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XIX ALL-UNION PARTY CONFERENCE AS A FACTOR OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE CPSU-KPU IN THE WESTERN REGIONS OF THE UkrSSR

Abstract. The Purpose of the Research. In the year of celebrating the 30th anniversary of Ukraine's independence restoration, the research focuses on the reconstruction issues of the reception of the CPSU-CPU decisions of the XIXth All-Union Party Conference by the nomenclature of the Western Ukrainian regional committees in 1988. The chief focus is on the context of the conference destructive influence on the communist elite, which resulted in the collapse of local party bodies in the western regions of the UkrSSR and not the least caused the collapse of the USSR and the Ukrainian state-building renaissance. **The Methodology of the Research.** There has been done the scientific analysis of the Communist Party western regions of the UkrSSR elites' reception of the decisions of the XIXth All-Union Conference on a rational stage with observance of the principle of a historical objectivity. In the course of the research the methods of critical and structural analysis and classification, systematization and verification of unpublished archival sources were used. The conclusions are based on the documents of one republican and seven regional archives, as well as the columns of periodicals and the results of field research. **The scientific novelty** of the article consists in the fact that for the first time in the Ukrainian and world historical science there has been done a comprehensive analysis of the party nomenclature disintegration as the highest social stratum in the western regions of the UkrSSR at the end of the 80s of the XXth century, which occurred as a result of its natural inability to a democratic innovation. Such a comprehensive analysis was possible on the basis of the introduction

of a new archival documentary database and interviews with participants and contemporaries of the events. **The Conclusions.** The main results of the scientific article are revealed on the basis of the a priori impossibility of the synthesis of autocratic and democratic methods of the state building, which was used by the initiators of “perestroika” in order to preserve the monopoly right to power. Therefore, the political reform in the USSR, proclaimed at the XIXth All-Union Party Conference in 1988 in the direction of “Sovietization” of the country, not only was unable to strengthen the position of the CPSU, but also naturally led to the rapid corrosion of the highest bodies of local party structures, which in turn caused a total reduction in the number of communist bodies and not the least enabled the collapse of the Soviet Union and the proclamation of Ukraine as an independent state.

Key words: XIX All-Union Party Conference, CPSU-CPU, Western Ukrainian regional committees, political reform, disintegration, collapse.

XIX ВСЕСОЮЗНА ПАРТІЙНА КОНФЕРЕНЦІЯ ЯК ЧИННИК РОЗПАДУ КПРС-КПУ У ЗАХІДНИХ ОБЛАСТЯХ УРСР

Анотація. Мета дослідження. У рік відзначення тридцятилітнього ювілею відновлення незалежності України, наукова розвідка розв'язує завдання реконструкції сприйняття номенклатурою західноукраїнських обкомів КПРС-КПУ рішень XIX Всесоюзної партійної конференції 1988 р. Особливо у контексті її деструктивного впливу на комуністичну еліту, що мав наслідком розпад локальних партійних осередків у західних областях УРСР і не в останню чергу спричинив крах СРСР та український державотворчий ренесанс. **Методологія дослідження.** Науковий аналіз сприйняття компартійним елітами західних областей УРСР рішень XIX всесоюзної конференції відбувався на раціональному щаблі із дотриманням принципу історичної об'єктивності. У ході дослідження було застосовано методи критичного й структурного аналізу й класифікації, систематизації і верифікації неопублікованих архівних джерел. Висновки базуються на документах одного республіканського й семи обласних архівів, а також на публікаціях у періодичних виданнях і результатах польових досліджень. **Наукова новизна статті** полягає у тому, що вперше в українській та світовій історичній науці здійснено комплексний аналіз дезінтеграції партійної номенклатури як найвищого суспільного прошарку у західних областях УРСР наприкінці 80-х рр. XX ст., що відбувся внаслідок її природної неспромоги до демократичних новацій. Такий розгляд був можливим на основі сведення до наукового обігу нової архівної документальної бази та інтерв'ю із учасниками й сучасниками подій. **Висновки.** Основні результати наукової статті розкриваються на основі апріорної неможливості синтезу автократичних й демократичних методів державної побудови, що був використаний ініціаторами “перебудови” з метою збереження монопольного права на владу. Тому політична реформа у СРСР, проголошена на XIX всесоюзній партійній конференції (1988) у бік “радянської” країни, не тільки не могла зміцнити становище КПРС, а й закономірно спричинила стрімку корозію вищих органів місцевих партійних структур, що, зі свого боку, призвело до тотального скорочення чисельності комуністичних осередків і не в останню чергу уможливило розпад Радянського Союзу та проголошення України самостійною державою.

Ключові слова: XIX всесоюзна партійна конференція, КПРС-КПУ, західноукраїнські обкоми, політична реформа, дезінтеграція, розпад.

