Abstract. In the modern world, the state’s foreign policy is one of the supporting foundations of statehood, and therefore the study of the foreign policy concepts formation and implementation experience is relevant and necessary for the development of the modern interstate and good neighborly relations between Ukraine and Poland. The Polish political elite, in different historical periods, distinguished visions about Ukraine clearly, its role and significance for Rzeczpospolita (Commonwealth), and these visions remained constant, actualized over time, or, conversely, acquired new shapes and coloring. The Piast and the Jagiellonian concepts have been the main Poland’s foreign policy concepts since the beginning of the XXth century, and continue to be of utmost importance and that new or existing foreign policy doctrines have been created or developed based on them. The article depicts Poland’s foreign policy concepts evolution regarding Ukraine, in particular, and the
eastern vector of Polish politics in general. The purpose of the research is to analyze and compare Poland's foreign policy concepts evolution towards Ukraine and to study the factors that influenced the transformation of these concepts. The methodology of the research is based on the principles of historicism in the unity of all its components, systematization and scientificity. The interdisciplinary research is focused on the involvement of historical comparative and historical systemic methods, methods of microhistorical analysis. The scientific novelty is that there is the continuation of studies, which were initiated by domestic, Polish and other foreign researchers, in particular on Poland's foreign policy concepts formation and implementation in the eastern direction and on Ukraine in particular.

The Conclusions. The historical traditions of Poland's eastern foreign policy vector are obvious, and although the Polish eastern policy forms may have changed, its content has balanced between two established concepts: the Jagiellonian and the Piast. The Republic of Poland having used the positive experience of the past and striving to have a reliable ally on its eastern border, builds a modern eastern policy vector in which Ukraine is given one of the leading roles in the best traditions of the Jagiellonian foreign policy doctrine.

Key words: Poland, Ukraine, foreign policy, Jagiellonian concept, Piast concept, Prometheanism, incorporation, eastern policy.

The Problem Statement. The centuries-old history of the Ukrainian-Polish neighborhood absorbed many examples of good neighborly and allied relations, along with numerous conflicts and confrontations. The historical neighborhood of the two peoples was not always the neighborhood of two states: often the Ukrainian and the Polish lands were part of the same states, such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire or the Russian Empire, were closely
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linked by “friendship” in the Soviet era of the second half of the XXth century. One of the manifestations of the common historical heritage is the Ukrainian lands presence in the First and Second Rzeczpospolita, which, in fact, implies that the Poles deprived the Ukrainians of statehood twice. (It implies, for example, the Ukrainians loss in the Ukrainian-Polish War. In addition, the above-mentioned statement belongs to A. Michnik, a Polish public figure and journalist). However, despite the “swing of history” in the Polish political elite, in different historical periods, visions concerning Ukraine were distinguished clearly, and these visions remained stable, updated over time, or, conversely, acquired new shapes and coloring.

In the modern world, the state’s foreign policy is one of the supporting foundations of statehood, and therefore the study of the foreign policy concepts formation and implementation experience is relevant and necessary for the development of modern interstate and good neighborly relations between Ukraine and Poland. Taking everything into consideration, we propose to study Poland’s foreign policy concepts formation and evolution regarding Ukraine.

The Analysis of Recent Researches. Numerous Ukrainian historians studied Poland’s foreign policy concepts formation and evolution issues towards Ukraine, for example, M. Lytvyn (Lytvyn, 2017), V. Komar (Komar, 2011), L. Strilchuk (Strilchuk, 2008), (Strilchuk, 2013) L. Zashkilnyak (Zashkilnyak, 2002). Furthermore, the Polish historians, publicists and politicians also covered Poland’s eastern policy vision towards Ukraine in their works, for example, K. Fedorowicz (Fedorowicz, 2004), K. Skubiszewski (Skubiszewski, 1997) and the others.

The purpose of the article is to identify Poland’s foreign policy concepts formation and evolution features towards Ukraine during the XXth – the beginning of the XXIst century, the implementation of their comparative analysis and study of factors that influenced the transformation of these concepts.

