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**FORMATION OF CONCEPTUAL PRINCIPLES AND ARSENAL OF ASYMMETRIC ("HYBRID") WARFARE DURING THE PERIOD OF INTERBLOC MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONFRONTATION IN THE WORLD (1946 – 1990)**

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the article is to identify the formation of a set of conceptual principles during the period of the "Cold War", global confrontation in the world and the collapse of the world colonial system, of relevant military and political structures and specific strategies, forms and methods of military and special activities, which formed the basis of doctrines and arsenal of modern asymmetric ("hybrid", unconventional) conflict. The methodological basis of the work is based on the methods of classification, typology, structural-system, historical and comparative, historical and typological, historical and genetic methods, methods of military and special science, security science, political conflictology. The scientific novelty of the study consists in the authors' attempt to study systematically, on the historical material of the period of the "Cold War", the formation of doctrinal preconditions and strategy, a set of special structures and methods of destructive activity, which found their structured*

embodiment in “hybrid” conflicts at the beginning of the XXIst century. **The Conclusions.** During “World War III” or “Cold War” (1946 – 1990) paradigms, forms and methods of hybrid confrontation, its doctrinal and conceptual principles, and the relevant theoretical and methodological, scientific, practical and technological principles achieved unprecedented development. Special services and affiliated with them “non-governmental” and paramilitary (irregular) structures, specialized analytical, forecasting and research centers, media structures became able to influence purposefully the change of political reality in the national, interstate and transnational dimensions.

There was a qualitative improvement of Special Forces which became an important (sometimes decisive) factor in local wars and armed conflicts, participation in complex special operations, the deployment of controlled irregular armed formations. A new qualitative stage in the organization of “elite troops” began – their reorganization into special operations forces as autonomous component of the armed forces. As part of SOF, units (structures) of information and psychological struggle and work with civilian population were further developed.

During the period of inter-bloc confrontation in the post war world, the core of which was the psychological war, significant and growing importance acquired the methods (mechanisms) of influence on the sphere of controlling collective activity of people, reformatting the mass consciousness and worldview by manipulating human consciousness and creating virtual reality by means of modern information and socio-cultural technologies.

On the basis of the powerful legacy of the planetary confrontation of social systems and the inter-bloc confrontation of 1946 – 1990 numerous strategic, tactical and technological, and information-cognitive preconditions for the formation of a new qualitative type of conflict developed – “hybrid”, in the sense of synthesizing various new forms and methods of destructive activity, and their complex and coordinated application.

Such essential features of “hybrid” confrontation developed as lack of registration in accordance with international law of war; use of anti-government organizations and movements, illegal armed formations, separatist movements, extremist groups, destructive communities, etc., a priority role of special services, special operations forces, use of other methods of non-military pressure on the victim state, including diplomatic, financial and economic, humanitarian and the others. The main driving forces of the asymmetric strategy were non-governmental organizations, insurgent and “opposition” movements, special operations forces, means and forces of psychological operations, and the focus in the strategy shifted in favor of special operations and low intensity conflicts.

**Key words:** military and special art, military theory, intelligence, subversive activities, special forces, intelligence agencies, information and psychological warfare.

## **ФОРМУВАННЯ КОНЦЕПТУАЛЬНИХ ЗАСАД І АРСЕНАЛУ АСИМЕТРИЧНОГО (“ГІБРИДНОГО”) ПРОТИБОРСТВА У ПЕРІОД МІЖБЛОКОВОГО ВОЄННО-ПОЛІТИЧНОГО ПРОТИСТОЯННЯ У СВІТІ (1946 – 1990)**

**Анотація.** *Мета статті* полягає у виявленні формування в період “холодної війни”, глобального протистояння у світі та розпаду світової колоніальної системи комплексу концептуальних засад, відповідних воєнно-політичних структур, а також специфічної стратегії, форм і методів військової та спеціальної діяльності, що лягли в основу доктрин і арсеналу сучасної асиметричної (“гібридної”, неконвенційної) конфліктності. **Методологічну основу** праці становлять методи класифікації, типології, структурно-системний, історико-порівняльний, історико-типологічний, історико-генетичний, методи військово-спеціальної науки, безпечознавства, політичної конфліктології. **Наукова новизна** полягає у спробі авторів впорядковано дослідити на історичному матеріалі часів “холодної війни” формування доктринальних передумов й стратегії, комплексу спеціальних структур та методів деструктивної діяльності, котрі знайшли своє структуроване втілення у “гібридних” конфліктах початку XXI ст. **Висновки.** У період “III світової”, або “холодної війни” (1946 – 1990) нечуваного розвитку сягнули парадигми, форми і методи гібридного протистояння, його доктринальні й концептуальні засади, відповідні теоретико-методологічні, науково-практичні та технологічні засади. Спеціальні служби, афілійовані з ними “неурядові організації”

та парамілітарні (ірегулярні) структури, профільні аналітико-прогностичні та науково-дослідні центри, медіа-структури стали здатні цілеспрямовано впливати на зміну політичної реальності в національному, міждержавному і транснаціональному вимірах.

Відбулося якісне удосконалення військ спеціального призначення, котрі перетворилися на важливий (інколи – вирішальний) фактор ведення локальних війн і збройних конфліктів, участі у комплексних спеціальних операціях, розгортання керованих ірегулярних збройних формувань. Розпочинається новий якісний етап в організації “елітних військ” – їх реорганізація в сили спеціальних операцій як автономний компонент збройних сил. У складі ССО подальшого серйозного розвитку набули підрозділи (структури) інформаційно-психологічної боротьби та роботи із цивільним населенням.

