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CAUSES OF THE RUSSIAN-MOLDOVAN CONFLICT OF 1992 IN UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL DISCOURSES

Abstract. *The purpose of the research* is a comparative juxtaposition of facts, assessments derived from the Ukrainian and Russian periodicals, materials of online publications concerning the causes of the Russian-Moldovan conflict in 1992. **The research methodology** is based on the principles of historicism, systematicity, scientificity, verification, authorial objectivity, as well as on the historical method and methods of analysis, synthesis and generalization. The historical method was used to study the events that took place in Moldova in 1992. Owing to the method of analysis and synthesis, the causes of the conflict itself and the proof by scientific means were identified. The method of generalization formed a general vision of the problem, the results of the study became the basis for the conclusions. **The scientific novelty** is that for the first time a comprehensive analysis of information and scientific research in Ukrainian and Russian historiography concerning the topic of the Russian-Moldovan conflict of 1992 was carried out, and the main reasons were also clarified and enumerated, which contributed to the development and actions of the above-mentioned conflict. **The Conclusions.** The main causes of the Russian-Moldovan conflict, which in fact became the first hybrid confrontation

between the countries neighboring Ukraine, in the Ukrainian and Russian historiographical discourse can be considered a number of factors, including the collapse of the USSR and the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact, which opened diverse new explosive situations in the territories of the former republics, including Moldova; crisis of the world political system; linguistic and geopolitical factor; economic factor. In general, the Russian-Moldovan conflict at the current stage of development of international relations is considered to be “frozen” and incomplete due to the unwillingness of the current authorities in Moldova to resolve the situation radically and the intervention and incitement of the conflict by the representatives of other states that are interested in its existence.

Key words: Ukraine, Moldova, historiography, causes of the conflict, post-Soviet space, Transnistria.

ПРИЧИНИ ВИНИКНЕННЯ РОСІЙСЬКО-МОЛДОВСЬКОГО КОНФЛІКТУ 1992 р. В УКРАЇНСЬКОМУ ТА РОСІЙСЬКОМУ ІСТОРІОГРАФІЧНИХ ДИСКУРСАХ

Анотація. *Мета дослідження* полягає у компаративному зіставленні фактів, оцінок, почерпнутих з української та російської періодики, матеріалів інтернет-видань стосовно причин початку російсько-молдовського конфлікту 1992 р. **Методологія дослідження** базована на принципах історизму, системності, науковості, верифікації, авторської об'єктивності, а також на історичному методі та методах аналізу, синтезу та узагальнення. Історичний метод застосовувався при дослідженні подій, які відбувалися на території Молдови у 1992 р. Завдяки методу аналізу і синтезу були виокремлені причини виникнення самого конфлікту та їх доведення науковими засобами. Методом узагальнення було сформоване загальне бачення проблеми, отримані результати наукових студій стали основою висновків. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що вперше здійснено сукупний аналіз інформації та наукових розвідок в українській та російській історіографії на тему російсько-молдовського конфлікту 1992 р., а також з'ясовано і названо основні причини, які сприяли розгортанню та дії вищезазначеного конфлікту. **Висновки.** Основними причинами виникнення російсько-молдовського конфлікту, який фактично став першим гібридним протистоянням між країнами, сусідніми з Україною, в українському та російському історіографічному дискурсі вважають низку чинників, серед яких: розпад Союзу Радянських Соціалістичних Республік (СРСР) та ліквідація Варшавського договору відкрили багато нових вибухонебезпечних ситуацій на територіях колишніх республік, включаючи Молдову; криза політичної системи світу; мовний і геополітичний чинники; економічний чинник. Загалом російсько-молдовський конфлікт на сучасному етапі розвитку міжнародних відносин як через небажання чинної влади у Молдові радикально врегулювати означену ситуацію, так і через втручання тарозпалення конфлікту представниками інших держав, зацікавлених у подальшому його існуванні, вважається “замороженим” та незавершеним.

Ключові слова: Україна, Молдова, історіографія, причини конфлікту, пострадянський простір, Придністров'я.

The Problem Statement. The Russian-Moldovan conflict of 1992 should be studied in detail and is quite relevant for Ukraine. First of all, the above-mentioned conflict can be considered as a direct threat to the Ukrainian national security. This is because the territory borders on Ukraine and in case of any clashes, the conflict may be displaced at any time. Second of all, the majority of Transnistria's population consists of the Ukrainians and the Russians, which again indicates Ukraine's interest in resolving the ongoing conflict.

