THE SOVIET SPECIAL SERVICES’ PROPAGANDA AND SABOTAGE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES IN THE TERRITORY OF WESTERN VOLYN (1919 – 1921)

Abstract. The purpose of the article is to represent the forms, methods and means of the Soviet special services activity on the territory of Western Volyn during the period of functioning in the region of the Polish Provisional Administration (1919 – 1921). The methodology of the research is based on the principles of scientificity, historicism, systematicity, verification. The general scientific methods of the historical cognition have been applied: analysis, synthesis, generalization, comparison. Among the special historical methods the most important for the study were the historical typological, historical comparative, historical chronological, historical systemic, historical geographical methods. The scientific novelty consists in the archival documents’ introduction into the scientific circulation, which makes it possible to clarify the role of Western Volyn in the communist revolution export task realization to Europe, conducted by the Bolsheviks. It has been shown that the Soviet special services...
sabotage subversive activity’s main purpose in Volyn was to destabilize the region, liquidate the bodies of the temporary Polish administration, establish the Soviet power with the subsequent accession of the region to the USSR during 1919 – 1921. **The Conclusions.** During 1918 – 1921, the western Ukrainian lands became the object of fierce confrontation between three states: Poland, Ukraine (UNR-ZUNR) and the Soviet Russia. The Western Volyn and Eastern Galicia became the part of the Polish state due to the ZUNR’s (Western Ukrainian People’s Republic) defeat in the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918 – 1919 and the Soviet Russia in the Polish-Soviet War of 1920 – 1921. The Bolsheviks’ defeat in an open armed confrontation with Poland did not mean, however, that the Bolsheviks were refused to spread the communist regime ideology and practice to European countries. Volyn became one of the main bridgeheads for the realization of the above-mentioned goals. Hence, the Bolshevik agitators and propagandists were active in Volyn when the temporary Polish administration was taking over the control. There were a number of reasons, why the Bolsheviks agitation was successful. Due to several factors: Volyn international legal status uncertainty, the postwar instability, which was complemented by the difficult economic situation in the region, some miscalculations in the Polish interim administration, the Polish military and police abuse of power, which exacerbated the Polish-Ukrainian confrontation and raised the local sentiment peasant. The Bolshevik agents were not only spreading communist propaganda in Western Volyn. The Soviet Special Services were active in the areas bordering the USSR in order to prepare the local armed demonstrations. The vivid example of such actions was the specially trained sabotage units, which carried out the terrorist acts, attacked the state authorities, police departments, military units, and destroyed means of communication. Even the archival sources confirm that the Bolshevik movement was supported by the local population significantly (especially the Ukrainian peasants, the Jews in Volyn cities, and often the Poles). Furthermore, the Bolshevik movement became a stumbling block for the Polish government’s goal to strengthen the Polish statehood in the eastern lands and the fastest possible integration of the region into Poland.

**Key words:** Polish administration, Western Volyn, anti-Polish movement, propaganda, subversive activity.
The problem statement. The consideration of this topic is vital in the context of the Polish-Soviet and the Ukrainian-Polish relations of the interwar period. The transition from open-armed confrontation in the relations between the Soviet Russia and Poland to the agitation and sabotage-espionage activities of the Soviet and Polish special services had a direct impact on the security situation in Western Volyn. As there is the absence of scientific publications on this topic (in the specified chronological period of time (1919 – 1921), which gives grounds to single it out as a separate historical problem.