The Basic Material Statement. J. Giedroyc’s thesis, the Polish publicist, that the modern Republic of Poland still lives by two ghosts – J. Pilsudski and R. Dmowski – is widely known today (Unger, 2002, p. 12). In fact, we agree with the thesis. To our mind, it should be noted that the modern foreign policy of the Republic of Poland, to a large extent, absorbed J. Pilsudski's and R. Dmowski's political concepts. In particular, the two main visions of the new Poland emerged and survived to this day: the Jagiellonian concept and the Piast concept due to the Polish state nationalism wave at the time. It is no secret that in the current Polish political debate on foreign policy in the East, there are many concepts that are quite difficult to understand. In general, the current discussions in Poland on Eastern policy can be called a conflict between the nationalists and Giedroyc’s ideas supporters.

Hence, the Jagiellonian and the Piast concepts are the oldest Polish political doctrines, date back to the Polish state heyday, the times of greatness and power, which become role models and are projected by contemporaries on their own realities. The Piast's foreign policy concept is based on the so-called doctrine of “Sarmatism”, which substantiates the fact of the Polish nobility origin from the Sarmatians. According to this concept, it was the Piast dynasty that brought Poland into Western civilization, removed the veil of paganism and brought Christianity in 966. Within the framework of this concept, “theories of the platform and the foothills” stood out, according to which the state acted as a kind of Western civilization and Christianity outpost. At the heart of this approach was R. Dmowski’s incorporative, the anti-German theory (Wapinski, 1989), which emphasized that there could be no room for a weak Poland between strong Russia and Germany, and that Poland should own the lands where the Poles prevailed (Roszkowski, 2009, p. 29).
The Jagiellonian concept is based on memories of the mighty Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which emerged during the Jagiellonian era and was the result of a series of successful unions and alliances, which in turn led to the formation of a multinational state body. The Jagiellonian concept is characterized by an anti-Russian orientation (the Russian Empire emerged later and expanded, mainly due to the conquest policy) and differs from the Russian peaceful direction of political, economic, cultural and religious expansion to the east (Koniuszewski, 2012, p. 94).

The doctrines of the Intermarium (Between-Seas, Międzymorze) and Prometheanism (Prometeizm) stood out within the Jagiellonian concept. The Intermarium (Międzymorze) was a political project aimed at creating a huge federation of countries between the Baltic, Black and Adriatic Seas on the legacy of the First Polish Republic. The Prometheanism (Prometeizm) was a political project carried out in the period between the two world wars by J. Pilsudski. After all, it was the idea of peaceful state-building that inspired J. Pilsudski’s federal concept, which aimed not only to revive Poland after World War I, but, above all, to create a federation of Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus. In the predominant eastern direction of expansion, declared by the Polish leader, the dominant role was played by the Ukrainian issue in order to weaken Russia (Suelya, 2018, pp. 268–271). According to J. Pilsudski, an integral element of Prometheanism was the attempt to “rip Russia to the national seams” (Pilsudski, 1939, p. 63).

The Polish head of state defended the belief that the greatest threat to the Polish state and other countries in the region was the Imperial Russia. Therefore, for the Poles, the Ukrainians and the Lithuanians, the joint task against the Imperial Russian encroachments was a priority. In fact, the above-mentioned motivation was the basis of the Polish army’s attack on Kyiv in 1920 (Dodonov, 2019, p. 127), the allied relations between S. Petliura and J. Pilsudski, (Krasivskyy, 2008, pp. 210–254), and the failed coup attempt in Kaunas in August 1919 by J. Pilsudski against the Lithuanian government and Prime Minister, M. Sleževičius (Komar, 2011, p. 79). The coup’s aim was to create a pro-Polish government cabinet that would join the union of Lithuania and Poland.

J. Pilsudski tried to create a kind of barrier between Russia and the Polish state in the form of independent nation-states linked to Poland by federal ties. It would guarantee security for the Polish state on the part of Russia (Zashkilnyak, 2002, p. 451). Those states were supposed to be Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. The federal concept embodied by the Polish leader encountered the territories delimitation issue, the Polish population was a significant part of the population in all those territories, the Poles inhabited compactly such territories as Eastern Galicia, Grodno Governorate and Vilnius region, although the Ukrainians, the Belarusians and the Lithuanians predominated there (Lytvyn, 2017, pp. 230–244).

