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## THE ROLE OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN CIVIC IDENTITY FORMATION IN MODERN UKRAINE

**Abstract. The Purpose of the Study.** *Based on the fact that civic identity remains one of the crucial motivators of a person's behaviour, its formation through educational institutions is an essential means of ensuring the state national security. Therefore, it seems complicated to determine the nature and factors of educational institutions' influence on the formation of civic identity in modern Ukraine.*  
**The Research Methodology.** *The study combines the use of variable scientific abstraction with modelling and analysis of hierarchies. Besides, critical discourse analysis and content analysis methods have been used and the orientation-value method, political and legal analysis.*

**The Scientific Novelty.** The main work directions of educational institutions of modern Ukraine in the formation of civic identity and the nature of the organization of patriotic education have been determined. The paper contains an assessment of educational institutions effectiveness in this area based on the civilizational approach. The influence of globalization processes and the Russian Federation of aggressive plans for Ukraine on the formation of civic identity in Ukraine have been elucidated. The impact of state policy on educational institutions efficiency and readiness to adapt to the “knowledge economy” requirements have been determined. The main threats to national security in the formation of civic identity by educational institutions have been outlined. **The Conclusions.** The prolonged absence of statehood has significantly affected the formation of civic identity by educational institutions in Ukraine. Another problem was the lack of a strategy for constructing the information space in the context of its protection from information wars in other countries’ interests. The number of respondents who mostly consider themselves citizens of modern Ukraine is not growing fast enough. When this is not a priority for the state, it is not surprising that there is a reduction in training courses on the history of Ukraine. Refusal of humanitarian disciplines in technical educational institutions cannot promote full-fledged patriotic education of youth. However, the priority of civic identity over other identities proved to be extremely important under the conditions of war and a large-scale growth of external labour migration. Success in the civic identity formation by educational institutions, as evidenced by the active civic position of the population of modern Ukraine during the Orange Revolution, the Revolution of Dignity and the war in Donbas, should not be a thing of the past. Educational institutions’ potential in this area is vital for ensuring the state national security, preserving its integrity.

**Key words:** education, identity, citizen, civil society, state.

## РОЛЬ ЗАКЛАДІВ ОСВІТИ У ФОРМУВАННІ ГРОМАДЯНСЬКОЇ ІДЕНТИЧНОСТІ В СУЧАСНІЙ УКРАЇНІ

**Анотація. Мета дослідження.** Виходячи з того, що громадянська ідентичність залишається одним із важливих мотиваторів поведінки особи, її формування через освітянські заклади виступає важливим засобом забезпечення національної безпеки держави. Тому важливим видається з’ясування характеру та чинників впливу освітянських закладів на формування громадянської ідентичності в сучасній Україні. **Методологія дослідження.** У статті поєднане використання варіативного наукового абстрагування із моделюванням й аналізом ієрархій. Крім того, використані методи критичного дискурс-аналізу та контент-аналізу, а також орієнтаційно-ціннісний метод і політико-правовий аналіз. **Наукова новизна.** Визначено основні напрями роботи освітянських закладів сучасної України у формуванні громадянської ідентичності та характер організації патріотичного виховання. У роботі міститься оцінка ефективності роботи закладів освіти у цьому напрямі, заснована на дотриманні цивілізаційного підходу. Показано вплив глобалізаційних процесів та реалізації Російською Федерацією агресивних планів щодо України на формування громадянської ідентичності в Україні. Визначено вплив державної політики у сфері освіти на ефективність роботи освітянських закладів та їх готовність адаптуватися до нових вимог “економіки знань”. Окреслені основні загрози національній безпеці у контексті формування закладами освіти громадянської ідентичності. **Висновки.** Тривала відсутність державності суттєво вплинула на формування освітянськими закладами України громадянської ідентичності. Проблемою також стала відсутність стратегії формування інформаційного простору у контексті його захисту від інформаційних воєн в інтересах інших країн. Зростання кількості респондентів, які переважно вважають себе громадянами сучасної України, відбувається не досить швидко. В умовах, коли для держави це не є пріоритетом, не дивно, що відбувається скорочення навчальних курсів з історії України. Відмова від гуманітарних дисциплін у технічних освітніх закладах не може сприяти повноцінному патріотичному вихованню молоді. Однак пріоритет громадянської ідентичності над іншими ідентичностями виявився надзвичайно важливим в умовах війни та масштабного зростання зовнішньої трудової міграції. Успіхи на шляху формування громадянської ідентичності освітянськими закладами, про що свідчила активна громадянська позиція населення сучасної України в роки Помаранчевої революції, Революції Гідності та війни на Донбасі, не повинні відійти у минуле. Потенціал закладів

