
Patriots & Critics: The Story of How Public Receptions of World War I in the Russian Empire Changed

Abstract. The purpose of the research is to outline the main features of society’s reaction to the outbreak of World War I and the subsequent transformational changes in the mood of different population groups in the course of the war events. The methodology of the research is based on the principles of historicism, the effectiveness of systematic and scientific using national (analysis, synthesis, scientific abstraction) and special and historical (historical and comparative, retrospective and problematic) methods. The Scientific Novelty. For the first time the peculiarities of the moods of different population groups of the Ukrainian lands of the Russian Empire in 1914 – 1917 were comprehensively presented, taking into account not only the social status of the person, but also the age peculiarities and personal motives; clearly outlines the major stages of changing society’s reception and understanding of World War I events. The Conclusions. Therefore, the initial stage of the war was marked by widespread patriotism, which, despite of its “mass” nature, had a differentiated, ambivalent and permanent character during the years of 1914 – 1917. The majority of “ardent” patriots were wealthy people who, owing to their privileged and financial position avoided military service and practically didn’t participate in the hostilities, or representatives of ultra-monarchical circles. For some people the war was a way of showing their loyalty to the government, but for the others it was an opportunity to make money and enrich themselves. Other groups of the population were overwhelmed by a sense of patriotism and liberation struggle, though the main reason for this was not the love for the “great tsarist Motherland”, but understanding of the need to protect their “small homeland”. A similar vision and reception of the war was typical of the soldiers’ environment, as it was based on village natives. In the early years of the war, the behavior of soldiers was determined by the humble, patient, and self-righteous fulfillment of their military duty. Delaying the timing of the war, defeats at the front, increasing of the number of victims, growing economic crisis triggered a process of destabilization
inside the country. Distrust and dissatisfaction were spreading in the society. Negative trends began to show up in the army, in particular, a decline of patriotism, morale and religiosity. As a result, in 1916 – 1917, measures, adopted by the Russian imperial government in order to control the socio-political situation, could no longer hide the true situation and restrain the serious transformations in the mass public consciousness. The increase of political activity in the national consciousness of the Ukrainians was a notable phenomenon. It also was one of the important preconditions for the revolutionary events and the development of the Ukrainian statehood in the 1917s – 1920s.

**Key words**: World War I, Russian Empire, Ukrainian people, public consciousness, public mood, patriotism, criticism.

**The Problem Statement.** The events of World War I caused considerable resonance in many countries of the world. For the first time in history, military conflict became so global and led to significant transformations in the socio-political and socio-economic life of people. Immediately after the outbreak of war, the governments of the belligerent states started an active propaganda campaign, which mission was to form the necessary views and beliefs in society for the importance of war for future peace and prosperity. The Russian...
Empire as one of the active participants in the world conflict was no exception. The imperial government was well aware of the importance of information justification of country’s participation in the war, and needed to mobilize human resources and implement geopolitical goals. At the same time, the heterogeneity of society and wide multiethnic diversity made this process more difficult. Due to different factors, each of the population groups received and understood the surrounding events differently. For some people the war was a way of showing their patriotism, heroic deeds, etc., for the others, on the contrary, a great burden with negative consequences, the beginning of a great catastrophe. In this context, the position of the population of the Ukrainian lands of that time was the subject of interest, which, owing to their spatial affiliation with the European world and their favourable geographical position, occupied one of the leading positions in the socio-political, socio-economic and cultural environment of the Russian Empire. In addition, during the war, the Ukrainian territories were close to the front lines and in certain regions, such as Southwestern region, which was based on the provinces of Kyiv, Podillia, and Volyn, was introduced a martial law, which led to an active propaganda campaign and increasing of censorship control.

The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches. Scholars have demonstrated a strong interest in researching the matter of the information factor and its impact on the formation of public consciousness during World War I over the last two decades. The population’s reaction to the events of the war, the nature of patriotism among different social groups, motives of individuals, increasing criticism and satisfaction are all gaining considerable attention. Among modern scientific studies undertaken in European countries (Germany, Austria-Hungary, the United Kingdom, France), the work of the following researchers should be brought to light: G. Schneider (Schneider, 1999), E. Machen (Machen, 2013), G. Tison, (Tison, 2015), K. Guenther (Guenther, 2017), D. Monger (Monger, 2018), S. Bonnerje (Bonnerje, 2019).

Historians place a high value on the Russian Empire as a major participant in World War I. The growth of articles published on the tsar government’s information policy, methods of propaganda and public sentiment control, military censorship, reactions of various groups to war events, patriotism and its manifestations, the age of discontent and criticism of the government, and other subjects were especially notable. As a result, we will concentrate our efforts solely on the work that is the most thorough of the upcoming research.

Of great interest is the monograph of a German scientist, Professor at the University of Cambridge Jahn Hubertus, “Patriotic Culture in Russia during World War I” (Hubertus, 1995). It reveals the peculiarities of the development of artistic culture, its influence on the formation of patriotic moods of the population and national identity. While reflecting patriotism through artistic means, Jahn Hubertus uses the term “patriotic culture”, which includes two aspects: 1) patriotic activity of artists, performers, entrepreneurs; 2) the response of the audience and society to the works of art and the surrounding events. As a result, the researcher states that in 1914 – 1917 the Russian patriotism had a differentiated nature, and at the same time reflected separate and even heterogeneous loyalties in the society (Hubertus, 1995, pp. 171–173).

