of independence in Donetsk, various ideologems were formed about the peculiarity of Donbas territorial community, the significance of “Donetsk region inhabitants” and the difference between “native” and “alien”, etc. (Losev, 2013). Thus, “Donetsk identity” was artificially formed, which was opposed to all Ukrainian. All this formed a favourable ground for the spread of separatism in Donetsk region.

The Conclusions. Despite the active process of Russification and denationalization, which took place in the 1930-ies, the Ukrainian identity prevailed in Donetsk region at the beginning of the 1990-ies. However, a purposeful Russification policy aimed at destroying the language identity and national consciousness of the Ukrainians, led to mixing of all the peoples of the Soviet Union on the principles of the so-called internationalism into one, artificially formed, “*homo sovieticus*”. The new Ukrainian authorities practically did not care about the state of the Ukrainian language and national consciousness in Donetsk. Instead, only public organizations took care of the development of the Ukrainian language and national consciousness, quite sporadically and not systematically. It was owing to public organizations and Ukrainian cultural and national societies in Donetsk region at the end of the 1980-ies – the beginning of the 1990-ies there was made the attempt of Ukrainization of the population identity of the region. However, a number of factors hampered this process. In particular, the predominantly individualistic orientation of the ethnic self-expression of the Ukrainians in Donetsk region hindered the broad development of their language identification and a national self-awareness. As a result of a massive Russification and the chauvinistic stereotypes imposition, the Ukrainians were transformed purposefully into a

second-class ethnic mass. The initiators of this action were mainly the former party and komsomol functionaries, who during the 1990-ies reached leadership positions practically in all authority structures. It was they, who stood at the origin of separatism long before the spring of 2014. In Donetsk region “Donetsk identity” had been formed artificially for a long time, which was opposed to all Ukrainian. This formed a favourable ground for the spread of separatism in Donetsk region. During the period of independence in Donetsk region, there was formed a conglomerate of criminals, the authorities and the pro-government politicum, which controlled the law offices. Taking a full advantage of the Ukrainian independent state, this “conglomerate” was hostile to everything Ukrainian, which, among other things, led to the events of 2014 in Donbas.

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THE “MEMORY STUDIES” DEVELOPMENT AND THE HISTORICAL MEMORY DYNAMICS IN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE FROM THE VIEW OF THE MODERN WESTERN HISTORIOGRAPHY

Abstract. *The purpose of the article is to analyze the historical memory development dynamics, which has a complex, contradictory nature, linked to changes in the government and the corresponding changes in the memory policy, regional and age characteristics of the population. The methodology of the research is based on the theory of scientific knowledge and general philosophical provisions concerning the dialectical interconnection and interdependence of phenomena and processes in society; the specific historical approach and the principles of integrity and objectivity. The article uses primarily the search-bibliographic, historiographic and comparative methods in order to characterize the multifaceted approach of Western scholars concerning the historical memory problems related to the events of World War II. The scientific novelty is that for the first time in the historical science of Ukraine, the most recent English historiography on the historical memory problems in our country concerning the devastating years of World War II has been analyzed from a critical point of view. The Conclusions.* Thus, the experience of World War II, which was the greatest tragedy for the peoples of Europe, became the most complex and ambiguous in terms of interpretation. For Ukraine, which was not an independent state at the time, it was more complicated because of the two totalitarian regimes domination: the Communist and the Nazis. The conflicting interpretations of the past, which took place in different regions of Ukraine, were systematically used by politicians during the electoral race, which hindered the creation of a national consensus. Analyzing the historical memory development in modern Ukraine, Western analysts tend to isolate such issues as the collective memory dependence on the regions' historical path peculiarities, the population's pre-war and military experience, and changes in the memory politics by the authorities. And these changes in our state were extremely difficult due to the historical science politicization by the ruling elite. The history nationalization, which also took place in Russia, formed the basis for the formation of pro-Soviet historical myths, the “The Great Patriotic War” glorification and, at the same time, the distortion of the Ukrainian experience during 1939 – 1944. The “memory wars” became one of the major causes of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict.

Key words: *historical memory, politics of memory, decolonization, post-colonial dimension, “nationalization” of history, collective memory.*

РОЗВИТОК “MEMORY STUDIES” ТА ДИНАМІКА ІСТОРИЧНОЇ ПАМ’ЯТІ В НЕЗАЛЕЖНІЙ УКРАЇНІ З ПОГЛЯДУ НОВІТНЬОЇ ЗАХІДНОЇ ІСТОРИОГРАФІЇ

Анотація. *Мета дослідження* – проаналізувати процес розвитку історичної пам’яті в Україні, який мав складний, суперечливий характер, пов’язаний зі змінами у державному керівництві та відповідно змінами політики пам’яті і регіональними особливостями. **Методологія дослідження:** теорія наукового пізнання та загальнофілософські положення про діалектичний взаємозв’язок і взаємозумовленість явищ та процесів у суспільстві; конкретно-історичний підхід та принципи цілісності й об’єктивності. У статті використано насамперед пошуково-бібліографічний, історіографічний та компаративний методи, з допомогою яких схарактеризовано багатоаспектність підходу західних вчених до проблем історичної пам’яті, пов’язаної з подіями Другої світової війни. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що вперше в історичній науці України з критичної точки зору проаналізовано новітню англомовну історіографію, присвячену проблемам історичної пам’яті у нашій державі щодо травматичних років Другої світової війни. **Висновки.** У роботі стверджується, що усвідомлення суспільствами європейських держав складного минулого особливо суперечливе там, де громадяни пережили існування двох тоталітарних режимів: комуністичного і нацистського. Зокрема, нові члени Євросоюзу з Центрально-Східної Європи вибрали несумісні моделі подолання минулого. Простежено погляди західних учених щодо співвідношення історії та міфу, трансформаційних процесів у суспільній, офіційній та інших різновидах пам’яті, значення музеїв. Наголошується, що в сучасній незалежній Україні, на думку зарубіжних аналітиків, в політиці пам’яті використовується концепція “антиколоніального націоналізму” і “гібридності”. При цьому вони вказують на логічність застосування при інтерпретації минулого у посткомуністичному суспільстві Україна саме постколоніальних рис. Зазначено, що політика пам’яті перших трьох президентів України більше нагадувала імпровізації, носила випадковий, суперечливий характер, не могла подолати регіональні відмінності у сприйнятті минулого. Вказано на унікальну роль Львова, який після 1991 р. завдяки зусиллям тамтешньої інтелігенції фактично відродив роль “українського П’ємонту”.

Ключові слова: історична пам’ять, політика пам’яті, деколонізація, постколоніальний вимір, “націоналізація” історії, колективна пам’ять.

The Problem Statement. Due to the extremely high level of public attention to the past eras’ issues, especially those related to World War II, the topic is relevant. Moreover, in connection with the annexation of the Crimea by Putin’s Russia and aggression in Donbas the topic escalated in present-day Ukraine significantly. The historical revisionism, the historical events’ politicization cause certain strains in the society that are undesirable for maintaining stability in our country. Therefore, of the historical memory problems updating, and interest in the historical memory development process, which first appeared in the Western countries, is becoming a priority in Ukraine.

The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches. According to the researcher A.M. Kyrydon, the memory studios’ emergence in Ukraine (a kind of transition) began during 1990-ies – 2000-ies, while the “obsession with memory” was observed in the West. Only since 2011, The researcher made a statement in 2014 concerning the memory studios’ institutionalization stage in Ukraine, which could be observed only since 2011. Although, on April 22, 2008, the Scientific Conference “The Historic Memory as a Field of Competition for Identity” was held in Kyiv. “The National and Historical Memory: A Keyword Glossary” was published in 2013 (Kyrydon (Ed.), 2013, 436 p.). Numerous national scholars are involved in the historical memory issues, including the “memory war”. Let us pay attention to the works of such scientists as H. Kasianov (Kasianov, 2015, pp. 149–155; 2016, pp. 118–137;

2018, 420 p.), A. Kyrydon (Kyrydon, 2010, pp. 96–105; 2015, pp. 244–250; 2016, 320 p.), L. Nahorna (Nahorna, 2012, 328 p.), O. Rozumnyi (Rozumnyi, 2017), O. Hrytsenko (Hrytsenko, 2017, 1136 p.), V. Babka (Babka, 2016), Yu. Zernii (Zernii, 2008, pp. 41–51), O. Lysenko (Lysenko, 2015, pp. 4–21). I.M. Tymkiv published an article, dedicated to the historic memory, analyzing the non-fiction literature but only the domestic authors (Tymkiv, 2019). The researcher O.Ya. Volianiuk made conclusions on the controversial interpretation of historical events in modern Ukraine, the existence of “mutually exclusive models of vision of the past”. O. Ya. Volianiuk also proved that people expressed particular interest in the theme of World War II concerning the national versions of Wikipedia (Volianiuk, 2013, p. 49). So far, there is no work in Ukrainian historiography devoted to the analysis of foreign scientific literature, which discusses the historical memory development in our society.

The purpose of the article is to analyze the historical memory development dynamics, which has a complex, contradictory nature, linked to changes in the government and the corresponding changes in the memory policy, regional and age characteristics of the population. The task is to find out, through a critical analysis of recent English-speaking historiography, how the historical events of World War II are interpreted in the collective memory, why political elites form selective discourses of the past, especially of “traumatic” content.

The Statement of the Basic Material. A considerable amount of attention was paid to the issues of the past in almost all countries, especially in the 80-ies of the XXth century. As a rule, this concerned the periods marked by the cataclysms, wars, changes in political regimes, etc. Particularly complex, controversial, and often situational were the processes of analyzing and understanding the past in the post-communist countries. First of all, because they experienced the activities and consequences of the power of two totalitarian regimes: the Communist and the Nazi.

It cannot be said that in the West, including the European Union countries, there are no problems related to the attitude of the professional scientists, the society to their own past, especially the tragic 1939 – 1945 years. Hence, in Brussels in May 2017 when The Museum of European History was opened, and the journalists, especially the British ones, raised serious doubts as to whether the museum would be sufficiently linked to the “European” identity to justify its high name for the Museum of European History. After all, the journalists emphasized that there could be no overlapping interpretations of the past in EU countries. Indeed, the new members of the EU from Central and Eastern Europe chosen different models of overcoming the past, depending on the communist regime level of legitimacy. For example, the Czech Republic adopted the position of the “investigate and punish”, and in Slovakia “forget and forgive” position was widely spread, as the political legitimacy of the communist government was much greater in Slovakia (Echternkamp & Jaeger, 2019, p. 1).

According to the French sociologist P. Nora, memory is life, and while history reconstructs the past, it is always problematic and incomplete. Therefore, the end of the XXth – the beginning of XXIth century is not accidentally characterized by the presence of “memory fever”, “memory phenomenon”, “memory mania», “obsession with memory”, “memory madness”, “memory epidemics”, “memorial fever”, “memory crisis”, “memory industry”, “memory boom”, and there are also innumerable talks about the “archival fever era”, “memorial extremes”, and a “crusade of heritage” (Macdonald, 2013, 3). The historical narratives, the varieties of collective memory (folk, official, autobiographical, historical, memorial) coexist, though the former plays the role of a “civil religion” closely linked to the power legitimacy (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, pp. 8–9).

Back in 1956, Professor at the University of Victoria in Wellington (New Zealand) P. Munz (1921 – 2006) argued that the juxtaposition of history and myth was not entirely correct. Not only because they were interdependent, but also because the events of the past in myths were sometimes told according to the historical facts. Of course, there are many examples when myths depicted some events as ridiculously wrong, but when a historian misinterpreted the past, it should be also considered as a myth. (Munz, 1956, p. 5). The Professor of History at the University of London D. Ramsden (1947 – 2009) wrote the following: “The historians ... use myths to determine the way in which the memory of the past can be organized selectively, with a conditional version of the past that explains how people come to why they themselves believe in a certain time”. But if history is a discourse that involves debate and criticism in the search process, then memory is a matter of choice, silence, and certain construction. Memory is not static, it is transformed over time, storing events and phenomena in accordance with the desired narrative. Memory rarely goes the same way, so it chooses its own “facts”. In addition, the national and regional identities (University College Lecturer D. Lowenthal (1923 – 2018) was convinced that one person may have not only a single identity) are closely related to memory and mythology. The authoritarian regimes always determined who was to be remembered and honored, regardless of the society’s opinion. The study of memory, which focuses on the historical facts’ manipulation, is used for political purposes – the so-called “The Representative Paradigm”. Such kind of conclusion provided by the University of London College Teacher W. Davis can be fully attributed to the Soviet and post-Soviet cults commemorating World War II. A unique example of brazen Soviet mythology is the myth of the “Small Earth” (Mala Zemlya). The troops consisting of 630 marines headed by Major Ts. Kunikov on the 4th of February in 1943, which landed in the Cemaes Bay, had no strategic importance, and owing to L. I. Brezhnev was almost at the level of the Stalingrad operation (Davis, 2018, pp. 3, 16–17; Lehr & Aponiuk, 2011, pp. 212–228).

A. Assman (Professor at Constantine University, the author of the book “The Remembrance Spaces. Cultural Memory Forms and Transformations” (Munich, 1999) stated that the positivist historiography had reached its limit. Therefore, if there are no archival documents, the oral evidence will come in handy. It should be remembered that the changes in the historiographical discourse, official memory, historical and political debates affect the individual memory (Penter & Titarenko, 2011, pp. 479, 482).

The French sociologist P. Nora noted that the modern style of memory is no longer natural, passed down from one generation to the next. For the time being the modern style of memory is the “artificial hyper-reality created by different institutions in the interests of political manipulation”. It is capable of dividing the nation, undermining its identity. The social, economic, political contexts of the situation dictate accordingly, and changes in the historical memory (Koposov, 2018, p. 23).

The above-mentioned conclusion is illustrated by an example of the changes that take place in museums, the number of which in the countries of East-Central Europe during the XXth century. increased significantly. According to D. Cameron (Royal College of London), there are two types of museums: “The Temple” and “The Forum”. The first type enumerates the museums, which were founded in the XIXth century that provided a single, steady interpretation of history in the form of the “objective” truth. The museums-“forums”, on the contrary, open different interpretations, they have a pluralism of important and equivalent interpretations. It is noteworthy that since 2005 the most information about the history of museums creation in the countries of East-Central Europe has been provided by the scientists

from the West and the USA: M. Buko, S. Dudley, E. Hooper-Greenhill, S. McDonald, S. MacLeod, J. Marston, S. Pierce, D. Preziosi. They emphasized that the power of museums, especially the historical ones, was not only that they support the collective memory, but also “create part of a morally and emotionally shaped social and ideological landscape”. They all belong to a particular memory matrix, even if it is distant from the interests and concerns of the individual. However, all history museums are too vulnerable to ideological manipulation and conflict. The best example is the historical exhibitions about World War II in the post-communist bloc states, not excluding Ukraine. It is still the subject of heated discussions and silences, dilemmas and simplifications, underestimations and exaggerations. It is still a living story, created by dreams, fighting the mentions of being both weary and too painful. Due to the history nationalization process taking place in Eastern Europe, museums cannot shirk responsibility for shaping the national identity. Quite often, as Poland (and Ukraine – according to the Author) exemplify, museums are at the crossroads of romanticizing and redefining the national history (Bogumił, Wawrzynia, Buchen, Ganzer (eds.), 2018, pp. 4–14).

B. Törnquist-Plewa (Lund University Center for Languages (Sweden)) notes that the European Union promotes a cosmopolitan memory that upholds respect for human rights, can be the basis for the global ethics and has a transformative effect. This approach does not focus on the national identities, which are a potential source of the conflict, and does not frighten the self-criticism. The cosmopolitan thought is known to respect all people regardless of race, language, religion, or gender, and is sympathetic to human suffering. The international organizations use the memory phenomenon as a tool for preventing ethnic conflicts and genocide, fighting nationalism, racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism. Today, the EU is a leading force in developing the policy of compassion, the idea of an international understanding of memory. B. Törnquist-Plewa noted the impact of the German experience with its policy of “overcoming the past”. It is no coincidence that Jürgen Habermas, the German philosopher, the sociologist is one of the most famous leaders of the cosmopolitanism and post-nationalism idea (Törnquist-Plewa, 2016, pp. 144–145).

