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**THE ROLE OF ROMAN DASHKEVYCH IN THE FORMATION
OF THE ARTILLERY OF THE SICH RIFLEMEN DURING THE UKRAINIAN
REVOLUTION OF 1917 – 1921**

Abstract. *The purpose of the research: analysis of the role of R. Dashkevych in the formation of the Sich Riflemen artillery units during the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921. The research methodology is based on the principles of historicism and objectivity. Methods of generalization, analysis, synthesis of information have been used during the research. The scientific novelty of the research consists in the fact that, despite the presence of individual historical biographical studies dedicated to R. Dashkevych in the Ukrainian historiography, to this day there is no comprehensive analysis of his role in the formation of the Sich Riflemen artillery units during the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921. On the basis of the memories of military, public and political figures, there has been done a comprehensive analysis of the role of R. Dashkevych in the formation of the Sich Riflemen artillery and his contribution to the combat readiness of artillery units, which affected not only the fighting capacity of the Ukrainian army, but also the existence of the Ukrainian state in general. The Conclusions. As a result of the overthrow of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian monarchies, a liberation movement began on the Ukrainian lands, the goal of which was to gain statehood. It is common knowledge that a combat-ready army is necessary for the existence of any nation. The Ukrainian military elite, aware*

of this fact, began to form its own armed forces. However, initially the government of the Central Rada did not approve of the senior officers' idea of forming a regular army and adhered to the idea of forming "a national militia". Among the officer corps R. Dashkevych was one of the first to join the military movement to start the process of forming of the Sich Riflemen artillery and the Ukrainian army. Despite the shortage of quality military personnel, lack of weapons and ammunition, the Bolshevik aggression and numerous contradictions between the military and political leaders, R. Dashkevych managed to form combat-capable artillery units and develop the artillery of the Ukrainian army during the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921. Later on, R. Dashkevych's artillery units played an important role in battles with the Ukrainian statehood opponents and ensured the activities of state authorities during the liberation struggles.

Key words: Roman Dashkevych, artillery, the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921, the Sich Riflemen, Halytsko-Bukovynsky kurin.

РОЛЬ РОМАНА ДАШКЕВИЧА У ФОРМУВАННІ АРТИЛЕРІЇ СІЧОВИХ СТРІЛЬЦІВ В ПЕРІОД УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ РЕВОЛЮЦІЇ 1917 – 1921 рр.

Анотація. Мета дослідження: аналіз ролі Р. Дашкевича у формуванні гарматних підрозділів Січових Стрільців періоду Української революції 1917 – 1921 рр. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на принципах історизму та об'єктивності. Під час дослідження використані методи узагальнення, аналізу, синтезу інформації. **Наукова новизна** дослідження полягає у тому, що, попри наявність в українській історіографії поодиноких історичних біографічних розвідок, присвячених Р. Дашкевичу, до сьогодні немає комплексного аналізу його ролі у формуванні гарматних підрозділів Січових Стрільців у період Української революції 1917 – 1921 рр. На основі спогадів військових і громадсько-політичних діячів, проведено комплексний аналіз ролі Р. Дашкевича у формуванні артилерії Січових Стрільців та його вклад у боєготовність гарматних підрозділів, що вплинуло не лише на боєздатність українського війська, але й на існування Української держави загалом.

Висновки. Унаслідок повалення Російської та Австро-Угорської монархій на українських землях розпочався визвольний рух, який мав на меті здобуття державності. Як відомо, для існування нації необхідна боєздатна армія. Українська військова еліта, усвідомлюючи цей факт, взялася будувати власні збройні сили. Однак уряд Центральної Ради спочатку не схвалив задум старшин будівництва регулярної армії та притримувався ідеї формування "всенародної міліції". Серед офіцерського корпусу, Р. Дашкевич одним із перших приєднався до військового руху, щоб розпочати процес формування артилерії Січових Стрільців та українського війська. Незважаючи на дефіцит якісних військових кадрів, відсутність озброєння і амуніції, більшовицьку агресію та численні суперечності між воєнцями і політичними лідерами, Р. Дашкевичу вдалося утворити боєздатні гарматні підрозділи та розбудувати артилерію українського війська в період Української революції 1917 – 1921 рр. Надалі артилерійські підрозділи Р. Дашкевича, відіграла важливу роль у боях з противниками української державності та забезпечили діяльність органів державної влади під час визвольних змагань.

Ключові слова: Роман Дашкевич, артилерія, Українська революція 1917 – 1921 рр., Січові Стрільці, Галицько-Буковинський курінь.

