Warsaw Treaty of 1920 between Ukraine and Poland: History of Signing and Lessons for Today

Abstract. The purpose of the paper is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of key factors and circumstances which caused the evolution of the Ukrainian-Polish relations in 1919 – 1921 from military and political confrontation to partnership, as well as to determine the reasons for failure of Warsaw Treaty of 1920. The methodology of the research includes historical method, system approach, objectivity, the use of general research methods (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and special historical methods (historical and genetic, historical and typological, historical and systemic ones). The scientific novelty consists in comprehensive research of the internal political situation in the Ukrainian People’s Republic and Poland before signing the Treaty of Warsaw on April 21–24, 1920, elucidation of external factors that favoured signing of the Ukrainian-Polish Allied Treaty, identifying lessons from the failure of the Allied Treaty of 1920 for contemporary Polish relations.
The Conclusions. The writers are convinced that during the period of concluding World War I and restructuring the world geopolitical space, the UPR and Rzeczpospolita Polska II were to establish allied relations in order to strengthen their resumed statehood and ensure security in the Baltic-Black Sea region. However, signing of the Treaty of Warsaw, due to a number of internal and external factors, failed to ensure stable Ukrainian-Polish interaction, which had an extremely negative impact on the prospect of preserving state independence of the UPR and Ukrainian-Polish partnership.

Key words: the UPR of the Directory period, Rzeczpospolita Polska II, the Treaty of Warsaw, allied relations.

The Problem Statement. Today, the definition of the Ukrainian-Polish relations as a strategic partnership is something that has long been understood and ordinary. But this was not always the case. And the fact that we are now celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Warsaw signed on April 21–24, 1920, makes historians pay close attention to the events of that time. It is known that the UPR of the Directory period, both geopolitically and militarily and strategically, was objectively interested in establishing allied relations with the newly restored Rzeczpospolita Polska II. The Entente’s victory in World War I made it impossible for the Ukrainian statehood to gain diplomatic recognition in the nearest period by France, Great Britain, the USA and Italy as a result of Ukraine’s signing the Brest Treaty and thus getting “a stigma” of accomplice or even “creation” of Central Powers. Left alone in the opposition to Bolshevik and “white” Russia, Ukraine had little chance for survival. Instead, the Polish Republic, officially recognized by the Allies, could not only become a powerful ally of the UPR in the struggle against attempts to revive a “united and indivisible” Russia, but also act as a diplomatic “window to Europe” for Ukraine.

The Analysis of Recent Research and Publications. The topic of concluding the Treaty of Warsaw in 1920, as well as the then Ukrainian-Polish relations became the subject of the Ukrainian research (Hud, Golubko, 1997; Lisevych, 1997; Tereshchenko, 1999; Krasivsky,
1999; Lytvyn, 2001; Matviyenko, 2002; Tymchenko, 2011; Datskiv, 2015; Trofymovych, 2017) and Polish writers (Wandycz, 1969; Koko, 1996; Karpus, 1999; Pisuliński, 2004). However, the importance of the Treaty of Warsaw within the context of formation of allied relations between the UPR and Poland in 1919 – 1920, the prospects of defending the independence of the UPR, and especially in resolving the problem of unity of the Ukrainian lands, still causes much discussion amidst the scientific and expert environment (Verstyuk, 2005). If in the papers of the Ukrainian contemporaries of those events negative assessment of consequences of the Treaty of Warsaw is dominating (Shelukhin, 1926; Shapoval, 1928), as it did not solve the key issue – the UPR survival under war conditions on several fronts, the research of modern authors abound with statements concerning the compelled nature of the alliance with Poland, to which Simon Petliura was prompted by the Bolshevik threat and indifference and misunderstanding of the Entente states (Yeremenko, 1997; Lytvyn, 2001). Therefore, there is an urgent need to rethink the events of a century ago in order to answer the key question of that period of the Ukrainian history: why the Ukrainian-Polish alliance appeared unable to stand in the way of the Bolshevik occupation of Ukraine.

Thus, the purpose of the paper is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of key factors and circumstances which caused the evolution of Ukrainian-Polish relations in 1919 – 1921 from military and political confrontation to partnership, as well as to determine the reasons for failure to implement the Treaty of Warsaw of 1920. Equally important is the answer to the question concerning what exactly aspects of the Ukrainian-Polish cooperation of that time is worth noting for today, emphasizing that experience of allied relations between the two countries, initiated a hundred years ago, turned into a comprehensive cooperation between Ukraine and Poland and is now classified as a strategic partnership. We will try to give the answer to the outlined issues in this article.

