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**ARTILLERY OFFICERS' ROLE IN THE UKRAINIAN ARMIES FORMATION  
AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION OF 1917 – 1921**

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the research is to analyze the artillery officers' role in the armies artillery formation of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) (since 1917) and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) (since 1918), when the Ukrainian revolution of 1917 – 1921 broke out. The methodology of the research is based on the principles of objectivity, historicism, as well as the use of methods of analysis, synthesis, generalization. The scientific novelty is that, in spite of the presence of diverse studies on the officer corps in the historiography of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921, the artillery officers' role in the formation of artillery of the UNR / ZUNR armies was not clarified comprehensively. On the basis of official and unofficial documents, as well as memoirs of military and political figures of the UNR / ZUNR era, the artillery officers' efficacy and their impact on the combat readiness of artillery units have been analyzed. The efficacy and impact are considered to be one of the determining factors. The Conclusions.* *After the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires collapse, the Ukrainian people had the opportunity to build an independent state, but it was impossible to achieve this goal without the army ready for combat. The officers, who became the driving force of*

the Ukrainization process of corps, brigades and regiments of the former empires (in the summer and autumn of 1917, the Ukrainization of 17 light artillery brigades and 102 batteries of the Russian army; in November of 1918, the Ukrainization of the 33rd Artillery Regiment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire), played an important role in the formation of the first military units of the Ukrainian army. The first Ukrainian artillery divisions and batteries began to be formed on the initiative of the artillery officers (on January 1, 1918, on the initiative of O. Almazov, a cavalry and artillery division was formed; in January of 1918, under the leadership of K. Smovskiy, a cannon battery of the Haydamatskyi Kish of Slobidska Ukraine was formed, at the beginning of January of 1918 a separate cannon battery was formed in R. Dashkevych's Galician-Bukovynian Kurin, during December of 1918, on the initiative of S. Leshchi and other officers, cannon kish was formed in Kolomyia, Stanislaviv, Stryi, Sambir, Chortkiv, Ternopil, and Zolochiv), as evidenced by the memoirs of the direct participants in the events. The artillery officers were the most active among the large corps of officers of the Ukrainian army and made plenty of efforts in order to form the artillery of the UNR (since 1917) and ZUNR (since 1918). In spite of certain difficulties, which were caused by the external military threat and internal political contradictions, the process of army formation took place and played an important role in the formation of the Ukrainian statehood during the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921.

**Key words:** artillery officers, the UNR army, Galician Army, Ukrainian revolution of 1917 – 1921, Ukraine, artillery.

## РОЛЬ СТАРШИН-АРТИЛЕРИСТІВ У ФОРМУВАННІ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ АРМІЙ НА ПОЧАТКУ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ РЕВОЛЮЦІЇ 1917 – 1921 рр.

**Анотація. Мета дослідження:** проаналізувати роль старшин-артилеристів у формуванні артилерії армій УНР (з 1917 р.) та ЗУНР (з 1918 р.) на початку Української революції 1917 – 1921 рр. **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на принципах об'єктивності, історизму, а також використанні методів аналізу, синтезу, узагальнення. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що, незважаючи на наявність в історіографії Української революції 1917 – 1921 рр. низки досліджень офіцерського корпусу, досі не було комплексно з'ясовано роль старшин-артилеристів у формуванні артилерії армій УНР/ЗУНР. На основі офіційних та неофіційних документів, а також спогадів військових і громадсько-політичних діячів доби УНР/ЗУНР проаналізовано ефективність діяльності старшин-артилеристів та їх вплив на бойову готовність артилерійських частин, що є одним із визначальних факторів боєздатності збройних сил загалом. **Висновки.** Внаслідок розвалу Російської і Австро-Угорської імперій в українського народу з'явилась можливість збудувати незалежну державу, однак досягти цієї мети було неможливо без боєздатної армії. Важливу роль у формуванні перших військових частин українського війська відіграли офіцери, які стали двигуном процесу українізації корпусів, бригад і полків колишніх імперій (улітку-восени 1917 р. українізація 17 легких гарматних бригад та 102-х батареї російської армії, з листопада 1918 р. українізація 33-го гарматного полку армії Австро-Угорської імперії). З ініціативи старшин-артилеристів почали формуватися перші українські гарматні дивізіони та батареї (1 січня 1918 р. з ініціативи О. Алмазова було сформовано кінно-гарматний дивізіон, в січні 1918 р. під керівництвом К. Смовського – гарматну батарею Гайдамацького коша Слобідської України, на початку січня 1918 р. – окрему гарматну батарею в Галицько-Буковинському курені Р. Дашкевича, протягом грудня 1918 р. з ініціативи С. Леція та інших старшин утворено гарматні коші в Коломиї, Станислові, Стрию, Самборі, Чорткові, Тернополі і Золочеві), про що свідчать спогади безпосередніх учасників подій. Серед численного корпусу офіцерів українського війська, старшини-артилеристи були одними із найактивніших та доклали багато зусиль для формування артилерії армій УНР (з 1917 р.) та ЗУНР (з 1918 р.). Попри певні труднощі, зумовлені зовнішньою військовою загрозою та внутрішньополітичними суперечностями, процес формування війська відбувся та відіграв важливу роль у становленні української державності в період Української революції 1917 – 1921 рр.