The Problem Statement. More than a third of the century has passed since the undeservedly forgotten a very important event by the Ukrainian and world historical science against the background of the natural collapse of the Soviet Union, which spread in the USSR in the second half of the 80s – the beginning of the 90s of the XXth century. This important event acquires an exceptional topicality in the year of celebrating the 30th anniversary of the state independence restoration of Ukraine in 1991, which was the result of a national liberation movement for centuries of the Ukrainian people struggling for independence.

The XIXth All-Union Party Conference in 1988 is meant, which launched a political reform in the country towards the formal transfer of the state power from the CPSU into the

hands of the Soviet institutions. According to the Soviet Union leadership, such a step should have strengthened the party's social foundations and emphasized the role of the ruling party as the only effective reformer in the country. However, unexpectedly for the Soviet Union party apparatus, the conference doubted the "infallible sacredness" of a communist doctrine, doubted the rightness of the Soviet Union initiatives, shook the monolithic nature of the party ranks, and initiated the disintegration of their local branches, which in turn led to the disintegration and collapse of the state. The conference accelerated the collapse of the CPSU as one-party core of the Soviet Union significantly, and thus its Ukrainian unit, – the CPU.

Having proclaimed the policy of "perestroika" at the XXVIIth Congress of the CPSU in 1986, the Communist Party leadership of the USSR tried to maintain the monopoly on political power in the country, the foundations of which were shaken due to a permanently poor financial situation of the country's citizens. There were signs of stagnation in the economy, growing scientific and technological backwardness, failures in the social sphere, the merging of the party-state nomenclature with the dealers of the shadow economy, and the most important – problems in the national and religious spheres. This state of affairs could have fatal consequences for the ruling party. The first step towards the use of innovations was the "acceleration" of the existing economic mechanism, which immediately failed, as the country's production complex was always extensive, and therefore worked at the limit.

Thus, in 1988, it became clear that a political reform was inevitable. However, it was not an issue of changing the state-owned production bases to the private ones, but an issue of changing of an autocratic political system to a democratic one. The ideological communist orientations of the Soviet society and atheism were not doubted either. In economy, it was only about the need to apply certain elements of a market economy based on the effective use of NPT achievements, activation of the "human factor" and change of the planning order in the context of expanding the autonomy of industrial enterprises. The political vector was about turning to Lenin's norms of the state creation and resuscitation of the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!". To proclaim these objectives, it became necessary to convene all-Union party forum, which would be legitimate during the inter-congress period. Thus, the need arose "to resurrect" the forgotten party conferences at the Soviet Union level.

It should be noted that such meetings had not been held since 1941. Their key goal was announced in 1905 at the IIIrd Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. In the resolution "On Periodic Conferences of Representatives of Various Party Organizations" the necessity was singled out to convene conferences systematically in order to clarify the problems of social democracy in the presence of representatives of various party branches. The first conference was held in Tammersfors, Finland in 1905.

However, in 1934 at the XVIIth Congress of the RCP (b), on the initiative of J. Stalin, the provisions on the conference were removed from the party statute. The last union party conference took place in 1941, finally "burying" democratic intra-party principles (SALR, f. P-3, d. 62, c. 229, pp. 4-6.). In October of 1952, the XIXth Congress of the CPSU once again agreed with Stalin's opinion that the issues of the party formation could be considered at congresses and plenums of the Central Committee, and therefore there was no need to convene All-Union party conferences. During Khrushchev's "thaw" this issue was not raised. It was only during Brezhnev's "stagnation" that in March of 1966 the XXIIIrd Congress of the CPSU renewed a section in the party's charter that allowed these forums to be held, but that was the only renewal. Almost half a century later, in order to proclaim political reform in the USSR, on June 26, 1987, at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU there was

the resolution proclaimed “On Convening the XIXth All-Union Party Conference” in 1988. One delegate among 3 780 members of the CPSU was elected. Thus, 5 000 communists were delegated to the conference, and 4 991 party members took part in it.

The Purpose of the Research. Taking into consideration the fact that modern Ukrainian historical science has not yet paid enough attention to the corrosion phenomena of the ruling CPSU-CPU against the Western Ukrainian background on the eve of the restoration of Ukraine’s state independence, the attempt will be made to trace the destructive influence of the XIXth All-Union Party Conference on the administrative party development of the regional level and the political consequences of “perestroika” reforms within the party, especially among the party nomenclature. After all, it was the internal party destructive phenomena in such a patriotic region of the UkrSSR as its western regions that initiated the national liberation renaissance, which became the key to the resuscitation of the state-building process at all territory of Ukraine.

