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## YEVHEN KONOVALETS AND INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the research* is to study the formation, directions and results of the international activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Ye. Konovalets in 1929 – 1938. **The research methodology** is based on the principles of historicism, general scientific methods of generalization and typology, as well as special scientific research methods: comparative historical, historical systemic and critical analysis of sources. **The Scientific Novelty.** On the basis of a rich source material, the major part of which is introduced into a scientific circulation for the first time, the following issues have been elucidated: development and challenges during of international activities implementation; directions and result of international activity. **The Conclusions.** Therefore, the international activity of Ye. Konovalets and the OUN can be divided into two periods. The first one is 1929 – 1934. During this period, there was an attempt to define conceptual issues of international politics. However, due to the lack of experience in international activities, a sufficient number of specialists and the dynamics of international processes, this was not

done. In the process of discussing foreign policy, there was an initiative to unify with other stateless peoples of the former Russian Empire. Due to the lack of specialists and weakness of other national movements, this was not implemented. Instead, in 1930 – 1933, they launched international activities within the framework of the League of Nations successfully. Several times the Ukrainian issue became the subject of consideration in this global international institution. It mainly concerned the life of the Ukrainians in Galicia under the Polish occupation. Trying to convey the truth about the life of the Ukrainians in Poland, it was possible to establish diplomatic relations with Italy, Japan and England, which were engaged in the Ukrainian issue. Diplomatic relations were especially close with Italy, which was considered a kind of lawyer, both in the League of Nations and Germany. At the same time, Ye. Konovalets had no hope for Germany led by A. Hitler in support of the revival of the Ukrainian state. Instead, Germany and Japan were considered the strongest of those capable of breaking the borders formed after World War I. The OUN planned to use the situation in its favour: The second stage of international activity under Ye. Konovalets began in 1937. A kind of pause in international activity, lasting almost for three years, was connected with the murder of the Minister for Internal Affairs B. Pieratski by a member of the OUN in Warsaw. After that, Poland succeeded in getting the activities of the OUN branches in Czechoslovakia, Germany and Lithuania to be limited for a certain time. However, when it became clear that Germany's ambitions in the redistribution of Europe could not be put to rest, Ye. Konovalets and the PUN resumed international activities, especially with Japan. There was hope that this state would start a war with the USSR. Although joint actions with Japan were not agreed upon. In the end, we should state that Ye. Konovalets and the OUN in general in their international combinations did not develop relations with the USA.

**Key words:** Yevhen Konovalets, Yevhen Onatsky, Dmytro Andriyevsky, Rico Yariy, Stepan Bandera, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, League of Nations.

## ЄВГЕН КОНОВАЛЕЦЬ ТА МІЖНАРОДНА ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЇ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ НАЦІОНАЛІСТІВ

**Анотація.** *Мета роботи* – дослідити формування, напрями та результати міжнародної діяльності Організації українських націоналістів (ОУН) під керівництвом Євгена Коновальця. **Методологія дослідження** базується на принципах історизму, загальнонаукових методах узагальнення і типологізації, а також спеціально-наукових методах дослідження: порівняльно-історичному, історико-системному та критичному аналізі джерел. **Наукова новизна.** На основі багатого джерельного матеріалу, більшість з якого вперше вводиться до наукового обігу, розкрито: розбудову і виклики під час реалізації міжнародної діяльності; напрями та результат міжнародної діяльності. **Висновки:** Отже, міжнародну діяльність Є. Коновальця та ОУН можна поділити на два періоди. Перший – 1929 – 1934 рр., коли була здійснена спроба визначити концептуальні питання міжнародної політики. Однак через відсутність досвіду міжнародної діяльності, достатньої кількості фахівців і динаміку міжнародних процесів цього не було зроблено. У процесі обговорення зовнішньої політики виникла ініціатива об'єднання з іншими бездержавними народами колишньої Російської імперії. Ця ініціатива не була реалізована. У 1930 – 1933 рр. вдалося розгорнути міжнародну діяльність у рамках Ліги Націй. Намагаючись донести правду про життя українців у Польщі, вдалося встановити дипломатичні відносини з Італією, Японією та Англією, які займалися розслідуванням української справи. Особливо тісні дипломатичні відносини склалися з Італією. Щодо Німеччини, то Є. Коновалець не покладав на неї надії у підтримці відродження Української держави. Другий етап міжнародної діяльності за Є. Коновальця розпочався в 1937 р. Своєрідна пауза в міжнародній діяльності, тривалістю майже три роки, пов'язана із вбивством членом ОУН у Варшаві міністра внутрішніх справ Б. Перацького. Після цього Польщі вдалося добитись, щоб на певний час було обмежено діяльність осередків ОУН у Чехословаччині, Німеччині та Литві. Однак коли стало зрозумілим, що амбіції Німеччини у перерозподілі Європи не вдасться приспати нікому, Є. Коновалець та ПУН відновили міжнародну діяльність, особливо з Японією. Була надія, що ця держава почне війну з СРСР. До узгодження спільних дій з Японією таки не дійшло. Насамкінець доводиться констатувати, що Є. Коновалець та ОУН загалом у своїх міжнародних комбінаціях не розвинули відносини з США.

**Ключові слова:** Євген Коновалець, Євген Онацький, Дмитро Андрієвський, Ріко Ярій, Степан Бандера, Організація українських націоналістів, Ліга Націй.

**The Problem Statement.** On January 27 – February 3, 1929, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists was held in Vienna. As a result, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was established. It can be argued that from the defeat of the First National Liberation Struggle in 1921 until World War II, it was the only successful event that brought together 32 representatives of various Ukrainian nationalist forces and ended with the creation of a new national military political force. With the creation of the OUN, systematic work on preparations for the revival of Ukrainian statehood began. Objectively, as of 1929, the only one who could organize such an event was Yevhen Konovalets, the former leader of the Ukrainian youth movement of Galicia, the commander of the military formation of the Sich riflemen, the colonel of the UNR Army and the head of the Ukrainian military organization. In addition, he managed to develop the OUN into the strongest revolutionary Ukrainian military political force.