У період міжблокового протистояння у новосвітному світі, стрижнем якого виступала саме війна психологічна, суттєвого й зростаючого значення набули методи (механізми) впливу на сферу управління колективною діяльністю людей, переформатування масової свідомості та світогляду за рахунок маніпулювання свідомістю людини і створення віртуальної реальності через застосування сучасних інформаційних та соціально-культурних технологій.

На основі потужної спадщини планетарного протистояння суспільних систем та міжблокової конфронтації 1946–1990 рр. склалися численні стратегічні, тактико-технологічні й інформаційно-когнітивні передумови для формування нового якісного типу конфліктності – “гібридної”, у розумінні синтезування різноманітних новітніх форм і методів деструктивної діяльності та їх комплексного, скоординованого застосування.

Набули розвитку такі сутнісні ознаки “гібридного” протистояння, як відсутність оформлення відповідно до міжнародного права війни, використання антиурядових організацій та рухів, незаконних збройних формувань, течій сепаратистського характеру, екстремістських угруповань, деструктивних спільнот тощо, пріоритетна роль спеціальних служб, сил спецоперацій, застосування інших методів невійськового тиску на державу-жертву, включаючи дипломатичні, фінансово-економічні, гуманітарні та інші. Основними рушійними силами асиметричної стратегії ставали неурядові організації, повстанські й “опозиційні” рухи, сили спецоперацій, сили і засоби психологічних операцій, а наголос у стратегії змішувався на користь спецоперацій та конфліктів малої інтенсивності.

**Ключові слова:** *військове й спеціальне мистецтво, військова теорія, розвідка, підривна діяльність, спеціальні війська, спецслужби, інформаційно-психологічне протиборство.*

**The Problem Statement.** The issues of reforming the security and defense sector of Ukraine, increasing its research analytical, and forecasting capabilities require in-depth studies of the conflict of a new non-traditional (hybrid, asymmetric) type, which in recent decades has become one of the leading factors in the world and military political strategy. In “The National Security Strategy of Ukraine” there was generalized an expanded view on a set of very diverse in origin and content the latest threats to the state system and society of Ukraine; there was emphasized the need for a serious analysis of “lessons of hybrid aggression against Ukraine” by the state, and the experience analysis of modern local wars to elaborate “new doctrinal approaches to military security” (Prezydent Ukrainy, 2020)

Extensive cognitive opportunities for understanding the genesis and essence of hybrid conflict are opened by the period of “the Cold War” of 1946 – 1990 and inter-bloc confrontation in the world, which is characterized by (on conditions of mutual destruction of global rivals by nuclear arsenals) rapid strategy development, forms and methods of asymmetric confrontation, including such essential components as information and psychological warfare, shadow diplomatic combinations, local wars in the “third world”, support for allied regimes and inspiration of anti-state armed movements of insurgent and terrorist nature, secret special operations, etc.

**The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications.** The research objective set in the article on the complex retrospective analysis of functional and conceptual components genesis of the hybrid confrontation arsenal caused the involvement of a polythematic complex of scientific works (including publications of special services) by the authors, in

which the relevant topic was under a special professional analysis with the slightest coverage ideologisation of the issues raised.

First of all, it is meant the research work of domestic and foreign authors on the post-war period wars and local conflicts with the direct or latent participation of the main actors of "the Cold War": Lavrenov S. Ya. & Popov I. M. (Lavrenov & Popov, 2003); Hurzhiy O. I., Mosov S. P. & Makarov V. D. (Hurzhiy, Mosov & Makarov, 2006); Rybak M. I. & Badakh Yu. H. (Rybak & Badakh, 2000); Rohoza S. L. & Achkasov N. B. (Rohoza & Achkasov, 2007); Shyshov A. V. (Shyshov, 2006). Significant cognitive opportunities are open up with scientific work in the study of insurgent guerrilla actions and tactics of irregular armed formations: Bruderer H. (Bruderer, 1998); Hrynychak V. (Hrynychak, 2002); Zelnytsky V. & Sidorov S. (Zelnytsky & Sidorov, 2005); Spolnykov V. N. (Spolnykov, 1987).

Significant are the works on the study of the special operations art of the intelligence services of the world's leading states – participants in the inter-bloc global confrontation: Bogatyriev S. G. (Bogatyriev, 1962); Damaskin I. (Damaskin, 2003); Kolpakidi A. I. & Prokhorov D. P. (Kolpakidi & Prokhorov, 2000); Sudoplatov P. A. (Sudoplatov, 1997); Faligo G. & Koffer R. (Faligo & Koffer, 1998); Shyronin V. (Shyronin, 1997); Peskov Ye. B. (Peskov, 1974). The scientific researchers' achievement of information and psychological confrontation as a leading component of "the Cold War" is extensive: Bobkov F. D. & Sydorenko A. G. (Bobkov & Sydorenko, 1976); Komarovskiy V. S. (Komarovskiy, 1978); Panarin I. N. (Panarin, 2006); Rimarenko Yu. I. (Rimarenko, 1989); Shyronin V. (Shyronin, 1997). There was formed a huge historiography of the evolution and combat use of special forces: Bohdan B. (Bohdan, 1999); Boltunov M. (Boltunov, 1998); Viedenieiev D. V., Bystrukhin H. S., Semuka A. I. (Viedenieiev, Bystrukhin & Semuka, 2010); Kozlov S. and the others (Kozlov and al, 2003); Sliusarenko A. V. (Sliusarenko, 2019); Stryzhevskiy V. V. (Stryzhevskiy, 2002); Chikishev A. (Chikishev, 2004).