The source base of the research is the unpublished archival materials, pages of periodicals of that time and materials of field researches. The factual sequence of reconstruction of the historical events is formed on the basis of historical and cultural regions of the Western Ukrainian lands: Halychyna, Volyn, Zakarpattia and Bukovyna, which according to a modern administrative dimension are the following regions: Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Volyn, Rivne, Transcarpathian and Chernivtsi regions.

The Analysis of Researches and Publications. The following scientists focused on this issue fragmentary: Volyn professor V. Baran (Baran, 2003), Kyiv professor S. Kulchytskyi (Kulchytskyi, 2001) and Lviv scientist O. Muravsky (Muravskyi, 2011). However, their works mostly concerned the main directions of the national democratic movement in Ukraine on the eve of the restoration of its state independence. This issue has already been the subject of attention of one of the authors, but it concerned its Lviv format only. However, revelation of new facts and expansion of the geographical framework of a scientific research caused the need for the unification of the author’s efforts and the research extension of this theme (Chura, 2010).

The Main Material Statement. In the context of perestroika transformations, in 1985 – 1987 the new General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. Gorbachov came to understand the urgent need to deepen innovations and prepared the citizens of the Soviet Union to reformatting of the CPSU into a European-style party. But disguised by the slogan of returning to Lenin’s postulates of the elected institutions primacy, this “Sovietization” was aimed at prolonging the monopoly right of the CPSU to power in the USSR. Therefore, on June 28, 1988, the XIXth All-Union Party Conference began its work in Moscow. The main orientations of a political reform in the USSR and the internal reformatting of the CPSU were proclaimed by the main party leader – M. Gorbachov. According to the speaker, the progress of economic innovations was slowed down, the well-being of the country’s citizens did not improve. Only the policy of publicity brought noticeable results, which softened the intolerance of the Communist Party to alternative points of view, revived the inert environment of ordinary communists, and began to overcome certain segments of an atrophied communist dogma, and most importantly, the policy of publicity was a key factor in the democratization of the stagnant Soviet society and the party bodies. Taking into consideration the fact that the general public found out numerous Communist atrocities of the past, the party denied them in every way, blaming everything on Stalin’s totalitarianism, Khrushchev’s voluntarism and Brezhnev’s disorder (Materyaly, 1988, pp. 7–13).

Simultaneously, the result of reflections on the failures of the previous years was the belief in the low efficiency of the command-administrative system of the country party leadership, the

bureaucratic foundations of which were formed during the first half of the XXth century. It turned out that the party itself made it difficult to implement the innovations initiated by it. Therefore, the inevitability of renewing the status of the party in the state structure was formed as a mature regularity. However, this task brought a main problem: how should the Central Committee transfer power to the hands of the Soviet authorities, and remaining the “main player”?

After defeating the backstage struggle against the Bolshevik-style orthodox, the modern wing of the Communist Party envisioned the following programme of action. Using administrative resources and the help of party committees of all enterprises in the country, the Communists intended to head the newly elected councils at all levels, and thus to continue the leadership of the Soviet bodies of the USSR. Therefore, the Soviet Union party documents emphasized the need for their qualitative and quantitative renewal, the introduction of constitutional amendments and the separation of powers of the party and Soviet institutions (CSAPOU, f. 1, d. 11, c. 1850, p. 6). As a result, the conference adopted five key resolutions: “On the Democratization of the Soviet Society and the Reform of the Political System,” “On Combating Bureaucracy,” “On International Relations,” “On Publicity,” and “On Legal Reform” (XIX Vsesoiuznaia konferentsiia, 1988, p. 21). In the first resolution the most important thing was the return of a political significance to the highest legislative body – the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR by holding alternative elections at all levels.

The citizens of the USSR were convinced that under the party control there was a full delegation of the state power from the CPSU to the elected institutions of the country, since the convening of the Congress of Soviets was the main decision of the forum. However, due to the fact that the political reform was introduced only by the Communist Party, the tools of its implementation remained completely under its control. M. Gorbachov’s promise that the party will never give up the role of the political vanguard turned out to be true (Pravda, 1988, p. 3). On April 23, 1985, M. Gorbachov became the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, on October 1, 1988 – the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and on March 15, 1990 – the first and last President of the USSR.

The conceptual principles of “intra-party democratization” in Lviv region were stated by its newly appointed leader Ya. Pohrebniak at the XXII regional party conference, which took place on December 9, 1988. In his detailed report it was stated that the regional committee would continue to be the body of a political leadership, and that its activities should be restructured simultaneously with the transition from authoritarian methods to persuasion, discussion, and purposeful ideological work. “Instead of back flexibility – flexibility of mind!” – he proclaimed the slogan of the Communist Party renewal. According to the speaker, unfulfilled promises, unreasonable planning, command and control levers, excessive administration, adoption of intimidating decisions and violations of current legislation should have remained in the past. Their place had to be taken by a common sense, concreteness, independence of the primary party organizations, the dominant pluralism of opinions and collegiality of decisions aimed at increasing the lost significance of the party membership card. He called for the elimination of the party apparatus’s isolation from the lower party environment and non-party members of labour collectives. It was especially emphasized that “structural perestroika is not for the sake of reduction, but in order to renew the role of the party in the Soviet society” (SALR, f. 3, d. 62, c. 220, pp. 15–17).