The Problem Statement. Actually, during the period of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921 the artillery formation began with the creation of a separate cannon battery as part of Halytsko-Bukovynsky kurin of the Sich Riflemen by Roman Dashkevych. It was on the initiative of a former artillery senior officer of the army of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy that at the beginning of January of 1918, the artillery division was created, which gave rise to the first Ukrainian battery, and later – the artillery brigade of the Sich Riflemen.

The objective need for the army as a guarantee of the existence of the state gave impact to a number of young, but already experienced officers to form the Ukrainian artillery after World War I, mainly from among prisoners of war and soldiers of the former Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires.

The active ideological and propaganda activities of the Bolshevik agents and participants of the Russian white movement had a negative impact on the consciousness of the Ukrainian military. Therefore, a significant number of the Ukrainians, exhausted by the Great War, easily accepted the populist promises of the enemies (social promises concerning land property, a rapid career growth, promoting the idea of the Ukrainian autonomy as part of “Great Russia”, etc.). The combination of these circumstances complicated the process of forming the Ukrainian army and created the atmosphere of mistrust between government officials and the senior corps.

Roman Dashkevych, as a talented artilleryman, was well aware that without artillery units (artillery was one of the most combat-capable types of weapons at that time), the Ukrainian army was unable to repel the attack of the Ukrainian statehood enemies. Therefore, despite the problems mentioned above, R. Dashkevych managed to rally like-minded senior officers around the idea of creating the first cannon battery of the Sich Riflemen.

Numerous recollections of direct participants in the liberation struggle contain mentions of the Sich Riflemen artillery formation and development. The gun battery in Halysko-Bukovynsky kurin became the foundation for the formation of artillery not only of the Sich Riflemen, but also of the Ukrainian armies in general, as evidenced in the memoirs of Roman Dashkevych, Yevhen Konovalets, Mykhailo Kurakh, Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko, Oleksandr Pylkevych, Roman Sushka. Their effectiveness largely determined the combat capability of not only the Sich Riflemen, but also the combat readiness of the Ukrainian army in general.

The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications. General-khorunzhy of the Army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic – R. Dashkevych played an important role in the Ukrainian artillery formation during the period of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921, which is evidenced by the memories of military, social and political figures, archival sources and separate historical research papers. However, to this day there is no comprehensive scientific study devoted to the role of R. Dashkevych in the artillery formation of the Sich Riflemen during the First Liberation Struggle.

For the completeness of the material coverage, first of all, we should note the memories of R. Dashkevych, which he set out in his work “Artillery of the Sich Riflemen in the Fight for the Golden Gate of Kyiv” (Dashkevych, 1965). In his work, the key aspects of the artillery’s participation in the hostilities against the Bolsheviks are elucidated in detail, and the issues of organization, support, and battle tactics of the of the Sich Riflemen artillery units are analyzed partially.

Several modern Ukrainian researchers studied some elements of this topic. M. Lytvyn, K. Naumenko and Ya. Tynchenko should be noted for the complete coverage of the material. In their works, the authors summarized the data on the life path and military career of R. Dashkevych, but they almost did not analyze the organizational aspects of the Sich Riflemen artillery formation with his participation (Lytvyn & Naumenko, 2007).

In his scientific articles and monographs, a historian and military man P. Tkachuk (Tkachuk, 2003, 2009) analyzed, among other things, the artillery formation process of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 1917 and 1920, and the role of R. Dashkevych in the artillery formation. However, the issue of R. Dashkevych’s role in the first artillery units formation (from which the formation of the Ukrainian artillery began) of the Sich Riflemen regiment was only analyzed partially (Tkachuk, 2003, 2009).

More balanced in this respect are the works of Ya. Dashkevych, I. Durbak and H. Svarnyk (Dashkevych, Durbak & Svarnyk, 2009). The articles by A. Kurdyka, S. Nechai, M. Plaskiy,

and K. Tryliovsky, which focus on the description of military activities during the liberation struggle and R. Dashkevych's public activity during emigration, also deserve attention (Dashkevych, Durbak & Svarnyk, 2009).

Analyzing R. Dashkevych's role in the artillery formation of the Sich Riflemen, the authors considered the memories of military and public political figures of the period of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921 mainly. Evaluation of R. Dashkevych's activity effectiveness is largely based on his own memoirs and the memories of those events participants.

The purpose of the article is to analyze the role of R. Dashkevych in the artillery formation of the Sich Riflemen during the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921.