**Ключові слова:** Старшини-артилеристи, армія УНР, Галицька Армія, Українська революція 1917 – 1921 рр., Україна, артилерія.

**The Problem Statement.** The Ukrainian armies' artillery of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921 at the initial stage of its formation inherited the organization, tactics of hostilities, armaments and large corps of officers, primarily from the imperial armies, in which numerous Ukrainians were enrolled. It was the officers of the artillery brigades, regiments and divisions of the armies of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires that became one of the main achievements of the Ukrainian armies at the stage of their formation. Equitably, there was an urgent need to build own Ukrainian army, and it was impossible to implement the task without the involvement of trained officers. The combat experience of artillery officers was particularly valuable as it was gained during World War I as well as the organizational skills acquired during military service.

There were a number of reasons (wounds, fatigue from World War I and the fervent desire to get back to the family as soon as possible) that complicated the process of involving significant Ukrainian officers in the Ukrainian armies artillery formation. Furthermore, numerous officers came under certain ideological anti-Ukrainian influences, which were cultivated by members of the Bolshevik and White movements in the military environment actively. Hence, their reliability and the feasibility of using their formation potential were brought into question. However, numerous artillery officers showed a sincere desire to serve in the Ukrainian army.

The combination of the above-mentioned reasons, mixed with the dynamic change in geopolitical conditions, required Ukrainian political leaders to take swift, decisive action in order to create a combative armed force that will be able to withstand growing threats from the Ukrainian statehood opponents. In spite of the somewhat slower pace than other branches of the military, the Ukrainization process of the artillery units and the formation of governing bodies took place, and the Ukrainian artillerymen were responsible for that.

The memoirs of military and political figures of that time contain diverse references to the artillery officers' activities. By large the effectiveness of their activities was determined not only by the combat readiness of artillery units but also by the combat effectiveness of the armed forces as a whole.

**The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications.** The issue concerning the artillery officers' role in the Ukrainian artillery formation with the outbreak of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917 – 1921 has not been comprehensively covered by researchers yet. But some elements of the above-mentioned topic were considered in the works written by the Ukrainian and foreign historians and scholars. The publications of P. Tkachuk and L. Kryvyziuk (Tkachuk, 2007; Tkachuk & Kryvyziuk, 2012; Tkachuk & Kryvyziuk, 2017) should be noted for the completeness of the covered material. Their works covered in detail the stages of the artillery units' formation and describe the key battles with the participation of the Galician Army artillery. In addition, the issues of training officers, mainly artillery officers, were also reflected in the works partially. In general, V. Zadunaisky's research concentrated on the military organization peculiarities of the Ukrainian formations during the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921, but the role of the officers, in particular, the artillerymen, in their formation was hardly covered (Zadunaiskyi, 2008). The works, written by M. Lytvyn (Lytvyn, 1998), Ya. Tynchenko (Tynchenko, 2011) and R. Tiutenko (Tiutenko, 2018) were more balanced in this respect. The generalized work of the Polish researcher G. Skrukwa, devoted to the structure of the Ukrainian People's Republic army in the crisis and the formation of the Ukrainian corps of officers in revolutionary conditions should also be mentioned (Skrukwa, 2008).

