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UKRAINIAN-POLISH INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN THE BORDER AREAS

Abstract. Integrative processes of the 21st century resulted in a new configuration of international relations in the eastern borders of the European Union. It was particularly evident in the Ukrainian-Polish border defined by the boundary that was established after the World War II. The purpose of this
article is scientific interpretation of active forms of the Ukrainian-Polish intercultural communication, induced by religious, denominational, and commemorative factors, as well as an analysis of a phenomenon of cross-border coexistence amidst the processes of Eurointegration at the end of the 20th – the beginning of the 21st century. The research methodology covers a wide spectrum of interdisciplinary scientific approaches developed by ethnology and cultural anthropology. Scientific apprehension of the Ukrainian-Polish relations in the categories Ours – Alien – Other based on the typology of memory studies – individual-communicative-cultural – made it possible to trace the nature of self-identification of residents in the Ukrainian-Polish border areas and measure the influence of religious and memorial factors on the Ukrainian-Polish intercultural borderline communication on the verge of centuries in the most effective way. The scientific novelty of this article consists in spotting typical mechanisms of intercultural and state-to-state Ukrainian-Polish interaction, definition of the role of historical stereotypes as consolidative power for the preservation (or failure to do it) of common historical heritage and building the Ukrainian-Polish relations in accordance with the traditions of European value landmarks. The Conclusions. The present-day Ukrainian-Polish border is a reflection of a socio-cultural phenomenon based on shared historical experience, collective memory, and negative/positive stereotypes. The conflict potential of the Ukrainian and Polish social relations took the form of disputes regarding the Greek-Catholic Cathedral in Przemyśl and the Cemetery of the Defenders of Lviv resulted from the Soviet suppression of historical memory, cultivation of negative stereotypes, and immaturity of elites. The positive aspect manifested through institutional activities aimed at preservation of cultural heritage by the means of Ukrainian and Polish publishing, exhibition and restoration projects, as well as intercultural discourse.

Key words: the Ukrainians, the Poles, border areas, ours–alien–other, Przemyśl, Lviv, cultural heritage, historical memory.

UKRAINIAN-POLISH INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN THE BORDER AREAS...
The Problem Statement. The phenomenon of multiculturalism and multiplicity of forms of identity at the international borders of modern Europe is an important scientific problem given the nature of integration processes of the last decades and extension of the system of European values towards the east. In terms of the Ukrainian-Polish relations, the matters of shared cultural heritage, mutual myths and stereotypes, and the potentiality of historical memory to generate conflicts remain unresolved, especially since the Republic of Poland joined the European Union in 2004. They are still highly relevant while the Ukrainians and the Poles are actively integrating on the political, economical, and cultural levels, attempting to build a new concept of good relations between neighbors mutually beneficial development.

The Analysis of Recent Research Works and Publications. Interdisciplinary studies of inter-ethnic relations in the last decades are conducted in line with the cognitive category of otherness. Traditional research paradigms based on the dichotomy ones of our own – the alien ones evolved in the direction of the problem we – others, where the neighborly others transitioned from the category of the unknown to the position of members of multi-ethnic and multicultural societies in the political states of the world (Burszta, 2004, p. 26). Adoption of the above-mentioned category is particularly relevant for the study of the phenomenon of borderline areas and inter-ethnic relations in those areas. Given the historical intensity of inter-ethnic contacts (existence of shared congregation clusters, such as markets, fairs, and pilgrimage sites on the Ukrainian-Polish border, the ethnic endogamy manifested in business, scientific, and cultural relations becomes increasingly intensive) (Obrębski, 2005, p. 95).

Political demarcation of the present-day Ukrainian-Polish border in 1951 not only reshaped the nations and their identities, but significantly influenced the transformation of the image of the alien through the lens of emerging neoteric historical myths and stereotypes (Chunikhina, 2020, p. 306). The role of border as a barrier of self-identification between ones of our own and the alien ones resulted in crystallization of the category of alienated border in the postwar years, “where routine exchange beyond the borders did not exist due to tensions and hostility between those states” (Donnan & Wilson, 2007, p. 77). In the 1970s – 1980s the Ukrainian-Polish inter-ethnic contacts created a new kind of co-existing border areas when “neighboring states reduced the tensions between them to the level that made cross-border interaction with a moderate strain in relations possible” (Donnan, Wilson, 2007, p. 77).

