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DAILY LIFE OF THE POPULATION OF SOVIET TRANSCARPATIA IN THE DOCUMENTS OF THE USA CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (SECOND HALF OF THE 1940s – EARLY 1950s)

Abstract. The purpose of the study is to investigate the peculiarities of the US intelligence’s vision of the processes of sovietization in Transcarpathia and their impact on the daily life of the region’s residents, based on the declassified CIA materials. The research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, scientificity, and objectivity that are fundamental for historians. It was also necessary to apply historical and systemic, historical and comparative methods of historical science, which allowed, first of all, to trace the specifics of the formation of images of the history of Transcarpathia in the assessment of CIA specialists in the context of the initial stage of the “Cold War”. The scientific novelty of the study consists in an effort to carry out a balanced and comprehensive analysis of the vision of
the US intelligence on various aspects of the daily life of Soviet Transcarpathia population (processes of collectivization, a daily life of the population of the region's towns, activities of the authorities, etc.). The authors elucidated the content and a factual validity of these processes, showed their orientation and the main objects and lines of analysis. The set of documents analysed in the article is informative enough to fulfill the research objectives. The Conclusion. Despite the fact that the USSR was a strategic adversary of the USA during the Cold War, the information of the CIA specialists regarding the life of the population of Transcarpathia as a part of it is not one-sided in the framework of a possible “two-colour” analysis (“black and white”). In a number of relevant documents, sympathy for the population of the region is palpable, rather difficult conditions of its economic, political and cultural life in the first post-war years, a strict management style of the state and party leadership of Transcarpathia, a significant role of power structures, etc. have been emphasized. It is also important to recognize the Ukrainianness of the population of Transcarpathia, despite the presence of “mental” and “cultural” barriers among local residents and visitors, including those from the eastern regions of Ukraine.

Key words: everyday life, the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR, Transcarpathian region, the CIA, intelligence, information.
information about the life of population in countries that are adversaries on the international arena. Thus, nowadays we observe the intensification of interest, in particular in the activities of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) of the USA.

The CIA was established on September 18, 1947. It can rightly be called the most famous secret service in the world. It should be noted that even during World War II, the FBI conducted some operations abroad. The Strategic Services Division, headed by General William D. Donovan, was also involved in it. In 1947, as part of the reorganized senior state leadership, the CIA was under the direct authority of the National Security Council, thereby eliminating individual inconsistencies and uncoordinated actions between the previous agencies. But still during the reformation, “in March 1946, the intelligence agencies of the army, navy, and air force received an order, together with the Central Intelligence Group, to give the most qualified intelligence analysis to the Soviet Union in a short period of time” (Yakovlev, 1980, pp. 63, 81). During the Cold War, the USSR became one of the main objects and fields of activity for the CIA. Its experts did not ignore the new territories that became part of the USSR after World War II. First of all, this concerned Transcarpathia, which at the end of the 1930s found itself at the intersection of the great powers’ interests.

However, the “Transcarpathian” issue still occupies a certain place in the ideological confrontation in modern international relations. In particular, an important circumstance is that with the beginning of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, the Ukrainian historians intensified their opposition to the Russian propaganda, which operates with distorted historical narratives and uses biased scientific and pseudoscientific concepts of the Russian historians (Haliv & Sviontyk, 2023, pp. 262–263).

Under the conditions of the war, the special services of the aggressor country, together with the propaganda apparatus of this state, are actively working on the formation and promotion in the mass consciousness of artificially constructed stereotypes dangerous for the Ukrainian statehood about the non-Ukrainian character of Transcarpathia, about the existence of separatist centers on its territory, about the inevitability in the future successful steps taken by Ukraine’s western neighbours to capture part of the Ukrainian territories, etc.

Since the hostilities on the territory of Ukraine do not cease, and the Putin regime is constantly radicalizing the militant rhetoric, representatives of the Ukrainian academic community are forced to respond quickly to the events of the turbulent present, without having the psycho-emotional distance necessary for a deeper analysis, which makes it difficult to develop a proper stereoscopic vision (Telvak & Ilnytskyi, 2023, pp. 250–251). The study of the issue outlined in this article can serve as a suitable kind of research “distancing”, while shedding light in a number of important aspects on the historical roots of the current war.

