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**SPECIAL OPERATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE  
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA “AERODYNAMICS”  
AND THE SPLIT IN THE FOREIGN UNITS OF THE ORGANIZATION  
OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS IN 1954**

**Abstract.** *The purpose* is to do the research on the impact of the US CIA special operation “Aerodynamics” on the split in the OUN Foreign Units in 1954. **The research methodology** is based on adherence to the principles of historicism, objectivity, and scientificity using specific historical, comparative historical, problem chronological, and structural systemic methods. **The scientific novelty** of the article consists in the fact that for the first time, based on the declassified CIA documents, the OUN archives, domestic archives, and foreign printed sources, there has been analysed the influence of the CIA on the activities of the Ukrainian emigration nationalist organizations of the OUN Foreign Units and Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council.

**Conclusions.** In the context of the Cold War aggravation, the CIA studied the activities of Eastern European émigré groups for the purpose of cooperation and among the Ukrainians identified the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR) as such. The cooperation began in 1948 under the code name “Aerodynamics” and lasted until 1990. The first stage of the operation was the penetration of CIA agents into Ukraine, and after 1954 it was carried out in the form of cooperation with the Research and Publishing Association “Prolog”.

In 1948, at the Second Extraordinary Conference of the OUN Foreign Units, the first stage of internal discussion was completed, and the participants of the opposition, based on Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, voluntarily resigned from their mandates as members of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council and the OUN Foreign Units. The offer of cooperation, financial and material support received from the CIA changed their behavior; they announced the withdrawal of their resignation and stated that they would continue their activities independently. After this, the internal conflict in the OUN Foreign Units got a new momentum.

In 1948 – 1954, cooperating with Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, the CIA made efforts to discredit its opponents. The CIA demanded from the British intelligence

MI6 to abandon cooperation with S. Bandera and the OUN Foreign Units, and among the leadership of the Ukrainian underground, the document "Political Position of the United States Government" was distributed prepared by the CIA employees, which expressed support for the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council and condemned the activities of S. Bandera and the OUN Foreign Units. Such actions also contributed to the aggravation of the internal conflict in the OUN Foreign Units, which ended in a split in 1954.

**Key words:** US CIA, special operation "Aerodynamics", the OUN Foreign Units, Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, Research and Publishing Association "Prolog".

## СПЕЦОПЕРАЦІЯ ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОГО РОЗВІДУВАЛЬНОГО УПРАВЛІННЯ СПОЛУЧЕНИХ ШТАТІВ АМЕРИКИ "АЕРОДИНАМІКА" І РОЗКОЛ ЗАКОРДОННИХ ЧАСТИН ОРГАНІЗАЦІЇ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ НАЦІОНАЛІСТІВ У 1954 р.

**Анотація.** Метою дослідження є аналіз впливу спецоперації "Аеродинаміка" ЦРУ США на розкол в Закордонних Частинах Організації Українських Націоналістів (ЗЧ ОУН) 1954 р. **Методологія дослідження** базувалася на дотриманні принципів історизму, об'єктивності та науковості із використанням конкретно-історичного, порівняльно-історичного, проблемно-хронологічного та структурно-системного методів. **Наукова новизна** статті полягає у тому, що вперше на основі розсекречених документів ЦРУ, архівів ОУН, вітчизняних архівів та іноземних друкованих джерел проаналізовано вплив ЦРУ на діяльність українських еміграційних націоналістичних структур ЗЧ ОУН та ЗП УГВР.

**Висновки.** В умовах загострення "холодної війни" ЦРУ вивчило з метою співпраці діяльність східноєвропейських емігрантських груп й серед українських визначило такою ЗП УГВР. Вона розпочалася в 1948 р. під кодовою назвою "Аеродинаміка" і тривала до 1990 р. Перший етап операції зводився до проникнення агентів ЦРУ в Україну, а після 1954 р. вона здійснювалася у формі співпраці з науково-видавничою асоціацією "Пролог".

