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UKRAINIAN CANADIAN COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES IN INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL MATERIALS OF THE KGB OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR

Abstract. *The aim of the research is to analyze the activities of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) which attracted chief focus of the Committee of State Security (KGB) of the Ukrainian SSR and are accordingly reflected in its information and analytical materials. The research methodology is defined by an interdisciplinary approach and is based on general scientific and special scientific methods, first of all, retrospection and historical comparison. The scientific novelty of the research is that on the basis of declassified documents of the Soviet secret services the problems of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, which were of most interest to the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR, have been determined. The intelligence obtained information about the UCC's plans and initiatives was used in campaigns against the Canadian Ukrainians to "disintegrate" the Ukrainian Diaspora. The Conclusions. The UCC's activities, aimed not only at preserving Ukraine's cultural heritage overseas but also at uniting emigrants around the idea of liberating Ukraine and representing the world, contradicted the official Soviet ideology and undermined Moscow's propaganda efforts. As a result, the UCC's activities*

came to the forefront of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR, whose staff recorded key moments of its actions in the form of information and analytical materials. The greatest interest of the KGB, which had unconditional practical significance, was caused by: the history of the UCC and its structural development; resolutions adopted at congresses; international campaigns (for example, related to systematic human rights violations in the Ukrainian SSR, honoring the victims of the Holodomor of 1932 – 1933, etc.); the participation of the Canadian politicians in the UCC's activities (any support for the Canadian Ukrainians by the government or individual politicians was seen as cooperation with Western intelligence services); existing differences and measures to discredit the organization. Taking into consideration the fact that the UCC consisted of more than three dozen organizations, the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR was interested in deepening the differences between them, and thus complicating the activities of the UCC. The Soviet special services carried out operations to spread disinformation or the so-called “profitable” material in Canada, trying to cause a split among the Canadian Ukrainians, to create the atmosphere of mistrust and mutual suspicion. The KGB's “active measures” were designed to minimize the effects of the UCC's anti-Soviet measures. The perspective direction of the research is the study of the peculiarities of the work of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR with foreign agents and the conduct of special operations aimed at “disintegrating” the Diaspora.

Key words: Diaspora, Ukrainian Canadian Committee, Committee for State Security (KGB), information and analytical materials, discrediting.

ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ КОМІТЕТУ УКРАЇНЦІВ КАНАДИ В ІНФОРМАЦІЙНО-АНАЛІТИЧНИХ МАТЕРІАЛАХ КДБ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ РСР

Анотація. *Мета дослідження* – встановлення питань / напрямів діяльності Комітету українців Канади (КУК), які привертати найбільшу увагу Комітету державної безпеки (КДБ) Української РСР і відповідно відображені в його інформаційно-аналітичних матеріалах. **Методологія дослідження** визначається міждисциплінарним підходом і базується на загальнонаукових та спеціально-наукових методах, передусім ретроспекції та історичного порівняння. **Наукова новизна дослідження** полягає у тому, що на основі розсекречених документів радянських спецслужб визначено проблематику діяльності Комітету українців Канади, яка найбільше цікавила КДБ УРСР. Отримана агентурна інформація про плани та ініціативи КУК використовувалася у кампаніях проти канадських українців, завданням яких було “розкладання” української діаспори. **Висновки.** Діяльність КУК, що була спрямована не лише на збереження української культурної спадщини за океаном, але й нагуртування емігрантів навколо ідеї визволення України і здійснення представницьких функцій перед світовою громадськістю, суперечили офіційній радянській ідеології, підважуючи пропагандистські заходи Москви. Відтак, діяльність КУК опинилася в центрі уваги КДБ УРСР, співробітники якого у формі інформаційно-аналітичних матеріалів фіксували ключові моменти функціонування цієї організації. Найбільший інтерес КДБ, який мав безумовне практичне значення, викликали: історія КУК та його структурна розбудова; ухвалені на конгресах резолюції; міжнародні кампанії (наприклад, пов'язані із систематичними порушеннями прав людини в Українській РСР, вшанування жертв Голодомору 1932 – 1933 рр. тощо); участь канадських політиків у заходах КУК (будь-яка підтримка канадських українців з боку уряду чи окремих політиків розцінювалася як співпраця із західними спецслужбами); наявні розбіжності і заходи з компрометації організації. Враховуючи той факт, що КУК склався із понад трьох десятків організацій, КДБ УРСР був зацікавлений у поглибленні розходжень між ними, а відтак ускладнення діяльності КУК. Радянські спецслужби здійснювали операції з поширення у Канаді дезінформаційних або так званих “вигідних” матеріалів, намагаючись спричинити розкол поміж канадськими українцями, викликати атмосферу недовіри і взаємної підозрілості. Проведення “активних заходів” з боку КДБ було покликане мінімізувати наслідки антирадянських заходів КУК. Перспективним напрямком дослідження залишається вивчення особливостей роботи КДБ УРСР із закордонними агентами та проведення спецоперацій, покликаних “розкласти” діаспору.