In the context of our topic, Professor Eric Lohr’s scientific work “The Russian Press and the “Internal Peace” at the Beginning of World War I” (Lohr, 2004) is relevant. The work deals with the peculiarities of the functioning of the military censorship institute, the establishment of enhanced control over the dissemination of information and the closure of a wide range of periodicals that didn’t correspond to the official ideological and propaganda course of imperial power.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Russian historical science received a new impetus, and now it contains significant scientific works on the history of public consciousness.
and the reaction of the population of the Russian Empire to the events of the war. We should single out the work of the Russian researcher Elena Senyavskaya “The Image of the Enemy in Minds of the Participants of World War I” (Senyavskaya, 1997), which revealed the socio-cultural and psychological specificity of the concept of “foreign” in the public consciousness during World War I (Senyavskaya, 1997, p. 63). Olha Porshneva’s monograph “Peasants, Workers, and Soldiers of Russia before and during World War I” (Porshneva, 2004) attempts to elucidate the basic patterns of transformation of public consciousness of the population of the Russian Empire under the conditions of war. The author traces the changes of stereotypes, values and behaviour of people. Olha Suhova’s article “World War I as a Challenge to the Russian Mentality: Public Moods in the Provinces in 1914 – 1917” (Suhova, 2014) is devoted to the formation of peasants’ social consciousness. The study points out that serious tectonic shifts was formed in the axiological sphere of mass consciousness, and were connected with the desacralization of the former main foundations of social life (Suhova, 2014, p. 130). The works of the Russian historian Aleksandr Astashov (2014, 2016) are thought to be fundamental because of their content and conclusions. They draw attention to such issues as the peculiarities of the motivation base and collective behavior of the military at the front, the main features of the psychological portrait of the soldier, the problems of moral and religious status in the army, reasons of reducing of their level and consequences.

Among the Ukrainian historians, the peculiarities of public mood during the war were analyzed by Oksana Vilshanska (2014a, 2014b). The author describes the influence of imperial propaganda on the formation of a public opinion of the population of the Dnieper Ukraine, notes the fact of the patriotic uplift among the youth in the first year of the war, and also outlines the specifics of the formation of a negative image of the enemy-German. The Ukrainian historian Ihor Kolyada tried to shed light on the general features of reaction of the Right-bank Ukraine’s population to the events of the war. In conclusions, the author points out that the mood of the population of cities at the beginning of World War I was marked by a significant emotional outburst, which combined interconnected patriotic uplifting with panic feelings of uncertainty and fear of the difficulties, created by any war (Kolyada, 2018, p. 29).

As you can see, the historiography of information processes on the territory of the Russian Empire during World War I has quite a large number of works. There is a noticeable increase in the interest of scholars in the study of consciousness and mood issues of the society. However, the problem of patriotism and the growing criticism on the part of the Ukrainian society of the events of war and power remains under-researched, which determines the relevance and novelty of our research.

The main place in the structure of the source base was occupied by materials of personal origin. In this context, the memoirs of the Ukrainian figures are informative, in particular: Dmytro Doroshenko (1882 – 1951) – a diplomat, historian, chairman of the Committee on the Southwestern Front of the All-Russian Union of Cities for Assistance to Sick and Injured Soldiers, Mykola Kowalewskyi (1892 – 1957) – a representative of the Ukrainian Party of Revolutionary Socialists, Oleksander Koshyts (1875 – 1944) – an ethnographer, composer, choirmaster and conductor of the Kyiv Opera. Of particular interest are the memoirs of the Ukrainian journalist Havrylo Hordienko (1902 – 1982), who provided a detailed overview of the socio-political situation of those times on the example of the provincial town of Oleksandrivska (present day – Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine) in Katerynoslav Governorate.

The memoirs of people, who were directly involved in the hostilities, played an important role in determining the public mood of the population. The memories of the Ukrainian
public politician Mykola Halahan (1882 – 1946), an adjutant soldier of the 20th Zaamur Border Regiment, have a historical value: “From My Memories (the 1880s – the 1920s): Documentary and artistic publication” (2005). These memoirs show the socio-political position of the military, their attitude to war and government. Also the memoirs of General, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army of the Southwestern Front, Aleksei Brusilov (1853 – 1926) were useful in our research. Of particular interest are the memories of the last Protopresbyter of the military and naval clergy of the Russian Empire, Father Georgiy Shavelskiy (1871 – 1951), who during the war was responsible for the pastoral service of priests at the front, and directly observed the mood among soldiers.

Along with memories, epistolary documents are valuable sources. Among the processed materials we highlight the letters of Leonid Zhebunov (1851 – 1919), a Ukrainian statesman, public activist and member of public organization “Prosvita”, an employee of the well-known Ukrainian newspaper “Rada”, former head of the Gendarme Administration of Galicia that was occupied by the Russian army (1915), to another well-known Ukrainian activist Yevhen Chykalenko (1861 – 1929), an active initiator of the creation of a secret political and public organization Society of the Ukrainian Progressionists (1908), a philanthropist, publisher of a newspaper “Rada”. These letters cover the events of 1907 – 1919 and vividly reflect the views and moods of the Ukrainian intelligentsia of that time.

In the work we also used the materials of the Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Kyiv (CSHAUK), the State Archives of Kyiv Oblast (SAKO) and the State Archives of the Khmelnytskyi Oblast (SAKhO).

The Purpose of Publication is to outline the main features of society’s reaction to the outbreak of World War I and the subsequent transformational changes in the mood of different population groups in the course of war events.

The Main Material Statement. In the Russian Empire, unlike the great countries of the Western world, ideological and psychological preparation for war, which could have a profound effect on the mass consciousness, was not carried on. In fact, the society had no idea of Russia’s place in the coming struggle, nor of its potential external opponent. The development of the ideological justification for the Russian Empire’s involvement in the world war began only after its entry into conflict on July 19, 1914, and was conducted, as in other countries, from the standpoint of protecting its land, its people, its indigenous interests and values against the encroachment of hostile states (Porshneva, 2004, p. 87). In this regard, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Imperial Army of the Southwestern Front, General Aleksei Brusilov wrote in his memoirs: “The government omitted or didn’t allow the moral preparation of the people for the inevitable European war. If any commander in the army wanted to explain to his subordinates that our main enemy was the German, that he was going to attack us and that we should be ready to repel him, then this gentleman was immediately expelled or brought to court. Even a schoolteacher couldn’t talk about it, because he would be considered as dangerous pan-Slavist, an ardent revolutionary...” (Brusilov, 2013, p. 73).