In order to analyze the role of key figures (the artillery officers), the authors considered memoirs and biographical studies of military and political figures of the UNR / ZUNR,

including M. Hrushevsky, P. Skoropadsky, P. Yeroshevych, M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko, K. Smovsky, R. Dashkevych, S. Matskevych and the others.

**The Purpose of the Research.** In our research, we aim at analyzing the artillery officers' role in the artillery formation of the armies of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) (since 1917) and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) (since 1918), when the Ukrainian revolution of 1917 – 1921 broke out, based on the memoirs of officers and archival materials.

**The Results of the Research.** The February Revolution of 1917 in Russia and the revolutionary processes in the Habsburg Empire in the autumn of 1918 caused the collapse of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian monarchies. As a result of the above-mentioned changes, socio-political life in the Ukrainian lands became more active and transformed into the National Liberation Movement, from which the state-building processes began. With the establishment of the Tsentralna Rada (Central Council of Ukraine) (March of 1917) (hereinafter CCU) and the State Secretariat (on November 9, 1918), the Ukrainian political leaders faced a serious military threat from outside immediately: from the Bolshevik and White Movements, which, as a result of the monarchical system collapse, spread rapidly across the territory of the former Russian Empire, and from Poland (restored in November of 1918) (Mahochiĭ, 2007, pp. 441–442). Among the internal problems there were discrepancies among the political leadership regarding the views on the future of Ukrainian states. Despite the difficult conditions that prevailed after World War I and the urgent need to protect the Ukrainian lands, there was no united position of solidarity on the creation of its own army, among the Ukrainian states leaders (Demianiuk, 2017, p. 165).

Hence, the state-building processes, in particular the formation and development of the Ukrainian armed forces with the outbreak of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917 – 1921, took place under the influence of internal political uncertainty and intense struggle on several fronts with external enemies (Verstiuk, 2003, p. 73).

It should be mentioned that in the context of building state institutions, the peculiarity of the Ukrainian armies' formation was that the above-mentioned process unfolded and gained strength from the bottom, and its large scale came as a complete surprise to the political elite (Horielov, 2007, pp. 298–310). The first Ukrainian military communities were created already in February–March of 1917 in the Russian army, and later on – the Ukrainian Corps Councils and Army Committees were formed (Yevtymovych, 1937).

Unfortunately, the National Liberation Movement leaders did not have a clear vision of the directions for the formation of their own armed forces (Lebedieva & Komova, 2021, p. 127). M. Hrushevsky, depicting the situation at the time, made the following conclusion: “There was nothing unexpected in the fact that the Ukrainian organizational wave was the strongest in military circles – the army, in general, gathered the very blossom, the very strength of citizens, and during the Russian revolution in general, the army proved to be the most active. It was more unexpected that this movement turned out to be a demand to form new Ukrainian military units... The reason for this was the formation of the Polish legions” (Hrushevskiy, 1992, p. 16).

In contrast to Naddnipryanshchyna (the Dnieper region), where the process of Ukrainization of the army happened relatively gradually, the Galician Army (hereinafter GA) from the first days of its existence was formed during the war with Poland, which was supported by the Triple Entente actively (Yakymovych, 2019, p. 183). The State Secretariat of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (hereinafter ZUNR) was in a predicament as it did not have significant mobilization resources, as about 100 000 Ukrainians were

enrolled during the war by the Austrian government and sent to distant Balkan fronts mostly (according to L. Shankovsky – more than 30 infantry, cannon, cavalry regiments) (Shankovskiy, 1999, p. 43). Therefore, the calls of the government of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic to the Galicians to protect their homeland were initially in vain. However, as in Nadnipyrianshchyna (the Dnieper region), the process of formation and creation of the first military units of the GA (combat groups “Sokal”, “Uhniv”, “Yavoriv”, “Stare Selo”, “Navariya”, etc.) was mainly characterized by spontaneity and mostly on the initiative of energetic Ukrainian officers (Mykytiuk, 1958, p. 77).