Using the permission from Moscow, Ya. Pohrebniak proposed to stop the pursuit of an artificial increase in the number of members of the CPSU, being guided by Lenin’s slogan “Less is better!”. It was necessary to get rid of substitution of both economic and Soviet

institutions activities by the party apparatus. In the first case, the party apparatus must perform the function of an ideological orientation of workers, stopping interference in the solution of industrial matters. In the second, – the Communist Party bodies undertook to abolish joint decisions with elected institutions and, by breaking the stereotype of the kind “the council has the right within its competence,” to endow the Soviet institutions with a full state power. To increase political influence, the regional party leader advised to act by means of a large number of communists in the collectives of workers, pursuing the key goal of a political reform: the first secretary of the regional committee is the future chairman of the council of people’s deputies (SALR, f. 3, d. 62, c. 220, p. 18).

In fact, in Lviv “party democratization” led to a reduction in the number of responsible employees of the regional Communist party network from 188 to 84 people, or 30%. More than 60% of secretaries, bureau members and party committee leaders changed. The nomenclature of the party’s regional committee was renewed by 44% and all its employees by 50% (SALR, f. 3, d. 62, c. 220, pp. 40–49). On an alternative basis, 1 754 party leaders were elected, and 438 by a secret ballot. A total of 1 051 secretaries of the party committee of enterprises and institutions of the region were elected (SALR, f. 3, d. 62, c. 313, p. 4). As a result, hundreds of experienced leaders, who lost benefits, who were the “backbone” of the party and its direct support, found themselves “not on board”. They were replaced by young “perestroika” nominees, who saw the CPSU as a means of achieving a certain social status. “There were few convinced communists among the new party leadership,” – A. Sokolova, a chairman of the enterprise “Konveyer” (Conveyor) strike committee, said in her interview. They became the party members and were guided, for the most part, by mercantile interests. Only a membership card paved the way for getting higher in a social status, and thus provided a high level of welfare. “Thus, members of the CPSU considered the party membership as a tool for a further career advancement” (Interviu A. Sokolova, 2009).

The core directions of the innovations implementation against the regional background of Ivano-Frankivsk region were covered by the first secretary of the local regional committee I. Postoronko at the XXII d conference traditionally, which took place on December 9, 1988. The reform of the state and party system took place in two directions: the restoration of the powers of the councils and the delimitation of the functions of the party and the Soviet bodies. In this context, the staff of the regional committee was reduced by 20% and its branch departments were partially liquidated. 25% of the regional party composition of the first echelon was elected on an alternative basis. 75% of the leaders of the primary party branches, 80% of the heads of the Soviet, the trade union and Komsomol institutions were elected. The 4 largest party organizations, 4 city and district executive committees, and 58 enterprises changed their leadership. 360 members of the board of directors, 14 000 workshops heads, foremen and workmen, and 2 000 agricultural workers were elected. 10 heads of collective farms left their posts (SAIFR, f. 1, d. 1, c. 5336, pp. 8–14). “The party and the people are confidently pursuing a course of truthfulness, openness and democracy!” – the above-mentioned regional head summarized success of a public renewal (SAIFR, f. 1, d. 1, c. 5336, p. 7).

However, these reform actions provoked a strong criticism from those whom they had deprived of elite status. For 91% of secretaries of the party organizations and 82% of the party groups in Ivano-Frankivsk the alternative election was not in their favour. Members of the bureaus of city and district committees conceded the posts to nominees from the lower party environment (SAIFR, f. 2, d. 1, c. 1217, p. 9). At the March plenum of the regional committee, which considered the state of publicity in the party ranks of Halych

district committee, the party nomenclature expressed growing dissatisfaction with the policy of an internal party reconstruction and a strong reluctance to share power. During this report, the city party leader Yu. Krykhovetsky was concerned that the heads of village councils were reluctant to adopt the party experience and did not feel the demands of the time. The speaker was supported by the first secretary of Rozhniativ district committee M. Yakivchuk, noting that the district committee instructors were well aware of the situation in the area, and therefore the practice of removing them from main issues did not require a rapid deployment (SAIFR, f. 1, d. 1, c. 5342, p. 30).

