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EVOLUTION MOODS OF DONETSK RESIDENTS ON THE TEMPORALLY OCCUPIED TERRITORY

Abstract. *The purpose of the research is to characterize the mood of Donetsk residents in 2015 – 2019 on the territory where the Ukrainian authorities are temporarily not exercising their powers on the basis of the source base and historiographical work. The research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, scientificity, author's community, systematics, comprehensiveness, critical analysis of sources, as well as the use of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and interdisciplinary (political science, sociology) methods. The scientific novelty of the obtained results is determined by the fact that for the first time in domestic and foreign historiography the mood of Donetsk residents on the territory of the so-called “DPR” has been elucidated, their evolution towards pro-Russian sympathies has been traced and the reasons for the latter have been described. The analysis of tendencies in socio-economic, political and socio-cultural spheres has been further developed. The Conclusions.* The capture of certain areas of Donetsk by the Russian occupation forces led to their political, economic and socio-cultural alienation from Ukraine. In the temporarily occupied territories, the Kremlin has created a powerful propaganda machine and a comprehensive network of

socio-political organizations in order to reformat the mass consciousness of Donetsk residents. This propaganda led to an evolution of the latter's sentiments, which manifested itself in an increase in pro-Russian sentiments and self-identification, as the share of respondents who identified themselves as the Ukrainians or those who felt Ukrainian decreased. As for the fate of the "DPR", the majority sought its independent or autonomous status within Ukraine or Russia.

Key words: "DPR", armed aggression, moods, occupation, "republic", Russia, Ukraine.

ЕВОЛЮЦІЯ НАСТРОЇВ ДОНЕЧЧАН НА ТИМЧАСОВО ОКУПОВАНІЙ ТЕРИТОРІЇ (2014 – 2021)

Анотація. Мета дослідження – на основі джерельної бази та історіографічного доробку охарактеризувати настрої донеччан на територіях, на яких українські органи державної влади тимчасово не здійснюють своїх повноважень. **Методологія дослідження** спирається на принципи історизму, науковості, авторської об'єктивності, системності, всебічності, критичного аналізу джерел, а також на використання загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, узагальнення) та міждисциплінарних (політологія, соціологія) методів. **Наукова новизна** одержаних результатів визначається тим, що вперше у вітчизняній і закордонній історіографії розкриті настрої донеччан на території так званої "ДНР", простежена їх еволюція у бік проросійських симпатій та охарактеризовані причини, що впливали на останнє. Набув подальшого розвитку аналіз тенденцій в соціально-економічних, політичних і соціокультурних сферах. **Висновки.** Захоплення окремих районів Донеччини російсько-окупаційними військами призвели до політичного, економічного й соціокультурного їх відторгнення від України. На тимчасово окупованих територіях Кремль створив потужну пропагандистську машину й всеохопливу мережу громадсько-політичних організацій з метою переформатування масової свідомості донеччан. Це призвело до еволюції настроїв останніх, що проявилось у збільшенні проросійських настроїв, самоідентифікації, тому що серед респондентів зменшилася частка тих, хто ідентифікував себе як українець або тих, хто відчував себе українцем. Щодо долі "ДНР", то більшість прагнули її незалежного або автономного статусу в складі України, або РФ.

Ключові слова: "ДНР", збройна агресія, настрої, окупація, "республіка", РФ, Україна.

The Problem Statement. On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation expanded its military aggression against Ukraine by launching a full-scale war. The temporarily occupied territories were used as a springboard for war preparation. Deoccupation and reintegration of these territories will be a complex process that will require considerable period of time and different approaches. Repeatedly and publicly the Ukrainian authorities stated their desire to return not so much the territories as the people who remained there for various reasons. The latter have long been under the strong propaganda influence of Russia's special organizational and ideological apparatus, among which various quasi-state institutions of the "republic" occupy an important place. In addition, on January 28, 2021, during the international forum "Russian Donbas", a programme document was presented – the Doctrine of "Russian Donbass". It reflected the measures that were practiced and should only be deepened to further develop the state ideology of the "DPR", which is based on the idea of "Russian world". This idea influenced changes in the mass consciousness of Donetsk residents. Therefore, finding out residents' mood on the territory of the "republic" is an urgent task not only from a scientific point of view, but also from a practical one.