Ключові слова: діаспора, Комітет українців Канади, Комітет державної безпеки, інформаційно-аналітичні матеріали, компрометація.

The Problem Statement. The Ukrainian diaspora in Western countries, in particular in Canada, was a special focus object of the special services of the Soviet Union, primarily the State Security Committee (KGB). One of the priority tasks of the Soviet Union was to prevent the consolidation of diaspora organizations, especially those that were given the propaganda label “nationalist” (FISU SSA, f. 1, c. 15708, vol. 10, p. 195). However, in 1940, despite all the efforts of Moscow, on the basis of the five biggest emigrant organizations of the Canadian Ukrainians, namely the Ukrainian Catholic Brotherhood, the Union of Ukrainian Independence, the Ukrainian National Association, the Union of State Hetmans and the Ukrainian Workers’ Association the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) was formed. Soon, it included the majority of diaspora associations of the Ukrainians, such as the League for Liberation of Ukraine, Ukrainian Women’s Association of Canada, the Brotherhood of the Former UPA Soldiers, and the others (more than thirty organizations in total). And although the UCC was created for the sake of more effective interaction with the Canadian government and the preservation of the cultural heritage of the Ukrainians, one of its tasks was to unite for the idea of fighting for the freedom of Ukraine (Makar, 2009, p. 435). Thus, in the memorandum of the UCC to Canadian Prime Minister William Mackenzie King dated March 23, 1943, it was emphasized that “the Ukrainian people aspire to be considered as an equal nation. The Ukrainian people believe that in the post-war world order, their aspirations for an independent, free state in free Europe should not be abandoned” (MFAU SSA, f. 1, d. 1, c. 95, p. 89).

The aspirations of the UCC announced in the above-mentioned memorandum became clear and unambiguous as a result of the arrival in Canada after World War II of representatives of the third wave of the Ukrainian emigration. This third wave of the Ukrainian emigration, apparently, prompted the Soviet special services to pay more attention to the UCC, asserting that its “true goals and practical activities... are fully subordinated to the task of consolidating the anti-Soviet nationalist elements and coordinating the hostile activities of organizations... against the USSR” (FISU SSA, f. 1, c. 16310, vol. 4, p. 20). Therefore, the UCC began to be attributed to: 1) the coordination of the Canadian anti-Soviet emigration; 2) development of a unified political position against the Soviet Union; 3) conducting the anti-Soviet campaigns aimed at discrediting the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR; 4) the organization of hostile actions against the Soviet institutions on the territory of Canada, as well as against delegations and individual Soviet citizens who arrived overseas. At the same time, the Soviet propaganda claimed that the UCC was “at the service of imperialist reaction” (FISU SSA, f. 1, c. 16310, vol. 4, pp. 20–21).

