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THE “MEMORY STUDIES” DEVELOPMENT AND THE HISTORICAL MEMORY DYNAMICS IN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE FROM THE VIEW OF THE MODERN WESTERN HISTORIOGRAPHY

Abstract. *The purpose of the article is to analyze the historical memory development dynamics, which has a complex, contradictory nature, linked to changes in the government and the corresponding changes in the memory policy, regional and age characteristics of the population. The methodology of the research is based on the theory of scientific knowledge and general philosophical provisions concerning the dialectical interconnection and interdependence of phenomena and processes in society; the specific historical approach and the principles of integrity and objectivity. The article uses primarily the search-bibliographic, historiographic and comparative methods in order to characterize the multifaceted approach of Western scholars concerning the historical memory problems related to the events of World War II. The scientific novelty is that for the first time in the historical science of Ukraine, the most recent English historiography on the historical memory problems in our country concerning the devastating years of World War II has been analyzed from a critical point of view. The Conclusions.* Thus, the experience of World War II, which was the greatest tragedy for the peoples of Europe, became the most complex and ambiguous in terms of interpretation. For Ukraine, which was not an independent state at the time, it was more complicated because of the two totalitarian regimes domination: the Communist and the Nazis. The conflicting interpretations of the past, which took place in different regions of Ukraine, were systematically used by politicians during the electoral race, which hindered the creation of a national consensus. Analyzing the historical memory development in modern Ukraine, Western analysts tend to isolate such issues as the collective memory dependence on the regions' historical path peculiarities, the population's pre-war and military experience, and changes in the memory politics by the authorities. And these changes in our state were extremely difficult due to the historical science politicization by the ruling elite. The history nationalization, which also took place in Russia, formed the basis for the formation of pro-Soviet historical myths, the “The Great Patriotic War” glorification and, at the same time, the distortion of the Ukrainian experience during 1939 – 1944. The “memory wars” became one of the major causes of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict.

Key words: *historical memory, politics of memory, decolonization, post-colonial dimension, “nationalization” of history, collective memory.*

РОЗВИТОК “MEMORY STUDIES” ТА ДИНАМІКА ІСТОРИЧНОЇ ПАМ’ЯТІ В НЕЗАЛЕЖНІЙ УКРАЇНІ З ПОГЛЯДУ НОВІТНЬОЇ ЗАХІДНОЇ ІСТОРИОГРАФІЇ

Анотація. *Мета дослідження* – проаналізувати процес розвитку історичної пам’яті в Україні, який мав складний, суперечливий характер, пов’язаний зі змінами у державному керівництві та відповідно змінами політики пам’яті і регіональними особливостями. **Методологія дослідження:** теорія наукового пізнання та загальнофілософські положення про діалектичний взаємозв’язок і взаємозумовленість явищ та процесів у суспільстві; конкретно-історичний підхід та принципи цілісності й об’єктивності. У статті використано насамперед пошуково-бібліографічний, історіографічний та компаративний методи, з допомогою яких схарактеризовано багатоаспектність підходу західних вчених до проблем історичної пам’яті, пов’язаної з подіями Другої світової війни. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що вперше в історичній науці України з критичної точки зору проаналізовано новітню англомовну історіографію, присвячену проблемам історичної пам’яті у нашій державі щодо травматичних років Другої світової війни. **Висновки.** У роботі стверджується, що усвідомлення суспільствами європейських держав складного минулого особливо суперечливе там, де громадяни пережили існування двох тоталітарних режимів: комуністичного і нацистського. Зокрема, нові члени Євросоюзу з Центрально-Східної Європи вибрали несумісні моделі подолання минулого. Простежено погляди західних учених щодо співвідношення історії та міфу, трансформаційних процесів у суспільній, офіційній та інших різновидах пам’яті, значення музеїв. Наголошується, що в сучасній незалежній Україні, на думку зарубіжних аналітиків, в політиці пам’яті використовується концепція “антиколоніального націоналізму” і “гібридності”. При цьому вони вказують на логічність застосування при інтерпретації минулого у посткомуністичному суспільстві Україна саме постколоніальних рис. Зазначено, що політика пам’яті перших трьох президентів України більше нагадувала імпровізації, носила випадковий, суперечливий характер, не могла подолати регіональні відмінності у сприйнятті минулого. Вказано на унікальну роль Львова, який після 1991 р. завдяки зусиллям тамтешньої інтелігенції фактично відродив роль “українського П’ємонту”.