The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications. The issue of Donetsk residents' mood who found themselves under occupation has not received a proper scientific focus. This issue was elucidated by Ihor Rushchenko, Kharkiv sociologist partially. He came to the conclusion that the so-called "Luhansk syndrome" is spreading in some districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (hereinafter – ORDLO). The author described it as "the mood of the

hostages, victims with a high level of mythologized consciousness” (Rushchenko, 2017). The project “Conflict in Donbas: Current Realities and Prospects for Regulation” reflected the changes that have taken place in the military, socio-economic, energy, ideological, environmental spheres in the “DPR” (Viina na Donbasi, 2019). In a series of articles, Denis Kazansky, a journalist from Donetsk region, elucidated the changes that took place in the social and economic spheres of quasi-state formation (Kazanskyi, 2015; Kazanskyi, 2019). The Russian Federation provoked a number of other armed conflicts – Transnistria, Chechnia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia. The Polish political scientist Marczyn Kosienkowski analyzed the transformations that took place in the state ideology, the purpose of which was to change the opinions of the occupied population, in particular in the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic (Kosienkowski, 2011). Alina Osetrova and Lisa Sivets analyzed the changes in the educational policy on teaching History in Transnistria and the Crimea (Osetrova & Syvets, 2014). Therefore, due to insufficient study of this issue, the authors try to analyze it.

The purpose of the research is to describe the mood evolution of Donetsk residents in the temporarily occupied territory controlled by the “DPR” before the beginning of a full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine.

The Results of the Research. As a result of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation, Donetsk region was divided into two parts. In the spring of 2014, the Kremlin leadership did not have a single vision of the region’s fate. However, the invasion of regular units and signing the Minsk agreements demonstrated the desire to use the occupied territory on the one hand – to prevent the final loss of political influence on Ukraine, and on the other – to prepare for a full-scale invasion. Therefore, official Moscow, having held “elections” on November 2, 2014, began to form a power vertical with a full control over all spheres of life in the “republic”. Taking into account the continuation of hostilities and their localization, an important task was the formation of a combat-ready military force to oppose the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Thus, on the basis of Donetsk Russian occupation grouping, Donetsk operational and tactical command was formed, which was subordinated to the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces. The number of these forces was estimated at about 15 thousand soldiers. They were based on local residents, whose motivation is not so much ideological as material. As the socio-economic situation steadily deteriorated, unemployment rose, wages arrears increased, and therefore the only way out of this predicament for men was to serve in the “army”. If the rank and file was replenished with local representatives, the officer positions, senior command and logistics were headed by regular units soldiers of the Russian Federation (Viina na Donbasi, 2019, pp. 10, 37). No less important achievement, for the complete subordination of the military forces of the “republic” to the Russian command, was the death of the majority of the field commanders who were at the origins of the armed conflict in 2014 (Kazarin, 2017).

The next step was restructuring of the economy. In 2015, the monetary system of the “republic” switched to the ruble, and the Ukrainian hryvnia was completely withdrawn from circulation. After the signing of the Decree of the President of Ukraine № 62 / 2017 “On the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of March 15, 2017 “On Urgent Additional Measures to Counteract Hybrid Threats to Ukraine’s National Security”” external management was introduced at 43 Ukrainian enterprises. Thus, they found themselves under the leadership of the Russian company “Vneshtorgoservis”, and their focus on the Ukrainian market was redirected to Russia (Syzov, 2017, p. 2). This company was headed by S. Kurchenko, a Ukrainian businessman who was a member of V. Yanukovych’s mafia “Family”.

The socio-economic situation, after a temporary stabilization and improvement during the years of 2015 – 2016, due to the hostilities cessation and the normalization of the tax base, deteriorated in the “republic” steadily. This deterioration resulted in the forced dismissal of workers, the closure of enterprises, and an increase in wage arrears. For example, the above-mentioned enterprise owed its miners 8 billion Russian rubles in 2019 (Kazanskyi, 2019).

A number of the Kremlin legislative initiatives deepened the “republic’s” integration with Russia. In particular, on February 18, 2017, Vladimir Putin signed Decree № 74 “On the recognition in the Russian Federation of documents and registration plates of vehicles issued to citizens of Ukraine and people without citizenship, who permanently reside in the territories of certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine”. According to this Decree there were recognized the documents issued by the “DPR” (O pryznanii, 2017).