The analysis of the Russian-Moldovan conflict by the Ukrainian and the Russian historians in 1992 provides a deeper understanding of the options for the development of a hybrid conflict and uses the material developed to predict the situation of the current hybrid war in Ukraine. In addition, we find it interesting to compare the views of the Ukrainian and the Russian scholars concerning the 1992 Transnistrian conflict.

The Analysis of Recent Research Works and Publications. Since the outburst of the conflict in Moldova, much time has passed, which led to the emergence of a large number of

scientific papers and investigations into the details and descriptions of the conflict. Numerous scholars from many countries tried to analyze the problems and causes of the Russian-Moldovan conflict in 1992. The following domestic researchers, who studied the above-mentioned issue should be noted: O. Aliexsiechenko, O. Kava, O. Sadovnik, V. Anikin, I. Vyshnya, K. Vitman, I. Petrova, V. Pintsak, H. Perepelytsia, etc.

There were numerous Russian researchers, who covered the themes of the Moldovan conflict in their works: K. Myalo, N. Kharitonova, I. Kochedikov, A. Zubov, B. Bomeshko, N. Babilunha, K. Kodryan, I. Hrek, V. Shuryhin, D. Tukmakov, V. Matyash, M. Bergman and the others. It should be stated that the research topic was partially considered by Western researchers: the use of the factor of “separatism” in Transnistria by the Russian side was studied by K. Büscher (Büscher, 1996) and S. Troebst (Troebst, 2003); playing the ethnic card in the conflict was considered by King (King, 2001); the territorial dimension of the confrontation in 1991 – 1993 was analyzed by N. Lamont (Lamont, 2007).

The purpose of the research is to analyse scientific researches in the Ukrainian and Russian historiographies concerning the causes of the Russian-Moldovan conflict.

The Main Material Statement. The Transnistrian crisis, the Moldovan conflict, and the Russian-Moldovan conflict of 1992 – these are all names of one phenomenon that is often referred to in historiography as the collective name of the Transnistrian conflict. The above-mentioned confrontation is recorded in history as an armed conflict, which increases its importance and negative consequences. The conflict began on March 28, 1992, with an open armed confrontation in Transnistria. As a result, a state of emergency was declared in Moldova.

The international community is quite cautious about the determinants of the conflict and the perpetrators. However, Russia’s role in this conflict is almost undeniable. In addition, quite interestingly, it could be recognized in the Russian historiographical discourse. The representatives of the above-mentioned discourse, in order to raise Russia’s authority, often display it as a kind of philanthropist, who seeks to settle any disputes between states or parts of it peacefully. Although it is rather a veiled reason to intervene in the conflict and satisfy the interests of the Russian leadership.

Hence, it is appropriate to consider numerous aspects of the Transnistrian conflict and its causes in the Ukrainian and Russian historiographical discourse. Thus, O. Grom divides the historiography of this conflict into: inter-Romanian, the Soviet and modern (Grom, 2018, p. 130). The author began to study the conditions of the conflict not from the years of 1990 – 1992, but much earlier, he immersed in historical milestones. In addition, O. Grom emphasized the fact that for a long time the main works, which studied the conflict were the works written by Moldovan scholars, the objectivity of which is in great doubt (Grom, 2018, p. 140).

O. Grom, pointed at the specifics of the history of the region after 1917, stated that research on the sociopolitical movements in Bessarabia and, especially, on the history of local nationalism, was strongly dependent on the political situation and the continuous “war of identities” (Grom, 2018, p. 140).

N. Kharitonova noted in the abstract for the thesis “International political dimension of the Transnistrian conflict: strategic approaches to settlement” that the study of the Transnistrian conflict can be divided into several areas: the Transnistrian, the Moldovan, the Russian and the Western. The scholar found it quite interesting that the Russian and Transnistrian directions in general had the same essence, as well as the Moldovan and Western (Kharitonova, 2019, p. 6).

N. Kharitonova traced the connection between the number of scientific works and the discovery of new causes of the above-mentioned conflict. The researcher truly believed that

the above-mentioned conflict, like the others, occurred due to the transformation of the world political system in the 90s. In addition, the scholar also noted that the existence of entities with uncertain status was a consequence of the state system crisis (Kharitonova, 2019, p. 27).