The analysis of sources and recent researches. Numerous Ukrainian historians devoted their works to some aspects of the researched problem, for instance, L. Aleksiievets (Aleksiievets, 2006), L. Zashkilniak (Zashkilniak, 2002), B. Hud (Hud, Hud, 2011; Hud, 2018), M. Hetmanczuk (Hetmanczuk, 1998) and others. The Polish state policy peculiarities in Volyn in the interwar period were analyzed in the works, written by the following scientists: S. Makarchuk (Makarchuk, 2008), M. Kucherepa (Kucherepa, 1997), R. Davydiuk (Davydiuk, 2016), Yu. Kramar (Kramar, Yu. 2015). The scientist O. Razyhrazev studied the security aspects of the above-mentioned problem (Razyhrazev, 2019). Another researcher, O. Kupchyk covers the sabotage and intelligence activities of the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the KP (b) U (the so-called “Zakordot”) in Volyn at the beginning of the 1920-ies (Kupchyk, 2004). The Soviet special services’ activities, which were aimed at spreading the communist ideology in Poland during the above-mentioned period, were the subject of V. Misko’s investigation (Misko, 2016). However, the author limits the territorial boundaries of the study, mainly to the territory of Eastern Galicia (Halychyna). Among the Polish historians’ works devoted to the Ukrainian-Polish interethnic relations in the West Volyn lands during the 1920-ies and 1930-ies, there are works, written by V. Mędrzecki (Mędrzecki, 1997; Mędrzecki, 1999; Mędrzecki, 2005; Mędrzecki, 2018). The monograph, written by V. Śleszyński should be highlighted as it considers the security components of Poland’s state policy in the “Eastern lands” (Śleszyński, 2007). The temporary Polish authorities’ activities in Volyn during the transition period (1919 – 1921 pp.) were depicted in the works, written by J. Gierowska-Kallaur (Gierowska-Kallaur, 2003) and V. Kozyra (Kozyra, 2007). The archival materials were basic for the article’s preparation. Among the published sources used by us it is necessary to single out the collection “Archive of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Provincial Elders and Commissioners Reports (1918 – 1920)” (Kavunnyk (Comps.), 2017). The unpublished sources were also used and they were archival repositories documents primarily, in particular The Archives of New Documents in Warsaw (Central Archives) and the State Archives of Volyn Region.
The purpose of the article is to represent the forms, methods and means of the Soviet special services activity on the territory of Western Volyn during the period of functioning in the region of the Polish Provisional Administration (1919 – 1921).

The Statement of the Basic Material. The Polish state power apparatus formation in Volyn began in 1919. The international legal status of the western Ukrainian lands at that time was not fully determined yet. The borders issue of the newly created Polish state remained open. In the spring and summer of 1919, the fiercest battles took place on the Polish-Ukrainian front. As a result, the Ukrainian Galician Army was forced to leave Galicia (Halychyna) and withdraw beyond the Zbruch River territories. As a result of the Polish offensive in May, several povits (counties) of the former Volyn hybernia (province) (Volodymyr, Kovel, and the part of Lutsk) came under their control in 1919. Hence, the Polish temporary and civilian administrations’ formation began in the above-mentioned areas.

The first Polish institution, which carried out the general administration in Volyn occupied territories in 1919 was the Civil Administration of the Eastern Lands (hereinafter – CAEL). The above-mentioned structure was to perform the functions of a temporary administration in the eastern lands, and its development took place in parallel with the advance of the Polish army in the eastern direction (Gierowska-Kallaur, 2003, p. 68). Due to the order issued in June of the 1919th by the General Commissioner of the Eastern Lands, a new administrative unit of the Civil Administration of the Eastern Lands in Volyn was created, which was called Volyn Povit (County) Administration, whose powers temporarily extended to Volodymyr, Kovel and Lutsk povits (counties). On the 9th of September in 1919, in connection with the further transfer of control of the Poles to the eastern counties of Volyn, a separate Volyn district was created within the Civil Administration of the Eastern Lands with a temporary administrative center in Kovel, and from November 1919 in Lutsk. The Volyn district included Volodymyr, Kovel, Lutsk, Dubno, Rivne, Kremenets, Ostroh, Zaslavsk and Zviahel povits (counties) (Kozyra, 2007, p. 173). As an administrative unit, Volyn district of the Civil Administration of the Eastern Lands existed until the end of 1919. Due to the order issued by the Head of State on the 17th of January in 1920, Volyn and Podil lands Chief Commissioner position was introduced, who headed a new structure – the Civil Department of Volyn Lands and the Podil Front (SAVR, f. 191, d. 3, c. 1, p. 1). After the events of the Polish-Soviet War in 1920, according to the order issued by Józef Piłsudski, the administrative functions in the Ukrainian lands recaptured from the Bolsheviks were transferred to a new institution – the Provisional Administration of Stage and Frontline Territories. Simultaneously with the central ones, the lower levels of the temporary Polish administration were formed – the povit (county) elderships. Along with the minor changes, such an administrative system lasted until March 1921, when Volyn Voivodeship was established and the Polish state power permanent bodies formation began.