At the beginning of the XXIst century, numerous Western scholars claimed that the era of communism had left a kind of vacuum in the Eastern European countries, which had crystallized the ethnic features, nationalism, nostalgia, xenophobia, and ancient strife. That is why, according to their point of view, the post-communist memory policy was distorted. As a result, the memory processes seem to have evolved in the context of the mnemonic pathology, trying to catch up with the Western patterns of remembering the past. Not so long ago, Eastern Europe was seen as a minor, additional entity, where at best discussions were held on the Europeanisation of memory. The situation changed at the beginning of the XXIst century with the new political projects emergence, cultural programs, and academic works in the countries of the post-communist camp. Eastern Europe becomes an important factor in the debate on the content of the European narrative gradually. M. Pakier (Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw), J. Wawrzyniak (University of Warsaw) believe that in modern Eastern Europe, states have different cultural memories. It is desirable to divide them into the following groups: the societies with a strong, single anti-communist outlook, to which they refer Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The second group includes Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, where there is intense debate over the evaluation of the historical past. In Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Albania, attempts to delegitimize the communist past proved to be weak. Finally, in Russia, Belarus, Moldova, according to S. Trebst, professor at Leipzig University, the communist past does not suffer from a lack of the legitimacy (Pakier & Wawrzyniak, 2015, pp. 1–12).

Some Western historians are convinced that Ukraine is undergoing a post-communist transit phase. Others do not completely agree with the above-mentioned conclusion, as the researchers do believe that it is better to pay attention to the post-colonial period not the post-authoritarian. Many Ukrainian scientists oppose this, because such a concept is associated with the “Third World”, that is, the society’s development is too weak. But if we consider the Ukrainian state as a post-colonial state, then the politics of memory, according to B. Törnquist-Plewa and Y. Yurchuk (Södertörn University, Sweden), still uses the concept of “anti-colonial nationalism” and “hybridity”. At the same time, the imitative nature of this kind of nationalism is also noted. The authors emphasize that in memory politics there may be narratives, which completely reject everything related to the imperial culture. In addition, the anti-colonial politics creates a desire to forget the colonial past and to “adjust” the development of the nation to the historical self-invention and self-assertion. Furthermore, while looking for the new characters and national roots, there may be a serious distortion of the historical events, activities of certain renowned persons. Therefore, such a policy is “vulnerable to infectious remnants in the subconscious and the unresolved past”, “complicating the consequences of arbitrary historical amnesia”. Determining the anti-colonial concept’s positive role, especially in the mobilization of the masses, its opponents are convinced that it is only a transitional stage in the decolonization process. (Törnquist-Plewa & Yurchuk, 2019, pp. 3–4).

A. Polegkiy, the researcher at the University of Antwerp points out that Ukraine was not a classical colony, but the post-imperial and post-colonial elements analysis can help in understanding the complex transformation processes. According to D. Moore (American historian), there are two important features in explaining the post-colonial discourse: the kinds of the colonial features, which existed in the communist societies and the little attention, which was paid to the above-mentioned fact. Another researcher, Sandomirskaya I.I., Professor of the Center for Baltic and Eastern European Studies at Södertörn University outlined several provisions that make it possible to discuss the problem in a post-colonial dimension. The proposed provisions include the following points: the new way of thinking in terms of the global expansion, the opposition to East and West, the progress and backwardness, the majority and minority (the ethnic minorities), the center and periphery, diverse unified, universal representation’s systems created. The British and Canadian political scientist of the Ukrainian origin, Taras Kuzio, who predicted the Crimea occupation by Russia in 2010, argued that Ukraine had traits characteristic of the British colonialism’s internal colonialism. The characteristic features include: the persistent inequality, the economic dependence, the low-quality standards of life, a kind of the labor division, the reactive nationalism (Polegkiy, 2015, pp. 171–173).

According to D. Averre (the Senior Lecturer at the Center for Russian European and Eurasian Studies at the University of Birmingham) and K. Wolczuk (Professor of the Eastern European Politics at the University of Birmingham), Ukraine remained as terra incognita for the West in the early 90-ies of the XXth century. Later on, the scientists began to analyze the Ukrainian nationalism, identity, ethnic peculiarities issues, as well as the Ukrainian linguistic division. Hence, the scientists emphasized the riskiness of the Ukrainian position between the EU and Russia. But since the beginning of the XXIst century, more scientists studied the issues related to Russia’s aggressive policies in the Caucasus, rather than attempts at the reintegration with Ukraine (Averre & Wolczuk, 2016, p. 552). Moreover, Professor T. Kuzio points out rightly that most Western authors underestimated the scale of V. Putin’s nationalist plans, ignoring the chauvinistic views of the Ukrainians and other peoples (Kuzio, 2016, pp. 87–99.)

I. Katchanovski, the scientist at the University of Ottawa, emphasizes the importance of a regional factor in Ukraine's memory discourses. The extremely different political values or the cultural priorities determine the attitude of the population to the past, especially the events of the following years 1939 – 1945. As such kind of values, norms, orientations are passed on from generation to generation through political socialization through family, religious, educational institutions, mass media, etc. The scientist clarifies that if political values change gradually over time, then the political positions are much more variable. It should be mentioned that the Ukrainian regions had different pre-war experiences, and during the war, as it is known, there were different options for the occupation regimes of Germany, Romania, and Hungary. It goes without saying that the different population's activity levels were observed regarding the service in the Red Army, the participation in Guerrilla Movement, and the UPA units (Katchanovski, 2014, pp. 210–211). All the above-mentioned factors influence the collective and the individual memory greatly and put some psychological barriers on the path to the nationwide consensus.

A researcher at the Department of Slavic Studies at the University of Amsterdam, M. Makhortykh points to the fact that the Internet brings about the fundamental changes in the perception of the past fairly, especially with regard to the events of the war and the ethnic conflicts. The electronic media has become, according to the researcher: a “key modulator of safety and security”, undergoing the process of converting electronic texts into the memory mediators (Makhortykh, 2017). The Ukrainian researcher O. Ya. Volianiuk found that in up to 10 million interested visitors surfed the Internet, in various national versions of Wikipedia in order to read some information on World War II (“The Great Patriotic War” – in the Russian version) (Volianiuk, 2013, p. 49).

According to the estimates made by N. Koposov, the researcher at Emory University, there were more than 90 draft laws, which were proposed in Ukraine during 1992 – 2016 that dealt with various aspects of the historical memory. They have become important tools in the “memory wars” between Ukraine and Russia (Koposov, 2018, pp. 8–10).

Once, V. Churchill remarked quite aptly: there were so many historical events in the Balkans that they could not swallow them at all (Sakwa, 2014, p. 9). To a large extent, the above-mentioned statement may also be applied to Ukraine. In the rejuvenated independent state, which Ukraine became since the end of 1991, the study of the complex past could not have taken place without the search, hypotheses, researches, certain conclusions that took into account the varied atmosphere of the regional priorities, with their heroes and anti-heroes. S.O. Yekelchuk, Professor at the University of Victoria, once stated that the Ukrainian historical science after the Soviet Union collapse represented a tangled mishmash of the old and the new, trying to break institutionally and methodologically with the period of the Soviet past. The “national paradigm” in historiography grew, the historians freed themselves from the lasting legacy of the Soviet dogmatism but often tended to the post-communist nationalism. (Yekelchuk, 2011, pp. 560–565).

Moreover, the political memory of the first three presidents of Ukraine looked more like improvisation, was not deeply thought out, and there was only a one-sided change concerning the perceptions of the past. It was casual, situational in nature, unstructured, and therefore unable to overcome the regional differences. In the regions, the “memory wars” and the “monuments war” continued, complicating the situation with the insufficient historical literacy of the society (Portnov, 2013, pp. 235–250).

The researcher Yu. Yurchuk rhetorically asks the following question: “Is it possible to talk about the monolithic history of Ukraine if the World War II experience is asymmetrical

in different areas of Ukraine?”. In fact, the above-mentioned question concerning the history democratization is a transition from a monistic to a pluralistic narrative, an urgent need for dialogue. The society should be aware of the fact that both heroic and barbaric actions took place in the past in order to build a common future confidently where there was no room for the concealment. It is well known that in any society there are changes, which are more traumatic than others. Ukraine suffered a double trauma: after the war, when the true memory of the events from 1939 – 1944 was frozen, condemned to silence by the Soviet regime. In addition to it, here was the post-Soviet trauma: the topics that were not written or talked about publicly began to be explored and made public, causing a shocking state in the society. Again, there were new exceptions and silences. It should be remembered that the cultural trauma is closely connected to the collective memory (Yurchuk, 2012, pp. 75–77).

It is difficult to agree with the famous scientist M. Halbwachs (1877 – 1945), author of the classic work “Memory Social Framework” written in 1925, who believed that only weak societies need historical heroes and heroic events. On the contrary, M. Billing, the British academician argued that even in societies with a long history of statehood and nation, narratives of a heroic past were typically used discursively in order to confirm the existence of a nation. As modern Ukraine is in the process of state-building, there is inevitably a temptation to construct local, regional and national heroes. At the same time, other Western historians point out, in addition to the glorification process, Ukraine also witnesses the victimization of the Ukrainian past (Yurchuk, 2012, p. 79).

The memory policy implementation in Ukraine is significantly complicated (once again, it should be emphasized) due to diverse directions of the past understanding and perception by citizens from different regions. Since the end of the XXth century in seven western Ukrainian regions dominated the nationalist and anti-Russian political values, then, in 17 other Ukrainian regions, according to a poll in August 2008, the pro-Soviet and pro-Russian ones prevailed. Although during World War II all Ukrainian regions suffered from the invaders, for the people of Western Ukraine the Soviet occupation was actually worse than the Nazi occupation. P.A. Rudling, the associate professor at Lund University emphasizes that Hitler’s occupation regime in the West of Ukraine was not as cruel as in the Reich Commissariat of “Ukraine”. The national customs were not persecuted, talented Ukrainians were sent to Germany in order to study, many cultural and educational institutions operated (Katchanovskii, 2010, p. 975; Rudling, 2013, p. 230).

The leading role in the history “nationalization” process, of course, belongs to Lviv, the least Sovietized and Russified, most Ukrainianized city of Ukraine, according to R. Szporluk. After 1991, the myth on Lviv as the capital of “Ukrainian Piedmont” was revived. D. Bechtel, the professor at the University of Paris-Sorbonne-IV, noted that Lviv became the center of the Ukrainian propaganda in Soviet times, and in the early 90-ies changed the toponymics without any instructions from Kyiv, erected monuments to persons, who did not fit in the national pantheon. The researcher E. Narvselius pointed out that during debates about the “toxic” Ukrainian past, the Lviv intelligentsia claimed the city intellectual autonomy, a monopoly right to form a nationally conscious population. As in other regions, World War II remains an area where the “traumatic” memory concepts, insufficient academic knowledge, and controversial political rhetoric are confronted. The special attention of the Western Ukrainian society, as we know, was confined to S. Bandera for a long time – not so much to the person as to the Anti-Soviet Resistance symbol. Although, according to Lviv political scientist V. Pavlov, the collective memory is an ambivalent phenomenon, so it cannot serve as a criterion for creating historical truth about the

events and historical characters of dramatic war years. In fact, the memory, which in the above-mentioned context, consisted of family and expatriate narratives, inevitably became mythologized and mystified. Professor Y. Gritsak's call for the right to analyze the most "toxic" Ukrainian problems, which should be transferred to professional historians is ignored by politicians. The researcher, E. Narvselius mentioned that World War II issues are still unburied past for Ukraine, with contradictory historical memory filled with the conceptual "white spots", not made up in a clear narrative. Memory is still based more on predictions and speculation than on historical evidence. The debate over the nationalist resistance role, its leaders since 2007, became more intense (Narvselius, 2012, p. 470; 2012, pp. 51–72; 2012, 412 p.).

The Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tufts University in Boston, O. Shevel points out the following: Ukrainian history has many questions, especially in the XXth century. If T. Shevchenko, I. Franko, L. Ukrainka were national characters before 1991, then in independent Ukraine, only M.S. Hrushevskyi was in the limelight. The Assistant Professor recommends that the Ukrainian elite offer more pluralistic, less categorical narratives of the historical past, that is, non-military rhetoric. Although since 2001, the Council of Europe recommended that tolerance, pluralism should be used in the study of history, neither V. Yushchenko nor V. Yanukovych followed the recommendation. It is known that the maximum differences in Ukrainian society raise issues related to the activities of the OUN and the UPA. Many citizens do not have a solid knowledge of the essence of different historical narratives. The US political scientists (M. Bernhard of the University of Florida and J. Kubik of Rutgers University) distinguish four types of mnemonic figures: the mnemonic warriors – they are convinced that only they have a true vision of history, alternative versions of the past are expedient to be outlawed or liquidated; the pluralists have different visions of the past; the mnemonics are indifferent, uninterested in avoiding memory policies: they do not want to participate in the "memory wars" or believe that the population is fairly united in their understanding of the past events. The mnemonists of the future oppose any form of thinking that involves celebrating the past. They are sure that they solved the mystery of history and therefore have a sure key to a better future. In Ukraine, O. Shevel believes, it is necessary to create a solid memory regime where different interpretations of the past would coexist peacefully. Nowadays, there is more opportunity for a unified memory mode free of mnemonic conflicts (Shevel, 2016, pp. 23–31).

The beginning of the "memory war" in the post-Soviet space T. Zhurzhenko (University of Vienna) dates from 2005, when the 60th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany and its allies was celebrated in the world. Some observers consider the conflict of Russia with the West by the clash of different ideological contents of civilizations, but clashes of different, often opposite, views on the past and different cultures of memory were of no less importance. While in Europe, the Maidans in Ukraine were considered largely as mass movements for democracy and human rights, in Russia their participants were called radical nationalists and "fascists" – the direct heirs of the Nazi collaborators. The fetishization and mythology of "The Great Patriotic War" in Russia led to the fact that a large proportion of the population, who believed in such propaganda

In Europe, after the end of the Cold War, memory politics, in fact, become geopolitical. Therefore, the struggle for hegemony on the European continent is masked by the historical narratives' conflicts in which World War II plays a major role. But unlike the "old and new Europe" states, which have a universal human rights culture, the post-Soviet national identity prevails in Russia: the triumphant memory of the victory over fascism. That's why, Russia

is trying to debunk the “revisionist” memory policy of its western neighbors. According to T. Zhurzhenko, the “memory wars” may have begun earlier in 2005, when V. Yushchenko was called a “fascist” by his opponents during the 2004 presidential election. In addition, the events of 2004 on the Maidan were called “brown plague” – by analogy with Nazism. It is Putin’s idea to revive the idea of a “Greater Russia”, in which victory in the war remained the only positive of the Soviet era, which became the basis of Russia’s modernized policy. The memory policy in Russia is a countermeasure to “decolonize memory” in the former Soviet republics, an attempt to keep them in their geopolitical orbit (Zhurzhenko, 2015).

The Conclusions. Thus, the experience of World War II, which was the greatest tragedy for the peoples of Europe, became the most complex and ambiguous in terms of interpretation. For Ukraine, which was not an independent state at the time, it was more complicated because of the two totalitarian regimes domination: the Communist and the Nazis. The conflicting interpretations of the past, which took place in different regions of Ukraine, were systematically used by politicians during the electoral race, which hindered the creation of a national consensus. Analyzing the historical memory development in modern Ukraine, Western analysts tend to isolate such issues as the collective memory dependence on the regions’ historical path peculiarities, the population’s pre-war and military experience, and changes in the memory politics by the authorities. And these changes in our state were extremely difficult due to the historical science politicization by the ruling elite. The history nationalization, which also took place in Russia, formed the basis for the formation of pro-Soviet historical myths, the “The Great Patriotic War” glorification and, at the same time, the distortion of the Ukrainian experience during 1939 – 1944. The “memory wars” became one of the major causes of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict.

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**THE MODELS OF WORK-LIFE BALANCE IN NORWAY
AT THE END OF THE XXth CENTURY – THE BEGINNING
OF THE XXIst CENTURY IN THE CONTEXT OF GENDER EQUALITY**

Abstract. *The aim of the research is to describe, to analyse and to compare different models of the work-life balance, which were implemented in Norway to remove the gender asymmetry at the end of the XXth century – the beginning of the XXIst century. The research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, systemicity and interdisciplinarity. The following methods have been used while carrying out the research: general scientific (analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, analogy, generalization) and specially-historical (historiographical analysis, retrospective, historical-comparative). The gender approach, which is aimed to critically analyse the processes of constructing, interiorization and reproducing social representations of “masculine” and “feminine”, as well as the peculiarities of the activity and interaction of men and women in various spheres of life through the prism of gender hierarchy, has been applied. The scientific novelty of the research consists in comprehending models of work-life balance in Norway in the context of gender equality. The Conclusions.* During the end of the XXth century – the beginning of the XXIst century the three main models of work-life balance were implemented in Norway – the universal breadwinner, the universal caregiver and the caregiver parity. Norway, in contrast to many other European countries, offers its citizens a wide range of models of work-life balance. This kind of policy has its advantages and disadvantages, because the “freedom of choice” is often a smokescreen behind which there is a patriarchal structure reproduction. In particular, the “cash-for-care” system, which is the essential part of caregiver parity model, is based on the patriarchal ideology. The universal breadwinner model, which is the most popular among the Norwegians, does not promote gender equality as well, because it still puts the main part of caregiving on women. At the same time at the beginning of the XXIst century the dilemma of choosing a model of work-life balance obtained the intersectional connotation due to the large number of immigrants-representatives of other ethnic groups, cultures, and religions.