On April 24, 2019, V. Putin signed Decree “On the definition of humanitarian categories of people entitled to apply for citizenship of the Russian Federation in a simplified manner”. Thus, the procedure for obtaining the Russian citizenship was simplified for residents of uncontrolled territory, i.e., the so-called “passportization” took place. At first it was received by “civil clerics” and then by the holders of the “DNR passports”. The majority of people sought to obtain it because of the desire to claim the Russian social assistance, pensions, and benefits which that are higher than the Ukrainian or “republican” ones. However, holders of the Russian passports from ORDLO cannot receive the Russian social assistance, because they do not have the Russian residence permit (Katrychenko, 2019).

According to the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine L. Denisova, as of 2021, about 600 000 Ukrainian citizens of Donbas out of 2.2 million living there received the Russian passports. In addition, there were numerous cases of a forced receiving, in particular, at the enterprises of the “DPR”. This step of the Kremlin is not new and has been tested in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the Crimea to legalize its aggressive intentions. Because, under the Russian law, official Moscow can use the army abroad to protect its “compatriots” (Rzheutska, 2021).

An important question is how much it cost Russia to support the armed conflict. In general, the “DNR” is a loss-making quasi-state and existed owing to subsidies from Russia. In 2020, the then Deputy Prime Minister for the Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine O. Reznikov said that the maintenance of ORDLO cost \$ 5 billion a year. About 1.3 billion of them were spent on the public sector. This illustrated the importance to the Kremlin to influence the minds of Donetsk residents (Mokan, 2020).

Decisive changes took place in the ideological sphere. As noted in one of the analytical reports of the Institute for Strategic Studies, official Moscow used the “DPR” “as a platform for the levelling of the national identity of the citizens of Ukraine, the promotion of ideas aimed at deepening the existing regional, cultural, historical, ideological “lines of division” in the Ukrainian society” (Analitychna dopovid, 2017). In 2014, during the “Russian spring”, hostile propaganda was formed around “Novorossiya”. However, it was alien and was not understood by the local population. Therefore, the Soviet values became a priority, and the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih Soviet Republic became a landmark. According to I. Strelkov (“Girkin”), who inspired the armed conflict in Donbas, the ideology of ORDLO was not the annexation of these territories to Russia, but the separation from Kyiv. In other words, the Kremlin began forming an artificial structure of a political regional quasi-state (Voina neyzbezha?).

The quasi-state propaganda was carried out by a wide-ranging system – “institutions of state power”, among which is the “Ministry of Information of the DPR”, which formed the

information field, media, social networks, in particular, VKontakte, “Odnoklassniki”, Twitter, YouTube, Telegramme-channels, etc. (Aleksieieva, Bulyk & Hridina, 2020, pp. 145–146). Information resources played an important role. They were based on the TV channels “Oplot”, “Oplot 2”, “Novorossiia”, “Pervyi Respublikanskyi” and “Union”, which serve as repeaters for anti-Ukrainian messages. The main theses the information resources spread are: the Ukrainian government does not seek peace, it is run by “nationalists”, “fascists” and oligarchs, it is under external leadership, Russia – not a party to the conflict, but peace requires direct negotiations with the militants, and etc. (Syzov, 2020, pp. 2–3). However, the majority of residents did not trust them and watched the Russian channels mostly: “First Channel”, “REN TV”, “STS”, “Russia 1”, “Russia 24”, NTV and the others (Dumky ta nastroi, 2018).

To work with young people was the priority for changing the opinions of the Ukrainian population. Young people, as noted by D. Aleksyeyeva, M. Bulyk, I. Hridina, was “both an object and a subject of propaganda activities” for the Kremlin curators (Aleksieieva, Bulyk & Hridina, 2020, p. 147). “Cadet schools” were established at schools for teenagers in ORDLO. In addition to the latter, there is Zakharchenko cadet corps. At the age of 7, the minds of children are influenced systematically, as they study the fictional “history of the republic”, military affairs, as well as hatred for all Ukrainian is instilled in them (Mokan, 2020). “The Young Guard – Unarmy” is among the newly formed paramilitary organizations. Anyone between the ages of 8 and 35 can become a member of this paramilitary organization. Its purpose is the military and patriotic education of the younger generation.