It should be noted that the Polish administration formation in Western Ukraine took place under difficult conditions. The foreign policy factor that would have a significant impact on the domestic political situation in Poland (especially in its eastern territories) throughout the interwar XXth century was the neighborhood with the Soviet Russia, which did not abandon its intention to ignite the “world revolution” in Europe. The weakest link in the export of the Bolshevik revolution to the West, the Soviet leaders considered the newly revived Polish state (Misko, 2016, p. 132). Moreover, the western Ukrainian lands (first of all Volyn and Eastern Galicia) were given the role of a kind of bridgehead from which the revolutionary march of the Red Army by the countries of Europe was preplanned to begin. E. Quiring,
Chairman of the People’s Commissar of the USSR during the Ukrainian-Polish War of 1918 – 1919, later on, he became the Soviet delegation member at the negotiations with Poland in Ryga in the memorandum “Tasks of our party in the Polish-occupied Ukrainian areas”, dated back to the 30th of November in 1920 noted the following: “The rejection of a large part of Volyn with the Ukrainian population of several million from the USSR and the annexation of Eastern Galicia to Poland – pose a new task for our party and government: to take under its ideological and organizational leadership a revolutionary movement that will inevitably grow in these occupations. areas... The support is needed and we must give it” (Rublov, 2012, pp. 73–74).

However, the Bolsheviks’ struggle “for Volyn” did not stop from the beginning of the Ukrainian revolution and lasted during 1917 – 1921. The Bolshevik agitation’s success during the years of the Ukrainian People’s Republic was facilitated, first of all, due to the unresolved land issue. The Ukrainian Central Rada’s policy, which announced its intention to carry out radical land reform in order to eliminate large land holdings in the last weeks of 1917, caused the manors plundering wave in Volyn and Podillia. The process intensified especially at the beginning of the 1918th, when groups of deserters, demobilized soldiers, and the local population, instigated by the Bolshevik agitation, seized land, confiscated cattle, destroyed farm buildings, and destroyed agricultural equipment (Mędrzecki, 2018, pp. 71–72). The Bolshevik’s propaganda and open aggression in the border counties of Volyn hubernia (province) in the autumn of 1918 – the spring of 1919 influenced the course of military and political events in Ukraine significantly, complicated the struggle for the Ukrainian statehood in some regions of the UNR, in particular in the eastern counties of Volyn (Dem’ianiuk, 2013, p. 82). Since the part of Western Volyn territory was occupied by the Polish Army, the communist propaganda and sabotage movement intensified noticeably. There were several factors, which facilitated the above-mentioned intensification: the difficult economic situation caused by the consequences of World War I, the socio-political instability associated with openly discriminatory policies of the Polish authorities towards the ethnic minorities, including the Ukrainians, the mental characteristics of the local population due to the Soviet Ukraine historical factors. The very fact of the USSR existence led to the emergence of a movement among the Ukrainians in Poland, which saw the solution of the national problem by revolutionary restructuring the existing socio-economic system.

Due to the fact that the vast majority of the local population was negative concerning the Polish government, considering it occupation and temporary, the Bolshevik’s propaganda success was also facilitated (SAVR, f. 1, d. 2, c. 1082, pp. 15–25). The local administration’s personnel, which consisted mainly of the Poles, prompted great criticism. In addition, there were very few candidates for a civil service. According to the calculations of the Polish historian W. Mędrzecki, there were approximately 2,000 people (large landowners, doctors, lawyers, teachers), who made up the Polish intelligentsia (Mędrzecki, 2005, p. 21). This number of people was extremely small in order to form a local government, so almost all willing (the Poles) became civil servants, regardless of their professional qualities. There were often individuals whose reputations weren’t flawless.

The mutual distrust between the Poles and the Ukrainians was exacerbated by the sharply negative attitude of the new government to any manifestations of the Ukrainian movement in the occupied lands. In one of the reports of Volyn Hubernia Commissioner written in 1919 the following information: “Political life is completely suppressed. With the arrival of the Poles, all political organizations were dispersed ... All the Ukrainian “Prosvita” centers were...
closed [...] the property and the library were confiscated [...] the complete intolerance is expressed towards the Ukrainian life everywhere, the Ukrainian language is despised, every Pole pretends to be ignorant. All-Ukrainian is considered to be the Bolshevik and criminal” (Kavunnyk, 2017, p. 35).