The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches. The issue raised in the article is elucidated in historical research works insufficiently. However, certain aspects of it, primarily the role of the diaspora in the restoration of Ukraine’s independence, were discussed by Yuri Neduzhko in his research (Neduzhko, 2009) and Vitaliy Makar (Makar, 2009). Undoubtedly, the research works of Serhiy Zhuk (Zhuk, 2017), Liubomyr Luciuk (Luciuk, 2020) and Olha Bertelsen (Bertelsen, 2021) are important, in which the activities of the KGB on the decay of the diaspora were analyzed. Some constituent issues, in particular, the role of the KGB in having contacts with the Canadian tourists, and implementation of a cultural exchange as infiltration method of the Soviet agents into the diaspora environment were studied by the author of this article (Siromskyi, 2019; Siromskyi, 2020).

The research is based on declassified documents of the Security Service of Ukraine Sectoral State Archive (hereinafter – the SSU SSA), Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine Sectoral

State Archive (hereinafter – the FISU SSA); materials of the former First Main Directorate of the KGB, responsible for foreign intelligence and sabotage and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Sectoral State Archive (hereinafter – the MFAU SSA). Informational and analytical documents of the KGB, written for the highest authorities and management of the USSR/UkrSSR, give an idea of what exactly interested the KGB in the activities of the UCC. These documents (summaries, analytical notes, references) contain data on various aspects of the life of the Ukrainians abroad (Viatrovych, 2016, p. 31), in particular, about the social and political activities of the UCC. The state security bodies made these documents for the state top political and party leadership and submitted them to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine or the CPSU in the form of “Information Notices” marked “Top secret”. Informational and analytical summaries of the KGB, as a rule, are classified by affiliation (in our case, these are documents of the KGB in the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR), period of origin and subject of presentation (Birchak, 2018, pp. 153–154). Information on the activities of the UCC was obtained by the Soviet special services from open sources (for example, the press of the Ukrainian émigrés), as well as by their agents (in the documents analyzed by us a number of such agents are mentioned, such as “Havrylov”, “Berezin”, “Savva”, etc.) (FISU SSA, f. 1, c. 16310, vol. 4, p. 52). In case of certain gaps in the messages received from Canada, the KGB reported “taking measures to obtain additional information” by means their channels (SSU SSA, f. 16, d. 1, c. 977, p. 395).

The Purpose of the Article. The purpose of the publication is to elucidate the main issues of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC), which were covered in the information and analytical materials of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR.

The Results of the Research. If we analyze the documents of the KGB, we can single out several thematic blocks/directions in the activities of the UCC the Soviet special services focused on, in particular: 1) history of the organization and its structural development; 2) resolutions and programme documents adopted at congresses; 3) the UCC campaigns (both domestic and international); 4) participation of the Canadian politicians in the UCC events; 5) disagreements and measures to compromise the organization.

1) History of the formation of the organization and its structural development. It may sound paradoxical, but the KGB employees studied the history of the formation of the UCC carefully, necessarily emphasizing the involvement of the Canadian government. The Soviet special services obtained information about the organization from various sources, including the official Canadian ones. Thus, the translation of the Guide of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police on the organizations of the Ukrainian emigrants, in particular the UCC, dated June 13, 1983, deserves special interest (FISU SSA, f. 1, c. 15708, vol. 1, pp. 140–153). In departmental archives, we also come across excerpts from the history of the UCC, made both on the basis of the Ukrainian diaspora newspapers and commissioned publications of “progressive” (pro-communist) historians and journalists.

In the context of the study of the history of the UCC by the Soviet special services, the conclusions made by the analysts of the First Main Directorate of the KGB are important. One of the most important is the recognition of the growing role of the Ukrainian Canadians, compared to the American Ukrainians, let alone the Ukrainian diasporas in Western Europe. At the same time, in an analytical note dated 1959, the KGB employees focused on the fact that, owing to the post-war emigration, the UCC expanded the range of its activities, paying more attention to political issues. In particular, the Soviet special services noted “a sharp interest growth in the liberation of Ukraine”. At the same time, the growth of the “negative”

influence of the UCC on the Canadian Ukrainians was noted (FISU SSA, f. 1, c. 15708, vol. 1, p. 144).