I. Yatsola, the leader of the Communists of Kosiv region, shared the same point of view. According to him, weak, unsuccessful collective farms could not catch up with the others without the party support (SAIFR, f. 1, d. 1, c. 5342, p. 35). The most painful result of the “renewal” of local bodies of the CPSU-CPU was announced on November 12, 1988 at the XVIth Conference of Sniatyn District Committee. The First Secretary I. Ilyik emphasized that 5 candidates in the CPSU refused to join the party ranks voluntarily (SAIFR, f. 32, d. 1, c. 8873, p. 10). The natural consequence of the Communist Party’s innovations was expressed in an interview by I. Pylypiv, a direct participant of the events, Vice-Rector of the University of Marxism-Leninism. He recalled that the fired party leaders regretted only the lost positions, and therefore their preferences. No one thought about the current state of the ideology of the CPSU. “From this state of affairs I concluded that the party ceased to be a union of ideological colleagues, and thus the communist doctrine died, which led to the degradation of the party leadership” (Interviu I. Pylypiva, 2010).

Taking into consideration the fact that in Ternopil region the key tool for advertising the “victorious achievements of perestroika” were the media, the world saw more than 800 positive articles covering the achievements of the party reforms (SATR, f. 1, d. 36, c. 15, p. 48). A vivid is the publication in the regional newspaper “Vilne Zhyttia” (Free Life), in which the secretary of Zbarazh DC M. Saienko praised the results of the return to Lenin’s norms for resolving the personnel issue (Saienko, 1988, p. 2). On December 9, 1988 similar thoughts were expressed in the speech of the first secretary of the regional committee V. Ostrozhytsky from the tribune of the XXII regional party conference. The main embodiment of innovations, the speaker said, was “The Law on Amendments to the Constitution of the USSR” and “The Law on Elections of People’s Deputies”, which launched a large-scale programme of reforms of the political system and a further democratization of the society (SATR, f. 1, d. 36, c. 2, p. 10).

The regional leader considered the election of three thousand lower party leaders as a proof. As a result, 564 party group leaders, 272 secretaries of work-shops and 476 secretaries of primary party organizations lost their positions. Directors of 164 enterprises, heads of 80 collective-farms changed, 2 thousand heads of work-shops, masters and foremen lost their positions (SATR, f. 1, d. 36, c. 2, p. 46). A. Shvedova, the head of the protocol record keeping sector of the regional committee, announced a reduction in the state and economic leadership segment. According to her, the staff of regional departments decreased by 34%, city and district – by 15%, executive committees – by 22%, trade organizations – by 17%, industrial organizations – by 19%. Salary funds were cut in the economic sector by 13%, public sector – by 22% (SATR, f. 1, d. 36, c. 15, pp. 153–154). However, the general party staff reduction did not prevent the regional party leader from emphasizing the fact that the majority of the dismissed party staff were sent to work in the Soviet and economic institutions (SATR, f. 1, d. 36, c. 2, pp. 44–47). It seemed that the “return to the norms of Lenin’s personnel policy” provided an opportunity for the party nomenclature to find job by promotion of the Soviet leaders.

A real attitude of the party leadership to the reforms was well covered in an interview by V. Kolynets, a contemporary of the events, a lecturer at Ternopil Pedagogical Institute, the future deputy chairman of the NRU regional council and a member of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. According to him, the party apparatus only imitated the renewal of the party policy, especially in the field of interethnic relations. In fact, even after the proclamation of a political reform, it remained a key tool for the Russification of the Ukrainians. In support of this fact, the interlocutor cited the example of a confidential order of the regional committee on relations between the members of the CPSU and the heads of the national unions of Ternopil region. Despite the declared favorable attitude to multipartyism and pluralism of opinions, the party leadership forbade ordinary communists to join the ranks of the national associations. According to this principle, the Communists M. Hyrych and H. Petruk-Popyk were expelled from the Communist Party, which ultimately facilitated the formation of the latter as leaders of the national liberation movement of the region (Interviu V. Kolintsia, 2010).

The democratization development of the party environment of Volyn region was best illustrated by the secret seminar transcript of the party staff committees of the region of September 7, 1988. Highlighting the objectives of the Communists to implement the decisions of the XIXth All-Union Party Conference, L. Pavlenko, the first secretary of the regional committee emphasized that the essence of the renewal was the rejection of the party apparatus from a sectoral structuring, and the key task of innovation was to be free from administrative and economic functions and to focus on political methods of work. On this purpose, the July plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU allowed the republican central committees to make a new structure of local party bodies independently, but within the framework of the salary fund approved in Moscow. The dismissed party staff was sent to the state, economic and public positions. "At the expense of this category of employees", the speaker stated, "the apparatus of councils of people's deputies of all levels will be strengthened, taking into account their new role in the reformed political system of the USSR" (SAVR, f. 1, d. 17, c. 963, pp. 3–5).