The Results of the Research. At the end of World War I, global geopolitical changes took place in the world, as a result of which two empires – Russian and Austro-Hungarian – ceased to exist. The February Revolution of 1917 in Russia and the revolutionary processes in the Habsburg Empire in the second half of 1918 activated the liberation movement on the Ukrainian lands, the aim of which was to gain statehood. Under these conditions, the Ukrainians, like the rest of the peoples of the former empires, began to establish and develop state institutions, without which the existence of an independent country is impossible (Mahochiŭ, 2007, pp. 441–442).

It is common knowledge, the guarantee of any nation existence is a regular army. Owing to a combat-ready army nations are capable of a long-term existence, because they have tools (a combat-ready army) to prevent the influence of external enemies. The Ukrainian lands, located at the crossroads of important trade routes, have always been in the sphere of interests of other countries. The Ukrainian senior officers were well aware of this fact, that is why, after World War I, they united during the First All-Ukrainian Military Congress, which took place on May 5, 1917, to start the process of forming the army (Verstuiuk, 2003, p. 72). Sotnyk V. Ivanys recalled: *“we revealed a powerful demonstration of the Ukrainian military awakening”*. He also wrote in his memoirs: *“...the consequences of this demonstration were in strengthening the national positions of the Ukrainian soldiers at the front. The idea of separating the Ukrainians into separate hundreds, kurins, regiments, divisions up to corps has taken on expressive forms”* (Ivanys, 1991, c. 42).

However, the Ukrainian political elite did not immediately support the senior officers' initiative to form a regular army, initially taking an anti-militarist position. Representatives of the Central Rada (hereinafter referred to as the CR) questioned the expediency of creating the Ukrainian army (Verstuiuk, 2012, p. 4). One of the reasons for a slow creation of the Ukrainian army was the excessive politicization of this process (Lebedieva & Komova, 2021, p. 127). Among the members of the General Secretariat, the issue of forming the national militia as an alternative to the regular army was discussed publicly (Demianiuk, 2017, p. 165). *“We, the social democrats, do not need our army, but the destruction of all regular armies,”* V. Vynnychenko, the head of the General Secretariat, declared publicly. This idea was also supported by the head of the Central Committee – M. Hrushevsky, who supported the idea that: *“The national militia is the normal form of a democratic state protection”* (Tiutenko, 2018, p. 105).

As a result of growing contradictions, numerous disagreements arose, and senior officers, owing to their authority and popularity among the military, defended their own idea of forming the regular Ukrainian army. Owing to the decisive actions of officers, despite the dissatisfaction of the Central Government officials, the process of Ukrainization of the former empires military units and the formation of new Ukrainian military units started

(Horielov, 2007, pp. 298–310). One of the first and most active leaders of the senior officers movement was the future general-khorunzhy of the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic (hereinafter – the Ukrainian People's Republic) – R. Dashkevych (Tkachuk & Stetsiv, 2022, p. 57).

R. Dashkevych was born on December 6, 1892 in the family of a priest in the village of Tustanovychi of Boryslav povit in Halychyna. An important role in the formation of R. Dashkevych's personality was played by his parents' upbringing, a high-quality primary and higher education, and his life experience. The set of values laid down by his parents in his childhood had a serious impact on the consciousness of R. Dashkevych when he made decisions which were fateful for the Ukrainian people (R. Dashkevych mentioned about it in his memoirs) (Dashkevych, 1965, pp. 127–128).

Studying at the Przemyśl Gymnasium (he graduated from it in 1911) and at the Law Faculty of Lviv University (he graduated from it in 1914) provided R. Dashkevych with the necessary level of education and knowledge, which significantly broadened the horizons and influenced the officer's professional military career (Lytvyn & Naumenko, 2007, p. 75).

A unique experience of participation in World War I, during which R. Dashkevych served as an artillery sotnyk of the Austro-Hungarian army, influenced the formation of his character and hardened him as a military commander. The combination of experience, organizational skills acquired in the war, education and training became useful for R. Dashkevych later, when he, together with the rest of the Ukrainian senior officers, began to form the Sich Riflemen artillery (Tynchenko, 2011, pp. 133–134).

R. Dashkevych got the news about the beginning of the liberation struggle on the Ukrainian lands being in the Russian captivity, where he got together with other Ukrainian senior officers from the front (Lytvyn & Naumenko, 2007, p. 75).