Key words: *models of work-life balance, Norway, gender equality, state policy, feminism, childcare.*

МОДЕЛІ БАЛАНСУ МІЖ РОБОЧИМИ ТА СІМЕЙНИМИ ОBOB'ЯЗКАМИ В НОРВЕГІЇ НАПРИКІНЦІ ХХ – НА ПОЧАТКУ ХХІ ст. У КОНТЕКСТІ ГЕНДЕРНОЇ РІВНОСТІ

Анотація. *Мета дослідження* – описати, проаналізувати і порівняти різні моделі балансу між сімейними та робочими обов'язками, що впроваджувалися в Норвегії для усунення гендерної асиметрії наприкінці ХХ – на початку ХХІ ст. **Методологія дослідження** спирається на принципи історизму, системності та міждисциплінарності. Під час дослідження було використано наступні методи: загальнонаукові (аналізу та синтезу, індукції та дедукції, аналогії, узагальнення) та спеціально-історичні (історіографічного аналізу, ретроспективний, історико-порівняльний). Також був застосований гендерний підхід, спрямований на критичний аналіз процесів конструювання, засвоєння та відтворення суспільних уявлень про “чоловіче” і “жіноче” й особливостей активності та взаємодії чоловіків і жінок у різних сферах життєдіяльності крізь призму гендерних ієрархічних зв'язків. **Наукова новизна** полягає у спробі аналізу моделей балансу між сімейними та робочими обов'язками у Норвегії у контексті досягнення гендерної рівності. **Висновки.** Наприкінці ХХ – на початку ХХІ ст. в Норвегії були впроваджені три основні моделі балансу між сімейними та робочими обов'язками – універсального годувальника, універсального піклувальника та рівного статусу піклувальника. Норвегія, на відміну від багатьох інших європейських країн, пропонує своїм громадянам досить широкий вибір моделей балансу між роботою та приватним життям. Така політика має як переваги, так і недоліки, адже під ширмою “свободи вибору” нерідко відбувається відтворення патріархальних структур. Зокрема, саме на патріархальній ідеології заснована частина моделі рівного статусу піклувальника – схема готівка-за-піклування. Не сприяє гендерній рівності і найпопулярніша серед норвежців модель універсального годувальника, яка все ще покладає на жінку основні обов'язки догляду за дітьми. При цьому на початку ХХІ ст. проблема вибору моделі балансу між життям та роботою набула також інтерсекційного характеру через значну кількість іммігрантів – представників інших етносів, культур, релігій.

Ключові слова: моделі балансу між приватним життям та роботою, Норвегія, гендерна рівність, державна політика, фемінізм, догляд за дітьми.

The Problem Statement. Nowadays the division of work between men and women is the central issue in gender equality policy development. Its roots are deep in historical development of the humankind. The most epochs of written history of the world were accompanied by the belief that women are inferior to men, they were moved to the private sphere and women's roles were considered as complimentary to those that men had. Despite the fact that today in many countries these preconceptions were reconsidered and weakened, they still have influence in society.

In the Nordic context, this issue remains inspite of the leading position of the Scandinavian countries in providing the gender equality policies in comparison with the rest of the world. For example, Norway still has a pay gap between men and women, gender segregation of work and education, gender issues related to violence and other problems to deal with (Lister, 2009, p. 266). One of the most widespread problems is the asymmetry in the work-life balance between men and women – women still do the most of unpaid reproductive work, and this fact is one of the obstacles for achieving a gender equality.

The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches. The analysis of the various aspects of the socio-economic policy of Norway in the gender context was the subject of the study for many researchers. But in the context of our study the works that cover the place of women in the Norwegian welfare state and the gender division of responsibilities in the household are of particular interest. The theory and practice of women-friendly welfare state, “a democratic family” and women-friendly policy can be found in the works of J. Ahlberg, C. Roman and S. Duncan (2008); A. Borchorst (2008); A. Borchorst and B. Siim (2008) and R. Lister (2009).

The work of T. Rogg Korsvik (2011), as well as B. Bungum's and E. Kvande's (2013), is focused on the evolution of the Norwegian child-care policies and feminist activism.

In Ukrainian historiography there is the lack of the studies of approaches to solving the problem of work-life balance in Norway. At the same time, the study of the progressive Norwegian experience in this field from a historical perspective may be useful not only in the context of studying the socio-economic history of Norway, but also during the development of Ukrainian legislation, in particular, on a parental leave, etc.

The publication's purpose – to describe, analyse and compare different models of the work-life balance, which were implemented in Norway to remove the gender asymmetry at the end of the XXth century – the beginning of the XXIst century.

The Statement of the Basic Material. Studying the problem of achieving gender equality in Scandinavia, H. Hernes concludes that the welfare state, which is aimed at playing the main role in provision of socio-economic well-being of citizens, should be woman-friendly. Her explanation of this type of the state is as follows: “A woman-friendly state would enable women to have a natural relationship to their children, their work and public life... A woman-friendly state would not force harder choices on women than on men, or permit unjust treatment on the basis of sex. In a woman-friendly state women will continue to have children, yet there will also be other roads to self-realization open to them. In such a state women will not have to choose the future that demands greater sacrifices from them than are expected of men” (Borchorst & Siim, 2008, pp. 214–219).

The idea of women-friendly state and its existence in Norway is a subject of the study for R. Lister. Analysing the achievements of Scandinavia in a gender equality in the context of women-friendliness, R. Lister challenges the notion about the “Nordic Nirvana” that sometimes is used in describing gender policies in the Scandinavian region. She concludes that now it is just a chimera and the Scandinavian states are far from the “women-friendly” welfare state, because women and men here are not equal in their rights, obligations and opportunities. Also, there is a problem with incorporation of immigrants that caused the new challenges in the gender issue (Lister, 2009, p. 266).

The concept of “women-friendly” welfare state is closely related to the principles of shaping the balance between work and private life, as well as the concept of democratic family and U. Beck's & A. Giddens' theory of individualization.

The individualization theory is deeply connected with the weakening the traditional social structures that deal with gender, economic status, ethnicity etc. (Ahlbeg et al., 2008, p. 80). Due to the abolishment of normativity of the traditional social system individuals obtained the opportunity to shape their own lives and to choose the most preferable pattern of behaviour by themselves. In the family affairs individualization means appearances of the new type of family – “negotiated family” according to U. Beck – where people are not restricted by society and all the shape of their family relations depends on arrangements with each other (Ahlbeg et al., 2008, p. 80). A. Giddens suggests that in this type of family the relationships are “pure”, because they are based on honesty, openness, negotiations and equality; they contribute to the democratization of the family (Ahlbeg et al., 2008, p. 80). But when it comes to the practice, individuals have to choose for themselves the pattern of behaviour and shape their model of balance between work and private life. This choice depends on both objective and subjective factors, among which are options proposed by the state, personal beliefs, economic situation, the level of education and self-development, etc.

The Scandinavian countries worked hard to find an ideal balance among employment, interests of children and gender equality. But the construction of such a balance is not an easy task, because it is not stable. All its elements are in constant interaction with each other and under the influence of the surrounding world, where even the meaning of certain concepts, for example, of gender equality, constantly changes with the emergence of the new approaches and economic realities (Gislason, 2011, p. 13).

The long discussion on the ways of achieving of gender equality led to the emergence of many strategies, proposed by researchers on the basis of different approaches. Before analysing the work-life balance models and explanations for gender inequality, we should mention Wollstonecraft's dilemma that is based on the equality/difference division, which led to the private/public split (Borchorst, 2008, p. 27). This dilemma is focused on the women's place towards men. The central problem is either women should interiorize the male pattern of behaviour to achieve gender equality, or they are different and the roles between individuals should be redistributed according to their gender? This implies the following question – can we achieve gender equality, if we consider men and women as different human beings in a social dimension? (Borchorst, 2008, pp. 27–28).

In the late 1980-ies this dilemma was reconsidered and criticized strongly by the feminist researchers, which doubted the notion about the obligatory choice between sameness and differences. The majority of researchers consider this dilemma as a socially constructed phenomenon. In that period they started to argue that difference is opposite to sameness, but not to equality (Borchorst, 2008, pp. 28–29). In particular, J. Scott suggests that the view about opposition and irreconcilability between equality and difference was invented to restrict women's options (Borchorst, 2008, p. 28). It led to the appearance of different ways of achieving a gender equality, which refer to the approaches of sameness, as well as differences between men and women. The problem of integrating women at the labour market is in the central place here because it is connected directly with the shaping of work-life balance and division of responsibilities between men and women in the family.

This paper will focus on the Nancy Fraser's classification of work-life balance models for achieving gender equality. In general, she distinguishes the three ideal models, which have their own specificity (Borchorst & Siim, 2008, p. 211). Each of these models has its own legislation innovations, which are the means of implementing these types of work-life balance into practice.

For example, the universal breadwinner model is based on the approach of sameness of men and women and, in this case, on predominance of the male behavioural pattern. So it requires from women to take over this type of behaviour (Borchorst & Siim, 2008, p. 211; Borchorst, 2008, pp. 29–30).

In Norwegian legislation full-time day-care facilities are the means for implementing this model. This type of means is aimed at transferring the part of care responsibilities from family to the state and market. Having some problems with providing day-care facilities at the start of this initiative, nowadays Norway provides day-care facilities for the majority of children from 1 to 6 years old.

According to the universal breadwinner model, women have to enter the labour market and use childcare facilities, which have to be provided by the state (Borchorst & Siim, 2008, p. 211; Borchorst, 2008, pp. 29–30). It makes possible for women to obtain the job and ensure their economic independence.

The caregiver parity model is based on the approach of gendered division of work. It aims at giving significance and evaluation to the reproductive responsibilities, which

usually are considered as women's field of activity. This model includes different types of support to caregivers and aims at entitling those, who take reproductive responsibilities with the status of citizen caregivers (Borchorst & Siim, 2008, p. 211; Borchorst, 2008, pp. 29–30). In legislation this model is represented by the cash-for-care scheme, which is supposed to be gender neutral. This scheme is a special type of allowance that is provided to those, who don't want to use day-care services and prefer home care. The men or women can stay at home for the period of child's growing up and receive the same amount of money as the state spends for a child in a day-care centre. This scheme was introduced in Norway in 1998 and had been very popular for the next 7 years. But after 2005 the level of its popularity decreased drastically (Bungum, 2013, p. 31). Nowadays such schemes are popular among the poorly-educated low-income women-immigrants.

In contrast to the universal breadwinner, the universal caregiver model puts women's behavioural pattern in the centre. According to it, men should internalize female life patterns, sharing the reproductive work with women (Borchorst & Siim, 2008, p. 211; Borchorst, 2008, p. 29–30). It is embodied in a parental leave and "daddy quotas" and gives the opportunity to both men and women to be engaged in the childcare, as well as to maintain the job and take part in different fields of a social life. In Norway the majority of fathers use this leave. Nowadays the duration of the leave for them is 15 weeks (from July 1, 2018).

Two of these work-life balance models fit to the type of society, which a socio-anthropologist A. N. Longva calls mono-gendered. This kind of the society, according to her, envisages that the model of behaviour of particular gender becomes leading and all individuals should try to act according to it (Longva, 2003, p. 158). So, in our case, the universal breadwinner model aims at making a male behavioural pattern a central one in the society, in contrast to the universal caregiver pattern, which promotes a female model of activity.

Back to the history of the emergence and development of different work-life balance models in Norway, it should be admitted that during the 1970 – 1980-ies Norwegian feminist activists (representatives of different organizations), who worked actively on the integration of women in the labour market, made a significant impact on it. T. Rogg Korsvik, who studies the influence of grassroots movements on the childcare policies in Norway, allocates three main organizations, which made a lot of progress in the legislative innovations implementation, embodied in a parental leave, daddy quotas and cash-for-care scheme, which now coexist and represent different approaches to understanding a gender equality.

The most conservative wing was represented by the Norwegian Housewives' Association. This organization had considered women as different from men and supported gendered roles, where breadwinning was the male pattern and care responsibilities belonged to females (Rogg Korsvik, 2011, p. 137).

The Association accepted complementarity of women's roles, but was trying to raise the level of importance of reproductive work by cash benefits for those families with kids, who did not use day-care facilities. Its members fought against a full-time day-care and quotas for fathers. This organization was the largest one – it had approximately 60 000 members (Rogg Korsvik, 2011, p. 137). The Norwegian Housewives' Association's activity contributed to the implementing the cash-for-care scheme as a means of strengthening the caregiver parity model.

The Labour Women represented the left-wing ideology and fought for the parental leave scheme for fathers and developing the wide network of the full-time day-care facilities. This organization had strong connections with the Labour Party (Rogg Korsvik, 2011, p. 137).

The Women's Front representatives embodied the radical left wing and were struggling for the liberation of women through economic independence from men. It had 4 000 members, which were strongly convinced, that free day-care facilities for all children and men's engagement into reproductive responsibilities would help to release female population from economic dependence (Rogg Korsvik, 2011, p. 137).

So, as we can see, during the 1970 – 1980-ies among Norwegian activists there were supporters of all the three models of work-life balance, but the most numerous was the Norwegian Housewives' Association, which represented the conservative wing. Considering this fact, it can be concluded that Norwegian authorities had a tendency to make reforms from above, because their activity was more progressive in this case, than the reforms of the Norwegian society.

As it was stated above, all three models have their supporters and critics. For example, N. Fraser considers the universal breadwinner model as a means to achieve gender equality in capitalist post-industrial countries because of women's integration into breadwinning and decrease of men's wages that weakened the norm of male-breadwinner (Borchorst & Siim, 2008, p. 211).

Analysing the consequences of the universal breadwinner model in the context of mono-gendered Norwegian urban society, A. N. Longva suggests that nowadays Norwegian authorities and media do their best to promote this model. They try to prompt women to interiorize a male behaviour by the notion that they are able to do all the things that men do. This policy led to the appearance of the concept of "strong women" and ensured the leading position of male behavioural pattern. This governmental policy is the consequence of the theoretical rethinking of womanhood, in particular, avoiding the biological explanations of women's status in the society (Longva, 2003, pp. 159–160).

The process of defamilialization (according to G. Esping-Andersen), which is provided by the day-care facilities, is also connected with implementation of the universal breadwinner model. Defamilialization made it possible for women to combine productive and reproductive work. In G. Esping-Andersen's opinion the rate of women's participation in the labour market in this region, which is approximately the same as men's, a high percentage of women in Parliament (30–50% of MPs in national parliaments are females) and a low rate of single mothers were ensured by the defamilialization of women (Melby, Ravn & Wetterberg, 2008, p. 6).

At the same time, the universal breadwinner model and the means of its implementation were criticized by some feminist activists and researchers. On the one hand, the situation when the state takes some part of childcare has become the subject of a constant controversy for those, who are convinced of the harmful impact of kindergartens on the development of children, at least the youngest ones. Their proposal is to limit the time spent by children in the kindergartens (Gislason, 2011, p. 15). In particular, the representatives of the Housewives' Association considered children as mothers' responsibility and for them the level of children's welfare was inversely proportional to the level of mother's employment. This preconception became the basis of their critics of full-time day-care facilities, which made it possible for women to obtain the full-time job (Rogg Korsvik, 2011, p. 139).

On the other hand, the new trend towards this issue is the emergence of religious-oriented kindergartens, which is a new and serious challenge to a society that tries not to restrict the parents in their desires, but at the same time, wants to have developed and socialized children (Gislason, 2011, p. 15).

