Operational games as a method of struggle of the OUN special divisions against the Soviet special services in Western Ukraine (1944 – the beginning of the 1950s)

Abstract. The aim of the study is implementation of scientific and documentary reconstruction of an essence and appointment of operational games by the Security Service (SB) of the OUN (S. Bandera) in the 1940s aimed against the Soviet secret service as part of the confrontation of the armed national and independent underground in Western Ukraine with the Soviet security forces. The Research Methodology. The authors based the study on the structural and systemic approach of the analysis in order to identify the structural and functional role of the operational games in the system of secret confrontation of the OUN. The historical and analytical, historical and genetic and historical and comparative methods as well as the method of documentary verification have been used. The scientific novelty is based on the fact that for the first time the tasks, mechanism, forms and methods of using the operative game as the highest form of operative art by the OUN special unit have been comprehensively analyzed taking into account the wide range of archival sources and in the context of the OUN’s confrontation with the Soviet secret services,
also the fundamental types of accomplished operational measures of the OUN special units have been and evaluated on the basis of their effectiveness. The Conclusion. It is a proved fact that during the post-war period the level of reconnaissance activities of the OUN special forces increased qualitatively, their direction was the desire to create their own informational and reconnaissance positions in the enemy’s secret services and their intelligence apparatus. Complex operational games with the Soviet state security agencies testified to the SB OUN attempt to master the classical methods of operative art of the secret services. The main way of conducting the games was considered to be the “voluntary” immersion of one’s own informants in state security units (usually at the local level) according to the legend developed by the SB, with the further strengthening of trust in them, expansion of their intelligence capabilities. The tasks of those games included the identification of operatives-agents and agents of state security in the ranks of the underground; promotion of misinformation about the state of affairs in the underground; extortion and neutralization, or the use of “without knowledge” or through the recruitment of confidants of state security agencies for the development of the game itself; identification of tasks and plans of operational counterintelligence measures in relation to the underground; study of forms and methods of intelligence and operational work of state security bodies.

**Key words:** special services, operative art, operative game, intelligence, counterintelligence, Ukrainian nationalists movement.

**The Problem Statement.** Against the background of a huge research literature on the strategy and tactics issues of the armed activities of the Ukrainian nationalist movement in a violent resistance to the Sovietization of Western Ukraine in 1944 – the beginning
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of the 1950s, one of the least studied aspects of the problem is the analysis of the forms and methods peculiarities of the OUN intelligence and counterintelligence activities. In particular, it concerns the facts of the organization of operational games against the Soviet state security agencies by a special body of the underground, which serves as scientific and historical evidence of organizational and tactical maturity, serious professional skills of the military and special component of independent statesmen movement.

**The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications.** In 1994, for the first time Ivan Bilas covered the operational game of the regional officer of the Security Service Mykola Kozak (“Smoka”) with the leadership of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR (Bilas, 1994a). The following year, this topic was supplemented by Petro Boyarchuk, Volyn publicist (Boiarchuk, 1995), and in 2000 – by historians Dmytro Viedienieiev and Serhiy Shevchenko (Viedienieiev & Shevchenko, 2000). During the period of 2006 – 2007, D. Viedienieiev and Hennadiy Bystrukhin continued their research of the operative game initiated by “Smoka” (Viedienieiev & Bystrukhin, 2006; Viedienieiev & Bystrukhin, 2007a; Viedienieiev & Bystrukhin, 2007b). In 2009 the place of Liudmyla Foya (“Oksana”) in this operation was elucidated by Volodymyr Ivanchenko in a separate book (Ivanchenko, 2009). Protocols of interrogations of the arrested NKVD agents by the SB OUN: Mykhailo Zakharzhevsky (“Taran”), Kateryna Minkovska (“Yevhenia”), Nina Kaluzhenko (“Iryna”) and L. Foya (“Aprillska”) were published by Serhiy Burlaka in 2018 (Burlaka, 2018).

