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**IMPOSITION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY
IN THE USSR DURING THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR (1941 – 1945)**

Abstract. The purpose of the research is to analyze the special aspects of imposition and implementation of the state of emergency within the USSR during the German-Soviet War (1941 – 1945).

The methodology of the research is based on the principles of scientificity, historicism, authorial objectivity, the use of general (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and special historical (historical-genetic, historical-typological, historical-systemic) methods. **The scientific novelty** is the reconstruction of the process of the state of emergency imposing during the German-Soviet War 1941 – 1945 based on the analyzed documents. **The Conclusions.** It has been found out that the State Defense Committee (GKO), which became the main military-economic center of the USSR and ensured the process of mobilization, creation of new military units and switch of economy and agriculture to a war footing, played a pivotal role in the realization of the state of emergency. The priority was given to the mass evacuation of valuable property and population, the establishment of new enterprises manufacturing military goods. It has been illustrated in the research that the Soviet government used emergency measures for manufacture intensification through increasing working hours, production standard and calling citizens for labour service. The attention was drawn to the formation of local emergency bodies, such as the commission for urban defense, which were tasked with mustering defense of settlements, maintaining order and bringing provocateurs, spies and hostile agents to the Military Tribunal. It is proved that GKO activities across the Ukrainian lands liberated from the Nazi invaders didn't contribute to the stabilization of the lives of the people, taking into account deportations, "cleans" and creation of the conditions for a man-made famine of 1946. It has been noted in the research that imposition of the state of emergency was an important element for the restructuring of the Soviet system of government and public administration in the context of wartime. And the GKO with its exclusive powers in all areas of the social and political life of the country, economy, agriculture and transport was the main body developing and implementing the state of emergency.

Key words: the German-Soviet War, State Defense Committee, state of emergency, military facilities, state of siege.

УВЕДЕННЯ НАДЗВИЧАЙНОГО СТАНУ В СРСР У ПЕРІОД НІМЕЦЬКО-РАДЯНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ (1941 – 1945 рр.)

Анотація. Мета дослідження – аналіз особливостей введення та реалізації надзвичайного стану на теренах СРСР у роки німецько-радянської війни (1941 – 1945). **Методологія дослідження** спирається на принципи науковості, історизму, авторської об'єктивності, використання загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, узагальнення) та спеціально-історичних (історико-генетичний, історико-типологічний, історико-системний) методів. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що на підставі зібраних документів виконано реконструкцію процесу введення надзвичайного стану у період німецько-радянської війни 1941 – 1945 рр. **Висновки.** Встановлено, що особливу роль у реалізації режиму надзвичайного стану зіграв Державний Комітет Оборони (ДКО), який став головним військово-господарським центром СРСР та забезпечував проведення мобілізації, створення нових військових частин та переведення економіки та сільського господарства на військовий лад. Особлива увага приділялася масовій евакуації матеріальних цінностей, населення, створенню нових підприємств із виробництва воєнної продукції. Показано, що радянська влада використовувала надзвичайні заходи інтенсифікації виробництва шляхом збільшення робочого часу, норм виробітку та залучення громадян до трудової повинності. Акцентується увага на створенні надзвичайних місцевих органів на зразок комісій з оборони міст, на які покладалися завдання щодо організації оборони населених пунктів, реалізації заходів охорони порядку та притягнення до суду Воєнного трибуналу провокаторів, шпигунів та ворожих агентів. Доведено, що діяльність ДКО на звільнених від німецько-фашистських загарбників землях України не сприяла стабілізації життя населення з огляду на проведення депортацій, "чисток" та створення умов для появи штучного голоду 1946 р. Констатовано, що введення надзвичайного стану було важливою ланкою в перебудові системи влади і державного управління СРСР в умовах воєнного часу, а основним органом розробки і реалізації заходів надзвичайного стану став ДКО з виключними повноваженнями в усіх сферах суспільно-політичного життя країни, економіці, сільському господарстві та транспорті.

Ключові слова: німецько-радянська війна, Державний Комітет Оборони, надзвичайний стан, військові об'єкти, стан облоги.

The Problem Statement. The research elucidates the features of the state of emergency taking place across the Soviet territory during the German-Soviet War. The interest in this problem is not random due to the socio-political situation existing in modern Ukraine. This refers to the aggression of the Russian Federation, attempts of some political groups to destroy the Ukrainian statehood and to intensify crisis phenomena in the social and political life, economy and other areas. One of the means for countering such phenomena is the imposition of special period or state of emergency which must ensure public safety, the functioning of the state authorities, enterprises, and organizations. At the same time, it is important to mark that theoretical issues of the history of the emergency state is an underexplored problem which requires in-depth study. In this regard, there is a need to turn to historical experience and to study the special aspects of the operation of martial law during the German-Soviet War (1941 – 1945).