**The purpose** of the study is the scientific reconstruction of the leading conceptual and functional principles (model principles) formation of the unconventional (hybrid) type of confrontation (conflict) under the specific historical conditions of indirect global (inter-bloc) confrontation during the period of "the Cold War".

**The Main Material Statement.** "The Cold War" (1946 – 1990, formally its end is the adoption of the Paris Peace Charter in November of 1990) was a global confrontation between the capitalist and socialist systems (led by the United States and the Soviet Union), the NATO military and political blocs, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (The Warsaw Pact). At the same time, the gradual achievement of strategic nuclear missile parity, the guarantee of mutual destruction and global catastrophe during the thermo-nuclear war, the existence of the Yalta-Potsdam diplomatic system and the periods of detente kept the rivals from starting the war.

The doctrine of "mass nuclear response, retaliation", officially enshrined on March 12, 1947 in the form of the doctrine of "deterrence of communism" ("The Truman's Doctrine") and confirmed in 1953, provided, in particular, the mass introduction of the agency into enemy territory, the use of armed opposition. The adoption on August 18, 1948 of the top-secret Directive 20/1 of the US National Security Council was of a fundamental importance from the point of view of introduction of a set of methods of hybrid conflict strategy into the global confrontation of "the Cold War" era ("The USA goal for Russia"). It was emphasized that "our ultimate goal is war and the overthrow of the Soviet government", the periods of war and peace did not differ, and restrictions on violations of international law were rejected, and the strategy of indirect confrontation should be planned that way that the US government cannot be accused of involvement in subversive actions (Yakovlyev, 1983, pp. 33–34, 40).

Since 1949, in the conceptual documents of the US military and political circles, peculiar attention had been paid to “special subversive operations” (in the implementation of which a significant role was given to the organization of insurgent and underground movements in enemy territory). In the same year, the US Congress passed a special decree on the CIA (which gave intelligence and subversive activities the status of public policy, placing it above the institutions of a democratic control). In the CIA there was established “the Donovan-Dulles Service” (later – Office of Strategic Services) for conducting special operations. The U.S. “Mutual Security Act” provided for subversive activities of up to \$ 100 million annually. By the mid-1970s, in the largest of the CIA’s operational establishments, the Secret Operations Office, there were 15 departments in which 6 000 employees were hired (out of 16 500 in the office), half of whom worked abroad, and in general up to 2/3 of employees were involved into secret operations abroad (Sergeyev, 1983, pp. 23–29; Peskov, 1974, pp. 13–14).

The directive of the US National Security Council No. 5412/1 of March 12, 1955, adopted with the permission of President D. Eisenhower, was also notable in this aspect. According to it, the CIA in its daily activities was, in particular, to facilitate the deployment of guerrilla and underground movements in the territories of a potential enemy, to provide assistance in subversive activities to the correspondent insurgent and emigrant groups (Drozдов, 2000, pp. 403–404). The US Army’s “Guerrilla Warfare” Statute (1956) gave an important role to involving the local population into the theater of operations to rebel in favour of America (Bogatyrev, 1962, p. 23).

During “the Cold War”, for asymmetric actions in the context of indirect confrontation, the Soviet intelligence also formed units for sabotage, terrorism and other subversive activities abroad (although the scale of their activities was significantly smaller than that of the secret services of geopolitical opponents). On May 4, 1946, the “DR”, i.e., the department was established within the USSR State Security Committee, which was subordinated directly to the head of the State Security Committee department. It is known about the special operation of the mentioned above special unit to assist the security services of the Chinese Communist Party to counter the separatist Uighur movement in western China, in Xinjiang. The separatist demonstrations in the region under the leadership of Osman Batyr were initially inspired by the Japanese secret services, and sabotage was organized against the Soviet military enterprises located there. In 1944, with the support of the bourgeois nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek, anti-communist speeches were led by the Uighur activist Ali Khan Tere, who proclaimed the independence of East Turkestan. With the help of emissaries of the NKDB-MGB of the USSR, there was organized an effective counteraction to Chiang Kai-shek’s special services. In the battles of 1946 – 1949, the separatists suffered a serious defeat (Sudoplatov, 1997, pp. 394–396).

Under the conditions of the military, industrial and nuclear superiority of the United States and the NATO over the Soviet Union, plans were developed for asymmetric intelligence and sabotage operations against the infrastructure and important military facilities of a potential enemy during a “special period” (in particular, the plan of sabotage and destabilization against the NATO’s strategic military bases in Western Europe in case of war was approved in 1952). First of all, it was planned to destroy the communications of the NATO headquarters. The priorities were set for further actions, such as strategic air force bases – carriers of nuclear weapons; armaments and military equipment warehouses to supply the US Army in Europe and the Far East; naval bases in Brest and Le Havre (France), Norway; oil refineries, oil pipelines and oil storage facilities (in particular, the special unit “DR” planned to deploy an agency network among the personnel of the oil refining complex in Western Europe, etc.).