At the time of the OUN formation, the Movement of Ukrainian Nationalists (PUN) understood that a change in the international political situation was a necessary prerequisite for the restoration of independent Ukraine. That is why, the Ukrainian nationalists focused on the states that sought to revise the Versailles-Washington system of peace treaties and directed their activities against the USSR and Poland. Germany, Italy and Japan were the states that were interested in changing the borders, and also had the power to do it. The focus, especially on Germany and Japan, was balanced sufficiently. In the general provisions adopted by the Congress, it was noted that the OUN did not recognize international acts that enshrined enslavement of Ukraine.

Lithuania became the key international partner for the OUN, which was not satisfied with its borders either, and there was also a threat of occupation by Poland or the USSR. For the support of Ukrainian nationalists, Lithuania received from them informational and analytical data about international processes in Europe. Also, on the international arena, the Ukrainian national forces were heard more strongly, talking about repression, assimilation, etc. in Poland and the USSR. Criticism of these states was beneficial to Lithuania, and in the event of a new war, the Lithuanians expected to restore their ethnic borders.

For several years, the League of Nations played an important role in the international activities of the OUN. This international global organization sought to show the life of a stateless nation under occupation. In this way, they tried to gain favour for the Ukrainians of other countries, in particular England.

**The Analysis of Recent Research and Publications.** In modern historiography, the role of Ye. Konovalets in the international activities of the OUN has not become the subject of a comprehensive study. Fragmentary the study of this issue is determined by several scientific publications. The author of the first one is M. Havryshko (Havryshko, 2014, pp. 174–201). This is a complex scientific article based on little-known or unknown source material. It concerns the international activities of the OUN during and after the Polish policy of appeasement of the Ukrainian population of Galicia, which is better known as “pacification”. That is, how the leadership of the OUN worked so that these repressive actions of the Polish security authorities became known in Europe in the autumn of 1930. The author of the second article is M. Posivnych. Basically, it is the article about the theoretical aspects of the OUN foreign policy. Practical aspects or foreign policy activities concern the years of 1937 – 1939 (Posivnych, 2018, pp. 87–122). In the collective article by R. Demchyshak and T. Starodub there are discussed the theoretical aspects of the international policy of Ukrainian national forces in the publications of the Ukrainian nationalists (Demchyshak & Starodub, 2021, pp. 104–115).

The current state of historiography is defined by the publication on the search of a foreign policy concept by D. Andriyevsky, who was one of the founders of the OUN (Starodub, 2019, pp. 50–56). Some aspects of the foreign policy activities of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement structures are analyzed in the article by Vasyl Ilnytskyi, Vitaliy Telvak, Mykola Haliv (Ilnytskyi & Telvak, 2018; Ilnytskyi & Haliv, 2020). However, each of these publications is devoid of international activity practical measures, which the OUN managed under the leadership of Ye. Konovalets.

A number of recent publications about the OUN and the environment for preserving unpublished materials of this organization caused theoretical interest (Sych, 2024, pp. 111–120; Slobodianiuk, 2023, pp. 235–252; Antoniuk & Trofymovych, 2021, pp. 116–126; Khoma, Vovk, Holoshchuk & Muravska, 2023, pp. 299–311).

**The purpose of the research** is to study the formation, directions and results of the international activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Ye. Konovalets in 1929 – 1938.

**The Results of the Research.** For the first time, after the establishment of the OUN, international activities and the development of international policy were discussed in Prague at the meeting of the PUN on October 9–11, 1929. Ye. Konovalets, D. Andriyevsky, M. Sciborsky, D. Demchuk, L. Kostariv, M. Kapustiansky, M. Kushnir and the others were present at the meeting (Cherchenko & Kucheruk, 2005, pp. 209–210).

Two weeks later, D. Andriyevsky summarized the work of the meeting and presented it to Ye. Konovalets. He suggested several directions in the international policy of the OUN. In particular, to establish communication with the head of the public organization of the Pan-European Union, Richard Kudenhofe-Kalerghi, in order to introduce him to the Ukrainian issue. He believed that the OUN should promote the Ukrainian issue in the League of Nations. He recommended forming clubs at the OUN branches in Europe that would unite the Belarusians, the Georgians, the Lithuanians, the Latvians, the Kubantsi and the Dontsi. In his opinion, in the future it would be necessary to initiate the establishment of the League of Nations of Eastern Europe. In this way, it would be possible to fight for national rights in the League of Nations (Letter from D. Andriyevsky to E. Konovalets dated October 27, 1929. Oseredok. Mykhailo Seleshko Collections. Folder D. Andriyevsky. Box 12 (b), Ea 4–7, there is no numbering of documents and pages).

Ye. Konovalets sent D. Andriyevsky's letter of October 27 to M. Sciborsky, M. Kushnir and V. Martyntsev. Everyone treated positively these initiatives and looked forward to the completion of work on the concept of international policy of the OUN. As for the Ukrainian issues that need to be resolved in the League of Nations, Ye. Konovalets believed that it would be possible to start this work when he moved to Geneva (Letter from E. Konovalets to D. Andriyevsky dated November 22, 1929. Oseredok. Mykhailo Seleshko Collections. D. Andriyevsky folder. Box 12 (b), Ea 4–7, there is no numbering of documents and pages).

In continuation of the issue about the enslaved peoples of Eastern Europe, M. Kushnir (a pseudonym V. Bohush) devoted the article “League for the Liberation of the Peoples of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Transcaspia”, and subsequently several more publications. M. Kushnir tried to form the concept of a joint liberation struggle of enslaved nations. This joint effort would demonstrate that the struggle for state independence is the problem of Eastern Europe, and not only of the Ukrainians. Further, in his opinion, only the division of the USSR into national states and the creation of independent Ukraine (within their ethnic boundaries) in Eastern Europe will balance political and economic processes, as

well as contribute to the reduction of the Russian hegemony (Bogush, 1929, pp. 392–396; Dniprotskyi, 1930, pp. 12–18; Dub, 1933, pp. 109–114).