There was also created a whole network of organizations for the systematic education of the younger generation on the Soviet model. For children aged 7 to 10 there operate “The Eaglets”, from 10 to 14 – “The Zakhariivtsi” and “The Young Republic”. The latter should be singled out, as it has more than 7 000 activists, 37 headquarters in all cities and districts of the “republic”, 338 primary centers in educational institutions (Aleksieieva, Bulyk & Hridina, 2020, p. 147). Regular ideological work is carried out during mass events, in educational institutions, military and patriotic summer camps. In the latter, children have military training in weapons acquisition and the basics of military tactics. As the representative of the Ombudsman of Ukraine noted, “they have set up a whole network of camps”, in which children are instilled “love for the” Russian world” and hatred for the Ukrainians, for Ukraine”. In total, about 141 000 children study at the “DNR”.

Thus, there is a total political, ideological and socio-cultural russification of the youth. At secondary schools curricula play an important role in russification. Curricula have undergone significant changes as they have been converted to Russian. There is no subject “History of Ukraine”, and instead it there are the subjects: “History of the native land” and “History of Russia”. Textbooks from the Russian Federation are used in the educational process mostly, but school libraries are also gradually replenished with books already published in the “DNR”. In particular, a new History textbook was prepared for students, which contains a separate section “The Latest History of Donbas 2014 – 2017”. It should also be taken into account that in the “republic” children are born who are already separated from Ukraine and grow up in a hostile environment. This fact makes them a “lost generation” (“Svoia” ystoryia, 2018).

The situation with the adult population is different. The Kremlin is trying to influence it in various ways. According to “the Eastern Human Rights Group”, the Kremlin “is not limited to propaganda, but also funds political projects actively”. Thus, the Kremlin created an extensive system of pseudo-political formations. Among them “the Donetsk Republic” occupies an important place. It has about 210 thousand members (Analytycheskyi otchet

“Ahenti “russkoho myra” v okkupyrovannom Donbasse”, 2020, pp. 27, 47). During the last “elections” held on November 11, 2018, the “DNR” leader D. Pushylin received 60.85% of the votes, and remained the head of the “DPR”. In the “parliamentary elections”, its members received 72.5% of the votes, or 74 “parliamentary seats” (Lukashova, 2018). Another important political force, which received 26% of the votes and 25 “seats”, is “Svobodny Donbass”. In addition, in the latter there are about 110 000 activists (Analytycheskyi otchet “Ahenti “russkoho myra” v okkupyrovannom Donbasse”, 2020, p. 30).

Unlike children, adults could leave, but they remained under occupation for various reasons – economic, domestic, social, and some for ideological reasons. Their consciousness is also under information influence, but it was formed under other conditions and it is not as easy to be influenced as the younger generation consciousness. That is why, even those who are the supporters of Ukraine remained behind that line, in the occupation. A vivid example is the story of Donetsk journalist S. Vasin, who stayed because he had to take care of his relatives. He called this category “people who stayed”. In his opinion, these are the ones “who, in spite of everything, remain here, in the occupation, with the Ukrainian views” (Vasin, 2016). I. Kononov, Luhansk sociologist suggested the term “Luhansk syndrome” to describe this situation, starting from the definition of “Stockholm syndrome”. But, in his opinion, it would be more correct to use “Donbas syndrome”, because Donetsk residents, and not only Luhansk residents, are under the same condition. By this definition he meant “the anomic reorientation of large masses of the region’s population towards the aggressor in order to find security”. This phenomenon is psychological and situational, and if it disappeared on the Ukrainian territory, then on the occupied territory, on the contrary, it is rapidly developing (Kononov, 2015). How much their moods and views changed the opinion polls make it possible to follow. A study conducted by the German Center for Eastern European and International Studies at Humboldt University of Berlin in 2016, sought to understand “whether the growing physical and political distance between the two parts of Donbas is reflected in the life of the local population, its identity and positions”.