According to I. Kochedykov, the cause of the political crisis in Moldova and, as a consequence, the armed confrontation in Transnistria, happened due to the nationalists, who came to power (Kochedykov, 2015, p. 86). Kochedykov called the discourse of the Moldavianism the second discourse of the Moldavian state (Kochedykov, 2015, p. 90). I. Kochedykov also believed that the linguistic aspect was closely intertwined with the conflict. In particular, the scholar stated that language policy became firmly entrenched in the worldview of the people of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR), which ensured the group's internal unity and combined well with the aspirations of local elites to retain power and independence (Kochedykov, 2015, p. 91). In his research, I. Kochedykov tried to raise the issue of correlating the Moldovans with other nations and equated them more with the Russians.

Another researcher, Yu. Netkachev in his historical essay, called "The Unknown Truth about the Transnistrian Conflict of 1992", revealed the political circumstances of that period. Of course, in his work he did not leave behind the USSR collapse issue, which he considered to be a prerequisite for changing the political mood of the former Soviet republics. Yu. Netkachev was the Commander of the 14th General Army and described quite sharply all the events that he eyewitnessed. It was this army that was in Transnistria at the time. The question of belonging to the army of Russia or the Republic of Moldova drove the military into a dead end.

They were supposed to fight against former common peoples, people of different nationalities, in fact, on the orders of some people, who tried to carry out the separation of powers in the republic (Netkachev, 2019, p. 19). Yu. Netkachev highlighted the beginning of the formation of "new political thinking" and pointed at the need for changes in the political system of society, which had to meet the requirements of the time. In his work Yu. Netkachev also depicted the events in Transnistria. The scholar drew specific attention to the fact that the main part of Moldova's industry was concentrated in the Transnistrian region, and the Russian and Russian-speaking populations made up the vast majority. Due to the harassment by certain groups in Moldova, the Transnistrian population began to oppose rapprochement with Romania (Netkachev, 2019, p. 49). Based on the above-mentioned information, we can already grasp the different views of the population on the need for cooperation with the states.

Taking into consideration the Ukrainian historiographical discourse, it should be noted that the scientific works of the Ukrainian researchers of the Russian-Moldovan conflict and Ukraine's contribution to its solution were represented mainly by generalized analytical materials. Scholars distinguished numerous causes of the conflict, but they were also consistent with the Russian historiography.

Hence, the following reasons for its occurrence are singled out: historical reasons (Nechaieva-Iuriichuk, D. Yermolenko, O. Aliexsieichenko), geopolitical reasons (O. Sadovnik, M. Plaksenko), ideological reasons (O. Aliexsieichenko, O. Sadovnik), ethnic reasons, including ethno-political (O. Sadovnik, V. Kotsur), language factor (O. Sadovnik, V. Kotsur), economic reasons (Nechaieva-Iuriichuk, D. Yermolenko, political and legal reasons (H. Pereplytsia), political (V. Kotsur, O. Sadovnik), cultural reasons (Nechaieva-Iuriichuk, D. Yermolenko, O. Aliexsieichenko).

It should be mentioned that in their works the Ukrainian scholars tried to do the research on the conflict in a more descriptive way, using safe statements and maintaining neutrality in views, especially without expressing a subjective point of view. In the Ukrainian historiography, the

Russian-Moldovan conflict was considered to be a sociopolitical confrontation. By typology – the ethno-political conflict, because in its historical development it went through all the stages of conflict interaction, which are inherent in this type of conflict.

One more scholar, O. Kava states that during the existence of the Soviet Union in Transnistria, the subjects of the conflict were already identified. On the one hand, O. Kava said, it was the Moldovan national elite, represented mainly by national democrats and ultranationalists, and on the other hand, the conservative nomenklatura of Transnistria, represented mainly by the board of directors. According to O. Kava, the escalation of the conflict was inevitable between these extremes, diametrically opposed in their ideological and political views and forces (Kava, 2004). In addition, the union autonomy issue was a crucial political precondition that gave Transnistria the opportunity to determine its new state status and determine its participation in the conflict.

S. Pyrozshkov, a renowned Ukrainian scholar, diplomat and academician, who headed the diplomatic mission of Ukraine in the Republic of Moldova for a long time, recognised the Russian-Moldovan conflict as based on several dimensions: strategic, regional and domestic (Pyrozshkov, 2006, p. 557).