The other group of critics of this model have shown the patriarchal basis of this model. Studying the reasons for the gender pay gap in the context of the family and childcare,

I. Gislason shows the gender asymmetry in the family-friendly policy, stating that it still more concerned towards women and giving them the opportunity to combine paid and unpaid employment. Men are not yet considered as caregivers in this system. One of the reasons for women's lower wages is that they now take more responsibility for children's welfare and homework and are seen as those, who are more responsible for the health and safety of children. This situation led to employers' belief that most women with children are not inclined to give priority to work and leave the family behind. In order to ensure competitiveness with men, women should be free from family responsibilities, but now even this does not lead to an equal pay. The pay gap has direct impact on the decision of the couple concerning the division of responsibilities. If it exists, the tendency for a woman to be responsible for the most of unpaid work will be continued, because it is more profitable for the family (Gislason, 2011, p. 19).

In the context of development of the universal caregiver model I. Gislason suggests that "unless we manage to change the traditional division of labour in families and at home, further progress will be blocked in other areas as well. And unless we balance the distribution of a parental leave and other care duties, the devaluing of women at the labour market will continue" (Gislason, 2011, p. 13).

As it was noted above, the Scandinavian governments tried to resolve the problem of an asymmetric distribution of childcare responsibilities on the basis of gender equality by the shared parental leave. The arguments for this scheme are as follows: when the mother and father take part in upbringing from a child birth, this would eliminate (or at least weaken) the discrimination of women at the labour market, because in such a system both parents will be absent at the workplace for a certain time after a child birth. In addition, this system also introduces the idea that fathers should take care of the child even after the parental leave. And it will be easier for them because a parental leave will help the father to become more confident in caring and generate the desire to spend more time with his children (Gislason, 2011, p. 22).

A parental leave plays a key role in many aspects. This is important not only for the health of the mother and child, but also makes it possible to establish an equal distribution of family responsibilities between the mother and father and contributes to the establishment of a special relationship between children and both parents, since both take care of them from the early childhood. At the same time, considering the system of argumentation of this system opponents, it can be stated that they insist on their right to choose the most preferable system including that, where the mother is a key figure in the children upbringing. In the economic sense, this system is also a ground for concern, given the fact that men can also choose a private life and childcare as their priority, pushing paid employment to the second place (Gislason, 2011, p. 16).

The universal caregiver model corresponds to the concept of "a double emancipation" which considers the equal parenthood as an attribute of the state welfare (Hearn et al., 2012, p. 35). According to this concept, a man and a woman have to share their obligations in private and public spheres, which include productive work, as well as reproductive, equally. If it happens, they both will be emancipated, because a "traditional" division of work excludes men from childcare and domestic work, and women – from the labour market (Hearn et al., 2012, p. 35; Borchorst & Siim, 2008, pp. 214–215).

The universal caregiver model also correlates with H. Aarseth's research results. She studied the duty and passion in heterosexual couples and proposed a new scheme of work

division that includes an equal responsibility of men and women for caring and housework: “In the place of a female provider of practical care, something different emerges as various domestic tasks are redefined as team-work and motivated within a wider scheme – that of a joint project” (Aarseth, 2007, p. 140). H. Aarseth connected this model with Giddens’ theory on pure relations, where both in the couple do things together and she concluded that this division is partly free from “the gendered identities” (Aarseth, 2007, p. 140).

According to the recent research, a parental leave helped families to share childcare responsibilities more equally, but nowadays the situation is far from the equality. The researchers convinced that this is connected with fathers’ reluctance to take this leave, a mother’s reluctance to share it with a father, and also it is under the influence of economic factors, especially, the gender pay gap (Gislason, 2011, p. 23).

The caregiver parity model is the most controversial model of work-life balance. While the previous two models are based on the parental leave with “daddy quotas” and day-care centres, which encourage men and women to be engaged in productive and reproductive work; caregiver parity divides the couple into breadmaker and caregiver by introducing cash-for-care scheme. This scheme was presented as an alternative choice for the Norwegian families, because it provides the opportunity to spend more time with the family and to raise the children without day-care facilities, as well as puts those, who use the state-funded kindergartens in an equal position with those, who don’t want to do it, by compensating the money that the state spends to maintain children in day-care centres (Bungum & Kvande, 2013, pp. 32–33). The cash-for-care scheme does not require from parents to participate in the labour market and, in contrast to the previous models, it gives no opportunity to combine a paid job with childcare (Bungum & Kvande, 2013, pp. 32–33).

A. L. Ellingster and A. Leira stated that different political forces were engaged in shaping and developing a parental legislation in Norway (Bungum & Kvande, 2013, p. 33). The cash-for-care scheme is strongly supported by the Christian Democratic and Liberal forces, which consider it as a compensation for unpaid reproductive work. Under the guise of freedom of choice and because of the low rate of such allowances the idea of gender neutral option for one in a couple turned into the option for women with a low income or unemployed (Bungum & Kvande, 2013, pp. 34–35).

B. Bungum and E. Kvande discovered that there were 3 phases of using cash-for-care allowances. The first phase is characterized by heterogeneity of the recipients – from the beginning people from different backgrounds used it. In that case the discussion appeared “whether the cash-for-care scheme would undermine the dual-earner model by encouraging mothers to “return to the kitchen” and leave paid work?” (Bungum & Kvande, 2013, p. 49). Later it was shown, that the level of usage of family allowances depends on the educational background (Bungum & Kvande, 2013, p. 49).

The second phase is characterized by the significant decline of cash-for-care due to the introduction of “the day-care guarantee” in 2003, so this made it possible to B. Bungum and E. Kvande to conclude that since this time “the public debate on cash for care slowly turned from gender towards class and ethnicity” (Bungum & Kvande, 2013, p. 49).

The third phase has clearly shown that this scheme is popular among immigrants and poorly-educated women (so, this became an intersectional issue), and in this time the discussion about ethnicity and socialization of immigrants appeared (Bungum & Kvande, 2013, pp. 32–33, 50). And because of this situation the Norwegian authorities want to change the conditions of cash-for-care scheme by reducing the age of children, whose parents can

receive the allowance from 3 to 2 years. This measure is aimed at increasing the amount of women at the labour market and to raise the level of immigrant's children attending day-care centres. But this proposal remains controversial (Bungum & Kvande, 2013, p. 50).

Now the majority of Norwegians prefers daytime childcare facilities and keeps the universal breadwinner model of work-life balance. According to statistics, there were: "... approximately 6 100 kindergartens in Norway in 2015. Over half of these were private, accounting for 49 % of all kindergarten places. A total of 284 000 children now have a kindergarten place, and the kindergarten coverage now appears to have stabilised: 90 % of children aged 1–5 now have a kindergarten place, which is more than five times higher the number in 1980" (Modig & Kristiansen, 2016, p. 20).

Analysing the figures for older children (3–5 years), it can be concluded that most of them attend kindergarten. Over the last few years, the trend towards a reduction in the use of the cash-for-care scheme is maintained. The statistics is as follows: the number of children receiving a payment has decreased "from 86 700 in 2000 to 27 700 in 2011. In 2012 cash benefits to two-year-olds were stopped and in September 2015, 13 200 children received cash benefits, amounting to 24% of all one-year-olds" (Modig & Kristiansen, 2016, p. 20).

The Conclusions. The discussion about the ways of achieving gender equality remains in the Norwegian society and gets new challenges, caused by economic issue (pay gap, glass ceiling, etc.), consequences of different childcare approaches, immigration flow and other conditions.

Despite the existent problems, for the last few decades Norwegian men and women obtained more options to shape their lives combining labour activity and housework. The legislative innovations made it possible for men to be engaged in childcare and for women to be full-fledged workers by implementing day-care facilities and parental leave with "daddy quotas". It resulted in increase of the birth rate and drop of the single mother's poverty level.

During the end of the XXth century – the beginning of the XXIst century the three main models of work-life balance were implemented in Norway – the universal breadwinner, the universal caregiver and the caregiver parity. The specific feature of Norwegian childcare policy in comparison with other Nordic countries is that in Norway is the wide range of means that give people the opportunity to choose the work-life balance, which is the most preferable for them. This system has its pros and cons, which can be expressed in opposition "freedom of choice" vs "patriarchal structure reproduction". While the parental leave and day-care centres are aimed at giving women the opportunity to combine a paid job and caregiving, under the current socio-economic circumstances the cash-for-care system reproduces patriarchal structures. It should be admitted, that the universal breadwinner model, which is the most preferable among the Norwegians, also can be considered as an obstacle for achieving a gender equality, because it still considers women as the key figures in childcare and just tries to help them to combine productive and reproductive work.

It can be also concluded, that the dilemma of work-life balance shaping has obtained an intersectional connotation because of the huge flow of immigrants, a strong influence of class, ethnicity, religion and other factors on the choice of individuals.

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**THE ESTIMATION OF THE WAR IN DONBAS BY SCIENTISTS
AND FORMER POLITICIANS ON THE PAGES OF THE NEWSPAPER
THE NEW YORK TIMES (MARCH 1, 2014 – FEBRUARY 11, 2015)**

Abstract. *The aim of the research is to analyze the opinions of scientists and former high-ranking politicians on the war in Donbas during March 1, 2014 and February 11, 2015 and on this basis to illustrate the best ways to end the conflict. The research methodology is based on the principles of scientificity, systematicity, verification, historicism and the use of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and specially-historical (historical-genetic, historical-comparative, historical-typological, historical-systemic) methods as well as the method of content analysis. The scientific novelty is based on the fact that for the first time in the historiography of the war in Donbas, the views of scholars and former politicians on the war in Eastern Ukraine during March 1, 2014 and February 11, 2015 have been investigated. The Conclusions.* The experts listed Russia's efforts to prevent Ukraine's accession to the EU and the NATO and the historical hostility between the Ukrainians and the Russians among the causes of the war in Donbas. Some analysts did not think Russia would try to invade Ukraine, but maintained that it would rather support the war in Donbas in order to prevent Ukraine from moving closer to the EU and the NATO. Other experts, meanwhile, believed that the Kremlin might not stop in Ukraine but use the Russians in the Baltic countries to create “frozen” conflicts there. The opinions on whether to provide weapon to Ukraine were divided. A number of analysts favoured this move, as it would cause more damage to Russia and deter it from a further aggression. In contrast, the others thought that providing Ukraine with weapon would only intensify the war against Russia, which Ukraine would not win, and which would be a humiliation for the EU, the USA and NATO. One way of resolving the war consisted in the full exhaustion of Russia by sanctions and other measures: Ukraine's strengthening by the West through assistance with intelligence, non-lethal equipment, an information campaign, humanitarian aid, political and economic reforms, reaching a ceasefire, financing not only the Ukrainian government but also the Ukrainians. Another solution should be diplomatic, providing Donbas with autonomy within Ukraine transferring substantial local self-government powers to the Russian-speaking residents of the East.

Key words: war in Donbas, scientists, analysts, politicians, Ukrainian troops, Russian troops, separatists.

ОЦІНКА ВІЙНИ НА ДОНБАСІ ВЧЕНИХ І КОЛИШНІХ ПОЛІТИКІВ НА СТОРІНКАХ ГАЗЕТИ “THE NEW YORK TIMES” (1 БЕРЕЗНЯ 2014 – 11 ЛЮТОГО 2015 рр.)

Анотація. *Мета дослідження* – проаналізувати думки вчених і колишніх політиків-високопосадовців щодо війни на Донбасі 1 березня 2014 – 11 лютого 2015 рр. та на основі цього показати найоптимальніші шляхи припинення конфлікту. **Методологія дослідження** базується на принципах науковості, системності, верифікації, історизму та на використанні загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, узагальнення), спеціально-історичних (історико-генетичний, історико-порівняльний, історико-типологічний, історико-системний) методів і методу контент-аналізу. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що вперше в історіографії війни на Донбасі досліджено міркування науковців та экс-політиків щодо збройного конфлікту на Сході України 1 березня 2014 – 11 лютого 2015 рр. за матеріалами газети “The New York Times”. **Висновки.** *Експерти серед причин війни на Донбасі називали намагання Росії запобігти вступу України до ЄС та НАТО й історичну неприязнь між українцями і росіянами. Деякі аналітики не вважали, що Росія спробує захопити Україну, а підтримуватиме війну на Донбасі, щоб не дати їй зблизитися з ЄС і НАТО. Але інші експерти вважали, що Кремль може не зупинитися на Україні, а використати росіян країн Балтії, щоб створити там заморожені конфлікти. Думки щодо того, чи варто надавати Україні зброю, розділилися. Деякі аналітики були за такий крок, бо це завдасть більших збитків Росії та стримає її від подальшої агресії. На думку інших, надання Україні зброї тільки посилить війну проти РФ, яку Україна не виграє, і яка стане приниженням для ЄС, США і НАТО. Один шлях вирішення конфлікту вбачався у повному виснаженні Росії через санкції та інші кроки: зміцнення України Заходом через допомогу з розвідувальною інформацією, нелетальним обладнанням, інформаційною атакою, гуманітарною допомогою, політичними й економічними реформами, досягненням перемир'я, фінансуванням не тільки українського уряду, а й народу. Інший шлях є дипломатичним – а це надання Донбасу автономії в межах України або передача російськомовним мешканцям Сходу набагато більше місцевого самоврядування.*

Ключові слова: *війна на Донбасі, науковці, аналітики, політики, українські війська, російські війська, сепаратисти.*

The Problem Statement. The seventh year of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war in Donbas is already underway. After an active hot phase in 2014 – 2015, the armed conflict has evolved into a frozen one. The object of this study is the full-scale Russian invasion into Eastern Ukraine (within the historical and ethnographic region of Donbas) during March 1, 2014 (the first separatist rallies) and February 11, 2015 (the day before the second Minsk agreement was signed).

365 articles during March 1, 2014 and February 11, 2015 were analyzed. Among them, 38 publications contain opinions of 50 individuals, who are either scientists or former politicians. Their thoughts on the war in Eastern Ukraine are the subject of this research.

10 of the commentators are from Ukraine (Yevhen Bystrytsky, Alyona Hetmanchuk, Georgiy Kasianov, Ihor Koziy, Oleksiy Melnyk, Mykhailo Minakov, Mykola Riabchuk, Mykola Sunhurovskyi, Dmytro Tymchuk, Svitlana Khutka), 13 from the Russian Federation (the RF) (Alexander Baunov, Evgeny Gontmacher, Sergei Glazyev, Alexander Golts, Konstantin Eggert, Olga Kryshtanovskaya, Fyodor Lukyanov, Aleksei Makarkin, Sergei Markov, Yevgeny Minchenko, Gleb Pavlovsky, Kirill Rogov, Konstantin Sonin), 19 from the USA (Mark Hiznay, William Hill, Mark Galeotti, Clifford Gaddy, Lev Golinkin, Thomas Graham, Ben Judah, Barry Ickes, Adrian Karatnycky, Phillip Karber, Wesley Clark, Harold Koh, Clifford Kupchan, Michael McFaul, John Mearsheimer, Vali Nasr, David Patrikarakos, Craig Pirrong, Douglas Rediker), 4 from the UK (Guglielmo Verdirame, Anatol Lieven, Amanda Paul, Samuel Charap) and one from France (Bernard-Henri Lévy), one from

Germany (Stefan Meister), one from Norway (Ole Solvang) and one from Australia (Sharon Korman).

The number of articles in which these experts had been cited in the period during March 1, 2014 and February 11, 2015 was counted. The calculations also considered the articles authored by the scientists and former high-ranking politicians themselves. The results were the following: C. Kupchan is mentioned in five articles, A. Makarkin – in three, S. Charap – in three, M. Galeotti – in two, M. McFaul – in two, S. Markov – in two, O. Melnyk – in two, Y. Minchenko – in two, D. Tymchuk – in two, K. Sonin – in two, others (40 experts) – in one.

The terms used by the authors of *The New York Times* articles and the experts, whose thoughts were analyzed, are repeated in this work. However, the position of the author is clear: a war between the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the regular Russian army is taking place in Donbas, Russia is the aggressor, who has created, currently controls and supplies weapons to few local separatist units.

The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches. A significant number of works are currently available on the Russian-Ukrainian war in Donbas. With regard to recent publications, in particular, in the “Scientific Herald of Uzhhorod University. Series: History” articles focusing on the analysis of the Russian scientists’ works on the war between the RF and Ukraine (Silantieva-Papp, 2019) and Ukraine’s losses in it (Laver, Matyashovska, & Shumilo, 2019) have been published. However, the issues raised in this article are investigated for the first time.

The purpose of the article is to analyze the opinions of scientists and former high-ranking politicians on the war in Donbas during March 1, 2014 and February 11, 2015, and to outline on this basis the most optimal ways of ending it.