It was not difficult to predict the local population’s reaction to such actions. The interim Polish administration representatives reports testified the growing anti-Polish sentiment in the region. Hence, in June of 1919, an instructor of Lutsk Povit Kresova Guard Society ("Kresova Storozha” organization) reported that many weapons remained in the peasants’ apartments, which were carefully hidden. It was pointed out that there were many Bolshevik agitators in the villages, who created the underground organizations and conducted the anti-state propaganda (ANA, TSK, f. 55, c. 337, p. 62).

It came as no surprise that in some povits (counties) controlled by the Polish troops an insurgent movement reached the peak. Its coordination was carried out by the so-called The Central Anti-Polish Insurgent Committee, to which, in turn, the povit (county) “Rebel Committees” were subordinated, whose work was aimed at preparing an armed uprising against the Polish authorities in Volyn (Kavunnyk, 2017, p. 40). The reports written by Kresova Guard Society (“Kresova Storozha” organization) district instructors indicated that the activities of the so-called “Rebel Committees” (the content of the appeals, the proposed methods of the struggle) had a completely Bolshevik character and was obviously sent from the outside (AAN, TSK, f. 55, c. 327, p. 9).

In some places, the insurgent movement became widespread. First of all, it concerned the south-eastern districts of Volyn, in particular Dubenschyna and Kremenechchyna. In the spring of 1919, the “People’s Bolshevik” organization, headed by V. Rykun, which operated on Dubno Povit territory and began preparations for an anti-Polish armed uprising. The rebel forces in Kremenets district numbered up to 2 thousand people (AAN, TSK, f. 55, c. 327, p. 12). Some units of the Polish Army were sent in order to suppress the insurgent movement. The Polish Army even used artillery, which, according to Hubernia Commissioner, “burned the entire village of Ludwisce, as well as part of the surrounding villages”. In addition, the above-mentioned information provides evidences concerning the scale of the operation. Hubernia Commissioner also emphasized the “zhovnir” (Polish soldiers’) losses in this operation: “up to 600 people, the Poles, were killed near Shumsk and up to 200 people in Kremenets cities” (Kavunnyk, 2017, p. 40). It is difficult to say how objective these figures were (nothing is not mentioned about the loss of the Ukrainians; their loss was much bigger), but the scale of the events speaks for itself.

In the spring of 1920, the Bolshevik agitators while crossing the border tried to destabilize the situation, especially on Volyn front lines., Zviahel Povit Elder pointed out in his report, written in March of 1920, the state of constant tension in povit caused by widespread rumors of a new Bolshevik offensive (SAVR, f. 58, d. 1, c. 1, p. 3). Due to the Red Army offensive, the entire territory of the former Volyn Hubernia was occupied by the Bolshevik troops in July-August of 1920. As a result, the Soviet power re-established in Volyn.

In July-September of 1920, the povit (county), township, and village revolutionary committees (“revkoms”), as well as the Gmina Committees (Commune Committees) of the poor peasants became the main tools of the Bolshevik regime application in Volyn. Only in the territory of Lutsk povit at that time there were 16 township and 234 village revolutionary committees (“revkoms”) (SAVR, f. R.-213, d. 1, c. 1, p. 31). In rural areas, the so-called “peasant workers”, who were apparently the Bolshevik agents and agitators and appeared there before
the Red Army arrival, were engaged in the revolutionary committees (“revkoms”) creation. The “peasant workers” took care of the public safety, the army mobilization, and had to prevent any manifestations of the anti-Bolshevik propaganda (Mędrzecki, 1997, pp. 137–170).

In addition to it, the so-called House Committees were set up in the cities, which were aimed at distributing the confiscated property. According to the Order No. 1, issued by Reshetar, Lutsk Povit Military Commissar, on the 6th of August in 1920, the City Council and Police were obliged to register in the Commissariat Supply Department all the warehouses, property, and shops left in the city by the Poles during 24-hours. For non-compliance with the order, the owners of the hotels, restaurants, cafes, shops, etc., were to be on trial in the Revolutionary Tribunal Court (SAVR, f. R-316, d. 1, c. 16, p. 1).