The fundamental multi-level changes that took place in the historical science of Ukraine during the period of the 1990s – at the beginning of the 21st century are now indisputable. The specified changes concern, first of all, the revival of the Ukrainian scientific historical tradition and the formation of the latest scientific approaches and concepts, the accumulation of a wide array of the latest thorough knowledge of the history of Ukraine, in particular in the field of the study of an everyday life (for example, in the context of agrarian history). At the same time, a comprehensive theory of the history of an everyday life has not yet been created, although many specialists recognize that an everyday life is a special sphere of a human experience, that it has convincingly transformed from something not too serious in the reception of a scholar into an independent scientific field, a new method of scientific research (Kornovenko & Shamrai, 2023, pp. 277–278).
It is not surprising that so far there is no corresponding generally accepted, slender and internally consistent conceptual apparatus. The following concepts are used directly in the field of studying the history of an everyday life in post-war Ukraine: “the Soviet system”, “intelligentsia”, “material situation”, “wages”, etc. (Popp & Kantor, 2021, p. 162). Nevertheless, in a number of researches, the focus is on important structural components, the consideration of which serves to solve this problem as well. For example, among these components, on the example of the history of an everyday Ukrainian village of the second half of the 1940s – the first half of the 1950s (however, this model is in many respects also acceptable for urban studies), the following are highlighted: the living environment of the peasants, their production and household, educational, recreational and leisure spheres, as well as the degree of manifestation and completeness of all these aspects of a human life in the reception of contemporaries of the events of that time. Thus, not only the material and subject space of the inhabitants is researched, but also their actions, norms of behaviour, conditions for the formation of life positions, moral and psychological features, relations in society, the reasons for the choice of certain strategies of existence by different categories of the population in that complex and contradictory period of history (Kornovenko & Shamrai, 2023, p. 278). Regional features and social groups during different historical periods are also distinguished, which significantly complements and deepens the understanding of historical processes, shows them through the prism of the lives of individual people (Popp & Kantor, 2021, p. 162; Ilnytskyi & Holovko, 2021, pp. 265–266.). This approach contributes to an integrated and conceptual understanding of the history of Ukraine as part of the world-historical process.

The Analysis of Recent Research and Publications. During the Soviet period, not so much was written about the activities of American intelligence. One of the most famous works is N. Yakovlev’s monograph “The CIA Against the USSR”, published in 1980. (Yakovlev, 1980). The author emphasizes the ideological aspect of American intelligence in it.

A real discovery for researchers was the declassification of the materials of the US Central Intelligence Agency and the provision of access to a wide range of readers without geographical restrictions. At the beginning of January of 2017, the CIA released about 12 million pages of documents relating to the agency’s activities from the 1940s to the 1990s (12 million, 2017). In total, approximately 930,000 documents were declassified and became available in the online library on the administration’s website. For example, the word “Ukraine” is mentioned in more than 11,000 declassified documents. The documents were partially censored, in particular, the names of respondents and agents mentioned in the reports were erased. According to the representative of the CIA, Heather Fritz Horniak: “Nothing was singled out. It is a complete story, with all the good and all the bad” (Yarova, 2017).

On the other hand, we can see that the Russian Federation, which arbitrarily declared itself the successor of the Soviet Union, has been resorting to the classification of documents since the mid-2010s, creating restrictions on access to “unwanted” information for its citizens. Thus, in 2016, access to the entire online archive of the Ukrainian liberation movement was prohibited on the territory of the federation (Putin-Stalin, 2016). In January of 2020, three years after the release of the CIA documents, some Russian propagandists, manipulating the facts for a domestic audience, tried to show “Bandera and his supporters as criminals and facilitators of the Nazis” (Sedov, 2020). The propagandists were very hurt that “the Ukrainian fascist and professional agent of Hitler, Stepan Bandera ... announced the restoration of the state of Western Ukraine in Lviv” (TsRU pokazalo, 2020) and they are trying in every way to discredit his name.
Information about the declassification of the CIA documents and materials was immediately spread by the leading Ukrainian mass media (Vus, 2017; Tyshchuk, 2017; Kuryshko, 2017; TsRU vyklalo, 2017; TsRU rozsekretylo arkhivy, 2017; TsRU rozsekretylo, 2017). The Ukrainian historians Maksym Mayorov, Pavlo Hai-Nyzhnyk, Volodymyr Viatrovykh, an editor of the popular historical FB-resource “Wastelands of Eastern European Clio” Ivan Khomeniuk also shared their first impressions about the published documents. They noted that the value of access to the materials of the American special services provides an opportunity to look at long-known events from a new angle (Shurkhalo, 2017).

Recently some publications have already appeared, which are based on the declassified materials. These are scientific articles, journalistic essays, which present the view of American intelligence on the Soviet life in the capital (Kyiv) (Saliy, 2017), the regional centre (Rivne) (Marchuk & Bukhalo, 2022) and the regions (Cherkashchyna) of Ukraine (U zviti, 2017).

The declassification of the CIA materials aroused the interest of Transcarpathian journalists as well, who picked up and made public some declassified documents. Nowadays there are almost two dozen such publications. They related to the vision of American intelligence on various military and political, socio-economic and religious issues of the Soviet period (Rozsekrecheni, 2020; Tserkvy, 2018; Shcho znala, 2017). There are also publications that directly relate to the subject of our research – the changes that occurred in an everyday life of the population of Transcarpathia, caused by the sovietization of the region (Hlahola, 2017; Literati, 2017; TsRU oprylyudnylo, 2017; Rozsekrecheni arkhivy TsRU, 2017). The purpose of the article is to do the research on the peculiarities of the US intelligence’s vision of the processes of sovietization of Transcarpathia and their impact on a daily life of the region’s residents, based on the declassified CIA materials.