The Statement of the Basic Material. The Revolution of Dignity caused an immediate reaction from Russia, which occupied and annexed the Crimea and invaded Donbas to prevent Ukraine from breaking away from the sphere of influence of the RF. In his article, M. Riabchuk, a political and cultural analyst in Kyiv and a senior fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences (Vienna), doubted that Russia would try to invade the whole territory of Ukraine. In his opinion, the occupation of the Crimea was sufficient in order to prevent Ukraine from joining the European Union (the EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which would follow Russia’s policy towards its neighbours (Riabchuk, 2014).

As the war in Donbas broke out, the scientists attempted to explain its causes. The historical hostility between peoples was featured prominently in the analyses. In this regard, M. McFall, a Stanford University professor and former American ambassador to Russia in 2012-2014, noted that this ethnic animosity was driven by current political elites rather than ancient history (Tavernise, 2014).

By June 2014, international sanctions against the RF had become noticeable. With this in mind, Washington-based analyst (specializing in Russia at Eurasia Group, a political risk advisory organization) C. Kupchan believed that the RF would continue to agree to a ceasefire, urge militants to stop the warfare, and at the same time supply them with weapons until it reached a stable equilibrium on its own terms (MacFarquhar, 2014a).

According to experts, Russia was seeking an agreement. However, it wanted to have sufficient influence over the southeastern part of Ukraine to destabilize its government or make sure it does not get too close with the EU and does not consider joining the NATO. The analysts pointed at a lack of trust in the negotiations on both sides and stressed that the conflict could get out of control of the leaders. With regards to this, Mark Galleotti, professor

of global affairs at New York University and an expert in Russian security matters, noted that each of the parties intensified the conflict, and it became more and more difficult to reach an agreement and conclude a meaningful treaty (MacFarquhar, 2014a).

On June 22, 2014, the President of the RF (Russian Federation) V. Putin approved the peace plan of the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and at the same time blamed Kyiv for the shaky truce. That same month, V. Putin's economic adviser S. Glazyev noted that Ukraine should be considered the US occupied territory except for Donbas, and Russia should urge other regions to break free from occupation (MacFarquhar, 2014b).

However, many liberals in Russia among business leaders, economists, and diplomats did not want a break with the West. E. Gontmacher, an economist, stated that Russia could not be separated from the world as that would increase poverty and inflation. He added that Western businessmen had stopped investing in the RF and blacklisted its institutions (MacFarquhar, 2014b). Under these circumstances, as noted by A. Makarkin, an analyst of the Center for Political Technologies (Moscow), V. Putin had to show that he was a strong leader upholding national interests. He also had to assure the West that he was ready for dialogue, would not exacerbate the situation, and that there was no need to impose sanctions (MacFarquhar, 2014b).

On June 21, P. Poroshenko outlined his peace plan. He also refused to negotiate with separatists in Donbas, who in turn refused to cooperate with Kyiv. In this regard, Y. Minchenko, an expert on Ukraine at the International Institute for Political Expertise (Moscow), emphasized that in order to solve the problem, Kyiv should negotiate with the separatists. Interestingly, the analysts were unsure what would work under the circumstances and predicted that fighting could be protracted (MacFarquhar, 2014b).

Russia had plenty of time to call for peace and provide the separatists with everything they needed. According to some experts, Moscow could still dominate until it got Ukraine. C. Kupchan said the Russians' goal was to keep Ukraine in crisis, and the militants were their levers. He did not believe that peace would come quickly (MacFarquhar, 2014b).

The signing of the economic part of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine on June 27 came as a serious blow to V. Putin and his goal of restoring Moscow's influence in the countries of the post-Soviet space. A. Paul, a researcher at the European Policy Center (Brussels), noted that by creating problems for Ukraine, V. Putin pushed it even closer to the West, which ultimately became a loss for him (Higgins & Herszenhorn, 2014).

This also showed that Moscow had accepted the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU by P. Poroshenko and the change of circumstances after the occupation and annexation of the Crimea by Russia. In this regard, K. Sonin, vice-rector of the Higher School of Economics (Moscow), noted that the Kremlin was using the couple of months to assess the consequences of the new state of affairs. He believed that there was no need to rationalize the actions of the Russian leadership, as it was rather driven by emotions (Higgins & Herszenhorn, 2014).

On July 1, P. Poroshenko resumed the offensive in Donbas. Against this background, V. Putin warned again that he reserved the right to protect Russian-speaking citizens by force. Many supporters of the Ukrainian government backed the actions of the President of Ukraine. A. Hetmanchuk, a director of the Institute of World Policy (Kyiv), said that, by having prolonged peace talks while soldiers continued to die, P. Poroshenko failed to fulfill his promise that he would not negotiate with terrorists and would end the war in a few weeks (Herszenhorn, 2014a).

On the other hand, D. Tymchuk, a director of the Center of Military and Political Research (Kyiv), praised P. Poroshenko's decision to abolish the ceasefire. After all, compliance with the truce by the Armed Forces of Ukraine had only reinforced the terrorists. D. Tymchuk also noted on Facebook that a longer truce would allow the terrorists to increase dramatically their combat readiness (Herszenhorn, 2014a).

When the Russian troops and separatists began occupying Donbas actively in April 2014, the Security Service (the SBU) and the Armed Forces of Ukraine were incapacitated. However, according to the officials and analysts, two months after the start of the war, the composition of the army and the SBU command was reorganized and morale was raised. M. Sunhurovskiy, a director of military programs at the Razumkov Center (Kyiv), said that the soldiers had overcome the psychological barrier against shooting people. Moreover, after the restructuring of the forces, it became clear, who were the enemies and who were not, and the effectiveness of the military operations increased (Herszenhorn, 2014b).

According to O. Melnyk, a security analyst at the Razumkov Center, when Russia invaded the Crimea in February 2014, the number of the Ukrainian soldiers dropped to nearly 128,000. Few of them were ready for the combat. These men were neither trained nor equipped, the transport and weapons of the army were outdated, and its budget was plundered. O. Melnyk warned that despite the improvements the work to strengthen the armed forces would not end soon (Herszenhorn, 2014b).

On July 7, the separatists withdrew from their positions, starting to erect barricades in Donetsk and Luhansk in anticipation of the final battle against the Ukrainian troops. The Armed Forces of Ukraine were highly successful during those days. However, the analysts warned of the threat of urban warfare and the significant casualties among the civilians that would result from battles in big cities. O. Melnyk stated that the insurgents were making a strategic calculation to abandon other positions and return to cities, as the Ukrainian troops would not be able to use artillery and aviation then (Herszenhorn, 2014c).

When the militants lost Slovyansk, I. Strelkov moved to assert his authority over the disparate separatist militias that were gathering in Donetsk and Luhansk. He united them for a city war that analysts believed would be devastating, bloody and suicidal (Sneider, 2014).

Kyiv and the Western countries stated that I. Strelkov was an active Russian agent but provided no evidence of this. In turn, it seemed that I. Strelkov himself often acted at his own discretion, not on orders from Moscow. Confirming this, M. Galleotti noted that when I. Strelkov arrived in Eastern Ukraine, he was doing things that contradicted Russia's plan (Sneider, 2014).

On July 16, the President of the USA B. Obama imposed new sanctions on the important companies in Russia's energy, finance, and defense industries. These were the most punitive measures taken by the US in response to the Russian invasion into Ukraine. C. Pirrong, Professor of finance at the University of Houston, said these steps might not have much effect. After all, even though it would limit the capital available to the affected companies, they would still be able to obtain liquidity in other countries (Baker & Kanter, 2014). D. Rediker, a visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, believed that the real impact on the US capital market might be small, that a blow to large banks and energy companies could change business and investment in places where the US capital market had no direct impact (Baker & Kanter, 2014).

In turn, the others were more skeptical of the sanction pressure. In particular, S. Charap, a senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies,

noted that the risks of escalating the conflict were high and that damage from sanctions was unlikely to convince V. Putin to leave the territory of Ukraine (Baker & Kanter, 2014).

On July 17, 2014, the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 airliner was shot down over the territory of Donbas. According to the official position of the RF, Ukraine was responsible for the plane crash. An analyst from Russia, S. Markov, was inclined to believe the event had been an accident, but said it could also be a deliberate plot by Kyiv (MacFarquhar & Kramer, 2014a).

K. Rogov, an economic analyst and political commentator in Moscow, noted that V. Putin continued to raise stakes when it came to the military support for the separatists. In his opinion, the president of the RF continued making mistakes, but he raised the stakes even higher in a bid to conceal them (MacFarquhar & Kramer, 2014a). This resulted in the death of 298 people in a plane crash.

On July 22, Russia faced the threat of much tougher sanctions from Western European countries. The Russian troops in Donbas had been discredited around the world on suspicion of downing a plane and controlling the crash site. In this regard, G. Pavlovsky, a political consultant, noted that these circumstances were a strong blow to Putin and his strategy, and the President of the RF wanted to get out of this situation without losing (MacFarquhar, 2014c).

According to the analysts, during the investigation of the plane crash, Moscow could cling to both support for separatists and claims of its own righteousness. A. Makarkin emphasized that if there were no hard evidence, Russia would continue saying it was innocent and might continue supporting the rebels in Eastern Ukraine (MacFarquhar, 2014c).

Following V. Putin's meeting with Russian defense and security officials, the introduction of their peacekeeping forces into Ukraine was seen as a possibility. In this regard, F. Lukyanov, a foreign policy journal editor, noted that the pressure on the Kremlin was enormous, and many people said that the war in Ukraine was the beginning of a war against the RF and the rehearsal of a change in its regime. F. Lukyanov and other experts also suggested that V. Putin might begin to distance Moscow from the separatists (MacFarquhar & Roth, 2014).

At the same time, the Russian society was tired of the war in Ukraine and blamed both sides. O. Kryshtanovskaya, a sociologist, studying the political elite of the RF, emphasized the constant growth of the feeling that V. Putin had gone too far (MacFarquhar & Roth, 2014).

In *The New York Times* article from July 22, 2014, a philosopher B.-H. Lévy noted that only local thugs, thieves, rapists, ex-prisoners and vandals were fighting in the war in Donbas, V. Putin had turned them into paramilitary forces, the Russian military officers trained them, and Moscow supplied them with weapons. In particular, B.-H. Lévy was aware that Russia had provided a lot of artillery to the separatists and had taught them to use the SA-11 missile system that had brought down the Malaysia Airlines' plane. The philosopher noted that V. Putin was losing control over them (Lévy, 2014).

Regarding the behaviour of international players, B.-H. Lévy noted that it was difficult not to take the side of P. Poroshenko when he asked other countries to designate the Luhansk and Donetsk Peoples' Republics (the L/DNR) as terrorist organizations. The philosopher felt embarrassed over the indecisive actions towards Russia taken by France, Germany and the UK. They had commercial interests in cooperating with the RF, and their incertitude was a shame to the EU (Lévy, 2014).

The downing of the civilian plane over Donbas drew the world's attention to Ukraine's war with Russia. Many Ukrainians, including high-ranking officials in Kyiv, were still waiting for a strong response to the incident from Western countries. S. Khutka, an associate

professor of sociology at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, said that the Western countries would not impose strict sanctions, since they constantly said they were deeply concerned while actually having their own interests, and ultimately, Ukraine would have to defend itself on its own (Herszenhorn, 2014d).

A report by Human Rights Watch from July 24, 2014 identified four cases of the use of “Grad” system missiles that killed civilians in and around Donetsk. Even though the missiles were used by both the separatists and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the investigation stated that the four attacks were made by the Ukrainian fighters (Tavernise & Sneider, 2014).

Commenting on the information in the report, O. Solvang, a senior emergencies researcher at Human Rights Watch, emphasized that missile attacks in the cities and villages were a violation of the laws of war, so the USA and the EU had to condemn these attacks and urge Kyiv to stop them (Tavernise & Sneider, 2014). In turn, the Armed Forces of Ukraine denied bombing the areas where the civilians had been killed.

In the meantime, the Kremlin sent V. Antyufeyev out to form a “Ministry of State Security” in Donetsk. He was Minister for State Security in Transdnistria until 2012. W. Hill, a former head of OSCE mission in Moldova, noted that V. Antyufeyev’s assignment was a clear sign of support for the rebellion in Eastern Ukraine by certain circles in Moscow (Kramer, 2014a).

On August 4, Western officials reported that Russia had almost doubled the number of battalions near the border with Ukraine and could invade Donbas. W. Clark, a retired general and the former NATO commander, noted that the Russian president had deployed these forces for the invasion. V. Putin concentrated his troops near the border. He armed the separatists and sent operatives, conducted trainings. W. Clark added that if the RF invaded, it would receive tougher economic sanctions, resistance from the Ukrainian forces and military support provided to Kyiv by the West. Therefore, according to the retired general, V. Putin had not made the political decision to invade Donbas at that point (Gordon & Schmitt, 2014).

W. Clark and P. Karber, a former adviser to the US Defense Secretary C. Weinberger, believed that if V. Putin indeed decided to bring troops into Ukraine, he could formulate it as a “peacekeeping” invasion at the request of the separatists to whom Moscow provided weapons and political support. In July 2014, at a closed briefing for the US Congress, P. Karber noted that Russian military equipment with the Russian coat of arms for peacekeeping forces was positioned close to the border with Ukraine (Gordon & Schmitt, 2014).

On August 6, 2014, *The New York Times* published an article by M. McFall. It stated that sanctions and the deterioration of Russia’s reputation would not stop the war in Donbas in short terms, so the West should: 1) provide the Ukrainian soldiers with as much intelligence information as possible; 2) if requested, provide Ukraine with bulletproof vests and night vision goggles; 3) counteract the Russian propaganda with its own information campaign; 4) encourage Kyiv to reduce civilian casualties by establishing safer humanitarian corridors; 5) send more humanitarian assistance to refugees through the Ukrainian government; 6) convene an international donor conference to create Donbas Development Fund to rebuild the region after the war; 7) continue supporting economic and political reforms in Ukraine; 8) further encourage Kyiv to interact with legitimate representatives of Donbas, rather than with the Russian mercenaries in order to draw up a plan for reconciliation with the conditions of power decentralization, guarantees for the use of the Russian language and the introduction of international observers (McFaul, 2014).

According to the NATO and the White House, at the beginning of August 2014, Russia had enough troops at the border with Ukraine to invade. C. Kupchan conceded that, given the

rude, emotional and violent behaviour of V. Putin, he was capable of resorting to invasion. Eurasia Group estimated the likelihood of a Russian attack against Ukraine at about 35% (Kramer, 2014b).

On August 12, a convoy of about 260 trucks of humanitarian aid for Luhansk departed from Russia. Moscow insisted it wanted to help the civilians of Donbas. Ukraine decided to block the trucks at the border. Kyiv suspected that the convoy was an attempt to escort the Russian troops into the country under the guise of a humanitarian mission. A political analyst K. Eggert from Moscow confirmed that convoys would be perceived this way by the Ukrainian side (MacFarquhar, 2014d).

On August 17, the Ukrainian military forces reached Luhansk. Kyiv was celebrating success, but there was growing concern in the West that Moscow would consider the terrorists' defeat as a stimulus to a larger-scale war. C. Kupchan urged Western supporters of the Ukrainian military offensive to exercise care. If Putin believed that the rebels were close to a defeat, the West would have a problem to deal with (Kramer, 2014c).

In late August 2014, the Armed Forces of Ukraine retreated, as the Russian troops supported the separatists. Subsequently, an unstable contact line was established between the territories controlled by Ukraine and occupied by Russia. Analyzing the behaviour of Russia's leadership at that time and the military action, the analysts believed Moscow was pursuing the following goals: 1) to impose conditions that will weaken the government of Ukraine and ensure it will not avoid Russia's influence and will never join the NATO or other Western organizations; 2) to relieve pressure on the increasingly besieged separatist forces in Luhansk and Donetsk; 3) to create a land route to the annexed Crimea (MacFarquhar & Kramer, 2014b).

A. Makarkin said that the RF wanted talks that would end in major concessions for Ukraine. Therefore, the Kremlin was investing heavily in the L/DNR to force Ukraine to agree to Russian conditions (MacFarquhar & Kramer, 2014b).

The sanctions did not significantly change the behaviour of Russia's President in Ukraine. The analysts believed that if V. Putin should not receive what he desired through negotiations, he would continue supporting the war in Donbas for some time. A. Golts, an independent analyst, noted that the Ukrainians had offered more resistance than V. Putin had expected, but he had never backed down (MacFarquhar & Kramer, 2014b).