A common aspect for the Ukrainian armies at the initial stage of its formation was that, despite the imperfections of the building strategies of the political elite, the military played a leading role in the formation of the armed forces, among which the officer corps played a decisive role.

The organizational structure of the Ukrainian armed forces when the liberation struggles of 1917 – 1921 outburst, basically corresponded to the structure of the armies of the leading countries participating in World War I, in which the Ukrainians were the most numerous. The military formations of Nadnipyrianshchyna (the Dnieper region) borrowed the experience of the Russian army mostly, and the Galician Army favoured the Austro-Hungarian army experience. In different respects, both Ukrainian armies had their own characteristics, but the general structure of the ground forces was similar, consisting mainly of infantry, cavalry, engineering and armored units, as well as one of the most capable weapons at that time – artillery.

The process of forming artillery in the military formations of Nadnipyrianshchyna (the Dnieper region) actually set about with the Congress of Ukrainian artillerymen of the Reserve Army in Kazan, which took place on May 11, 1917. During the Congress, the delegates formed the Ukrainian Military Committee, which was headed by Colonel Savchenko and passed a resolution on the formation of the Ukrainian artillery batteries, divisions and brigades, sending a military delegation to Kyiv (CSASUGU, f. 1115, d. 1, c. 32, pp. 1–2; Verstiuk, 2012, pp. 10–11). As a result, 17 light artillery brigades and 102 batteries with 612 guns were Ukrainianized as part of infantry divisions in the summer and autumn of 1917 (Kliuchenko, 1931, pp. 5–9).

In fact, the artillery formation in the Galician Army (GA) began with the Ukrainization of the 33rd Austrian Artillery Regiment in Ternopil (from November of 1918), on the basis of which the first Ukrainian artillery battery was formed, led by chetar (junior officer) Yu. Poliansky (Kuzma, 1931, pp. 189–190). The orders of the State Secretariat for Military Affairs, issued on November 13, 1918, were vital for the formation of the GA artillery, which actually stimulated the process of mobilization (there were some difficulties with the mobilization when the war broke out) and the formation of twenty military districts: Lviv, Stanislaviv, Przemyśl, Stryi, Ternopil, Chernivtsi, Sambir, Zolochiv, Kolomyia, Chortkiv and the others. 12 district and 60 county military teams were formed, which played an important role in the formation of the GA artillery, as they were later entrusted with mobilization tasks, recruits training and officers training, in particular for the artillery (Kvasniuk, 2019, p. 115; Vistnyk Derzhavnoho Sekretariatu Viiskovykh Sprav, 1918).

In general, at the initial stage of its formation the artillery of the Ukrainian armies inherited, in addition to the organizational structure, tactics of hostilities, armaments, a large officer corps of the Ukrainians, many of whom served in the former imperial armies.

Taking into consideration the fact that there was a drastic need to defend their own lands, the Ukrainian government concerning the matters of building its own Ukrainian army relied

on the officers, who became the “personnel foundation” of the armed forces without any exaggeration. It should be mentioned that at the stage the Ukrainian army formation, the artillery officers, artillery brigades, regiments and divisions of the armies of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires became one of the main achievements. The combat experience of the artillery officers gained during their participation in World War I, and managerial skills acquired during military service were particularly valuable. The motivation and system of values, built upon the vivid examples of outstanding Ukrainian military victories of the past, provided the officers with the best understanding of the uniqueness of the chance given to the Ukrainian people to gain independence.