The Results of the Research. In particular, the CIA had its own vision on the movement for the reunification of Transcarpathia with Soviet Ukraine. In May of 1953, the administration prepared the reference “The Past and Present Developments Concerning Carpatho-Ruthenia”. It indicated favourable reasons for the reunification movement – “disappointment with the Czechoslovak regime” and “hatred of the Hungarian occupation”, which led to the fact that the population of the region “viewed the Soviet Army as a liberation force in 1944”. Already “in November of 1944, a Council or rada was convened in Mukachevo and voted unanimously to join the USSR” (CIA-RDP80-00809A000600040072-8).

The CIA analysts noted that initially the reaction of the Transcarpathian population to the agrarian transformations initiated by the Soviet authorities, in particular the land reform, was positive, because before collectivization “the majority of the people led a sub-standard existence”. Intelligence believed that at the first stage of collectivization, there was no serious resistance from the population of Zakarpattia Oblast: “initial reaction to collectivization in the Carpathian oblast was likewise favourable and that there was no significant opposition to it as late as 1950 ... transformed the former estates into big collectives, many Ruthenians were therefore quite pleased. Although no detailed information is available on signs of opposition and even acts of sabotage against collectives which occurred during the last three years and indicate that the Ruthenian population (Ukrainian – Author) finally understood that any short-range gains under the Soviet system are elusive” (CIA-RDP80-00809A000600040072-8).

More complete and accurate is the report, in which there is done the research on the process of collectivization in Zakarpattia Oblast. It states that “no attempt at collectivization was made in the Carpatho-Ukraine until 1947. Up to that time the average farm consisted of 8 to 10 hectares, and anyone who owned more than that amount of land was considered a
kulak. ... never heard of any instance when a kulak was exiled to Siberia or any other place). The first collective farm was formed from among about 20 families of the Bulgarians who lived in the area. These Bulgarians were engaged primarily in raising fruits and vegetables, and they lived in a collective atmosphere. This first collective farm (1/n Dimitrova) was given all the equipment it needed and all necessary seed free of charge” (CIA-RDP82-00046R000100230004-1).

The document indicated that the harvest was far greater than these people had ever received. Since they were allowed to dispose of the products, at their own discretion, and keep all the proceeds, these Bulgarian families lived well, earning 80 – 100 thousand rubles a year. At the invitation of the government, these Bulgarian families built new houses on the main highway of Mukachevo. This, of course, was an attempt by the authorities to advertise the advantages of the collective farm system. And although some people were tempted to join the collective farm, the majority of them refused categorically (CIA-RDP82-00046R000100230004-1). Modern researchers are also inclined to the opinion that “collective farm named after Dimitrov simply did not fit into the “normal framework of collectivization”. The “standard” collective farm was mostly entered by poor people without means of production, and here, in Rosvyhov, only the cost of the greenhouse frames ... was at a price of 57,590 krb” (Mishchanyn, 2000, р. 56).

The next attempt of the government to carry out collectivization (1947 – 1948) was in the area of Velyky Luchok, which had the best soils in the Transcarpathian region. As soon as the government organized a minimum number of volunteers, a collective farm was established. The land was given both to those who volunteered and to those who refused to join. By the end of 1948, about 20 collective farms had operated in Zakarpattia, mainly in lowland areas. They were also given machinery and seed material for free. These collective farmers were promised that they would be able to keep their entire harvest for the next five years, and the state did not demand any grain supplies from them. In 1948, members of these 20 collective farms earned 15–20 kg each grains per working day. In 1949, due to the imposition of various “necessary and urgent projects”, the payment was reduced to 12 kg. per working day. By 1950, this figure was reduced to 8 kg per working day, and in 1951 these people received only about 12 kg. per working day (CIA-RDP82-00046R000100230004-1).

By 1949, the Bolshevik government had achieved considerable success in the organization of collective farms throughout the territory of the Transcarpathian region. Some people joined the collective farms, believing the promises of the communists about “a huge pay for a working day, which the workers of these 20 collective farms received”. At the same time, the government resorts to tax pressure. Individual peasants who refused to join collective farms were taxed with heavy taxes, “they had to make grain deliveries to the state for the land which they claimed was theirs. It did these people no good when they protested that their land had been collectivized and that they had been forbidden to work on it. They were compelled to surrender much of their reserve grain or join the kolkhoz, so that quite a few of them gave in and joined. Another method employed by the government was to send recalcitrant farmers out to work in the forests during the winter” (CIA-RDP82-00046R000100230004-1).