It was quite natural that the structure of the UCC grew and became broader, in particular, new commissions appeared (such as, for example, the commission on human rights), whose activities did not escape the attention of the KGB. The Soviet special services closely followed the re-election of the UCC leadership: sometimes the information was limited to a simple list of candidates or elected heads of the Presidium, but mainly their characteristics were prepared, with an emphasis on the attitude towards the Soviet Union. Another feature – the desire to find at least some involvement with the Nazis during the war years. For example, in the report on the candidate for the post of president of the UCC, Yaroslav Kalba (1971), it was stated: “From July of 1941, he was the deputy head of the youth education department of the Sonderkommando, since November of the same year, he was an official employee of Abvergrupa-204, engaged in the recruitment of agents” (SSU SSA, f. 16, d. 1, c. 1026, p. 111). Such data, sometimes completely unverified, could be used by the KGB not only against a specific person, but also against the entire organization.

2) *Resolutions and programme documents adopted at the Congresses of the UCC.* The KGB monitored and analyzed the course of the UCC congresses carefully, preparing analytical reports based on the results of each meeting. In the spirit of the communist propaganda and superiority, the congresses of the organization were often called “meetings of reactionaries” (SSU SSA, f. 16, d. 1, c. 1119, p. 300). Since the plan of action for the near future was discussed at such meetings, it was extremely important for the KGB to have all the information. In a similar way, the Soviet special services were interested in changes to the UCC documents. For example, during December of 1970 – October of 1971, the KGB closely followed the process of making changes to the Statute of the UCC, highlighting the differences between individual organizations concerning “a limited number of representatives in the management of the UCC” (SSU SSA, f. 16, d. 1, c. 1026, p. 110). In an every possible way the Soviet side tried to prevent the unification of the Ukrainians in the diaspora, fueling strife by its agents and defending the development of interstate cultural exchange, which acted as “an instrument of ideological struggle” and “propaganda of the socialist culture” (Siromskyi, 2020, p. 86). Obviously, this was understood by both the Canadian special services and the majority of the Ukrainians in the diaspora (this is evidenced by the decisions of the UCC Congress), which ultimately resulted in limited cultural and scientific cooperation between Canada and the USSR/UkrSSR. The scientists, who nevertheless received the opportunity to work overseas were accepted, according to the definition of a researcher Serhiy Zhuk, as “the KGB agents” (Zhuk, 2017, p. 166).

In the same way as the cultural exchange, tourist trips to the Ukrainian SSR caused an ambiguous treatment among the Canadian Ukrainians. In October of 1971 the 10th Congress of the UCC requested that the Canadian government provide legal support for the Canadian tourists by establishing a consulate in the Ukrainian SSR. However, the issue of the Canadian consulate in Kyiv was blocked in every way by the Soviet side, and foreign tourism was used by Moscow to deliver “necessary” information and create an attractive image of the communist regime in the international arena (Siromskyi, 2019, p. 688).

3) *The UCC campaigns (both domestic and international).* The Soviet special services paid considerable attention to the activities of the UCC at world exhibitions (Expo-67), major sports competitions (Olympics in Montreal in 1976 and Calgary in 1988), review conferences within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1977 –

1978, 1980 – 1983, 1986 – 1989). Special services tried to get copies of memorandums, petitions, letters of the UCC sent to Canadian, British or American politicians. They were also interested in various scientific events, historical symposia (in documents often referred as “pseudo-scientific”), political events, and commemorative evenings. The KGB was quite wary of the UCC’s intentions to appeal to one or another international institution or state authority of a certain country. This was the case, for example, when the XIIIth Congress of the UCC (1980) appealed to the Polish Parliament in solidarity with the Poles who rose up against the authoritarian regime (FISU SSA, f. 1, c. 16310, vol. 6, p. 59). The availability of information obtained by the KGB about the intentions of the UCC in the international arena gave the diplomats of the Soviet Union the opportunity to act in advance.

