
Abstract. The purpose of the article is to find out the mechanisms and means of “disarmament” of the Ukrainian countryside in the 1920s and early 1930s in the context of overcoming resistance to the policy of the Soviet authorities in the countryside. In a broader sense – to give an answer to the key question: why did the peasantry, having a colossal numerical advantage, lose the competition for the future, was forcibly taken under control and brutally pacified? The methodological basis of the research was concrete historical, comparative historical and analytical methods. The Scientific Novelty. The article formulates the authors’ definition and reveals the essential features of “disarmament” of peasantry in Soviet Ukraine during the period of the 1920s – 1930s. The Conclusions. The “disarmament” of the Ukrainian countryside in the 1920s and at the beginning of the 1930s was a complex of hybrid measures that was organized by the Soviet authorities in 1919 with the aim of subjugating the peasantry and depriving them of the means to wage an
insurrectionary struggle and further resist the policies of the Bolsheviks. “Disarmament” is not reduced only
to the process of “pumping out” weapons from the village, which accumulated there under the conditions of
the end of the Great War, the revolutionary events of 1917 – 1921, as well as the peasant resistance
to the policy of the Bolsheviks in the 1920s – at the beginning of the 1930s. The authors substantiate the
“disarmament” of the village in a broader context – as a system of hybrid combined government measures
aimed both at the “disarming” of weapons (in the military sense) and at the destruction of traditional
peasant institutions (disarmament as the deprivation of all means, including moral and willpower, for
waging the struggle (“debilitating”), which offered an alternative under the conditions of the creation of the
Soviet image of a “new society”, a “new peasant”. A gradual elimination of institutions in the countryside
that were an alternative to the Soviet ones created the prerequisites for the subjugation of the Ukrainian
countryside during the period of the “Great Turning Point” of 1929 – 1933.

Key words: disarmament, unarming, debilitating, The “Great Turning Point” of 1929 – 1933, Soviet Ukraine, peasantry, collectivization, resistance.
After Russia’s full-scale invasion to Ukraine, the number of firearms not only increased, but new ways and means of obtaining them were discovered. Thus, the problem of illicit arms trafficking has become one of the current and projected threats to the national security and national interests of Ukraine.

From a scientific point of view, the relevance of the topic we propose lies in the lack of works by Ukrainian and foreign historians that would have made the “disarmament” of the Ukrainian village on the eve of the “Great Turning Point” the subject of special study.

The Review of Recent Researches and Publications. Modern historical scholarship is represented by a significant number of works that cover the social attitudes, behavior, and resistance of the Ukrainian peasantry to the Bolshevik regime in the 1920s and 1930s.

The relations between the Soviet government and the Ukrainian peasantry in the 1920s and at the beginning of the 1930s are summarized in a number of works by N. Bem (Bem, 2003), V. Vasylyiev (Vasylyiev, 2005), O. Hanzha (Hanzha, 2000a, 2000b), H. Kapustian (Kapustian, 2003, 2005), S. Kornovenko (Kalinkina, Kornovenko, etc., 2017), S. Kulchytskyi (Kulchytskyi, 2013), R. Podkur (Podkur, 2005), N. Romanets (Romanets, 2014), and others (L. Hrynevych, V. Kalinichenko, V. Lazurenko, V. Marochko, B. Patryliak).

Scholars have focused on the repressive mechanisms of socialist restructuring of the agricultural sector, the role of coercion in the implementation of a “continuous collectivization” repressive measures during the grain procurement campaigns of 1930–1933, and the extent and forms of resistance of the Ukrainian peasantry, which took on the character of an internal war against the Soviet regime.