Proclamation of independence of Ukraine and democratic transformations in Poland at the beginning of the 1990s gave a boost to evolution of the Ukrainian-Polish borderline into a kind of interdependent borderline, primarily characterized by “symbiotic relations between border regions and corresponding states expressed through emergence of bilateral interstate economic, social, and cultural systems” (Donnan & Wilson, 2007, p. 77). Intensification of interethnic contacts, accumulation of new experience, and implementation of joint projects resulted in revival of historical memory within national narratives, as well as (de)construction of positive/negative images as a result (Dziadzia, 2020, pp. 35–36).

Axiomatic claim about the existence of “politically fair borders” being “impossible per se” was supported by the Polish researcher Tadeusz Chrzanowski. According to him, “no nation within the borders established by questionable means of “rightful laws” has no right for an exceptionally laudable history, and one that is often hard to admit. The latter brings no glory; it is a result of wrongs done to others – neighbours, who shared ownership over the given territory up to a certain point. They were made mortal enemies by ideologists of morbid, primarily nationalistic concepts” (Chrzanowski, 2001, p. 8).
Analysis of canons of the Ukrainian and Polish historical memories confirms the point about the existence of “two, often mutually exclusive, memories, formed under and on demands of international divisions” (Zowczak, 2011, p. 61). According to the Ukrainian ethnologist Roman Kyrchiv, the bilateral nature of old stereotypes in the borderline areas is reflected in “mitigation of ethnic self-expression and escalation of the ones of our own and the alien ones antithesis” (Kyrchiv, 2009, p. 604).

The Purpose of the Article is to critically analyze various forms of the Ukrainian-Polish cultural communication, reflected in religious and commemorative factors, as well as to reveal the phenomenon of cross-border co-existence during the Eurointegration processes at the end of the 20th – the beginning of the 21st century.

The Results of the Research. The ending of World War II brought the Ukrainians and the Poles not only huge casualties and material losses, but also newly-formed national borders. Population of the postwar border areas were forced to change citizenship and, occasionally, abandon their property, or even leave their homes. Regarding the emotional-reflectory stance ones of our own – the alien ones, the Ukrainian-Polish border remained in a state of uncertainty. The Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish communities of the border, which prior to World War II recepted each other via the antithesis we – others, rather than us – them, were forcibly deprived of traditions of multi-culturality and relative ethnic and religious tolerance at the level of interpersonal relationships.

Field ethnographic data collected at the Polish-Ukrainian border in 2008 – 2013 prove the defining role of a language as an identifying factor. For example, residents of Sianky village in Turka Raion of Lviv Oblast treated the Poles as their own because “they spoke our language more, they were local Poles” (AEINASU, f. 1, d. 2, c. 584, p. 5). The Poles differed from the Ukrainians only in praying at the Roman-Catholic churches instead of the Ukrainian ones. On the other hand, the Jews spoke “their own, Jewish language”, while the Ukrainians (who were the majority in rural areas) spoke “our own, Ukrainian language”. Regarding insulting names or conflicts, “There were no such things here. That was something that did not exist” (AEINASU, f. 1, d. 2, c. 584, p. 9). Similar memories were shared by the Poles, who lived in Czarna village near Ustrzyki Dolne: “There was not that much of difference (…) they paid no attention to us (…) they did not bother us and everything was fine” (AEINASU, f. 1, d. 2, c. 622, p. 78).

Negative stereotypes were mostly present in memories about the lack of personal contact experience. As recorded in Halivka in Starosambir Raion of Lviv Oblast, “Everything was peaceful here; it was less of a problem here. Something like that used to happen in the Polish villages. Well, they say, there were villages where those Polish banderas – well, not banderas, but whatever they were called – they took off your gloves. They took gloves off a living man. Over there, towards Boberka, close to the border in the direction of the San. That was the Home Army” (AEINASU, f. 1, d. 2, c. 622, p. 128). The activity of the Polish and Ukrainian guerilla units was often recepted equally in historical memory of borderline inhabitants, resulting in a paradoxical term “Polish banderas”.