Answering the question “How did your identification change during the period of 2013 – 2016?” on the occupied territories, there was the share of those who felt more “Russian” – 26.1% of respondents, those who felt more “Ukrainian” – 8.5%, “Ukrainian” and “Russian” – 20.4%, and there were 45% of those who did not change their identity as a result of the war. Continuing the analysis of self-identification, 54% of respondents said that in recent years they began to feel less Ukrainian citizens, 8%, on the contrary – more Ukrainian citizens, and 38% did not see any changes self-identification. Thus, under the influence of a powerful ideological processing, the mass consciousness of the Ukrainian population of ORDLO began to change. Compared to pre-war sentiments, they began to associate themselves less with the Ukrainians.

Views on the cause of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine are important. 50.3% of respondents considered this conflict to be the result of Western intervention, 11.3% blamed Ukraine for initiating it, 9.2% blamed the Kremlin, and 30% considered the conflict as the reaction of Donetsk residents to the revolutionary government’s actions. The attitude to the Minsk process and the agreement is rather ambiguous, as the question “Do you agree to the Minsk agreement?” 45.5% of respondents disagreed, 23.7% – strongly agreed, 21.3% – more likely to agree. Only their geopolitical sentiments did not change due to the fact that 18.2% were not against Ukraine’s accession to the EU, and 81.8%, on the contrary, and 6.9% and 93.1%, respectively, were in favour of joining the NATO. The results illustrate

the reflection in the minds of the local population of the main theses about the origins of the Russian aggression, which have been spread by the Kremlin mouthpieces since 2014 (Sasse Gwendolyn, 2017). Geopolitical orientations have not changed, which have remained stable compared to previous years, as in 2013 in the East of Ukraine 18.4% supported accession to the European Union (Yakym shliakhom, 2013).

An important issue that sociologists were interested in was the attitude to the status of “DPR / LPR”. According to a survey conducted by the aforementioned German center, in 2016, 35% of respondents wanted a special autonomous status within Ukraine, 20.6% – to return to the controlled territory under the previous conditions, 33% – a special autonomous status within the Russian Federation, and 11.4% to become the part of Russia without autonomous status. In 2017, the indicators, respectively, were as follows: 31%, 23.5%, 27.2% and 18.3%. There is a tendency towards the desire of the inhabitants of the temporarily occupied territories to obtain autonomous status, either as the part of Ukraine or as the part of the Russian Federation. In this case, the figures are almost the same. This shows that over time, people increasingly perceive their “separateness” or “independence” and agree to enter or return only on an autonomous basis. However, it remains unclear what the respondents mean by “autonomy” – the expansion of socio-economic rights or political, ideological, socio-cultural rights.

These figures can be compared with another study commissioned by the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine. Thus, in 2016, 31% of respondents sought a special autonomous status within Ukraine, 3% – supported the economic blockade of uncontrolled territory, 6% – advocated the continuation of hostilities until the full return of the lost territory under the control of Ukraine, 47% – the granting of independence “DPR / LPR”, 13% did not know what to say. In 2017, respectively, the answers were as follows: 43%, 2%, 1%, 43%, 11% (Vikhrov, 2019). Other data only show slight differences with the previous ones in the issue of returning ORDLO to Ukraine. At the same time, indicators of their independence confirm the author’s theory of the spread of self-awareness as a separate “state body”, which is supported by almost half of respondents. Thus, a poll conducted by Donetsk Institute for Social Research and Political Analysis on March 26 – 29, 2014 among Donetsk residents there was support for the DNR only 4.7% of respondents (Большинство дончан не одобряют действия сепаратистов – опрос).

The most thorough study of the mood on the temporarily occupied territories was conducted in 2019 by New Image Marketing Group at the request of the Ukrainian Institute of the Future and the weekly “Dzerkalo Tyzhnya”. As noted, the data error can reach about 9%, which is a lot for opinion polls, and therefore its analysis by the authors is done without showing figures.

At first, let’s look at a set of answers related to self-identification and socio-economic issues. Almost half of the inhabitants of these territories still considered themselves citizens of Ukraine and the same number – citizens of unrecognized republics. However, due to changes in the Russian law and the availability of the Russian citizenship, the majority did not seek to obtain it. Almost no one expressed a desire to leave the “republic”, but if they left, the advantage were in favour of Russia. They were ready to leave for Ukraine only in the case of stable work, the opportunity to rent or purchase housing. In the case of leaving for neighboring Russia, the housing issue is not so acute, and the priority – stable income. This may indicate a reluctance to stay in Russia and the desire to stay there only on conditional earnings.