The document notes that peasants were given unrealistic standards for the delivery of agricultural products, and “when they failed to fulfill these norms (which was almost always the case) they were brought to court on charges of economic sabotage”, and forced to join a collective farm. Agitators of the collective farm system also often used threats and direct intimidation to convince people to join collective farms. There were also many rumors that
the kulaks were going to be sent to Siberia, and this also prompted many to join the collective farms (CIA-RDP82-00046R000100230004-1).

It is concluded that by means of promises, persuasions, threats and even open violence, the government managed to collectivize about 90% of the land by the end of 1949. The villagers of Velyki Luchky never fulfilled their promise not to take their crops for five years. Also, they were given only one-quarter of a hectare of land for their own planting instead of the full hectare of land given to those who joined in the beginning. In 1951, those who joined the collective farm after 1948 earned only 200-300 grams of grain per working day (CIA-RDP82-00046R000100230004-1). And this is how modern researchers describe collectivization in this village: “The fifth collective farm in the region appeared on March 16, 1947 in the village of Velyki Luchky of Mukachevo district on the basis of 16 farms. The collective farm was allocated 150 hectares of the best land that belonged to sole proprietors. The latter was compensated with allotments, in particular at a distance of 18 km from the village” (Mishchanyn, 2018, р. 259).

The consequences of the first years of collective farming are described in more detail in the information report dated April 14, 1953: “People working in collective farms are so hungry that they steal potatoes by hiding them in their sleeves and shirts. People receive only black bread. Many cattle are dying of infections and the agricultural output is decreasing because of poor labour organization. In the last agricultural year, profits decreased by 30 percent. There is a scarcity of fertilizers and animal manure, and seeds are of poor quality. The Soviet agronomists try to compensate for this by the so-called “deep ploughing”. This year was abnormally dry and the corn and potato crops were catastrophic. Only the wheat crop was good. One kg of potatoes now officially costs three rubles, while last year it was only 80 kopecks” (CIA-RDP80-00810A000600490008-4).

The CIA also had enough information about the religious situation in Zakarpattia Oblast, in particular about the ban on the Greek Catholic Church and the fate of its bishop Theodor Romzha. It is noted that until 1947, Transcarpathia was inhabited by a large number of nations and peoples who could practice different religious beliefs freely and independently of the state. In 1945, when Transcarpathian Ukraine joined the Ukrainian Communist Party, the most common religious denominations were: the Greek Catholics, the Roman Catholics, the Jews, the Protestants, and the Orthodox. Until 1947, the Greek Catholic Church remained the most widespread and influential religious denomination in the region. As an example, it is given that almost 70% of Mukachevo residents, 80% of Uzhhorod residents, and 60% of Khust residents were the Greek Catholics.

The leader of the religious community, Bishop Teodor Romzha of Uzhhorod and Mukachevo, enjoyed a considerable authority and influence in the region, and his opinion was listened to in the Vatican as well. The Soviet special services monitored the situation and often reported it to Moscow (Lendyel, 2017).

When it became clear that it would not be possible to convince the bishop to join the Orthodox Church, the Soviet authorities, through their special services, resorted to murdering the bishop. This is how it is described in the CIA documents: “At that time (1947), the Greek-Catholic bishop left for the consecration of the temple in the village of Kaidanova, which is 10 km from Mukachevo. On the way back, “unknown bandits” beat the bishop. After returning to Uzhhorod, he was hospitalized, but there are rumors that he was later poisoned” (Lendyel, 2017). Here, however, we have to make a clarification – T. Romzha was placed in Mukachevo City Hospital after the failed attempt. He died there after a nurse of this hospital gave him a lethal injection.
Analysts of the special service compared the bishop of the Mukachevo Greek Catholic Diocese, T. Romzha, with the Metropolitan of Halytskyi and the Archbishop of Lviv, Yo. Slipy, who was arrested by the Soviet authorities on April 11, 1945 and sent to Siberia together with other Ukrainian bishops. As noted in the secret document: “All the Ukrainian Catholic bishops were liquidated and, of those arrested, the majority died in prison, with the exception of the Uzhhorod Bishop Romzha who died in a reportedly faked motor accident in November of 1947” (AERODYNAMIC VOL. 25).

More details about the murder of T. Romzha became known only after the release of the memoirs of the employee of the Soviet special services, a spy and saboteur Pavel Sudoplatov, who was involved in its organization. According to him, in 1947, the Soviet special services received information from abroad that the Vatican was seeking the support of the American and British authorities to provide assistance to the Uniate Church and the “Bandera’s formations” associated with them. The information was passed not only to J. Stalin and V. Molotov, but also to M. Khrushchov, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. M. Khrushchov personally appealed to J. Stalin with a request to allow him to liquidate the Greek Catholic Church. In a letter to J. Stalin and the Minister of State Security of the USSR. V. Abakumov, M. Khrushchov and the Minister of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR S. Savchenko claimed that “Romzha actively cooperates with the leaders of the bandit movement and maintains contact with the secret emissaries of the Vatican, who are actively fighting against the Soviet authorities”, and also that “Romzha and his group pose a serious threat to a political stability in the region, recently annexed by the Soviet Union. Stalin agreed with Khrushchov’s proposal that “the time has come to liquidate the Vatican’s “terrorist nest” in Uzhhorod (Sudoplatov, 1998, pp. 412–414).