Analysis of L. Pavlenko's speech, the first secretary of the regional committee, showed that the CPSU, seeking to acquire a modern look, imitated the expansion of the democratic range, intending to "change clothes" in the robes of elected bodies. However, the main feature of this falsification was not so much intra-party reform as a total reduction in the structure of the party apparatus. From now on, the party leader had to obtain the recommendation of the primary party bodies, which were given the right to fire the unsuccessful party leader. The lower party organizations were given broad electoral rights, and their secretaries were elected on an alternative basis. The command-and-control methods of governing and "flattering" the real state of party affairs were the subject to a public condemnation. But these "good deeds" did not prevent the speaker from making an authoritative statement at the end of his speech: "It should be remembered that the development of democratic initiatives is not a spontaneous but a strictly party-controlled process" (SAVR, f. 1, d. 17, c. 963, p. 30). As a result, "renewing the party vertical", the regional leaders launched such a tumultuous activity that 174 new leaders were elected among 190 first leaders of Volyn region. 84% of the party groups leaders, 86% of secretaries of work-shops, 69% of leaders of primary party organizations left the positions. This percentage was the highest in the western regions of the UkrSSR (SAVR, f. 32, d. 30, c. 1, pp. 82–84).

Under such conditions, it became more difficult to carry out the plan of admission to the party. To get out of the predicament of the Communist Party had to attract candidates by means of various benefits. There were frequent cases of persuasion and pressure on future

members, which led the latter to various falsifications of the reasons for refusal. This fact was testified in an interview by M. Solovianchyk, the head of the party control commission of Kamin-Kashyrsky district committee. According to him, the party leaders continued to monitor the quotas implementation for admission to the party thoroughly. Their constant pressure to increase the number of workers, peasants and women led to an artificial increase in the number of the latter and a decrease in the number of candidates for the party membership among the civil clerks and intelligentsia. This approach forced secretaries to admit to the party accidental people who did not express by themselves a desire to become of the CPSU members (Interviu M. Solovianchyka, 2009).

In Rivne region the conception of reforms was announced by T. Panasenko, the first secretary of the regional committee. On December 9, 1988, he stated that, being guided by the key decision of the XIXth Party Conference “On the Democratization of the Soviet Society and the Reform of the Political System”, the region approved a strategy for managing the national economy, which provides a real opportunity to differentiate the functions of the party, the Soviet and economic bodies and to overcome duplication in their activities. On this purpose, a new body was created that would endow the Soviet institutions with full state powers – the Main Planning and Economic Department of the Regional Executive Committee. According to the speaker, the positive results were not long in coming: the number of economic resolutions adopted by the regional committee decreased by 50%, the number of joint decisions with the regional executive committee decreased by 6 times, the number of the party documents directed towards the activities of elected bodies decreased by 40% (SARR, f. 400, d. 136, c. 3, p. 41).

As a result, newspaper columns were covered with countless publications demonstrating the “triumph” of a political reform. “Where there is a party, there is success and victory,” said V. Avdymyrets, the secretary of the “Rivnesilmash” party committee, on the pages of Rivne district committee’s newspaper “Slovo Pravdy” (Avdymyrets, 1988, p. 1). But the real results of these “achievements” illustrated the speeches of the nomenclature during the election of the regional party leader on December 10, 1988. Using the presence of the spokesman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Yu. Yelchenko, the first secretary of Dubrovysky district committee V. Hulko complained, that so many problems accumulated in the region over the years of perestroika that to solve them one-day visit of the republican leader V. Shcherbytsky to Rivne was not enough. He was supported by V. Lutsenko, the second secretary of the regional committee, who stated that many communist leaders doubted the correctness of the political reforms vector initiated by Moscow and supported by Kyiv. The Chairman of Rivne City Executive Committee summarized the complaints of the local Communist Party concerning the destructive deployment of innovations as follows: “It turns out that nowadays we need to put everything aside and get on a new platform. It seems to me that a fashionable phrase will be followed by difficult consequences” (SARR, f. 400, d. 136, c. 24, pp. 4–9). There was so much criticism that the forum ended with the election of Rivne region’s new party leader. T. Panasenko headed the region for 16 years (SARR, f. 400, d. 136, c. 24, p. 15).

An interview with V. Chervoniy, the leader of the national societies in Rivne region, an engineer of the “Azot”, and later the People’s Deputy of Ukraine, sheds light on the process of “the party democratization” in the plane of the national societies formation in Rivne region. He noted: “In 1988, the unions beyond the control of the CPU began to emerge at the enterprises and institutions of the region: NRU, TUM, “Prosvita”, “Memorial”, and youth discussion clubs. As long as they were engaged in cultural and educational work, the party

system tolerated their activities, constantly presenting it as a sign of publicity in the society and the party. However, when the process took on a political colour, the unions automatically became the enemy No. 1” (Interviu V. Chervoniia, 2009). This was confirmed by the speech of M. Yermin, the Chief of Rivne Regional Executive Committee, from the tribune of the XXII Regional Party Conference on December 9, 1988. He warned that pluralism did not justify criticism of the communist system, that publicity was not permissiveness, and perestroika was not anti-Soviet (SARR, f. 400, d. 136, c. 5, p. 7).