Ключові слова: історична пам’ять, політика пам’яті, деколонізація, постколоніальний вимір, “націоналізація” історії, колективна пам’ять.

The Problem Statement. Due to the extremely high level of public attention to the past eras’ issues, especially those related to World War II, the topic is relevant. Moreover, in connection with the annexation of the Crimea by Putin’s Russia and aggression in Donbas the topic escalated in present-day Ukraine significantly. The historical revisionism, the historical events’ politicization cause certain strains in the society that are undesirable for maintaining stability in our country. Therefore, of the historical memory problems updating, and interest in the historical memory development process, which first appeared in the Western countries, is becoming a priority in Ukraine.

The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches. According to the researcher A.M. Kyrydon, the memory studios’ emergence in Ukraine (a kind of transition) began during 1990-ies – 2000-ies, while the “obsession with memory” was observed in the West. Only since 2011, The researcher made a statement in 2014 concerning the memory studios’ institutionalization stage in Ukraine, which could be observed only since 2011. Although, on April 22, 2008, the Scientific Conference “The Historic Memory as a Field of Competition for Identity” was held in Kyiv. “The National and Historical Memory: A Keyword Glossary” was published in 2013 (Kyrydon (Ed.), 2013, 436 p.). Numerous national scholars are involved in the historical memory issues, including the “memory war”. Let us pay attention to the works of such scientists as H. Kasianov (Kasianov, 2015, pp. 149–155; 2016, pp. 118–137;

2018, 420 p.), A. Kyrydon (Kyrydon, 2010, pp. 96–105; 2015, pp. 244–250; 2016, 320 p.), L. Nahorna (Nahorna, 2012, 328 p.), O. Rozumnyi (Rozumnyi, 2017), O. Hrytsenko (Hrytsenko, 2017, 1136 p.), V. Babka (Babka, 2016), Yu. Zernii (Zernii, 2008, pp. 41–51), O. Lysenko (Lysenko, 2015, pp. 4–21). I.M. Tymkiv published an article, dedicated to the historic memory, analyzing the non-fiction literature but only the domestic authors (Tymkiv, 2019). The researcher O.Ya. Volianiuk made conclusions on the controversial interpretation of historical events in modern Ukraine, the existence of “mutually exclusive models of vision of the past”. O. Ya. Volianiuk also proved that people expressed particular interest in the theme of World War II concerning the national versions of Wikipedia (Volianiuk, 2013, p. 49). So far, there is no work in Ukrainian historiography devoted to the analysis of foreign scientific literature, which discusses the historical memory development in our society.

The purpose of the article is to analyze the historical memory development dynamics, which has a complex, contradictory nature, linked to changes in the government and the corresponding changes in the memory policy, regional and age characteristics of the population. The task is to find out, through a critical analysis of recent English-speaking historiography, how the historical events of World War II are interpreted in the collective memory, why political elites form selective discourses of the past, especially of “traumatic” content.

The Statement of the Basic Material. A considerable amount of attention was paid to the issues of the past in almost all countries, especially in the 80-ies of the XXth century. As a rule, this concerned the periods marked by the cataclysms, wars, changes in political regimes, etc. Particularly complex, controversial, and often situational were the processes of analyzing and understanding the past in the post-communist countries. First of all, because they experienced the activities and consequences of the power of two totalitarian regimes: the Communist and the Nazi.

It cannot be said that in the West, including the European Union countries, there are no problems related to the attitude of the professional scientists, the society to their own past, especially the tragic 1939 – 1945 years. Hence, in Brussels in May 2017 when The Museum of European History was opened, and the journalists, especially the British ones, raised serious doubts as to whether the museum would be sufficiently linked to the “European” identity to justify its high name for the Museum of European History. After all, the journalists emphasized that there could be no overlapping interpretations of the past in EU countries. Indeed, the new members of the EU from Central and Eastern Europe chosen different models of overcoming the past, depending on the communist regime level of legitimacy. For example, the Czech Republic adopted the position of the “investigate and punish”, and in Slovakia “forget and forgive” position was widely spread, as the political legitimacy of the communist government was much greater in Slovakia (Echternkamp & Jaeger, 2019, p. 1).