Oleksandr Ackermann, Artillery General, Chief of the Corps Artillery since the 27<sup>th</sup> of April, 1917, made a significant contribution to the Ukrainianization of the first artillery units of Nadniproshchyna (the Dnieper region), which were stationed in Bila Tserkva, Berdychiv and Vinnytsia and became the part of the 1st Ukrainian Corps (former the 34th Corps of the Russian Army). O. Ackermann, as part of the corps, was involved in the disarmament of the Bolshevik 2nd Guards Corps of Ye. Bosch in the autumn of 1917, who aimed at overthrowing the Central Council of Ukraine in Kyiv (Hai-Nyzhnyk, 2011, pp. 78–79). Pavlo Skoropadsky, who commanded the 1st Ukrainian Corps, recalling, made the following conclusion: “A remarkable person, my artillery inspector General Ackermann, put a lot of work into its development” (Skoropadskyi, 1995, p. 23). The artillery units of the corps were one of the most organized and combat-ready, although they were formed in the rear, and it contributed to the result of Ukrainization (Tkachuk, 2009, p. 134).

Among the front artillery, which later became part of the 2nd Zaporizhzhia Corps of the Central Council (Tsentralna Rada), it should be emphasized that Vasyl Kyrei, General, had a high level of motivation and fervent desire to serve the Ukrainian people, who carried out the Ukrainianization of artillery units and recruited more than 80% of the Ukrainians (Kolianchuk & Lytvyn, 1995, p. 163). The artillery of the corps, headed by V. Kyrei from April to autumn of 1917, numbered 27 gun batteries (108 guns). Later on he was replaced in this position by another artillery officer – Colonel V. Afanasiyev in the autumn of 1917 (Tkachuk, 2009, p. 135).

It should be mentioned that the Ukrainianization of the artillery brigades of the 11th Corps under the command of General P. Yeroshevych was quite organized: he paid much attention to the formation of the artillery of the 12th Division, which consisted of the Ukrainians and occupied an important place in the combat readiness of the Central Council troops. P. Yeroshevych recalled that after the collapse of the Russian army in November of 1917 he managed to withdraw from the front at the disposal of the Ukrainian General Military Committee six batteries (36 guns) in the 12th Division (Yeroshevych, 1939, p. 9).

Odesa Serhiivska Artillery School, which was Ukrainianized in the autumn of 1917 under the leadership of General Andriy Nilus, played an important role in the formation of the Ukrainian artillery and training of officers for the military formations of Nadniproshchyna (the Dnieper region). Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko, who commanded the infantry school at that time, recollected about A. Nilus: “He was an educated and highly authoritative person among the school staff. In this terrible time he was able to defend the position of the school, which allowed the normal continuation of training of future artillery officers” (Omelianovych-Pavlenko, 2002, p. 52).

In addition to the Ukrainianization of the former artillery units of the Russian Empire, on the initiative of the officers, volunteer artillery units (separate artillery batteries and

divisions) were actively formed, which strengthened the artillery of the Central Council troops significantly. Among the first officers to lead this process were: O. Almazov (on January 1, 1918 he headed the cavalry and artillery division), K. Smovsky (in January of 1918 he created and headed the artillery battery of the Haydamatsky Kish of Slobidska Ukraine), R. Dashkevych (at the beginning of January of 1918 he created and headed a separate artillery battery in Galicia-Bukovyna kyren') and the others (Lytvyn & Naumenko, 2004, pp. 94–95).

There were often cases when the decisive actions taken by the officers allowed to attract a significant amount of weapons for the Ukrainian artillery, as K. Smovsky described it in detail in his memoirs: Colonel V. Afanasiyev ordered to organize one battery with horsepower. "The Kish headquarters has information that many echelons of cannon units from different fronts are gathering at Darnytsia station, including the Ukrainianized ones...". Having arrived at the railway station, K. Smovsky, along with a team of young cadets, began negotiations with the command of the division. As the officers did not support the request of the Kish headquarters (to gather instantaneously and go to the Ukrainian front in full force), and the soldiers began to plunder military property, K. Smovsky ordered the fire brigade to retreat 150 steps and take up firing positions. "You must follow my orders exactly, because otherwise the mob can crush us". K. Smovsky turned to his subordinates. Then he shouted: "Go away immediately, because we will shoot!" However, only after the fire was opened over their heads, the "soldier" ran in different directions, and K. Smovsky gave order to his driver to hook up with the echelons of the division, three more cars with heavy guns, which were on the next platform and go to the Haydamatsky Kish (Smovsky, 1935, pp. 141–144).