У 1948 р. на Другій надзвичайній конференції ЗЧ ОУН завершився перший етап внутрішньої дискусії, і учасники опозиції, що базувалася в ЗП УГВР, добровільно склали мандати членів УГВР та Проводу ЗЧ. Отримана від ЦРУ пропозиція до співпраці та фінансово-матеріальна підтримка змінили їхню поведінку, вони оголосили про відкликання відставки та заявили, що будуть самостійно продовжувати діяльність. Після цього внутрішній конфлікт в ЗЧ ОУН набув нового імпульсу.

Співпрацюючи із ЗП УГВР протягом 1948–1954 рр., ЦРУ докладала зусиль до дискредитації його опонентів. Перед британською розвідкою MI6 воно вимагало відмовитися від співпраці з С. Бандерою і Проводом ЗЧ ОУН, а серед керівництва українського підпілля поширювався виготовлений його співробітниками документ "Політична позиція уряду Сполучених Штатів", в якому виявлялася прихильність до ЗП УГВР та засуджувалася діяльність С. Бандери і Проводу ЗЧ. Такі дії також сприяли загостренню внутрішнього конфлікту в ЗЧ ОУН, який в 1954 р. завершився розколом.

**Ключові слова:** ЦРУ США, спецоперація "Аеродинаміка", Закордонні Частини ОУН, Закордонне Представництво УГВР, науково-видавнича асоціація "Пролог".

**Problem Statement.** Under the conditions of the Ukrainian society's resistance to Moscow aggression, modern studies of Ukrainian emigration focus on a new dimension. The war forced millions of Ukrainian citizens to change their way of life radically. Many of them, under pressure of circumstances, ended up abroad. Having adapted to a new social environment, they begin to make social ties and unite in existing Ukrainian emigration institutions, or establish new ones. At the same time, like their predecessors, the Ukrainians encounter the influence factor of the special services of different states on their activities. In this case, the experience of their predecessors is a valuable tool for adequately responding to

such attempts. Carrying out the process of ideological decolonization (Ilnytskyi, & Starka, 2024, p. 188) and debunking the crimes of the Soviet totalitarian regime, one should avoid an uncritical attitude towards the policies of other states, pragmatically subordinated to their national interests. Therefore, this article focuses on revealing the influence of Western special services on the Foreign Units (FU) of the OUN, which held leadership positions among the Ukrainian emigration during the post-war period (Antoniuk, & Trofymovych, 2021, p. 115).

**Review of Recent Research and Publications.** In their activities the OUN Foreign Units were subject to two-way influence of the Soviet and Western intelligence services. Against the background of a rather fragmentary coverage of their history (Sych, 2024, pp. 112–113), the influence of the Soviet special services and the confrontation with them of the Security Service (SB) of the OUN Foreign Units are elucidated in the studies by Yaroslav Antoniuk and Volodymyr Trofymovych (Antoniuk, & Trofymovych, 2021, p. 2021), Dmytro Viedienieiev and Hennadiy Bystrukhin (Viedienieiev, & Bystrukhin, 2006; Viedienieiev, & Bystrukhin, 2007), Vasyl Ilnytskyi and Mykola Haliv (Ilnytskyi, & Haliv, 2019; Ilnytskyi, & Haliv, 2020), Vasyl Ilnytskyi and Vitalii Telvak (Ilnytskyi, & Telvak, 2018).

At the same time, the influence of the Western special services on the OUN Foreign Units is less studied. The article by D. Viedienieiev and Oleksandr Lysenko is of a framework conceptual nature (Viedienieiev, & Lysenko, 2009). A more detailed account of the cooperation of the OUN Foreign Units opposition with the American intelligence services is provided in the book by Anatol Kaminskyi (Kaminskyi, 2009). A deeper understanding of the cooperation is provided in the studies by American historians Richard Brightman, Norman Goda, Timothy Naftali and Robert Wolf (Breitman, Goda, Naftali, & Wolfe, 2005; Breitman, & Goda, 2012). The studies are based on the documents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) declassified after the US Congress passed the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act in 1998.

