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THE POLISH-UKRAINIAN ALLIANCE OF 1920
IN THE POLISH PUBLIC DISCOURSE DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD

Abstract. The purpose of the research is to highlight the interaction of political thought and professional historiography, and its impact on the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance interpretation in the context of events of the historical process dynamics. We consider an integral part of our study to describe the discussions on Eastern policy in the Polish society before the conclusion of the alliance. The antagonism between the so-called federalist and incorporationist models, which was observed during the period beginning with the independent Polish Republic formation and ending in the Peace of Riga signing, determined the attitude to the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 during the interwar period. The methodology of the research is based on one of the main methods – content analysis, hermeneutic and epistemological approaches, since a significant part of the sources comprises the press and political journalism. Analyzing the work with texts, the principles developed by Q. Skinner and J. Pocock are considered to be the key ones. Q. Skinner and J. Pocock noted the importance of the context and intellectual atmosphere understanding of the time of writing the text, as well as taking into account the author’s planned recipient of the text. According to the method of the narrative analysis, elaborated by Jerzy Topolski, we single out three components in the texts analytically: logical and grammatical, persuasive, theoretical and ideological layers. We share the principle of relativity of the historical source concerning the knowledge and worldview of a historian. The scientific novelty consists in the following issue: in Ukrainian historiography a comprehensive analysis has been done on the material of the Polish public discourse of the interwar period concerning the attitude to the alliance with the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR), which was concluded on the eve of Kyiv Offensive of 1920. The Conclusions. In the article it is stated that during the interwar period the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 did not arouse significant interest both in the Polish public and among historians. Sometimes the alliance was mentioned in the politicians’ memoirs, sometimes it was discussed by the publicists as one of the minor episodes of the Polish-Soviet War. It was written about the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance in general works on the history of Poland or researches on the borders formation after 1918 mainly. Taking into consideration the nature of these works, the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance was described superficially, focusing on the political aspects mainly, for example, Poland’s recognition of Ukraine and border decisions. The genesis issue and various practical realizations of the
The Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 in the Polish public discourse during the interwar period

Polish-Ukrainian cooperation were ignored. The interpretation of the alliance with the UPR depended on the author’s political sympathies. J. Piłsudski’s concepts supporters wrote about the alliance positively, and it was strongly criticized by supporters of the national democracy.

Key words: the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920, Piłsudski, Petliura, the Polish-Soviet War.

The Problem Statement. The Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 is one of the key and very controversial episodes of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921. At the same time, it is an integral part of the Polish-Soviet War, being the formal cause of the Polish offensive in April of 1920. Furthermore, the contradiction of its assessments in both Ukrainian and Polish historiography was determined by the political worldview of the authors. In particular, in the case of Ukraine, the alliance of 1920 with Poland reflected the choice of a pro-European paradigm of Ukraine’s development. In the case of Poland, it was an attempt to change the geopolitical structure of Eastern Europe, to divide Russia by means of the national issue. It should be mentioned that the alliance of 1920 was treated no less ambiguously by the Polish society than by the Ukrainian one. The ideas and concepts of the interwar period had a great influence on the Polish political thought development concerning Ukraine during next decades.
Due to the political discussions of the interwar period the Giedroyć–Mieroszewski’s conception emerged, and the Polish-Ukrainian relations have normalized. The analyzed issue is also a part of a broader question concerning relations in the Ukrainian-Polish-Russian triangle.

**The Analysis of Recent Researches and Publications.** The articles, written by E. Koko (Koko, 1994, pp. 105–113; idem, 1996, pp. 305–316; idem, 1999, pp. 275–291) should be considered the first attempts to summarize and estimate the Polish historiography achievements on the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 and the Polish-Ukrainian relations in the XXth century. The researcher noted that until 1939, in Poland there was an unfavourable atmosphere for the reflections on the Ukrainian aspect of the Polish Eastern policy of 1918 – 1920 (Koko, 1996, p. 305). The theme under analysis was studied in general terms by M. Dutkiewicz, according to whom the historiography of the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 does not have a complete generalization. Analyzing the interwar Polish publications, the researcher stated that more often the issue on the alliance with the Ukrainian People’s Republic was raised in memoirs, written mostly by the military, than in historical studies (Dutkiewicz, 2009, pp. 361–372).