At the beginning of January of 1930, Ye. Konovalets gave recommendations to D. Andriyevsky in preparing the concept of the OUN foreign policy. In particular, he asked to distinguish between internal and external policy in the work on the concept of foreign policy. In his opinion, the main goal in domestic policy is to become an influential independent and self-sufficient Ukrainian political unit. On this path, the principles are constant, and the tactics are variable. As for foreign policy, he emphasized that the positions of the OUN had not been clarified. This process required time, experience, sufficient professional personnel, etc. Because what all the Ukrainian centres in emigration did could hardly be called foreign policy, it was rather propaganda of the Ukrainian issue in the world (Letter from E. Konovalets to D. Andriyevsky dated January 4, 1930. Oseredok. Mykhailo Seleshko Collections. D. Andriyevsky folder. Box 12 (b), Ea 4–7, there is no numbering of documents and pages).

Ye. Konovalets asked not to worry about the threat of Ukrainian political centres, but to concentrate on forming the strong OUN. Only after that, it will be possible to enter into relations with all those centres and dictate one's vision of the development of political processes. Instead, at the formation stage, it is necessary to continue to act independently, not to interfere in conflicts, but if possible to correct initiatives. As an example, there was S. Shulhin's initiative formulated at the League of Nations, which was amended by the Ukrainian community in Prague, which included members of the OUN. As for S. Shulhin's initiatives, it was about the Nansen Committee at the League of Nations. This committee was responsible for issuing Nansen Passports to stateless people. It was problematic for the Ukrainians, because those who came from the former Russian Empire were given passports as if they were the Russians. The task of Ukrainian representatives was to try to ensure that the Ukrainian nationality was indicated in Nansen passports. In this regard, Ye. Konovalets recommended, if necessary, to support the entry of S. Shulhin or M. Halahan, who headed the Ukrainian community in Prague, into the Nansen Committee (Letter from E. Konovalets to D. Andriyevsky dated January 21, 1930. Oseredok. Mykhailo Seleshko Collections. D. Andriyevsky's folder. Box 12 (b), Ea 4–7, there is no numbering of documents and pages).

Later, Ye. Konovalets instructed D. Andriyevsky to deal with this issue. As a result, he managed to join the Nansen Committee (Onatsky, 1954, p. 334).

In general, D. Andriyevsky, M. Kushnir or someone else from the PUN did not develop some coherent conceptual document on the international policy of the OUN. Work on this issue was reduced to international analytics (Yary, 1930, pp. 215–220; Dub, 1933, pp. 109–114). In particular, D. Andriyevsky considered Germany, Italy, Japan, England and the USA to be countries that seek to use the Ukrainian issue on the international arena in their own interests. Therefore, it is necessary to take maximum advantage of the contradictions between the above-mentioned states for the needs of the liberation movement (Andriyevsky, 1931, pp. 257–265).

At the beginning of March of 1930, Ye. Konovalets moved to Geneva, which contributed to the revival of international activity for a certain time (Letter from E. Konovalets to D. Andriyevsky dated March 7, 1930. Oseredok. Mykhailo Seleshko Collection. D. Andriyevsky's folder. Box 12 (b), Ea 4–7, there is no numbering of documents and pages). By the way, Ye. Konovalets was in Geneva as a Lithuanian journalist and a citizen of Lithuania (Lithuanian journalist's ID card in the name of Yevhen Konovalets, issued in 1929. Oseredok. Yevhen Konovalets Fund No. 307. Folder 19. Part 62/1).

In the spring of 1930, the expansion of the area of the OUN activity to Italy and the establishment of contacts with the political circles of this country were started. Ye. Konovalts connected the implementation of this idea with Ye. Onatsky. On March 17, 1930, he wrote a letter to Ye. Onatsky, asking him to find a day or two to meet. Ye. Onatsky agreed to meet at a convenient time (Onatsky, 1954, p. 143).

On May 24, at 9 o'clock in the morning, Ye. Konovalts arrived in Rome. After visiting Ye. Onatsky's apartment and getting to know his wife Nina, they went for a walk in Villa-Borghese Park. Ye. Konovalts said that he planned to hold the PUN conference in Geneva in June. He invited Ye. Onatsky to be present. Ye. Onatsky replied that he probably would not be able to, because he did not have any passport and money. Ye. Konovalts promised to help with the Lithuanian passport owing to S. Lazoraitis the diplomatic representative at the Vatican, and the OUN would pay for the trip (Onatsky, 1954, p. 233).

The meeting to which Ye. Konovalts invited Ye. Onatsky was held in Geneva on July 5–6, 1930. It was attended by Ye. Konovalts, D. Andriyevsky, Ye. Onatsky, V. Bohush and O. Boikiv. At this meeting, it was stated one more time that there was a lack of professionals for the development of domestic and foreign political activities. If you choose a priority between domestic and foreign policy, you should give preference to domestic policy. It is necessary to unite the emigration forces and form a broad Ukrainian representation in the world (Onatsky, 1954, pp. 301, 305, 310, 315–317).

The pacification and killing of Yu. Holovinsky, the head of the Regional Executive of the Ukrainian Military Academy, by the Polish police on September 30, 1930 led to the deployment of a powerful information campaign by the PUN on the international stage about the terror against the Ukrainians in Galicia. For this information campaign, the OUN used the network of its representative offices in Europe, as well as contacts with various other Ukrainian cultural and educational organizations.

The main goal for the PUN was the League of Nations. It was the centre where the main flow of complaints, protests, appeals, etc. was sent. The organizational reference office of the PUN sent the informational message "Circular" to the leaders, secretaries and departments of the OUN, so that they would send telegrammes to the League of Nations and the governments of the countries where they were, protesting against the Polish terror in Galicia. It was necessary to convey the necessary amount of information in order to draw attention to the events in Poland against the Ukrainians (Bulletin for the attention of leaders, secretaries of the OUN and department boards. Oseredok. Mykhailo Seleshko Collections. Medal's list. Box 12 (b), Ea 4–7, there is no numbering of documents and pages).