*освіти у цій сфері важливий для забезпечення національної безпеки держави, збереження її цілісності.*

**Ключові слова:** *освіта, ідентичність, громадянин, громадянське суспільство, держава.*

**The Problem Statement.** On December 1, 1991, the vast majority of the Ukrainian citizens spoke in support of independence. However, ideas about further developing the country and state-building priorities determined the civic position were gradually formed. This process took place under the influence of understanding and rethinking the role and place of Ukraine in the world and European historical process, the fate of the Ukrainian lands during the world wars, during the years of the USSR. It became essential to realize the responsibility of citizens for the future of the country. The obstacle was regionalism, cultivated in some regions of the state with the support of influential domestic and foreign political forces. Another critical factor was the process of globalization, which was accompanied by an increase in external labour migration, a “brain drain”, and the imposition of specific values that are not always acceptable to nation-states.

Under such circumstances, the issue of civic identity for modern Ukraine becomes an essential means of preserving the state. Therefore, at the country’s top leadership initiative, educational institutions have been transformed into powerful means of influencing citizens’ self-identification. The relatively long period of formation and development of personality during secondary and higher education provided ample opportunities for patriotic education and state thinking, overcoming the identity crisis. That included blurred values and foreign policy orientations, raising society’s general aggression with an active search for “enemies” regional, ethnic and interfaith relations. Ukrainization in the younger generations’ upbringing was to be an influential factor in the consolidation of society. The state Ukrainian language in the educational process helped overcome the language dictates of the Ukrainian cities’ Russian-speaking atmosphere.

**The Analysis of Sources and Recent Research Papers.** In this study’s context, it is appropriate to highlight X. Yonggen, (Yonggen, 2001), C. Rice, J. Klein (Klein & Rice, 2012). They paid much attention to analyzing the impact of educational institutions’ nature on social stability in the context of national security. G. Beckett, G. Postiglione explored the provision of “social harmony” through the assimilative role of language policy (Beckett & Postiglione, 2012). The specifics of the transformation of education in the modern world were studied by J. West-Burnham and L. Chapman (West-Burnham, 2009; Chapman & West-Burnham, 2010), analyzing it through the prism of social justice. The analysis of the influence of education on the socialization of marginalized strata of society is presented in the study of M. Bertrand and K. C. Rodela (Bertrand & Rodela, 2018), H. Haste analyzed the process of “constructing citizens” in Western culture formation an appropriate narrative aimed at accepting democratic values (Haste, 2004). S. Kvit’s work deserves attention (Kvit, 2020), who analyzed the development of higher education in Ukraine during the years of independence, as well as the analysis of the policy of decommunization of Y. Shapoval, I. Vasylieva and I. Matviienko (Shapoval, Vasylieva, Matviienko, 2020), who singled out the measures needed to overcome Soviet identity and identification in the Ukrainian society. It is also important to note the work of O. Sytnyk (Sytnyk, 2017), which shows the dependence of the implementation of aggressive plans of the Russian Federation in relation to Ukraine on the attitude of the Ukrainian citizens to Russia and Russians. In this context, we note the analysis of the national consciousness of the Ukrainians in Donetsk region at the beginning

of the development of the Ukrainian independent state (Sytnyk & Sytnyk, 2020). In general, the authors of many scientific studies agree on the importance of forming a civic identity in educational institutions, as it is an important component of ensuring national stability.

**The Purpose of the Research.** Based on the fact that civic identity remains one of the essential motivators of a person's behaviour, its formation through educational institutions is a vital means of ensuring the state's national security. Therefore, it seems complicated to determine the nature and factors of educational institutions' influence on the formation of civic identity in modern Ukraine.