R. Dashkevych recollected: *“The revolution found many Ukrainians from Galicia, Bukovyna, Transcarpathia, former soldiers of the Austrian army, in the Russian captivity, scattered throughout the whole of Russia at that time. They were trained senior officers and soldiers who had fought at the fronts, who knew the front-line service and heavy artillery fires well...”* (Dashkevych, 1965, p. 5).

Despite the risk of death, the thoughts of freedom and their own Ukrainian state motivated the prisoners to escape from captivity to join the liberation movement. It is worth noting that R. Dashkevych monitored the support of the fighting spirit of the Ukrainian captured officers, because even then he generated the idea of escape in his head, the return to his homeland and formation of the Ukrainian army, in particular artillery. He was aware of his responsibility for the Ukrainian people and understood that owing to the support of experienced Ukrainian officers, he will be able to form combat-capable artillery units that will constitute a powerful military force of the Ukrainian army. Among the military, the most supportive of R. Dashkevych's initiative to escape from captivity was sotnyk M. Matchak, who was one of the first senior officers of the Halytsko-Bukovynsky kurin and personal adjutant of Ye. Konovalts later (Naumenko, 2018). R. Dashkevych recollected about such officers the following: *“Being in captivity, these people, former soldiers, more than once escaped, their lives were at risk, from forced labour camps in the North of Russia, from Murmansk or Siberia”* (Dashkevych, 1965, p. 5).

A pre-war acquaintance with E. Konovalts had a great influence on R. Dashkevych's awareness of his responsibility for the future of the Ukrainian people. During his studying at Lviv University, students became friends quickly, because they had many common

interests and were brought up on common values – love of the homeland and respect for the Ukrainian traditions and culture. As it turned out, this budding friendship lasted between them until the end of their lives. Thus, while being in the Russian captivity, the internal value compass directed R. Dashkevych and a group of Ukrainian soldiers to escape from captivity in order to return to the Ukrainian lands and lead the army formation. It is worth noting that R. Dashkevych held a leadership position among the captured officers and, despite their doubts, managed to convince them of the decision correctness to escape from captivity. He concluded about the mood of the captured military: *“The revolution awakened hope for freedom in these people. Many of these captured Ukrainians tried to reach Ukraine, where they received news about the Ukrainian Central Rada (UCR), UCR Universals, military congresses, and the Ukrainian army. To get to Ukraine, to work there, to work freely, to help build the Ukrainian state, to enlist in the Ukrainian army – this was the dream of many captured Ukrainians”* (Dashkevych, 1965, p. 5).

Arriving in Kyiv, R. Dashkevych met with Ye. Konovalets, I. Chmola and F. Chernyk to discuss the issue of the Ukrainian army formation, so he was the first to take the initiative and suggested starting the formation of the Ukrainian artillery (Ripetskyi, 1956, p. 222). It is worth noting that R. Dashkevych's idea was facilitated by the decision of Halytsko-Bukovynsky committee, which was adopted in the summer of 1917 and aimed at organizing Halytsko-Bukovynsky kurin of the Sich Riflemen in Kyiv (Krypiakevych & Hnatevych, 1936, p. 446).

In order to start the first cannon battery formation, R. Dashkevych and Ye. Konovalets called on the “Temporary Main Council of the Ukrainians of Galicia, Bukovyna and Transcarpathia”, to appeal to the Ukrainians to join the ranks of the Sich Riflemen and replenish the ranks of the Ukrainian army (Pidkova, 2002, p. 761).

At the same time, despite the spontaneous Ukrainization process of military units and new volunteer units formation, the Ukrainian officers who served in the Russian army were not too eager to accept the Galicians and the Bukoynians into their ranks. The Ukrainian senior officers, brought up in the spirit of the Russian military tradition, were wary of accusations from the Russian command, who was hostile to the former Austrian soldiers, therefore, they focused mainly on military personnel of the former Russian Empire, ignoring representatives from Galicia and Bukovyna. The above mentioned circumstances contributed to the staff formation of Halytsko-Bukovynsky kurin, in particular R. Dashkevych's battery, because the unit was only being formed and all those willing were accepted for military service there (Kurakh, 1956, p. 4).

However, a difficult military and political situation in Kyiv, associated with an active Bolshevik agitation, had a negative impact and slowed down the process of army formation. R. Dashkevych characterized the current situation in Kyiv as follows: *“The Soviets, who came to power on November 7, 1917, formed their military units from the captured Austrians, the Germans, and primarily from the Magyars. The Ukrainian troops were needed as much as possible, all the more so because the Bolshevik agitators in Ukraine also started campaigning among the Ukrainian military units”* (Dashkevych, 1965, p. 8).