In the fund of Ye. Konovalts there are three passes in his name and surname for visiting the XI session of the League of Nations, which took place from September 10 to October 4, 1930. The first two passes for a morning visit on September 15, and the second one – for September 16, without specifying the time of visit (Pass to attend the meeting of the XI Assembly of the League of Nations, September 15, 1930. Oseredok. Yevhen Konovalts Fund No. 307. Folder 1/6; Pass to attend the meeting of the XI Assembly of the League of Nations, September 16, 1930. Oseredok. Yevhen Konovalts Fund No. 307. Folder 1/7). I think that the second pass for September 15, which differs only in a seat in the hall (on the first one – No. 244, and on the second one – No. 246), was for his wife Olha, who acted as a translator from the French language. Actually, O. Boikiv mentions it about Olha. Ye. Konovalts was invited by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lithuania Dovas Zaunius to take part in the meeting of the League of Nations (Boykiv, 2021, pp. 710–711).

Ye. Onatsky was involved in the distribution and production of information about events in Galicia. In particular, on October 8 he published the article “Polish Policy in Eastern Galicia” in the newspaper “Il lavoro fascista”, and on October 27 he sent an informational telegramme to the Pope (Onatsky, 1954, pp. 388–390, 408).

Ye. Konovalets considered the work of the OUN to be positive in the direction of informing Western Europe about the Polish terror in Western Ukraine. Moreover, he asked the editorial offices of newspapers that were not indifferent to the Ukrainian issue to write letters of gratitude, and also reminded of gratitude to the British ambassador Melon (Bulletin of the Main Office of the Ukrainian Nationalists’ Party, December 1, 1930, Oseredok. Mykhailo Seleshko Collections. Folder 1929. Medal’s list. Box 12 (b), Ea 4-7, there is no numbering of documents and pages).

In the last issue of “Building the Nation” for 1930, all information was collected about the protests of the Ukrainians in various countries of the world against “pacification”, complaints sent to foreign governments, articles, notes, reviews, etc. in the foreign and Ukrainian press (Khronika podiy, 1930, pp. 292–315). As M. Seleshko wrote, as of December 17, 1930, the League of Nations received about 600 protests sent by the Ukrainians (Cherchenko, 2010, p. 21).

On January 19, 1931, the XI session of the Assembly of the League of Nations began in Geneva. Out of hundreds of Ukrainian appeals, only three were taken into account. Among them, the petitions of the Ukrainian community from Omenankuri (France), the English deputies from London and the Ukrainian parliamentary representation. According to Ye. Onatsky, the petition of 65 members of the English Parliament strengthened the hope that the Ukrainian issue would not be ignored. In addition, Germany spoke against Poland’s policy towards national minorities at this session. Germany was concerned about the life of the Germans in Upper Silesia. To make this issue crucial, the German representative also mentioned the Ukrainian issue. As a result, the Ukrainian issue was not ignored. It was handed over to the “Committee of Three” formed at the session for study. Its members included Norwegian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Johan Ludwig Mowinkel, Italian diplomat and lawyer Massimo Pilotti and British Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson (Onatsky, 1981, pp. 16–18; Mirchuk, 2007, p. 204; Havryshko, 2014, pp. 191–192).

After a temporary rise, a new stage of work began, which consisted in an effort to establish contacts with the representatives of the committee and convey information about pacification to them. On February 13, Ye. Konovalets asked Ye. Onatsky to write, by the help of the bishop of the UGCC Ivan Buchko, an appeal to the bishops of the Church of England, so that they would support efforts to punish Poland at the international stage for terror against the Ukrainians in Galicia. In addition, Ye. Onatsky entered into communication with M. Pilotti. He reported on the background of the conflict between the Ukrainians and the Poles, attempts at reconciliation in 1920, etc. Ye. Onatsky also informed Italian journalists about the Ukrainians (Onatsky, 1981, pp. 26–27).

In the first decade of March of 1931, Ye. Konovalets visited Paris and Brussels, where the PUN members M. Sciborsky and D. Andriyevsky lived. The main issue he focused on was the Ukrainian issue in the “Committee of Three”. In various ways he tried to reach the representatives of England and Italy so that they would understand the problem and take the side of the Ukrainians. The leadership of the OUN wanted to inflict a diplomatic defeat on Poland in this issue. In Rome, Ye. Onatsky conducted a very complex communication with various government circles in Italy. He received support, sympathy, admiration for the appearance of the Ukrainian issue in the League of Nations, but they made it clear that the initiative in this issue belonged to the British (Onatsky, 1981, pp. 39–42).

In Geneva, Ye. Konovalets consulted with the Englishwoman Mary Shypshanks on whether it was possible to expect the English diplomats to side with the Ukrainians. Previously, M. Shypshanks did a lot to draw attention to the Ukrainian issue in the League of Nations and other international organizations. In particular, she was acquainted with M. Rudnytska and in November of 1930 she visited Galicia. There she learned about real Ukrainian-Polish social and political relations (Onatsky, 1981, pp. 13–15). Ye. Konovalets, M. Kushnir and M. Seleshko understood that England was interested in strong Poland as opposed to the Bolsheviks. Although a neutral position could be counted on (Cherchenko, 2010, p. 33).

A meeting of the “Committee of Three” was scheduled for May 19. The day before, V. Paneiko and M. Rudnytska arrived in Geneva. And as M. Seleshko writes, “diplomacy immediately went into motion”, namely meetings with representatives of the “Committee of Three” countries (Cherchenko, 2010, p. 38).

On May 19, the “Committee of Three” began working, and made a decision on May 23. It was a communique that ran about the importance of understanding between the Ukrainians and the Poles. Therefore, they decided to postpone consideration of this issue to a later time (Havryshko, 2014, p. 194).

Ye. Konovalets, writing to D. Andriyevsky and Ye. Onatsky regarding the communique, noted that the information provided was not final, and accordingly it might still be changed. In his opinion, it was not a defeat for the Ukrainian side. After all, the very fact that the communique did not run exclusively about “pacification” but about the Ukrainian issue in general. Among the bad signs was the fact that the committee called for negotiations between the Ukrainians and the Poles. Ye. Konovalets believed that one of the real scenarios of how the Poles would behave was that they would make demands that the Ukrainian side would not be able to comply with. Then they would inform the international community about the breakdown of negotiations or hold talks with various groups. This would lead to intrigues and quarrels between us, and the Poles will be informed that the Ukrainians do not know what they want. Therefore, obviously, the Ukrainian political forces in Galicia must be united, because they will still have to talk to the Poles. Success depends on the right tactics and unity. At the same time, it is expedient to continue to inform the international community about our problem with the Poles and to develop diplomatic contacts (Onatsky, 1981, pp. 97–98).