Vasyl Ilnytskyi was the first one who analyzed the operational game of the Security Service of the Carpathian Region, which involved the use of the arrested Soviet agent Yakov Kozlov (“Yarovyi”) (Ilnytskyi, 2016; Ilnytskyi, 2017).

Some examples of the use of the recruited Soviet agency by the OUN Security Service (SB) were covered in the publications of Anatoliy Rusnachenko (Rusnachenko, 2002), Valeria Yefymenko (Yefymenko, 2002), Yaroslav Antoniuk (Kucherepa, 2012; Antoniuk, 2021) and many others. However, nowadays, there is no scientific research that would comprehensively analyze the experience of the OUN Security Service (SB) in conducting operational games.

**The purpose of the research** is scientific and documentary reconstruction and analysis of military and historical circumstances, purpose, methods of conducting special games against the Soviet special service by the special body of the OUN (B) as the highest form of operational art of the OUN Security Service during the confrontation of the armed national and independent underground in Western Ukraine with the security forces of the USSR.

**The Results of the Research.** Based on the ideas established in the theory of operational activities of special services, “operational game” means a system of counterintelligence operations and activities on behalf of the special services and with the participation of its confidential assistants (agents), who penetrated into the personnel or intelligence apparatus of the enemy’s special services, and with the use of obtained opportunities in their interests promote disinformation among the enemy systematically, solve other operationally significant tasks, provide control of one’s own side over certain areas of activity or measures of the enemy’s intelligence services (Nikitchenko, 1972, p. 114).

In the work of special services, “operational games” are considered the highest manifestation of operational art. This term was introduced in the 1920s to ODPU officers as part of combination operations against foreign centers of “white” and the Ukrainian independent emigration and foreign intelligence services – their curators.

In the context of the subject of our article, it is expedient to take into account that the balance of power between the Soviet state security bodies and the OUN (B) Security Service
in terms of games and other skilled operational measures was not in favour of the anti-Soviet resistance movement (despite the fact that special forces of nationalists tried to master in practice persistently and in the course of operational experience training of the state special services of pre-war Poland, the USSR and Germany) (Viedienieiev & Bystrukhin, 2006, pp. 222–233; Ohorodnik, 2009; Antoniuk, 2021). By that time, the Soviet counterintelligence had accumulated a solid experience in operational games involving the legendary “enemy cells”. Suffice it to mention the classic operative games of the 1920s: “Trust”, “Syndicate”, “Academy”, as well as “Tobacco” (“Case 39”) and transporting from abroad the head of the Partisan-insurgent headquarters of the UPR, General Yurko Tiutiunnyk (Serhiy Karin-Danylenko, the future elaborator of the 1940s game against the OUN (B) leadership in Western Ukraine and deputy head of the counterintelligence department of the UkrSSR NKGB took an active part in it) (Viedienieiev, 2008, pp. 34–35; Viedienieiev, 2014). In 1941 – 1945 the operational art of the Soviets was enriched by long classical operative games “Berezino”, “Couriers”, “Monastery” with the special services of the Third Reich (sometimes up to 70 operational games were conducted simultaneously by the state security agencies and SMERSH to promote strategic disinformation in the interests of frontline operations) (Baryshnikov & Tarasov, 1964, pp. 69; Viedienieiev, 2014, pp. 454–457; Tkachenko & Shpalchenko, 2019, pp. 134–138).

Special units of the Ukrainian nationalist organizations did not use the definition of “operational game”, although they tried to resort to measures with all the basic features of such an operational game measure. It should be noted that the first documentary evidence we found concerning the attempts to organize games by the armed underground of the OUN dates back to the Sovietization of Western Ukraine in 1939 – 1941 (Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine in Ternopil region – ASSUTR, f. 1, c. 13444, p. 95; Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine – SSASSU, f. 73, d. 1, c. 451, p. 207). In particular, in 1940 – 1941 one of the leaders of the OUN special unit Mykola Arsenych (“Mykhailo”) developed the idea of an “operational game” of the OUN (B) Security Service using the detained and recruited member of the NKVD and taken abroad for further advance of Yaroslav Horbov (“Buya”), the emissary of Krakow center of the OUN (B) to Berlin OUN center. In addition to spreading disinformation to the Chekists, there were plans to lure abroad the recruiter of “Buya” – P. Sudoplatov, one of the heads of foreign intelligence of the NKVD-NKDB (ASSULR, f. 6, c. 33283, p. 15; Viedienieiev & Shevchenko, 2002). The use of the same method was continued by the esbists during the Nazi occupation of Ukraine (SSASSU, f. 6, d. 1, c. 33286, vol. 1, pp. 323–324).