J. Pilsudski came from Vilnius region, like the vast majority of his contemporaries, the Poles, was unable to imagine a united Polish state without the so-called “Kress” and relied on their accession by force. The Endeks took a different position on Poland’s eastern borders. The Endeks foreign policy position, known as the incorporation, was based on the unappealable inclusion in the Second Polish Republic of the vast majority of Ukraine (actually to the Dnipro), as well as Lithuania and Belarus. Such claims were made with reference to Rzeczpospolita borders in 1772. As L. Zashkilnyak noted the following: “in support of such claims, the Endeks claimed that although the Poles make up 15–25 percent of the population in these areas, they represent the joint intellectual and economic force of the region” (Zashkilnyak, 2002, p. 451).
The Prometheanism concept formation specificity, as a system of views on foreign and domestic policy of the Polish state, was that it was created through J. Pilsudski’s activities, individual members of the ruling camp – the Pilsudchyki, as well as the ideologists, politicians and scientists, who were the Prometheanism movement active participants. In addition, J. Pilsudski’s views were the Prometheanism concept foreign policy priorities’ worldviews development, who believed that the Soviet state became the successor to the Imperial Russia and was trying to expand its own spheres of influence in Asia and Europe. The Polish leader was convinced that the Bolshevik coup, although it caused significant political, socio-economic and cultural transformations, did not change the traditional Russian mentality to dominance in the region (Pilsudski, 1939, p. 66). The thesis concerning Poland’s unfavorable geopolitical location, which felt a constant threat from both Bolshevik Russia and Germany, was the starting point in the Prometheanism concept.

The contradiction between the policies of J. Pilsudski and the Pilsudchyki concerning the Ukrainian issue was obvious at least in that they did not notice the organic unity of Galicia with Dnieper Ukraine, on the one hand supporting Ukraine’s independence, which should become a barrier to the Russian expansion and most Poles, considered Galicia an integral part of the Second Polish Republic (Komar, 2011, p. 79). The prominent pilsudchyk L. Wasilewski wrote the following concerning the above-mentioned issue: “What will happen, if Poland defends enthusiastically in foreign policy an independent Ukraine up to the Caucasus, and in domestic will be guided by the invader’s morality?” (Wasilewski, 1932, p. 4).

Another important political figure in post-war Poland was R. Dmowski, a Polish politician and publicist, the founder of the nationalist political group “The Greater Poland Camp” (Obóz Wielkiej Polski). In addition, R. Dmowski was a supporter of good neighborly relations with Russia and had a bit different opinion concerning the Polish state revival, as he considered Germany to be the main threat to Poland (Radomski, 2000). Therefore, his new interpretation of eastern Polish policy consisted in the fact that Russia, which was still large but weakened, should transfer its lands to the Second Polish Republic. Furthermore, Ukraine and Belarus should be divided between Poland and Russia on a national basis, the essence of which was that the territories inhabited by the Poles were supposed to be transferred to the Second Polish Republic, and the rest – to Russia (Wapinski, 1989, p. 150).

It was believed that such scenario implementation would be a helping tool in the Polish element assimilation, and vice versa, its implementation would prevent the Poles’ “denationalization”. In fact, in the 1920-ies and 1930-ies, a synthesis of two foreign policy conceptions of Poland’s eastern policy took place, the irony of which is that the Second Polish Republic was built as a unitary state within the framework proposed by R. Dmowski. As a result, the Second Polish Republic owned the territories that, according to the federal concept, would belong to Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine.

A new Polish foreign policy concept emerged in the beginning of 1930-ies, known as the “equal distance policy” It was known that J. Beck was the policy’s initiator, who took the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Second Polish Republic in November 1932 (Kryvonos, 2013, p. 198). In fact, the policy’s main idea, proposed by J. Beck, was to strike the right balance between two super-powerful states – the USSR and Germany. In particular, the Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact for a period of three years was signed on the 25th of July in 1932, became its manifestation. Later on, the Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was extended for another ten years in 1934, and in conclusion, the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact was signed between Warsaw and Berlin for ten years in January 1934. Due to the treaties, the Second...
Polish Republic strengthened the position in the international arena and became a vivid example of the Prometheanism policy continuation. It should be mentioned that the National Socialists came to power in Germany in early 1933, which led to a significant decline in German-Soviet relations, which official Warsaw tried to take advantage of in order to establish neutrality with both Germany and the USSR, as well as to avoid war on two fronts in case of its break out.