The Bolsheviks introduced the laws of war in Volyn cities and towns. Hence, according to the order, issued by Kovel Military Revolutionary Committee on the 20th of August in 1920, every citizen was obliged to report to the Revolutionary Committees immediately on cases of banditry and looting, as well as on persons suspected of espionage and anti-Soviet agitation (SAVR, f. R-213, d. 1, c. 1, p. 4a).

The orders of the Bolshevik Revolutionary Committees provided for particularly severe penalties for private workshops’ owners, technicians, engineers, accountants, and cashiers who did not register in the Revolutionary Committees’ offices and did not receive the registration cards. For those, who did not comply with the above-mentioned order, was imposed the highest penalty – the execution (SAVR, f. R-213, d. 1, c. 1, p. 4a). At the same time, the restrictions were introduced in the settlements on the organization of concerts, strikes, performances, etc.

However, this time the Soviet power did not manage to keep everything under control for too long in Volyn. Already in August-September of 1920, the Polish Army launched a counteroffensive, which the Bolsheviks could not stop, and on the 17th of September the Poles re-entered Lutsk. The offensive potential of both sides was exhausted and in October of 1920, they signed an armistice, and later on – the Riga Peace Treaty on the 18th of March in 1921, according to which Poland recognized the USSR, and the part of the western Ukrainian lands was included in II Rzeczpospolita (the Second Commonwealth). Hence, the Polish administration’s re-formation in Volyn began.

In the autumn of 1920, the Polish State Security Authorities made numerous arrests in Volyn. The persons, who were suspected of espionage and collaboration with the Bolsheviks during the Polish-Soviet War appeared to be behind the bars. There were many Ukrainians among them. The above-mentioned information can be found in the reports written by the counterintelligence section agents, who were sent to the command of the 6th Army stationed in Volyn (SAVR, f. 52, d. 1, c. 1, pp. 18–35). Due to a large number of detentions, some accidental persons were obviously injured. The paramount evidence of this were numerous letters of appeal from Volyn villages residents to the State Security Authorities with a request to release certain illegally accused persons with some positive characteristics (SAVR, f. 52, d. 1, c. 1, pp. 18–19). However, among those arrested were those, who did hold high positions in the Bolshevik authorities. For instance, Yevtyhiy Oliferchuk, Mizoch resident, who held the position of local Police Chief in the summer of 1920. He explained his cooperation with the Bolsheviks by the fact that he did not want to be mobilized to the Red Army (SAVR, f. 52, d. 1, c. 1, p. 52).

In the cities, the Soviet law enforcement agencies were engaged in the mass recruitment of the Jewish population. Hence, only in the first half of August in 1920 approximately...
400 people of the Jewish nationality decided to do military service at the Red Army in Kovel (SAVR, f. 58, d. 3, c. 1, p. 10). A resident of the same town, Friedl Kreiselman, who was arrested on the 18th of December in 1920, was accused of being involved in the arrest and torture of many Kovel residents, including Prelate Shuhaevskyi, as a member of the local “Chrezvychaiky” (Emergency) (SAVR, f. 46, d. 9, c. 7, p. 51). According to the State Security bodies and District Courts materials, there were many people, who sympathized the Bolshevik power including the Polish population of Volyn (SAVR, f. 52, d. 1, c. 3, p. 245).

The Polish Ministry of the Interior issued an order in January in 1921, according to which, the povit elders were the subject to the Provisional Administration of Stage and Frontline Terrains to immediately arrest the Revolutionary Committees former members established during the Bolshevik occupation of the region in the summer of 1920. In the directive the following information was mentioned: “Their presence among the local population is undesirable, both because of possible agitation and because of espionage activities in favor of the Bolsheviks” (SAVR, f. 36, d. 13 a, c. 8, p. 247).