**The Results of the Research.** The modern concept of identity gives the most outstanding value to authenticity, confirming the significance of the inner essence, which cannot express itself. In this case, the priority is the inner self, not the outer self, although a person may often not know the true inner self, only feeling that he is forced to live his own life (Fukuiaama, 2020, p. 36).

The collapse of the USSR and the restoration of the Ukrainian statehood have sharply raised civic identity in Ukraine. The severity of the problem was due to several important political, economic and social factors.

It was important for Ukraine to ensure the state unity and territorial integrity in the face of escalating confrontation with the Russian Federation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in Russia, the vast majority of the population and the political elite considered Ukraine's independence a temporary phenomenon. In Russia, there is a widespread belief that it is enough to support the "right" forces in Ukraine, and it will enter into an alliance with Russia on the Belarusian model or split, which would allow "to unite with the brothers in the east and south of this country". Sharp contradictions also concerned Russia's final recognition of Ukraine's borders (Istoriya Rossii, 2009, p. 752).

There were significant obstacles in state formation and the formation of civic identity in Ukraine as well. The long existence of the Ukrainian society outside its state formation, repeated failures to restore statehood, which led to the physical destruction of many members of the national movement, famines and repressions, led to a significant reduction in responsibility for the fate of their country. And although the unification of most of Ukraine's ethnic lands took place under the communist regime, the Soviet-rooted habit of following instructions from the "centre" also did not contribute to its formation.

The Soviet system was based on society atomization with the destruction of the vast majority of elements independent of controlling power. Ukraine inherited from the USSR a model of relations between the state and society, in which there was a gap between state power and citizens' daily lives. Such mutual isolation was exacerbated by the annihilation of any manifestations of civil society designed to mediate between the legitimate government and the citizens.

The economic opportunities of the majority of citizens also did not contribute to the formation of self-confidence. However, in 1991, the prevailing belief in Ukraine was that the restoration of statehood with secession from unstable Russia, which had entered a period of acute internal conflict, would improve living standards. However, it was not possible to do it relatively quickly.

The idea of restoring the Ukrainian statehood was perceived in Ukraine as the establishment of democracy, joining the world community of nations (Sanchenko, 2008, p. 115). After the collapse of the USSR, free elections became a symbol of democratic development for some time. In line with Huntington's (Huntington, 1991, p. 9) views, the election was considered a sign of legitimacy. However, as it quickly turned out, organizing

the elections was of great importance and the nature of ordinary citizens' participation. Citizens' attitudes to elections have become an essential indicator of civic identity. One of the negative phenomena was the spread of absenteeism, based on disbelief in influencing the vote results. Therefore, educational institutions' necessary task was to form a civic identity based on citizens' responsibility for their future. An indispensable role in this process was played by the reformatting of the content and means of teaching.

In the first half of the 1990s, a large-scale revision of educational programs took place in the humanities and social sciences. The new national narrative was introduced into official discourse and history textbooks. The study of the history of Ukraine at schools and universities began to be given increasing importance due to the scale of its influence on the formation of worldviews essential for the construction of civic identity. The corresponding mood determined the emphasis on the introduction of the national narrative in society. Thus, at the beginning of 1996, for 72% of the surveyed students of universities in Ternopil, Kyiv and Poltava, the study of history contributed the most to patriotic education (Filipchuk, 1996, p. 2).

Coverage and analysis of events and phenomena of the past were based on the analysis of declassified archival documents and materials, which were first introduced into scientific circulation. The archival revolution, rather than the dictates of power structures, as it was during the USSR's existence, became the basis for eliminating "white spots", and the emergence of new approaches to the process's periodization system history became widespread. The "partisanship of science" and the definition of a strict methodological framework for scientific research are a thing of the past. Instead, integrating Ukrainian historiography into the European and world historiographical space was initiated, and against this background, interdisciplinary research became widespread. The integration of Ukrainian historiography into the world historiographical space took place along with the rethinking of the role and place of Ukraine in the historical process. One such rethinking result was forming a scheme of the Ukrainian lands' historical development based on political history. The history of state formations in the Ukrainian ethnic lands became the basis for the periodization of training courses in "History of Ukraine", "History of State and Law of Ukraine", "History of Ukrainian Culture", etc.