S. Pyrozshkov, comparing the armed conflicts in Transnistria of the Republic of Moldova and in the East of Ukraine, depicted similar and different signs among them. According to S. Pyrozshkov, there was no ethnic or religious conflict in Transnistria, as almost the entire population was the Orthodox. “The Ukrainians and the Moldovans always lived in this area. The Ukrainians are a national minority, but they are not a classic diaspora formed as a result of migration from other countries, as was the case in the United States. This is essentially an indigenous ethnic group that formed the basis of the region’s population. The Russians appeared at the beginning of the XIXth century. That is why, these people lived in this territory since ancient times, had their own ethnic identity and it is now in relief and can be really observed” (Pyrozshkov, 2006, p. 562).

The Ukrainian researcher V. Kotsur analyzed the Russian-Moldovan conflict in detail. According to V. Kotsur, there were three main reasons for the Transnistrian confrontation. Among them were the following: “sharp ethnic and political differences between Moldova on the west bank of the Dniester and Transnistria; polar geopolitical orientation of the extreme political camps of the politicum of Moldova and Transnistria; Russia’s military presence, personified by the remnants of the 14th Army stationed in Transnistria” (Kotsur, 2013).

H. Perepelytsia’s works, a specialist in foreign and military policy, military and political conflicts, who revealed the European security issue, analyzing regional and subregional conflicts, in particular, the causes and ways to resolve them, studying the conflict in Moldova differed from the other works significantly (Perepelitsa, 2001, p. 14).

According to N. Nechaieva-Iuriichuk, military assistance to official Chisinau from Romania and the readiness of the 14th Russian Army to side with Tiraspol created the conditions for the transition of the conflict from a latent stage to a stage of armed expansion (Nechaieva-Iuriichuk, 2010).

In addition, O. Kava states that the Russian troops’ deployment in Transnistria also exacerbates the frozen conflict nowadays (Kava, 2004).

Hence, O. Sadovnik considered the ethno-national factor to be one of the reasons for the armed confrontation, linking it with profound structural changes in the composition of the population of the MRSR in general, and the Transnistrian region in particular. “After all, the development of interethnic relations is in some connection with the ethnic structure of the population. Knowledge of ethnic statistics, the nature of changes in the number of peoples

provide an opportunity to show their role in the development of society, in the process of interethnic communication” (Sadovnik, 2018). In this context, the researcher highlighted the following: “the ethno-national structure of the Transnistrian region of Moldova (RM) differed significantly from the population of the Bessarabian part of the republic, that the Moldovan government ignored the cultural peculiarities of Transnistria and led to ethnopolitical conflict in the republic” (Sadovnik, 2018, p. 138).

Another factor that influenced the Russian-Moldovan conflict outburst in the Ukrainian historiographical discourse was the geopolitical and ideological factor that included language, as language is a multifaceted factor that relates to both cultural and historical and ideological factors. Transnistria was part of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic since 1940, before being part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) (as part of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR)). In turn, the ethnic composition of Transnistria consisted of roughly equal groups: the Ukrainians, the Moldovans and the Russians. As for the population of the rest of Moldova, it was more homogeneous and the majority of people spoke Romanian. Thus, linguistic and ethnic differences became one of the preconditions for the rapid escalation of the conflict, and according to O. Alieksieichenko, Nechaieva-Iuriichuk had a significant impact on the beginning of the armed phase of the confrontation in Transnistria.

N. Nechaieva-Iuriichuk stated that at that time the Moldovan population of those areas on the left bank of the Dniester, which was part of the MASSR, was not the vast majority. It enabled the Soviet leadership to secure the appropriate state status of the new autonomous republic. The researcher considered one of the factors in the Russian-Moldovan conflict outburst, the fact that the population of the Transnistrian territories, which were part of the Moldavian Republic, did not consist of the majority of the Moldovans (Nechaieva-Iuriichuk, 2010).

O. Alieksieichenko emphasized that the armed phase of the confrontation in Transnistria was caused primarily by geopolitical factors. According to O. Alieksieichenko, “the main geopolitical motive for the Kremlin’s participation in the settlement of the conflict is the desire to get the world’s leading states to recognize the post-Soviet space as “Russia’s area of special responsibility” (Alieksieichenko, 2014).