The Russian Emperor Nicholas II outlined the main reasons and nature of Russia’s involvement in the European conflict in his manifestos (20 and 26 July, 1914) for the declaration of war with Germany and Austria-Hungary: protection of the territories of the country, its honor, dignity, position among the great states, as well as “single-blooded and single-minded Slav brothers” (Porshneva, 2004, p. 87). However, it is clear that, in reality, the outbreak of war was driven by the geopolitical plans of the imperial government, which foresaw the expansion of territories and the strengthening of spheres of influence in the world.
After the declaration of war, the authorities took a number of measures to control the public mood of the population. On July 20, 1914, Nicholas II issued a decree to the Senate. According to it, the empire put into effect the “Temporary Provisions on Military Censorship”, and the Minister of the Interior was given the right to ban the dissemination of information related to Russia’s foreign security or its armed forces (CSHAUK, f. 316, d. 1, c. 21, p. 290). According to the “Temporary Provisions.. “, the main task of military censorship was to prevent the publication and distribution of information that could harm the military interests of the state during the mobilization of the army and the war by printed, postal, telegraphic means, speeches and reports (CSHAUK, f. 442, d. 864, c. 296, p. 166).

On August 15, 1914, Kyiv Governor General Fyodor Trepov published a binding resolution, which banned the retailing of newspapers, leaflets, weekly and monthly magazines that didn’t have the “Censorship Allowed” stamp, except those published in St. Petersburg or Warsaw. The legislation provided an appropriate punishment if the order wasn’t fulfilled: imprisonment in a prison or fortress for up to three months, or a fine of up to three thousand rubles (SAKhO, f. 292, d. 1, c. 359, p. 22).

On December 15, 1914, the Main Department of the Press at the Ministry of the Interior issued a circular to the local governors, which forbade to place any articles or drawings concerning persons of the imperial family in the media without official permission (CSHAUK, f. 1600 d. 1, c. 549, p. 131). The adoption of such measures intended to prevent the dissemination of information that could have a negative impact on the authority of the emperor and his family among the population.

It was an important task of the government to hide the negative facts about the events at the front and within the country. According to the circular of the General Directorate of the General Staff (August 28, 1914), addressed to the headquarters of Kyiv Military District, it was forbidden to publish any information about military events that could have a negative impact on readers in printed media (CSHAUK, f. 1600, d. 1, c. 549, p. 12). Thus, according to the List of testimonies and images, which composed Russia’s military secret (September 13, 1914), Paragraphs 22 and 24 prohibited the information on the loss of personnel, the unrest among the population on occupied territories, catastrophes, epidemics, explosions and fires in military units and institutions and naval agencies (CSHAUK, f. 278, d. 2, c. 6, p. 46).

In addition to concealment of information of military importance, it was also forbidden to disseminate any negative facts about the internal situation of the state. In the Telegram of the Minister of the Interior dated March 15, 1915, addressed to local governors, it was reported that the editors were prohibited from posting evidence of strikes in newspapers, as this could adversely affect workers’ mood (CSHAUK, f. 1600, d. 1, c. 549, p. 160). Also, it was forbidden to publish information about national, ration or other unrests in printed media (CSHAUK, f. 295, d. 1, c. 485, p. 98).

Thus, the country had a strong regime of control over the whole socio-political situation, and perhaps the most severe, compared to other belligerent countries. Such policy of the imperial government was aimed at providing information isolation of the society and for a certain time allowed to maintain the effect of “positive atmosphere in the air.”

The fact that Germany was the first to declare war on the Russian Empire, contributed to the formation of reception mechanisms of fair, defensive and necessary war to stop the German aggression. Due to the increased censorship control and active information propaganda at the initial stage of the struggle, a general patriotic rise was achieved among a large part of the population. In this regard, the Ukrainian researcher Oksana Vilshanka...
notes that the beginning of World War I was marked by a remarkable cohesion of the society, regardless of social or national affiliation or even political views (Vilshanska, 2014a, p. 441).

However, it should be noted that each of the social groups received and experienced war differently. In one of their works, the Ukrainian researchers Oleksandr Reient and Olena Serdiuk point out that “patriotic rhetoric calls to “strengthen the unity of the king with people” were shown only by the representatives of the ruling classes and urban segments of population” (Reient and Serdiuk, 2004, p. 8). Thus, the most “active” and “fairly talkative” patriots were either wealthy people who, due to their privileged and financial status, avoided military service and didn’t participate in the hostilities, or those who wished to show their loyalty to the empire for the sake of profit. The Ukrainian journalist Havrylo Hordienko, a native of Alexandrivska city (Katerynoslav Governorate), wrote in his memoirs about this: “Wounded people from Galicia were brought to the hospitals in Alexandrivska. The first sanitary train was greeted almost as winners in laurel wreaths! … The so-called “patriotic youth”, I mean high school students, and mostly the Jews, who persistently “juggled” [manipulated] the fact that they were “patriotic youth” rushed to carry the wounded from the wagons. But it is not surprising, because the real Russian should not emphasize in his country that he is Russian! And someone else has to do it! The patriotic youth may have met the second and third sanitary train, and later there was no trace of it.” (Hordienko, 1976, p. 87).

The “ardent” patriots were representatives of the Russian monarchical and ultranational organizations who succeeded after the revolutionary event of 1905 – 1907 and were called “The Black Hundred”. A famous Ukrainian composer and conductor Oleksander Koshyts mentioned the following in his memoirs about the situation in Kyiv: “During the daytime audition, a crowd of Black Hundreds burst into the garden with a shout and a song “God, save the tsar of ours”, interrupted us and the symphony orchestra, forced them to play the anthem with no end, began to make patriotic rallies, etc. It was no longer about the audition. We left everything and walked outside. People with furious faces were carrying a poor officer, and the policemen were already chasing the innocent people, administratively arrested the Germans and other foreigners to the Russian calaboose [prison]. In a word, it started as suddenly as plague…” (Koshyts, 1948, p. 190).