The Ukrainian lands historical development scheme appeared as follows: Trypillia culture – Kyiv state – Rus' (Kyiv Rus') – Galicia-Volyn state – Lithuanian-Polish era – Cossack era – Hetmanate – the period of national liberation struggles 1917 – 1921 – the USSR – independent Ukraine. The Cossack era was positioned as the "golden age" of the Ukrainian history, which initiated the creation of the Ukrainian nation and statehood based on the observance of basic democratic principles. An important feature of the Ukrainian statehood was the election of its top leadership. Gone are the claims of "Ukraine's age-old desire to unite with Russia". Instead, the Ukrainian-centric narrative of history asserted Kyiv's state-centred state long before state-based entities emerged in Moscow. Ancient state traditions were important justifications for the right to restore the Ukrainian statehood, and the nature of Kyiv's foreign relations had long shown integration into the European historical process. The ties of the Kyivan state with Byzantium, the spread of Christianity in the Kyivan lands as early as the ninth century, and Russia's recognition in Western Europe proved the unscientific claims about Ukraine exclusively "suburb" of Russia.

However, even among pedagogical teams, there was a lack of understanding of the process of "Ukrainianization of education". Some teachers showed contempt for ethnocultural revival (Kindratets, 2009, p. 51).

The formation of large financial and industrial groups in Ukraine also hindered introducing a national narrative in educational institutions. The concentration of real economic power in a relatively small group of people, combined with the growth of their influence in the political establishment, contradicted the declared course of building a social and legal state. Therefore, there was negativity towards the country's top leadership in the educational environment, combined with disbelief in their work effectiveness.

A large part of the teaching staff was not aware of the essence of events and phenomena that took place in Ukraine, sceptical of the prospect of building a powerful state. Involuntary confusion and scepticism were passed on to pupils and students. In such circumstances, it is not surprising that at the beginning of the 1990s, many young people lost faith in the possibility of changing the situation in the country for the better on their own. A significant number of young people lost confidence in the prospects of their participation in political activities due to frustration, primarily in the government's economic policy (Holovaty, 1993, p. 132).

Awareness of such difficulties was reflected in the discussion in scientific circles of the definition of the content of "state" and "national" education. In the Ukrainian polyethnic society, this issue was critical, as the Ukrainian civil nation's formation depended on its solution. The emphasis on the "Ukrainian ethnic component" in the construction of civic identity has created not only the unity of the Russian community in Ukraine but also specific problems in determining worldviews and assessments of the historical past. Therefore, in Ukraine, as in many Eastern Europe countries, the way out was seen in Eurocentrism.

In Eastern Europe, the attractiveness of the prospect of joining the European Union became a fundamental factor for democratic change and the development of democratization (Aizekhen & Stokvell, 2017, p. 534). The existing problems in the EU and the foreseeable future difficulties that could arise in this union were secondary to the advantages in human development formed in the EU: the priority of law, free development of civil society while maintaining scientifically sound state management of economic processes. Growth of living standards and ensuring the highest possible national security and state-guaranteed freedom of entrepreneurial activity do not contradict legal norms. The formation of a course for integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures in Ukraine took place in the conditions of growing pressure from the Russian Federation. Such pressure in the Ukrainian government circles was perceived primarily as a prospect of losing their influence in the state and the threat of organizing economic activity in their interests. Perhaps, that is why, in the educational sphere, the emphasis was placed on the assimilation by young people of world culture's achievements, focusing on the civilizational approach to humankind's development.

In Ukraine, the European vector in the course of educational institutions became noticeable at the beginning of the 1990s, based on the goals and objectives set out in the State National Program "Education" ("Ukraine of the XXIst century"). This document emphasized that the formation of worldview should take place based on ideas, views, beliefs, ideals, traditions, customs, and other socially significant achievements of not only domestic but also world spiritual culture. The primary purpose of education was to gain social experience for the younger generation, inherit the Ukrainian people's spiritual heritage, achieve a high culture of interethnic relations, and form youth regardless of the nationality of citizens' personality traits the Ukrainian state (Pro Derzhavnu, 1993). The priority was the individual's free development based on interethnic tolerance and the importance of universal values. And this direction of educational activity was preserved and allotted.