For the Poles, who came from former eastern voivodeships of the Second Polish Republic, the negative stereotype about Banderites extrapolated to all Ukrainians. In the village of Bystre near Ustrzyki Dolne of Subcarpathian Voivodeship, a former citizen of Krystynopil (present-day Chervonohrad), who moved to Silesia shared a rather positive memory about the atmosphere of the Ukrainian-Polish relations during the interwar period whilst equating

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1 We presume that in an average citizen’s lexicon the term “banderite” was a synonym for a person, who fought for their land.
the actions of the UIA with the Ukrainians: “In those years it did not matter whether you were a Ukrainian or a Pole; people got married no matter what. One of my grandfathers was a Ukrainian, while the other one was a Pole” (AEINASU, f. 1, d. 2, c. 622, p. 196). Stereotypical extension of accountability for actions of individual representatives over each member of a society often conflicts with positive/neutral childhood memories about the Ukrainian-Polish relations within the scope of a single locality and emphasis on ethnic heterogeneity of one’s family. Analysis of field data leads to a conclusion that memory of contemporary residents of the Ukrainian-Polish border falls within the so-called “totalitarian pluralism” inherent to public opinion in post-Communism states. It features a concept of majority of residents supporting mutually exclusive ideas, thoughts, and political views (Hrycak, 2009, p. 225).

Proceeding from types of memories proposed by the German scientist Jan Assmann, field ethnologic data reflects the confrontation of individual memory with communicative and cultural memory, formed, inter alia, under the influence of tales from other people, as well as mass media in their social environment (Assmann, 2015, pp. 50–93; Prylutska, 2020, p. 211).

Meanwhile, forced monoethnization of the Soviet-Polish borderline territories after the end of World War II put an end to inter-ethnic Polish-Ukrainian military and political conflict. In the context of friendly relations between the “brotherly” Polish People’s Republic and the Ukrainian SSR, all Polish-Ukrainian/Jewish and Polish everyday relations became marginalized (Riabchuk, 2009, p. 260). According to the Polish sociologist Joanna Konieczna, the above-mentioned tradition “ceased to be a part of life of the Polish society and transitioned to the type of individual memory about historical events” (Koniechna, 2001, p. 5).

Nonetheless, the population of those border regions, who managed to stay in their native areas had met new others of their own – various specialists, sent from the USSR for establishing a new order. Analysis of expeditionary material showed that new inhabitants of border areas, who came from the east (those included the Ukrainians from the Ukrainian SSR and representatives of other nationalities) had failed to become theirs and fully integrate themselves into local communities. The locals, who call the new arrivals “migrants” or “evacuated”, clearly know where from and when the latter came. Sometimes, when misunderstandings between neighbours arise, the newcomers are being reproached and segregated with expressions like “you’re a beggar, you’ve come here, but what have you brought?” and the others (Czmełyk & Mróz, 2010, p. 95).

The collapse of the Soviet Union and democratic processes in the Central-Eastern Europe revitalized the Ukrainian and Polish relations in border areas. The newly-formed type of mutually dependant frontier was distinguished by active cooperation of its population regardless of national or religious denomination (Chmelyk, 2017, p. 177). The Ukrainian-Polish border areas saw reconsideration of negative historical stereotypes and emergence of new mutually positive images, reflected in transformations of the categories them/others.

Democratic transformations in Ukraine and Poland at the beginning of the 1990-s were distinguished by changes in social structures and value systems, as well as political instability. As metaphorically defined by the Polish historian Andrzej Wyrobisz, the Ukrainian-Polish relations began to feel the impact of “ghouls” of fear, hatred, intolerance, fanaticism, racism, nationalism, and hostility towards anything foreign” (Wyrobisz, 1991). Prejudice towards neighbours also occurred in inter-ethnic communication in the borderline areas, where regained freedom of expression of religious and national beliefs resulted in conflicting interests and expectations in the field of ethno-religious activities and efforts for preservation of heritage, revival of cultural life, and conservation of memorial sites.
Nonetheless, disdain towards the culture of neighbours, appropriation or even complete neglect for traditions and culture of *others* remained major challenges for the two cultures in the border.Activization of nationalistic or chauvinistic socio-political powers caused manipulation of historical interpretations and their politisation (Smoleński, 2001, p. 6). Excessive idealization, non-critical magnification of ethno-cultural features and achievements of one’s nation were compensated by marginalizing spiritual, material and cultural advancements of their neighbors. Reputable Polish public figure, editor of the “Kultura” magazine Jerzy Giedroyć recognized the presence of the complex of superiority over eastern neighbours in the Polish mentality (Gedroits’, 2000, pp. 5–7). In return, the Ukrainian national ideals in the border areas were reinforced by stereotypical notions about the Ukrainians being inferior to the Poles, similarly to the Germans toward the French and the Czechs towards the Austrians (Bidar, 2006, p. 68).