Usually in cities patriotism had collective nature and appeared in two most common forms: 1) holding festive events and demonstrations; 2) organizing charity events for the benefit of the army and war victims. The first form was mainly declarative and propagandistic, but the second was rational, since the need for money and food during the war didn’t lose its relevance. There were also cases of individual patriotism. A journalist Havrylo Hordienko wrote: “There were exceptional demonstrations of patriotism. For example, landowner Ivanenko from Andrievka village, at his own expense bought boots, beautiful cloth pants and soldier’s blouses for a thousand soldiers. It surprised me then, and will always be surprising that in such a “backward” Russia, in the county town of Aleksandrivska, such stocks of military clothes and shoes were found within a couple of days!” (Hordienko, 1976, p. 84).

During the war there were situations when students, while in a state of patriotic uplift and with no understanding of the seriousness of the problem, escaped to the front. Havrylo Hordienko wrote: “…In 1914, in the anniversary of the capture of Paris, a solemn event was organized at the Higher Primary School. Pupils of all classes came to the large school hall, the teachers were dressed in formal shirts with orders they had, and the school inspector Gavriil Vasylovych Krasnyanskiy and another senior teacher had swords with them... we have never seen such a parade again. The inspector said the opening statement about the
events of 1914, one of the teachers spoke more about the progress of the Napoleonic War of 1812 – 1814. After that, the school spiritual orchestra played cheerful marches. In the end, we all sang the hymn “God, save the tsar” and left the event with a patriotic delight. And soon one or two students “fled to war!” Such stunts we had back then.” (Hordienko, 1976, p. 62).

As we can see, patriotism among the urban population had rather ambivalent and marginal nature. The greater part of society was overwhelmed by a sense of patriotism and liberation struggle, though the main reason for this was not the desire to show their loyalty to the authorities and once again to be distinguished, but understanding of the need to protect their home from the enemy. This was especially relevant for the peasant environment.

The archetypal basis of the peasants’ attitude to the war was a permanent sense of their indefinable dependence on natural and social forces. This generated a fatalistic worldview, within which God was recepted as destiny, judgment, but on the contrary, the course of events of a natural or social nature was regarded as the unfolding of providential divine will. Because of this the war for peasants was a kind of unacceptable natural cataclysm, a punishment sent by God (Porshneva, 2004, p. 88). In such situation, the rural population became a “hostage” to their own narrow outlook. Due to the difficult financial situation, ignorance and information isolation, geopolitical interests of Russia and the personal claims of tsar were almost alien to a common peasant. His outlook was limited by his native village and the local district, and therefore, the main identifier that determined patriotism and peasant’s involvement in the war, was not the awareness of personal responsibility for protecting “Great” Russia, but the fear for his own home and family, as well as a sense of love for his native land – places where he was born, grew up and worked all his life.

At the initial stage of the war, patriotism was widespread among the peasants. Last but not the least, the stories of the heroic deeds of the soldiers and the first successes on the front line played a significant role. In one of the then publications in the newspaper “Kievskaya zemskaya gazeta” (August 29, 1914) was noted: “Rumors about the heroic deeds of our troops and the Cossacks soon started to spread in the village [Kryve of Skvyra County] and greatly inspired the population. Everyone has a warlike spirit and now they are only talking about the destruction of the Austrian and the German states” (V ojna i derevnya, 1914, August 29, p. 15). Peasant patriotism appeared in various forms. First of all, it was material assistance to the front. At the beginning of the war people in the villages began to organize donations of bread and other supplies for the needs of the army. Such events had a massive nature in the fall (1914), so the Council of Ministers set a limit on donations: no more than 1/5 of personal stock or capital. Rural communities provided money for the treatment of sick and wounded soldiers. Peasant girls knitted and sewed warm clothes for the soldiers (Porshneva, 2004, p. 88).

It should be added that the peasantry was the main reserve for the replenishment of the Russian army: from 15.8 million people mobilized until autumn of 1917, more than 12.8 million were taken from villages (Porshneva, 2004, p. 90). Since the troops were based on village origin, the attitude of soldiers at the beginning of the war was almost similar to the attitude of peasants. A researcher Olha Porshneva notes that it was the peasant component of the army’s body that allowed the commanders to have full and uncontrolled power over the lower ranks. The soldiers were ready to entrust themselves to the full authority of the commanders if they, in return, as was customary in the authoritarian-patriarchal system of relations, would not only be responsible for their actions, but also show genuine parental concern for them. This axiom of consciousness of the peasant-soldier was the basis of their psychological perception of military service (Porshneva, 2004, p. 177). This leads to two basic
facts: first, for most soldiers and peasants-soldiers, the declared geopolitical goals of Russia in the war were incomprehensible and unacceptable; secondly, the words of the military commanders had considerable authority and, usually, weren’t criticized. No wonder that such informational method as “appeal to authority” were used in media. In order to motivate and form the desired position in the war for the readers, the editors of the publications often posted texts or passages of the commanders’ speeches.

A sense of “popular support” played a significant role in supporting the morale and fighting spirit of the soldiers; they believed that they are remembered at home and would get assistance in every possible way. One of the authors of that time wrote in the military front newspaper “Armeisksi Vestnik”: “The ordinary citizen... sends his gifts and donations to the soldiers willingly, joyfully or just by inertia, and probably doesn’t suspect what he is doing. For him it’s always a trifle... But in these little things a soldier feels that he isn’t abandoned, torn off or left alone... Different gifts were handed out to officers, who returned on their positions. So many emotions, delight, joy! One soldier was given a shirt with embroidery: “From a high school student Shura [Olexandra] – from Poltava”, and in a sleeve was a note filled with pleasant words. The soldier gone crazy from delight, he was jumping, bragging about it ... Every little thing a soldier gets, acts like an electric current... A great power of spirit is born – a force that pushes forward for amazing feats, for immortal courage and for the victory” (Novitskiy, 1916, February 9, p. 4).