In Russia, on the other hand, the main problem was the “ideological and political division of society”, and its solution was seen in the “realization of a new Russian idea” that “organically combined universal goals with truly Russian ones” (Putin, 1999) in search of symbols of national civic identity.

During the period of the 1990s, necessary steps were taken to spread the Ukrainian language in educational institutions. Despite some progress in this field, appropriate textbooks and manuals to technical educational institutions remained a problem. In technical universities, the situation persisted when many teachers continued to teach the material mainly in Russian.

One of the reflections of this situation was the relatively large number of citizens who continued to communicate mainly in Russian. Thus, during the period of 1994 – 2002, from 31,9 to 39,1% of respondents preferred communication in families in Ukrainian, from 32,4 to 36% – in Russian. And from 26,8 to 36,5% of respondents spoke Ukrainian and Russian, depending on the circumstances (Vyshniak, 2007, p. 383). Studies of ethno-political scholars have registered a steady increase in the number of Ukrainians who considered Russian their mother tongue – during the period of 1959 – 1989, their number increased by 5,59%, and in 1989 – 2001 – by another 2,53% (Kotyhorenko, 2003, p. 21, 23). The number of those who used Russian in family communication increased to 37% in 2001, compared to 29% in 1992 (Maznytsia, 2002). The liquidation of the Department of Language Policy of the State Committee for National Migration in 2000 and the Department of Language Supervision in 2001 remained indicative. Policy in the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Council for Language Policy under the President of Ukraine (Udovenko, 2005, p. 9). Thus, the Ukrainian language’s official use in educational institutions did not provide the desired effect for a long time. This was facilitated by some politicians’ position, heads of enterprises, institutions and organizations who demonstratively refused to speak Ukrainian.

In educational circles, especially teachers of technical specialties, doubts were expressed about the feasibility of maintaining for students large amounts of teaching the humanities and, above all, history. The motivation, in this case, was the reduction of teaching hours in specialized subjects. Some teachers did not think about the possible consequences of such an approach, disregarding patriotic education.

Gradually, the consumer attitude to education as a means of self-realization of citizens became widespread in Ukraine. The digitalization of education with the possibility of acquiring knowledge via the Internet by limiting or eliminating real communication with the teacher has become an obstacle to young people’s patriotic education. This was facilitated by the realities of the labour market in the context of globalization. The demand for specialists in a particular profession in the leading countries of the world, as a rule, did not presuppose the need to instil in them patriotic feelings for the country where they were invited to work. As a rule, it was enough for employers to be convinced of the employee’s potential loyalty to a particular company.

Education was increasingly a product of consumption, the quality of which was to be determined by supply and demand in the labour market. Ukraine’s integration into the European and world economic space strengthened the influence of globalization processes. The requirements and values of the world labour market increasingly began to compete with the tasks of state-building. Describing this situation, M. Friedman drew the line between “learning” and “education”, emphasizing that not every education is education, and not every education is education (Fridman & Fridman, 2017, p. 93). J. Stiglitz argued that state subsidies for education lead to its “excessive consumption” (Stihlits, 1998, p. 459). J. Stadwell

noted the role of the state in the implementation of long-term goals to accelerate learning to maximize the future incomes of citizens with a high level of education (Stadvell, 2017, p. 12). This approach, first of all, reflected the interests of the heads of large firms interested in sponsoring the training of highly qualified specialists by state bodies of different countries. The interest here was in the possibility of attracting such specialists to their enterprises due to better conditions of self-realization and a relatively high level of wages. However, for donor countries, this situation resulted in a large-scale “brain drain” with the acceleration of educational institutions’ orientation not on the needs and interests of domestic state-building but the demands of the world labour market.

State-building was important not only to achieve a high level of development of production technologies but also the formation of civic identity through a balanced approach to the ratio of teaching technical and humanities (Faria, Montesinos-Yufa, Morales & Navarro, 2016). Otherwise, educational institutions produced specialists who were unwilling to work in their state’s interests and became an appendage of large financial and industrial groups of world scale, which supplied relatively cheap labour.