Among the advantages for leaving for Ukraine were the following: no war, recognition of the country, a legal force of documents, functioning of banking system, availability of prospects, no shortage of medicines, the opportunity to buy foreign medicines, high quality and tasty food, improving the infrastructure of settlements. Among the shortcomings there were high utility tariffs, inflated rents, unfair increases in pensions (among some categories of people pensions were raised significantly, the others – “pennies”), medical reform, expensive medical care.

Everyone complained about the difficult socio-economic situation in the “DPR”, which, compared to the previous period, changed in a negative direction and was associated with unemployment, difficulty of employment. But there are also positive changes noted by respondents – low utility tariffs compared to the controlled area. Regarding the improvement of their situation, the mood was pessimistic, because no one believed that the situation would change in the near future.

Another block of issues concerned the armed conflict. Almost all respondents considered the actions of the aggressor in the Crimea to be legitimate in order to protect the Russian-speaking citizens alienated by Ukraine. The vast majority did not consider it an interstate confrontation between Ukraine and Russia, but fully agreed that it was a “civil war”. The revolutionary leadership of Ukraine, the United States, activists from the Maidan, the EU, and the government led by Viktor Yanukovych were responsible for it. The latter was found guilty because he did not disperse the Maidan, as happened during the riots in Russia and Belarus, and thus, did not suppress the conflict in its infancy. In general, the main cause of the conflict was considered to be the geopolitical processes at that time.

Respondents also expressed their views on the goals of the parties to the conflict:

1) **Ukraine** seeks to return territories, but not people, because the latter do not see that Ukraine wants to improve living conditions; to launder money to get rich in the war; to receive additional grants from the West;

2) **Russia** wants to protect its own interests and territory to prevent the NATO troops on its borders; to create a “buffer zone” for confrontation with the United States; to distract attention from the occupation of the Crimea; to defend the interests of Donetsk residents from the nationalist Ukrainians. In addition, respondents said that “in 2014 they were full of hopes to join Russia, it was for this purpose that they participated in the referendum”, but their hopes did not come true;

3) **The West** aims at creating a buffer zone that will defend its interests in the confrontation with Russia; placing the NATO bases closer to Russia; capture of the latter and its resources; dismemberment of Ukraine and its neighbour;

4) the “DPR / LPR” want to gain their recognition and join Russia; to return to Ukraine on federal rights; to oppose the spread of “the Bandera ideology”; to protect the right to speak Russian.

Concerning the future of the “republics”, the vast majority of respondents sought to join the neighbouring state in any status. Returning to Ukraine is also an acceptable option for them, but only on federal terms. In order to resolve the conflict, Ukraine should take the following steps: to amend the Constitution of Ukraine (especially with regard to the administrative and territorial structure), to grant a special status with the ability to adopt their own laws, to give Russian the status of the state language, to abolish the “nationalist Bandera ideology” in the Ukrainian government.

Among the biggest fears of returning to Ukraine among respondents there were the following ones: physical violence, repression by the nationalist Ukrainians, deportation to

camps and prisons, the stigma of “enemy”, and confiscation of property. At the same time, everyone noted that the DNR / LNR alone was not capable of defeating the Ukrainian army (Dumky ta nastroi, 2018).

The Conclusions. The invasion of certain areas of Donetsk by the Russian occupation troops led to their political, economic and socio-cultural alienation from Ukraine. According to opinion polls, this alienation has affected the mood and thoughts of Donetsk residents. The analysis of the surveys showed that self-identification has changed, as the share of those who identified themselves as a Ukrainian or those who felt Ukrainian has decreased. As for the fate of the DNR, the majority seek its independence or autonomous status within Ukraine or Russia. The choice was influenced by the powerful propaganda, information and ideological processing of the mass consciousness of the Ukrainian population in ORDLO, the development of an extensive system of political and public organizations covering all age groups, socio-economic factors. This led to the deepening of differences with “all-Ukrainian tendencies” that were prevalent in the Ukrainian-controlled part of Donetsk.

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