In the CIA documents it was noted that the population of Zakarpattia Oblast is the most opposed to the Soviet policy in religious matters: “Following the practice adopted earlier in Soviet Ukraine, the Soviet regime has suppressed the Catholic Church of the Eastern Rite in the Carpathian Oblast. All Catholic priests who would, not announce their subservience to the Orthodox Church lead an illegal existence in the country but it has been stated that they are supported ideologically and materially by many people”. Catholic masses are still being celebrated in the forests. Many Orthodox priests are considered as Moscow agents since it has become known that they use confessions to obtain denunciations of anti-Orthodox and anti-Soviet individuals” (CIA-RDP80-00809A000600040072-8).

Analysts of the special service pointed at another problem that appeared with the arrival of the Soviet power – Russification. For this, they use the term “Russianization”. This is how they write about it: “Russianization, which is being advanced all over the USSR, is as wholeheartedly opposed in the Carpathian oblast as Magyarization was some years ago” (CIA-RDP80-00809A000600040072-8). Russian became the official language. It was taught at schools, street signs were also in Russian. The local population tried to resist the Russian language, ignoring it and continuing to name streets and public buildings in the Hungarian names (Hlahola, 2017).

The CIA documents do not describe the regional leadership very favourably. “The Uzhhorod Communist Party headquarters and Secretariat has premises on the 9th floor of the 100-meter-high building with escalators bulls by the pre-war Czecho-slovak administration for the Trans-Carpathian legislative assembly. The building is under the guard of the Sluzhba Bezpeky (Security Service) and of members of the Frontier Guard. There is free access to all floors except the 9th floor, for which passes are needed. These are yellow-brown, have
two pages, and a photograph of the holder. Heed of the area Communist Party Committee is Stefan Turianica, a chimney-sweep by trade, of a Hungarian nationality, who was prominent at the time of the Hungarien occupation during World War II. Regular meetings of the area Committee take place on Wednesdays and Fridays. The Committee is a gang of unscrupulous adventurers, imposed by dictatorial methods upon the population, whose fate they decide according to orders from Moscow” (CIA-RDP80-00810A000600490008-4).

A lot of information was also collected about the state security agencies. In particular, it is indicated that state security is located not far from the party’s regional committee in a four-storied building. Here is an excerpt from a document about its work: “Outsiders are admitted by the officer on duty on producing a summons. These are not posted but are delivered by messengers of the Security Service headquarters and read briefly: “Report on (date) at (time) at Section so-and-so”: beneath this there is a stamp with the Soviet star and one signature. The Security Service controls all district and local committees and has a wide-spread network of informers. District and local committees have their own Bezpeka (Security – Authors) agents (sometimes the chairman), who in turn employ a number of informers”.

Also, “all letters sent to or received from foreign countries are censored by the Bezpeka; and inland mail, at least most of it is censored by agents or informers employed as clerks at the post offices” (CIA-RDP80-00810A000600490008-4).

The CIA made an attempt to analyse the national and demographic situation in Transcarpathia. In particular, the document notes that “the total pre-World War II population of the Carpathian Ukraine was 750,000. Of the 120,000 Jews included in this number, fewer than 20,000 are still residing in the area. Of 100,000 Hungarians, only about one half are left in the Carpathian oblast. Some 50,000 inhabitants of the area were forcibly resettled in different regions of the USSR. There were no reports on the whereabouts of these people. In spite of these sizable population movements, the population of the Carpathian oblast was estimated at 950,000 to one million in 1950 or considerably more than the pre-war figure. Of the total population, some 600,000 are believed to be ethnically Ukrainians”. The increase in the population in the region was explained by “only a sizable influx of non-Ukrainian elelants, presumably from other areas of the USSR and for military service and defense industries, could account for the present population picture” (CIA-RDP80-00809A000600400072-8). As an example, it was cited that “according to rumors” up to 15,000 troops are stationed in Uzhhorod alone. It was assumed that the population data showed an influx of personnel from the armed forces or defense industry workers.

For comparison, here are long-classified documents regarding the population of Transcarpathia, as of November 12, 1945. We are talking about the “brief political and economic characteristics of Transcarpathian Ukraine” prepared by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Transcarpathian Ukraine and sent to the Central Committee of the CP(b)U. It indicated the population of the region – 800,000 people “mostly the Ukrainians, who in terms of language and customs differ little from the Ukrainians of Dnieper, Galicia and Bukovyna” (CSAPAU, f. 1, d. 23, c. 1902, p. 2). The Soviet statistical collections give the figures of 792,000 in 1947 and 920,200 in 1959. (Narodne, 1969, pp. 11–12; Narodne, 1987, p. 2).