The historiography of the interwar period was covered in J. Pisulinski’s monograph partially. In his opinion, after the Peace of Riga signing, the Polish policy towards Ukraine was practically not analyzed in researches due to the belief that the Ukrainian issue no longer played a significant role in Polish foreign policy (Pisulinski, 2004, p. 20). J. Legieć noted that during recent years the Polish-Ukrainian alliance issue gained popularity among the researchers (Legieć, 2002, p. 7).

The author of a thorough monograph on the State Center of the UPR in exile, J. J. Bruski believes that despite a large number of works on the alliance of 1920, the theme has not been covered yet (Bruski, 2004, p. 17). According to the author, the attitude to the personality of the Chief Ataman in the Polish public opinion was directly correlated with the attitude to the eastern policy of J. Piłsudski and the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance (Bruski, 2011, pp. 113–132). In his opinion, in the interwar Polish historiography the issue of the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance was not covered broadly in comparison to later periods, when the theme began to interest historians much more.

**The Purpose of the Publication.** The article focuses on the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 estimation by the Polish intellectual and political elites during the interwar period. It should be emphasized that the object of the research is not only professional historiography, but also political journalism, and memoirs. The study is at the intersection of the history of ideas, the history of political thought and the history of historiography. The purpose of the research is to highlight the interaction of these three areas and its impact on the interpretation of the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance in the historical context and dynamics.

Furthermore, we consider an integral part of our study to elucidate the discussions on the Eastern policy in the Polish society before the conclusion of the alliance, as the contradictions between the “federalist” and “incorporationist” models, which appeared during the period beginning with the independent Polish Republic formation and ending in the Peace of Riga signing, determined the attitude towards the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 during the interwar period.

**The Main Material Statement.** The political atmosphere in interwar Poland was characterized by a sharp ideological antagonism between the national democracy representatives and J. Piłsudski’s political group. It was the most noticeable on the example of the Eastern policy. In pro-Belweder political circles awareness of the need to establish relations with Ukraine emerged immediately after Poland’s independence. At the beginning of 1919, during
The Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 in the Polish public discourse during the interwar period

The fierce battles for Galicia, in the weekly newspaper “Rząd i Wojsko”, in an editorial article it was written that the Ukrainian issue was a priority to Poland. The article proved that Ukraine should be immediately recognized by the entire Polish people as its natural ally. Instead, the reconstruction of Russia was considered to be a great threat to Poland (Strug, 1919, nr 7, pp. 3–4). The newspaper expressed the belief that Russia, “white” or “red”, would threaten Poland again after the Ukrainian movement suppression. For the sake of coming to such understanding, it was proposed to compromise with the Ukrainians on the border issue (Ibidem, p.4). The article was written, probably, by T. Galecki, the editor-in-chief, better known under the pseudonym Andrzej Strug, a prominent socialist figure and mason.

In addition, in another publication (Strug, 1919, nr 16, p. 4) it was explained that Poland faced two options of the Eastern policy. The first option was to agree to Great Russia reconstruction. The second one was to support the state-building aspirations of non-Russian peoples of the former empire, primarily the Ukrainian one. Directly related to this was the war for Galicia, which, according to the editorial board, should be ended as soon as possible to turn efforts against a common enemy. Emphasizing that the politicians of Kyiv were more inclined to an alliance with Poland, the editorial board believed that it was worth striving for an agreement with the UPR evading ZUNR, which would give Poland an ally against Russia. The continuation of the war with Ukraine will lead to its division and, as a consequence, to strengthening of Russia. At the same time, the Ukrainian issue would turn into a “Little Russian” issue, which would threaten Poland much more. Another renowned publicist, one of the ideologues of Belweder camp, A. Skwarczyński, argued that it was in Poland’s interests to limit Russia to its ethnographic borders. Otherwise, Poland would be a weak entity without much significance to European politics. In addition, A. Skwarczyński emphasized that the whole territory of Ukraine was in a state of continuous uprising against the Bolsheviks, that is why, Poland must give the Ukrainians support and help in a new attempt to build the state (Skwarczyński, 1919, nr 21 pp. 2–4). Paying attention to the fact that the politicians of Dnieper Ukraine considered Russia as the main enemy, while by the Galicians, in contrast, Poland was rated as the main assailant, A. Skwarczyński argued that S. Petliura was ready to conclude an alliance with Warsaw, while Western Ukrainian People’s Republic would remain an implacable enemy of Poland (Skwarczyński, 1919, nr 25, pp. 4–5).