The topic of state pressure on the Ukrainian countryside on the eve of the “Great Turning Point” is not entirely new to foreign scholarship. Since the 1990s, its historiographical reflection has expanded thematically and conceptually. We are talking about the thorough works by O. Arkhipova, Alexis Berelovich, Andrea Graziosi, V. Danilov, M. Ivnitsky, Robert Conquest, Hiroaki Kuromiya, Robert Manning, Viola Lynn, Norman Naimark, S. Neklyudov, Villiam Noll, James Scott, N. Tarkhova, Sheila Fitzpatrick, and the others. Among the latest conceptual approaches proposed by foreign scholars to the relationship between the peasantry and the government, the works of J. Scott, in particular, the monograph “The Art of Not Being Governed”, in which the author showed a complex system of limited relations between the peasantry and the state, which was built on the initiative of the former to avoid influence and interference in their lives by the latter.

The purpose of the article is to find out the mechanisms and means of “disarmament” of the Ukrainian village in the 1920s and at the beginning of the 1930s in the context of overcoming resistance to the Soviet policies in the countryside. In a broader sense, to answer the key question: why did the peasantry, having a colossal numerical advantage, lose the struggle for the future, was forcibly taken under control and brutally pacified?

The Results of the Research. On the eve of the 1917 revolution, when 83% of the Russian Empire’s population lived in rural areas, the peasantry had accumulated enormous energy that had remained imprisoned for many years within the traditional culture and pyramidal demographic structure of the empire, because since the 1880s, the state, in order to guarantee political stability, had taken measures to isolate or segregate the peasantry from both civil society and the political core. Such efforts had the unexpected effect of increasing the autonomy of the village and the peasantry’s sense of “difference”.

Moving on to consider armed resistance among other forms of peasant resistance, let us first try to explain what resistance itself is. L. Viola notes that this is a complex question that
cannot be answered simply, as we try to fit the term into a larger number of questions and often messy definitions. In fact, resistance includes the notion of opposition – active, passive, skillfully disguised, attributed or even assumed (Viola, 2005, p. 104).

The active forms of peasant resistance to the Soviet government’s policies include: 1) agitation (anti-Soviet, anti-collective farm, against the delivery of bread); 2) riots; 3) murders and attempted murders of activists; 4) peasants leaving the ‘Society for Joint Land Processing’ and collective farms, accompanied by the dismantling of communal property; 5) establishing ties with local military units and police in order to obtain weapons, agitating the latter to their side; 6) peasants fleeing their homes (mainly to the mines of Donbas, construction sites of the first five-year plans, or illegal border crossings); 7) self-seizure and unauthorized cultivation of collective farm land by peasants; 8) massive theft of collective property; 9) attacks by peasants on food warehouses; 10) arson; 11) picketing of district police stations to release arrested fellow villagers; 12) beatings of activists; 13) uprisings; 14) demonstrative church services and memorial services for the Soviet regime; 15) spoilage of livestock feed; 16) dispersal of commissions, party cells, committees, village councils; 17) peasant Luddism.

Passive forms of resistance include: 1) anti-Soviet (and anti-collective farm) folklore; 2) refusals to sell bread at low state prices; 3) refusals of peasants to fulfill sowing plans; 4) refusals to create seed funds; 5) imitation of work on collective farms, poor quality work; 5) letters of complaint to the “good” higher party leadership; 6) failure to go to work in collective farms; 7) hiding grain; 8) secret sale, starvation or slaughter of their own livestock by peasants to prevent collectivization. Although the manifestation of passive resistance is subject to multiple interpretations and explanations, its objective reality cannot be questioned given the context and results of peasants’ behavior in collective farms. Motivated by a number of not always clearly defined reasons, they used various forms of passive resistance. S. Fitzpatrick (Fitzpatrick, 1994) described in detail the strategies of peasants in the 1930s, when they faced work, life, and survival in the new system of collective farms.

Many of the actions of the peasantry are difficult to qualify as resistance, although they clearly demonstrate elements of unusual or antisocial behaviour. Is there a place in the spectrum of resistance for crime, the black market, bribery and banditry, or for alternative subcultures and features inherent in religious sects, the world of traditional healing, etc.? Can we define critical expressions in personal diaries or words spoken at the dinner table as resistance? Is the very existence of an alternative social space a typical act of resistance in the context of Stalinism?