The Main Material Statement. To find out how the policy of Rzeczpospolita Polska II towards Ukraine was being formed, it is necessary to dwell on the positions of the main Polish political groups at the end of 1918 – the beginning of 1921 concerning the Ukrainian issue. The so-called Belvedere Group, which consisted of supporters of the Head of State Józef Piłsudski and the first Prime Minister of the Polish government, Andrzej Moraczewski, advocated the idea of creating a federation with Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania liberated from the Russian rule. This would have created a “corridor” to protect Poland from direct aggression by the Kremlin or “white” Russia if the latter won the civil war. At the same time, Kholmshchyna, Western Volyn up to the Styr River and Lviv Region were to be withdrawn to Poland. However, the idea of federation was supported by the political force of J. Piłsudski, as it became known from the instructions of the Head of State to the Polish ambassadors to the Paris Peace Conference of 1918 (Nowak, 2009), published only in 2009, only for external factors. Concerning the problem of the future of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus, the text of instructions written by J. Piłsudski, as it became known from the instructions of the Head of State to the Polish ambassadors to the Paris Peace Conference of 1918 (Nowak, 2009), published only in 2009, only for external factors. Concerning the problem of the future of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus, the text of instructions written by J. Piłsudski was practically indistinguishable from the position of Roman Dmowski’s National Democratic Party (NDP), which believed that Russia, but not Ukraine, would be the eastern neighbour of restored Poland. In the instructions of the Head of State, written, according to the apt remark of the Polish researcher M. Maszkiewicz, in the “national democratic style” (Maszkiewicz, 2015), it is stated that Poland, without taking away any of its own lands in Russia ..., has to get enough terrain for its own expansion (to the East. – The authors.), as well as to establish a convenient and strong border in the East. This border must cover [sic] Lithuania, Pinskoye, Western Volyn and industrial areas of central Galicia” (Nowak, 2009, p. 137).
The above mentioned federalist concept was supported by the Polish Socialists (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, PPS) and the Polish People’s Party “Wyzwolenie” (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL-W), who stood for a peaceful settlement of the Polish-Ukrainian territorial issue with the inclusion of Lviv and Kholmshchyna into Poland. In the rest of Eastern Galicia and Volyn, the Left-wing Democrats proposed granting the Polish minority national and cultural autonomy within the UPR.

As to the National Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczno-Narodowe, SDN) of Roman Dmowski, regarding the Ukrainians immature for independent state existence, its ideologists were first of all concerned about the prospect of Ukraine pursuing a Germanophile policy, which, due to Poland’s geopolitical location between Germany and Russia, would pose a threat to the Polish state. Therefore, the National Democrats assumed that in the East, Poland would border directly on Russia. However, advocating the creation of a multinational state, they sought to possess not all the lands of previous Rzeczpospolita, but only those where the Poles could dominate, assimilating in the long run other ethnic groups. The incorporation programme of the National Democrats concerned Kholmshchyna, Western Volyn to the Sluch and the Horyn rivers, the whole of Eastern Galicia and Western Podillya to the Zbruch and the Smotrych rivers. These demands were supported by the Polish Peasant Party “Piast” (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL “Piast”).

The most conservative views on the Ukrainian issue were held by the so-called “żubry kresowe” from among the owners of large estates in Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, who insisted on the restoration of Rzeczpospolita within its 1772 borders, including Eastern Volyn, most of Kyiv region and Eastern Podillya.

In spite of this, the forces of supporters of federalist and incorporation concepts on the problem of Poland’s eastern borders, as shown by the results of elections to the Constituent Sejm in February 1919, were approximately equal, which created certain grounds for finding ways to the Polish-Ukrainian understanding.

As for the Ukrainian government, even in the leadership of the Directory of the Ukrainian People’s Republic there was no unity in matters of the Polish politics. Of the five members of the Directory, only the Chief Ataman of the Republican Army, Simon Petliura, was well aware of the need for rapprochement with Poland, even through the concessions of certain territories in Kholmshchyna, Podlasie, Western Volyn, and Eastern Galicia, which had already been occupied by the Polish troops by the end of 1918.

Through the mediation of Warsaw, S. Petliura hoped to reach an agreement with the Entente and thus bring Ukraine out of international diplomatic isolation and receive effective military and political assistance against Bolshevik Russia in order to defend the UPR state independence. Already in December of 1918 the Polish armed forces, numbered 130,000.