O. Sadovnik singles out another group of causes of conflict – cultural and linguistic. According to the scholar, the Moldavian language was used only in an everyday life, it was excluded from the sphere of intellectual circulation, and its use in official speeches was seen as a manifestation of nationalism. Such kind of situation concerning the language issue did not suit the Moldovan intelligentsia, which not only took care of granting the status of the Moldovan language to the state, but also tried to recognize the identity of the literary Moldovan and Romanian languages and return to Latin graphics officially. A crucial impetus to significant changes in the sociopolitical climate of the republic were concrete steps, in particular, the adoption of numerous laws granting the Moldovan language the status of the state. O. Sadovnik believed that the diverse ethnic composition of the population of the Republic of Moldova led to disputes over the status of the state language (Sadovnik, 2018).

In addition, N. Nechaieva-Iuriichuk also determined that the language factor influenced its emergence. The researcher argued that at the end of the 1980s the process of ethnopoliticization of Moldovan society and party nomenklatura took place very quickly and under the slogans of Romanianization of Moldovan society. “The process of ethno-politicization of Moldovan society was not accepted and considered by the population of Transnistria, seeing in it a real threat to the existence of their own way of life. In such an uncertain situation, people united around the Transnistrian nomenklatura in a conflict with official Chisinau, which only

exacerbated the situation and intensified the conflict causing factors, one of which was the language” (Nechaieva-Iurichuk, 2010).

H. Perepelytsia, commenting on the linguistic reason, which had an influence on the Russian-Moldovan conflict outbreak, stated that the adoption of the language law in Moldova on August 31, 1989, and the fact that the law made Romanian the official language with Latin spelling received a negative response from the Russian-speaking population of Transnistria, which responded with political strikes. Hence: “a sharp change in the language environment increased significantly the negative attitude of the Transnistrian population towards official Chisinau and became one of the causes of the conflict” (Perepelitsa, 2001).

Taking into account the fact that scholars of both the Ukrainian and Russian historiographical discourse revealed the Transnistrian conflict at a sufficient level, we understand that the topic is quite controversial and requires the rejection of subjective opinions. Although the scholars reached a mutual agreement that there were different groups of factors, each side interpreted the favourable positions and conditions of the above-mentioned conflict, wanting to use certain facts to their advantage, or condemn the actions of the other party.

Taking into consideration, the current tense relations between Ukraine and Russia and the hybrid war, it is impossible not to point at illegal interference and sometimes provocations by the Russian leadership both in Transnistria and in the current situation in Ukraine. We understand that such conflicts will be in a constant “smoldering” phase. That’s why, it is vital to turn to international means of resolving conflicts. Constant provocations, recruitment and intimidation of the local population, false media only add fuel to the conflict.

At the present stage, the leaders of the Republic of Moldova (RM) are making every effort in order to prove that the Transnistrian problem has nothing to do with the issue of the right of nations to self-determination. Their argument is that there is no “title” nation on Transnistrian land. Chisinau believes that the “Transnistrian issue” is the fruit of the ambitions of a group of leaders led by President I. Smirnov, who has Russian citizenship and does not want to lose control over the property of the Left Bank of the Dniester (Reintegratsiya Pridnestrovyya: pooshchrenie i prinuzhdenie (prezentatsiya proekta), 2017).

According to the Memorandum on the Fundamentals of Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria, signed in 1997, which, despite attempts made by some political forces in Moldova to denounce it, is still recognized by the Moldovan leadership, Chisinau agreed to establish a “state legal relations”. According to this provision, the status of Transnistria should be based on the principles of mutually agreed decisions, which include delimitation and delegation of powers and mutually secured guarantees.

According to the “Kozak Memorandum”, drafted by Russia through a draft compromise between Transnistria and Moldova, Transnistria should gain legitimacy as a state entity within the Moldovan Federation. It should be mentioned that negotiations concerning the above-mentioned issue lasted a long time, but in November of 2003, the Moldovan President V. Voronin refused to sign the agreed text of the document. As a result, the story remains the subject of dishonest interpretations in Chisinau. On the eve of Parliamentary elections of 2005 (after which the new Parliament was supposed to elect the President), V. Voronin and his adviser on domestic affairs, M. Tkachuk, told the media that Moscow’s refusal to accept the “Kozak Memorandum” was due to “deception” by Moscow (Reintegratsiya Pridnestrovyya: pooshchrenie i prinuzhdenie (prezentatsiya proekta), 2017).