**The purpose** of this study is to analyse the impact of the CIA of the United States of America (USA) Operation “Aerodynamics” on the split in the OUN Foreign Units in 1954. To achieve the goal, in addition to published domestic and foreign studies, declassified documents of the US CIA, little-studied documents of the OUN Archival Collection in New York (USA) (AZNYU OUN), and the Branch State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine (BSA SBU) have been used.

**Research Results.** In 1945, even at the final stage of World War II, owing to the efforts of two groups of leading figures of the OUN-Bandera (OUN-b), who had found their way abroad through various means, the OUN Foreign Center (FC) was established. In 1946, it was transformed into the OUN Foreign Units, which split in 1954. A group of activists opposed to the OUN Foreign Units broke away from them and united on the basis of the Foreign Representation of the the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, and established the nationalist formation OUN-abroad. This split was the result of permanent discussions that arose between the two groups at the stage of the creation of the OUN Foreign Center and lasted until 1954. The first of them included leading figures of the OUN-b of the pre-war period, led by S. Bandera, who at the final stage of the war were released from German prisons and concentration camps. The second group consisted mainly of those members whom the underground leadership of the OUN-b had sent abroad from Ukraine to organize work and support the national liberation struggle (Sych, 2024a, p. 179).

Chronologically historians single out two periods concerning the split issue: 1946 – 1948 and 1949 – 1953 (Krychevskyi, 1962, p. 24). The end of the “first” opposition was the Second

Extraordinary Conference of the OUN Foreign Units in August of 1948, which condemned its actions. As a result, the opposition representatives Dariya Rebet, Ivan Hryniokh, Vasyl Okhrimovych, Myroslav Prokop, and Zenoviy Martsiuk surrendered their mandates as members of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council and members of the OUN Foreign Units. However, shortly after the conference, unexpectedly they announced that they were withdrawing their resignation and would continue their activities independently (Mudryk-Mechnyk, 1995, p. 18).

At the second stage of the internal conflict in the OUN Foreign Units, the Soviet special services managed to penetrate the “regional” communication system and capture courier groups of the OUN Foreign Units and the opposition, which were landed in Ukraine in May of 1951 with the help of the British and American intelligence, respectively, and radio stations, ciphers, etc. with them. In the course of skillfully staged radio plays under the code names “Zvieno”, “Trasa”, “Kometa”, the conflict in the OUN Foreign Units was brought to extreme tension (Viedienieiev, & Bystrukhin, 2007, p. 165). Therefore, the influence of the Soviet special services on the split in the OUN Foreign Units in 1954 is undeniable.

At the same time, the influence of Western special services on the development of the internal situation in the OUN Foreign Units during this period requires additional study.

The head of the Security Service (SB) of the OUN Foreign Units, Stepan Mudryk, explained the unexpected change in the behaviour of the opposition members after the Second Conference of the OUN Foreign Units by the fact that they had established contact with American intelligence and reached an agreement on cooperation with it (Mudryk-Mechnyk, 1995, p. 18). The fact that the opposition “had crawled up to its ears into the American pocket” was also stated by Stepan Bandera in his letter of September 5, 1952 to the OUN Leadership in Ukraine, arguing for his resignation from the post of Head of the OUN Leadership (OUN Archive Collection in New York City – OUN ACNY, A., p. 1).