Almost all campaigns initiated by the UCC were given definitions of “anti-Soviet” and “enemy” from the KGB. The Soviet side was especially outraged by the support of the dissident movement in the Ukrainian SSR, the publication of books by Viacheslav Chornovil, Valentyn Moroz and other dissidents banned behind the “Iron Curtain”, as well as “letters of representatives of the intelligentsia arrested and persecuted in the Ukrainian SSR” (MFAU SSA, f. 1, d. 2, c. 1824, p. 116). In order to discredit these persons, the KGB tried to “send” to Canada all kinds of “incriminating materials” aimed at reducing support for the dissident movement.

The resolutions of the UCC, concerning honoring the victims of the Holodomor of 1932 – 1933, became irritating for the Soviet side (Neduzhko, 2009, p. 402). In April of 1983, a number of scholars from Canada founded the Fund for Research on Famine in Ukraine, later reorganized into the Committee for Research on Famine in Ukraine, and later – into the Ukrainian-Canadian Research and Documentation Center, which collected source materials on the history of the Holodomor. References to an artificial famine in Ukraine were regarded by the Soviet leadership as spreading false information and slander. The KGB “due to operational abilities” tried with all its might to spread information in the Canadian public space, aimed at undermining the credibility of the Ukrainian diasporic and Western historians, and on the other hand, “to prevent information from leaking abroad that can be used in a provocative campaign about “artificial famine”” (Danylenko, 2017, p. 424). However, a paradoxical situation arose when in Canada it was much more known about the Holodomor of 1932 – 1933 than in Ukraine (Kulchytskyi, p. 219). In response to the campaign commemorating the victims of the Holodomor of 1932 – 1933 in Western countries, primarily the USA and Canada, the KGB launched Operation “Pharisees”, trying to disprove the artificial nature of the famine of 1932 – 1933 in Ukraine and to compromise researchers and witnesses of the Holodomor. At the same time, in order to divert public attention, the Soviet special services, as part of “Operation Retribution”, intensified a campaign to accuse a number of the Canadian Ukrainians of crimes against humanity during World War II (Luciuk, 2020).

4) *Participation of the Canadian politicians in the UCC activities.* The Soviet side was outraged by the fact that “condescending to the anti-Soviet and anti-communist activities of the UCC, the Canadian government treats it as the only representative of the Ukrainian emigration in the country” (FISU SSA, f. 1, c. 16310, vol. 4, p. 22). On July 12, 1959, Lester Pearson, the leader of the Liberal Party, a diplomat, who became the Prime Minister of Canada a few years later, addressed the VIth Congress of the UCC. The General Assembly of the SZRU contains the English-language version of his address, in which the politician noted the contribution of the Ukrainians to the development of the federation, the diversification of its culture, etc. Certain fragments of the text are underlined with a blue pencil, in particular those when L. Pearson mentioned “the great Ukrainian hero Mazepa, who symbolizes an

incorruptible spirit of freedom... and became a banner for thousands of fighters against the communist tyranny in Ukraine and everywhere in the world” (FISU SSA, f. 1, c. 10791, vol. 1, p. 125). Obviously, someone from the KGB considered such phrase as the threat to the state security. Of course, the phrase “communist and Muscovite empire ... in the old reactionary sense” was not overlooked. Undoubtedly, such definitions did not impress the Soviet side at all and were interpreted as hostile (FISU SSA, f. 1, c. 10791, vol. 1, p. 127).