Not surprisingly, it was S. Petliura who initiated sending a UPR special mission headed by Viacheslav Prokopovych to Warsaw on December 31, 1918. It was to find out the conditions for reaching an agreement on joint actions against Bolshevik Russia and receiving assistance (Dotseuiko, 1924, p. 7). However, because of opposition by the supporters of a peaceful agreement with the Kremlin, led by the Head of the Directory, V. Vynnychenko, V. Prokopovych’s mission failed to achieve significant results and at the end of January of 1919, it had to return to Kyiv. Nevertheless, Warsaw talks facilitated the establishment of the UPR first diplomatic representation in the Polish capital, headed by O. Karpinsky, which began functioning on January 18, 1919. Warsaw government, in its turn, sent to Kyiv the former ambassador of the Regency Council S. Wankowicz, who held consultations with
circles interested in the Ukrainian-Polish rapprochement (CSAHAU, f. 3696, d. 1, c. 31, pp. 10, 13, 39). Another positive result of V. Prokopovych’s mission was J. Pilsudski’s personal interest in S. Petliura’s position, about which it is informed in an excerpt from the report of the American liaison officer in Warsaw Foster to the USA delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in the first half of January 1919. In particular, the American officer reported that in a conversation with him J. Pilsudski noted that it was impossible to find ways to armistice with Galician Ukrainians. Instead, the “Head of State” expressed the belief that “it would be easier to negotiate with Petliura in Kyiv” (Stakhiv, 1965b, pp. 152–153).

The position formulated by J. Pilsudski on the Ukrainian issue was confirmed by V. Prokopovych upon his return to Kyiv. The Ukrainian diplomat stated at the time that “our initiative to establish normal relations was met with sympathy from Polish … . It was the easiest to talk about Kholmshchyna, Podlasie and Berestya (Beresteishchyna. – Authors), and it was difficult to speak about Lviv and Boryslav ” (Dotsenko, 1924, p. 8).

As V. Prokopovych’s diplomatic mission, despite its formal failure, proved that there was a solid ground for continuing the Ukrainian-Polish dialogue, the Council of People’s Ministers UPR decided at the end of January 1919 to send a special delegation in the nearest days to negotiate with the Polish government. It was to be headed by the former Minister of Education of the Ukrainian State Petro Stebnytsky. However, the hasty evacuation of the Directory and the UPR government on February 2, 1919 from Kyiv to Vinnytsia prevented the departure of P. Stebnytsky’s mission. And the signing of the “Pre-accession Treaty” on December 1, 1918 in Fastiv, intended to “merge in the nearest future in one great state” by members of the WR UPR Directory V. Vynnychenko, P. Andrievsky and F. Shvets and representatives of WUPR State Secretariat L. Tsehelsky and D. Levitsky, made it extremely difficult to establish a political dialogue between Kyiv and Warsaw. Probably because President of the Western Ukrainian National Council and a member of the UPR Directory Yevhen Petrushevych, around whom the vast majority of Galician political figures gathered, opposed any territorial concessions to Poland in Eastern Galicia. He was supported by a substantial part of the UPR leadership actively, who considered withdrawal from ethnic borders a betrayal of the Ukrainian national idea. Thus, the lack of unity among the Ukrainian leadership did not favour the Entente’s mediation efforts to resolve the armed conflict and transfer the Polish-Ukrainian dispute to the diplomatic dimension.

Meanwhile, the resignation of V. Vynnychenko from the Directory on February 9, 1919, and the appointment of a new centrist government of Serhiy Ostapenko on February 13, to certain extent created favorable conditions for the intensification of the Ukrainian-Polish dialogue. The new Head of the UPR’s foreign ministry, Kost Matsievych, in agreement with S. Petliura, left for Odessa to personally participate in negotiations with representatives of the Entente and Poland on concluding an agreement on joint hostilities against Bolshevik Russia (Matviyenko, 2001, p. 31).

With the consent of S. Petliura, K. Matsievych secretly sent Colonel Borys Kurdynovsky, an official of the Ukrainian mission in Odessa, to the Polish capital at the beginning of April of 1919. His powers stated that “the Government of the Directory grants all rights in order to enter into diplomatic relations with representatives of the Republic of Poland to discuss and sign agreements and establish relations between the Government of the Republic of Ukraine and the Government of the Republic of Poland” (Stakhiv, 1965b, pp. 158–159).

The secret nature of B. Kurdynovsky’s mission will become clear if we take into account the failed negotiations between the Entente delegation led by French General Jean Barthelemey
and the Western region (WR) UPR leadership and the Galician Army Command with S. Petliura’s participation in Khodoriv on February 27–28, 1919. Polish armistice, proposed by the mission of J. Barthelemy, according to which the government of the WR UPR would retain control over two thirds of the territory of Eastern Galicia (but without Lviv and Drohobych-Boryslav oil region), with the full assistance of the Antante in the rearrangement and reorganization of the Galician Army and the right to use the required amount of oil, could be the basis for developing a mutually beneficial Ukrainian-Polish compromise. Personally S. Petliura “strongly advised the members of the Galician delegation to accept the proposal of the Barthelemy Commission, pointing out that in addition to the recognition of Ukraine by the Entente states, this would enable provision of ammunition and other military materials from Europe to continue the struggle for the Ukrainian issue” (Mazepa, 2003, p. 142). The deployment of a joint front of Polish and Galician troops against Bolshevik Russia was envisaged to radically alleviate the position of the Directory Republican Army, which had left Bila Tserkva, Cherkasy, Kremenchuk, Katerynoslavl and retreated under the blows of the Red Army further to the West and South-West.