Despite the difficulties, R. Dashkevych received the approval of Ye. Konovalets and began recruiting those willing to join the ranks of cannon battery from among the Galician prisoners, who were in a temporary camp on the outskirts of Kyiv. On November 19, 1917, arriving at Darnytsky camp, R. Dashkevych selected the first 22 volunteers for kurin, who later became part of the Separate Corps of the Sich Riflemen and numbered more than 600 soldiers (4 infantry hundreds and R. Dashkevych's cannon battery) (Kovalchuk, 2006, p. 387).

As the experience of World War I proved, without artillery units, the infantry could not operate on the battlefield effectively (Внуков, 1938, с. 3). R. Dashkevych, as a front-line artilleryman, was perfectly aware of this fact, that is why, he undertook to reorganize the artillery department created by him in order to form the first cannon battery of the Sich Riflemen. The first gunners of the battery were: I. Vishnevsky, H. Horychka, I. Dmytrakh, P. Koval, M. Kurakh, P. Kuzyk, V. Oleskiv, S. Romaniuk, A. Stelmakh, V. Fedorovych and M. Shkvarko. R. Dashkevych noted their high level of motivation: *“They gave the mood and military spirit to the first battery, which was spread the entire rifle artillery then”* (Dashkevych, 1965, pp. 9–10).

The cannon battery formed by R. Dashkevych was actually the first artillery unit of the Ukrainian army. *“These twelve army men and horsemen became the beginning of the great Sich Riflemen artillery, later the Cannon Brigade of the Sich Riflemen, consisting of six cannon regiments”* – R. Dashkevych mentioned in his memoirs (Dashkevych, 1965, p. 10).

After resolving personnel issues, R. Dashkevych made considerable efforts to obtain artillery weapons and ammunition for the battery. Since all the necessary weapons for the battery could be obtained only from the demobilized units of the Russian army, R. Dashkevych together with nine artillerymen went to Kodno station, where artillery formations of the former empires arrived from the fronts of World War I. The commandant of the station informed R. Dashkevych where the abandoned cannons and other artillery items were located. *“Behind the territory of Kodno station, artillerymen found eight cannons with locks, eight ammunition chests, a field kitchen and wagons”* (Dashkevych, 1965, p. 16). Very soon, all the artillery weapons taken at the station were transported to the gun battery location.

Owing to R. Dashkevych’s perseverance and leadership skills it was possible to find and load artillery weapons onto the railway platform quickly, because the cannons were heavy, and there were no ramps for loading them at the station. In addition, there were only nine artillerymen with him, so owing to the ingenuity of R. Dashkevych, the problem was solved in the way he invented (R. Dashkevych invented a method of using wooden logs to load the property items onto the platform), and the weapons were loaded onto the railway platform. In addition to the above mentioned problems, there was a threat of notification about the artillerymen actions, of local Bolshevik agents, who at that time were in the Ukrainian cities and towns. Thus, R. Dashkevych, in order to obtain the desired weapons for the battery, demanded quick and coordinated actions from his subordinates. As a result of a successful operation, the battery received 60 horses, 4 cannons, 4 ammunition chests and a field kitchen. It is not surprising that R. Dashkevych, as a professional artilleryman, also paid much attention and training to battery’s gun calculations, and artillerymen were mostly trained according to the Austrian artillery textbooks. Their training was supervised by experienced artillery sergeants who, together with R. Dashkevych, escaped from the Russian captivity (Dashkevych, 1965, pp. 16–17).

R. Dashkevych paid much attention to a psychological training of his subordinates. Patriotic education, focused mainly on forming respect for the Ukrainian culture and traditions, loyalty to the ideas of liberation struggle, and it was of great importance for raising the fighting spirit. R. Dashkevych’s vision on this issue was formed by him as follows: *“One goal lit everything: the battery – against evil fate – will be... everyone worked as hard as they could. Everyone understood that this was the revolution, the war, the retreat”* (Dashkevych, 1965, p. 18).

In February – March of 1917, during the Bolshevik troops offensive on Kyiv and Zhytomyr, R. Dashkevych’s cannon battery protected the retreat of the UNR government. Government officials led by M. Hrushevsky, due to the Bolshevik armed attack in Kyiv,

were forced to flee to the city of Sarny. R. Dashkevych's cannon battery became a fire shield for the departure of the politicians of the Ukrainian People's Republic and did not allow the Bolsheviks to kill the leaders of the young Ukrainian state (Dashkevych, 1965, p. 17).