The destructive nature of national ambitions showed up in the 1990s in the border areas of Przemyśl and Lviv. In the Przemyśl Voivodeship, where 10 to 20 thousand Ukrainians lived (2 thousand living in the city) (Malikowski, 2010, p. 22; Polak, 1991b), a conflict erupted over the transfer of a cathedral to local Greek-Catholics. Restoration of eparchial structures of the Greek-Catholic Church at the beginning of 1991 was met with strong opposition from local Polish Roman-Catholics. The reason for this resistance was the fact of construction of a church for the Carmelite Order two centuries before the cassation of Emperor Joseph II and the transfer of the church to Greek Catholics. For local Ukrainians, the church being built on the foundation of an ancient Orthodox sanctuary and the hierarchs of the Roman-Catholic church agreeing upon giving back the temple to Greek Catholics remained a historical fact.

Having ensuring the support of local Roman-Catholic clerics, the Poles barricaded themselves in the church and protested via the local mass media. Representatives of the Polish community organizations not only rationalized their right for the church, but also blamed the Ukrainians in ruining the Polish cultural heritage in Przemyśl. The conflict between the representatives of different denominations of a single church was so severe that the will of His Holiness Pope John Paul II about the transition of the church to Greek Catholics was left unnoticed. In June of 1991, during his visit in Przemyśl the Pope gave the former Jesuit church, which stood several hundred meters below, to the Greek Catholic diocese. The appeal of John Paul to the faithful was also eloquent: “Let this diocese form an example of coexistence and unity in pluralism. Let love, tolerance and mutual understanding be stronger than any artificial divisions and disputes. Restoration of old nationalisms and enmity would be acting against the Christian identity” (P., O., 1991; Lytvyn & Khakhula, 2019, pp. 186–187).

The Carmelite church in Przemyśl became a symbol of dominance of negative stereotypes among the local population of the border areas. Back in 1994 the Polish “patriotic societies” decided to dismantle the Byzantine-style dome of the church built by Greek Catholics in the 19th century. Having obtained the local landmark conservator’s permit and declaring the necessity of returning its original look to the sacred object, the Poles took apart the Byzantine dome in 1996 (Malikowski, 2010, pp. 21–39). Symbolically, the 400th anniversary of the Union of Brest fell on that year. The Union was a symbol of unity of the Eastern and Western traditions, but the celebration ceremony was held in the nearby city of Jarosław (Hann, 2019)

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2 There were 129 active Ukrainian churches and 193 cemeteries in the Przemyśl Voivodeship. Branches of the Ukrainian Union in Poland, the Ukrainian People’s House in Przemyśl, the Bishop Hryhoriy Lakota Scientific Society in Jaroslaw, the Ukrainian Independent Youth Society, Dubrava folkloristic society with a center in Chotyniec, and others were the centers of national cultural life.
2001, pp. 190–193). Thus, the conflicts in Przemyśl had shown how much “religious matters (namely, formal and legal, involving relations between different denominations subject to single jurisdiction in Rome) weigh upon the Polish-Ukrainian relations, while there is no historical experience and sense of belonging to a single Church among Roman and Greek Catholics” (Polak, 1991a).

From the Ukrainian side of the border – in Lviv – a confrontation arose around restoration and honoring of the Polish memorial site, the Military Memorial in Lychakiv Cemetery in Lviv, known in the Polish collective memory as the Cemetery of Eaglets. For the Poles, restoration of the Eaglets memorial was a part of historical policy aimed at honoring those fallen in the struggle for revival of the Polish state in 1918–1920. In this reconstruction the Ukrainians saw an allusion to historical trauma, defeat and forgone craving for statehood (Khakhula, 2016, pp. 180–208).

Ideologically-driven barbaric devastation of the Cemetery of Eaglets with the Soviet bulldozers and tanks in August 25, 1971 symbolized a physical reprisal of the Polish military history and cultural heritage by the USSR leadership. Only the democratization of Ukraine allowed the Polish government and local elites to speak openly about the restoration of the memorial complex to its original (prewar) look by Rudolf Indruch.