The practice of using the Security Service (SB) of double agents (“dvorushnyky” in the terminology of the Chekists) to misinform the Soviet secret services became the most widespread during the postwar period (Yefymenko, 2002, p. 139; Ilnytskyi & Kantor, 2018, pp. 173–180; Ilnytskyi, 2018, pp. 326–337; Antoniuk & Trofymovych, 2021, p. 119). Attempts to immerse their agents in the Soviet security forces and the network of their secret agents intensified (Antoniuk, 2018, p. 174). For example, the informant of the Security Service (SB) “Mariyka” worked during the autumn of 1945 in Medenytysia regional department of the NKVD of Drohobych region (Rusnachenko, 2002: 320). During the period of October – December of the same year, two similar cases were detected in Ponykovets district of Lviv region (SSASSU, f. 71, d. 9, c. 147, p. 84; c. 150, p. 57; c. 161, p. 266).

According to the Soviet side, the underground special forces attempts to ‘include” and introduce their own confidants into the NKDB-MGB intelligence apparatus lasted until 1952.
(SSASSU, f. 71, d. 9, c. 204, p. 247; Vovk, Pavlenko & Cherchenko, 2001, p. 458). Thus, in April – May of 1951, during the inspection in 28 regional departments of the MGB of the western regions of Ukraine there were found 65 double agents (“dvorushnyky”) (SSASSU, f. 2, d. 1, c. 1876, p. 276).

A typical example is provided in this article. On January 15, 1946, a woman with a certificate in the name of H. Fedoruk came to Volyn Region KGB Office and asked for a meeting with an operative. During a conversation with the UNKD officer, she announced her real name – Nadiya Kudryk. During the interrogation, she said that she worked as a printer for the security officer of Lutsk regional branch “Mykyta” and stated her desire to be found guilty. At the same time, N. Kudryk expressed a desire to carry out intelligence tasks in the NKGB. She explained her visit to Lutsk by the need for a dental treatment. According to a dentist examination N. Kudryk’s teeth did not need any treatment. This circumstance, as well as obsessive offers to help in the fight against the OUN, aroused suspicion.

During further interrogation, N. Kudryk admitted that she had arrived for intelligence purposes, hoping to learn about the intelligence work of the regional UNKVD (SSASSU, f. 13, d. 1, c. 372, vol. 92, pp. 210–213).

From a professional point of view, it is significant that in “sending” their agents to the enemy, the Security Council gave an important role to the development of “legends” about the agents. Sometimes, for the sake of plausibility, they were allowed to “expose” the places of hideouts, “dead spots” or even members of the underground (ASSULR, f. 5, c. 2234, p. 15; VMLL, f. KDF-21337, kv-93694, pp. 40–45). However, despite the measures taken, the failures could not be avoided (ASSUVR, f. 5, c. 7383, vol. 1, pp. 1–109; vol. 2, pp. 1–84; SSASSU, f. 13, d. 1, c. 372, vol. 8, pp. 61–62; f. 71, d. 9, c. 226, pp. 119–120; Viedienieiev & Bystrukhin, 2007a, p. 298).