Ye. Konovalets focused on M. Rudnytska’s major diplomatic work and informed that she was going to go to London. There, she planned to ask English parliamentarians to continue supporting the Ukrainian issue (Onatsky, 1981, p. 99).

According to Ye. Onatsky, the communique is a compromise document, but “leans more in our direction”. In addition, on June 5, Ye. Onatsky managed to get to a meeting with M. Pilotti, who explained what the result of the committee’s work was. It is about the fact that Poland was forced to talk with the Ukrainians, try to reach an agreement, etc. (Onatsky, 1981, pp. 101, 110–111).

It is obvious that this was an international achievement of the PUN. However, it would not be worth waiting for an understanding with Poland from the regional authorities. They rejected the legal evolutionary methods of fighting Poland, because with the help of these tactics, the Ukrainian political parties and public organizations did not manage to win even autonomy for Ukraine, let alone independence (SALR, f. 121, d. 3, c. 1020, pp. 3v–4).

Imbalance in the created working atmosphere aimed at preparing for the League of Nations caused the murder of the Polish politician Tadeusz Gołowko in Truskavets on August 29, 1931. This terrorist act was organized by the combat officer of the Ukrainian Defense



Forces, R. Shukhevych, and was carried out by members of the military organization, Vasyl Bilas and Dmytro Danylyshyn. The regional leader of the OUN, Ivan Gabrusevych, agreed to the execution of the murder. Most likely, organizing the murder of T. Gołowko was not previously discussed with the leadership of the UVO and the OUN. The regional leadership of the UVO and the OUN considered Tadeusz Gołowko involved in pacification and complicit in the understanding with the Polish authorities, which was humiliating for the Ukrainians (Mirchuk, 2007, pp. 218–220).

Reacting to this event, Ye. Konovalets sent “Communiqué” to the members of the PUN on September 3, 1931, where he expressed his thoughts and recommended how foreign journalists and interested people should be informed about this event. Based on the fact that Ye. Konovalets did not know about the preparation of the murder of Tadeusz Gołowko, in the “Communiqué” he reduced the position rather to a provocation by the Poles, and maybe even by the Bolsheviks. In his opinion, provocation is indicated by the fact that the murder was carried out on the eve of the meeting of the League of Nations, at which the issue of the Polish terror against the Ukrainians was to be decided – pacification (Onatsky, 1981, pp. 193–195).

The Ukrainian deputies, politicians and journalists started coming to Geneva at the end of August. Among them, M. Rudnytska, Z. Pelensky, Ye. Onatsky, D. Andriyevsky, V. Paneiko, Ya. Makohon and the others. From the memoirs of Ye. Bachyna-Bachynsky, Ye. Konovalets held on confidently enough. Despite the fact that the Polish information campaign, especially provoked by the murder of Tadeusz Gołowko, fueled anti-Ukrainian sentiments. The Ukrainian issue was not the only one and definitely not the first priority (Bachyna-Bachynsky, 2021, p. 796).

On September 11, the Swiss newspaper “La Suisse” reprinted the article from the Polish newspaper “Kurjer illustrowany Godzienny”, in which, among other things, there was discussed the financing of the activities of Ye. Konovalets by the Germans. On the same day, the letter was written on his behalf in French to the editors of the newspaper “La Suisse”. In the letter it was stated that Ye. Konovalets was not the head of the UVO, he did not cooperate with and did not receive any funding from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Military Affairs of Germany. The appearance of these allegedly sensational falsified news appeared on the eve of the consideration of the case about the Ukrainian minority in Poland at the meeting of the League of Nations. In this way, the Polish journalists intended to discredit the Ukrainians. He writes that he will challenge the baseless accusations published in “Kurjer illustrowany Godzienny”. Finally, Ye. Konovalets requests that a rebuttal be published in the next issue (Mr. Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper “La Suisse” Switzerland. Oseredok. Yevhen Konovalets Foundation No. 307. File 10. Part 8).

On September 17, M. Rudnytska organized a meeting with Mykhailo Luchkovych, the Canadian Parliament member. Ye. Konovalets, D. Andriyevsky, Ye. Onatsky and V. Bohush were present as the members of the PUN. The arrival of M. Luchkovych is connected with the meeting of the “Committee of Three” to strengthen international support for the Ukrainians (Bachyna-Bachynsky, 2021, p. 797).

On September 18, 1931, the meeting of the “Committee of Three” was held under the chairmanship of the English representative Robert Cecil. The situation that arose due to the murder of T. Gołowko led to the postponement of consideration of the Ukrainian issue at the January session of the League of Nations (Havryshko, 2014, p. 197).

In the letter dated September 28 in Chicago to the editors of the newspaper “Ukraine”, Ye. Onatsky evaluated the postponement of this issue positively. In his opinion, this

made it possible to continue introducing the Ukrainian national issue in Poland to “wider circles of people and politicians”. Although he did not consider this issue to be promising (Onatsky, 1981, pp. 208–209).

Objectively, during the January session of the League of Nations, the informational activity of the PUN decreased greatly. It was understood that after the murder of T. Gołowko and a series of articles about the cooperation of the Ukrainian nationalists with Germany, it is difficult to find convincing arguments in the issue of pacification. In particular, the lack of convincing information material is mentioned in the letter of Ye. Konovalets to R. Yary and D. Andriyevsky dated January 13, 1932. He writes that M. Shypshanks, who in 1930 did a lot to actualize the issue of pacification, sent several letters in which she noted the lack of information for anti-Polish agitation in England. She criticized the Information Bulletin of the OUN because of the two anti-Bolshevik articles. M. Shypshanks believed that criticizing the Bolsheviks could alienate supporters of the Ukrainian issues. Ye. Konovalets noted that in his reply to M. Shypshanks he explained that the Bolsheviks also carried out anti-Ukrainian terror and therefore it is necessary to draw international attention to them. Instead, anti-Polish materials were planned to be published in another issue (Cherchenko, 2007, p. 288).