The analysis of sources and recent researches shows that the issue of imposition of the state of emergency was considered by historians, lawyers, policy analysts, public administration experts. Among them, particular attention is paid to the works of D. Bondarenko (Bondarenko, 2005), T. Vronska, O. Lysenko and O. Shandra (Vronska, Lysenko & Shandra, 2017), A. Wood (Wood, 2004), V. Hrynevych (Hrynevych, 1991), D. Glantz (Glantz, 2001), O. Deryugin (Deryugin, 2007), M. Koval (Koval, 1999), A. Limanskaya (Limanskaya, 2015), R. Overy (Overy, 1998), I. Patrilyak (Patrilyak, 2016), G. Roberts (Roberts, 2006), O. Cherepanova (Cherepanova, 2005), etc. The particularity of these works is a fragmentary consideration of the history of the state of emergency during the German-Soviet War as the above researches were devoted to the development of more general problems. As a result, this issue needs more thorough and systemic study.

The purpose of the article isto analyze the features of imposition and implementation of the state of emergency in the USSR during the German-Soviet War (1941 – 1945).

The Statement of the Basic Material. The outbreak of the German-Soviet War necessitated the essential changes in the activities of public and administrative authorities of the USSR. There was a need to reorganize the functioning of state authorities, to switch economy and the agricultural sector to a war footing, to mobilize the population, to provide the army with military equipment, food-stuffs, other auxiliary aids and to ensure effective performance of all enterprises.

One of the means for the solution of the above task was the imposition of the state of emergency through which the re-organization of the activity of the defense industry, transport and all material and military resources of the country was carried out. The decision concerning the imposition of the state of emergency was adopted according to Art. 49 (n) of the Constitution of 1936, which authorized to proclaim martial law in separate localities or throughout the USSR in the interests of the defense of the state or for the purpose of ensuring a public order and state security. Based on this constitutional provision, the Decree of the Supreme Council of the USSR as of June 22, 1941 “On Martial Law” was adopted.

The issue of the imposition of the state of emergency in that historical period was considered by Soviet scientists very briefly, but there were some best practices of such pre-revolutionary lawyers as V. M. Gessen, I. A. Shendzykovskiy, V. F. Deriuzhynskiy. For example, Ya. M. Magaziner stated that the government imposes the state of emergency when the current legislation can't combat crisis phenomena (Magaziner, 1911, p. 56).

In the regions where martial law was proclaimed, all functions of the state authorities in the sector of defense, maintenance of public order and national security were delegated to the

councils of front lines, armies, military districts, and in case of their absence – to command authority of military formations. As para. 1 marked, all local authorities, establishments, organizations and enterprises were obliged to provide resounding support to military leaders through using powers and means for defense needs and keeping public order. In O. O. Deryugin's opinion, the feature of the state of emergency taking place in the USSR during the German-Soviet War was the delegation of the state powers of emergency nature related to all areas of the social life (Deryugin, 2007, p. 47). Thus, according to para. 3 of the Decree, the military authorities were granted the right to involve citizens in labor service to carry out defense activities, security of critical objects, deployment of military units and establishments, as well as to proclaim transport and cartage obligation for military purposes.

In order to keep the public order and security, military authorities could take the following measures: to regulate the working hours of establishments and enterprises; to hold some sessions, meetings; to organize a transport-pedestrian movement in particular places; to impose a curfew; to organize entry and exit of the population in the areas proclaimed martial law; to evict socially dangerous people from the territory proclaimed martial law. In addition, the military authorities were empowered to issue the decisions obligatory for the entire population and to fix an administrative penalty in the form of imprisonment for up to 6 months or fine of up to 300 karbovanets for their violation; to give instructions to the local bodies, governmental organizations and to demand from them unconditional and immediate execution (fig. 1).

In general, the Decree delegated all powers in the area of maintenance civic order and security to the military authorities that often caused the malpractice and infringement of the citizen's rights. As D. V. Bondarenko marks, a wartime situation resulted in the emergence of such phenomena as breach of orders, abandonment of workers and servants of their duties, under-performance of workdays by kolkhoz members and deliberate non-delivery of radio receivers (Bondarenko, 2005, p. 12).