On the one hand, there was the international political situation aggravation in Europe in the second half of the 1930-ies, and on the other, J. Pilsudski died in May 1935, which deprived Poland’s ruling political camp of universal authority, led to the Prometheanism’s policy crisis. Therefore, the Polish foreign policy was based on the concept of balancing between Germany and the USSR with regard to France, but France at that time sought for rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Under such circumstances, the Polish diplomacy, led by J. Beck, succumbed to the German promises concerning peaceful coexistence (Zashkilnyak, 2002, p. 488), which, as the following events showed, was a great miscalculation.

The Polish foreign policy was subjected to meticulous revision after the end of World War II, in 1945. As a result, it was removed from the discussion’s agenda on its content and forms, because all visions of official Warsaw (including foreign policy) were approved or, most often, dictated from Moscow. That is why, during the postwar period, it is impossible to talk about the existence of any Polish foreign policy concepts. Hence, the Polish People’s Republic followed the USSR foreign policy and was forced to cooperate with the “socialist camp” states, limit contacts with the capitalist countries. The above-mentioned period could be characterized as Poland’s forced orientation to the East.

The paradox was that the de facto ban on political discussions in the Polish People’s Republic led to the birth of probably the most important concept of modern Polish Eastern policy, brought in by Polish emigrant figures J. Giedroyc and J. Mieroszewski. The renowned figures presented and substantiated the political program actually in the columns of the magazine “Kultura”, which, in the opinion of the authors, was to form the basis for future independent Poland’s foreign policy emergence with its neighbors. The political program became known as the “Giedroyc-Mieroszewski Doctrine”. The Emigrant figures counted and ruminated on possible ways and options for Eastern Europe unification in order to counter the Soviet threat jointly, analyzed possible options for political transformation in the Polish People’s Republic and the restoration of an independent Polish state (Myroshevskyy, 2005a, pp. 149–156).

J. Mieroszewski was known as Poland’s reconciliation supporter with neighboring peoples along the eastern border, hence another name for the “Giedroyc-Mieroszewski Doctrine” emerged – “ULB” (the abbreviation stands for the names of countries – Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus). Its essence was that it was necessary to recognize the irreversibility of postwar borders and territorial changes that occurred as a result of World War II. Consequently, J. Mieroszewski regarded Lviv and Vilnius acceptance loss by the Poles as the main guarantee for the mutual understanding with the Polish People’s Republic neighbors in the east, and, in the future, the independence acquisition by Central and Eastern Europe states that fell within the USSR’s influence sphere (Myroshevskyy, 2005b, pp. 195–209). Taking into consideration that it was a bold point of view that was obviously a new look and contrasted sharply with the Polish emigration policy visions in Britain and the United States in the 1950-ies and 1960-ies of the XXth century. In fact, it was said that Poland had to agree to its post-war borders and abandon the ideas of revisionism.

J. Giedroyc and J. Meroszewski argued that Poland’s security depends on the existence of independent states on its eastern border directly, which would exclude Poland from being
between the super-powerful states – Germany and the USSR, as it happened on the eve of World War II (Gedroyts, 2015). In fact, the above-mentioned doctrine combined the post-Stalinist political reality with the Polish national interests. Nowadays, that position is quite logical and understandable, but during the Polish People’s Republic days, the vast majority of the Polish political emigrants did not accept the existing borders, they recognized only the Second Polish Republic borders.

During the 1970-ies of the XXth century, J. Giedroyc published the concept, which was called: “There can be no free Poland without free Ukraine” (Genyk, 2006 – 2007, p. 308). Of course, such statements were not possible in the Polish People’s Republic or in the USSR territory. And the fact that J. Giedroyc and his associates developed foreign policy doctrines while in exile, not being limited by censorship, only contributed to the spread of the democratic (persecuted in the USSR and the Polish People’s Republic) ideas about the future of Ukraine and Poland. It should also be emphasized that J. Giedroyc nurtured and heralded ideas about the Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation repeatedly, to which, by the way, he remained loyal for the rest of his life.