On January 19, D. Andriyevsky was refused the reception by the Japanese ambassador in Brussels, who was supposed to be a speaker at the League of Nations. He had to hand over the memorandum to the ambassador, and a copy was sent to M. Rudnytska, maybe she would be able to meet with him (Cherchenko, 2007, p. 289). In the memorandum there was discussed the importance of creating the Ukrainian state in opposition to Soviet Russia, which would constantly threaten Japan in the Far East. The first stage of the creation of such a state could be the formation of a state in the western Ukrainian lands, which would be under the protectorate of the League of Nations, not Poland (Havryshko, 2014, p. 199).

The Ukrainian issue was discussed at the League of Nations on January 29, 1932. Naotake Sato, the Japanese ambassador to Belgium, reported on this issue. Despite critical remarks towards Poland regarding pacification, the decision was made in its favour. Poland’s actions were justified by the terrorist activities of the Ukrainians in the region, accusing them of trying to use the League of Nations for anti-Polish propaganda (Havryshko, 2014, p. 199).

The PUN understood this decision. In February of 1932, Ye. Onatsky summarized the struggle with Poland in the international arena in the article “On International Issues”. This is a long article, with the penultimate paragraph devoted to the January 29 meeting. The author considers the very fact of this issue in the League of Nations as a victory. After all, many Ukrainians in emigration organized themselves to protect the Ukrainian population against Poland. In general, based on the decision-making procedure, something else should not have been expected. He notes that the English, the Irish, and the Norwegians expressed their sympathy (Onatsky, 1932, pp. 35–40).

Ye. Konovalets considered the decision and the discussion that unfolded after the Japanese ambassador’s report as the Ukrainian moral victory, and the Ukrainian deputies left with the decision to continue the fight with Poland in the League of Nations (Cherchenko, 2007, p. 293).

The Ukrainian issue continued to be discussed in the League of Nations. This discussion is connected with R. Sushko, who sent a petition about torture in the Polish prison back in November of 1931. On December 12, the Committee of the Three of the League of Nations considered the case of R. Sushko about the abuse of political prisoners by the Polish authorities and condemned these actions of the Poles, expressing the hope that the guilty would be punished

and that the abuse would not happen in the future (Onatsky, 1981, p. 611). These remarks were delivered to the Polish diplomats on December 21, 1931 (Sushko, 1933, p. 60).

On January 29, 1933, Ye. Onatsky reported at the end of the letter that A. Hitler had come to power in Germany (Onatsky, 1985, p. 35). On February 7, Ye. Onatsky gave an answer to the question of what to expect from A. Hitler's coming to power? First, you should not expect miracles. Secondly, he will deal with the reconstruction of the country, therefore, for a certain time, foreign policy issues will take a back seat, and accordingly, the Ukrainian issue will be non-vital (Onatsky, 1985, p. 53).

The meeting of M. Rudnytska and Ye. Onatsky in Rome with the director of the Eastern Europe Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Italy P. Quaroni was important for the future foreign policy emphasis of the OUN regarding the revival of the Ukrainian statehood. M. Rudnytska reported that the liberation of the Ukrainian lands under Poland was possible only after the liberation of the Ukrainian lands from Bolshevik occupation. The Ukrainian diplomacy would focus on this in the future. Because in Poland they believe that the Ukrainian movement in their country was a tool in the hands of the Bolsheviks against Europe. P. Quaroni replied that indeed, as long as the Ukrainians acted as enemies of Bolshevism, the Ukrainian issue would find support, but when the issue concerned Poland, there would be difficulties. At the end of the meeting, P. Quaroni recommended carrying out multifaceted Ukrainian propaganda, 70% of which should relate to Ukraine occupied by the Bolsheviks, and 30% to Poland. In addition, he expressed his opinion about three scenarios when the Ukrainian issue would become relevant for the world: 1. The war between Europe and the USSR; 2. Uprising in the USSR, because the situation there was catastrophic; 3. The revolution in Poland, which may take place after the death of J. Piłsudski (Onatsky, 1985, pp. 55–58).

During several weeks in Rome, M. Rudnytska with the assistance of Ye. Onatsky and his wife, held many important meetings with government officials, intelligentsia and even met with B. Mussolini. During M. Rudnytska's stay in Rome, Ye. Onatsky wrote several letters to Ye. Konovalets, informing about meetings and trips. In particular, he wrote about M. Rudnytska's meeting with B. Mussolini on February 17. Summing up her visit to Italy Ye. Onatsky wrote: "... she is an unusually valuable person for our cause, whom it would be a great pity to lose. A smart and comfortable woman in politics, and especially in diplomacy, is absolutely necessary" (Onatsky, 1985, pp. 60–79).

On March 2, Ye. Konovalets thanked M. Rudnytska for her help in a letter to Ye. Onatsky. However, he warned not to succumb to the illusion that this trip would bring any benefit in the near future. Ye. Konovalets reminded of the fact that M. Rudnytska was not a member of the OUN, belonged to the environment of political competitors, her worldview was far from theirs, she was a liberal and a democrat, and even a pacifist. Instead, her international activity is useful for the Ukrainian issue. Further he informed that the coming to power of A. Hitler activated some Ukrainian circles in Berlin, who "in the hope of big money from the Hitlerites" began to spread intrigues against the OUN (Onatsky, 1985, pp. 94–99).

On March 30, Ye. Onatsky informed Ye. Konovalets about the meeting with the German ambassador in Italy, where he raised the Ukrainian issue, which would be worth raising during the meeting of the leaders of Italy and Germany. R. Yary asked him to visit the Italian embassy in Germany (Onatsky, 1985, pp. 137–138).

At the end of March of 1933 Ye. Konovalets came to Berlin, and on April 3 he went to Gdansk. In one of these cities, a conference was held with the regional representation led by S. Bandera. Most likely, after this conference, S. Bandera began to perform the duties of

the head of the regional branch of the OUN. On April 6, Ye. Konovalts returned to Berlin, because he had a scheduled meeting with A. Rosenberg on April 8 (Posivnych, 2005, p. 130; Onatsky, 1985, pp. 140–141, 144). It is not known whether the meeting with A. Rosenberg did take place.