The Polish National Democrats took the opposite view. They considered the negotiations with the Ukrainians as a betrayal of the state interests. Their position was to deny the Ukrainian issue completely. The paramount evidence of such kind of view could be traced in the newspaper “Gazeta Warszawska”, which convinced the readers that the Ukrainians were politically immature and the newspaper warned against the “Ukrainian adventures” (Kotowicz, 1920, nr 49, p. 6). In March of 1920 Z. Berezowski cautioned that pro-Russian sympathies in Ukraine were much stronger than the pro-Polish ones and the Ukrainians would rather unite in a federation with Russia with their lands up to the San River than make the alliance with Poland against Russia (Berezowski, 1920, No. 70, pp. 1). In his opinion, there was a great risk that Ukraine, liberated from the Bolsheviks by the Poles, would turn to anti-Bolshevik Russia. Z. Berezowski called the policy of creating a buffer state between Poland and Russia “covering with piles of sand”, not believing in the stability of the Ukrainian statehood. Moreover, such strategy, according to the National Democrats, would only increase the risk of losing new territories (Berezowski, 1920, nr 71, p. 3).

The belief that support given to UPR posed risks to Poland was a key argument of the incorporationist concept supporters (Lesznowski, 1920, nr 80, p. 1). One of the leaders of
the National Democrats, St. Grabski convinced that attempts to create Ukraine were the renunciation of the territories to which Poland was entitled and which should be included into its possession (Grabski, 1920, nr 115, pp. 1–2.). He paid special attention to the fact that Poland and Russia will be able to make claims concerning Volyn and Podillya to the international community, which will make the final decision on the Polish eastern border. Poland’s arguments, in that case, would be looked much more substantiated. If the Poles themselves legalized Ukraine in the international arena, it would become the third claimant to these territories and also to Eastern Galicia. In that case, it would be extremely difficult to repel Ukraine’s claims to the “Polish Kresy” (Ibidem). Therefore, according to St. Grabski, the existence of an independent Ukraine was a threat to Poland, not protection.

Hence, on the 21st of March, almost a month before the signing of the treaty between Poland and UNR, it was written in the newspaper “Gazeta Warszawska” that, in addition to all mentioned above, the creation of buffer states also looked to the Entente like the Polish imperialism. Like pro-Belweder publicists, the representatives of National Democracy also made a dilemma to Poland, only in a different way: either to create the strongest possible state with the inclusion of all Polish territories (which included the territories with a fairly small amount of the Polish population), or “stepping on a fantastic path of ideas that will inexorably turn against the territorial integrity of Poland” (Lesznowski, 1920, nr 80, p. 1).

The tone of the press, even the one that was hostile to J. Piłsudski, changed to euphoric after the taking of Kyiv on the 7th of May and during the victories at the front (Lesznowski, 1920, nr 126, p. 1). This time, the nationalist press proposed to use the war achievements and not to give the lands conquered by Poland to Ukraine, “not to take the chestnuts out of the fire instead of others, the Ukrainians, who are ready to betray at any moment” (Lesznowski, 1920, nr 127, pp. 1–2). The Ukrainians were once again credited with the political immaturity (Lesznowski, 1920, nr 178, p. 2).

The Ukrainian issue disappeared almost completely from the view of the press during the retreat and intense combat in the suburbs of Warsaw in the summer of 1920. The Polish elites were almost unanimous in recognizing the powers of the UkrSSR and not the Ukrainian People’s Republic in negotiations (Lesznowski, 1920, nr 271, p. 5). After the Bolsheviks almost took Warsaw, in the Polish public opinion, which did not understand Piłsudski’s Ukrainian policy even earlier, the nationalists’ slogans and the mood of peace with the Bolsheviks won finally. At the Sejm debates, almost all deputies spoke about the agreement positively (Lesznowski, 1920, nr 291, p. 3).

Furthermore, mentioned above St. Grabski, a member of the Polish delegation, said that the Riga border was not a compromise line between the Polish and Russian projects, but entirely what the Polish delegation wanted. He stated that even if the Polish delegation wished for greater concessions, the Bolsheviks would agree (J.R. 1920, nr 301, p. 2).

The agreement was also supported by the politicians, who recently expressed support for Ukraine. There were only some politicians, for instance, T. Hołówko, who opposed strongly: he called the Peace of Riga a betrayal of the Ukrainians. In his opinion, a very small effort would be enough to make the Bolsheviks sit down at the negotiation table with the Ukrainian People’s Republic delegation (Kedryn, 1933, nr 3, pp. 11–12).