It should be noted that the reaction of opposition members to such accusations was ambiguous. For example, Roman Krychevsky-Illytskyi called them a manifestation of “dirty propaganda” (Krychevskyi, 1962, p. 108). At the same time, the fact of the opposition’s cooperation with American intelligence is confirmed by another member of the opposition, Yevhen Stakhiv (Stakhiv, 1995, p. 260). Even more frank is A. Kaminskyi, who clearly indicates that the cooperation of the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council with the CIA began in 1948 and confirms S. Mudryk’s words about a significant role played in its establishment by Yevhen Vretsona’s contacts with American intelligence services in Switzerland and M. Lebed’s contacts with American diplomatic circles and representatives of intelligence services in Rome (Kaminskyi, 2009, pp. 50, 55, 59).

Thus, the substantive interest of the US intelligence services in Ukrainian émigré nationalist circles dates back to 1948. In the context of the unfolding Cold War and the real threat of a new war in Europe, the CIA studied the activities of 30 émigré groups from Eastern Europe and their ability for substantive cooperation. In the Ukrainian segment, the so-called “Hryniokh-Lebed group” was recommended as “the best organization for underground activities” and as one that, compared to Bandera’s group, “represented a moderate, stable and operationally secure group with the most reliable connections with the Ukrainian underground in the USSR” (Breitman, & Goda, 2012, p. 86).

However, such a conclusion by the CIA does not seem entirely logical, because the information it had showed that S. Bandera enjoyed the support of 80% of his compatriots

who originated from Western Ukraine, he was recognized as their leader by the majority of the UPA fighters who fought their way into the American occupation zone of Germany, and that the organization he led “had a complex courier system that reached Ukraine”. Even under the conditions of the unfolding conflict with the opposition, led by M. Lebed and I. Hryniokh, S. Bandera controlled 80% of the membership of the OUN Foreign Units (Breitman, & Goda, 2012, pp. 78–79).

Apparently, the main reason for choosing not to favour the “Bandera group” was that the American intelligence services had already formed an unfavourable attitude towards the group. The US Army Intelligence SIS (SIS – Secret Intelligence Service) first became interested in S. Bandera in September of 1945. Knowing that he was actively engaged in anti-Soviet activities and fearing that this would have serious consequences for the Soviet-American relations, SIS took measures to search for S. Bandera and was even ready to “get rid of him”. It is characteristic that this was done at the time when S. Bandera had already been hunted by the special Soviet team sent to the American occupation zone in June of 1946. However, despite the “large-scale and aggressive search”, by mid-1947, SIS officers were still unable to find S. Bandera’s location. The CIA never considered the possibility of collaborating with S. Bandera, characterizing him as “a political radical with great personal ambitions” in its reports. By 1951, the CIA stated that he “had become openly anti-American, since the United States did not support the independence of Ukraine” and considered the best solution to the issue “to neutralize Bandera as an individual politically” (Breitman, & Goda, 2012, pp. 78–82).

It is obvious that the above characteristics of S. Bandera were of a secondary importance, because his opponents were also distinguished by similar features of radicalism. Thus, in its reports SIS uses sources that depicted M. Lebed as “a notorious sadist and collaborator with the Germans”, and regarding I. Hryniokh they had information about his contacts with “the Jewish expert in the SD” (Breitman, & Goda, 2012, pp. 77, 86).

By the way, having made the choice, the CIA had some respect for its Ukrainian partners, especially M. Lebed, and until the end of their lives protected them from accusations of the pro-Nazi activity and persecution (Breitman, & Goda, 2012, p. 91). In particular, when relying on staged decisions of the Soviet courts, the Kremlin diplomats appealed to the governments of Western countries with a demand to extradite the nationalist activists (Antoniuk, Trofymovych, & Trofymovych, 2023, p. 263).

Obviously, the fact that the first contacts with the SSU (Special Services Unit) were important in the CIA’s choice of partnership, it was also important back in 1945, it was M. Lebed who made the contacts (Breitman, & Goda, 2012, p. 85). At this stage, S. Bandera was informed of the contacts, although he had already preferred cooperation with the British. This was stated in particular by Vasyl Chyzhevsky, a courier of the OUN Foreign Units Central Command to the OUN Central Command in Ukraine, who was captured and recruited by the Soviet special agencies (Branch State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine – BSA SSU, f. 6, c. 33286, vol. 1, pp. 278–279).