In view of the above, we can conclude that tradition itself became a resource of legitimization and mobilization for peasants in search of justification for their interpretations of and responses to state policy. The peasants used the usual arsenal: spreading rumors, running away, hiding grain, and a number of other active and passive forms of resistance, the choice of which was determined by their effectiveness and the reaction of the authorities. At the same time, the forms of peasant resistance were characterized by pragmatism, flexibility, and adaptability, which were vital resources in the struggle against powerful and repressive authorities.

Analyzing the means of peasant self-defense, V. Vasyliev noted that the peasantry organically combined both active (peasant Luddism) and passive (self-dispossession, flight from their native places) forms of resistance, which manifested themselves in the form of “social mimicry”. The belief of most peasants that the “good” ruler and his entourage were unaware of the barbaric actions of local leaders was clearly manifested in tens of thousands
of peasant letters to the central authorities. A peculiar form of peasant resistance was leaflets and anonymous letters, which contained not only threats of physical violence against local communists and activists, but also calls for disobedience and peasant uprising against the authorities (Vasyliev, 2005, p. 143).

It should be emphasized that, despite the availability of significant stocks of weapons, peasants resorted to violence only as a last resort, when despair and thirst for revenge reached a level that could push them into open conflict.

The above-mentioned extensive network of active and passive forms of resistance naturally encountered equally diverse forms of counteraction from the authorities, which were manifested in arrests, interrogations, show trials, expulsions and exiles, intimidation of peasants with weapons, raids and raids, party propaganda, family hostage-taking, etc. However, the Holodomor of 1932 – 1933 in Ukraine was the final means of “pacifying” and “exhaustion” the countryside by the authorities, which would not have been possible without the prior “disarmament” of the village.

The “disarmament of the countryside” was a set of hybrid measures launched by the Soviet authorities in 1919 to subjugate the peasantry and deprive it of the means to wage insurgency and further resistance to Bolshevik policies.

The organized “deprivation of weapons” in the countryside began after the 1919 decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR “On the Surrender of Weapons by the Population of Ukraine” was issued. Weapons were confiscated in the form of campaigns, either two-week or one-month campaigns. The decree declared all weapons, firearms and cold steel, on the territory of Ukraine to be the property of the state. People were asked to immediately register their weapons and hand them over at the first request of local revolutionary committees. As for persons who used hired labour, Article 9 of the decree stated that they certainly had no right to keep weapons and were obliged to immediately hand them over to the revolutionary committees under penalty of death. In addition, the decree prohibited the purchase and sale of weapons on the territory of Ukraine (Kucher, 1971, p. 104).

According to the decree “On the Surrender of Weapons...”, special troops were created to “deprivation weapons”, which included representatives of the district party committee, revolutionary committee, and later the district military committee and police. On behalf of the troikas, orders were printed out, which included prices for voluntary surrender: for example, “Russian carabine – 800 rubles, foreign one – 500 rubles”. Those who would indicate who had the weapons were guaranteed non-disclosure and a reward: 1,200 rubles for a machine gun (600 rubles for a faulty one), 600 rubles for a rifle (Balabanova, 2007, p. 189).

Guided by the resolution of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, on August 21, 1919, the VUNK published an appeal to the population on the resolution of M. Latsys, which stated that those guilty of keeping firearms without permission would be subject to the highest form of punishment – execution. Those who hid bandits and assisted them were also punished in the same way (Chuvakov, 2007, p. 107).

The number of weapons confiscated from the population in 1921 is evidenced by the data provided in the report of the Deputy Commander of the troops of Ukraine and the Crimea K. Avksentievsky at the 6th All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets (December 14-17, 1921): rifles – 4412, revolvers – 2719, checkers – 1307, machine guns – 664, cannons – 5, ammunition – about 1.5 million (Kucher, 1971, p. 103).