The arrests and repressions of the population carried out by the Soviet authorities in the Transcarpathian region were also pointed out. In particular, it was noted that “all suspicious people are deported to concentration camps in Siberia. Punishments are very strict and the
most severe ones are for violation of guard duties in the frontier zone. Two soldiers were sentenced to 25 years of forced labor in Siberia for not reporting footprints on the ploughed field in the frontier zone”.

The civilian population was also subject to arrests. “Civilians are arrested secretly, primarily during the night, and are taken into custody in small groups. Their relatives hear from them only after three to four months, because such people are usually transported to Siberia. People are asked to voluntarily” accept civilian jobs, primarily in the Donbass, under the promise of higher wages. The others are taken there by force. Some try to escape from the Donbass to the Ukrains, where they are usually caught by the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs – Authors)” (CIA-RDP80-00810A000600490008-4).

Regarding the socio-economic situation in Zakarpattia Oblast, we also have a lot of materials collected by the CIA. The document noted that “in general, consumer goods including clothing and mechanical equipment are more plentiful in the towns (at the cooperative stores) whereas the rural areas are relatively better supplied with agricultural products. The result is a considerable extra-legal barter and outright black market trade between urban and rural areas” (CIA-RDP80-00809A000600040072-8).

This is how an everyday life in the city of Uzhhorod is described in an information report dated April 14, 1953: “90 percent of the adult women are employed, primarily in factories. In the veneer manufacturing plant, “Fanerny-Mebelny Kombinat”, and in the “Lesopilka” (lumber mill) 70 percent of the workers are women. Only foremen, supervisors, etc., are men. Women may get better paid Jobs if they are members of the Komsomol or are wives of prominent Communists. There are frequent irregularities in the payment of wages, because of poor organization. The average earnings of a woman worker is just enough to pay for food and accommodations, and at best for one dress and pair of poor quality footwear a year. One can see them walking in the snow with their toes showing. After seven years of Soviet administration one can still see people wearing clothes bought during the prosperous Czechoslovak era” (CIA-RDP80-00810A000600490008-4).

He also notes the peculiarities of the education of the Soviet youth: “Youngsters on leaving school may choose their trade, but cannot change it later. After six months’ preliminary training they go to factories and remain apprentices (though working practically like grown-up workmen) at average wages of 100 rubles per month, plus full board in government hostels. Every youth has to be in the Pioneers or in the Komsomol, whether they or their parents like it or not. Thus, they are educated in Communism and are taught to be more numbers in a collective” (CIA-RDP80-00810A000600490008-4).

A lot of intelligence materials also concern other aspects of an everyday life in the regions. Thus, food has become synonymous with “standing in line”. “Even so, only the basic foods can be bought. It is an appalling situation for a country almost wholly agricultural, where food used to be plentiful and extremely cheap under the pre-war Czechoslovak administration. The canned food production for the Soviet, Army, such as is produced in the Western Ukraine, is concentrated in Lviv... The most hateful system of exploitation of workers prevails in these factories. Very high norms are fixed and non-fulfillment results in severe punishment of individuals or entire sections whose wages are then reduced for the benefit of the few shockworkers and Party members who work under privileged conditions. This phenomenon – to be observed in all Cominform countries – is a novel type of class warfare within a class. Coffee is unobtainable for an average worker. People have tea only, Georgian and Chinese, sold under various names all of a poor quality. Now there is only
canned fish and crab-meat for the civilian and non-privileged population. There is, however, plenty of vodka” (CIA-RDP80-00810A000600490008-4).

The CIA specialists tried to establish what the standard of living in Zakarpattia Oblast was at that time, comparing it, in particular, with life in other regions of Soviet Ukraine, as well as with the time when the region was part of Czechoslovakia. It was noted that “there was no difference between workmen’s wages in the various towns of the Carpathian Oblast and in the Ukrainian SSR as a whole. A unified system of wages was established throughout the Ukrainian SSR, and probably the entire USSR (except specially designated regions), whereby workers with certain qualifications received the same wages whether they worked in Mukachevo, Uzhhorod, Kyiv, or Odesa” (CIA-RDP82-00046R000200030017-8). During the period of 1949 – 1952, wages remained practically unchanged in Zakarpattia Oblast, but due to the tariff system of wages and the constant increase in labour standards, workers had to constantly increase their efforts, work faster and harder, just to maintain the level of wages.

According to American intelligence, an average salary of an unskilled worker was 450 rubles per month in Zakarpattia Oblast in 1949. The average monthly salary of a skilled worker was 700 rubles. The same salary was in 1952.