In turn, the head of the courier group of the OUN Foreign Units Central, Myron Matviyko, who was detained by the Soviet special services, claimed that the contradictions between M. Lebed and S. Bandera began precisely on the basis of control over contacts with the Americans – S. Bandera tried to make the contacts, and M. Lebed treated the attempts extremely jealously (BSA SSU, f. 6, c. 56232, p. 88).

In 1948, the CIA began cooperation with the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian



Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR), which initially received the codename Cartel, which was later changed to Aerodynamic. It went through several stages, in the 1980s it changed its name first to Qrdynamic, then to Pdddynamic and again to Qrplumb and the cooperation continued until the collapse of the USSR. The operation was terminated in 1990, the total cost of it was estimated at 1.75 million US dollars (Breitman, & Goda, 2012, pp. 86, 90).

This special operation was a very large-scale and long-term CIA project, but not the only one involving experienced Ukrainian émigrés. And these included not only members of the OUN and UPA, but also the “Galicia” division. In particular, it is known that those Ukrainian émigrés who moved from the camp in Rimini (Italy) to Spain and became students at local educational institutions were involved by the CIA in the anti-Soviet operations “Belladonna” and “Trident” (Pronkevych, & Shestopal, 2018, p. 125).

The first phase of Operation Aerodynamic lasted until 1954 and consisted of the CIA agents entering Ukraine and then withdrawing them. In the process of carrying out such tasks, the US intelligence services were unexpectedly struck by a “well-organized and secure underground movement” that was “more developed than the previous reports had suggested”. In light of this, Frank Wisner, head of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), called Operation Aerodynamic the “highest priority project” (Breitman, & Goda, 2012, p. 87). It should be noted that according to V. Ilnytskyi’s calculations, in 1948, only in Lviv and Carpathian regions, the OUN and UPA carried out 1,031 armed and sabotage actions (Ilnytskyi, 2017, p. 91). However, in 1949 – 1953, a number of courier groups were captured or liquidated, and M. Lebed lost proper contacts with the Ukrainian underground. Therefore, in 1954, the “aggressive” phase of the project was completed (Breitman, & Goda, 2012, pp. 87–88).

After that, Operation Aerodynamic entered the phase of cooperation with the Ukrainian research group organized in New York under the leadership of M. Lebed. Under the auspices of the CIA, it collected the Ukrainian literature and historical materials, and also published the Ukrainian nationalist newspapers, bulletins, radio programmes, and books for distribution in Ukraine. To this end, in 1956 the group was officially registered as a non-profit organization “Research and Publishing Association Prolog” and published the magazine under the same name. It also opened its office in Munich, where, headed by I. Hryniokh, it operated under the name “Ukrainian Society for Foreign Studies” and published the magazine “Modernity”. To carry out its tasks, the group recruited and paid for the work of Ukrainian émigré writers and scholars, who were usually unaware that they were working for the CIA-controlled operation. Only six members of the senior leadership of the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR) were privy to the group’s actual activities (Breitman, & Goda, 2012, pp. 88–89).

The scope of our study is limited to the first of the above described stages. It was difficult for all parties involved in the process under analysis. After receiving financial, material, moral, and political support from the US intelligence services, the opposition in the OUN Foreign Units intensified its activities significantly, and the internal conflict flared up with a renewed vigor. In the context of its aggravation, favourable circumstances arose for external provocative intervention. As V. Kuk noted in his explanations after the collapse of the USSR, “conflict passions at that time (1951 – 1953) flared up to such an extent that all critical, analytical thinking was blunted, pushed into the background” (OUN ACNY. B, pp. 1–2).