At a meeting with General J. Barthelemy, S. Petliura supported his mission’s attempt to reconcile Galicians with Poles and agreed with the idea of Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Entente, to put an end to the armed conflict in Eastern Galicia and direct the Polish and Ukrainian armies to fight against Bolsheviks. Mykhailo Lozynsky, a participant in the negotiations on the part of the WUPR, rightly mentioned that “even then Petliura was ready to make concessions at the expense of Eastern Galicia in order to obtain peace with Poland and recognition by the Entente” (Lozynsky, 1922, p. 77).

But the Galician military, politicians and diplomats strongly rejected the proposals of J. Barthelemy’s mission and S. Petliura’s advice. Finally despairing of the possibility of understanding with the Galicians, S. S. Petliura, elected Head of the UPR Directory on May 9, 1919, carried out all further measures concerning establishment of interaction with Poland personally and in deep secret not only from E. Petrushevych but also from many of his associates (Stakhiv, 1965b, pp. 168–169).

At that time, the problem concerning if not an alliance, then at least reconciliation with Poland became a matter of life and death for the UPR, because on April 5, 1919, Bolshevik troops took Mohyliv-Podilsky and reached the Dniester river, having split the Directory Army into two parts. The southern group was forced to move to Romania-controlled territory of Bessarabia and underwent internment, while the northern group retreated rapidly to Volyn, having lost grounds to the east of Sarny-Rivne-Kremenets-Starokostiantyniv-Proskuriv line by mid-June.

At the insistence of S. Petliura, in May 1919, the new government of Borys Matros came to a principal decision to conduct direct truce talks with Warsaw without informing the State Secretariat of the WR of the UPR. On May 31, 1919, on S. Petliura’s initiative, a representative mission headed by Lieutenant General of the former tsarist army Serhiy Delvig was sent to Lviv, which had the authority to conclude a truce between the UPR and Poland and reach an agreement on joint hostilities against the Bolsheviks. Negotiations were quite successful and on June 16 the Ukrainian-Polish agreement on the demarcation line between the Galician Army and Polish troops through Zalozce – the Seret river – Ternopol – Ostriv – Lytyatyn – the Zolota Lypa river – Nezvisk was agreed. The “Delvig Line” was undoubtedly much worse than the “Barthelemy Line”, but the only one possible under those circumstances. However, Yevhen Petrushevych, who had been proclaimed a “Dictator” of the WR UPR a week earlier, and newly appointed by him Commander-in-chief (Commander) of
the Galician Army, General O. Grekov, who replaced General M. Omelyanovich-Pavlenko, inspired with success of the counter-offensive at the Polish front when “advanced Ukrainian detachments reached as far as Bibka, Khodoriv, and Mykolayiv, threatening Lviv itself … refused to confirm the armistice with the Poles, signed by the Ukrainian military delegation headed by General S. Delvig, although a representative of the Galician Army lieutenant-colonel K. Slyusarchuk also took part in the delegation”, and continued the Chortkiv offensive (Mazepa, 2003, p. 223).

The failure of the WR UPR leadership to implement an armistice was used by Warsaw to ensure that the “Council of Ten” of the Paris Peace Conference passed a resolution on June 25, 1919, allowing the Polish army to completely occupy Eastern Galicia. And three days later the Galician Army was forced to begin a retreat at the entire Polish-Ukrainian front, until on July 16 it crossed the Zbruch River into the territory controlled by S. Petliura’s troops. “Dictator” Ye. Petrushevych together with his government was also forced to move to Kamianets-Podilskyi – at that time the temporary capital of the UPR.

Thus, S. Petliura and his close surroundings were forced to take into account the position of Ye. Petrushevych, at least formally, for another three months, as they needed the loyal attitude of the 50,000-strong Galician Army, the best organized and disciplined part of the UPR armed forces. But after the occupation of the entire territory of the WR UPR by Polish troops (with the permission of the Entente), the Head of the Directory was given much more freedom in seeking for compromises with J. Pilsudski.

The basis for the Ukrainian-Polish understanding remained the same threat of the revival of “united and indivisible” Russia, which would not only put an end to the Ukrainian statehood, but also call in question Poland’s independence. J. Pilsudski asserted at the time that “regardless of what its government will be like, Russia is stubbornly imperialistic. This is even the main feature of its political nature … The attack on Poland depends primarily on the Ukrainian issue... If the Ukrainian issue is resolved in their favour, then it (Russia – Authors) will attack Poland” (Hud, Golubko, 1997, pp. 13–14).