According to the French sociologist P. Nora, memory is life, and while history reconstructs the past, it is always problematic and incomplete. Therefore, the end of the XXth – the beginning of XXIth century is not accidentally characterized by the presence of “memory fever”, “memory phenomenon”, “memory mania», “obsession with memory”, “memory madness”, “memory epidemics”, “memorial fever”, “memory crisis”, “memory industry”, “memory boom”, and there are also innumerable talks about the “archival fever era”, “memorial extremes”, and a “crusade of heritage” (Macdonald, 2013, 3). The historical narratives, the varieties of collective memory (folk, official, autobiographical, historical, memorial) coexist, though the former plays the role of a “civil religion” closely linked to the power legitimacy (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, pp. 8–9).

Back in 1956, Professor at the University of Victoria in Wellington (New Zealand) P. Munz (1921 – 2006) argued that the juxtaposition of history and myth was not entirely correct. Not only because they were interdependent, but also because the events of the past in myths were sometimes told according to the historical facts. Of course, there are many examples when myths depicted some events as ridiculously wrong, but when a historian misinterpreted the past, it should be also considered as a myth. (Munz, 1956, p. 5). The Professor of History at the University of London D. Ramsden (1947 – 2009) wrote the following: “The historians ... use myths to determine the way in which the memory of the past can be organized selectively, with a conditional version of the past that explains how people come to why they themselves believe in a certain time”. But if history is a discourse that involves debate and criticism in the search process, then memory is a matter of choice, silence, and certain construction. Memory is not static, it is transformed over time, storing events and phenomena in accordance with the desired narrative. Memory rarely goes the same way, so it chooses its own “facts”. In addition, the national and regional identities (University College Lecturer D. Lowenthal (1923 – 2018) was convinced that one person may have not only a single identity) are closely related to memory and mythology. The authoritarian regimes always determined who was to be remembered and honored, regardless of the society’s opinion. The study of memory, which focuses on the historical facts’ manipulation, is used for political purposes – the so-called “The Representative Paradigm”. Such kind of conclusion provided by the University of London College Teacher W. Davis can be fully attributed to the Soviet and post-Soviet cults commemorating World War II. A unique example of brazen Soviet mythology is the myth of the “Small Earth” (Mala Zemlya). The troops consisting of 630 marines headed by Major Ts. Kunikov on the 4th of February in 1943, which landed in the Cemaes Bay, had no strategic importance, and owing to L. I. Brezhnev was almost at the level of the Stalingrad operation (Davis, 2018, pp. 3, 16–17; Lehr & Aponiuk, 2011, pp. 212–228).

A. Assman (Professor at Constantine University, the author of the book “The Remembrance Spaces. Cultural Memory Forms and Transformations” (Munich, 1999) stated that the positivist historiography had reached its limit. Therefore, if there are no archival documents, the oral evidence will come in handy. It should be remembered that the changes in the historiographical discourse, official memory, historical and political debates affect the individual memory (Penter & Titarenko, 2011, pp. 479, 482).

The French sociologist P. Nora noted that the modern style of memory is no longer natural, passed down from one generation to the next. For the time being the modern style of memory is the “artificial hyper-reality created by different institutions in the interests of political manipulation”. It is capable of dividing the nation, undermining its identity. The social, economic, political contexts of the situation dictate accordingly, and changes in the historical memory (Koposov, 2018, p. 23).

The above-mentioned conclusion is illustrated by an example of the changes that take place in museums, the number of which in the countries of East-Central Europe during the XXth century. increased significantly. According to D. Cameron (Royal College of London), there are two types of museums: “The Temple” and “The Forum”. The first type enumerates the museums, which were founded in the XIXth century that provided a single, steady interpretation of history in the form of the “objective” truth. The museums-“forums”, on the contrary, open different interpretations, they have a pluralism of important and equivalent interpretations. It is noteworthy that since 2005 the most information about the history of museums creation in the countries of East-Central Europe has been provided by the scientists

from the West and the USA: M. Buko, S. Dudley, E. Hooper-Greenhill, S. McDonald, S. MacLeod, J. Marston, S. Pierce, D. Preziosi. They emphasized that the power of museums, especially the historical ones, was not only that they support the collective memory, but also “create part of a morally and emotionally shaped social and ideological landscape”. They all belong to a particular memory matrix, even if it is distant from the interests and concerns of the individual. However, all history museums are too vulnerable to ideological manipulation and conflict. The best example is the historical exhibitions about World War II in the post-communist bloc states, not excluding Ukraine. It is still the subject of heated discussions and silences, dilemmas and simplifications, underestimations and exaggerations. It is still a living story, created by dreams, fighting the mentions of being both weary and too painful. Due to the history nationalization process taking place in Eastern Europe, museums cannot shirk responsibility for shaping the national identity. Quite often, as Poland (and Ukraine – according to the Author) exemplify, museums are at the crossroads of romanticizing and redefining the national history (Bogumił, Wawrzynia, Buchen, Ganzer (eds.), 2018, pp. 4–14).