At the same time, the Soviet secret service deployed an intelligence network of intelligence and sabotage specialization on the Western Coast of the United States, in California (consisting of agents with sabotage experience during the war, acting under the guise of emigrants from Czechoslovakia who lived in Latin America). An agent-sabotage network of K. Wiesel, an experienced saboteur, also appeared on the Eastern Coast (Sudoplatov, 1997, pp. 398–404). The task of the intelligence service on asymmetric actions outside the country was confirmed in the report of the head of the KGB of the USSR O. Shelepin (1960), it was necessary “to take active measures aimed at dismantling and liquidation of the most dangerous anti-Soviet emigration centers, compromising the leaders of bourgeois nationalists” (Sbornik KGB SSSR, 1960, p. 14).

During “the Cold War” a qualitative step towards the strategy plan and methods of indirect (hybrid) confrontation was the development of *complex special operations* which included “correction” activity, in the interests of aggressive actions initiators, of a political reality and the state system of sovereign states while maintaining formal and peaceful relations with the object (country, government, etc.) – the victim of subversive actions.

In this regard there should be mentioned the coup of 1953 in Iran (the operation “Ajax” of the US CIA). On March 15, 1951, the Iranian Parliament passed a law to nationalize the oil industry. The demands of the United States and Great Britain to change the new course were not accepted, and the British intelligence began planning measures against the new government headed by of M. Mossaddek. K. Roosevelt, the head of the Middle East department and the CIA’s chief resident in the region, (a nephew of the US President Theodore Roosevelt), was directly involved into preparation-work for the coup. In 1952, according to an intergovernmental agreement, an American economic aid mission (120 people) was launched in Iran, which consisted of personnel intelligence. American economic aid mission opened branches in all major cities of the country, created positions of influence in the state apparatus and law enforcement agencies.

K. Roosevelt not only communicated vigorously with M. Mossaddek’s opponents, but he also chose a successful candidate for the future dictator, the pro-fascist General F. Zahedi, a former interior minister and personal enemy of the prime minister. General N. Schwarzkopf established an illegal “Committee to Save the Homeland”, which consisted of Iranian generals and officers, including the head of military intelligence, General Mokkadam. The CIA allocated \$ 19 million to bribe the military leadership. Many commanders joined the ranks of the rebels – on their side there were the shah’s guard, the command of tanks and other units, police and gendarmerie. The intelligence work was carried out with the influential Islamic clergy, the traditionalist “bazaar” (trade and craft circles).

On August 19, 1953, a large group of K. Roosevelt’s agents staged a riot in the center of the capital with the participation of “bazaar”, the clergy under the slogans of the overthrow and death of M. Mossaddek. Natural riots and pogroms became widespread, and F. Zahedi’s troops entered the city to “suppress” them. 9-hour skirmishes broke out with government loyalists, but the army sided with the rebels gradually (they seized key Tehran facilities and a radio station). F. Zahedi seized power, key positions in Iran and its oil industry passed to the United States, in 1955 the country joined the military political bloc – “The Baghdad Pact” (Glazunova, 2013, pp. 100–117; Damaskin, 2003, pp. 387–390; Sergeev, 1983, pp. 44–62; Faligo & Koffer, 1998, pp. 26–28).

A typical example of a special operation to correct a political reality was the political coup in Czechoslovakia on September 20 – 25, 1948, organized with the participation of the Soviet special services to bring to power Moscow-oriented government of local communists led by

K. Gottwald. By 1947, in Prague there was established an illegal residency of the intelligence of the State Security Committee of the USSR, headed by B. Rybkin, an experienced spy, which operated under the guise of an export-import company and was identified as a base for possible sabotage operations in Western Europe and the Middle East.

A “special purpose brigade” of 400 members of the Soviet secret services was sent to Prague to support and protect K. Gottwald. To put pressure on the current government, a one-hour strike was organized at industrial enterprises with the participation of 2.5 million workers. Rallies were held across the country. On February 21, up to 100 000 citizens came to the square in Prague. On February 25, 6 000 paramilitary fighters, an armed unit of the “people’s militia” (a total of more than 40 000 members, including experienced partisans of the anti-Nazi era), took control of important facilities in the capital. The government resigned, and the Cabinet formed on February 27, 1948, included 11 communist ministers. After the resignation of E. Benes on June 14, 1948, K. Gottwald became the President, the country moved to the socialist path of development (Sudoplatov, 1997, pp. 382–385).

***Indirect confrontation of superpowers in local wars and armed conflicts in “the third world” countries*** reached special proportions during “the Cold War” (***mostly in the former colonies or dependent territories of Western countries in Asia and Africa***), which took place without a declaration of war between the United States, the NATO bloc, and the Soviet Union and its allies.

The war in Korea in 1950 – 1953 demonstrates the real scale of the military confrontation between social systems and military political blocs, which is not recognized in international law. From November of 1950 to July of 1953, military pilots of Air Corps 64 of the Soviet Army, fighting on the side of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, shot down 1 106 US aircraft (its troops made up 70% of the forces of the anti-communist camp of the Korean War) and South Korea, 212 aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery of the Corps. The losses of the Soviet aircraft are the following: 335 aircraft and 120 pilots (total losses – 315 soldiers). In general, the indirect confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union with their allies in the “local” war in Korea cost, South Korea more than 181 thousand dead, the United States – more than 33 thousand, North Korea – 1.6 million (of which up to 60% were the Chinese “volunteers”).