In a regional projection, the scale of the “disarmament of the village” can be illustrated by the example of Kryvyi Rih district. Thus, in June of 1921, 59 rifles, 20 sawed-off shotguns
(“kutsaks”), and 4 nagans were confiscated from peasants in Novokryvyi Rih only. During the “weapons deprivation” in Kryvyi Rih district from May 5 to June 5, 1922, 280 rifles, 218 sawed-off shotguns, 13 revolvers, 13 grenades, 14 shells, 10 hunting rifles, 23 sabers, and 6 bayonets were confiscated from the population. During March 1923, 1451 rifles, 1127 sawed-off shotguns, 607 revolvers, 207 grenades, and 30,600 rounds of ammunition were confiscated in the Kryvyi Rih district (Balabanova, 2007, p. 189; CSAPO of Ukraine, f. 1, d. 2, c. 238, p. 108; c. 644, p. 29; c. 1690, p. 96; SADO, f. P-3225, d. 1, c. 53, p. 178; f. 3650, d. 1, c. 431, p. 81).

In 1922, according to a report by the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, thousands of rifles, hundreds of revolvers, tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition, several cannons, and many machine guns were seized in rural areas. For example, in Podilsk province, 17,000 pieces of various weapons, including 11,000 rifles (Kucher, 1971, p. 104), were seized from the population. According to official data, in Podillia, the 1922 “arms deprivation” campaign was “conducted firmly”, which resulted in the confiscation of 90% of the population’s weapons. As of November 20, 1922, about 5,000 rifles had been “deprived the peasants, most of them voluntarily” (Oliinyk, 2015, p. 117). On January 9, 1923, summarizing the practice of using the institute of defendants and in order to support families whose sons served in the Red Army, the regional executive committee ordered to exclude persons from such families from the list of defendants. According to M. Oliinyk, the accumulated experience, the actual immunity of the members of the operational teams, and a certain liberalization of the attitude towards the defendants allowed “almost without pressure” to “deprived up to 2000 rifles, sawed-off shotguns, and other weapons from the village” in March-April of 1923 (Oliinyk, 2015, p. 117).

When analyzing the statistical data, one should note the frequent and sometimes significant discrepancies between the data on the volume of seized weapons in Ukraine as a whole and the results of “weapons deprivation” operations conducted by local authorities during the same period.

Thus, between February and April of 1923, 6956 rifles, 1339 revolvers, 571 sabers, and 14 machine guns were confiscated in Ukraine (CSASBPG of Ukraine, f. 3204, d. 2, c. 9, pp. 6–17). At the same time, as a result of law enforcement operations in January-February of 1923, 1415 rifles, 1125 sawed-off shotguns, 607 revolvers, 30635 rounds of ammunition, and 207 pieces of explosives were seized from the population of Kryvyi Rih district of Yekaterinoslav province alone (CSAPO of Ukraine, f. 1, d. 20, c. 1690, p. 96). During one month, in 1923, 8 machine guns, 3764 rifles, 1139 sawed-off shotguns, 958 revolvers, etc. were seized in the Katerinoslav province (Pakhomov, 2021, p. 26; SADO, f. P-3373, d. 1, c. 2).

In 1922 – 1927, the peasantry outplayed the Soviet government. It had a better grasp of market mechanisms and maneuvered with ingenuity and patience between the mines constantly laid by the government in the form of changes to the tax code, “price scissors”, creeping inflation, and finally the so-called self-taxation. The peasantry won elections to local authorities, despite all the constitutional restrictions, disenfranchisement, and crookedness of district officials (Smoli, 2013, p. 282). The experience of the first years of the new economic policy showed the country’s top leadership that the countryside was not capable of being satisfied with individual concessions, that harmony in the relations between the Communist Party authorities and the countryside was possible only if the peasant program was adopted, and that for this to happen the government had to be truly reborn – in its ideology, economic policy, and foreign policy. Obviously, this was a sacrifice too great, simply impossible for the ruling party.
Campaigns to confiscate weapons continued until the beginning of the “Great Turning Point” in the countryside. According to the administrative department of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, during the period of 1927 – 1928, 13486 firearms, 2087 cold steel weapons, and 35438 pieces of various ammunition were confiscated from the population of Ukraine. During the following years, 1928 – 1929, the number of seized weapons was 13810 firearms, 1417 bladed weapons and 40767 pieces of various ammunition (Ulianych, 2004, p. 45).