J. Giedroyc had discussions concerning the Ukrainian borders in the late 70-ies of the XXth century, together with like-minded people initiated the signing of the “Declaration on the Ukrainian case”, published in the “Kultura” issue in 1977. The declaration raised questions about the urgent need to create an independent Ukrainian state for liberation from the totalitarian regime, along with other countries of the socialist camp. The declaration was signed by a whole cohort of the Polish, Czech, Russian and Hungarian emigrants, who pointed to their own suffering “not only from the Russian but also from the Polish imperialism” (Genyk, 2010 – 2011, p. 215). The next logical step was to move away from the Jagiellonian concept, which put emphasis on the so-called normality of the Belarusian, Lithuanian and Ukrainian lands belonging to the Polish Crown.

In addition, one more J. Giedroyc’s Polish foreign policy conception concerning Ukraine should be analyzed, as it is more relevant today than ever and boils down to the fact that the main guarantee of a successful struggle for the independence and democratic transformation in Poland and Ukraine is and remains important the Ukrainian-Polish interethnic reconciliation and joint anti-totalitarian struggle. According to the thesis, the Poles and the Ukrainians reapprochement is the key to counteracting the Russian expansion in Central and Eastern Europe. In the context of Russia’s current aggression in Eastern Ukraine, this thesis acquires special significance and urgency.

Meanwhile, the Polish Solidarity confident victory in the June 1989 elections ushered in a new stage in the Polish history and raised questions about the forms and content of policy in the eastern direction. In fact, the new Eastern policy consisted in the policy of two vectors as it demonstrated that J. Giedroyc’s and J. Meroszewski’s painstaking work was not in vain, because the Polish Eastern policy postulates, formulated by them in previous decades became possible to implement.

The Polish foreign policy formation process since 1989 was quite complex and controversial, because from the very beginning it was necessary to develop a clear position on the changes that took place in the West, and more importantly – in the East. The crisis, and later on the USSR collapse, put on the agenda the Polish political elite’s need to approach the Third Partition of Poland new foreign policy formation with special balance. Therefore, the main goal of the new Eastern policy was to respond to the changes taking place abroad (Strilchuk, 2008, p. 516). K. Fedorowicz, the Polish political scientist believes that, first of all, it was dictated by the state
security considerations, an attempt to prevent a situation in which the Polish eastern border could become a zone of tension (Fedorowicz, 2004, p. 226). On the one hand, the two vectors policy begun in 1990, was to support the USSR former republics, which aspired to independence, and, on the other hand, to preserve the old, stable relations with the Soviet authorities and not violate the Warsaw Pact. In fact, it was the Prometheanism policy implementation “with looking back on Moscow” (Fedorowicz, 2004, p. 227).

E. Nowakowski, the Polish researcher believes that Poland’s foreign policy in the eastern direction at the turn of the 80 – 90-ies of the XXth century “was based on three basic principles:
- the Soviet structures preservation and support for the reforms initiated by M. Gorbachev;
- the support for some republics of the USSR, especially Ukraine, as its closest eastern neighbor (so-called modern Prometheanism);
- maintaining permanent contacts with the Russian Federation as the Soviet Union successor” (Nowakowski, 1991, p. 87).

It should be noted that all these concepts developed in parallel, none of them was a priority, but at the same time Polish diplomacy took Ukraine in particular (given its importance in the region and importance for Poland) in shaping Eastern policy in the period 1989 – 1999. The Eastern policy evolution of the Republic of Poland was inextricably linked with the democratic processes in Poland and T. Mazowiecki’s first government of solidarity formation, as well as with the loss of relevance of the Polish-Soviet relations. It was a rather complex process that did not involve the rapid changes in relations with Poland’s eastern neighbors (Strilchuk, 2013, p. 142). According to K. Skubiszewski, who headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland from 1989 to 1993, the content of the two-vector policy (also known as the “two-way” policy) was: “to maintain the necessary relations with the so-called center, Moscow”, and the parallel implementation of equal contacts with the USSR republics, mainly with Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, bypassing the center…” (Skubiszewski, 1997, p. 271).