The Vietnam War of 1960 – 1975 is the most illustrative historical episode of defending one’s own geopolitical interests by means of a covert military confrontation. In addition to the army of the pro-Soviet Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the insurgents of South Vietnam (Viet Cong), there warred millions of soldiers of the army of pro-Western South Vietnam, the US allies in the SEATO bloc, and at the peak of the “local” war it involved a total of up to 3 million people, up to 600 tanks, more than 7 000 guns and 5 000 aircraft. 2.5 million American soldiers were involved into the war (up to 60 000 killed and missing, 300 000 wounded, \$ 146 billion spent).

Unofficially, 6 359 Soviet servicemen took part in the Vietnam War (13 were killed). In particular, in North Vietnam, there served two corps of 18 anti-aircraft missile brigades, which guarded the capital of Hanoi, ports, air bases, etc. By 1991, the Soviet Union had supplied Vietnam with more than 2 000 tanks, 1 708 BBMs, 7 000 guns, 158 ZRKs, and more than 700 fighter jets.

Special mention should be made of the supply of huge arms and military equipment by big states, the deployment of military advisers, specialists and limited military contingents. Thus, during the postwar period the USSR became an indirect participant in more than 15 military conflicts: in Korea (1950 – 1953), Laos (1960 – 1970), in Egypt (1962 – 1974),

Algeria (1962 – 1964), Yemen (1962 – 1963), Vietnam (1965 – 1974), Syria (1967 – 1973), Cambodia (1970), Bangladesh (1972 – 1973), Angola (1975 – 1979), Mozambique (1967 – 1969), Ethiopia (1977 – 1979), Afghanistan (1978 – 1991), etc.

Military and technical assistance from the USSR and the USA to the allied countries grew steadily. If in 1966 – 1975 the volume of the Soviet supplies amounted to \$ 9.2 billion, then in 1978 – 1982 – \$ 35.4 billion, in 1980 – 1984 36 countries received assistance. During the last 5 years of its existence, the USSR supplied to developing countries more than 6 000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 10 000 armored combat vehicles, up to 9 500 guns and RSZV, 2 500 warplanes, 1 650 attack and transport helicopters, 50 large and 185 other warships, 190 000 anti-aircraft missiles, other weapons and equipment. During the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, the United States provided Tel Aviv with 20 000 tons of military cargo, including 128 fighter jets, 150 tanks, 4 000 PTURs, and thousands of missiles, cluster bombs, and etc. (огляд дано за: Lavrenov & Popov, 2003, pp. 369–379; Hurzhiy, Mosov & Makarov, 2006, pp. 112–124; Rogoza & Achkasov, 2007, pp. 32–73, 212–280; Shishov, 2006, pp. 282–307, 433–439).

The global rivalry of the great powers, the use (incitement) of ethno-religious factors, and the disintegration of the world colonial system led to the spread of *specific unconventional wars, which were based on the state confrontation with insurgent-guerrilla movements*. The USSR conducted considerable work on military and special training of revolutionary, anti-colonial, and radical movements.

It concerned, in particular, the armed formations of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which were provided with active military technical support and assistance in training of saboteurs. From 1956 to 1991, at least 1 500 Palestinian militants underwent special training in the USSR. In September of 1972, the supply of weapons to the OVP began. By 1982, it had received up to 100 modernized BM-21 “Hrad”, up to 100 guns of 122 calibre and 130 mm caliber, 250 units of armored vehicles, a significant number of submachine guns and RPGs) (Lekarev & Viktorov, 2003; Lekarev, 2002; Rossiya (SSSR) v lokal’nykh voynakh, 2000, p. 209).

From the point of view of the hybrid model genesis of confrontation by a large-scale testing of asymmetric confrontation methods (formation, armament, combat use of irregular armed units on the basis of ethno-religious factor) was the Afghan war of 1979 – 1989.

Tens of thousands of specialists in guerrilla warfare, sabotage and terrorist actions were trained in about a hundred training camps. At the peak of mujahideen activity, 178 camps were set up in Pakistan and 34 in Iran, where more than 1 500 instructors could train 75 000 guerrilla warfare specialists a year. It was possible to train 75 thousand various specialists of guerrilla warfare with the help of more than 1 500 instructors during the period of a year. In 1982 – 1992, 35 000 Muslim radicals from 43 countries gained combat experience in Afghanistan. As it was written in “The American Washington Post” in 1985, “The US CIA’s secret assistance to the Afghan rebels grew into the most significant covert operation since the Vietnam War. This assistance will exceed 80% of the CIA’s annual covert operations in the current fiscal year” (Bruderer, 1998, pp. 353–361; Grinchak, 2002, pp. 9–15; Zel’nyts’kyi & Sydorov, 2005, pp. 122–125; Obobshchennyi opyt, 1987, pp. 28–42; Spol’nikov, 1987, pp. 42–57).

It should be emphasized that the long-term global confrontation between geopolitical opponents (civilizational rivals) during “the Cold War”, and numerous wars for the overthrow of colonial dependence, local conflicts, and the artificial creation (or support) of radical and terrorist organizations by big powers as instruments of asymmetric confrontation in the global confrontation, led to the spread of insurgent movements, radical organizations and extremist groups, terrorist centers of various ideological or ethno-confessional orientation,

development of appropriate doctrinal views, tactics of destructive activity, accumulation of huge contingents of “professional rebels” in the postwar world. All these aspects mentioned above created a huge reserve for recruitment under the current conditions of “infantry” for unconventional wars, which, in particular are begun by the centers of global superpower to maintain control over the resource and strategic regions of the world.