As a result, after signing of the Peace of Riga, a peaceful life began in Poland, the Ukrainian troops were disarmed and interned, and the alliance issue with the UNR disappeared from the pages of the Polish press (Karpus, 2009, pp. 5–18). During the interwar period, the alliance issue was mentioned only in general works or in studies relating to Poland’s restored
The Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 in the Polish public discourse during the interwar period

borders formation. According to E. Koko (Koko, 1996, p. 305), the above-mentioned topic was covered rather superficially. As a rule, the authors, ideologically close to the National Democracy, characterized J. Piłsudski’s plans as adventurous and harmful. His failure to support the Ukrainian People’s Republic was considered a natural and, most importantly, a successful outcome for Poland. In the intellectual atmosphere of interwar Poland, when the Ukrainian minority was the cause of the domestic political tensions, the above-mentioned issue was not easy to discuss also by Piłsudski supporters, whom the Ukrainians accused of treason. As a result, the first major works on the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 appeared only at the end of the 30s. It is noteworthy and surprising that J. Piłsudski did not mention the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance at all in his book “The Year of 1920” (Piłsudski, 1924).

After S. Petliura’s assassination, the interest in the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance increased in May of 1926. T. Hołówko, referring to the events of 1920, called the Chief Ataman a “true friend” of Poland (Hołówko, 1926, pp. 1–2). The conservative Kraków newspaper “Czas” published a very kindly article about S. Petliura, portraying him as a great patriot of Ukraine, a far-sighted and wise politician. In addition, the article also emphasized that the Ukrainian troops “went hand in hand with us in the battle against the Bolsheviks” and “fulfilled their obligations with honor” (Paszkowski, 1926, p. 3).

One of the first studies that concerned the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance, albeit briefly, was a description of the activities of the Third Army, written by J. Stachiewicz, the Chief of the 3rd Department of the General Staff during the Kyiv offensive. The 6th Rifle Division under the command of colonel M. Bezruchko was in the structure of the Third Army (Stachiewicz, 1925). The above-mentioned topic was also briefly covered by A. Przybylski (Przybylski, 1930). The researcher characterized the essence of the Alliance as an exchange of assistance in the liberation of Dnieper Ukraine from the Bolsheviks and Ukraine’s renunciation of territories west of the Goryn and Zbruch. Marginally, the theme of alliance with the Ukrainians was raised in the memoirs of M. Lepecki, an officer of the 2nd Legion Infantry Regiment (Lepecki, 1926, p. 112).

It should be mentioned that one of the detailed descriptions of the Ukrainian revolution events of the interwar period was S. Kamiński’s book, which represents a point of view typical of the Poles from the “Kresy” territories. He approved Piłsudski’s policy but believed that its purpose was to protect the Polish landowners. At the same time, S. Kamiński was very critical concerning the Ukrainian statehood and its leaders, in particular S. Petliura (Kamiński, 1928).

It is worth noting that the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance in interwar Poland was more often the publicists’ interest object than the object of professional historians. During almost the entire interwar period, supporters of the federalist conception enjoyed the sponsorship of the authorities. One of their main platforms was the magazine “Biuletyn Polsko-Ukraiński”, which grouped around many J. Piłsudski’s supporters and on the pages of which the articles of the Ukrainian political emigration representatives were often published (Kravchenko, 2011, pp. 471–480). Its authors often addressed the topic of the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance, analyzing the reasons for its failure. In addition, on the pages of this journal, the Alliance of 1920 began to gain symbolic weight as an attempt to put into practice the Promethean conception (Bruski, 2016). It should be emphasized that the Polish authors often highlighted the Polish mistakes and faults concerning the war failure of 1920. The Ukrainian authors were also free to express their views on the pages of the magazine, often criticizing the Polish policy (Łoś, 1933, p. 5).
The renowned Polish publicist A. Bocheński, discussing with his Ukrainian counterpart I. Kedryn, who accused Poland of treason (Kedryn, 1933, pp. 11–12), claimed that the Poles were made to withdraw from the alliance with the Ukrainians, and the Ukrainians, in turn, were forced to make the alliance without intending to keep to it. Consequently, he believed that Galicia and Volyn issue was too important for Ukraine (Bocheński, 1933, pp. 14–15). In his opinion, without the territorial disputes’ settlement, any cooperation between Poland and Ukraine was impossible. The researcher stuck to the same view in his monograph “Between Germany and Russia” in which he noted that the Alliance was doomed to failure because of the Galician issue. A. Bocheński considered the main reason for this in the Ukrainians’ obstinacy. If in 1918 or in the first half of 1919 the Ukrainians had dared to compromise on Galicia issue, they would have been able to use their resources in Dnieper Ukraine, which would have been enough to resist the Bolsheviks and the Volunteer Army (Bocheński, 1937, p. 83). The reason for the refusal to support the Ukrainian People’s Republic was the military situation in Poland at the end of 1920. A. Bocheński believed that Poland had not been able to continue the war (Bocheński, 1933, p. 15).