Taking into consideration the difficulty of creating intelligence positions among the Soviet secret services, the SB tried to recruit informants of the enemy, especially those, who voluntarily confessed and wanted to atone for the guilt (Ilnytskyi, 2016, p. 174). During the spring of 1947, such three cases were registered in Lviv and Ternopil regions (SSASSU, f. 13, d. 1, c. 372, vol. 8, pp. 61–62; f. 71, d. 9, c. 226, pp. 119–120). During the period of July of 1947 – May of 1948, Ivan Matios, a double agent, managed to misinform the bodies of the UMDB of Chernivtsi region concerning the fate of agent Ya. Kozlov (“Yarovy”) (SSASSU, f. 60, d. 1, c. 86736, vol. 25, pp. 114, 119–120, 150, 168; Ilnytskyi, 2017, p. 246).

A high level of professionalism of the OUN Security Service (SB) is evidenced by the operational game conducted by M. Kozak (“Shepherd”), the OUN Security Service officer at the PZUZ, with the leadership of the NKGB of the UkrSSR in 1945 (Kucherepa, 2012, p. 98). At the beginning of 1945, S. Karin-Danylenko, an experienced functionary of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, established the legendary “the OUN Leadership in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands”. He was tasked with involving the Soviet agency into the OUN leadership at the PZUZ. Experienced ODPU agents M. Zakharzhhevsky (“Taran”) and K. Minkovska (“Yevheniya”) were appointed the head of this structure. They were joined by a recruited member of the OUN Kyiv branch, L. Foy (“Oksana”) (SSASSU, f. 2, d. 1, c. 342, pp. 1–112; c. 343, pp. 1–163; f. 6, d. 1, c. 74331, pp. 20, 28, 33; Viedienieiev & Bystrukhin, 2007b, pp. 93–94). Other members of the “OUN leadership in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands” were used “directly” (Author – that is, they believed that they were really members of the underground), including “SB officer” Anatoliy Yeremenko (“Tymosh”) (Burlaka, 2018, p. 83). On May 6, 1945, the NKGB agents L. Foya (“Oksana”) and N. Kaluzhenko (“Iryna”) arrived in Lutsk. Under the guise of representatives
of the OUN Leadership in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands, they tried to get in touch with the OUN leadership and deliver fabricated “mail” (SSASSU, f. 73, d. 1, c. 453, p. 43). Among them there was a letter with threats addressed to the Soviet writer M. Rylsky (SSASSU, f. 2, d. 1, c. 342, pp. 12–27; Boiarchuk, 1995, p. 2). The actions of these NKGB agents attracted the attention of esbists. Therefore, they were monitored. Four days later, the esbists appointed “couriers” a meeting place outside the city. Immediately upon arrival, they were captured by Lutsk district SB members headed by Petro Tykhniuk (“Mykhas”) (Bilas, 1994b, pp. 363–364). During interrogations, L. Foya voluntarily confessed to cooperating with the NKGB and provided a detailed testimony about her intelligence tasks (SSASSU, f. 13, d. 1, c. 372, vol. 20, p. 166). Instead, N. Kaluzhenko denied any connection with the Soviet secret services and was executed (SSASSU, f. 2, d. 1, c. 1981, pp. 169–173). Later, M. Kozak recruited L. Foy personally. After several weeks of talks, she agreed to take part in the “operational game” of the Security Service with the leadership of the NKGB of the UkrSSR. On July 19, 1945, L. Foya returned to Lutsk, where she re-established contact with the NKGB (SSASSU, f. 60, d. 1, c. 11946, pp. 109–113; Ivanchenko, 2009, p. 29). On July 23 of the same year, she returned to Kyiv with a significant amount of underground literature (Viedienieiev & Bystrukhin, 2007a, p. 212). Meeting at the secret apartment with the Deputy Minister of State Security of the UkrSSR, Lieutenant General Pavlo Drozdetsky, L. Foya reported on the success of the operation and persuaded to send “Taran” with “Yevheniya” to Volyn. Underestimation by the heads of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR of the professionalism of the OUN Security Service and success euphoria ensured the further operation success (Viedienieiev & Bystrukhin, 2006, p. 198). It was decided to send M. Zakharzhevsky to Lutsk, who was seized at the “communication point” by esbists in August of 1945 (SSASSU, f. 6, d. 1, c. 71184, pp. 32–24). During the interrogations, “Taran” confessed to his agency tasks and agreed to write a letter with a proposal to call “Yevhenia” (SSASSU, f. 2, d. 1, c. 342, p. 1). On September 19, 1945, L. Foya brought K. Minkovska to Lutsk. A few days later, she was also arrested by esbists at the “communication point” (SSASSU, f. 65, d. 1, c. 8978, vol. 4, pp. 191–198). M. Kozak’s misinformation of the leadership of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR lasted until April of 1946 (Ivanchenko, 2009, p. 37). Only on May 20, 1948 the State Security Committee of the Ukrainian SSR issued a decision to exclude L. Foya from the intelligence network (SSASSU, f. 60, d. 1, c. 11946). In the future, the mentioned SB employee edited the journals of the OUN leadership at PZUZ (SSASSU, f. 13, d. 1, c. 372, vol. 20, p. 168). Interestingly, after the above-mentioned “letter to M. Rylsky” was found in the underground archives in 1946, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the UkrSSR Tyomofi Strokach reported about it to the Union Minister Serhiy Kruhlov and M. Khruschev, considering the fabricated document as “methods of police toothpicking”. Combined with the game failure, this led to the dismissal of S. Karina-Danylenko from the ranks of state security agencies in 1947.