The historical era of “the Cold War” and the global inter-bloc confrontation was marked by the vigorous development of such a classic GV weapon as *the Special Forces* (SPF). In 1952, the Office of Special Methods of Warfare was established within the US Department for Defense, which began the formation of military units of special purpose for combat operations in the rear of the troops of the USSR and its allies, as well as on other potential TVD. Each of these units or “groups” was considered capable of deploying up to 100 000 insurgents from the local population at its base in the enemy’s rear. According to the plans of the American command, only in the European part of the USSR there were up to 30 “operational areas” for the actions of “guerrilla” troops (“green berets”) (Dresvyagin, 1998, p. 369).

There is recorded D. Kennedy’s well-known conceptual statement on the mission of special forces in his speech to graduates of the West Point Military Academy (June of 1962): “This is a completely different kind of fighting, completely new in its intensity, but at the same time as old as the war itself ... This is the war of guerrillas, exploders, rebels... It needs a new strategy and tactics, special forces and new forms of military action” (Yefimov, 2000, p. 1).

In 1958, to the Combat Statute of the US Army “Guerrilla War” EM-31-21 there was introduced the definition of “guerrilla warfare”. In the US Army Field Statute of Warfare (at the beginning of the 1960s) it was emphasized that the use of intelligence and sabotage groups grew. With the intensification of ideological struggle, increasing the effectiveness of the media and methods of psychological confrontation, the Field Statute of the “Groups and Large Units” defined the main goals of special forces:

- to penetrate to the location of the enemy and to leave it by air, sea and land;
- to survive and to act for a long time in remote areas, in a hostile environment without support and instructions from the outside;
- to create, to equip, to train and to manage “local forces” (armed formations of anti-government forces) during the guerrilla warfare;
- to take part in the captivity release of servicemen of their own armed forces;
- to conduct intelligence and surveillance in remote areas on enemy territory;
- to attack especially important objects in remote areas or in big cities, to carry out sabotage there;
- to train personnel of the armed forces of the USA and allied states in methods of special combat operations, to provide them with military technical and other support (an overview of the formation of US special forces is presented in: Bogdan, 1999, pp. 14–21; Vyedyenyeyev, Bystrukhin & Semuka, 2010, pp. 26–55; Stryzhevs’kyy, 2002, pp. 28–35).

The organizational and functional model of the SPP troops of the Soviet Union had a noticeable specificity, which underwent numerous reorganizations in the 1950s and the 1991s, but retained a general focus on its application precisely in the context of a large-scale modern war with the NATO bloc in order to conduct special intelligence, sabotage and combat operations in the deep rear of the enemy (in particular – to neutralize its missile and nuclear weapons). By 1979, the Special Forces of the GRU of the General Staff of the Soviet Army numbered 14 brigades of district subordination and almost 30 separate units of the armies and groups of troops (Kolpakidi & Prokhorov, 2000a, pp. 140–142).

The Afghan war of 1979 – 1989 proved convincingly the need for the widespread use of special forces units in specific hostilities against irregular guerrilla-insurgent formations. In March – April of 1985, Brigade 15 and Brigade 22 of the SPP, with a total number of up to 4 000 soldiers, encamped in Afghanistan. Their main tasks were intelligence and destruction of mujahideen formations and their caravans, search and destruction of weapons depots, identification of enemy concentration areas and directing aircraft at them, capture of prisoners and other specific tasks.

The first year of the Afghan war forced the formation and sending to the Republic of Afghan of non-structural special units of the KGB of the USSR "Zenith" and "Cascade" (the KGB officers and special reservists were sent to form special units, trained by Department 8 of Office "S" (illegal intelligence) PHU of the KGB of the USSR). Under the common name "Cascade" there were groups of the KGB officers from different regions, including the group – "The Carpathians" from the Ukrainian and Moldavian SSRs. In terms of the development of the unconventional fighting art, the experience value of these special units of the KGB was the following: they proved the need to fight against the insurgents with adequate methods and means, the importance of developing and applying non-standard tactics of irregular formations from within, the spread of discord in relations among insurgents, careful consideration of the specifics of a particular country (див.: Boltunov, 1998; Kozlov, 2003; Otryad, 2000; Chikishev, 2004).

*The ideological and information-psychological spheres* became the key field of the post-war global confrontation (which under modern conditions of development of information-cognitive technologies and all-encompassing technological means of virtual social reality formation turned into the main theater of a hybrid conflict). As "the Cold War" broke out and the strategic military parity between the United States and the Soviet Union progressed gradually, the emphasis in the global confrontation shifted in favour of destructive information and psychological influence on the population of the socialist camp countries. In 1961 – 1964, the doctrines of "flexible response", "aking friendly relations", "silent counterrevolution", and etc., were approved in the United States officially.

Under the term "psychological war" as a constituent part of the "the Cold War" the Soviet specialists understood the use of propaganda, economic and diplomatic pressure, the use of intelligence and sabotage actions aimed at controlling people's behavior, the destruction of ideological, political and moral unity of the socialist countries citizens. In the Soviet scientific publications, the practice of the state security services and the propaganda apparatus, and the concept of "ideological diversion" were established – as the most acute form of psychological warfare of the West against the USSR and its allies during the period of "the Cold War". It was emphasized that ideological diversion is characterized by destructive influence on human consciousness, its erosion, "ideological rebirth", manipulation of feelings and thoughts, undermining the foundations of the state system; according to its individual characteristics, ideological sabotage was similar to the agency activity. Among the possible signs of ideological sabotage there were subversive propaganda, intelligence and subversive activities in forming and supporting illegal groups to fight against the existing state system (Bobkov & Sidorenko, 1976, pp. 8–9, 16–17, 23–27).