It should be noted that there were also certain age and personality traits that influenced the soldiers’ position at the beginning of the war. The young unmarried boys recepted the war as a fighting adventure that could tear them away from the routine and everyday life without being aware of the basic nature of the problem and its consequences. Protopresbyter of the military and naval clergy Father Georgiy Shavelskiy stated in his memoirs: “… He [a Russian soldier] considered to be his duty to continually show courage, often unnecessarily put his life at risk, and sometimes die to no avail. His motto was: I’ll die for the tsar and the motherland. There was a serious defect in the mood and ideology of our officers, which wasn’t noticed. …It was often known, that a soldier, ready to lay down his life at any moment, developed some kind of nonchalance and careless attitude to the real battle situation, to military experience and science. He was fascinated by psychosis of heroism. The ideal of heroic deed of death overshadowed his ideal of victory. It was very dangerous thing for the affair” (Shavelskiy, 1954).

The family soldiers and masters were usually depressed, and felt only oppression and despair. When sent to the front and during breaks between battles, soldiers sang mournful and gloomy songs in hospitals. This depressed psychological condition was caused by a number of factors: a fatalistic view of war as God’s punishment for sins and a natural cataclysm which had no salvation; historical memory of the spilled blood in the previous wars of imperial Russia, when the government tried to compensate for the enemy’s military and technical superiority by the size of its infantry; the psychology of waiting for the unknown (Porshneva, 2004, pp. 179–180). In addition, these factors were compounded by sorrow and grief over their own families, family homes and lands that were actually left behind.

Owing to active enthusiasm, patriotism, a large number of troops, despite the backward material base, during the first period of the war the Russian army managed to carry out a number of victorious operations, occupied part of Eastern Galicia, Bukovina, Transcarpathia and retained the wide front line. But such success, gained by colossal human sacrifices and material destruction, was temporary. Later the situation in the country and at the front got worse. There was a clear dissonance between what the government and media claimed and what was happening in reality.
Even before the war, many people realized that war would bring significant problems and troubles to every day’s life. The Ukrainian historian, a chairman of the Committee of the Southwestern Front of the All-Russian Union of Cities for Assistance to Sick and Injured Soldiers Dmytro Doroshenko wrote in his memoirs: “The mood among Kyiv Ukrainians was very depressive. Everyone expected the greatest disaster because of this war, especially if it goes well for the Muscovites. Hopelessness and despair took over people when they thought that these shackles for the Ukrainian life were forged by the Ukrainian hands, watered by the Ukrainian tears.” (Doroshenko, 1969, p. 22).

Austrian researcher Hannes Leidinger notes that “hurray-patriotism” at the beginning of World War I, which, despite all efforts, was accepted mostly by small sections of the urban population and the “patriotic” Duma, which the monarch and his advisers treated critically and simply had to tolerate with its existence, hid the problems of the country, but only for a while (Dornik et al., 2015, p. 510). Within a year of the hostilities, public mood changed dramatically. Appeared a rethinking of the events of the war and a new understanding of its catastrophic consequences. Some part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was overwhelmed by a depressive mood. Leonid Zhebunov wrote in his letter to Yevhen Chykalenko (September 4, 1915): “There is a kind of horror in my soul, an invincible burden that crushes my heart, because a real catastrophe has come, a universal catastrophe that has embraced half of the world... The main horror for me is that all those moral values produced by science, art and life, achieved by thousands of years of hard work and brilliant thought – are broken down, crushed. Not to mention the destruction of material goods. It will be renewed, but what about the moral laws or habits? Where did they go, and what will be established instead of them, how will this blizzard be stopped?! Sometimes I think – the faith in human progress is lost...” (Starovoitenko, 2005, pp. 188–189).

The socio-political situation became more complicated with every year. The factional strives in the Duma sharpened, left and right factions began to calculate how many heroes they had in each faction. There was a growing desire among men to avoid mobilization. The difficult economic situation and disappointing news from the front deprived the euphoria of society that prevailed in the first days and months of the war. The average citizens were forced to earn sufficient resources for livelihood in difficult conditions. The residents of the cities were worried about the lack of apartments, the shortage of basic necessities, fuel, the constant increase in prices, problems with transport (Vilshanska, 2014b, p. 65). Messages about making wrong decisions, corruption, and “preying on the war”, as well as talks and rumors about the arrest of “rebels”, who dared to express their indignation, dispelled the illusions even further (Dornik et al., 2015, p. 36).

The mentioned above father Georgiy Shavel’skij, wrote in his memoirs: “At that time we didn’t want to think about the power of the enemy, our own unpreparedness, the various and countless sacrifices that war would require, flows of blood and millions of deaths... Everyone – young and old, both light-hearted and wise – eagerly wandered into this dreaded, unknown future, as if only in the flow of suffering and blood we could find our happiness. This mood didn’t weaken during the months of the war, until our defects appeared on the front, and required many sacrifices” (Shavelskiy, 1954).

The retreat of the Russian army in the spring – summer of 1915 clearly demonstrated the large-scale miscalculations in the country’s preparation for war, the organization of the army supply, ammunition and uniforms, the consequences of the inconsistency and incompetence of military and civilian power. Since the beginning of the war, Russia suffered the greatest
losses among the armies of the belligerent states: about 3.5 million people were killed, wounded and captured, including 300 thousand killed, 1.5 million captured, and the officer corps lost 45 thousand people (Porshneva, 2004, p. 103). Such factors began the process of destabilizing the situation in the country and rethinking of the events, that happened lately.