On December 9, 1988, analyzing the political reform in the country, H. Bandrovsky, the first secretary of Transcarpathian regional committee from the tribune of the XXI regional party conference emphasized, that only the initiator of “perestroika” – the Communist Party was carrying out a radical change in the political, social and economic components of the life of the Soviet people. According to the speaker, the society unanimously supported the reformist innovations of the CPSU. Publicity and democracy, collegiality and exactingness became the norm. They were caused by the reports of the party members leaders, which restored the connection between the party apparatus and the ordinary communists. Thus, excessive organization, administrative pressure, duplication and remoteness from the “lower” party bodies were left behind. Indisputable proof of renewal, the speaker saw in the election of more than 470 secretaries of the party organization, 312 chairmen of the trade unions, 231 komsomol leaders (SAZR, f. 1, d. 30, c. 1, pp. 11–23).

200 directors, 5 000 work-shop supervisors, foremen lost their positions (SAZR, f. 1, d. 30, c. 1, pp. 11–23). The nomenclature of the regional committee was reduced by a third. The first 7 leaders of Zakarpattia at the regional level and 88 at the district level were fired. There were the following leaders among them: a chairman of the regional trade union council, a deputy chairman of the executive committee, a chairman of the agricultural and industrial complex, the first secretaries of Svaliava and Mukachevo district committees, the heads of Mizhhirya, Mukachevo, Tiachiv district executive committees and 25 chairmen of village councils. 45% of those fired were sent to work in the production and Soviet sectors. But ironically, these changes cost the position of the regional head himself. He was fired (SAZR, f. 1, d. 30, c. 22, pp. 28–31).

During the report and election campaign, the secretaries of city and district committees of Transcarpathian region expressed the ideas concerning about 340 remarks, which testified to the lack of understanding of the center’s reform initiatives by the regional branches of the party (SAZR, f. 1, d. 30, c. 92, p. 3). I. Mashkov, the head of Uzhhorod City Committee, believed that the reforms destroyed the system of a political education, and his colleague from Vynohradiv district, P. Levchuk, hinted at the loss of the perestroika dynamics due to the amplitude narrowing of the party influence. I. Habor, the head of Rakhiv district committee, complained about the increase in the office work volume, and P. Ivanov, the Komsomol leader, stated about a decrease in the number of candidates for members of the CPSU. V. Yaroshovets, the second secretary of the regional committee warned: “It is alarming that the staff of Volovets, Svaliava, Tiachiv district committees was changed almost completely” (SAZR, f. 1, d. 30, c. 19, pp. 8–10). The resistance of Transcarpathian party apparatus reached the point that on December 28 the Central Committee of the Communist Party sent a written remark about the reluctance of the regional party leaders to dismantle the outdated propaganda such as “Glory to the CPSU!”, “Our Goal is Communism!”, “The plans of the party are the plans of the people!” (SAZR, f. 1, d. 30, c. 94, p. 5).

The process of “reform” in Chernivtsi region was illustrated on December 23, 1988 by M. Nivalov, the regional communist leader. From the tribune of the XXII Party Conference, he

assured that the party was advancing on the course of a revolutionary change confidently. The speaker considered the examples of intra-party democratization in the reduction of scheduled meetings by 25% and the reduction of party-economic decisions by 50%. The speaker reported that 5 departments were liquidated in the regional committee, the staff was reduced by 13 people, or 21%. He considered the election of a third of the secretaries of primary and work-shop organizations and a quarter of the party groups as a guarantee of the innovations irreversibility. Cancelling of 60% of the local party bodies decisions by the regional committee, M. Nivalov interpreted as a deepening of perestroika. As a result, 212 communists were expelled from the CPSU, who got admonition at first (SACHR, f. 1, d. 60, c. 1, pp. 9–15).