In return, in his letter to Yu. Pidsudsky of August 9, 1919, S. Petliura wrote that while defending state independence, Poland and Ukraine had common foreign policy strategic interests that “require coordination and cooperation.” And as a starting point on this path he offered to reach full understanding between the armies of the two neighboring states. “The return to Ukraine of our prisoners from Poland, respectively armed,” wrote the Head of the Directory, “would be the first step towards the following friendly acts of Polish and Ukrainian peoples” (Petliura, 1979, pp. 357–358).

To reach understanding with Poland, a mission headed by P. Pylypchuk was directed from Ukraine to Warsaw, which represented Ukraine at three joint meetings of the Ukrainian mission and the Polish government delegation on August 19–21, 1919. Activities of P. Pylypchuk’s mission resulted in signing on September 1, 1919 of an armistice agreement for a period of one month (further it had to be extended by other agreements). According to it, Polish troops ceased the hostilities, and a neutral zone was established between the Zhvanchyk and the Zbruch rivers, and to the North, the demarcation line ran between Slavuta and Shepetivka to Sarn-Luninets and crossed into Belarus. Liaison officers were to stay at the headquarters of both armies to exchange information, and joint anti-Bolshevik actions were to be coordinated by a special bilateral commission (Ukraine, September 6, 1919).

After concluding an armistice, mutually beneficial Ukrainian-Polish trade and economic relations began to be established at the front. The “Polish Mission of the South-Eastern Trade”
arrived in Kamianets-Podilskyi consisting of representatives of the interested ministries for negotiations with the UPR Ministry of National Economy. As early as October 7, 1919, an agreement was signed under which Poland was to supply Ukraine with textiles, salt, and oil products in exchange for the Ukrainian bakery products and sugar. The Polish side undertook to pay for a certain part of the supplies in hryvnias of the UPR (CSAHA AU, f. 3696, d. 1, c. 34, pp. 30–32, 51). The trade agreement was also political in nature, as it was a guarantee that the Polish side had no intention to violate the armistice.

The cessation of the hostilities and the establishment of mutually beneficial trade laid the groundwork for full-scale government talks on signing a major interstate treaty. On September 22, 1919, at a joint meeting of the UPR Directory and the Council of People’s Ministers, a decision was approved to send a special mission to Poland headed by the Minister of Justice and Foreign Ministry official A. Livytsky.

On October 28, 1919, at the first Ukrainian-Polish meeting, A. Livytsky’s mission published a declaration which promoted ethnographic principle for defining the interstate border. The document stressed that “common interests in defense against the common enemy should become the basis for close military cooperation, which is necessary for a victorious end of the war imposed on Ukraine and Poland by Russian imperialism.” On a parity basis, both states had to lay together “long-term foundations for lasting peace and order in the East of Europe” (CSAHA AU, f. 3696, d. 2, c. 275, p. 63).

The intentions expressed in the declaration failed to be implemented, first because of the Directory’s most capable armed formation, the UGA, going over to the command of General A. Denikin’s Russian Volunteer Army, and then due to the loss of real control over the national territory by the UPR government in early December 1919.

At the meeting of S. Petliura with J. Pilsudski, which took place on December 9, 1919 in Warsaw, the parties agreed to accelerate measures to provide assistance to the government of the UPR even before signing of a large-scale allied agreement. However, official Ukrainian-Polish negotiations resumed only in March 1920, given the government crisis in Warsaw and opposition to J. Pilsudski’s eastern policy in the Sejm. In particular, on March 12, 1920, the parties agreed to focus on developing such provisions of the draft allied agreement as: the status of the administration on the Ukrainian lands occupied by the Polish army, preparation of an act of diplomatic recognition of the UPR by Poland, delimitation of interstate borders CSAHA AU, f. 3696, d. 2, c. 275, pp. 102–103).

But already on April 9, during the discussion of Paragraph 1 of the allied Treaty, some differences emerged in the formulas of recognition of the UPR proposed by the parties. A. Livytsky’s delegation insisted on that “Poland recognizes the UPR as an independent sovereign state with which it enters into friendly and good-neighborly relations as an equal party”. Instead, the Polish draft stated that “Poland recognizes the Provisional Government of the Ukrainian Directory, headed by Otaman S. Petliura, as a “de facto” government”. In the final version, the delegations agreed on a compromise formula: “Rzeczpospolita Polska recognizes the Directory of the independent Ukrainian People’s Republic, headed by the Chief Otaman Mr. Symon Petliura, for the Supreme Power of the UPR” (Dotsenko, 1924, p. 225).