Fig. 1. Powers of the military authorities during the state of emergency according to the Decree of the Supreme Council of the USSR as of June 22, 1941

The Decree strengthened the criminal liability for crimes committed by military servants; for the avoidance of performance of general military service duty; for illegal purchase, sale

and possession of weapons, as well as theft of weapons. According to the war law (para. 6), perpetrators were subjected to a criminal liability for the failure to execute instructions and orders of the military authorities and for the crimes committed in the localities proclaimed the martial law. The military authorities were additionally granted the right to submit cases of speculative trading, gross misconduct and other crimes for consideration by military tribunals if a command group deemed it necessary under the circumstances of martial law.

The fact that the Decree contained the Law as of August 7, 1932 “On the Protection of Public (Socialist) Property”, which tragically remained in the national memory entitled “The Law of Five Spikelets”, generates interest. As V. V. Halunko states, the world history can’t find the more insidious, inhumane, anti-human official document under which hungry children aged twelve, who were caught at corn field collecting as little as a handful of spikelets, were subjected to imprisonment for 10 years, and adults were sentenced to shooting death for that sort of offence (Halunko, 2008, p. 47). According to the scientist’s data, 55 thousand people were convicted under that law, 2110 of them – to the extreme penalty.

The imposition of the state of emergency required the deployment of armed forces that caused a need to mobilize the population. A complex of measures designed to complete the army up to the authorized war strength was conducted based on the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR “On the Mobilization of Men Liable for Call-Up...” as of June 22, 1941 (Sbornikzakonov, 1956, pp. 213–215). The action uptook place in Leningrad, Baltic, West, Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Oryol, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Ural, Siberia, Volga, North Caucasus and Transcaucasian military districts. Men liable for call up who were born from 1905 to 1918 inclusively, i.e. men of the most energetic age – from 22 to 36 years, were subjected to mobilization. The performance of such activity in the context of the Soviet system had some special aspects: a large scale and high rates of mobilization of designated military personnel; mobilization of women to rear-based units of the Red Army; deployment of a voluntary movement in the form of divisions of the people’s volunteer corps; quick creation of combat formations.

The Nazi Germany was thoroughly preparing to attack the USSR and many diversion units, which had crime partners among the locals, were acting at the frontier. Consequently, the next step for ensuring the state of emergency was the adoption of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR as of June 22, 1941 “Regulation on Military Tribunals in the Localities Proclaimed Martial Law and Combat Areas”. The Decree facilitated the procedure of holding liable and reduced the terms for considering such cases. The military tribunal took up the case for 24 hours without involving defense counsels, witnesses’ testimony were rarely heard, and citizens didn’t have the right to appeal against decisions. The tribunals’ judgments came in force since the proclamation and were implemented promptly for 3 hours. Commanders and military councils of districts, front lines and armies were authorized to suspend the execution of the judgment on the death penalty. A similar document had been adopted as of 22.11.1917 in the form of the Decree “On Court No 1” approved by the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Russia where by the Military Revolutionary Tribunals had been established to hear cases of espionage, outrages, robberies, sabotage and hooliganism.

Under the framework of the imposition of combat activities, there was a need to take emergency measures through increasing output of military goods that was implemented by switching economy to a war foot. The motto of such actions was a slogan: “Everything for the front! Everything for Victory!”. To realize the ideas, it was adopted the Decree of the

Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR “On the Working Hours of Workers and Employees during War Time” as of June 26, 1941. That document stipulated the cancellation of weekends and holidays, introduction of the obligatory overtime work, engagement of child labor, and arbitrary departure of the workplace was equated to desertion and considered as a crime, which meant punishment and referral of a case to the Military Tribunal.