The most vivid example of the deforming influence of a political reform in the Communist Party environment of Transcarpathia was the discussion that broke out between M. Nivalov, the first secretary of the regional committee, and V. Panasiuk, the first secretary of Kelmenets district committee, at the plenum of the regional committee on October 15, 1988. At the end of the controversy, the latter said that workers “cannot constantly live during reforms” (SACHR, f. 1, d. 60, c. 5, pp. 22–28). The hidden dissatisfaction of the party apparatus was illustrated by the minutes of the XXVIIth report and election conference of Khotyn district committee of November 18, 1988. K. Luchkov, the leader of the local communists, did not understand how to increase the influence in the collectives of workers, on condition of liquidation of the general, agrarian and organizational departments of the district committee and changes in the staff (SACHR, f. 6, d. 29, c. 1, pp. 11–13). V. Potseluyko’s point of view, the district prosecutor, was that the reduction of the party influence on economic bodies resulted in an increase in production problems (SACHR, f. 10, d. 29, c. 1, pp. 44–46). The analysis of the minutes of the XXIst Conference of Hlybotsky District of November 19, 1988, showed that the basis for the dissatisfaction of the party leadership was the lack of logic of the Soviet Union reforms, which led to the destruction of the party monopoly. It turned out that the party lost the positions it had won on the instructions of Moscow center. Little was believed in the declared increase in the Communist influence in the Soviet institutions. N. Semotiuk, the first secretary of the district committee, the members of the bureau T. Dyka, K. Dabula, V. Bodnarash warned about this fact in their speeches. They demanded a clear explanation: who exactly, according to the decision of the XIXth All-Union Party Conference, retains the leading function – the party or the Soviet bodies. If the first ones, then why there is the question of the delimitation of the party-economic functions and how to deal with Article 6 of the Constitution of the USSR on the leading and guiding role of the CPSU. If the latter, the party may find itself on the sidelines of political processes in the country and eventually lose pro-government status due to the reduction of its number and the state significance (SACHR, f. 11, d. 29, c. 1, pp. 9–33).

Such warnings were fair. The fact is that in 1985 the regional party organization of Lviv region united 125 111 communists, Ivano-Frankivsk – 53 837, Ternopil – 47 221, Volyn – 51 037, Rivne – 57 521, Transcarpathian – 45 841, Chernivtsi – 42 120 communists. In 1988, 41 communists left the ranks of the Communist Party voluntarily in Lviv region, 40 – in Ivano-Frankivsk, 9 – in Ternopil, 6 – in Volyn, 9 – in Rivne, 0 – in Zakarpattia, and 52 – in Chernivtsi.

In 1989, in Lviv region, 253 communists returned party-membership cards, Ivano-Frankivsk – 91, Ternopil – 51, Volyn – 185, Rivne – 111, Transcarpathian – 76, Chernivtsi – 310 communists. In 1990, 38 232 communists ceased to be members of the CPSU-CPU in Lviv region, 8 904 – in Ivano-Frankivsk region, 5 742 – in Ternopil region, 4 773 – in Volyn region, 5 796 – in Rivne region, 4 031 – in Transcarpathian region, and

3 338 communists – in Chernivtsi region. In 1991, 48 822 communists left the ranks of the party in Lviv region, 10 718 – in Ivano-Frankivsk region, 5 251 – in Ternopil region, 2 170 – in Volyn region, 12 991 – in Rivne region, 4 127 – in Zakarpattia region, and 2 990 communists – in Chernivtsi region. The rest of the party members stopped paying membership fees and duties, leaving themselves outside the party.

Thus, in 1988, as a result of the artificial incorporation of democratic principles into the autocratic party and the state background, the country's key political core – the CPSU, embarked on a rapid fiasco. In 1989, the political reform led to the collapse of the Communist Party's monopoly on all-Union power as a result of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and in 1990 local and Verkhovna Rada elections ended it at the republican and local levels.

The Conclusions. Thus, after the proclamation at the XIXth All-Union Party Conference in 1988 of the “Sovietization” of the USSR and the “renewal” of the CPSU, the Communist Party nomenclature of the Western Ukrainian regional committees fell within the deprivation scope of its powers, which was considered as a key indicator of democratization of the Soviet society. This process weakened local party foundations significantly, as it deprived the party of a reliable support it had formed for recent decades. As a result of the total reduction of the party structures, thousands of experienced communists at both party-economic and Soviet levels lost their preferences, which facilitated the intra-party tensions, eroded the party monolithicity and generated a distorting misunderstanding of the expediency of the reform aimed at narrowing the pro-government position of the party itself.

Therefore, the regional party elite was forced to stage fulfilling the tasks of the conference, not wanting to share the state powers with the Soviet institutions of the region even partially. But the imitation of the decisions implementation of the XIXth All-Union Party Conference caused dissatisfaction among ordinary communists and the patriotic non-party public, who sought a social democratization and improvement of their own financial situation. Consequently, full-fledged democratization innovations were a priori incompatible with an autocratic communist rule, and therefore encountered opposition from the local ruling party bodies, because it meant the rejection of the pro-government monopoly. Therefore, a political reform repeated the fate of economic reform – in an authoritarian society, it did not strengthen, but shook the power principles of the key bearer of authoritarianism – the CPSU and its Ukrainian representative – the CPU. As a result, three years later the party ranks were completely reduced, and the party itself was outlawed.

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