In the reality of the XXIst century, there was a self-limitation of national-state sovereignty. Instead of fighting for their independence in the international arena, some states deliberately transferred it to the more influential subjects of the world political process (Ozhevan & Dubov, 2017, p. 158). Ukraine is no exception, having lost nuclear weapons under external pressure in exchange for illusory guarantees of territorial integrity from other states. This policy continuation preserved external dependence on energy supplies and the country’s gradual transformation into an exporter of cheap raw materials and labour.

Therefore, it is not surprising that at the turn of the XXIst century in Ukraine, a relatively small number of respondents who primarily felt like Ukraine citizens were alarmed. Among the Ukrainians, there was about half of them, and among the state’s Russian population – only about 30% (Lytvyn, 2009, p. 726).

However, one of the results of Ukrainian educational institutions’ activities can be called citizens who can participate in political activities. Given the gradual loss of the electorate’s trust in “old” politicians in the second half of the 1990s, the rotation in the echelons of power meant a gradual increase in the number of politicians not burdened by “the Soviet identity” (L. Nagornaya’s statement). The result of educational institutions work positions young people’s electoral activity in the XXIst century. In the 1998 elections to the Verkhovna Rada, about 60% of young people took part, as opposed to 25% in the 1994 elections. One of the results was the election of more than 10 deputies under the age of 30 and a relatively large number of deputies under the age of 35. More than 5,000 young candidates became deputies of local councils, almost twice the previous convocation’s elected bodies (Dovzhenko, 1998, p. 26).

At the beginning of the 2000s, there was awareness in Ukraine of the importance of building a civil society. Growing competition and the presence of military and political threats required universities to train qualified not only professionals but also active members of civil society, for whom the interests of state-building were a priority (Romanovska, 2010, p. 71).

In the state educational policy, this understanding is reflected in the large-scale standardization of educational activities. Higher education standard became the basis for licensing and accreditation of educational institutions and a criterion for evaluating their actions, regardless of ownership (Terepyshchyi, 2007; Terepyshchyi, 2008). The realities of building a “knowledge society” and the need to confront the growing scale of “brain drain” (including due to Ukraine entry into the so-called Bologna process) required more attention

to the formation of curricula and work programs in disciplines focused on patriotic feelings, self-esteem own civic position with the rejection of outright election fraud.

It can be argued that the awareness of the inadmissibility of large-scale election fraud (perceived as neglecting the position of citizens) and the beating of students (perceived by many as an encroachment on family values through “child abuse”) were the reasons for the Orange and Dignity Revolution on patriotic education in educational institutions of Ukraine. Civic identity in Ukraine proved incompatible with national supremacy or racial discrimination, or the imposition of the one-person rule on society (even despite the demand for a “strong hand” in power).

The relatively tolerant attitude to the position of opponents can also be called the property of the Ukrainian society. This view was supported by the absence of armed clashes due to differences in foreign or domestic policy and the peaceful nature of protests when citizens’ position did not coincide with the state’s top leadership. Examples include the organization of elections in 1994, the delicate nature of resistance during the Orange Revolution, and civic stance during the Dignity Revolution. Despite the deteriorating economic situation with the spread of COVID-19, protests in 2020 against quarantine in Ukraine were peaceful. They were not accompanied by riots in shopping malls, shops or the seizure of office buildings, unlike, for example, the situation in Italy.

For a long time, the Ukrainian state leaders, despite everything, avoided the use of force against protesters. The exception was the top leadership of the state headed by V. Yanukovich, conditioned and provoked by the Russian Federation leadership. But even this did not lead to the “split of Ukraine” along the Dnipro cultivated in Russia. That is why, the Russian Federation was forced to resort to an undeclared war against Ukraine to realize its foreign policy interests. But even under conditions of such action, one of the consequences of civic identity formation by educational institutions of Ukraine was the spread of the volunteer movement aimed at repelling external aggression. And the roots of the unexpected large-scale resistance of the Ukraine population should be sought precisely in the priority of civic identity, despite the differences of citizens in assessing politicians’ actions of the present or past or specific events or facts in the Ukrainian history.