On June 3, 1933 invited participants of the OUN conference began to arrive in Berlin. There came to the conference: Ye. Konovalts, M. Kapustiansky, Ye. Onatsky, V. Bohush, V. Kurmanovych, R. Sushko, R. Yary, S. Chuchman, M. Sciborsky, D. Andriyevsky, O. Senyk, D. Demchuk, A. Fedyna, I. Reviuk, V. Martynets, M. Seleshko, I. Habrusevych, Ya. Baranovsky, Ye. Vretsiona, S. Bandera, V. Yaniv, B. Kordiuk, Ya. Stetsko, Oleksandr Sokil and M. Turchmanovych. From the memories of Ye. Vretsiona, the meeting place was the house of D. Levytsky. Commission meetings were held in the Ukrainian Press Bureau, which was located in the same building on the second floor. Volodymyr Stakhiv and Mykola Mytliuk helped solve household matters (Mirchuk, 2007, p. 249; Vretsona, 2021, p. 521).

“Attitude of the OUN towards Germany” was brought up for discussion as a separate issue. According to the conference participant Ye. Vretsiona: “Ye. Konovalts spoke against “imposing ties with the Nazis, motivating his position by a negative attitude of the National Socialist Party towards all the peoples of Eastern Europe – towards the Slavs in general, and towards the Ukrainians in particular. Hitler is not looking for allies in Eastern Europe, but a living space for his nation” (Vretsona, 2021, p. 524).

In general, as a result of the conference on international issues, a resolution was adopted, and the participants agreed that the current system of international relations in Europe was unfair, and therefore should be changed. As a result of the changes, Ukrainian state-building competitions would resume. A revived independent and united Ukrainian state will ensure balance in Europe. Ukrainian nationalists fight for the revision of international treaties. Accordingly, it is necessary to get closer to the forces of other peoples who fight for the revision of international treaties (Onatsky, 1985, pp. 249–251).

Also, after the conference, talks began about a plan to extend activities to the Ukrainian lands occupied by the Bolsheviks. At that time Ye. Liakhovych joined the OUN, whose main task was to develop the representation of nationalists in London (Onatsky, 1985, p. 265).

It is known that Italy, Germany, France and Great Britain signed the “Pact of Four” in Rome on July 15. This pact was supposed to strengthen the position of these states in the League of Nations in relation to smaller states. Ye. Konovalts did not ignore the appearance of this document: “No pacts and combinations of world politics will actualize our problem until we ourselves on the Ukrainian lands create such a situation that would force the world to treat it seriously. Therefore, I emphasize once again that the centre and specific weight of actualization does not lie in global combinations, but primarily in whether and what force we will imagine. That is an axiom from which we must proceed in our planning and in our activities in general” (Cherchenko, 2007, p. 373).

On September 23, 1933, the IXth Congress of National Minorities began its work in Bern. The Ukrainian delegation from Poland was represented by deputies of the Seimas Z. Pelensky and M. Rudnytska, and Volodymyr Zalozetsky and Yurii Serbeniuk from Romania. The Ukrainian delegation brought up the issue of famine in the USSR. Famine became the subject of consideration at the Congress. M. Rudnytska made a thorough report, emphasizing that this tragedy was of a national political nature, i.e. it was about the extermination of the Ukrainian nation. As a result of the work, the Congress adopted the resolution “On Famine Disaster in the UkrSSR”, calling on the world community to provide humanitarian aid (Solar, 2011, pp. 293–294).

Ye. Konovalets, R. Yary and Ye. Liakhovych represented the OUN at the Congress. M. Rudnytska needed support from Ukrainian nationalists in spreading information about the Holodomor in Ukraine and organizing aid. It was also up to M. Rudnytska to ensure that the appeal to the League of Nations was signed by representatives of the “European Association of Ukrainian Organizations Abroad”, which was headed by D. Andriyevsky. In this way, the Ukrainian emigration had to demonstrate unity in informing the world about the Holodomor in the UkrSSR and calling for help (Onatsky, 1985, p. 389).

In mid-December of 1933 Ye. Konovalets visited Paris, where he had a meeting with Ye. Liakhovych, the representative of the OUN in London. Ye. Liakhovych planned to meet with the Japanese ambassador to France, Nabumi Ito. However, I did not find him in Paris, because he moved to a new place of work in Warsaw. N. Ito was sent, through the Japanese embassy in Paris, to Warsaw the materials of the OUN. Then Ye. Liakhovych arranged the meeting in Warsaw for the first half of January of 1934. In turn, Ye. Konovalets ordered Ye. Liakhovych, M. Sciborsky and M. Kapustiansky to prepare a memorial for Japan. e. Onatsky asked to share ideas about the content of the memorial (Cherchenko, 2007, p. 397; Onatsky, 1985, p. 473).

The OUN planned to start diplomatic relations with Hungary. V. Vyshyvany, with whom contacts were restored in the middle of 1933, advised to pay attention to this country (Onatsky, 1985, p. 375). At the meeting of Ye. Konovalets and V. Vyshyvany in Paris, the issue of establishing cooperation with Hungary was discussed in more detail. Ye. Konovalets recommended that Ye. Onatsky and V. Kurmanovych would deal with it as the OUN representatives. In turn, V. Vyshyvany was supposed to facilitate a meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Onatsky, 1985, p. 483). However, diplomatic relations were not developed with Hungary.

At the end of January of 1934, Ye. Konovalets was upset when the “Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and Poland” was signed in Berlin, on January 26. This Pact delayed the actualization of the unjust borders issue. Although it is known that in his attitude to Germany, as of 1934, he was very cautious, without admiration for this state (Onatsky, 1989, p. 30).

An interesting trend noted by Ye. Konovalets in a letter to Ye. Onatsky dated March 24 was the desire of the Don and Kuban emigration forces to cooperate with the OUN. However, he believed that cooperation with them was not at the right time, because the OUN did not have any vision regarding the Don and the Kuban (Onatsky, 1989, p. 69). Three weeks later, D. Andriyevsky was given the task of starting a study of the issue of the peoples east of Ukraine and their desire to liberate themselves from the Bolshevik occupation. The idea of holding a conference of peoples occupied by the Bolsheviks was also raised (Cherchenko, 2007, p. 423).