The Polish Eastern policy sequence could be traced during the 1990-ies till the beginning of the XXIst century in numerous examples, such as the fact that Poland became one of the first countries in the world to recognize Ukraine’s independence on the 2nd of December in 1991; since 1997 RP and Ukraine – strategic partners; Poland’s support for Ukraine during the Orange Revolution; joint holding of the football championship “Euro – 2012” (Strilchuk, 2013, pp. 205–206).

After the Civic Platform came to power in the Republic of Poland, a new Polish concept of Eastern policy appeared, aimed at detente in relations with the Russian Federation and was created in the style of the idea of the German Foreign Minister – F.-W. Steinmeier. The Polish version of this policy was presented by Foreign Minister R. Sikorski, whose concept in fact created a paradoxical situation in which the Polish government implemented the concept of detente and Polish President L. Kaczynski, keeping to the Prometheanism position, tried to implement it.

In fact, the struggle between the two foreign policy concepts of Eastern policy came to an end due to the tragic death of President L. Kaczynski in April 2010. And already in 2013, R. Sikorsky delivered a speech in which he called for a reorientation of Poland’s foreign policy in the western direction. It was J. Giedroyć’s original ideas that were rejected de facto in favor of the Piast concept, the Polish Foreign Minister saw the priority of relations with Brussels and Germany in order to strengthen the position of the Republic of Poland in the European arena. The analogy with the era of Piast Poland is clear because, in contrast to the Jagiellonian, who made history through their activities in Eastern Europe, the Piast opened Poland’s door to Western Carolingian civilization in the mid-Xth century by bringing
Christianity. The Piast’s foreign policy was based on close contacts with the West. R. Sikorski, imitating the Piast dynasty representatives, tried to highlight the Western vector priority in the foreign policy of the Republic of Poland. However, with Kaczynski’s victory “Law and Justice” party in the elections to the Polish parliament, the Polish government was rejecting the Polish foreign policy orientation to the West increasingly, there was another turn to the Jagiellonian idea, which manifested itself through the so-called concept of the “Three Seas”. The above-mentioned concept was reduced to intensifying contacts between EU member states between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas with the parallel support of Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania.

M. Zanevych, the Polish researcher calls the modern eastern policy of the Republic of Poland a “hybrid course” given that it was influenced actively by the representatives of the extreme right forces (neo-endeks) in the Polish parliament. It is well-know that the main neo-endeks rhetoric is reduced to the care of the Poles located on the eastern border of Poland, and as a rule, this rhetoric has a negative tone towards Ukraine and Lithuania. It concerns primarily common history issues, such as World War II and the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation in Volyn and Galicia, Volyn tragedy victims’ memorialization, the common history interpretation (Strilchuk, 2018, pp. 158–159), etc. Therefore, we fully agree with M. Zanevych’s opinion about modern Poland eastern policy hybridity, which carries out a kind of maneuvering between support for Kyiv and neo-endeks rhetoric, which in modern Ukrainian-Polish relations is manifested by the disputes over historical memory, the aggravation of the interstate relations through the acts of vandalism and the Polish national memory places (Strilchuk, 2018, p. 160), the attacks on Ukrainian workers in Poland, etc.

Taking everything into account, we can conclude that over time, the Jagiellonian and the Piast concepts, as foreign policy doctrines, did not lose their relevance in Poland, but with each state’s historical stage of development were revised and adapted to new realities, continuing to remain relevant. The historical traditions of Poland’s eastern foreign policy vector are obvious, and although the forms of Polish eastern policy may slightly changed, its content balanced between two well-established concepts. For the last three decades, Ukraine, represented by the Republic of Poland, had a reliable political ally, a lobbyist for the national interests in European institutions, and a powerful economic partner. Due to the joint efforts of the Ukrainian diplomacy and the Polish ruling political elites it became possible to implement the above-mentioned cooperation. The Republic of Poland having used the positive experience of the past and striving to have a reliable ally on its eastern border, builds a modern eastern policy vector in which Ukraine is given one of the leading roles in the best traditions of the Jagiellonian foreign policy doctrine.

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