B. Törnquist-Plewa (Lund University Center for Languages (Sweden)) notes that the European Union promotes a cosmopolitan memory that upholds respect for human rights, can be the basis for the global ethics and has a transformative effect. This approach does not focus on the national identities, which are a potential source of the conflict, and does not frighten the self-criticism. The cosmopolitan thought is known to respect all people regardless of race, language, religion, or gender, and is sympathetic to human suffering. The international organizations use the memory phenomenon as a tool for preventing ethnic conflicts and genocide, fighting nationalism, racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism. Today, the EU is a leading force in developing the policy of compassion, the idea of an international understanding of memory. B. Törnquist-Plewa noted the impact of the German experience with its policy of “overcoming the past”. It is no coincidence that Jürgen Habermas, the German philosopher, the sociologist is one of the most famous leaders of the cosmopolitanism and post-nationalism idea (Törnquist-Plewa, 2016, pp. 144–145).

At the beginning of the XXIst century, numerous Western scholars claimed that the era of communism had left a kind of vacuum in the Eastern European countries, which had crystallized the ethnic features, nationalism, nostalgia, xenophobia, and ancient strife. That is why, according to their point of view, the post-communist memory policy was distorted. As a result, the memory processes seem to have evolved in the context of the mnemonic pathology, trying to catch up with the Western patterns of remembering the past. Not so long ago, Eastern Europe was seen as a minor, additional entity, where at best discussions were held on the Europeanisation of memory. The situation changed at the beginning of the XXIst century with the new political projects emergence, cultural programs, and academic works in the countries of the post-communist camp. Eastern Europe becomes an important factor in the debate on the content of the European narrative gradually. M. Pakier (Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw), J. Wawrzyniak (University of Warsaw) believe that in modern Eastern Europe, states have different cultural memories. It is desirable to divide them into the following groups: the societies with a strong, single anti-communist outlook, to which they refer Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The second group includes Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, where there is intense debate over the evaluation of the historical past. In Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Albania, attempts to delegitimize the communist past proved to be weak. Finally, in Russia, Belarus, Moldova, according to S. Trebst, professor at Leipzig University, the communist past does not suffer from a lack of the legitimacy (Pakier & Wawrzyniak, 2015, pp. 1–12).

Some Western historians are convinced that Ukraine is undergoing a post-communist transit phase. Others do not completely agree with the above-mentioned conclusion, as the researchers do believe that it is better to pay attention to the post-colonial period not the post-authoritarian. Many Ukrainian scientists oppose this, because such a concept is associated with the “Third World”, that is, the society’s development is too weak. But if we consider the Ukrainian state as a post-colonial state, then the politics of memory, according to B. Törnquist-Plewa and Y. Yurchuk (Södertörn University, Sweden), still uses the concept of “anti-colonial nationalism” and “hybridity”. At the same time, the imitative nature of this kind of nationalism is also noted. The authors emphasize that in memory politics there may be narratives, which completely reject everything related to the imperial culture. In addition, the anti-colonial politics creates a desire to forget the colonial past and to “adjust” the development of the nation to the historical self-invention and self-assertion. Furthermore, while looking for the new characters and national roots, there may be a serious distortion of the historical events, activities of certain renowned persons. Therefore, such a policy is “vulnerable to infectious remnants in the subconscious and the unresolved past”, “complicating the consequences of arbitrary historical amnesia”. Determining the anti-colonial concept’s positive role, especially in the mobilization of the masses, its opponents are convinced that it is only a transitional stage in the decolonization process. (Törnquist-Plewa & Yurchuk, 2019, pp. 3–4).