A compromise was also reached on determining the composition of the local administration on the Ukrainian territories occupied by the Polish army. After long discussions, it was decided that “power on the hitherto occupied territories, which, on the basis of political conditions, are recognized the UPR, remains temporarily in the hands of the Polish government, and the Ukrainian government would organize its administrative apparatus and with its establishment,
in agreement with the Polish government, the power at those territories passes into the hands of the Ukrainian government” (Paragraph 8 of the Military Convention of April 24, 1920) (Shelukhin, 1926, p. 30).

Regarding the provisions of the Political Convention, signed on the night of April 22, 1920, the most contradictory comments of politicians and diplomats were made on its Paragraph 3, which stated that the Polish government “recognizes as Ukraine’s territory to the East of the border specified in Article 2 of this condition (i.e., along the line: the Zbruch river – Vyshegradok – Kreminets hills – Zdolbunov – the eastern administrative border of Rivne district (‘povit’) – the eastern administrative border of the Minsk province (‘gubernia’) – the Pripyat river. – Authors), to the Polish borders of 1772 (pre-divisional), which Poland already occupies, or will acquire from Russia in an armed or diplomatic way (italicized by us. – Authors)”.

This meant that in the event of the UPR military defeat of by the Bolsheviks on the Left Bank and the South or the impossibility of liberating these regions at that time, the territory of the Right Bank outlined in Paragraph 3 of the Political Convention would become the center of the Ukrainian statehood. According to the UPR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this territory would cover the entire Podillya province (‘gubernia’) and most of Volyn and Kyiv ones, some districts (‘povits’) of Minsk, Mogilev and Kherson provinces (‘gubernias’). The northern border of such a mini-UPR was to pass along the line of the river Pripyat – Mozyr – the mouth of the Sozh river, its area would exceed 160 ths sq. km, and the population – 12 million people (CSAHAU, f. 3696, d. 2, c. 370, p. 169). That is, the Ukrainian-Polish Political Convention guaranteed at least the preservation of the UPR’s center of power on the Right Bank.

Paragraph 4 of the Political Convention, which obliged both parties “not to conclude any international conditions” against each of them, also complied with the norms of International Law fully. The UPR retained full sovereignty in its foreign policy at both the regional and European levels.

Can the interstate border outlined in Paragraph 3 of the Political Convention be considered a betrayal by the authorities of the UPR Directory of Ukrainian national interests in terms of the territorial affiliation of Eastern Galicia and Western Volyn? Olexander Shulgin gave a comprehensive answer to this question in 1931, writing: “What was going on then: “Petliura gave (some even said “sold”) Galicia and Volyn to the Poles”. In fact, Symon Petliura did not give anything away, and there was nothing for him to sell, because he had nothing. He and his successor, Andriy Livytsky, on behalf of the government: 1) agreed with the current line of the Polish borders and 2) did not mention anything concerning Galicia in the Treaty.

“Why did he do that? What rights did he have? – his enemies shouted. Firstly, because these lands were in fact already in the hands of the Poles; secondly, because the Galicians themselves wanted that we would leave them alone, because they hoped that without us they would win an easier case against the Poles in the League of Nations; thirdly, because in the terrible circumstances at this and only this price the rest of Ukraine could be liberated, that is, four-fifths of our territory, and finally – and this is the most important point – this and only this could save the state.

At that time it did not work. But no matter how much we think over it now, it was basically the only true decision of the case” (Shulgin, 1931, pp. 6–7).

Signing of the Political Convention paved the way to intensify the Ukrainian-Polish dialogue in financial and economic sphere. On the instructions of S. Petliura, the Ukrainian Trade Mission to Rzeczpospolita Polska was established, headed by First Vice-Premier and Minister of National Economy Ivan Feshchenko-Chopivsky, which was to develop and conclude a bilateral trade and economic agreement. At negotiations held in Warsaw on May
8 – August 4, 1920, the Polish side was led by Vice-Minister of the Polish Government Henryk Strasburger.

At negotiations the sides agreed that the UPR had to grant Warsaw concessions in Kryvyi Rih iron ore basin with the permission to transport raw materials to the Black Sea ports under the Polish protection, as well as the primacy in exploitation of Podolian phosphorites, followed by their transportation by the Polish. Postal and telegraph and railway conventions and agreements concerning the distribution of state property and debts of the former Russian Empire were envisaged (CSAHAAU, f. 2486, d. 1, c. 1, p. 23). To meet the needs of the Ukrainian Army, governmental and cooperative institutions in Polish goods, the 'Krajowa Spółka Handlowa' gave credit of 200 mln Polish marks for the UPR.