The personnel of the battery underwent a real baptism of fire at the end of January of 1918 in the battles with the Bolsheviks for Kyiv. At the beginning of March of 1918, R. Dashkevych reorganized the battery into a division. With the capture of the capital, R. Dashkevych's division was located in the Mykhailiv Monastery, where he formed a senior officer school for the training of command personnel. R. Dashkevych directly manages the educational process at the school and takes care of artillerymen teaching. In difficult battles with the Bolshevik troops, R. Dashkevych made significant efforts to strengthen the young Ukrainian artillery (Tkachuk, 2003, p. 14).

At the end of January of 1918, the corps of the Sich Riflemen was reorganized into Regiment 1 of the Sich Riflemen. Reorganization measures were carried out by the Sich Riflemen command in order to attract a larger number of Naddniprorianskykh soldiers to their ranks, who, as a result of the Bolshevik agitation influence, slowly joined the ranks of the Sich Riflemen, receiving them as the Austrian formations. Such actions gave a positive result immediately and the ranks of the Sich Riflemen were replenished with new volunteers daily. R. Dashkevych, was one of the initiators of this decision (Kovalchuk, 2006, pp. 29–30).

It is worth noting that it was R. Dashkevych who invented new tactics for the use of artillery units, which he used during the first Ukrainian-Bolshevik war. The essence of R. Dashkevych's idea was to increase the mobility of cannon calculations by placing them on railway platforms. R. Dashkevych described his idea as follows: *"The artillerymen pulled the cannon into the freight car. A hole was cut in the front wall for the mouth of the cannon, and the floor was cut at the end of the cannon mounts so that there would be resistance for the cannon when fired. The walls of the freight car were covered with bales of straw to make it safer from bullets and warmer. Ammunition was loaded. The cannon was ready to fire"*. Applying the calculation in this way made it possible to use a cannon in front of the train and conduct artillery fire during short stops, covering the actions of the infantry (Dashkevych, 1965, pp. 22–23). This idea of R. Dashkevych increased the mobility of artillery and its survivability increased significantly, because after firing, the cannon was quickly moved to another place so that the enemy could not respond quickly. In the future, R. Dashkevych's invented tactics of artillery operations, found its application not only in the Ukrainian army, but it was also widely used by the armies of the leading countries of the world.

R. Dashkevych constantly thought about the growth of field artillery not only professionally, but quantitatively. However, R. Dashkevych's intentions to reorganize the Sich Riflemen's artillery into a regiment were thwarted by a coup. On April 29, 1918, owing to the support of the German troops, power passed to Hetman P. Skoropadsky, and the Central Rada officials were arrested. Having gained power, P. Skoropadsky began to subordinate the Ukrainian military units, in particular, he sent his representatives to the Sich Riflemen with the demand to lay down their arms without resistance. However, they were refused. R. Dashkevych sadly recalled those events: *"...a battery could have killed the whole assembly... but it wouldn't have changed the situation. The German command was behind Hetman Skoropadsky. About 30,000 German troops were in Kyiv, and those 3,000 Sich Riflemen could not measure up"* (Dashkevych, 1965, p. 46).

Mostly, the Sich Riflemen, reacted negatively to P. Skoropadsky's coming to power. The soldiers noted that they had sworn to serve, first of all, the Ukrainian people, who

were represented by the CR. At that time, P. Skoropadsky demanded a full loyalty from the Sich Riflemen. Therefore, it is not surprising that Ye. Konovalets, after meeting with P. Skoropadsky, turned to his subordinates to inform them of the refusal to recognize the Hetman's authority: "... I submitted my opinion to the Hetman that the Sich Riflemen, as the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic, which it served faithfully, which together with other Ukrainian troops captured Kyiv, where many riflemen were killed in battles, cannot change their attitude overnight, because only that someone else's force – the Germans, removed the UNR government and appointed another government". The Sich Riflemen were in a full solidarity with the position of Ye. Konovalets, therefore supported his decision and once again declared, that they, the Sich Riflemen, are the army of the Ukrainian people, and not "mercenaries" of individual governments (Dashkevych, 1965, p. 48). As a result of disobedience, P. Skoropadsky ordered the disarmament of the Sich Riflemen (including R. Dashkevych's artillerymen), so the corps ceased to exist temporarily. R. Dashkevych made the conclusion: "*The battery disarmed. It was, it seems, on Holy Thursday, 1918*" (Dashkevych, 1965, p. 49).