During the “disarmament of the village”, the Bolsheviks did not disdain terrorist methods, executions, and family hostage-taking.

In his memoirs, M. Doroshenko described an incident that occurred in the Znamianka district in 1920: “A group of selected thugs from the special unit went from one wealthy or even semi-wealthy household to another, carried a box they called a ‘device’ for finding weapons, and at night they stuck the weapons in the owner’s roof somewhere, and when they found them, they severely punished the poor owner, frightening others” (Doroshenko, 1973, p. 122).

On May 15, 1923, the secretary of the Podillia regional committee, Denys, reported to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine that by January 1, 1923, “the Opposition managed to siphon off up to 20,000 rifles and breechblocks... However, they discredited themselves in the eyes of the peasants, acting with terrorist methods and inevitably getting involved in the maelstrom of official crimes” (Oliinyk, 2015, p. 117).

In Zaporizhzhia province, in October of 1921, extraordinary troops took 307 local people in order to seize weapons from the population. Of these, 103 were shot for not handing over their weapons. After that, in its report, Zaporizhzhia Provincial Military Council noted that the work of the emergency troops made a huge political and moral impression on the population (CSAPO of Ukraine, f. 1, d. 20, c. 616, p. 119).

Such isolated incidents, the incompleteness of the process of “disarmament of the village”, and the need to seek a compromise with the peasants in order to avoid a new round of insurgency forced the provincial committees to decide in 1922 – 1923 to liquidate the three arms deprivation teams in the countryside.

Obviously, the process of “deprivation of weapons” from the countryside was uneven. According to the criminal investigation authorities of Kyiv district, even in 1927 in the village of Voronkiv, Rohoziv district, Kyiv region, the local population “had a large number of weapons” and “considered themselves Cossacks” (SAKO, f.Р-112, d. 1, c. 8495, p. 36).

In the context of the “disarmament of the village”, such a passive form of resistance as rumors about the war deserves special attention, as they reflected the political and moral atmosphere that existed in Ukraine in the 1920s. The spread of rumors was closely linked to the general assessment of the authorities, or rather, the spread of rumors was a kind of manifestation of the alienation of the masses from the authorities. It is interesting that the war was discussed as a fait accompli: “we read it in the newspaper”, “a friend told it”, “relatives wrote about it in a letter”. “Rumors are spreading in the village that the war is already underway and that Pilsudski is already attacking Ukraine” / “There is talk that we will live only until 1927. And in 1927 there will be a big war, such that few people will be left alive. Stop getting rich. We need to go out... ” / “They say that the bourgeois countries have already divided up which part of the Soviet Union will go to whom, and that we will be attacked from all sides” / “We have been heard rumors for a long time that Poland is already near Kyiv. England is also on the move”. Different conclusions were drawn from the information about a possible war. For many, it caused despair and apathy: “Dark people are even avoiding
farming, saying that if you do it for someone else, it’s better not to make money”. There was also a willingness to take up arms again, as in the past: “Peasants say: ‘The lord is dead or alive, but we will take up arms. Poland will not get Ukraine cheaply” (Smolii, 2013, pp. 261–263). Such sentiments and rumors can be considered evidence that the peasantry had significant resources for armed struggle.

In the second half of the 1920s, the Bolsheviks, having “deprived” a significant number of military weapons from the peasants, focused on confiscating hunting weapons. In the summer of 1927, the secretary of Krynchy regional brunch of the communist party reported to the Central Committee of the communist party of Ukraine that the “Union of Hunters” had appeared in the area, which had its own branches in the villages, sold weapons and taught how to use them, and conducted training shootings. The secretary believed that rebel peasant groups were being formed under the guise of hunters and under the cover of the Union (SADO, f. 7, d. 1, c. 857, p. 69).

In connection with the wave of anti-Bolshevik peasant uprisings of 1929–1930, the head of the Joint state political administration of the Ukrainian SSR, V. Balytskyi, noted that only in some cases were villagers armed with hunting rifles and sawhorses. “This suggests”, he wrote, “that the timely work on deprivation of weapons in the countryside was successful and the Ukrainian village, previously filled with weapons, is now completely disarmed” (Podkur, 2005, pp. 97–98; CSAPO of Ukraine, f. 1, d. 20, c. 3184, p. 65).