Thus, the projected trade and economic agreement had a somewhat unequal character for the UPR, given the complete disruption of economic life in the latter. Similarly, the Polish side also gained significant advantages in the Military Convention signed on April 24, 1920, which was an integral part of the political agreement. In particular, combat operations on the Right Bank were supposed to take place “according to mutual understanding of the Polish Armed Forces’ initial command and the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ main command” but “under the general command of the Polish Armed Forces’ command”. The Polish military control over the Ukrainian railways was envisaged during the military campaign, as well as the participation of the Polish officers in the organization and formation of power structures etc. The UPR government had to provide the Polish troops with food and cartage.

The main result of the Treaty of Warsaw was, as A. Nikovsky mentioned, due to the Treaty of Warsaw the UPR received “moral assistance in the form of de jure recognition of state sovereignty and real support in political, military and financial fields. After long and persistent struggle against the enemies of the Ukrainian statehood – the Bolsheviks and Denikin, Ukraine for the first time found an ally, whose troops, together with our reorganized and well-equipped army, were to clear the Ukrainian territory from hostile occupation and assist in establishment peace and public tranquility … The Ukrainian People’s Republic, up to recently closed by hostile neighboring states, with this Treaty broke the barrier which obstructed its way to Western Europe” (CSAHAAU, f. 3696, d. 2, c. 278, p. 6).

When allied Ukrainian-Polish troops liberated Kyiv on May 7, 1920, the UPR Foreign Ministry informed in “Foreign Policy and the Ukrainian Issue Abroad” monthly review that “now the press of England and France is discussing a new political situation in the East of Europe, as well as economic prospects that would open up in connection with the future liberation of the whole territory of Ukraine from the Bolsheviks ... English capitalists and industrialists express their desire to participate in the economic reconstruction of Ukraine” (CSAHAAU, f. 3696, d. 3, c. 26, p. 27). At the end of March of 1920, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly, Louis Barthou and MP Gailard, submitted an issue concerning the recognition of the UPR independence, to the Parliament. It was to be considered on May 25, and, as the Ukrainian government was assured by Warsaw’s political circles, “the matter would be certainly resolved positively” (CSAHAAU, f. 3696, d. 3, c. 26, p. 27).

However from the very beginning of formation and implementation of Ukrainian-Polish military and political alliance, its vulnerable domestic and international aspects were obvious. Firstly, it actually remained the 'personal alliance' of the two Heads of State – S. Petliura and J. Pilsudski – and was based on their trusting personal relations and private arrangements. After all, the two leaders had a lot in common, firstly, regarding their socialist past and their rejection of the idea of “Great Russia” revival. S. Petliura and J. Pilsudski managed to reject...
the dramatic stratification of the complicated historical past of the two peoples and, despite national mentality and negative social stereotypes, found courage and wisdom in themselves to embark on the path of partnership relations.

For all this, none of those politicians could convince their countrymen of the expediency of allied relations between Ukraine and Poland, that is why the Ukrainian-Polish military-political alliance did not become a consolidating factor in either the UPR or Poland. Moreover, both leaders faced strong opposition to their plans within their own states, since past misunderstanding, potent confrontation and conflicts between the two nations came to the fore.

In Poland, the National Democrats and centrist parties, having a majority in the Sejm, were concerned that the pro-Ukrainian policy of the 'Head of the state' was merely antagonizing Moscow. Besides, they did not trust the Directoyt government either, considering the latter as a potential ally of Germany and competitor in the struggle for Eastern Galicia, and therefore opposed the support of Ukrainian statehood in any form strongly. The Polish Socialists, though were keen on the UPR independence, did not approve the hostilities against Bolshevik Russia principally and insisted on peace talks (Wandycz, 1980, pp. 190–196).

S. Petliura, in his turn, got under fire of shattering criticism by almost all prominent figures of the Ukrainian movement (V. Vynnychenko, M. Hrushevsky, M. Shapoval, etc.), who considered Warsaw agreements to be a betrayal of the interests of Greater Ukraine (“Soborna Ukraina”). Hostile or, at best, neutral attitude to the arrival of the Polish Army was also demonstrated by the majority of the Ukrainian Right Bank peasantry, who strongly held in memory the recent times of the Polish landowners’ domination. The mass anti-Bolshevik uprising that S. Petliura and J. Pilsudski hoped for, had not taken place.

Last but not least, the lack of expected support from the Entente states played a significant role in the defeat of the Ukrainian-Polish alliance. Following the Entente’s cessation of economic blockade of the RSFSR, the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference on February 24, 1920 adopted a special resolution, supported by France and Britain, which did not advise the neighboring with Bolshevik Russia countries to proceed with the war, to say nothing of passing to the offensive (Wandycz, 1980, p. 166). At the same time, the US Secretary of State Robert Lansing informed the US Ambassador to Warsaw that in the event of war against Bolshevik Russia, Poland could not rely on military and economic assistance of the United States (Wandycz, 1980, p. 149). In the midst of the Bolshevik counter-offensive on Warsaw on July 10, 1920, the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, on behalf of the Allies, promised Poland assistance only if it concluded a truce with the Kremlin.