In some places, the property needed for artillery batteries could be obtained only due to the personal qualities of the artillery officers. According to R. Dashkevych's memoirs: "The locomotive arrived at Korosten station late in the evening. Chaos reigned at the station. Hundreds of soldiers, who left their military units were waiting for trains to take them home... The Bolshevik agitators were campaigning among the soldiers, agitating against the Ukrainian government... Some batteries were being transferred to demobilization at the station...". As soon as R. Dashkevych arrived at the station, he went to the echelons to check the artillery property that was there.

When R. Dashkevych assured that it was impossible to take out guns and horses under those conditions, he decided to steal at least the cannon locks, sighting panoramas and telephones (there was the lack of them in the Kish), at night when everyone fell asleep, with the help of the station commandant, and to send everything to Zhytomyr, where the battery of the Galician-Bukovynian kyren' was (Dashkevych, 1965, pp. 13–15).

However, the anti-Ukrainian propaganda prevented more active involvement of officers in the service of the Ukrainian artillery. Later on, some units under the leadership of the Ukrainian artillery officers took part in the October Revolution in Petrograd and Moscow on the side of the Bolsheviks (the Ukrainian heavy battery on the Moscow garrison "established" the Soviet power in Tula). In some places, the political populism of government officials prevented the involvement of artillery officers in the artillery military formations of the UNR army. According to further development of events, one of the most destructive was the decision of the Central Council on the mandatory affiliation of officers, who served in the Ukrainian military units as of 1917, to any socialist party (Tynchenko, 2011, p. 89).

The above-mentioned facts mostly affected the mood of the officers corps negatively and prevented the Ukrainian General Military Committee from pursuing personnel policy more efficiently at the initial stage of the Ukrainian armies formation, in particular in the artillery.

Under the influence of the invasive actions of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (restored in November of 1918), the first artillery units of the Galician Army (GA), as in Nadnipyrianshchyna (the Dnieper region), were formed on the initiative of officers mainly. Further reorganization measures, which were taken after the November uprising in the army of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) in January of 1919 under the leadership of Chief of Staff Ye. Mishkovsky, led to the formation of three corps of four brigades in each and one artillery regiment in each (Panas, 2015, p. 78). It should be mentioned that a great amount of attention was paid to the development of artillery; the command relied on experienced Ukrainian artillery officers, who were recruited from the army of the Austro-Hungarian Empire mainly. S. Matskevych, Commander of one of the cannon regiments, made the following remark: "Its very good organization, this one of the most important flags of the GA, owed not only to well-trained gunsmiths, but also to prominent artillery officers, commanders of batteries and regiments with their extensive combat experience and organizational skills. From the modest remnants of the Austrian army, soon these commanders formed batteries and cannon regiments so well that the artillery of the GA surpassed the Polish artillery and the artillery of Nadnipyrianshchyna" (Mykytiuk, 1958, p. 177).

The artillery kishs, played an important role in the combat readiness of the Galician army, which were founded in December of 1918 under the leadership of artillery officers (in Kolomyia, Stanislaviv, Stryi, Sambir, Chortkiv, Ternopil, and Zolochiv) under the District Military Commands (hereinafter DMC). They organized cannon batteries and sent them to the front. One of the most organized was the cannon kish in Zolochiv, commanded by Captain S. Leshchiiy. The perseverance and energy of S. Leshchiiy were described the best way by the Commander of the artillery regiment Stepan Matskevych: As soon as a new transport of abandoned guns, or brought from Zbruch, appeared at the station, they were immediately transported to the cannon kish, where they were disassembled, cleaned, lubricated and adjusted so that they were ready for combat. Then the assigned service staff was trained, took care of the horses, harness and the whole outfit, and in a few weeks a new battery grew, which was ready for combat" (Mykytiuk, 1958, pp. 179–180).