The Conclusions. During the post-war period, the level of reconnaissance activities of special units of the OUN underground increased significantly, which vigorously resorted to building an intelligence network among the population, tried to create their own positions in the administrative apparatus, industrial institutions, communications, public associations, educational institutions. A new area of operational activity of the OUN Security Service (SB) was the desire to create its own information and intelligence positions in the enemy’s special services and their intelligence apparatus.

Quite complex operational games with the Soviet state security agencies testified to the growth of the OUN Security Service (SB) counterintelligence skills, its attempts to master the classical methods of the secret services operational art. According to the documents
under analysis, the Security Service (SB) in some cases even managed to intercept the
initiative of the Soviet counterintelligence and impose a difficult game with the NKGB in
response, for a long time to imitate the “activities of the embedded agency” of the Chekists
in the underground environment, promoting the disinformation concluded by the Security
Service (SB) and obtaining additional information about the plans of the enemy and its
official orientation towards the nationalist underground.

The leading method of conducting the games was considered to be a “voluntary”
immersion of informants in the state security units (usually at the local level) according
to the legend developed by the Security Service (SB), with a further strengthening of trust in
them, and expanding their intelligence capabilities.

The analysis of the documents studied by us allows us to identify the leading tasks
pursued by the Security Service (SB) during the games with the NKGB-MGB. Among
them: identification of operatives-agents and agents of state security in the ranks of the
underground; promoting misinformation about the state of affairs in the underground;
extortion and liquidation, or the use of “dark” or through the persuasion of the confidants
of state security agencies for the development of the game itself; identification of tasks and
plans of operational counterintelligence measures in relation to the underground; study of
forms and methods of intelligence and operational work of state security bodies.

The majority of the future “double agents” of the Security Service (SB) were recruited from
people who voluntarily confessed to being recruited by the state security agencies and wished
to atone for their guilt for the underground. At the same time, there arose the task of their serious
preparation before the assignment execution, the education of psychological resilience.

Conducting operational games is one of the most complex and skilled methods of
operational art as its component. Thus, in general, the elaboration of the idea, plan and
scenario of participation in operational games became a serious catalyst for the OUN
special unit to improve their professional skills, in particular – the analytical component
of operational work (including the development of disinformation materials and “legends”
of cover), improving the skills of employees and comprehensive study of the arsenal of
enemy intelligence services, improving recruitment skills, providing reliable channels of
communication with their own participants in the game, etc.

Operational experience gained in the 1940s during the confrontation in Western Ukraine,
the study of forms and methods of the Soviet special services were useful for the Security
Service of the OUN Foreign Parts (FU) in exile, who resorted to the method of ann operational
play (the last operational game of the OUN Central Committee against the KGB of the USSR
lasted until 1983).

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