On the first days of the war, the Red Army suffered crushing defeats in the Baltics, Belarus and central Ukraine: the Nazis seized Kaunas – June 23, Vilnius – June 24, Minsk – June 28, Bobruisk – June 29, Lviv – June 30. The Regulation of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks (TsK VKP (b)) No. 825 created the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR consisted of S. K. Tymoshenko (Chairman), H. K. Zhukov, J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. Ie. Voroshilov, S. M. Budonnyi, N. H. Kuznetsov. The body of command control couldn’t establish the connection with military forces and wasn’t informed about actions at the front. The beforementioned fact is proved by the book of H. K. Zhukov, which states that on June 29, 1941, J. V. Stalin twice visited the People’s Commissariat of Defense and Headquarters of the High Command in person, and both times he reacted very sharply to the situation in the western strategic direction (Zhukov, 2002, p. 101). Under such conditions, the need to create more effective center, which should manage armed forces and economic sectors in the context of the emergency state, arose. That circumstance was caused by a catastrophic situation at the front in the form of a blockade of the Soviet troops in the area of Bialystok and Minsk which faced the main bodies of the Western Front. As O. Isaev notes, according to the German data, 300338 of Soviet soldiers felt prisoner of two mousetraps, and according to the Soviet sources, about 200000 of military servants were captured that confirmed major losses of the Red Army during the first days of the German-Soviet War (Isaev, 2005, p. 125). The State Defense Committee (GKO) established on June 30, 1941 was that kind of the body. Its orders, directives and decrees had a status of the wartime laws including obligatory and unconditional execution by all state, the Soviet bodies without exceptions. The body was primarily headed by S. K. Tymoshenko and later by J. V. Stalin, and it consisted of V. M. Molotov (Deputy Chairman), K. Ie. Voroshilov, H. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beria, from February 1942 – A. I. Mikoian, M. O. Voznesenskyi and L.M. Kahanovych. The State Defense Committee didn’t have its executive office and exercised control through the executive offices of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and TsK VKP(b): draft decrees and orders were elaborated by the relevant people’s commissariats and offices, and paperwork was conducted by the special sector of the Central Committee of the Party. The Soviet historical literature mainly studied the activities of GKO as a body secured the implementation of defensive measures during the German-Soviet War, but as the Ukrainian historian I. K. Patryliak states, the government organized a devastating artificial famine, carried out massive deportations, exiles, “cleanings” based on the GKO Resolutions (Patryliak, 2016, p. 178).

When establishing GKO, it was used the historical experience of the alike body which had been operating during the Civil War entitled the Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defense (SRKO) formed by the Resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee as of November 30, 1918. The agency had been the special military and economic center of the Soviet Russia controlling the activities of the Revolutionary Military Council, other military agencies, sectors of economy and transport. According to A. A. Fomin, the consideration of the history of the Soviet Russia permits highlighting three types of the state of emergency:

1) martial law at the front; 2) martial law at “peaceful” regions”; 3) the state of emergency which could be imposed in any region of the country (Fomin, 2006, p. 25).

One of the elements of the German military doctrine was the use of massive bombings to weaken and destroy the enemy’s defense. Such tactics significantly helped the German army to win in Poland, Belgium, France and Yugoslavia. It is clear that the experience was used in the war against the USSR when aircraft of the German air fleets inflicted massive attacks on the positions of the Soviet troops. Consequently, during the first hours of the war, there were bomb attacks on Minsk, Zhytomyr, Sevastopol, Kaunas and Kyiv, which were bombed 5 times on June 22, 1941. The Nazis dropped 90 blast and incendiary bombs on the Ukrainian capital. Thus, it caused the urgent need to prepare the population for military actions and civil defense that was realized through the Resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union as of 02.07.1941 No.1812 “On General Obligatory Preparation of the Population for Air Defense”, which engaged all citizens aged 16 to 60.

Simultaneously with military advance, the German command was taking ideological measures aimed at misguiding the population of the USSR. To fulfill the assigned task, they used various means: leaflets, radio broadcasts, spreading rumors, appealing to bear arms against Bolsheviks authorities in different cities of the country. With a view of the prevention of negative influence on the population, information on the retreat of the Red Army, the following documents were adopted under the framework of the realization of the state of emergency. It referred to the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR as of July 6, 1941 “On Liability for Spreading Rumors at War Time Causing Anxiety of the Population” whereby criminal liability in the form of imprisonment for up to 5 years was established for such actions. Subsequently, according to the letter of the People’s Commissariat, shooting death was introduced if the actions involved calls for the subversion of the current state system”. As M. V. Belanyuk states, the success of the Wehrmacht, from the standpoint of the Soviet government, required neutralizing and performing counterpropaganda, so the information must be classified for the population (Belanyuk, 2011, p. 135). At the same time, the decree neglected the human rights because the law didn’t clarify the concept “rumors,” which could be understood as citizens’ opinion on some issues. In other words, the interpretation of the term provided fertile ground for the penal staff of the USSR of that time. The further step was the Decree of GKO No. 37 “On Measures for Strengthening Political Control of Post and Telegraph Correspondence” which established military censorship that was entitled to withdraw citizens’ letters, any correspondence and to bring addressers to responsibility. Another step was the Decree as of 25.06.1941 No. 1750 “On Delivery of Radio Receivers and Radio Transmitters by the Population”. As S. A. Vaupshasov notes, after the liberation of the territory from the Nazi invaders, people who had radios and informed the population about the victories of the Red Army were awarded the Order of the Great Patriotic War II degree (Vaupshasov, 1961, p. 78).

In the early phases of the war, the activities of public authorities took place under the conditions of a mass evacuation of valuable property and population. To solve the above tasks as well as to stand against spies and saboteurs, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the merger of the People’s Commissariat of State Security of the USSR and the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR into the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD) was adopted. According to T. Iu. Stepanov, that kind of decision afforded to focus on the fight against the hostile agency and crime, to strengthen protection of a public order (Stepanov, 2010, p. 256).