During the first years of "the Cold War", the United States and the West in general, in a short period of time formed an original system of information and psychological confrontation with the communist bloc, which consisted in the use of special technologies to influence the mass consciousness, meta-action (synthetic, complex, indivisible action on a single plan) with the help of coordinated and long-term actions of such elements as:

- the highest authorities of the leading Western states and informal structures of transnational (global) governance;
- departments of foreign policy relations;
- special services and socio-political, information and other state and formally non-state structures under their control;
- media structures (news agencies, radio stations, publishing houses, etc.);
- public and private research and analytical institutions (“brain tanks”);
- various private and semi-public funds that provide financial support for projects of information and psychological impact on opponents;
- opposition, anti-government organizations, groups, individual figures in the countries of the communist camp, who were assigned the role of the “fifth column”.

In 1951, the Office of Psychological Warfare under the National Security Council (NSC) of the United States (since 1953 – the Office of Coordination of Operations, the OCO) was established. In 1953, under the auspices of the US National Security Service (which was carried out by the capabilities of the OCO and the US State Department) formed a leading body of the US foreign policy propaganda – American News Agency (USIA). By 1966, in USIA there were 11 628 employees, 106 branches abroad, 142 information centers, 168 libraries, in 1965 it distributed 25 million copies of brochures, it published 85 magazines in 25 languages, and 60 newspapers. In 1967 – 1968 the budget of the institution was \$ 186.3 million. The radio station “The Voice of America” reached the amount of 850 hours per week in 38 languages (Vidyasov, 1959, pp. 85–86; Sbornik materialov, 1969, p. 3).

In 1987, the sum of \$ 887.9 million was allocated for USIA, and the radio stations “Liberty” (“Svoboda”) and “Free Europe” (“Vilna Yevropa”) received \$ 125 million. In 1977, the newspaper “The New York Times” reported that the CIA’s information operations were served by up to 800 propaganda publications and bodies, and that the CIA department “Soviet Russia” coordinates ideological operations against the USSR, the special operations department supervises the work of “Svoboda” and “Vilna Yevropa” radio stations. According to the Institute of Sociology of the USSR Academy of Sciences, up to 30% of young people in large cities of the European part of the USSR regularly listened to foreign radio stations (“voices”), especially since in 1973 the “jamming” of a number of government radio stations of Western countries was stopped. By the beginning of the 1980s, the United States had completed the construction of up to 20 broadcasters of such power that it was not possible to silence their transmissions (Merzlikin, 1980, pp. 38–40; Komarovskiy, 1978, pp. 98–100).

The USSR built its own system of informational influence on foreign audiences. The main body of foreign policy propaganda of the USSR was the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TARS), established in 1925. In the 1970s and 1980s, TARS prepared and transmitted more than 300 home and international communications daily. The main editorial office of information for foreign countries prepared special materials in 6 languages for 115 countries (73% of countries).

Being established in 1961, other opportunities had a “public information service” of the Union of Journalists, the Union of Writers of the USSR, the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies and cultural relations with foreign countries, and the “Znannia” (“Knowledge”) Society, the Agency Press “News” (APN). The main purpose of the APN was to form a positive image of the USSR, the spread of analytical materials, translations of official documents, reviews, literature, etc., in the interests of a long-term impact on foreign consumers of information. The APN was successful in countries with weak or moderately developed infrastructure and

mass media technologies. By 1989, in the agency there were bureaus, branches and offices in 90 countries, 26 departments in the capitals of the Union Republics and major cities of the USSR, 4 thousand employees. The authors of the materials were more than 3 000 Soviet and foreign politicians and public figures, scientists, writers, artists, and the others.

The APN cooperated with more than 4 500 media agencies from 120 countries, provided materials to 110 countries, published 2.2 million copies of newsletters, newspapers and magazines in 45 languages for foreign audiences, and distributed them in 130 countries. It was formally considered that the Soviet state was not legally responsible for the activities of the APN.

The structure of the State Television and Radio of the USSR included the main directorate of programmes – the main editions of information and propaganda on broadcasting to individual countries and regions. Broadcasts were conducted in 75 languages, 1800 hours a week. Since 1978, the world service of Moscow Radio had been launched. In 47 countries there were cultural centers and Houses of the Soviet science and culture (Panarin, 2006, pp. 189–194).

At the end of 1981 – the beginning of 1982 the US President Ronald Reagan, together with several close associates, elaborated a new strategy for global confrontation with the USSR (the first comprehensive programme of a large-scale hybrid warfare), the essence of which was the secret coordinated blows and pressure on the most vulnerable parts of the Soviet political and economic system. Under the President of the United States, a special coordinating body was created – the National Security Planning Group. At the beginning of 1982, a group of advisers began to elaborate an offensive strategy “to dismantle the Soviet empire”. There were identified the main areas of implementation of the strategy on undermining the USSR:

- secret political, intelligence, material and financial support of the opposition movement “Solidarity” in Poland in order to provide a source of instability within the Warsaw Bloc;
- intensification of assistance with modern weapons, finances, trained personnel to the Afghan armed Islamic opposition, its transfer of hostilities to the Soviet Central Asia;
- nuclear missile blackmail, militaristic propaganda, intimidation, etc., in order to involve the USSR in an excessive arms race;
- a series of measures to reduce foreign money income from the sale of oil and by the USSR;
- restriction of the USSR’s access to advanced technologies and technical disinformation of the enemy;
- comprehensive psychological warfare and support for the ideological and political opposition in the countries of the socialist camp (Kalashnikov, 2008, pp. 78–87; Shveytser, 1995, pp. 5–6).