On August 31, 2014, *The New York Times* published an article written by B. Judah, a journalist and expert at Hudson Institute. According to him, the West had to be ready for a proxy war with the RF, and in the meantime it had to send military advisers to Ukraine, to support it with intelligence and satellites, to provide it with weapons, tanks, drones and medical kits. In addition, the USA and the EU had to be prepared to bring in the NATO troops if Russian tanks moved to the Crimea to make a land corridor to the peninsula (Judah, 2014). B. Judah predicted that the President of the RF wanted to weaken the NATO and could use the Russians in the Baltic States to create new frozen conflicts. In this case, Poland would have to act as if the NATO did not exist and create its own defense alliance with the Baltic States and even a buffer zone in Western Ukraine (Judah, 2014).

On September 3, 2014, an article by A. Lieven, professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service in Qatar, appeared in *The New York Times*. He mentioned T. Graham from the consulting firm Kissinger Associates, who wrote that the RF was paying more attention than the West to events in Ukraine for reasons that lie in the history of Russia and Ukraine. For A. Lieven, the development of the war in Donbas was predictable. Since

the “rebellion” began there with the support of Russia, it would not allow its suppression, so it was unlikely for Ukraine to achieve a military victory in the war (Lieven, 2014).

A. Lieven believed that the separation of Donbas with the preservation of Ukraine’s integrity would cease hostilities and help the West develop and consolidate the rest of the country. In the long run, Ukraine would be able to join the EU (Lieven, 2014).

Interestingly, major Western states shied away from applying certain terms to the war in Donbas at the official level, especially the term “invasion”, when speaking of Russia’s actions. D. Tymchuk emphasized that there an invasion had taken place. He noted that Western leaders were playing political schizophrenia, as they understood what was happening, but at the same time did not want to break up with Moscow, hoping that V. Putin would come to his senses. This, however, would not happen (Higgins, 2014).

International law professionals were puzzled by the cautious use of the word “invasion”, since it has no particular legal significance. H. Koh, Yale University law professor, a former State Department legal adviser under B. Obama and former assistant secretary of state under President B. Clinton, noted that “invasion” was a colloquial term and had no consequential meaning legally (Higgins, 2014).

Australian lawyer S. Korman agreed but added that the term was emotionally and politically loaded. It evoked the image of World War II and may legitimize armed action by the West. She emphasized that Australia had called Russia’s behavior an “invasion” since Australia was not expected to conduct retaliatory actions. If the USA or Germany did the same, they would be expected to have military involvement which they did not plan to resort to (Higgins, 2014).

According to G. Verdirame, professor of international law at King’s College (London), the word “invasion” was not an impetus for other countries to fulfill obligations, it indicated the purpose to capture or annex the territory of another state (Higgins, 2014).

The EU leaders were strongly reluctant to use the term “invasion”, as it suggested similarities between the actions of V. Putin and those of A. Hitler. In this regard, S. Meister, who served the German Council on Foreign Relations, noted that the unwillingness to use the term “invasion” reflected a common desire, especially in Germany, to reach an agreement on Ukraine with Russia (Higgins, 2014).

On September 5, Ukraine, OSCE, the RF and the separatists signed the first Minsk ceasefire agreement. The analysts considered it to be very weak. A number of politicians, civic activists, diplomats and other analysts endorsed it but doubted it would be adhered to (MacFarquhar, 2014e).

G. Kasianov, a historian, approved Minsk agreement, as he believed, it was impossible to resolve this conflict in military terms. The scientist added that most Ukrainians wanted peace, but some would not accept any compromise with the terrorists. In addition, certain fighters in Donbas were uncontrollable and difficult to be tamed. He noted that a spark would be enough to restart the fighting (MacFarquhar, 2014e).

Regarding Minsk agreement, C. Kupchan noted that it would not last long, since the Kremlin sought federalization with the right of each region to conduct its own foreign policy, while the president of Ukraine offered only decentralization. Many analysts believed that a frozen conflict would ensue (MacFarquhar, 2014e).

On September 6, the ceasefire in Donbas was on the verge of collapse when bombing resumed near Mariupol. Despite P. Poroshenko’s assurances that Minsk agreement would preserve the country intact, the Ukrainians were concerned that by directing its army at the

Armed Forces of Ukraine, the RF was dictating conditions that would put much of the country under the Russian rule. Therefore, P. Poroshenko's task was to convince the Ukrainians that negotiations with the separatists were the best choice (Gall & MacFarquhar, 2014).

In this regard, M. Minakov, professor at the University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and civil rights activist, emphasized that the Ukrainians were not ready for the peace, which does not meet the interests of Ukraine and would not respect an agreement satisfying the demands of separatists or the Russians (Gall & MacFarquhar, 2014). In turn, Y. Bystrytsky, the executive director of the International Renaissance Foundation, noted that a perceived lack of consent was a problem, and the first Russian news on the truce used the word "decentralization" (Gall & MacFarquhar, 2014).

The Kremlin's demands included Ukraine's refusal to join the NATO along with a significant regional autonomy for the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The analysts, however, said the agreement between Ukraine and the separatists should include concessions to Moscow on free trade between Ukraine and the EU. For example, establishing special trade relations between the RF and Donbas would serve this purpose (Herszenhorn, 2014e).

A. Karatnycky, an expert at the Atlantic Council, noted that these elements of the agreement could eventually be accepted by Kyiv. In turn, Russian writer and political commentator A. Baunov saw the prospects of a long-term political agreement as very distant, since the parties mistrusted each other and each imposed their plans on the rest of the world. P. Poroshenko was trying to eke out time to regain control over Donbas, while V. Putin was seeking to secure Russia's influence. A. Baunov stressed that the goal of the President of the RF was to federalize, to create an autonomous region within Ukraine that would influence Ukraine politically, militarily and economically, bring it closer to Russia and prevent Ukraine from integrating with the West without consulting with Moscow and V. Putin (Herszenhorn, 2014e).

Many experts doubted that an agreement could be reached before fighting resumed. Y. Minchenko noted that MPs in Kyiv would not be able to vote for amendments to the Constitution since domestic politics in Ukraine was dramatically radicalized. He believed the point of no return had passed and the "great civil war" in Donbas would continue (Herszenhorn, 2014e).

On the whole, it was unclear whether V. Putin wanted a political settlement or preferred a prolonged war. The separated Donbas was too expensive for Moscow to maintain both politically and financially, which experts believed would create some incentive for an agreement (Herszenhorn, 2014e).

Many analysts asserted that decentralization of power in Ukraine would help fight inefficiency and corruption in the Ukrainian government. S. Charap acknowledged that it was unclear whether a decentralization plan favourable to Ukraine would be sufficient to appease V. Putin (Herszenhorn, 2014e).

On September 10, 2014, *The New York Times* published an article by V. Nasr, dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He stated that the USA had no crisis management strategy in Ukraine and the Middle East. To settle the crises, Ukraine and Iraq had to agree to a new distribution of power. Therefore, in addition to the US pressure on Russia, sovereignty over Ukraine must be maintained by the government in Kyiv, and more local self-governance should be given to Russian-speaking Donbas residents (Nasr, 2014).

In late October, evidence emerged that the Ukrainian troops had repeatedly fired at Donetsk with cluster munitions banned in most countries. M. Hiznay, a senior arms researcher

at Human Rights Watch, noted that these munitions were being used randomly in settlements, especially in the attacks at the beginning of October in Donetsk. These attacks, therefore, had to be stopped because they had threatened many civilians (Roth, 2014).

On November 5, the Prime-Minister of Ukraine A. Yatsenyuk declared that the government would freeze the state payments in the occupied territories of the country's East. In general, the paradox of the war in Donbas was that Russia and Ukraine were fighting for a region with outdated and uncompetitive subsidized coal mines, metallurgical and machine-building plants. That is why C. Gaddy and B. Ickes from the Brookings Institution offered to punish Russia by handing over Ukraine to it, as it would completely exhaust the RF (Kramer, 2014d).

On December 8, 2014, *The New York Times* published an article by L. Golinkin, the author of the memoir *A Backpack, a Bear, and Eight Crates of Vodka*. He called Russia's denial of its involvement in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine nonsense, as Moscow trained, strengthened and provided separatists with equipment. L. Golinkin agreed that V. Putin stirred up riots in Donbas, but he also used local people, many of whom distrusted Kyiv and the West, and silently supported Russia and the separatists. In the writer's opinion, V. Putin's greatest weapon might be the West's refusal to communicate not only with the people of Donbas, but also of the East of Ukraine in general, who believed that the West called them enemies (Golinkin, 2014).

On December 29, 2014, *The New York Times* published an article by D. Patrikarakos, Poynter fellow in journalism at Yale University. He argued that there the war was taking place in Ukraine, conducted with 21st-century means, where communities of citizens responded better than the state. Therefore, to win over the separatists, the West needed to fund the people of Ukraine, not just its government (Patrikarakos, 2014).

In January 2015, the war broke out again at dozens of points in Donbas. Although the RF rejected its involvement in the fighting, the evidence that its troops and equipment were re-entering Ukraine was growing stronger. It was no surprise to S. Markov that V. Putin supported the L/DNR even under economic pressure from the USA and the EU. He noted that the intensity of the confrontation undermined the influence of V. Putin's liberal economic advisers in government and in discussions about Ukraine. This was confirmed by K. Sonin. However, as noted by S. Markov, the Kremlin's stance on the war in Donbas and the deepening of the economic crisis in the RF made V. Putin closely consider his further steps (Lyman & Kramer, 2015).

On February 5, 2015, Western leaders began talks to end the war in Donbas. However, the prospect of concluding a new peace agreement was overshadowed by suspicions concerning Moscow's goals in Ukraine. On February 4, an officer was arrested in Kyiv for espionage for the Kremlin. Concerns were raised that the Armed Forces of Ukraine were teeming with spies, complicating the plans to provide weapons to Ukraine (Gordon & Herszenhorn, 2015).

This arrest prompted I. Koziy, military analyst at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation (Kyiv), to say that Moscow might have other double agents. Therefore, it was suggested that the structure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine be completely changed or a new one created (Gordon & Herszenhorn, 2015).

On February 8, 2015, *The New York Times* published a discussion article by J. Mearsheimer, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, on whether lethal weapons should be provided to Ukraine. The USA was inclined to do so, but the expert warned against it, as he believed the weapons would not save the Ukrainian army but would intensify the fighting. He saw a diplomatic solution: the West would transform Ukraine into a neutral state between

the RF and the NATO, the sovereignty of Ukraine would be restored in Donbas, Donetsk and Luhansk regions would be given autonomy, and the Russian language would be protected. The Crimea, meanwhile, was lost forever (Mearsheimer, 2015).

The Conclusions. The largest number of articles about the Russian-Ukrainian war in Donbas were published in *The New York Times* in 2014. Naming the reasons for the clash, the experts mentioned Russia's efforts to prevent Ukraine's accession to the EU and the NATO, as well as the historical hostility between the Ukrainians and the Russians. Since the beginning of the war, the newspaper also provided predictions about future developments. Some analysts believed that Russia would not try to capture Ukraine but would fight in Donbas to keep the country destabilized and prevent it from moving closer to the EU and the NATO. Other experts believed that the Kremlin might not stop at invading Ukraine but use the Russians in the Baltic countries to create frozen conflicts there.

The usage of terms to denote the war in Donbas and the enemies of the Ukrainian troops was ambiguous. They were mainly labeled "rebels", rarely "separatists", on single occasions – "militants" and "terrorists". The war itself was often referred to as "rebellion" or "conflict", rarely "invasion" and in isolated cases – "war". Some experts (W. Clark, P. Karber, B.-H. Lévy) believed that Ukraine is only at war with separatists whom the RF supports with weapons, military instructors, and political assistance.

The conclusion of the first Minsk agreement was approved by almost all experts, but they doubted it would be respected due to a lack of agreement on key issues, such as the status of the Donbas territories. At the time, Russian, Ukrainian and American analysts suggested that V. Putin might prefer a lengthy conflict instead of a political settlement. Meanwhile, Russian experts noted that the President of the RF had also sought a way out of the crisis in relations with the West without a major defeat.

In 2014 and early 2015, discussions continued whether to provide weapons to Ukraine. Opinions differed. Some analysts called on the West to assist Ukraine more actively, with weapons in particular, as it would cause greater damage to Russia and deter it from aggression against other states. A number of scientists believed that V. Putin would not allow the defeat of the separatists in Donbas, since it would threaten the existence of his regime in Russia. Therefore, providing Ukraine with weapons would only intensify the war against the RF. Ukraine's ultimate defeat would be a disaster for Kyiv and a humiliation for the EU, the USA, and NATO.

The US scholars predicted that the sanctions imposed against Russia would not end the war in Donbas in the short term. Therefore, one of the ways to resolve the conflict would be based on completely exhausting the RF through sanctions and other measures. In particular, these could include Ukraine's strengthening by the West through assistance with intelligence information, non-lethal equipment, information campaigns, humanitarian aid, political and economic reforms, the achievement of a truce, and funding not only the Ukrainian government but also the people.

Another (diplomatic) way of ending the war involved Ukraine granting the Donbas autonomy or extended local self-governance. At the same time, the pro-Kremlin experts believed that Kyiv should negotiate directly with the separatists.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the noted aspects deserve new and in-depth studies of the modern Russian-Ukrainian war. In planning his researches, the author considers it appropriate to investigate the coverage of this war on the pages of *The New York Times* in the period between February 12, 2015 and May 2019.

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РЕЦЕНЗІЇ / REVIEWS

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THE DILO NEWSPAPER: ACHIEVEMENTS OF UKRAINIAN BIOGRAPHICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

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ГАЗЕТА “ДІЛО”: ЗДОБУТКИ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ БІОГРАФІЧНОЇ БІБЛІОГРАФІСТИКИ

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There are not so many newspapers in the history of Ukraine, whose influence on the socio-political and cultural life of the Ukrainians was as important as the influence of the Lviv publication *Dilo* (The Deed). The *Dilo* newspaper was the first and for a long time the only Ukrainian daily newspaper in Galicia for more than half a century. The first issue of the newspaper was published in Lviv on January 1, 1880. At first it was published twice a week, then three times a week, and from 1888 it began to be published every day. For some time, the newspaper represented the position of the largest Ukrainian parties in Western Ukraine: the Ukrainian National Democratic Party and the Ukrainian National Democratic Union. Although the newspaper was associated with these parties, it repeatedly criticized the party leadership. At the beginning of the 1920-ies, due to censorship of the Polish occupation regime, the publication often changed its name: *Hromadska Dumka* (Public Opinion), *Ukrainska Dumka* (Ukrainian Opinion), *Ukrainskyi Vistnyk* (Ukrainian Herald), *Hromadskyi Vistnyk* (Public Herald), *Svoboda* (Freedom).

During World War I, Lviv was under the Russian occupation for some time. At that time, all Ukrainian newspapers were closed. Therefore, *Dilo* was published in Vienna until the editorial office returned to Lviv in June 1915. During the Ukrainian-Polish war of 1918 – 1919, the newspaper was closed by order of the Polish military command. The issue of the newspaper was briefly resumed in September 1922. At the end of October of the same year, the Polish authorities arrested the editor-in-chief of *Dilo*, Fedir Fedortsiv, his deputies and close associates for political reasons. The newspaper was restored only a year later – in September 1923.

The first editor of the newspaper was Volodymyr Barvynskyi, a well-known Ukrainian journalist and public figure. Later it was edited by Antin Horbachevskyi, Ivan Belei and others. From 1914 the newspaper was edited by Vasyl Paneiko and Fedir Fedortsiv (1914 – 1918), Dmytro Levytskyi, Olha Kuzmovych, and Vasyl Mudryi (1927 – 1935). In 1937 – 1939 the editors were Ivan Kedryn, Ivan Nimchuk, and Volodymyr Kuzmovych. At the beginning of World War II, the publication of the newspaper stopped – the last issue of the newspaper was published on September 15, 1939. With the establishment of the Soviet power in western Ukraine, the printing of the newspaper was banned.

Back in 1930, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the newspaper, the famous historian of culture Stepan Siropolko wrote: “The work of the Ukrainian citizenship in politics, church, school, cooperation, science, education, theater, music, etc., always finds its imprint on the pages of *Dilo*, and therefore no historian of our past... cannot pass by the material contained in the yearbooks of *Dilo*” (Siropolko, 1930, p. 10). These words remain relevant today. It is safe to say that studies of the past of both Galicia and the whole of Ukraine will be incomplete without analyzing the publications of the *Dilo* newspaper, which is an important source for reproducing various aspects of the Ukrainian life (Kurylyshyn, Vol. 1, p. 5).