Management analysts encountered certain difficulties in assessing the standard of living in Transcarpathia: “It is most difficult to give detailed information on the standard of living in the Carpathian Oblast, because the living standard was so very low, and the purchasing power of workers so minimal. It is practically impossible to say what an average worker considered adequate for his needs; in this respect, the situation in the Carpathian Oblast seemed to be much worse than elsewhere in the USSR. The population of the Carpathian Oblast still had a clear recollection of what the living standard had been prior to 1939, when the Oblast was a part of Czechoslovakia; the standard of living then was approximately 150% higher than in 1952. In 1939 a worker had to spend 20% of his wages for food; in 1952 he had to spend 80% and even then he was unable to obtain what he had been accustomed to in 1939. In fact, if one spent 80% of his wages on food in 1952, he would only be living near the subsistence level. To illustrate, one kilogram of meat cost 15–22 rubles, and butter cost 60 rubles per kilogram. A worker was glad if he could buy a piece of meat once a week. It took him several years, living on a subsistence diet to save enough money (800–1,000 rubles) to buy an average quality suit” (CIA-RDP82-00046R000200030017-8).

We can look at the price policy for everyday goods in Mukachevo. In a special table, analysts of the service presented the dynamics of prices for consumer goods in the city during the period of 1948 – 1952 – food, expensive food and drinks, clothes, handmade goods and cars (CIA-RDP82-00046R000200030018-7). It should be noted that the prices of certain goods have partially decreased during the specified years. But on the other hand, the state could not saturate the market with certain categories of goods. See: Table A.

Here are the estimated prices of prepared meals and alcoholic beverages in Mukachevo in 1952 – 1953 in rubles (karbovantsi). As we can see from Table B, the cheapest meals were available in canteens and departmental canteens, followed by the buffet. The most expensive meals were spent in first-class food establishments. The same applied to the prices of alcoholic beverages. Alcohol was not sold at all in canteens, and prices in first-class establishments were 50–100% higher than in buffets.
**Table A**

**Prices (in rubles) for Consumer Goods in Mukachevo, Transcarpathian Oblast**

*(CIA-RDP82-00046R000200030018-7)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOODSTUFFS</th>
<th>1948 Govt.</th>
<th>1950 Govt.</th>
<th>1950 Free</th>
<th>June 1952 Govt.</th>
<th>June 1952 Free</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black bread, kg.</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White bread, kg.</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk; l.</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs, dozen</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter, kg.</td>
<td>100*</td>
<td>80*</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60*</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable oil, l.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheese, kg.</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar, kg.</td>
<td>15*</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13*</td>
<td>20-25</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef, 2nd choice, kg.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pork, 1st grade; kg.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>20-22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veal, 1st grade, kg.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22-23</td>
<td></td>
<td>18-20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicken, dressed, kg.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh salmon or carp, kg.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12-14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes, kg.</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice; kg.</td>
<td>50*</td>
<td>40*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White beans, kg.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apples, kg.</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oranges</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt, kg.</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Seldom Available

**Table B**

**Approximate Prices (in rubles) of Meals and Liquor (1950 – 1952) in Mukachevo (CIA-RDP82-00046R006200030019-6)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>First Bar</th>
<th>Snack Bar</th>
<th>Factory or Enterprise Mess</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breakfast: two eggs, butter, bread tea</td>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinner: Soup, the second course meat or fish with potatoes and one vegetable, dessert</td>
<td>12-15</td>
<td>8-10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supper: Meat course with potatoes and one vegetable, dessert</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>6-8</td>
<td>4-4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150 gram of vodka</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.7-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottle of beer (500 rp.)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.8-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottle of cheap wine (750 rp.)</td>
<td>15-18</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reports noted that the standard of living in Carpathian Ukraine rapidly deteriorated. “Since the summer of 1951 people stood in line for everything. Those who want to get food in the morning have to line up in queues at 01.00 hours. Shops open at 07.00 hours. People
call these lines “ochered” (the Russian word for bread-lines). Vegetables disappeared in the
shops and at markets; rationed margarine could be bought once or twice a month, but since
last summer it has almost disappeared. The only relatively cheap product is alcohol. Moscow
vodka costs 15 rubles per liter, various other types of brandy cost 45 – 56 rubles. A pack of
20 cigarettes costs from 1.45 to 5 rubles. They are often raw and moldy. A pair of leather
shoes made by the “Svit” plant in Gotwaldov (Zlín), Czechoslovakia, without coupons cost
400–420 rubles. Cheaper are the Soviet-made shoes (only 350–400 rubles), and the cheapest—
Kyiv and Uzhhorod. In the summer of 1951 cheap shoes were sold at the market. They cost
about 100 rubles. Woolen materials cost 360 to 450 rubles per meter. These are sold once
a month. All textiles are imported from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. One has to
pay 220 rubles for having them made into a suit. Motor vehicles are rare in Uzhhorod now.
Only the state enterprises and police have trucks and there are only two passenger cars left in
the entire city. The rent for a city apartment, belonging to communal enterprises, consisting
usually of only one room, runs from 30 to 40 rubles. The rent for the so-called civilian
apartment is 150 to 200 rubles” (CIA-RDP80-00810A000600490008-4).