According to a historian L. Shankovsky, in general, DMC prepared and sent to the front: Zolochiv – 20 gun batteries (battery commanders S. Leshchi, V. Halan, A. Kozak, O. Tsarevych, I. Baleshta, A. Buchak, O. Melnykovich, O. Vynnychuk and the others); Stryi – 8 (T. Matskiv, I. Mykhailiv, R. Oleksiy, S. Kohut, H. Pushkar, etc.); Kolomyia – 8 (V. Totoyeskul, Ya. Kurylyuk, T. Polikha, V. Stafinyak, etc.); Stanislaviv – 7 (I. Baltro, V. Zubrytskyi, I. Medvid, A. Vaidakevych, etc.). Kishs in Ternopil, Chortkiv, Sambir organized five batteries (Shankovsky, 1999, pp. 285–286).

Despite the dynamic process of transfer of the Ukrainian artillery officers to the artillery units of the GA, the military command of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) faced problems and challenges that complicated the process of attracting a significant number of officers to the service. It was primarily due to the lack of time caused by the Polish offensive. Numerous Ukrainian officers, who could potentially join the ranks of the artillery units did not return from the Italian front yet (many Ukrainians served in the Austro-Hungarian army) or were captured by the enemy (Shankovsky, 1999, p. 43). Compared to Nadnipyrianshchyna, which was the part of the Russian Empire, where military service launched career prospects for the Ukrainians, in Galicia (Halychyna), which was the part of Austria-Hungary, military service was not popular among the population. Andriy Tchaikovsky, who held the position of Sambir Povit Commissioner during the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR),

aptly described the Galicians' attitude to the service: "The majority of us hated the military uniform, like a prisoner's clothes... Antimilitarism among the Ukrainian citizens. It was promoted by the Ukrainian intelligentsia... And our youth liked this propaganda so much that they even tried to walk in that manner so that it would not resemble a direct military march" (Holubko, 2006, p. 182).

Hence, the political leaders of both the Central Council and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic made important decisions about building an army in the face of serious challenges related to the consequences of World War I. The officers, including a large number of artillery officers, became a reliable support for the Ukrainian authorities in Nadnipyrianshchyna, as well as in the Western Ukrainian People's Republic. They were at the forefront of forming the combat-ready army. The effectiveness of their activities was largely determined not only by the combat readiness of artillery units but also by the combat capability of the armed forces in general.

**The Conclusions.** The desire of the Ukrainian people to gain statehood was directly related to the ability of the political leaders of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) to build armed forces ready to combat. At that time artillery was one of the most capable weapons. Officers were the basis of the Ukrainian artillery, who played a key role in the formation of the Ukrainian armies when the Ukrainian revolution of 1917 – 1921 broke out. However, there were a number of reasons, that occurred due to the consequences of First World War I, which made it difficult to recruit significant artillery potential into the Ukrainian artillery. Among them the following reasons should be singled out:

- the external military threat from Russia (both the Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik) and Poland;
- the lack of managerial experience of the Ukrainian government and political differences over the future of the state (including different views on the structure and size of the armed forces);
- the rapid spread of the ideological Bolshevik and White ideas in the Ukrainian military environment (career growth, populist land promises, abolition of subordination in the army, the idea of indivisible Great Russia, etc.);
- general depletion of resources after World War I (destroyed infrastructure, dead, wounded, war-weary officers, the desire to return home as soon as possible);
- distrust of the political leadership to the artillery officers, who served in the Russian army;
- the presence of a significant number of officers on the distant fronts of World War I and in captivity.

The combination of the above-mentioned reasons, mixed with the dynamic change in geopolitical conditions, required the Ukrainian political leaders to take swift, decisive action to create a capable armed force that could withstand growing threats from opponents of the Ukrainian statehood. However, despite being somewhat slower than other weapons, the process of Ukrainization and the formation of the Ukrainian artillery took place primarily due to artillery officers, many of whom showed a sincere desire to serve the Ukrainian people. This desire was, first of all, due to the following:

- the presence of a significant number of initiative and highly motivated artillery officers;
- combat and management experience of artillery officers gained during World War I and military service;

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