In the context of this study, we note the role of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory. Thus, on his initiative in 2016, the Revolution of Dignity and the annexation of the Crimea were included in external independent testing issues. In 2017, a new Law of Ukraine, “On Education”, was adopted (Zakon, 2017), which initiated the reform “New Ukrainian School” created by the Ministry of Education and Science. In terms of the content of humanities, including history, the Ministry of Education and Science in cooperation and the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory initiative in the 2016/2017 school year introduced a new history programme in grades 10–11 schools. The new program highlighted the theme “Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921”, the period of 1921 – 1939 was called “Establishment of the Soviet totalitarian regime”. Given the development of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the Donbas, the themes of the battle of Kruty and the war of Soviet Russia against the Ukrainian People’s Republic were also singled out and expanded. The Ukrainian people’s contribution to the victory over Nazism during World War II was described in detail, covering the Ukrainians’ participation in the United Nations’ military formations. The terms “Soviet occupation”, “deportation”, etc., as well as several figures and personalities of the Ukrainian liberation movement, were introduced into the history course (Yakymenko, 2018, p. 45).

The installation of memorial plaques to the Russian-Ukrainian war participants in the educational institutions they studied played a positive role in educating young people during

the period of 2014 – 2021. And it is essential that such an initiative came “from below”, which testified to the Ukrainian citizens’ attitude to Donbas confrontation. In such situation, educational groups often acted as organizers of the memorialization of fallen soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Even though some educators remained on the Russian-annexed Crimea territory or continued to work on the territory of the so-called “DPR” and “LPR” not recognized by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the vast majority of educators supported the struggle for Ukraine’s territorial integrity. A significant consequence of the Ukrainian society’s rejection of the concept of “Russian peace” was the failure of the “Novorossiia project”, which provided for the sacrifice of Ukraine’s eastern and southern regions.

The formation of a pro-European identity in Ukraine outweighed attempts to implement the Russian neo-imperial project. And the construction of civic identity in the Ukrainian educational institutions mustn’t be based on the restoration of “military greatness” or “revenge for past wrongs”. While the Russian President V. Putin openly regrets the collapse of the Soviet Union and seeks to restore superpower status, the Hungarian Prime Minister V. Orban speaks of a “return of self-esteem and the future”, and the Chinese government Xi Jinping speaks of “a hundred years of humiliation” and as the United States, Japan, and other countries try to prevent it from regaining its status as a great power (Fukuizama, 2020, p. 21), there is no emphasis in Ukraine on securing force or fighting through economic pressure for future prosperity. The priority is democratic values combined with the Ukrainian traditionalism, based on respect for the family, the native land with the importance of productive work for the better life of future generations.

Simultaneously, the growing pace of external labour migration, caused by growing economic problems in an armed confrontation with the Russian Federation, became a challenge to modern Ukrainian society. Its character had taken threatening forms since 2016 when a growing number of young people expressed a desire not only to find employment abroad temporarily but also to live permanently outside Ukraine. The ever increasing rate of external labour migration led to a shortage of workers in specific sectors of the economy. In 2018, the share of those who wanted to move to a permanent residence abroad increased to 54% (Reitynh, 2017).

Formed by the media’s active influence, citizens’ desire to “live with dignity here and now” contributed to the growth of young people seeking employment abroad. Although the vector of external labour migration changed significantly due to a sharp reduction in the number of migrant workers working in Russia, favouring an increase in the number of those who preferred to work in the EU, migration continues to be large and may threaten national security.

Unfortunately, the educational institutions activities field of counteracting external labour migration growth have been unsuccessful. Educators failed to form in young people a strong belief in the prospects of employment in modern Ukraine. Therefore, at the micro-social level, there is a situation where personal ties between citizens, who are responsible for making economic and political decisions, proved to be more important than official ones. And more than a third of respondents said in 2018 that they could not live under new social conditions (Vorona & Shulha, 2018, p. 467). This statement resulted from insufficient vocational guidance in educational institutions and a certain detachment of theoretical training from practical skills.