It should be noted that at the turn of 1920 – 1921, the Bolsheviks, not abandoning their intentions to export the “Communist Revolution” to the West, moved from the direct confrontation with the Poles to the active training of specially trained sabotage groups crossing the border to conduct espionage and terrorist activities. activities in the eastern voivodships. One of the bridgeheads for the implementation of these plans was to be Western Volyn, where the socio-political and economic situation remained quite difficult. Kremenets elder noted in his report from December of the 1920th the following information: “the mood of the population in the povit territory remains extremely disturbing. The Bolshevik agitators arrive every day and call for the resistance to the Polish administration and for organizing the armed units” (SAVR, f. 58, d. 1, c. 34, pp. 1–2). At the same time, the District Administration Head noted that the Bolsheviks used the mood of the local population successfully. “Difficult economic conditions created a favorable ground for agitation”, – he said....The disappointment, despair lead to the fact that the population becomes vulnerable young to the various external influences of elements hostile to the state” (SAVR, f. 58, d. 3, c. 3, p. 22).

The elders of the border povits of Western Volyn drew the attention of the Security Services to the fact that the active Bolshevik propaganda, sabotage and espionage activities of the Soviet Secret Services were facilitated by the extremely unsatisfactory staffing of the police. Hence, there were only 54 policemen in the entire Kremenets povit in November in the 1920th (SAVR, f. 58, d. 3, c. 3, p. 22). The elder pointed to the need to immediately replenish the police with at least 300 people per povit.

Another reason for the unhindered Bolshevik agents’ penetration into the territory of the region was the unsatisfactory state of border protection, which was constantly reported by the military themselves. Hence, Brusnytskyi, Sarny Counterintelligence Section Head, told the Command of the General District of the 2nd Division of the Headquarters in Lublin that there were many Soviet spies and agitators among the people, who arrived on the Polish side of the border every day. They often apply for a pass voluntarily and thus legalize their presence. “The situation at the border”, Brusnytskyi summed up, “is simply catastrophic…in the current conditions the border exists only denomine, defakto it is absolutely not present” (SAVR, f. 46, d. 9, c. 7, p. 26).

The situation in the povits bordering on the territories controlled by the Bolsheviks, in particular, Shumsk and Ostroh, was especially tense in the end of the 1920-ies and at the beginning of 1921. Hence, in February of 1921, the Soviet side demanded that the Polish
Civilian Administration leave Shumsk, the town (according to the Riga agreements, it was on the Polish side of the demarcation line – Authors). The local population was concerned about the rumors, which dealt with the Bolshevik government’s mobilization of the population in the neutral zone. The report of the police station in Shumsk, issued on the 2nd of February in 1921, stated that the Bolsheviks in the villages of Blarivka and Stefanivka, Ostroh povit, took people, carts and horses to the army by force. It was noted that the mobilization was violent, accompanied by beatings and arrests, which violated the terms of the ceasefire and the neutral zone regime (SAVR, f. 58, d. 3, c. 4, pp. 28–29).

The local population, however, suffered not only from the Bolsheviks, but also from the Polish military and police. The numerous complaints from residents of Volyn villages, dating back from 1920 were the main evidence. (SAVR, f. 58, d. 1, c. 68, pp. 2–19; SAVR, f. 52, d. 1, c. 8, p. 2). The above-mentioned facts caused concern among the local officials – elders, “soltys” and “viyt” (SAVR, f. 58, d. 3, c. 3, pp. 14–15). The report written by Kremenets povit elder, stated that robbery and banditry among the military in the form of requisitions from the peasants for cattle, household utensils, shoes, horses, carts, as well as cash became a mass phenomenon (SAVR, f. 58, d. 3, c. 3, p. 12). The Povit Administration was especially outraged by the behavior of the military of the 13th Infantry Regiment, which was housed in Kremenets Lyceum. The latter, according to the elder, “broke down the walls, floor, window frames, sawed off the roof beams. The houses, which somehow withstood the rudeness and vandalism of the Bolsheviks thanks to the Polish soldiers, are turning into a complete ruin” (SAVR, f. 58, d. 3, c. 3, p. 12). The scale of mass abuses of the military is evidenced by the fact that on the 20th of December in 1920, the authorized delegate of the Office of Frontline and Stage Terrains was forced to convene in Rivne a meeting of elders of his subordinate territories to discuss measures to combat requisitions carried out by the Polish army (SAVR, f. 58, d. 3, c. 3, p. 22). According to the civil administration representatives, the actions of the military had an extremely negative effect on the local population, creating a favorable ground for the Bolshevik agitation.