W. Bączkowski, one of the most influential figures of the Prometheus movement, put emphasis on the fact that Kyiv offensive was not a manifestation of romanticism or sentiment towards Ukraine, but it was dictated by “dry logic”. He denied the arguments of National Democrats about Ukraine’s threat to the Polish possession of the “Kresy” territories, noting that it would be much harder to withstand giant Russia’s onslaught, which would inevitably seek to possess all the “Rus’” lands, than to resist the onslaught of Ukraine. Moreover, W. Bączkowski argued that the Polish and Ukrainian efforts’ unification was the only way for both peoples to refrain from Russia. He appealed to the search of a mutual understanding with the Ukrainians, which, in his opinion, lacked in 1920 (Bączkowski, 1937).

Reflecting on the reasons for the failure in 1920, W. Bączkowski did not skimp in criticism of the Polish side. According to the researcher, Kyiv offensive’s organizers were not so much mistaken in their estimation of the anti-Soviet sentiment in Ukraine (which was the most popular explanation for the defeat and a popular argument of the National Democrats) as they did not take into account the Polish landowners destructive activities. “We will not exaggerate much”, he stated, “if we claim that the erroneous selfish policy, which lasted for centuries, of equating Polish national interests with the material and materialistic interests of the Polish landowners’ (in Polish: stanu posiadania – the author) in the East, was the basic reason for Kyiv offensive failure” (Bączkowski, 1937, p. 3). However, W. Bączkowski noted that Kyiv offensive remained as a historical fact and as an idea. The idea turned out to be much cleaner. He expressed the feeling that because of the Polish policy towards the Ukrainians after 1920, the “great legend” could be discredited (Bączkowski, 1937, p. 4). At the same time, W. Bączkowski paid tribute to Lenin’s national policy ingenuity, which he called a great trick to save the empire from collapse by taking the responsibility of representing the national interests of the peoples of Russia and creating appropriate republics whose national territories were outside the USSR. This policy, according to his opinion, created the basis for the future accession of these territories to the “state body of Russia” (Bączkowski, 1938).

The Polish nationalists had completely different reflections. Estimating the Ukrainian issue at the negotiations in Riga in more than a decade, one of the main figures of the Polish National Democrats, J. Giertych, believed that the agreement with the Ukrainian People’s Republic should not be interpreted other than gaining benefits concerning the Dnieper territories at the cost of renouncing the part of the Polish territory. After the UPR lost its
real force, the Polish delegation did not have to take into account the agreement’s provisions with it (Giertych, 1933, p. 20).

R. Dmowski, the leader of the National Democrats, mentioned that Piłsudski’s actions raised fears that Poland would bring up the pretender for Eastern Galicia, and that the Ukrainian People’s Republic (R. Dmowski himself did not use the acronym UNR on principle, but used the word “Petliura” instead), after becoming stronger, would make claims concerning the disputed territories (Dmowski, 1988, p. 172). The refusal to support Ukraine made the above-mentioned issue disappear eventually.

St. Grabski, in 1935 recalling the negotiations in Minsk and Riga, contradicted his previous assertion that the border defined by the Peace of Riga was optimal for Poland and he pointed out that it was the territorial maximum that Poland could obtain then. Furthermore, St. Grabski argued that if J. Piłsudski had not started the war then, the borders could have been made further east with the help of diplomacy (Grabski, 1932). Thus, the Polish National Democrats’ attitude to the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance and to Ukraine, in general, remained unchanged until the end of the interwar period.

The Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 was covered in the most detail by T. Kutrzeba, a close associate of J. Piłsudski. His monograph, which was called “Kyiv Offensive of 1920” (Kutrzeba, 1937) remains relevant to this day. He was convinced that the war with the Bolsheviks and the support of Ukraine was not a situational step, but a well-thought-out strategy concerning geopolitical reformatting of Europe (Kutrzeba, pp. 49–50). According to him, only the geopolitical situation hampered the Polish offensive in Ukraine. The support for the UPR would be a hostile step towards the Volunteer Army, which was supported by Britain and France, that is why, the implementation of this concept could begin only after A. Denikin’s defeat (Kutrzeba, 1937, p. 51). The personnel potential of the Ukrainian army, according to T. Kutrzeba, allowed to make optimistic forecasts concerning its further development (Kutrzeba, 1937, p. 82).