Biographical materials were a rather large part of the newspaper’s information resource. Most often, they were presented in the form of extended obituaries, which revealed the life path of a person, who passed away. Obituaries were mainly printed on the third or fourth page of the newspaper and contained information about the deceased: a surname and name (for the wife – also a maiden name), her social status, position, scientific or literary achievements, awards, date and place of death, as well as in which cemetery they were buried. Much more information was provided about well-known people in society. In these cases, obituaries were published in the form of articles on the first two pages of the newspaper. They, in addition to an extensive biography, contained a description of the merits of the deceased to society.

However, a considerable layer of biographical information contained descriptions of various events, analytical and journalistic articles, surveys, essays, various reviews and advertisements. The study of this biographical array and the formation of a bibliographic index on its basis was undertaken by the Candidate of Historical Sciences Kostiantyn Kurylyshyn – the head of the department of Ukrainian Studies in Lviv Vasyl Stefanyk National Scientific Library of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.

It should be noted that this researcher achieved significant success in the field of the Ukrainian bibliography. Back in 2007, K. Kurylyshyn published two volumes of a large-scale historical and bibliographic study devoted to the Ukrainian legal press of the period of the German occupation (1939 – 1944) (Kurylyshyn, 2007). In 2013, he edited the *Halychanyn* newspaper (1893 – 1913) and formed a collection of materials on a biographical bibliography (Kurylyshyn, 2013). This work received positive reviews from reviewers (Haliv, 2013).

Almost immediately after the publication of biobibliographic materials of the *Halychanyn* newspaper, K. Kurylyshyn began to work on the *Dilo* newspaper. He planned to publish ten volumes of a biobibliographic reference book based on articles in the newspaper. He currently published five volumes. The first volume (Kurylyshyn, 2015) covered the biobibliographic materials about more than three thousand known, little-known and forgotten representatives of the Ukrainians and other nationalities, whose destinies are connected with Galicia. The content of the first volume was formed on the basis of the publications of the *Dilo* newspaper for the first ten years of its existence (1880 – 1889). We should note that all the materials of this and the next volumes, the researcher concentrated in two sections. The first section *Obituaries* contains posthumous mentions of the people recorded in the newspaper obituaries, as well as in such a column as *Gratitude*. These are short messages from the deceased's family, which also provided additional information about the life, family and description of the deceased's funeral. The second section *Biobibliographic Publications* presents information about the persons mentioned in the *Dilo* newspaper in the form of a bibliography. The materials included in this section are divided into four parts: 1) biographical information about the person; 2) publications on parliamentary activities (participation in election campaigns, speeches at meetings of the Galician and Bukovinian Seimas, the State Council of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, legislative initiatives, reports to voters); publications (correspondence, letters, speeches, reviews, thematic investigations, appeals, letters, statements); works of art and their translations.

The first volume contains, in particular, obituaries of the President of Krakow, Ukrainian Mykola Zyblykevych (1825 – 1887), a prominent historian Mykola Kostomarov (1817 – 1885), well-known teachers Yevhen Zhelekhivskyi (1844 – 1885) and Stefan Kurylovyeh (1842 – 1884), the famous Lviv lawyer and banker Markyl Madeiskyi (1882 – 1886), a prominent economist, statistician and publicist Volodymyr Navrotskyi (1846 – 1882) (Kurylyshyn, 2015, pp. 142, 147, 167, 175, 193, 204). Bibliographic materials on the activities of a journalist and politician Volodymyr Barvinskyi, a composer Porfyrii Bazhanskyi, a politician and teacher Mykola Antonevych, an educator Anatolii Vakhnyanyn, a writer Sydir Vorobkevych, a politician Yulian Romanchuk, the Greek Catholic Metropolitan Sylvester Sembratovych (Kurylyshyn, 2015, pp. 282, 285, 287, 317, 326, 473–476, 483–484) and the others.

The second volume covers biobibliographic materials that were published in daily issues of the *Dilo* newspaper during 1890 – 1894. This volume contains information about more than three thousand people, some of whom were mentioned in the first volume. The section *Obituaries* of the second volume contains materials about 1520 dead people, among them

about such famous people as a politician and public figure Ivan Borysykevych (1815 – 1892), a teacher Demian Hladylovych (1846 – 1892), Chernihiv poet Leonid Hlibov (1827 – 1893), Bishop of Krakow Roman Catholic, Ukrainian Albin Dunaievskiy (1817 – 1894), Galician Muscovite Ivan Naumovych (1826 – 1891), Polish artist Jan Matejko (1838 – 1893), a teacher and writer Julian Celewicz (1843 – 1892), a writer Wołodymyr Chylak (1845 – 1893), Przemyśl, Sambir and Sanok Greek Catholic Bishop Ivan Stupnytskyi (1816 – 1890), a linguist and Slavic, professor of Kharkiv University Oleksandr Potebnia (1835 – 1891), associate professor of Lviv University Oleksandr Ohonovskiy (1848 – 1891) and the others. The *Biobibliographic Publications* section of the second volume provides instructions for newspaper articles about famous figures, in particular, a teacher and politician Oleksandr Barvynskiy, a theatrical figure Ivan Biberovych, a naturalist Ivan Verkhratskiy, a historian Mykhailo Hrushevskiy, a writer Stepan Kowaliw, Stanislav Greek Catholic Bishop Julian Sas-Kuilovsky, an architect Vasyl Nahirnyi and the others (Kurylyshyn, 2016, pp. 252–254, 260–262, 296–297, 335–336, 351–352, 383–384).

The third volume of the peer-reviewed bibliographic collection contains materials of 1895 – 1899. Their total number again exceeds three thousand. This time the compiler placed mentions of 1,527 deceased persons in the *Obituaries* section. Among them there is a doctor and professor of Chernivtsi University Vasyl Volian (1832 – 1899), a high school teacher and writer Vasyl Ilnytskyi (1823 – 1895), Kyiv archaeologist Petro Lebedyntsev (1819 – 1896), a teacher and composer Petro Nishchynskiy (1832 – 1896), a teacher, philologist Omelian Partytskyi (1840 – 1895), the Czech ethnographer František Ržegorž (1857 – 1899), Odessa historian Apollon Skalkovskiy (1808 – 1899), a teacher and priest Oleksii Toronskiy (1838 – 1899), professor of Lviv University Yevsevi Cherkavskiy (1822 – 1896) (Kurylyshyn, 2017, pp. 117, 152, 178, 203, 209, 222, 233, 247, 258). More than 2,000 bibliographic materials are contained in the second section of the third volume. They testify that the most popular articles on the pages of the *Dilo* newspaper were related to the names of a writer Tymofii Borduliak, professor of Lviv University Oleksandr Kolessa, a singer Solomiia Krushelnyska, a lawyer and politician Kost Levytskyi, the writers Bohdan and Sylvester Lepkykh, Andrii Tchaikovskiy, the politicians Teofil Okunevsky, Yevhen Olesnytskyi, Yulian Romanchuk, Danylo Taniachkevych, philologist Vasyl Shchurat (Kurylyshyn, 2017, pp. 294–295, 386–387, 402–403, 415–417, 419–421, 465–472, 506–509, 539–543, 575–577, 593–595). The first notable mentions of the young monk, and later of the Stanislav Greek Catholic Bishop, and later the Metropolitan of the Greek Catholic Church Andrii Sheptytskyi (Kurilyshyn, 2017, pp. 588–589), also appeared in this volume.

Issues of the *Dilo* newspaper of 1900 – 1904 formed the basis of the fourth volume of the peer-reviewed edition. This time K. Kurylyshyn published the *Biobibliographic Publications* section first, as it contains the most slogans – more than 2,750. The newspaper materials about the following people are especially widely presented: the politicians Teodor Bohachevskiy, Viacheslav Budzynovskiy, Andrii Kos, Yevhen Olesnytskyi, Yulian Romanchuk, Danylo Taniachkevych, a pedagogue and philologist Ivan Kopach, a lawyer and politician Kost Levytskyi, composer Mykola Lysenko, a public figure and publicist Mykhailo Lozynskiy, cooperater Mykhailo Petrytskyi, a publicist Roman Sembratovych, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky (Kurylyshyn, 2018, pp. 139–140, 147–148, 261–262, 269–270, 293–295, 302–305, 363–367, 386–388, 413–416, 432–433, 460–464, 511–515). Instead, in the *Obituaries* section in the fourth volume of the publication of the *Dilo* newspaper a little more than 1,300 slogans are published. Among them we find the obituaries of the poet and composer Sydir

Vorobkevych (1836 – 1903), a teacher Hryhoriiy Vretsona (1836 – 1891), a writer and public figure Oleksandr Konyskyi (1836 – 1900), a historian and publicist Venedykt Ploshchanskyi (1834 – 1902), the Czech national figure Franz Volodyslav Rieger (1818 – 1903), a rector of Lviv University, the Roman Catholic priest Luka Soletskyi (1827 – 1900), a public and political figure Ostap Terletskyi (1850 – 1902), a literary critic Piotr Chmielowski (1848 – 1904), a historian Izydor Szaraniewicz (1829 – 1901) and the others (Kurylyshyn, 2018, pp. 565, 604, 648, 653, 663, 672, 681, 688). In total, the fourth volume contains more than 4,000 biobibliographic slogans.

The fifth volume of the peer-reviewed collection of biobibliographic materials covered 1905 – 1909. The *Biobibliographic Publications* section contains almost 2,800 slogans. Among them there are quite extensive materials about the following people: the politicians Mykola Vasylo, Yevhen Levyskyi, Kost Levyskyi, Teofil Okunevskyi, Yevhen Olesnyskyi, historian Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, a lawyer and politician Stanislav Dnistrianskyi, a pedagogue and philologist Ivan Kopach, a singer Solomiia Krushelnyska, a publicist Mykhailo Lozynskyi, a politician and writer Mykhailo Pavlyk, a student Myroslav Sichynskyi, a public and political figure Kyrylo Tryliovsyy, etc. (Kurylyshyn, 2019, pp. 156–157, 190–192, 204–205, 253–255, 265–266, 280–285, 292–294, 343–350, 363–364, 422–424, 451–452). More than 1,100 obituaries are presented in the second section of the fifth volume. The most voluminous obituaries are devoted to the historian Volodymyr Antonovych (1834 – 1908), the educator Anatol Vakhnianyn (1841 – 1908), the peasant Mark Kahanets (? – 1908), the director of the Dniester Society Yaroslav Kulachkovskyi (1863 – 1909), the philosopher Volodymyr Lesevych (1837 – 1905), the students of Ternopil gymnasium Vasyl Makohon and Roman Steslovych (both died in 1906), the imperial governor of Galicia Count Andrzej Potocki (1861 – 1908), a public and political figure Danylo Taniachkevych (1842 – 1906), the Croatian bishop and scholar Joseph Yuri Strossmayer (1815 – 1905) (Kurylyshyn, 2019, pp. 518, 529, 561, 574, 580, 586, 606, 621, 624, 638).

It should be noted that Ivan Franko, a prominent Ukrainian scientist, writer, public and political figure, worked closely with the *Dilo* newspaper. In all five volumes of the peer-reviewed edition, K. Kurylyshyn managed to collect bibliographic materials related to the life and work of this outstanding personality. The first journalistic article about Ivan Franko in the *Dilo* newspaper was published on May 31, 1880. This article, entitled *From Kolomyia...*, was about the poet's release from prison. Ivan Franko began publishing his journalistic and journalistic essays in the *Dilo* newspaper in September 1882 under the pseudonym *M*. It was an article *Galician Indemnification*, later a review of the theatrical play *Dobush*, then reviews of the achievements of science, art and literature. There were also publications of a scientific nature, such as *One Card from the History of Our Folk School*, and *Auction of Farms of Peasants and Burghers in 1873 – 1883* (1884). Ivan Franko's works of art (often under the pseudonym *Myron*) began to be published in *Dilo* in November 1892. It was then that the *Gypsies* story was published. Later, the works *Hrytseva School Science*, *Pies with Blueberries*, and *Christmas Eve Tale* were published (Kurylyshyn, 2015, pp. 515–516). A detailed bibliography on Ivan Franko is collected in the following volumes (Kurylyshyn, 2016, pp. 477–478; Kurylyshyn, 2017, pp. 561–564; Kurylyshyn, 2018, pp. 485–486, Kurylyshyn, 2019, pp. 466–468).

Extremely interesting information about the information palette of the *Dilo* newspaper is given by K. Kurylyshyn's prefaces to each of the volumes of the *Chasopys "Dilo"*. Each of these prefaces is, in fact, a scientific historical and bibliographic study, which analyzes

the views of the newspaper on political, social, national, cultural, artistic, religious, educational issues of the past. Here we find an analysis of Ukrainian-Polish interethnic relations, disclosure of the struggle of Galician Jews for national self-affirmation, criticism of Muscovites, coverage of all aspects of the struggle of the Ukrainians for their own university, characterization of educational policy of the National School Council, a review of major problems of the Greek Catholic Church, etc. Undoubtedly, K. Kurylyshyn's author's prefaces deserve a positive approval and in the future may form the basis of a synthesized monograph devoted to the *Dilo* newspaper.

Concluding our review of the five volumes of the *Chasopys "Dilo"*, we would like to wish the author to complete the work he has begun. He still has to work on the issues of the newspaper of 1910 – 1939. This is colossal and exhausting work, but its implementation will provide the Ukrainian studies studios with an extremely valuable reference material, and the Ukrainian bibliography will be enriched with publications of an international scientific level.

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**HETMANATE OF 1918 THROUGH THE PRISM OF UKRAINIAN
BUREAUCRACY HISTORY**

Monograph review: Degtyarev S. State Institutions and Officials of the Period of P. Skoropadsky's Hetmanate (Treatise on the History of the Authorities and Governance Bodies of the Ukrainian State in 1918): Monograph. Sumy: SSU, 2018. 168 p.

**ГЕТЬМАНАТ 1918 Р. ЧЕРЕЗ ПРИЗМУ
ІСТОРІЇ УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ЧИНОВНИЦТВА**

Рецензія на монографію: Дегтярьов С. Державні інституції та чиновники періоду гетьманату П. Скоропадського (нарис з історії органів влади й управління Української Держави 1918 р.): монографія. Суми: СумДУ, 2018. 168 с.

Alternative ways of further development of the state and society always appear at critical moments of history. In 1918, the attempt to move away from the revolutionary-socialist path in favour of an independent Ukraine building on a conservative basis was made under conditions of chaos, anarchy and a foreign military presence. A strong leader, able to take decisive action to give peace to the people, law, order, and opportunity for productive work was necessary.

A century has passed since the existence of P. Skoropadsky's Hetmanate, but a number of aspects of the functioning of the Ukrainian State (*Ukrayinska Derzhava*) remain poorly studied. Professor Serhiy Degtyarev's monograph is dedicated to covering little-known pages on this topic. The scientist made an attempt to reveal the mechanism and principles of a state power functioning and local self-government in 1918 from the perspective of the Ukrainian bureaucracy at that time.

The monograph consists of an introduction, four sections, conclusions, a list of sources and literature, annexes and a name index. The author outlined the main problems and tasks of the research, characterized the theoretical and methodological apparatus in the introduction. The historiography of the issue was analysed. In particular, several groups of scholarly works on this problem were distinguished, namely: the works of the Soviet historians, the contemporary Ukrainian historiography, the researches of representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora, and the works of foreign scholars.

Section I “Higher and Central Government Authorities” focuses on the description of the structure and character of the Hetmanate as a specific form of government. P. Skoropadsky’s reorganization efforts to save the state were analysed. According to the author, the system of management of the Hetmanate became more viable in comparison with the inefficient state apparatus of the Central Council (*Tsentralna Rada*). During the regime of P. Skoropadsky, the government was formed with a network of subordinate ministries and other institutions with clearly defined and regulated powers. Many important regulatory acts were adopted. During the development of this system, the positive experience of the Russian Empire was taken into account. But this experience was rethought and adapted to the Ukrainian traditions and realities of that time. It seemed that such a path could give the Ukrainian State a chance to survive in the current military, political and socio-economic situation.

Section II “Local Administration and Local Authorities” is devoted to the interaction of the local state apparatus and territorial self-government. In particular, the causes, characteristics, and consequences of a permanent conflict between government and self-government were investigated.