They claimed that the final text of the document, proposed by the Russian mediator, contained previously uncoordinated and unacceptable conditions for Chisinau. These include

the use of the term “Transnistrian Moldavian Republic” and the inclusion of a clause on the deployment of a Russian military contingent in Transnistria for a period of twenty years.

Apparently, Chisinau was very annoyed by the clumsy actions of the Russian side. Moscow lobbied for Tiraspol’s interests in maintaining Russia’s military presence, contrary to the declaration of 1999 of the Istanbul Summit of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which called on Russia to withdraw troops from Moldova. However, both Russian and Western analysts are more likely to point otherwise.

V. Voronin’s rejection of Russia’s proposals came after he was pressured by the High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Defense Policy H. Solan and the US Ambassador to Chisinau. The pressure was synchronized with anti-government protests in Chisinau demanding the resignation of V. Voronin and his “communist” regime. The psychological effect of the wave of the Rose Revolution in Georgia, which forced the “communist” President Shevardnadze to resign, also played a major role. V. Voronin did not want to face such fate, preferred to succumb to the Western pressure (*Reintegratsiya Pridnestrovyia: pooschrenie i prinuzhdenie (prezentatsiya proekta)*, 2017).

There is no evidence that the principle of federalization of Moldova, which formed the basis of the “Kozak Plan”, caused serious objections from Chisinau. Furthermore, his version of federalization required much greater concessions from the Transnistrian side – it would have to abandon the de facto existing statehood. As to V. Voronin, the document could be a trump card, demonstrating his ability to overcome the country’s division and neutralize separatism. However, such kind of decision did not suit the West: a compromise reached with Moscow’s help could return Moldova to Russia’s sphere of influence.

Few opposition politicians question the prospects of Transnistria’s independence more openly. Although independence is a good and popular idea among the Transnistrian people, the Kremlin is not ready to recognize it officially. The best solution is a federal model with elements of a confederation, especially since Russia itself recognizes Moldova’s territorial integrity. All these realities are often ignored by those Russian politicians, who see Transnistria as a “bastion of Russia against the West”.

Russia’s geopolitical interests are intertwined with those of commercial groups, and this affects Russia’s position on Transnistria. There is a sense that Moldova is dealing with several Russian Ministries, representing the Kremlin, the State Duma, the Defense Ministry, the FSB and major private economic interests. At the same time, Moscow never advocated the recognition of Transnistria as an independent state.

Exacerbation of geopolitical conflicts in Europe brought attention to Transnistria, as a result of expanding the EU’s political and economic sphere of influence, signing Association and Free Trade Agreements with Ukraine and Moldova unrecognized Transnistrian Republic of Moldova (TRM) exchange and migration of citizens. Choosing the anti-crisis strategy for the development of Transnistria – an enclave between large neighbouring territories where the EU’s interests are realized, involves studying the factors and conditions that determine the real economic potential, analysis of management challenges and constraints, opportunities to achieve a certain level of self-financing (*Kharitonova*, 2014).

O. Sadovnik stated that the strategy of rivalry accompanied the conflict in the Transnistrian region at all its stages, and each of them was important both for the development of the conflict and its settlement in the future. That is why, the Transnistrian problem remains far from being solved today (*Sadovnik*, 2020, p. 102).

The topicality of research on the anti-crisis strategy of the TMR necessitates the search for ways and methods to solve problems of preservation and development of labour and

production potentials, strengthening the geopolitical significance of the Republic (one third of Russia, Ukraine and Moldova), increasing exports, increasing the intensity of production and scientific connections.

Nowadays, Transnistria maintains a high level of social spending of the state with the simultaneous economic impossibility of meeting the needs of the population with current production and employment in the public and private sectors of the economy, the share of retirees in the population. Management of the economy was adequate so far to the crisis period, and in the social sphere there are no measures to stimulate job positions growth, consolidation of the most skilled workforce.

The Conclusions. Having examined the theoretical research works of scholars of the Russian historiographical discourse, we can spot Russia's interest in trying to justify its "help" in resolving the Transnistrian crisis. But it is worth noting that this position is presented to scholars quite biased. Instead, the Ukrainian historiographical discourse is represented by a certain detachment from the analysis of events that cause conflict, and more by a historical description of events without additional expression of subjective views. In conclusion, it should be mentioned that among the main causes of the Russian-Moldovan conflict in 1992 there were political, economic, linguistic, geopolitical factors.

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