Numerous facts testified to the intensification of the Bolshevik agents and sabotage groups in Volyn in the beginning of 1921. Their activities were coordinated by both Soviet Special Services and Army Intelligence Units. Hence, the head of the Counterintelligence Section in Volyn, which was subordinated to the Command of the 6th Army, in his report on the 3rd of March in 1920, noted that on the territory of the Soviet Ukraine in Berdychiv there is the so-called the Front Emergency Commission (“Chrezvychaika”) headed by Yankel Bronfeld, which sent its people to Poland in order to conduct the Bolshevik propaganda and intelligence (SAVR, f. 58, d. 1, c. 3, p. 282). Specially trained groups were formed in Zhytomyr by Volyn Hubernial CheKa. Under the guise of civilians, they moved across the Polish-Soviet border (SAVR, f. 52, d. 1, c. 4, p. 36).

Furthermore, the intelligence units also existed in the Red Army military units. On the border with the eastern povits of Volyn, the 41st Special Caucasian Brigade was stationed, which consisted of two cavalry regiments and four squadrons, each with one spy and a liaison. The liaisons were directly inferior to the Intelligence Chief of Bronstein’s brigade (SAVR, f. 52, d. 1, c. 6, p. 173).

The Polish Army’s former soldiers, military invalids living in Volyn were often involved in the anti-government propaganda by the Soviet Secret Services. In 1921 of July, the Ministry of Military Affairs sent a directive to the Command of the General District in Lublin, to which the Volyn Voivodeship was subordinated, according to which: “Recently, in crowded
places (markets, bazaars, in front of churches) you can see a large number of beggars – the military invalids, who gather around crowds of people. At the same time, they sing or recite poetic works of the anti-state content, which depict the terrible consequences of the war and the plight of the demobilized, deprived of work and left by the government without any care and assistance. There is no doubt that this action is directed by hostile factors, which are trying to turn public opinion against the government” (SAVR, f. 45, d. 1, c. 52, p. 190).

The refugees from the Soviet Russia, who arrived in Poland, often agitated among the locals as well as among the Polish military soldiers. Apparently, there were dime a dozen Soviet Secret Services agents among them. Furthermore, there were records in the units of the 26th Infantry Brigade stationed in Rivne concerning the Soviet Secret Services agents’ presence. One report reported that the refugees housed temporarily in military barracks were openly making campaign among them, describing the benefits of the Soviet way of life (SAVR, f. 52, d. 1, c. 6, p. 100). The command demanded to take immediate measures in order to prevent the agitation among the military. The directives on refugee affairs were sent from the Ministry of Military Affairs and to the Head of the Counterintelligence Section of the 6th Army, which was stationed in Volyn. According to the directives, the surveillance should have been established on individuals, who were the subject to repatriation. It was known that they arrived by trains from the Soviet Russia to the cities of Zdolbunov and Rivne. The information concerning the repatriated persons was sent to Warsaw from a Polish agency located in Moscow (SAVR, f. 52, d. 1, c. 6, p. 102).

The reports written by the Polish counterintelligence agents show that the Bolshevik agents used actively the entertainment establishments in order to carry out the intelligence and the counterintelligence tasks. In Rivne at the beginning of 1921 of February, the cabaret “Artistique” came into the sight of the police. According to a report written by the head of one of the police departments in the city, “CafeArtistique”, “this is not an ordinary recreation facility, but a secret communist platform (cell) that carries out military intelligence and demoralizes our officer corps through the sale of alcohol and drugs (cocaine). This institution is funded through the Cooperative of the Disabled, which maintains constant contact with the Lublin Consumer Cooperative, one of the most secretive communist centers in Poland” (SAVR, f. 52, d. 1, c. 3, p. 57).

The Soviet Secret Services’ task in Volyn was not only the intelligence activities and communist propaganda among the population, but also the sabotage preparation and conduct. In 1921 of April, a sabotage group led by Oleksiy Molchanov left Zaslav in the direction of Dubno. The sabotage group was given the task to blow up the Klukivsky Bridge (across the Ikva River), then go to the village Sapanove, Kremenets povit, where the sabotage group had to blow up another bridge across the Ikva on the road Kremenets-Verba, the railway track between the stations Smyka-Kluka, as well as damage the telegraph (SAVR, f. 52, d. 1, c. 6, p. 201).