Similar tendencies were observed during the following years. Thus, in the autumn of 1972, the Xth Congress of the UCC was in the epicenter of attention, at which its leader Fr. Vasyl Kushnir handed over the powers of the president to Petro Kondra. The KGB studied the welcome speech of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau carefully, who, however, was cautious in his statements, speaking about the cultural heritage of the Ukrainians mainly. Instead, P. Kondra’s statements about the “impoverished situation and enslavement of the Ukrainian people on their native land”, as well as calls to “influence domestic and foreign policy”, did not escape the attention of the KGB employees (Danylenko, 2017, p. 262).

The KGB carefully recorded all appeals of the Canadian Ukrainians to local politicians and public figures regarding the release of political prisoners (John Diefenbaker, Pierre Trudeau, Brian Mulroney). As an example, we can mention the telegramme to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, Donald Jamieson, dated July 5, 1977, in which the UCC called on the Soviet Union to protest against the sentences of the members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group Mykola Rudenko and Oleksa Tykhyi, “to seek their release and permission to leave the USSR” (MFAU SSA, f. 1, d. 2, c. 3502, p. 68).

5) *Existing disagreements and measures to compromise the organization.* One of the established directions of the KGB’s work was the identification and strengthening of disagreements in the Ukrainian diaspora (Antoniuk, Trofymovych, 2021, p. 124). For this purpose, they used the capabilities of “foreign units”, in particular, the distribution of “useful” materials with the compromise of leading figures of the UCC (Bertelsen, 2021, p. 268). Most often, attention was drawn to differences in the methods of the anti-Soviet activity, ties with the Ukrainian SSR, perspectives of the struggle, and interreligious relations. For example, emphasis was laid on the fact that the LVU denies the right of the UNRada to call itself a government-in-exile, while the UNO and BUK defend this point of view, of course, the Soviet special services paid special attention to the confrontation between the people of Bandera (LVU) and the people of Melnyk (UNO), their desire to play a decisive role in the leadership of the UCC (FISU SSA, f. 1, c. 16310, vol. 4, p. 24). This situation forced diaspora communities to act in advance, realizing who benefits from internal disagreements (Seheda & Viedieniev., p. 189).

The KGB tried in every possible way to use certain facts from the biography, personal attitudes towards certain representatives of the dissident movement in Ukraine (for example, around the figures of Valentyn Moroz or Leonid Pliushch) to compromise the leadership of the UCC. During the XIIth Congress of the UCC, the Soviet special services noted disagreements concerning the invitation of the dissident L. Pliushch to participate in the meeting, who was accused of “Marxist and atheistic views”. As a result, the UCC cancelled the invitation of L. Pliushch to the meeting, but in the organization the atmosphere did not improve. At the same time, discussions about changes to the statute of the UCC, concerning the procedure for electing members of the Presidium of the organization, took place (FISU SSA, f. 1, c. 16310, vol. 4, p. 51). In the end, the KGB stated: “A characteristic feature of the internal life of this group (the UCC – The authors) is the fierce struggle among its members-organizations for leadership positions, efforts to impose their tactics

of struggle against the USSR, being at the reactionary forces service, and in the end, in general, considerable material benefits which are given by occupying the leading positions in nationalist activities” (FISU SSA, f. 1, c. 16310, vol. 4, p. 23).

The Conclusions. Therefore, in its informational and analytical documents, the KGB focused on the history of the UCC and changes in its structure, the topics of resolutions adopted at congresses, international campaigns of the Canadian Ukrainians, the participation of the Canadian politicians in the activities of the UCC, existing disagreements and measures to compromise the organization. Collected information, both from open sources and by agents, allowed to act ahead of time, to reduce the effectiveness of individual initiatives of the UCC. Owing to “active measures”, the KGB tried to discredit the leaders of the UCC and the organization in general, to introduce permanent disorganization into the ranks of the Ukrainian community in Canada, contributed to disagreements and political strife, the spread of an atmosphere of excessive suspicion, which ultimately led to the limitation of the anti-Soviet campaigns overseas.

A perspective direction of research remains the study of the peculiarities of the KGB work with foreign agents and the conduct of special operations aimed at causing “decay” of the diaspora.

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