Rumors about betrayal at the highest government levels, spies and German domination began to spread among the population. There were reports of mass dissatisfaction from army officers, who blamed the Ministry of Defense for the lack of ammunition. As a result, in order to reassure society, on June 12, 1915 the emperor decided to dismiss Minister of Defense Vladimir Sukhomlinov. Along with him some people lost their posts, such as: Minister of the Interior Nikolay Maklakov (June 6), Chief Prosecutor of the Holy Synod Vladimir Sabler (July 5), Minister of Justice Ivan Shcheglovitov (July 6). Their places were taken by: Minister of the Interior – Nikolai Shcherbatov, Minister of Justice – Aleksei Khvostov, Chief Prosecutor – Aleksandr Samarín, and Minister of Defense – Aleksei Polivanov (Oldenburg, 1949, p. 171).

The change of ministers and the convocation of the State Duma on July 19, 1915 were accepted positively by society, because it brought hope for better changes in the army. But at the same time, these actions didn’t just calm people down, but created the desire for further, greater changes. People believed that those reforms, which were refused by government in peacetime, could be achieved in time of war. Misunderstanding between the state and society was growing bigger: the emperor considered it necessary for the purposes of war to concentrate power in his hands and to govern through people whom he could trust; for him the popularity or non-popularity of these people among the population didn’t play a special role. On the other hand, the society believed that the moment had come, and it was given the opportunity not only to “throw off” but also to “appoint” its own ministers (Oldenburg, 1949, p. 172). The society’s need and understanding of importance of changes were increasing every day.

The involvement of the Russian Empire in the war and its negative effects had intensified the process of spreading of negative rumors about members of the monarch family, betrayal of its members, and the desire to make peace with the enemy. Father Georgiy Shavelskiy mentioned: “Two or three months after the start of the war, when the front ...endured many trials, when both the power of the enemy and our unpreparedness were seen, when the future of the war stopped to be cloudless, – at this time rumors about the Empress leaning toward the peace with Germans spread across the front. And these rumors confused everyone more than reports of terrible failures at the front. Under the influence of the general mood, I had to write a letter to Anna Vyrubova [maid of honor of Empress Alexandra Fedorivna], asking her to influence the Empress with all her might, to dissuade her from thinking about premature peace” (Shavelskiy, 1954).

Emperor Nicholas II was increasingly criticized and discredited. The slogan of 1914 about “unity of people with the king” lost its relevance and went against public opinion. The emperor was accused of treason and major problems, and from the defender of the state turned into responsible person for such difficult situation. A separate consequence of this situation was the gradual destruction of the sacred image of the monarch in the public consciousness. The emperor lost the status of “God’s anointed” and turned into an ordinary government official, whose actions can be criticized, questioned and even condemned.

The press became bolder and more critical, and destroyed the established foundations of imperial traditions in its information material. The Moscow security chief stated in his report (October 23, 1916), that the press vigorously undermined the authority of the government, the spirit of society and optimism. He noted that sensations, which showed problems at the front and
at the home front, induced people to stock up on food and other goods, which ultimately increased the atmosphere of the crisis. In addition, the press hinted at the betrayal of the royal family. In the last months of the empire’s existence, the “attacks” of journalists increased, merging with more or less fantastic rumors of crisis, defeat, corruption and betrayal (Daly, 2001, p. 40).

Negative trends began to show up in the army. The prolongation of the war, the decline of patriotism and morale were the reasons for the spread of such phenomena as the refusal of soldiers to fulfill order about the offensive and the voluntary imprisonment. According to Russian researcher Aleksandr Astashov, during World War I, the surrender of soldiers in the Russian army became massive. This was especially noticeable during and after the “Great Retreat” in the summer of 1915 (Astashov, 2014, pp. 416–418).

Frustration and reluctance to continue the war were spreading among the soldiers’ corps. The negative consequence of this was the spread of such phenomena as desertion. The famous Ukrainian public politician and diplomat Mykola Halahan, who was mobilized to the ranks of the Russian army from the first days of the war and performed the functions of a regimental adjutant and personally saw the peculiarities of the occupation of Eastern Galicia, wrote in his memoirs: “…The signs of internal decomposition in the army were seen in 1915. The barometer of this phenomenon was desertion. In 1916 it became already a mass thing, there were more than a million deserters.” (Halahan, 2005, p. 189).

In total, according to official data, from the start of hostilities in 1914 until the February Revolution, about 195 000 people deserted from the Russian army. However, this data isn’t reliable, because the government usually downplayed the figures. In addition, it’s not entirely clear by what principle the calculation was made and who was included in the general list: only those who were caught and brought to tribunal, or those who weren’t caught or were fugitives. Today, the majority of the researchers refer to testimony of former State Duma Chairman Mikhail Rodzianko, according to which, from the beginning of the hostilities in 1914 to the February Revolution, there were about 1.5 million deserters in the Russian army, including captured and fugitives (Astashov, 2014, pp. 475–480).

Along with desertion, self-injury spread in the army. The average number of upper extremity injuries in the Russian army in previous military conflicts was 25–35% of the total. However, during World War I, this number had reached 45–55.8%, which was 10–15% more than usual. In general, the number of people who harmed themselves in the period of 1914–1917 was about 200–350 000 (Astashov, 2014, p. 42).

With each passing year, more and more petty officers tried to avoid engaging in military action by sitting in the rear. Such evaders were commonly called “zapilnyky” (clandestines) and “shkurnyky” (tradesmen, mercantilists, egoists). As a consequence, unskilled officers who had neither experience nor sufficient practice and little understanding of military affairs, were sent to the front instead of them. Mykola Halahan wrote in his memoirs: “… There were more and more typical “zapilnyky” and “shkurnyky” that didn’t have any desire to “smell gunpowder”… There were some stubborn “zapilnyky” nobody could pull out from their well-settled places, even by the end of the war… The poor students and teachers, who had to become Warrant Officers during 6 or 8 months and were poorly prepared for the duties of the petty officers, were ruthlessly driven to the front because they were stepchildren, but “their brother” (staff officer) was kept in the rear.” (Halahan, 2005, p. 184).