In our opinion, “disarmament” is not limited to the process of “deprivation” weapons from the countryside that had accumulated there after the end of World War I, the revolutionary events of 1917–1921, “disarmament” of the countryside is understood in a broader context – it is a system of hybrid combined governmental measures aimed at both unarming and the destruction of traditional peasant institutions (debilitating as deprivation of all means, including moral and volitional ones), which offered an alternative in the context of the creation of the Soviet image of a “new society” and a “new peasant”. Thus, by destroying the economic foundations of market relations and establishing a dictatorship in the field of agricultural pricing, the authorities put the peasantry in opposition to the existing regime. A gradual elimination of institutions in the countryside that were an alternative to the Soviet ones created the preconditions for the subjugation of the Ukrainian countryside during the “Great Turning Point” of 1929–1933.

The Bolsheviks’ instruments of “debilitating” of the Ukrainian countryside in a broad sense on the eve of and in the context of the “Great Turning Point” were mass arrests and executions; blockade of districts and villages affected by peasant uprisings (“volynky”); expulsion of peasants to other regions of the USSR; unblocking of village councils and other important buildings surrounded by rebels or protesters; demonstration trials of peasants (in some cases – demonstrative executions); intimidation with weapons; sending agents and provocateurs to villages or insurgent centres; campaigns to seize weapons in the countryside; control of suspicious people and movement of the population; disarmament/bleeding/liquidation of insurgent groups; registration of civilians; organization of ambushes; party propaganda, fight against anti-Soviet, gossip, “defeatism”; patrolling or combing the area; increased protection of state borders, prevention of crossing the border by peasants; postal censorship; interrogations; sudden, mostly nighttime, raids in villages; raids by punitive units; dispersal of mass peasant rallies, gatherings, etc.; compilation of lists of insurgents with their relatives and addresses; family hostage-taking.

Thus, the complex and hybrid nature of the process of “disarmament” of the Ukrainian countryside on the eve of the “Great Turning Point” is a combined approach – the confiscation
of cold steel and firearms while suppressing the will of the peasants to resist. The latter was achieved by attacking various peasant institutions: the yard, assembly, community, church, market, traditional holidays, etc., as all of these ensured self-organization and social autonomy of the peasantry. Disarmament in a broad sense also occurred through the split of peasant society into “Kurkuls” – “enemies of the people” – and “poor people” – conscious supporters of Soviet rule. An equally effective tool of psychological oppression was the creation of an atmosphere of fear in society – fear for one’s own life and the lives of one’s family members; fear caused by the repressive measures of the Soviet authorities against opponents of collectivization; fear of “losing everything” – being among the dispossessed and/or being arrested and sent to Stalinist camps.

The Conclusions. Thus, we should summarize that in the first third of the twentieth century the rural community in Ukraine retained the features of a para-civil peasant society and for some time could resist the Bolsheviks’ economic and socio-cultural transformations in the countryside, in particular the formation of a new type of peasantry – the state and collective farms.

In 1917 – 1933, in the context of a political instability, weakness of local authorities (often complete powerlessness), critical crime situation, militarization of public consciousness, uncertainty of the agrarian issue, low culture of conflict resolution at the local level, actualization of vengeful goals, etc. Traditional peasant institutions remained the only reliable means of self-defense and defending their own interests, a source of self-organization and social autonomy: yard, assembly, community, church, market, holidays, and weapons (which were overflowing in the village as a result of the collapse of the Eastern Front of World War I and the seizure of military depots).

Although the campaigns of unarming and debilitating during the period of 1919 – 1929 did not result in the total disarmament of the peasantry, they largely deprived it of the means to conduct active resistance, including insurgency. On the eve of the “Great Turning Point”, the peasantry became much weaker than in 1920 – 1922, when it was properly armed and threatened the existence of the new Bolshevik state.

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