The Hetman government was immediately confronted with the problem of the complete absence of the implementation mechanisms of the local authorities. The network of peripheral government agencies was set up in an extremely tight time frame. The greatest power was concentrated in the hands of the governorate and county heads (*huberniya* and *povit starostas*). At the same time, local self-government institutions (*zemstvos* and *city dumas*) had to deal with an extremely large number of issues of daily living for the people. This self-government was based on an electoral nature. Because of this, political opponents of the government, who tried to use *zemstvos* to struggle against P. Skoropadsky’s Hetmanate often became its representatives. The author illustrates how the authorities struggled with this by means of revisions, dismissals and the dissolution of self-government bodies. This confrontation was very detrimental for the effective resolution of local economic, social and humanitarian issues.

Section III “Judicial and Law Enforcement Bodies” focuses on the organization of the judicial and law enforcement system in the Ukrainian State. The author described in general the state of justice in Ukraine in 1918. The problem of the functioning of foreign (German and Austrian) military courts is discussed in details. The very fact of their presence was a sign of incompleteness of the Ukrainian sovereignty and created some tension between the population and the allied troops. The author paid a special attention to the issue of the State Guard functioning (*Derzhavna Varta*), which was the body with police and gendarmerie functions and absorbed both the experience of the imperial era and the Ukrainian national specifics (in particular, its name). The researcher reasonably points at the extraordinary efficiency and effectiveness of the State Guard. The particular value of this section is the widespread use of information about the activities of ordinary provincial courts and law enforcement agencies.

Section IV “Officials of the Ukrainian State” illustrates the staff specifics of the central and peripheral state bodies of the Hetmanate. Thus, it presents a social portrait of the Ukrainian bureaucracy of that time. This section is extremely rich in factual material collected from various sources. It is argued that the biggest problems in the functioning of the state bodies were the shortage of a qualified personnel and inadequate material support of the officials. The formation of the public servants contingent took place primarily on a professional basis without assessing the political preferences of the candidates. However, political opponents

of the Hetman government tried to do harm in various ways, in particular, by infiltrating administrative or local self-government bodies to sabotage or discredit the work of these institutions. The representatives of leftist political forces initiated the acts of terrorism, inciting the population to show discontent for political destabilization in Ukraine.

S. Degtyaryov's research is based on the following groups of sources:

- collections of published documents of the period of the Ukrainian State;
- archival materials from the Central State Archives of Higher Authorities and Administration of Ukraine and regional state archives;
- information from the central and local newspapers published in 1918, namely: *Derzhavnyi Visnyk*, *Visnyk Ministerstva zemel'nykh sprav*, *Vidrozhennia*, *Zemske Dilo*, *Selianska Sprava*, *Luch*, *Sumskyi visnyk* etc.
- memoirs of direct participants in the events of 1918 in Ukraine, both the Ukrainian leaders and leaders of the “White” movement.

However, it should be noted that most of involved archival sources and materials of the local press concern the Left Bank Ukraine. The researcher focused his attention precisely on this part of the country. At the same time, we can assume that this work would become even more relevant and informative by wide using of documents from the regional archives of the Right Bank and the South of Ukraine. However, the foregoing does not detract from the scientific achievements of this comprehensive study. Undoubtedly, it will be useful not only for academic experts, but will be useful for teachers and students in the study of the history of the state and law of Ukraine, as well as a wide range of readers.

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UKRAINIAN IMMIGRANTS IN POST-WAR WESTERN GERMANY

Review on the monograph: Olena Podobied. Ukrainian planet DP:

Culture and Everyday Life. Zhytomyr: Publ. O.O. Yevenok, 2018. 396 p.

УКРАЇНСЬКІ МІГРАНТИ У ПОВОЄННІЙ ЗАХІДНІЙ НІМЕЧЧИНІ

Рецензія на монографію: Олена Подобєд. Українська планета ДіПі:

культура та повсякдення. Житомир: Вид. О. О. Євенюк, 2018. 396 с.

In 2018, a monograph, written by Olena Podobied, Doctor of Historical Sciences, "Ukrainian Planet DP: Culture and Everyday Life" was published, is dedicated to current issues of a cultural and everyday life of displaced persons and refugees from Ukraine in Western Germany during the postwar years.

During and after the end of World War II, many Ukrainians found themselves in Germany, Austria, Italy and some other European countries. However, most of them (almost 3 million people) were in Germany. The UN granted them, like immigrants of other nationalities, the legal status of displaced persons and refugees. Temporarily living in a part of Germany, controlled by the United States, Great Britain, and France, they not only managed to arrange

their lives in camps for displaced persons under extremely difficult material and moral and psychological conditions, but also developed a social and cultural activity, which impresses greatly.

Despite the increasingly frequent studies of the topic of DP by Ukrainian researchers, before the publication of O. Podobied's monograph in the domestic historiography there was no comprehensive study of a cultural life and everyday life of this social group. Until now, this theme has been presented in separate publications on its individual aspects or figures, who found themselves in DP camps. They formed a diverse canvas of information, but did not form a generalized view of this page of the Ukrainian history. Thus, the publication of O. Podobied's research was on time. At the same time, the growing interest in the history of an everyday life in general adds topicality to the reviewed monograph. Having studied the historiographical legacy of the predecessors over the past half century, the author came to a reasonable conclusion, formulated in the preface that the problem of the Ukrainian community in postwar West Germany begins to be studied by the Ukrainian historians. At the same time, the analysis of the source base illustrates the following: there is a sufficient amount of materials and documents on the topic. In general, the researcher analyzed the materials of the funds of 10 domestic archives, in which, in fact, there is a concentrated documentary on this problem in Ukraine. Also during the writing of the monograph, a set of published documents and materials was involved into the analysis: the legislative acts that determined the social and legal status of the displaced persons and refugees in post-war West Germany; the works of the staff of the State Security Committee of the USSR, published during the 1960-ies and 1970-ies under the titles "Confidential" and "Top Secret". A special attention should be paid to the art albums, the catalogs of exhibitions and works of the Ukrainian artists – DP; the memoirs and epistolary sources rich in exclusive evidence, the periodicals of that time, which could become the basis of a number of separate art and historical researches. A wide source base allowed the author of the reviewed monograph to introduce into a scientific circulation the materials, which had not been considered or used without a proper contextual support.

Conceptually, O. Podobied tried to create a thorough generalized study and at the same time to reveal, in detail, various aspects of the situation, the life and activities of the Ukrainian DP in West Germany. Thus, in this monograph the foundation is made for a systematic understanding of the stated topic by other researchers.

The structure of the monograph looks quite logical and is determined by the main thematic blocks, which allow to reveal the topic completely, ranging from the causes of migration to the smallest nuances of the displaced persons' life. In the functional dimension, each section covers a specific problem-thematic segment of the topic and is a complete structural unit. The presentation of the material is a combination of narrative and focusing on certain points. In our opinion, the division of sections into small thematic chapters is successful.

Chapter I of the monograph "Displaced Persons and Refugees from Ukraine in West Germany as a Socio-Psychological Phenomenon" is of a key importance for understanding the topic of the research. Chapter I reveals the reasons for the migration of the Ukrainians during World War II, their political and legal status; presents the social characteristics of the migrants.

Based on statistics on the age, gender, education and employment of the Ukrainian migrants, the researcher was able to create a generalized image of the Ukrainian displaced persons and refugees in the western occupation zones of Germany. The vast majority of them were young and middle-aged people, men were predominant, and according to the

professional composition – former peasants and workers. At the same time, a significant percentage of DPs were people with a higher education – according to the author of the monograph, it was higher than that of the displaced persons and refugees of other national groups. It is the very feature of the third wave of the Ukrainian emigration, formed mainly by the DP, that led to the completion of the Ukrainian diaspora formation in most countries of the settlement. This fact was illustrated mostly in the United States, Canada, Australia, Great Britain and other countries, where the largest flow of the Ukrainians from the camps in West Germany was directed.

The researcher analyzed the economic situation in which the western occupation zones of Germany found themselves in the second half of the 1940-ies. A deep economic crisis caused the rapid devaluation of the Reichsmark, the introduction of a card system of food distribution, the functioning of “gray” and “black” markets, natural trade circulation, the cases of stealing food. This made the author draw a logical conclusion about the low level and quality of life of most Ukrainians in DP camps (pp. 55–56).

In this context, the attempt to determine the socio-psychological attitudes of the Ukrainian migrants in post-war West Germany deserves a special attention. O. Podobied states that the difficult process of adaptation to the peculiarities of life in West Germany, as well as the threat of a forced repatriation to the USSR led to the predominance of pessimistic and even suicidal attitudes. At the same time, we consider it debatable to conclude that the DP era changed both the individual consciousness and the social psychology of the Ukrainians (p. 68). After all, the significant changes in the situation, and hence – the consciousness of the Ukrainians, at that time were due to a complex set of problems caused by World War II, i.e., have deeper origins.

Chapter II of the monograph “Ukrainian Education and Science in Post-war West Germany” is profound, in which the author tries to generalize a rather large array of information about the development of education and science in post-war West Germany. Although this topic is not poorly studied, O. Podobied offers her point of view on it through the prism of the needs of the Ukrainian DPs and provides a systematic and comprehensive overview of the educational and research institutions work.

There was analyzed process of educational structures formation on the basis of camps, where children, youth, adults received or continued education; there were characterized the types of educational institutions, kindergartens, public (primary) schools, graduation courses, the humanities and real gymnasiums, teachers' seminaries, universities, institutes, seminaries), which started their functioning during this period. It is important that the author did not limit herself to generalizing the information, but she points at specific educators and scientists, who provided the organization and implementation of the educational process, among them – well-known figures in Ukraine: Leonid Biletsky, Yuri Boyko, Dmytro Doroshenko, Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko, Dmytro Chyzhevsky, Yuri Sherekh and the others.

O. Podobied's explanation seems to be quite reasonable that the creation of a significant number of educational institutions by the Ukrainian emigrants was conditioned by a large percentage of children and young people in their environment, the need to acquire education for further employment in Western countries, where they wanted to go. At the same time, it is noteworthy that the priority of preserving the Ukrainian identity and cultivating patriotism prompted parents to send their children to study in Ukrainian educational institutions.

A special place in the monograph belongs to the activities of the leading Ukrainian scientific institutions of West Germany – T. Shevchenko Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences and the

Scientific Society, which united most Ukrainian scientists. The development of the Ukrainian humanities studies among DPs was marked, primarily, by the flourishing of the researches in the field of the Ukrainian studies. We share O. Podobed's opinion completely that the ascetic activity of the Ukrainian educators and scientists was aimed at the formation, preservation and development of the national identity of the Ukrainians. The researcher emphasizes an interesting point: the Ukrainian educators and scientists from different regions of Ukraine, who practically did not communicate at home, in West Germany were able to get acquainted with each other's professional achievements and establish cooperation.

Chapter III of the monograph "Cultural, Artistic and Religious Life of Displaced Persons and Refugees from Ukraine" is a logical continuation of the previous block. In it there are collected and summarized the rich materials, primarily narrative documents, about the transformations of the Ukrainian language that took place in the speech of the displaced persons and refugees from Ukraine as a result of contacts between people from different regions and in connection with external communication needs. Based on the works of linguists, the researcher found out that the language of the displaced persons and refugees from Ukraine had virtually no independent neologisms, except for the lexemes "privateers" and "campers". At the same time, the language of migrants was characterized by an interlingual lexical interference; most borrowings penetrated into Ukrainian from German, less from English, and very few from French (p. 124). The mixing of Western and Central-Eastern dialects by the Ukrainians was another feature of the Ukrainian language functioning among the Ukrainian DPs.

A positive feature of Olena Podobied's research, which can be traced throughout the text, is its anthropocentrism, the attention to the individual achievements, worldview and destinies of the Ukrainian artists, educators, and scientists during the DP era. This was fully reflected in the author's consideration of the Ukrainian artists activities in the field of music, theater, fine arts, sculpture and architecture. Once in the western occupation zones of Germany, the Ukrainians continued their creative work, overcoming financial difficulties and overcoming their depressed state. This gave them the opportunity not only to self-realize, but also to "escape" from the difficult post-war everyday life and uncertainty of their future. During this period, the Ukrainian refugee artists also had the opportunity to get acquainted with the work of European colleagues, which inspired them with new ideas. An important result of the Ukrainian artists' activity, including theater performances, music concerts and art exhibitions, was the positive feedback not only of the displaced persons and refugees (as the main target audience), but also of the occupation administrations and the German population. Thus, their creative self-expression had a positive effect on the formation of a positive image of the Ukrainian community and Ukrainian culture in general.

The author's attention to the efforts of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to form a national memory of displaced persons and refugees from Ukraine by getting acquainted with the history and culture of their country deserves approval. According to O. Podobied, these efforts were effective in both the short and long term and ensured the consolidation of the Ukrainian community and hindered a cultural assimilation in a non-ethnic environment.

An significant role in this aspect belonged to the Church – the Ukrainian Greek Catholic, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox and Evangelical Baptist, – which was always the center of the Ukrainian national, cultural and social life in the diaspora. The Church not only supported the spirit of the faithful, but also cared about their financial situation, defended against forced repatriation to the USSR. The monograph focuses on the analysis of the

activities of individual hierarchs – Mykola Voyakovsky, Ivan Buchko, Bishop Mstyslav and Metropolitan Policarp. It is important that the part of some young Ukrainians, who grew up in an atheistic environment in the USSR, was given the opportunity to get acquainted with the faith of their parents and grandparents during the camp period. The importance of the Church in the life of the Ukrainian community is evidenced by the fact that in each camp there was a chapel, a wooden church or a temple in some building.

Thematically related are the last two chapters of the monograph “Everyday Life of Ukrainians in West Germany” and “Family, Holidays and Leisure of Displaced Persons and Refugees”, in which the aspects of the history of DPs are revealed. These aspects have not been sufficiently studied in Ukrainian historiography. Based on the analysis of a huge number of documents of a personal origin (diaries, memoirs, epistolary, etc.), the author reproduces the daily life of the displaced persons from the peculiarities of the diet to the celebration of weddings. Among other things, the problem of covering the medical support in DP is interesting. The network of medical institutions (clinics, hospitals, sanatoriums), a large number of medical professionals among DPs, who were able to work due to their specialty (some of them had private practices), but the above-mentioned network did not guarantee the absence of health problems of the Ukrainian refugees. According to the main indicators, the health state of the Ukrainian refugees was defined as unsatisfactory, mainly due to financial difficulties, a banal malnutrition and peculiarities of a psycho-emotional state.

The seemingly simple question of the specifics of communication and information spread among DPs raises a very serious problem of the influence of the Soviet secret services on the Ukrainians by agents, recruited among the Ukrainian community in the western occupation zones of Germany. Using specific examples, O. Podobied demonstrated how disinformation was spread in DP camps to prevent the Ukrainians from leaving the western occupation zones of Germany for Western democracies, to discredit “the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists” before the occupation administrations, and to prevent the consolidation of the Ukrainian community. Topical from modern point of view is the author's thesis that many Ukrainian intellectuals of the time understood that the “merit” of the Soviet secret services, not displaced persons and refugees from Ukraine, was the division of the latter into “the Easterners” and “the Westerners”, “the Catholics” and “the Orthodox”, and “the Orthodox”, in turn – into the “autocephalous” and “cathedrals” (pp. 250–262).

The section about the life and social adaptation of the Ukrainian family as a separate social organism in West Germany draws attention. The author analyzed in detail the religious, national and family traditions and holidays celebrated by the Ukrainians; highlighted the features of festive and leisure everyday life of DP. The attention is focused on the fact that the Ukrainian family outside the homeland became the main center and means of forming children's ethnic identity. And the main Ukrainian religious and national holidays (Christmas and Easter, Reunification Day and Shevchenko's Days) became widespread and of a special national consolidating significance.

An important and significant component of the monograph is “Appendices” – diagrams, sociological, prayer, humorous, educational materials and texts, colorful photos and cartoons, which the author compiled carefully. The attention is drawn to the design of the scientific apparatus of the study. The inscriptions to each photo contain a link to the archival source, and a professionally compiled name index makes it much easier to work with the text.

In conclusion, Olena Podobied's monograph reveals an important scientific problem and is of value to historical science as a comprehensive study of the culture and everyday life

of the Ukrainian immigrants in postwar West Germany. Due to the use of a large array of sources and coverage of a wide range of problems of the situation and life and activities of the Ukrainians in DP camps, the reviewed monograph can be a good incentive for experts in various fields of knowledge of various activities of DPs and refugees from Ukraine in West Germany. At the same time, the materials of the monograph “Ukrainian Planet DP: Culture and Everyday Life” may be of interest not only to scientists and educators, but also to writers, theater and film artists, as well as journalists and publicists to recreate the cultural and everyday life of DP.

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