In order to avoid military service and engagement in combat, some officers resorted to simulations, pretending to be seriously ill. Mykola Halahan, who was repeatedly mentioned in our work, wrote: “… It was especially unpleasant to look at the “shall-shocked” simulants
and the so-called “wounded in the little finger”. They were ardent supporters of the “war to the end,” but didn’t fight by themselves... Of course, from the perspective of people it’s easy to understand that nobody wants to die. But to see the figure of a simulant-shkurnyk from senior staff, who screams about “the war to a victorious end,” but hides in the rear – is more than unpleasant” (Halahan, 2005, p. 184).

Fighting failures, hunger, bad uniforms, infectious diseases, as well as rumors of betrayal of the king and queen dramatically reduced the level of “trenchant religiosity”. Hope for God, faith in the power of prayer and the protective power of the cross were all gone. More and more soldiers had an anti-Church mood, religious kindness was supplanted by cynical views on faith, and “loss of soul” turned into drunkenness, depression, and open blasphemy. There were cases when soldiers burned crosses on mass graves. The religious-protest mood of the front-line soldiers escalated: in 1915 priests and the church were sometimes accused of retreating from the commandments of Christ, but in 1916 there were mass evasions from the performance of religious ceremonies, which were transformed even into the denial of God. The image of the priest-hero, who encouraged people to deeds by the cross, in the minds of soldiers changed into image of priests with “traditional” flaws (Petrov, 2014, p. 482). It is clear that the need for faith didn’t disappear, but its significance has decreased significantly since 1914.

With each passing year, incidents of anti-war and anti-government agitation by former soldiers, who returned home from the front, have increased. This phenomenon was especially widespread at the end of 1916 – the beginning of 1917. Such information was written in the prescription of the Chief of Podilsky Governorate Gendarmerie Administration of January 24, 1917: “Commanders, as well as formerly wounded lower ranks, when coming from the front on vacation and on other occasions, propagandize against the war and call on the population to disobey the law and the government. I would like to draw attention to this phenomenon ... to clarify the agitators and to take the necessary measures in time to stop this propaganda” (CSHAUK, f. 301, d. 2, c. 195, p. 23).

It is clear that from the soldiers’ point of view this agitation had a rational explanation, since they, as direct combatants, experienced the basic horrors of war, the difficult living conditions at the front and the futility of hostilities that killed thousands of people.

In fact, 1916 was a decisive year for the Russian Empire. The economic crisis and unsuccessful hostilities led to an increase of number of workers’ protests. In that year, about 951 000 people participated in strikes and protests all over the empire. In addition, peasant protests intensified, while patriotic mood in the army weakened and even disappeared in some places. The end of the year was marked by a radical turn in the mass psychology and mood of a large part of the population, workers, peasants and soldiers, the essence of which was the spontaneous growth of the desire for peace (Zolotarev, 2014, p. 461).

In February of 1917, the governor of Kyiv noted in one of his circulars, addressed to the peace agents and chiefs of the local police, that number of parcels, sent from Russia to prisoners of war in Germany and Austria-Hungary, in which the border gendarmerie revealed negative messages, had increased. The author emphasized the difficult situation in the empire, the general cost of living, high prices for basic necessities, people’s dissatisfaction and various kinds of unrest, and also noted the growing desire for peace in society (SAKO, f. 1716, d. 1, c. 16, p. 17).

As a result, during World War I, significant transformations took place in the national consciousness of the Ukrainian people. The Ukrainians became more politically active and tried to counteract the Russian propaganda illegally. An important place in this context was
given to students. At the end of November – the beginning of December of 1914, a special, illegal Information Bureau of Kyiv Ukrainian Students (IBKUS) was organized at the Imperial University of St. Vladimir in Kyiv. It consisted of young people who didn’t want to put up with the aggressive actions of the Russian government on the occupied territories of Eastern Galicia and Northern Bukovyna and its chauvinistic policy towards the Ukrainians. In attempt to prevent the Russian domination and propaganda, the IBKUS started an active anti-Russian and anti-autocratic information policy.

On December 17, 1914, the Department of Military Censorship at Kyiv Military District Headquarters sent a message to the local Governorate Gendarmerie Administration chief, stating the need for appropriate orders to counteract such agitation. The document was accompanied by a sample of the leaflet of Information Bureau, dated December 2, which was disseminate to students. It referred to the cruelty of imperial power policy and called for a boycott of fundraising for the benefit of the “Russian” population of Galicia: “Comrades! Another prisoner appeared in the “Great Prison of Nations”. Galicia became a military prey of Russia, crushed, devastated, national culture of the population is destroyed... Thousands of best Galician Ukrainian intellectuals have been deported to Siberia. ...December 16 is a day of assistance to the “Russian population of Galicia”... Don’t give money to the black hundred... Ukrainian students are appealing to you, comrades, to boycott the day of “crocodile tears” (CSHAUK, f. 274, d. 4, c. 325, pp. 56, 57).

Soon, another leaflet with the following content was published: “The Russian government will bring Galicia absolute economic ruin, spiritual oppression and violence against national consciousness. Comrades! Neither of us will go out to raise money on 16th of December! We won’t give even a coin!” (CSHAUK, f. 274, d. 4, c. 325, p. 59). Such materials completely discredited the actions of the government in the eyes of society and became a threat of the formation of anti-Russian and anti-government positions among the population. Responding to this situation, on December 20, 1914, the Police Department, in a message to the Chief of the Kyiv Governorate Gendarmerie Administration, required to present evidence about the compilers and distributors of these leaflets. On February 11, 1915, Colonel A. Shredel stated in his reply that the local gendarmerie had failed to find any information about the authors (CSHAUK, f. 274, d. 4, c. 325, pp. 58, 60). This testifies to the fact that the activities of the police to identify “untrustworthy” people, who were engaged in “hostile” agitation, didn’t always have a success.