Architectural details and texts of inscriptions on the central tomb of an unknown soldier and other sculpture and architectural compositions became subjects of controversies. The Polish side was trying to solve the conflict on two levels simultaneously: at the central level in Kyiv, and locally, in Lviv. The Polish-Ukrainian disputes were made needlessly severe by the socio-political situation in Ukraine, caused by low authority of President Leonid Kuchma and Kyiv officials in the community of Lviv. The Lviv City Council insisted that the Lychakiv Cemetery fell within its competence, while Kyiv had no right to impose its position.

The ceremonial opening of the Cemetery of Eaglets planned for May 2002 involving the presidents of Ukraine and Poland was compromised by local authorities and general public, who opposed the installation of the inscription about the “heroic defense of Lviv and the South-Eastern borderlands” by the Poles. The memorial’s problem was resolved only after the Orange Revolution, when the Polish side proposed a neutral inscription on the slab: “The grave of Polish soldier, died for the Fatherland” (“Tu leży żołnierz polski poległy za Ojczyznę”). In June 24, 2005 the opening ceremony for the Cemetery of Eaglets and the Ukrainian Galician Army Memorial was held at the Lychakiv Cemetery with the involvement of Presidents A. Kwaśniewski and V. Yushchenko, Polish and Ukrainian clergy, and the public (Ziółkowski, 2008, pp. 40–50).

While the Lviv conflict revitalized historical memory and politics over the history of all Polish society and diaspora, for the Ukrainians it was a conflict between a “provincial town on the border of its former parent state, a conflict of different canons of memory and interpretations of the past” (Lomann, 2003, p. 132). National and democratic elite of Lviv viewed the actions of the western neighbours as an attempt to impose the Polish perspective. Individual nationalistic organizations of Lviv (such as UNA-UNSO) saw chauvinism and claims for the territory of former Polish Galicia in the official stance of Warsaw. Only a minor part of Lviv intellectuals (coalesced around the periodical “Ji” (“Ї”) was willing to engage in a dialogue and compromise with the Poles.

According to the Polish historian Robert Traba, the presence of stereotypes in the Ukrainian-Polish relations is much more noticeable than among other European nations. Prominent Polish sociologist Antonina Kłoskowska believed that in Polish democratic
Society intolerance for the Ukrainians was stronger than for the Germans, and it was based on a historical background (Traba, 2001, p. 11). However, the prevalence of antagonistic beliefs in Przemyśl or Lviv reinforces the negative foundation, on which endless conflicts and disputes arise.

Throughout all the 20th century, religious, national or social conflicts dominated in the Ukrainian-Polish relations. Partially this became a continuation of traditions of previous centuries, as well as a reflection of prevalence of negative myths and stereotypes. At the same time, such aspects of relations between the Ukrainians and the Poles as common origins and cultural affinity were ignored or despised (Hud’, 2011, pp. 19–34). Traditionally, the Ukrainian-Polish border was predominately the territory with many memorial sites, which represent the cultural heritage of both nations. The purpose of culture as an external sign of identity is to create new meanings and forms of communication, building mutual respect and understanding. Despite the controversial status of individual memorial sites (the Lychakiv Cemetery in Lviv, the Greek-Catholic cathedral in Przemyśl, the Ossolineum collection in the Vasyl Stefanyk Lviv National Science Library of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine), it remains a part of historical canons of the Poles and the Ukrainians alike. Very often excessive care over such objects causes a severe reaction of the opposite side, a reaction which results from misunderstanding of historical contexts of nations’ cultural heritage origins (Khakhula, 2021).

After the postwar changes in borders, cultural values created by both nations for over a thousand years became the heritage of the Ukrainians/Poles. Thus, acceptance or rejection of world culture gives meaning to local identity, forms cultural and world outlook background for functioning of border communities. The biggest threat to the Ukrainian-Polish memorial sites is their ideological instrumentalization in favour of political interests (Syrnyk, 2022).