The armed action’s organization and preparation on the territory of Western Volyn was carried out by the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks of Ukraine. Thy Secret Special Unit was established in 1920 of May in order to intensify intelligence activities abroad, in particular in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus (Kozeniuk (Comps.), 2000). One of the paramount tasks of Zakordot in Western Volyn was to organize (with the local population’s support) the local armed demonstrations. Their ultimate goal was to eliminate the Polish Administrative Apparatus, eradicate the Soviet power establishment in the region, and include the Western Ukrainian lands in the USSR (more detailed information can be found: Kupchyk, 2004, p. 67). The archival documents
provide information about the armed Bolshevik detachments that operated in Western Volyn at the turn of 1920 – 1921, in particular, there was the sabotage group, which consisted of 59 people, in the vicinity of Shumsk, Kremenets povit (SAVR, f. 58, d. 3, c. 3, p. 35). In addition, the Hrytska Drozda’s gang, or the so-called “Black fighters” (“Chornobortsi”) consisting of 18 people was present near Mizyn, Dubno povit (SAVR, f. 45, d. 1, c. 52, p. 196). At the head Vasyl Rykun some detachments (which consisted of 80 people) operated in the vicinity of the villages of Narayiv, Balashov and Mizoch, Dubno povit (SAVR, f. 52, d. 1, c. 5, p. 42). The police confidants reported that a Bolshevik “gang”, which consisted approximately of 200 people, was crossing the border (near Ostroh) (SAVR, f. 46, d. 9, c. 29, p. 24). The purpose of these sabotage groups was to physically destroy the Polish authorities representatives, police and landowners. Hence, diverse attacks on the state institutions, banks, destruction of roads, means of communication were planned.

Furthermore, the situation did not change for the better even when the Polish power permanent state bodies formation began in Volyn: Voivod Administration and Povit Elders. Volyn Voivodeship formation dates back to the 1st of March, 1921. The difficult economic and socio-political situation in the eastern lands, the openly discriminatory policy of the authorities towards the Ukrainian population of Volyn led to the growth of the anti-state sentiment among the local population and contributed to the further growth of the anti-Polish guerrilla movement, which was controlled mainly by the Bolsheviks and inspired by the Soviet Ukraine. As a result, the government aimed at stabilizing the situation in the eastern voivodships was forced to the application of the repressive measures, involving the police and troops in order to eliminate the resistance. However, the above-mentioned drastic measures did not change the local population’s attitude towards the Polish authorities and soon led to growing tensions between the Poles and the Ukrainians during the interwar period of the XXth century.

The Conclusions. During 1918 – 1921, the western Ukrainian lands became the object of fierce confrontation between three states: Poland, Ukraine (UNR-ZUNR) and the Soviet Russia. The Western Volyn and Eastern Galicia became the part of the Polish state due to the ZUNR’s (Western Ukrainian People’s Republic) defeat in the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918 – 1919 and the Soviet Russia in the Polish-Soviet War of 1920 – 1921. The Bolsheviks’ defeat in an open armed confrontation with Poland did not mean, however, that the Bolsheviks were refused to spread the communist regime ideology and practice to European countries. Volyn became one of the main bridgeheads for the realization of the above-mentioned goals. Hence, the Bolshevik agitators and propagandists were active in Volyn when the temporary Polish administration was taking over the control. There were a number of reasons, why the Bolsheviks agitation was successful. Due to several factors: Volyn international legal status uncertainty, the postwar instability, which was complemented by the difficult economic situation in the region, some miscalculations in the Polish interim administration, the Polish military and police abuse of power, which exacerbated the Polish-Ukrainian confrontation and raised the local sentiment peasant. The Bolshevik agents were not only spreading communist propaganda in Western Volyn. The Soviet Special Services were active in the areas bordering the USSR in order to prepare the local armed demonstrations. The vivid example of such actions was the specially trained sabotage units, which carried out the terrorist acts, attacked the state authorities, police departments, military units, and destroyed means of communication. Even the archival sources confirm that the Bolshevik movement was supported by the local population significantly (especially the Ukrainian peasants, the
Jews in Volyn cities, and often the Poles). Furthermore, the Bolshevik movement became a stumbling block for the Polish government’s goal to strengthen the Polish statehood in the eastern lands and the fastest possible integration of the region into Poland.

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