A. Polegkiy, the researcher at the University of Antwerp points out that Ukraine was not a classical colony, but the post-imperial and post-colonial elements analysis can help in understanding the complex transformation processes. According to D. Moore (American historian), there are two important features in explaining the post-colonial discourse: the kinds of the colonial features, which existed in the communist societies and the little attention, which was paid to the above-mentioned fact. Another researcher, Sandomirskaya I.I., Professor of the Center for Baltic and Eastern European Studies at Södertörn University outlined several provisions that make it possible to discuss the problem in a post-colonial dimension. The proposed provisions include the following points: the new way of thinking in terms of the global expansion, the opposition to East and West, the progress and backwardness, the majority and minority (the ethnic minorities), the center and periphery, diverse unified, universal representation’s systems created. The British and Canadian political scientist of the Ukrainian origin, Taras Kuzio, who predicted the Crimea occupation by Russia in 2010, argued that Ukraine had traits characteristic of the British colonialism’s internal colonialism. The characteristic features include: the persistent inequality, the economic dependence, the low-quality standards of life, a kind of the labor division, the reactive nationalism (Polegkiy, 2015, pp. 171–173).

According to D. Averre (the Senior Lecturer at the Center for Russian European and Eurasian Studies at the University of Birmingham) and K. Wolczuk (Professor of the Eastern European Politics at the University of Birmingham), Ukraine remained as terra incognita for the West in the early 90-ies of the XXth century. Later on, the scientists began to analyze the Ukrainian nationalism, identity, ethnic peculiarities issues, as well as the Ukrainian linguistic division. Hence, the scientists emphasized the riskiness of the Ukrainian position between the EU and Russia. But since the beginning of the XXIst century, more scientists studied the issues related to Russia’s aggressive policies in the Caucasus, rather than attempts at the reintegration with Ukraine (Averre & Wolczuk, 2016, p. 552). Moreover, Professor T. Kuzio points out rightly that most Western authors underestimated the scale of V. Putin’s nationalist plans, ignoring the chauvinistic views of the Ukrainians and other peoples (Kuzio, 2016, pp. 87–99.)

I. Katchanovski, the scientist at the University of Ottawa, emphasizes the importance of a regional factor in Ukraine's memory discourses. The extremely different political values or the cultural priorities determine the attitude of the population to the past, especially the events of the following years 1939 – 1945. As such kind of values, norms, orientations are passed on from generation to generation through political socialization through family, religious, educational institutions, mass media, etc. The scientist clarifies that if political values change gradually over time, then the political positions are much more variable. It should be mentioned that the Ukrainian regions had different pre-war experiences, and during the war, as it is known, there were different options for the occupation regimes of Germany, Romania, and Hungary. It goes without saying that the different population's activity levels were observed regarding the service in the Red Army, the participation in Guerrilla Movement, and the UPA units (Katchanovski, 2014, pp. 210–211). All the above-mentioned factors influence the collective and the individual memory greatly and put some psychological barriers on the path to the nationwide consensus.

A researcher at the Department of Slavic Studies at the University of Amsterdam, M. Makhortykh points to the fact that the Internet brings about the fundamental changes in the perception of the past fairly, especially with regard to the events of the war and the ethnic conflicts. The electronic media has become, according to the researcher: a “key modulator of safety and security”, undergoing the process of converting electronic texts into the memory mediators (Makhortykh, 2017). The Ukrainian researcher O. Ya. Volianiuk found that in up to 10 million interested visitors surfed the Internet, in various national versions of Wikipedia in order to read some information on World War II (“The Great Patriotic War” – in the Russian version) (Volianiuk, 2013, p. 49).

According to the estimates made by N. Koposov, the researcher at Emory University, there were more than 90 draft laws, which were proposed in Ukraine during 1992 – 2016 that dealt with various aspects of the historical memory. They have become important tools in the “memory wars” between Ukraine and Russia (Koposov, 2018, pp. 8–10).

Once, V. Churchill remarked quite aptly: there were so many historical events in the Balkans that they could not swallow them at all (Sakwa, 2014, p. 9). To a large extent, the above-mentioned statement may also be applied to Ukraine. In the rejuvenated independent state, which Ukraine became since the end of 1991, the study of the complex past could not have taken place without the search, hypotheses, researches, certain conclusions that took into account the varied atmosphere of the regional priorities, with their heroes and anti-heroes. S.O. Yekelchuk, Professor at the University of Victoria, once stated that the Ukrainian historical science after the Soviet Union collapse represented a tangled mishmash of the old and the new, trying to break institutionally and methodologically with the period of the Soviet past. The “national paradigm” in historiography grew, the historians freed themselves from the lasting legacy of the Soviet dogmatism but often tended to the post-communist nationalism. (Yekelchuk, 2011, pp. 560–565).