In the recent five years, there has been a reduction in hours of History of Ukraine, the refusal of technical departments to teach History to students, the liquidation of political science

departments and the decline of the total number of humanitarian workers in the unification of educational institutions. So the actions took place in general in line with ministerial decisions. Thus, by order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine of October 15, 2020, “On Approval of Conditions for Admission to Higher Education in 2021”, independent external testing in the Ukrainian language and literature was made mandatory for admission to 44 specialities, mainly humanitarian profile. The test only in the Ukrainian language was required for access to 91 specialities out of 135, and in History of Ukraine, only to 17 mainly humanitarian specialities and the specialities “Law Enforcement”, “Social Work”, and etc. Testing in Mathematics remained a priority, as the external examination results were required as the second compulsory subject for admission to 81 specialities, 82 – in 2018, 87 – in 2019 and 69 – in 2020. Successful passing of such test was recognized as mandatory for all specialities of the fields of knowledge “Transport”, “Health Care”, “Information Technology”, “Production and Technology”, “Architecture”, etc. On October 22, 2020, the Acting Minister of Education and Science S. Scarlett noted that the decision on the possibility to choose which external examination should be made – the Ukrainian language and literature or only the Ukrainian language – was made by Minister L. Hrynevych in 2019 and this is what led to the implementation of this rule in 2021.

Taking into consideration such actions, it is not surprising that the number of citizens who associate themselves with Ukraine citizens is relatively slow. Thus, if in 1992, 45,6% of respondents considered themselves mostly Ukraine citizens in 2018 – 58,6%. And even during the war, there was a reduction in the proportion of such respondents from 60% in 2016 to 58,6% in 2018. Simultaneously, the number of those who considered themselves primarily citizens of the former Soviet Union decreased from 12,7% in 1992 to 3,1% in 2018. During this period, the number of those who considered themselves primarily citizens of the world decreased from 6,4, up to 3,3% (Vorona & Shulha, 2018, p. 464).

The formation of civil liability for the election results remained a problem. Thus, in 2018, 53,2% of respondents did not feel any responsibility for who is the President of Ukraine, and 52,7% – for who is the People’s Deputies (Vorona & Shulha, 2018, p. 466). And this situation remains quite threatening in the face of continued war and powerful information attacks aimed at undermining faith in the subjectivity of the Ukrainian state and the right and ability of the Ukrainian people to decide their future.

**The Conclusions.** The formation of civic identity by educational institutions of modern Ukraine was significantly influenced by the long absence of statehood and a full-fledged civil society, paternalism formed during the years of the USSR combined with the alienation between the government and citizens, as well as crisis phenomena in economic development. The separation of voters from the illegal actions of the elected representatives of the authorities, rooted in the Soviet practices of interaction between the leaders and the citizens, has been preserved in post-Soviet Ukraine as well.

A particular state strategy played a negative role in forming a civic identity for creating a national information space of the Russian and Western products dominated for a long time, creating an appropriate atmosphere in society and identity far from the Ukrainian national interests.

The reduction in the volume of training courses in the history of Ukraine and the liquidation of training courses in political science had a negative impact on the formation of civic identity by educational institutions. The emphasis on studying the exact sciences in globalization with a significant reduction in attention to the humanities may be why Ukraine, spending its funds, will train specialists for other countries. In this context, the digitalization

of education with the introduction of distance learning significantly reduces its educational potential and may, in the future, pose a threat to national security.

Educational institutions do not sufficiently develop skills for long-term social adaptation. The priority remains basic knowledge rather than the ability to implement them in practice and the formation of social stability and relative invulnerability to stressful situations. Educational institutions have failed to form an idea of the priority of highly professional work over personal connections and the belief that promising self-realization is possible, mainly in Ukraine. At the same time, the formation of a stable readiness of citizens to defend their homeland, family, place of residence from hostile encroachments, as well as ideas about the ancient traditions of the Ukrainian statehood and belief in the right of the Ukrainian people to decide their destiny can be considered a success.

The priority of civic identity over religious beliefs or ethnic customs in determining the population's attitude to encroachments on the state territorial integrity is the key to organizing a successful repulse of the aggressor. The formation of civic identity in educational institutions should be a priority regardless of their form of ownership, activity profile, or education organization. The importance of acquiring special knowledge necessary for professional activity before forming an active civil position may create a situation where citizens' priority will be external labour migration, regional and narrow corporate interests.

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