In order to preserve the existence of his formation, R. Dashkevych was forced to redeploy the battery to the South in February of 1919, to continue his military service with his artillerymen as part of Zaporizhzhia Light Artillery Regiment commanded by Colonel Parfeniv. Very soon, R. Dashkevych's cannon battery was included into the regiment's staff and was named Battery 4 of Zaporizhzhia Light Artillery Regiment (Dashkevych, 1965, pp. 62–64). A new page in the history of R. Dashkevych's artillery began.

Despite the fact that as a result of the disarmament of the Sich Riflemen by the Hetman's troops, the artillerymen lost all their weapons, R. Dashkevych continued to worry about the combat readiness of his battery, and also agreed on training his artillerymen at Battery 3 named after Captain Savytsky. It is worth noting that even under such difficult conditions, R. Dashkevych managed to organize effective practical training, and thus, prevented demoralization of the subordinate artillerymen, who later proved themselves more than once in battles with enemies. In his memoirs, he concluded: "*Classes were easy. Artillerymen gathered at 7 o'clock in the morning. There were morning exercises, and often, instead of them there was singing... There was a half-hour drill, and then exercises with cannons and machine guns. At 10:00 p.m. the exercises ended and artillerymen went to the river... At 4 o'clock in the afternoon... military lectures on service continued, reading maps, measuring distances, controlling battery fire, making situational plans... This was followed by lectures on History of Ukraine, on literature, or books were read*" (Dashkevych, 1965, pp. 64–65). R. Dashkevych realized that only through regular, practical training he could maintain the combat readiness of his cannon battery.

In the fall of 1918, when Ye. Konovalets, after another appeal, received the permission of Hetman P. Skoropadsky to restore the Sich Rifle Corps, R. Dashkevych was one of the first to arrive at Bila Tserkva to begin re-forming the cannon unit. Very quickly, owing to the commander of the Sich artillery, a new artillery battery was formed and equipped with specialists and equipment. Somewhat paradoxically, however, it was precisely in the battles with Hetman's army, later, during the uprising of the UNR Directory, the newly created artillery formation demonstrated its fighting ability, and the Sich Riflemen were the best. V. Vynnychenko, one of the leaders of the Directory, recalled: "... but our main force, on which I relied the most, was the regiment of the Sich Riflemen, the Galicians, stationed in Bila Tserkva. There were one and a half thousand bayonets, the regiment was exemplary

disciplined and consisted of a nationally conscious element". He noted: *"This regiment, according to the organization, should serve as the core of the uprising, around which all our forces would gather"* (Vynnychenko, 1920, p. 90).

Along with R. Dashkevych's artillery, there was the unit of Captain F. Chernyk near Motovylyvka. He also noted the professionalism and courage of R. Dashkevych's artillerymen in battle: *"The Sich Riflemen battery was the most initiative in this battle and contributed to the victory at Motovylyvka not only by the fact that the cannons fired, but also carters fought bravely"* (Dashkevych, 1965, p. 90).

Further battles for Kyiv led more and more regiments and divisions of the Hetman's army to join the Directory's troops, which contributed to the replenishment of R. Dashkevych's artillery units with human resources and military equipment. At the beginning of December of 1918, he reorganized the artillery of the Sich Riflemen Corps of Ye. Konovalts into a cannon regiment. Later on, R. Dashkevych took an active part in the formation of the Black Sea Kosh artillery, Zaporizhzhia Corps and the Sirozhupannyky division (Tkachuk, 2003, p. 15).

After the capture of Kyiv, the military leadership of the Directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic appreciated the organizational and combat activity of the Sich Riflemen highly, and therefore promoted R. Dashkevych to the rank of an artillery colonel. In February of 1919, with his participation, six artillery regiments were formed, which were commanded by experienced artillerymen, senior officers Ya. Butryn, M. Kurakh, V. Zarytsky, D. Inkiv and O. Holubayev. Very soon, the formed regiments were united into a powerful artillery brigade, which numbered 4,600 soldiers and there were 70 cannons and 2,000 horses (CSAHAAU, f. 10781, d. 4, c. 1, pp. 124–125). The brigade was armed with 52 light cannons, 10 howitzers, 4 mountain cannons, 4 long-range cannons (Lytvyn, 1998, p. 172). R. Dashkevych constantly took care of all Ukrainian artillery and its development.