Ye. Liakhovych took an active role in establishing the OUN in London, and began contacting the English politicians and journalists. However, he needed from Ye. Konovalets, an understanding of the foundations of the OUN’s international policy, especially the attitude towards Germany, and clear instructions: “In this issue, I would ask for precise instructions ... that you express your thoughts about my notes from time to time, because sometimes, having in mind the good of the whole organization and the whole nation, I get lost, and I have doubts about the expediency of my steps” (Onatsky, 1989, p. 30).

Ye. Konovalets, responding to a request to clarify the foundations of the OUN’s international policy, stated that there was none. There were several attempts to write it, but international processes were so dynamic that it was not possible to do so. Since 1929 there had been attempts to make different combinations. Current international politics was based on

a common sense, instinct and intuition. Therefore, among the potential allies were Germany, Italy, England and Japan. At the same time, the main focus was on Germany and Italy. As for England, the international policy boiled down to the fact that, in the case of assistance by Germany and Italy in the revival of Ukrainian statehood, England did not stand in the way. Help should not be expected from France. Therefore, politics boiled down to ensuring that France was not an enemy at the decisive moment. Accordingly, at present, the mission of Ye. Liakhovych was reduced to promoting the Ukrainian issue. Regarding Germany, Ye. Konovalets recommended the following position: "... we conduct propaganda for our cause in all states that are interested in the existence of a strong Ukrainian State, and in particular in those states that, in the future settlement of relations in Eastern Europe, will undoubtedly have a decisive influence and voice" (Onatsky, 1989, pp. 108–112).

On June 15, 1934, the regional leadership of the OUN carried out the assassination of the Minister for Internal Affairs of Poland, B. Pieratski, in Warsaw. After that, the international activity of the OUN found itself in a very difficult situation. In fact, it was almost invisible for three years. The Polish security forces managed to paralyze the OUN cells in Prague, Berlin and Gdańsk temporarily. Lithuania limited its support, and some members of the OUN left the country. In Prague, the OUN stopped publishing the main magazine "Building the Nation", and in Kaunas – the newspaper "Surma". Under the influence of a number of Soviet provocations and Polish articles, Ye. Konovalets was forbidden to live in Geneva, and in the middle of 1936 he was forced to leave Switzerland. At the end of 1936, he moved to Rome.

Ye. Konovalets reacted particularly negatively to Germany's actions. After all, it extradicted M. Lebed, the organizer of the murder of B. Pieratski, in Germany there was arrested the PUN member R. Yary and the others. This time, he described his attitude in a letter to O. Senyk on September 10, 1934: "Our rank-and-file membership at the ZUZ was unusually fascinated by the coming of Hitlerism to power and placed great hopes on it... . I several times, knowing the relationship, drew the attention of the Regional Executive to try to paralyze this calf-like enthusiasm for Hitlerism..." (Onatsky, 1985, p. 291).

The restoration of international activity took place in 1937. Ye. Konovalets, being in Geneva on June 18, 1937, in communication with the leader of the Ukrainian community in Switzerland Ye. Bachyna-Bachynsky, analysed the situation optimistically, made a forecast about the inevitability of war in 2–3 years and, if A. Hitler "does not go crazy with his imperialism of Great Germany", then Ukraine will have autonomy and its own army (Bachyna-Bachynsky, 2021, 827).

Contacts with Japan were also intensified at the time. In August of 1937, Ye. Konovalets, M. Kapustiansky and V. Kurmanovych met with Japanese diplomats in Vienna. They discussed the coordination of actions in the event of a war with the USSR. At approximately the same time, R. Sushko and R. Yary had the conversation with representatives of the Japanese military headquarters in Munich. They discussed the creation of an alliance of the Ukrainian national forces with the Don Cossacks, Turkestan and the peoples of the Caucasus against the USSR. In this alliance, the Ukrainian revolutionary army was supposed to be created in the Far East for the war with the USSR. However, after several months of negotiations, Ye. Konovalets did not sign any cooperation agreement with Japan. He understood that Japan balanced between attacking the USSR or the USA (Kapustiansky, 1987, p. 106). It was known that the attack would be carried out on the USA.

Characteristically, in its international activities, the OUN made almost no attempts to establish contacts with the US diplomatic circles. This was probably due to the fact that

the USA distanced itself from the events in Europe and clearly became closer to the USSR. Therefore, the PUN did not consider them as a party that could really help the Ukrainian liberation movement.

**The Conclusions.** Therefore, the international activity of Ye. Konovalets and the OUN can be divided into two periods. The first one is 1929 – 1934. During this period, there was an attempt to define conceptual issues of international politics. However, due to the lack of experience in international activities, a sufficient number of specialists and the dynamics of international processes, this was not done. In the process of discussing foreign policy, there was an initiative to unify with other stateless peoples of the former Russian Empire. Due to the lack of specialists and weakness of other national movements, this was not implemented. Instead, in 1930 – 1933, they launched international activities within the framework of the League of Nations successfully. Several times the Ukrainian issue became the subject of consideration in this global international institution. It mainly concerned the life of the Ukrainians in Galicia under the Polish occupation. Trying to convey the truth about the life of the Ukrainians in Poland, it was possible to establish diplomatic relations with Italy, Japan and England, which were engaged in the Ukrainian issue. Diplomatic relations were especially close with Italy, which was considered a kind of lawyer, both in the League of Nations and Germany. At the same time, Ye. Konovalets had no hope for Germany led by A. Hitler in support of the revival of the Ukrainian state. Instead, Germany and Japan were considered the strongest of those capable of breaking the borders formed after World War I. The OUN planned to use the situation in its favour. The second stage of international activity under Ye. Konovalets began in 1937. A kind of pause in international activity, lasting almost for three years, was connected with the murder of the Minister for Internal Affairs B. Pieratski by a member of the OUN in Warsaw. After that, Poland succeeded in getting the activities of the OUN branches in Czechoslovakia, Germany and Lithuania to be limited for a certain time. However, when it became clear that Germany's ambitions in the redistribution of Europe could not be put to rest, Ye. Konovalets and the PUN resumed international activities, especially with Japan. There was hope that this state would start a war with the USSR. Although joint actions with Japan were not agreed upon. In the end, we should state that Ye. Konovalets and the OUN in general in their international combinations did not develop relations with the USA.

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