During the entire period of the war, the IBKUS carried out active information activities against the Russian autocracy. On February 24, 1916, in connection with the anniversary of the death of the Ukrainian poet T. Shevchenko, the Information Bureau issued and circulated propaganda proclamations in Kyiv with the following content: “Comrades! the 26th of February is anniversary of T. Shevchenko’s death... Let us add our voice to the all-democratic space against slavery, captivity and oppression. We protest against the oppression of our word, against total disregard for our rights and interests. ...we will boldly say: “Laugh, fierce enemy / but not too much”. Comrades, let us dedicate the day of February of 26 to the memory of a person, who has spent all his life and all his power to fight for the better fate for his people.” (CSHAUK, f. 274, d. 4, c. 548, p. 119).

Similar calls received positive feedback from Ukrainian youth. On the 26th of February there was a demonstration speech of students of Kyiv Imperial University and cadets of higher women’s courses. The youth intended to sing a song for the eternal memory of the poet near the Vladimir cathedral, but the police prevented such action. Two people were
arrested and other participants (201 people) were fined. It is worth noting that not only ethnic Ukrainians but also representatives of other nationalities took part in the demonstration: 21 Caucasians, 58 Jews (CSHAUK, f. 274, d. 4, c. 548, p. 109). So, students, as a politically-conscious category of the population, tried to show their own national position and counteract imperial chauvinism.

It should be noted that the establishment of close contacts between the Ukrainians of the Dnieper Ukraine and Eastern Galicia, which were long divided between empires, had a significant influence on the growth of national consciousness. This happened because of: 1) the increasing of number of the Ukrainian prisoners of war, who fought on the side of Austria-Hungary and, after the capture, traveled to Kyiv, as it was the focal point of the entire Southwestern Front of the Russian Empire; 2) the growth of civilian Galician emigrants; 3) and the disposition of the Russian army on the occupied territories of Eastern Galicia and Bukovyna. On this occasion Mykola Kowalewskyi mentioned: “The presence of the Russian army in Galicia and Bukovyna had a huge impact on the growth of the Ukrainian consciousness among those soldiers and officers, who only spontaneously felt that they were the Ukrainians, but were not able to form these feelings and elevate them to the level of national consciousness. While staying in Galicia and Bukovyna, they came in contact with a population that showed a fairly high level of national consciousness, and it made many of them conscious Ukrainians.” (Kowalewskyi, 1960, p. 194).

The Conclusions. Therefore, the initial stage of the war was marked by widespread patriotism, which, despite of its “mass” nature, had a differentiated, ambivalent and permanent character during the period of 1914 – 1917. The majority of “ardent” patriots were wealthy people who, through their privileged and financial position avoided military service and practically didn’t participate in the hostilities, or representatives of ultra-monarchical circles. For some people the war was a way of showing their loyalty to the government, but for the others it was an opportunity to make money and enrich themselves. Other groups of the population were overwhelmed by a sense of patriotism and liberation struggle, though the main reason for this was not the love for the “great tsarist Motherland”, but understanding of the need to protect their “small homeland”. This tendency was peculiar to the peasant environment, whose outlook, because of informational isolation, archaic thinking, stereotyping, low education and poverty, had a local and limited character. Fear for family, home, household, and that the enemy could destroy everything, was a powerful and stimulating factor to volunteer to fight in the front or join the rear. A similar vision and perception of the war was typical for the soldiers’ environment, as it was based on village natives. In the early years of the war, the behavior of soldiers was determined by the humble, patient, and self-righteous fulfillment of their military duty. Patriotic state and stable psychological atmosphere prevailed in the army and at the front due to active information propaganda, functioning of the institute of military censorship and activities of the clergy. A large number of soldiers believed in the liberation nature of the war and the rapid victory of the Russian Empire. It should be noted that the Russian army conducted military operations mainly on its territory, which formed in the public consciousness the perception of war as defensive and fair.

Delaying the timing of the war, defeats at the front, increasing of the number of victims, growing economic crisis triggered a process of destabilization inside the country. Distrust and dissatisfaction were spreading in society. Rumors about treason in the upper echelons of government, spies and German domination spread among the population. One of the main consequences of the war was the growing criticism of the emperor’s personality and his role in
the life of the country, which led to the gradual destruction of the sacred image of the monarch in the public consciousness. Negative trends began to show up in the army, in particular, a decline of patriotism, morale and religiosity. This caused the spread of such phenomena as desertion, the refusal of soldiers to fulfill the orders of commanders, voluntary imprisonment, hiding in the rear, large number of simulations etc. As a result, in 1916 – 1917, measures, adopted by the Russian imperial government in order to control the socio-political situation, could no longer hide the true situation and restrain the serious transformations in the mass public consciousness, which included: the gradual destruction of traditional forms of imperialism and official ideology, based on the formula of Sergey Uvarov (1786 – 1855): Orthodox faith, autocracy, nation. The increase of political activity in the national consciousness of the Ukrainians was a notable phenomenon. It also was one of the important preconditions for the revolutionary events and the development of the Ukrainian statehood in the 1917s – 1920s.

In conclusion, we can allocate three main stages of society’s reception and understanding of the events of war:

1) July of 1914 – spring 1915 – a stage of patriotic “euphoria”, a positive attitude to war and support of government’s actions by the majority of the population;
2) the summer of 1915 – the summer of 1916 – the period of rethinking of the war events, a gradual understanding of its true goals and negative consequences, the decline of patriotism, the appearance of indifference and distrust of the population of civilian authorities and military structures;
3) the autumn of 1916 – February of 1917 – increasing of public dissatisfaction, negative criticism of the government’s actions, intensification of anti-war and revolutionary mood, increasing of political activity of the society and actualization of national issues, in particular the Ukrainian one.

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Patriots & Critics: the Story of how Public Receptions of World War I in the Russian Empire Changed


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