Under such conditions, the radio programmes conducted by the Soviet special services equally harmed the OUN Foreign Units, the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian

Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR – Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada), and their British and American partners. And although the UHVR representatives in their reports to the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency. Secondary Navigation Freedom of Information Act. Electronic Reading Room – CIA FOIA ERR, Aerodynamic, vol. 43) and in later publications fondly characterized the OUN Foreign Units as “infiltrated by the Soviet agents” (Kaminskyi, 2009, p. 51), however, it was through their communication system, as part of the radio programme “Trasa”, that documents prepared by the Soviet intelligence services, known in the relevant literature as “Volia Batkivshchyny,” were transmitted abroad (Viedienieiev, & Lysenko, 2009, p. 142). In the documents, the OUN Leadership in Ukraine allegedly accused S. Bandera of “deviating from the Resolutions of the III Extraordinary Great Meeting of the OUN”, that “he is neither formally nor actually the Leader of the OUN” and authorized “Lev Rebet, Zenon Matla and Byilykh [Stepan Bandera] to temporarily take over the leadership of the Foreign Units of the OUN and reorganize the Foreign Units in accordance with the positions of the OUN Leadership in Ukraine” (OUN ACNY, B, p. 9). This state of affairs escalated the conflict to an irreversible stage and eventually led to the split in the OUN Foreign Units. In the process of conducting radio programmes, in 1951 – 1959 the Soviet special services also “managed to neutralize 33 agents of the British intelligence SIS and CIA (18 of them were killed), and trophies were obtained – 10 radio stations, weapons, and valuable operational documents. Five emissaries and radio operators were used in operational games” (Viedienieiev, & Lysenko, 2009, p. 142).

Having chosen the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR) as a partner, the CIA made efforts to provide it with financial and material support. In addition to the testimonies of the opposition members, this is also confirmed by the declassified CIA documents (CIA FOIA ERR, Aerodynamic, vol. 43-1). It is obvious that such assistance was provided not only from the CIA funds, but through its mediation from other sources, in particular the United Ukrainian American Aid Committee (CIA FOIA ERR, Aerodynamic, vol. 11-1). Starting in 1947, the Committee was active in Bavaria, one of the main centres of concentration of relocated people in post-war Europe (Kokosh, 2024, pp. 299–300).

The CIA also took steps to monopolize its contact with the Ukrainian nationalist underground and simultaneously weaken the positions of the OUN Foreign Units. The CIA tried to convince its colleagues from the British intelligence agency MI6 to stop cooperating with S. Bandera and the OUN’s Foreign Units Leadership, which had been established back in 1948 (Breitman, & Goda, 2012, pp. 81–82). However, in April of 1951, at a joint meeting, which was organized specifically to resolve differences on this issue, MI6 representatives took the position that the CIA had underestimated the potential of S. Bandera and not only the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR), but also other Ukrainian organizations had the authority to conduct business with Western governments on a pragmatic basis on behalf of the homeland. In the matter of contacts with the underground in Ukraine, MI6 intelligence insisted that “OUN-b is no less reliable than the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR)”. However, even as they jointly developed alternative proposals for a possible end to the conflict in the OUN Foreign Units by including their leaders in the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR), or by uniting the leaders of the two competing groups in one reorganized OUN Foreign Units, the CIA insisted that “Bandera is absolutely unacceptable” as are the people associated with him (CIA FOIA ERR, Aerodynamic, vol. 9).

Such CIA efforts to break off MI6 cooperation with S. Bandera and the OUN Foreign Units Leadership until 1954, and until the provocation of the Soviet special services with forged documents of “Volia Batkivshchyna” had the effect, influencing not only the course of the conflict in the OUN Foreign Units, but also the British intelligence, which nevertheless severed contacts with the OUN Foreign Units Leadership (Breitman, & Goda, 2012, p. 82; CIA FOIA ERR, Aerodynamic, vol. 43-2).