Information about everyday items is also provided. For example, according to American
intelligence, “Plain, German steel watches, available only at the black market, cost 500
rubles. German gold watches cost 1,200 rubles. Cameras are rarely seen and those imported
from East Germany, marked “FET” (sic), cost 1,600 rubles. The Soviet-made primitive
box-cameras cost 60 rubles (in Germany 10 DM) of an extremely poor quality Soviet film.
Kitchen utensils, in a limited variety and poor quality, are sold at the Univermah. A plant
called Dynamo sells bicycles and sporting goods. The cheapest bicycle, without accessories,
costs 750 rubles and the so-called racing bicycle costs from 1,200 to 1,300 rubles. A single-
barrel small-bore gun costs 280 rubles and a double-barrel shotgun costs 800 rubles”
(CIA-RDP80-00810A000600490008-4).

And this is the way entertainment and leisure in Zakarpattia region are described: “Former
coffee shops have now become teahouses, where you can buy non-meat dishes for two or
three rubles and fish. There are only two cinemas in Uzhhorod, “Omnia” and “Moscow”.
Now and then an old Hollywood movie is still on, such as Tarzan or Rose Marie, and then
the cinema house is packed. Otherwise, only the Soviet films are on in half-empty cinema
houses. Films must be approved by the local Censor Committee of the Communist Party.
Workers are entitled to 14 days of holiday per year, which they do not have to take and
can receive cash compensation in return. Recreation centres in the Carpathians are reserved
for approximately five percent of beneficiaries. So far, not a single Carpatho-Ukrainian
worker went to any of the famous Soviet recreation centres in the Crimea or the Caucasus”
(CIA-RDP80-00810A000600490008-4).

The Communist Party leadership paid more attention to urban broadcasting, through
which intensified campaigning and propaganda of the Soviet system was carried out. “Town
broadcasting is transmitted through public loudspeakers, bellowing from dawn to dusk.
Anti-American slogans are repeated in Russian, Ruthenian, and Hungarian. People prefer
to listen to the Voice of America, BBC, and broadcasts from Paris”, – the CIA report says
(CIA-RDP80-00810A000600490008-4).

And this is how American intelligence saw the situation in medical care in Zakarpattia
region: Uzhhorod hospital is overcrowded; people lie on mattresses spread on the floor and,
if more seriously ill patients are brought to the hospital, those who suffer from minor diseases
are simply thrown out. This hospital has only three experienced doctors, while a number
of Russian physicians have no experience and literally learn on the patients. More serious operations are done by local doctors, less serious ones by the Russians, who are considered to be stupid and primitive. Mortality rates even among the less seriously ill are high” (CIA-RDP80-00810A000600490008-4). In general, the set of documents analysed in the article is informative enough to fulfill the research objectives.

**The Conclusions.** The CIA documents analysed in the article contain really important information that, unlike many other historical sources, is not burdened with excessive subjectivism in the assessment of events and historical figures, but is primarily of a practical nature in the context of the strategic confrontation between the USA and the USSR on the international stage arena during the post-war period. Not all aspects of a daily life in Transcarpathia in the second half of the 1940s and early 1950s are fully revealed in these documents (it is unlikely that such a task was set before the CIA specialists), but they reflect significant layers of the region’s history both in a panoramic, spatial and temporary vision, as well as in a concrete and historical section (relevant information often is of a retrospective character); the detailing of certain aspects description of the population’s life in the region is sometimes at a very high level.

Despite the fact that the USSR was a strategic adversary of the USA during the Cold War, the information of the CIA specialists regarding the life of the population of Transcarpathia as a part of it is not one-sided in the framework of a possible “two-colour” assessment (“black and white”). In a number of relevant documents, sympathy for the population of the region is palpable, the rather difficult conditions of its economic, political and cultural life during the first post-war years, a strict management style of the state and party leadership of Transcarpathia, a significant role of power structures, etc. are emphasized. It is also important to recognize the Ukrainianness of the population of Transcarpathia, despite the presence of “mental” and “cultural” barriers between local residents and visitors, including those from the eastern regions of Ukraine.

The outlined issue deserves its further thorough study. First of all, the focus is on the issues of synthetic assessments of the history of the region, potentially available in the CIA documents of the Cold War era, as well as their correspondence to reality (regarding individual assessments or facts contained in them, additional in-depth research is needed to clarify and verify them), comparison of their information with data available in the documents of other special services of the world (the USA, the UK, the USSR, etc.), the specifics of the activities of individual historical figures whose lives were connected with Transcarpathia at that time, etc.

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