Such a position of the great powers in the East of Europe can be explained by their outspoken skepticism concerning the possibility of asserting Ukrainian statehood, a wary attitude towards the personality of J. Pilsudsky (his participation in the socialist movement and pro-German orientation during the First World War) and considering interests of the “ally” – “white” Russia. On June 21, 1920, the Embassy of “White Emigration” in Paris circulated a memorandum stating that the creation of the Ukrainian state “would be contrary to the natural state of affairs” and that “economic, historical, ethnic, political and cultural grounds deny such artificial formation” while Ukraine’s union with Russia is “necessary and inevitable”.

Hence, under pressure of the Entente on October 12, 1920, in Riga, between Poland, on the one hand, and Soviet Russia and Ukraine, on the other, a Treaty of armistice and preliminary peace conditions was signed. It happened at a time when, after the “miracle over the Vistula”, which became possible due to successful interaction of the Polish and Ukrainian troops, the Bolshevik troops were moving eastward from Warsaw and Lviv constantly.
S. Petliura believed that “the joint advance of the Polish and Ukrainian troops into the depths of Right-Bank Ukraine considering the situation of the Russian-Communist hostile forces, after our the capture of the Zbruch line, could have ended with the complete defeat of the enemy, and in connection with this, the prospects for restoring our statehood could be brighter and have signs of a real affair” (Petliura, 1956, p. 391). And J. Pilsudski later recollected: “The Bolshevik Army was so broken that I had no military obstacles to step where I wanted to go at the whole front. But at that time I was detained at the campaign because of the lack of moral force in the society” (Hud & Golubko, 1997, p. 32).

In fact, in Poland itself, everybody was against the continuation of war against Bolshevik Russia – the government, the Sejm, political parties, media – with the exception of the Head of the State. The majority of Warsaw politicians were interested not in the defeat of Russia but in the retention of Western Ukrainian lands under power. After experiencing critical moments in the middle of August 1920, when the Red Army stood at the walls of Warsaw, the Poles did not want again to risk their independence gained through much suffering.

Therefore, in a favorable situation from military point of view, the Polish side in Art. 1 of the Treaty of armistice in Riga actually recognized the UkrSSR, and in Art. 2 undertook to refrain from any interference into the internal affairs of the RSFSR and the UkrSSR, and also agreed to include in a future peace treaty the obligation not to create or support organizations aimed at overthrowing the state or social order of the other party, as well as organizations that assume role of the government of the other party.

Shortly after Riga Peace Treaty of March 18, 1921, on which the Ukrainian diplomacy had no influence at all, virtually cancelled the Treaty of Warsaw of 1920 (the Polish-Ukrainian Agreement), although Poland declared about it officially only in 1923.

**The Conclusions.** Thus, the Ukrainian-Polish military and political alliance appeared to be fragile and being under pressure of insurmountable foreign and domestic political factors first formally, and then actually disintegrated. It appeared to be somewhat late and without assistance of the Entente states was unable to resist the stronger Bolshevik Russia.

At the same time, the Warsaw Treaty of 1920 was of great importance not only for the Ukrainian people, who, due to the help of Poland, continued the armed struggle for the independent UPR till the end of 1921. It can be certainly assumed that if it were not for common Ukrainian-Polish resistance in the summer of 1920, the planned by the Kremlin campaign under the slogan of the ‘export of world revolution’ against Poland, Romania and Germany would have proved to be quite successful and would inevitably have turned into a tragedy for all these countries, and Europe as a whole.

The Baltic states of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania owe much of their independence to the Ukrainian-Polish military and political alliance and its struggle against Bolshevik Russia. Due to the fact that Moscow was weakened significantly by the war with the UPR and peasant uprisings in Ukraine, Poland then also gained the opportunity to strengthen its statehood.

The failure to implement the Ukrainian-Polish Treaty of 1920 led not only to the overthrow of the UPR Directory, but also to the establishment of the Bolshevik occupation regime brought to Dnieper Ukraine on the bayonets of the Russian Red Army. As for the Rzeczpospolita Polska II, the most important lesson of defeat of the 1920 Polish-Ukrainian alliance was the events of September of 1939, when the Rzeczpospolita Polska II collapsed, being torn by the two totalitarian regimes, the German Nazis and the Russian Communists, because at the beginning of the 1920s its politicians neglected the geopolitical formula, which has now become axiomatic: without independent Ukraine, there is no independent Poland.
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