Thirty years of experience of cultural cooperation between democratic Ukraine and the Republic of Poland have shown that political elites understand the common background of historical and cultural heritage, and consequently mutual responsibility for its well-being and future. Poland, having developed the fundamentals of cultural policy at the beginning of the 2000s, namely in the field of preservation of cultural landmarks, started to implement several museum exhibition and restoration projects by the means of the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage. Involving experts from both countries allowed for quality restoration of the Lychakiv Cemetery, the Armenian Cathedral, and the Church of St. Peter and Paul (the former Jesuit church). Over 150 sacred and secular sites had been restored in 57 Ukrainian cities over the period of 1993 – 2014 following the initiative of such Polish institutions as Center of Polish Cultural Heritage Abroad (Kraków) and the Center of Preservation of Polish Heritage Abroad (Warsaw) (Petrus, 2020, pp. 26–43). It becomes clear that cultural memory and public consciousness of the Ukrainians and the Poles are gradually losing their conflict-inducing potential and become a platform for mutual understanding and dialogue, strengthening the civil society (Hahn, 2009, pp. 44–48).

Other joint Polish-Ukrainian initiatives are focused on museum publishing activities: scientific catalogues are being made as a result of thorough research of museums asset collections in the border areas, including those in Lviv (Kasprzak & Skoropadowa, 2008; Szabolowska & Seńkiw, 2009; Chomyn, 2015a; Chomyn, 2015b). Activity of such kind is intended not only to make the museums more popular, but also to show the versatile nature of cultural heritage. Historical consciousness of the Ukrainians and the Poles, formed over the centuries-old shared history within the Commonwealth of Poland and, later, within the
Austro-Hungarian or Russian empires, is reflected in spiritual and material cultures of local border communities. Despite most landmarks being under the custody of two neighbouring states, there is an understanding of responsibility for shared cultural heritage among the Poles and the Ukrainians.

Reflecting upon the nature of inter-ethnic cultural relations, Czech polonist Roman Baron noted: “Being able to see positive values and meanings in the other nation’s culture mostly implied a sine qua non condition for mutual understanding and unity” (Baron, 2013, p. 7). The present-day Polish-Ukrainian border as an environment, where different identities coexist and interlace, has a powerful capacity for the creation of new quality relations, the ultimate goal of which is shared prosperity based on European values (Kalakura, 2007, pp. 401–402).

The Conclusions. Therefore, the analysis of intercultural relations in the Ukrainian-Polish border proves the existence of a socio-cultural phenomenon based on shared historical experience, collective memory, and negative/positive stereotypes. The Ukrainian and Polish vision of ones of our own and the alien ones in the border areas stems from a similar system of values, predominately traumatic memory about the 20th century, and tolerant perception of cultural diversity.

The modern Ukrainian and Polish border is also distinguished by existence of a conflict-inducing potential of social relations суспільних відносин, often reflected in the patterns of appropriation/destruction of cultural heritage of a neighbour nation. Severe conflicts involving the Greek-Catholic church in Przemyśl and the Cemetery of Eaglets in Lviv were the result of the Soviet suppression of historical memory, cultivation of negative stereotypes and prejudice, and immaturity of political and public elites. Positive resolve of the specified issues has allowed for closer integration of the Ukrainians and the Poles within the European system of values.

The tradition of interpersonal and inter-ethnic contacts in the context of democratization of Ukraine and Poland at the end of the 20th century gained a new impetus, reinforced by institutional activity of cultural institutes. The Ukrainian and Polish elites began to realize the importance of cultural diversity for harmonizing inter-ethnic relations, as well as necessity of preservation and restoration of shared cultural heritage. Over the last thirty years, joint Ukrainian and Polish publishing, exhibition, and restoration projects encompassed Lviv, Lutsk, Lublin, Rzeszow, Zamość, and Przemyśl. Culture managers, researchers, and cultural practices hold regular meetings dedicated to matters of preservation of cultural heritage, persistently exchanging experience, expert scientists and restorers (Chmelyk, 2017, pp. 272–278).

The verge of the 20th and 21st centuries introduced the factor of individual, communicative and culture memory to the Ukrainian-Polish intercultural dialogue. These kinds of memorization not only enrich historical experience, but also aid in comprehending the many-sided socio-political processes of today. Researchers and, partially, managers and politicians recognize the fact that “the past is not an objective reality that can be easily discovered and comprehended by a historian or an anthropologist, since there is no objective past” (Kaniowska, 2003, p. 58). Hence they understand the challenges of impossible escape from “symbolic interpretation of the past and present, where myth and history are equal” (Hastrup, 1977, p. 25).

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