Moreover, the political memory of the first three presidents of Ukraine looked more like improvisation, was not deeply thought out, and there was only a one-sided change concerning the perceptions of the past. It was casual, situational in nature, unstructured, and therefore unable to overcome the regional differences. In the regions, the “memory wars” and the “monuments war” continued, complicating the situation with the insufficient historical literacy of the society (Portnov, 2013, pp. 235–250).

The researcher Yu. Yurchuk rhetorically asks the following question: “Is it possible to talk about the monolithic history of Ukraine if the World War II experience is asymmetrical

in different areas of Ukraine?”. In fact, the above-mentioned question concerning the history democratization is a transition from a monistic to a pluralistic narrative, an urgent need for dialogue. The society should be aware of the fact that both heroic and barbaric actions took place in the past in order to build a common future confidently where there was no room for the concealment. It is well known that in any society there are changes, which are more traumatic than others. Ukraine suffered a double trauma: after the war, when the true memory of the events from 1939 – 1944 was frozen, condemned to silence by the Soviet regime. In addition to it, here was the post-Soviet trauma: the topics that were not written or talked about publicly began to be explored and made public, causing a shocking state in the society. Again, there were new exceptions and silences. It should be remembered that the cultural trauma is closely connected to the collective memory (Yurchuk, 2012, pp. 75–77).

It is difficult to agree with the famous scientist M. Halbwachs (1877 – 1945), author of the classic work “Memory Social Framework” written in 1925, who believed that only weak societies need historical heroes and heroic events. On the contrary, M. Billing, the British academician argued that even in societies with a long history of statehood and nation, narratives of a heroic past were typically used discursively in order to confirm the existence of a nation. As modern Ukraine is in the process of state-building, there is inevitably a temptation to construct local, regional and national heroes. At the same time, other Western historians point out, in addition to the glorification process, Ukraine also witnesses the victimization of the Ukrainian past (Yurchuk, 2012, p. 79).

The memory policy implementation in Ukraine is significantly complicated (once again, it should be emphasized) due to diverse directions of the past understanding and perception by citizens from different regions. Since the end of the XXth century in seven western Ukrainian regions dominated the nationalist and anti-Russian political values, then, in 17 other Ukrainian regions, according to a poll in August 2008, the pro-Soviet and pro-Russian ones prevailed. Although during World War II all Ukrainian regions suffered from the invaders, for the people of Western Ukraine the Soviet occupation was actually worse than the Nazi occupation. P.A. Rudling, the associate professor at Lund University emphasizes that Hitler’s occupation regime in the West of Ukraine was not as cruel as in the Reich Commissariat of “Ukraine”. The national customs were not persecuted, talented Ukrainians were sent to Germany in order to study, many cultural and educational institutions operated (Katchanovski, 2010, p. 975; Rudling, 2013, p. 230).

The leading role in the history “nationalization” process, of course, belongs to Lviv, the least Sovietized and Russified, most Ukrainianized city of Ukraine, according to R. Szporluk. After 1991, the myth on Lviv as the capital of “Ukrainian Piedmont” was revived. D. Bechtel, the professor at the University of Paris-Sorbonne-IV, noted that Lviv became the center of the Ukrainian propaganda in Soviet times, and in the early 90-ies changed the toponymics without any instructions from Kyiv, erected monuments to persons, who did not fit in the national pantheon. The researcher E. Narvselius pointed out that during debates about the “toxic” Ukrainian past, the Lviv intelligentsia claimed the city intellectual autonomy, a monopoly right to form a nationally conscious population. As in other regions, World War II remains an area where the “traumatic” memory concepts, insufficient academic knowledge, and controversial political rhetoric are confronted. The special attention of the Western Ukrainian society, as we know, was confined to S. Bandera for a long time – not so much to the person as to the Anti-Soviet Resistance symbol. Although, according to Lviv political scientist V. Pavlov, the collective memory is an ambivalent phenomenon, so it cannot serve as a criterion for creating historical truth about the

events and historical characters of dramatic war years. In fact, the memory, which in the above-mentioned context, consisted of family and expatriate narratives, inevitably became mythologized and mystified. Professor Y. Gritsak's call for the right to analyze the most "toxic" Ukrainian problems, which should be transferred to professional historians is ignored by politicians. The researcher, E. Narvselius mentioned that World War II issues are still unburied past for Ukraine, with contradictory historical memory filled with the conceptual "white spots", not made up in a clear narrative. Memory is still based more on predictions and speculation than on historical evidence. The debate over the nationalist resistance role, its leaders since 2007, became more intense (Narvselius, 2012, p. 470; 2012, pp. 51–72; 2012, 412 p.).

The Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tufts University in Boston, O. Shevel points out the following: Ukrainian history has many questions, especially in the XXth century. If T. Shevchenko, I. Franko, L. Ukrainka were national characters before 1991, then in independent Ukraine, only M.S. Hrushevskyi was in the limelight. The Assistant Professor recommends that the Ukrainian elite offer more pluralistic, less categorical narratives of the historical past, that is, non-military rhetoric. Although since 2001, the Council of Europe recommended that tolerance, pluralism should be used in the study of history, neither V. Yushchenko nor V. Yanukovych followed the recommendation. It is known that the maximum differences in Ukrainian society raise issues related to the activities of the OUN and the UPA. Many citizens do not have a solid knowledge of the essence of different historical narratives. The US political scientists (M. Bernhard of the University of Florida and J. Kubik of Rutgers University) distinguish four types of mnemonic figures: the mnemonic warriors – they are convinced that only they have a true vision of history, alternative versions of the past are expedient to be outlawed or liquidated; the pluralists have different visions of the past; the mnemonics are indifferent, uninterested in avoiding memory policies: they do not want to participate in the "memory wars" or believe that the population is fairly united in their understanding of the past events. The mnemonists of the future oppose any form of thinking that involves celebrating the past. They are sure that they solved the mystery of history and therefore have a sure key to a better future. In Ukraine, O. Shevel believes, it is necessary to create a solid memory regime where different interpretations of the past would coexist peacefully. Nowadays, there is more opportunity for a unified memory mode free of mnemonic conflicts (Shevel, 2016, pp. 23–31).

The beginning of the "memory war" in the post-Soviet space T. Zhurzhenko (University of Vienna) dates from 2005, when the 60th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany and its allies was celebrated in the world. Some observers consider the conflict of Russia with the West by the clash of different ideological contents of civilizations, but clashes of different, often opposite, views on the past and different cultures of memory were of no less importance. While in Europe, the Maidans in Ukraine were considered largely as mass movements for democracy and human rights, in Russia their participants were called radical nationalists and "fascists" – the direct heirs of the Nazi collaborators. The fetishization and mythology of "The Great Patriotic War" in Russia led to the fact that a large proportion of the population, who believed in such propaganda

In Europe, after the end of the Cold War, memory politics, in fact, become geopolitical. Therefore, the struggle for hegemony on the European continent is masked by the historical narratives' conflicts in which World War II plays a major role. But unlike the "old and new Europe" states, which have a universal human rights culture, the post-Soviet national identity prevails in Russia: the triumphant memory of the victory over fascism. That's why, Russia

is trying to debunk the “revisionist” memory policy of its western neighbors. According to T. Zhurzhenko, the “memory wars” may have begun earlier in 2005, when V. Yushchenko was called a “fascist” by his opponents during the 2004 presidential election. In addition, the events of 2004 on the Maidan were called “brown plague” – by analogy with Nazism. It is Putin’s idea to revive the idea of a “Greater Russia”, in which victory in the war remained the only positive of the Soviet era, which became the basis of Russia’s modernized policy. The memory policy in Russia is a countermeasure to “decolonize memory” in the former Soviet republics, an attempt to keep them in their geopolitical orbit (Zhurzhenko, 2015).

The Conclusions. Thus, the experience of World War II, which was the greatest tragedy for the peoples of Europe, became the most complex and ambiguous in terms of interpretation. For Ukraine, which was not an independent state at the time, it was more complicated because of the two totalitarian regimes domination: the Communist and the Nazis. The conflicting interpretations of the past, which took place in different regions of Ukraine, were systematically used by politicians during the electoral race, which hindered the creation of a national consensus. Analyzing the historical memory development in modern Ukraine, Western analysts tend to isolate such issues as the collective memory dependence on the regions’ historical path peculiarities, the population’s pre-war and military experience, and changes in the memory politics by the authorities. And these changes in our state were extremely difficult due to the historical science politicization by the ruling elite. The history nationalization, which also took place in Russia, formed the basis for the formation of pro-Soviet historical myths, the “The Great Patriotic War” glorification and, at the same time, the distortion of the Ukrainian experience during 1939 – 1944. The “memory wars” became one of the major causes of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict.

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