R. Dashkevych also made a significant contribution to the formation of cannon batteries of Iron Infantry Division 3 (Colonel O. Udovychenko), insurgent «Zaporizka Sich» (otaman Yu. Bozhko), the Black Sea Kosh and Volyn group. Under R. Dashkevych's leadership, two artillery regiments under command of V. Zarytsky and Ya. Butrym were formed, which he sent to help the Galician army of General M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko. On March 6, 1918, these regiments took part in the operation to destroy the ammunition warehouse of the Polish troops, which was located in the area of Lviv main railway station. As a result of successful actions of R. Dashkevych's artillery, a mass panic began among the Polish garrison, and the loss of ammunition negatively affected the fighting capacity of their troops. However, the Command of the Galician Army was unfortunately unable to take full advantage of the successful actions of the Naddniproshchyna artillerymen, losing the chance to liberate Lviv. As Polish historians later noted: "at that time the Galicians could return their capital!" (Lytvyn, 1998, pp. 333–335).

During his service, R. Dashkevych constantly paid much attention to riflemen training, maintained high discipline and order in the artillery units, took care of national and patriotic education, organized the celebration of the Christian Galician traditions. He was the first to achieve the liquidation of individual officers' canteens, which earned him authority and respect among the rank-and-file artillerymen. A famous the Sich Riflemen historian S. Ripetsky recalled: *"The artillery brigade was an exemplary part of the Sich Riflemen Corps. Its famous organization, discipline and combat command were the pride of the Sich Riflemen"* (Ripetskyi, 1956, p. 284).

In the winter of 1919, during the Bolshevik aggression against the Ukrainian People's Republic, R. Dashkevych's artillery regiments provided support for the actions of infantry

divisions at the fronts from Poltava to Vapniarka. Already at the beginning of April of 1919, he sent the Sich artillery (which at that time amounted to 80 cannons and 3,850 soldiers) to fight against the Bolshevik troops in Proskuriv, where R. Dashkevych's artillerymen stopped the enemy offensive (Dashkevych, 1965, p. 193).

One of the reasons for the Ukrainian army defeat was the entrapment of our troops by the Bolsheviks, the Denikin's army and the Polish army from three directions (Yakymovych, 2019, p. 183). In further actions of the troops of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the artillery units subordinate to R. Dashkevych joined partisan actions on December 6, 1920, and for a long time supported the Ukrainian army raids with fire. However, as a result of the military triumph of the Bolsheviks and the occupation of the Ukrainian lands, artillerymen of the Sich Riflemen Corps were interned in Poland. Later, the Sich Riflemen leaders Ye. Konovalets, R. Dashkevych, R. Sushko and the others formed the Ukrainian Military Organization in Vienna in 1920 (UMO), which continued the underground struggle against the enemies of the Ukrainian people (Udovychenko, 1954, p. 122).

Further activity of R. Dashkevych as a member of the Ukrainian Military Organization was of great importance to the Ukrainian struggle for statehood. On behalf of the UMO, he renewed the network of the "Sich" society in a number of countries and formed the military and patriotic association "Luh", in which by 1939 there were 500 members, and later on – almost 100 thousand young men and women (Naumenko, 2000, p. 401).

While in exile, R. Dashkevych took an active part in veteran organizations, wrote a series of memoirs about the period of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921 and his own experiences. However, R. Dashkevych was a modest and few-spoken person, that is why, unfortunately there are few memories of him from the senior officers with whom he fought side by side for the Ukrainian independence. "*My parents were miserly of their youth memories, military, and emigration years*", later wrote in his monograph, the son of General-Khorunzhy of the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic – Ya. Dashkevych (Dashkevych, Durbaka & Svarnyk, 2009, p. 10).

The Conclusions. Nowadays, the same as at that time, the Ukrainian people continue their struggle for independence in modern Russian-Ukrainian war. Every day thousands of artillerymen protect the Ukrainian land with fire from enemy aggression in the East of Ukraine. Naturally that one of the artillery brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, by Presidential Decree of May 6, 2019, was awarded the honorary title – "Artillery Brigade 26 named after General-Khorunzhy Roman Dashkevych" (Ukaz Prezidenta Ukrainy, 2019).

An important aspect of modern Ukrainian struggle for independence is objective study and awareness of one's own military history. The foundation for the education of future generations of soldiers in Ukraine, should become biographies of outstanding Ukrainian commanders of the period of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921, among whom R. Dashkevych occupies a leading place.

Thus, further biographical study of R. Dashkevych's figure is important not only in the context of an example of courage and professionalism to modern artillery commanders, but also an effective method of refuting the distorted ideas of the Soviet historiography about the absence of a military elite in the Ukrainian army at the beginning of the 20th century, becomes part of ways of effective counteraction to modern Russian narratives that convince the world of inability of the Ukrainians to build their own state.

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