T. Kutrzeba tried to be impartial in his assessments and pointed at the Polish side’s miscalculations clearly. As a result, he criticized the Polish military leadership, whose majority did not understand the war aims and distrusted the Ukrainian allied forces. This was one of the reasons why Poland did not fully comply with its commitments to supply weapons and ammunition to the Ukrainian troops. T. Kutrzeba noted that taking into consideration even the existing difficulties, the Ukrainian units’ supply was unjustifiably slow, thus, hampering the desired rapid increase of the Ukrainian army. However, certain inactivity of the Ukrainian peasants also played an important role (Ibidem).

In addition, T. Kutrzeba analyzing the Peace of Riga results, tried to find the reason for the Polish-Ukrainian plans’ failure. He denied that the alleged refusal to support UNR was a disappointment in the state-building forces of the Ukrainians and emphasized their devoted struggle on the common front, he explained the reason for the failure of Poland’s inability to wage further war (Ibidem).

Summing up the general outcome, T. Kutrzeba stated that the result of the Alliance turned out to be positive for both Poland and Ukraine. He considered the separate existence of the UkrSSR to be a consequence of joint Polish-Ukrainian actions in 1920: “I dare say that if it was not the Polish-Ukrainian bloodshed for this issue, if it was not Poland’s political program of 1920, which was aimed at liberating Ukraine from the Russian rule, maybe Ukraine would not exist today as an independent republic” (Kutrzeba, 1937, pp. 343–344).

In conclusion, it is worth mentioning the far-sighted forecast of the newspaper “Rząd i Wojsko”. In November of 1919, after the end of the war for Galicia, the newspaper called for
the full support of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. “If Petliura abstains,” – it was mentioned in the editorial article, “under such circumstances he will take on the burden of struggle with Russia” [...]. If Petliura falls, no doubt Eastern Galicia will have to be handed over to Russia in fifteen years – which would be a catastrophe for us – because if the Ukrainians can make fair claims against us in Eastern Galicia, Russia will not. […] But Poland does not implement such a peace programme if it pursues the policy of a common border with Russia, or if it pursues half-hearted, indecisive tactics” (Strug, 1919, nr 40/41, p. 5). The author of those lines miscalculated only for a couple of years, which in the following decades added some persuasiveness of the conception proposed by the Piłsudski supporters.

The Conclusions. During the interwar period, the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 was not a popular issue for Polish historians. Sometimes the Alliance was mentioned in the politicians’ memoirs, sometimes discussed by the publicists as one of the minor episodes of the Polish-Soviet War. The majority of Polish society did not understand and did not approve of Piłsudski’s Ukrainian policy. The public opinion was completely dominated by the National Democracy slogans, which questioned even the existence of the Ukrainian nation, and considered the Ukrainian movement an Austrian intrigue against Poland. The constantly growing Polish-Ukrainian enmity that characterized interwar Poland also left its mark. It is clear that such an intellectual atmosphere complicated the reasoning over the recent history of the Polish-Ukrainian relations significantly. The alliance with the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) was mentioned mostly in generalizing works on the history of Poland or in studies concerning Poland’s restored borders formation. Hence, as this topic was described in general terms, the main focus was on Poland’s recognition of Ukraine and decisions on borders. Depending on the political preferences of the authors, the Alliance of 1920 was considered either as a wise and far-sighted policy or as a dangerous adventure that only did harm to Poland. The authors, who were associated with the Piłsudski supporters, wrote about it positively, while the authors, who were focused on the National Democracy, wrote about it critically. The opposite approach to the Eastern policy was preserved during the whole interwar period. The first serious historical elaborations of the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance appeared after J. Piłsudski’s death. The most important work of that time was T. Kutrzeba’s monograph “Kyiv Offensive of 1920”. For the first time, J. Pilsudski’s intentions regarding Ukraine and Russia were presented widely in it and the motives of his actions were explained. In contrast to earlier works, in which little attention was paid to the alliance with the Ukrainian People’s Republic, T. Kutrzeba described it as a cornerstone of the entire Polish strategy in the war of 1920. The work became the most detailed study on J. Piłsudski’s Eastern policy during the interwar period.

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