The doctrine of information warfare underwent some changes. Maintaining a number of its traditional components (the formation of the “fifth column”, the emphasis on the “human rights problem”), the attempts to influence political decision-making in the USSR, etc.), in the doctrine it was emphasized on the need to use the latest information technologies (satellite television, the Internet), to coordinate all efforts of the media, government and non-governmental organizations, special services to demoralize the Soviet leadership and to facilitate the coming to power of politicians who made political concessions.

At the beginning of the 1980s, Z. Brzezinski, the State Security Adviser to the President of the United States, submitted a report to the State Department entitled “Game Plan. Geostrategic Structure of the Struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union”. It was suggested emphasizing the “decentralization of the empire” by means of “real conflicts, which may erupt in the Baltic republics, in Belarus and Ukraine which were close to Russia in the cultural relations...” (Shironin, 1997, pp. 80–81).

Revealing the basis for the implementation of such promising programmes, in April of 1988, the KGB of the USSR spread the information that the US intelligence services in cooperation with the intelligence of Germany and France intensified efforts to destabilize the domestic political situation, creation of a political opposition, a multiparty system, “free trade unions”, use of nationalist and religious extremist sentiments in the USSR. A special mission was assigned to the political centers of emigration (diasporas) of the peoples of the socialist countries (Rimarenko, 1989, p. 177).

The specifics of the global confrontation made theorists of military affairs and special arts form some *theoretical and applied concepts (views) on the art of asymmetric confrontation, the strategic foundations of a new type of conflict*. The book of the famous English military theorist B. Liddell-Garth (1895 – 1970) “Strategy of Indirect Action” was a kind of manifesto of such searches, based on the study of world martial arts for 2500 years (Liddell Gart, 1957). The author spoke in favour of mobility as opposed to defense without any mobility or frontal attacks, “a detour as the shortest way”, bringing the enemy out of balance as a guarantee of victory, intellectual victory as a prerequisite for success on the battlefield.

From the point of view of the genesis of theoretical and conceptual ideas about asymmetric war and models of a new type conflict, Eugene Messner’s concept “rebellion-war” became really far-sighted. E. Messner (1891 – 1974) was a professional soldier, finished the course of the General Staff Academy before the revolution, and took part in World War I and the Civil War of 1918 – 1922.

The main ideas of E. Messner are set out in the books “Rebellion – the Name of World War III” and “World Rebellion War” (Messner, 2004; Khochesh’ mira, 2005).

The author’s reasoning is based on the analysis of the vast empirical material of contemporary wars and armed conflicts, national liberation movements and uprisings. The author distinguishes between “traditional warfare” and rebellion-war as a new type of war. The riot rebellion-war “is mixed with strikes from the underground (for example, terrorism) of secret organizations, or sabotage groups, or disparate individuals, and it is not easy to classify their main considerations: revenge on the occupiers, liberation of the country, political and social coup...”.

The researcher aptly formulated such cornerstones of hybrid confrontation as the formally undeclared status of conflicts, their going beyond international law, the lack of a clear boundary between states of war and peace, emphasis on the defeat of public consciousness as a guarantee of achieving goals without a possible direct confrontation, the diverse nature of the driving forces and participants with the predominance of non-governmental associations of network (non-hierarchical) system, marginal or antisocial segments of the population, covering almost all spheres of a public life, insidious nature of “warfare” with the emphasis on information-psychological, political subversive, insurgent-guerrilla, sabotage and terrorist actions (“psychological warfare”, “irregular warfare”), etc. (Khochesh’ mira, 2005, p. 50).

**The Conclusions.** In the postwar world “the Cold War” included military and political confrontation and a race for all kinds of weapons; support for allies in local wars and conflicts; intelligence and sabotage activities; ideological confrontation and information-psychological war with the steady growth of non-military, “indirect” methods of confrontation until a nuclear-missile parity is achieved, and etc. This structure of confrontation caused a radical shift in the center of gravity of the arsenal of military and political conflict in favor of indirect, unconventional (asymmetric) methods and their combination in a hybrid strategy.

During “the Cold War”, the core of which was psychological warfare, methods (mechanisms) of influence on the sphere of controlling collective activity of people, acquired

significant and growing importance, reformatting the mass consciousness and worldview by manipulating human consciousness and creating virtual reality through the use of modern information and socio-cultural technologies. Such algorithms of destructive influence became qualitatively developed and widespread in the strategy of today’s “hybrid” nowadays.

It was during the era of “World War III, the Cold War” that the paradigms, forms and methods of hybrid confrontation, its doctrinal and conceptual principles, the relevant theoretical and methodological, scientific, practical and technological principles were achieved. Special services, affiliated “non-governmental organizations” and paramilitary (irregular) structures, specialized analytical and forecasting and research centers, media structures became able to purposefully influence purposefully the change of political reality in the national, interstate and transnational dimensions.

There was a qualitative improvement of special forces, which became an important (sometimes decisive) factor in local wars and armed conflicts, participation in complex special operations, the deployment of controlled irregular armed formations. A new qualitative stage in the organization of “elite troops” begins – their reorganization into special operations forces as an autonomous component of the armed forces. As part of the SSO, units (formations) of information and psychological struggle and work with the civilian population were further developed

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