It should be noted that the cooperation of Ukrainian émigré nationalist circles with the special services of Western states should not be interpreted straightforwardly through the prism of the Soviet propaganda clichés about “betrayal of the fatherland”. It can be explained by the very fact that for the OUN Foreign Units, the USSR was not the “fatherland”, but a colonizer of the Ukrainian lands, and such cooperation was of a completely pragmatic nature for their liberation and the construction of the national state. D. Viedienieiev and O. Lysenko point out in this regard that “it is wrong to extract the facts of cooperation between the OUN and the UPA from the general context of the actions of other national liberation or anti-colonial movements of that time” (Viedienieiev, & Lysenko, 2009, p. 138).

The CIA also helped the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR) to strengthen its authority among the leadership of the Ukrainian underground and discredit its opponents. An example there is the document distributed in 1951 called “Policy Position of the United States Government”. Its content demonstrated support for the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR) and rejection of S. Bandera and the OUN Foreign Units led by him (CIA FOIA ERR, Aerodynamic, vol. 11).

After the split in the OUN Foreign Units, this document was published in the Parisian Bandera-oriented magazine “Ukrainets-Chas” and commented on as a “cunning maneuver and deception” on the part of the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR). The publication caused concern within the CIA and led to an internal investigation. The CIA ultimately determined that the document was authentic and had been prepared and delivered to Munich by the CIA employee “who was affiliated with the project as a staff officer in 1951”. In the process of analyzing this fact, the CIA also came to the conclusion that, while controlling part of the foreign connection with the Ukrainian underground, the Soviet special services could have deliberately omitted the transmission of this document in order to “increase discord and split in the Ukrainian emigration” (CIA FOIA ERR, Aerodynamic, vol. 11).

**Conclusions.** Under the conditions of the Cold War aggravation, the US CIA studied the activities of Eastern European émigré groups with the aim of cooperation in the event of a military conflict in Europe, and in the Ukrainian segment, the US CIA made contacts with the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR). The cooperation began in 1948, initially codenamed Cartel, later changed to Aerodynamic, and ended in 1990. Its first phase lasted until 1954 and consisted of the penetration of CIA agents into Ukraine and their subsequent withdrawal abroad. After that, the Aerodynamic Operation entered the phase of cooperation with M. Lebed’s Ukrainian research group in New York, which in 1956 was officially registered as the non-profit “Research and Publishing Association Prolog”.

The beginning of the CIA’s cooperation with the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR) coincided with the end of the so-called “first opposition” in the OUN Foreign Units, which was based on the Foreign Representation of the



Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR). In August of 1948 the second extraordinary conference of the OUN Foreign Units condemned the UHVR actions, and the opposition members voluntarily resigned from the UHVR and the OUN Foreign Units Leadership, and later they expressed their readiness for further organizational activity. The offer of cooperation, financial and material support received from the CIA changed the behaviour of the opposition members. They declared that they would withdraw their resignation and continue their activities independently. After that, the internal conflict in the OUN Foreign Units flared up with a renewed force.

Implementing Operation Aerodynamic in 1948 – 1954, the CIA sought to monopolize contacts with the nationalist underground in Ukraine, relying exclusively on the UHVR and making efforts to discredit S. Bandera and the OUN Foreign Units Leadership. The CIA demanded that the British intelligence agency MI6 refuse to cooperate with S. Bandera and the OUN Foreign Units Leadership, and when jointly modelling ways to end the conflict in the OUN Foreign Units, and in any case the CIA excluded such an association of leaders of the conflicting parties in which S. Bandera and those loyal to him would be present. At the same time, the document “Political Position of the Government of the United States” prepared by the CIA officers was distributed among the Ukrainian nationalist underground, which demonstrated support for the UHVR and condemned the activities of S. Bandera and the OUN Foreign Units Leadership.

The financial and material support of the opposition in the OUN Foreign Units by the CIA and systematic discrimination of their leadership contributed to the aggravation of the internal conflict, which ended in a split in 1954.

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