To perform intelligence work in the rear of the Red Army, the German military intelligence service “Abwehr” actively involved such national and social groups as prisoners of war, defectors and others. Trainees of those institutions entered Soviet territory with reconnaissance and sabotage missions to carry out insurrection activities at the front line and in the rear of the Red Army. Taking into account the need to react against the actions of invaders, GKO adopted the Decree No. 433 as of August 8, 1941 “On the Protection of the Most Important Industrial Enterprises” whereby the supreme authority obliged NKVD to participate in strengthening the protection of such facilities.

In the context of the state of emergency, the Soviet leadership decided to fully involve all workers of the country in the defense actions and consequently, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR as of December 26, 1941 “On the Responsibility of Workers and Employees of Military Industry Enterprises Unauthorized Departure of Enterprises” was adopted. The document stated that the unauthorized departure of workers and employees from enterprises of the specified industries, including evacuated ones, should be considered as desertion, and persons guilty of unauthorized departure (desertion) should be punished by imprisonment for a term from 5 to 8 years. As the prominent English scientist Newton Scott writes, the foundation of the Soviet model of the state of emergency was the use of lawlessness, violence, terror and threats to family members, who become hostages of the Soviet system (Newton, 2015, p. 67).

During the first period of the war, there was a critical situation with the provision of troops with weapons, ammunition, supplies and other equipment. As a result of the retreat of the Red Army, losses of weapons and ammunition were severe in the first months of the war. According to the data provided by M. I. Meltyukhov, in the Baltic, Byelorussian, and Kyiv districts, several thousand wagons of ordnance supplies gathered in the district warehouses were lost during 10 days of the war. There were 6838 wagons of weapons and ammunition, incl. 442 wagons of artillery ordnance, 5814 wagons of ammunition, 181 wagons of small arms, 401 wagons of various ordnance materials at 17 blown-up warehouses of the mentioned districts (Meltyukhov, 2008, p. 67). To preserve military equipment, GKO adopted the Resolution No. 1379 as of 03.03.1942 “On the Protection of Military Equipment of the Red Army in War Time”. Liability for thievery, willful damage, loss, leaving unattended, violation of the precautions of storage of military supplies, weapons, tactical equipment was introduced. Taking into account the diversity of activities of the public authorities during the state of emergency, they were systematized (table 1).

Taking into account heavy losses of the Red Army and the necessity to make up for them, the Decree of GKO “On Universal Compulsory Military Training of the Citizens of the USSR” was issued on September 7, 1941. The reason for drafting the document was heavy losses of the Red Army as according to M.V. Filimoshin’s data, they amounted to 5187200 people killed or dead from wounds for 1941 – 1945. During the first period of the war, the Red Army lost 3.9 million people, of whom almost 2.8 million were taken prisoner, and the total loss of that period was estimated at 11285000 people (Filimoshin, 1999, p. 95). Thus, to prepare the reserve force for the Red Army, GKO approved to introduce a compulsory military training of male citizens of the USSR aged 16 to 50 years from October 1, 1941. Foremost, conscripts born in 1923 and 1924 and military reservists (among the untrained) under the age of 45 were covered. Training organization was entrusted to the People’s Commissariat of Defense (GKO) and its local agencies. As a part of GKO of the USSR, it was formed the Central Department of Universal Military Training (Vsevobuch) and Vsevobuch agencies in

districts and regional (krai and republican) military commissariats. Local party organizations were offered to carry out in-service training. In years of the war, a total number of citizens undergone the universal military training was 9862 people.

Table 1

Normative legal acts designed to regulate the state of emergency during the German-Soviet War

Document title	Date
Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On Martial Law"	22.06.1941
Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "Regulation on Military Tribunals in the Localities Proclaimed the Martial Law and Combat Areas"	22.06.1941
Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR "On the Working Hours of Workers and Employees during War Time"	26.06.1941
Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union No.1812 "On General Obligatory Preparation of the Population for Air Defense"	02.07.1941
Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR "On Liability for Spreading Rumors at War Time Causing Anxiety of the Population"	06.07.1941
Decree of GKO No. 37 "On Measures for Strengthening Political Control of Post and Telegraph Correspondence"	06.07.1941
Decree of GKO No. 433 "On the Protection of the Most Important Industrial Enterprises"	8.08.1941
Decree of GKO No.690 "On Universal Compulsory Military Training of the Citizens of the USSR"	17.09.1941
Decree of GKO No.1379 "On the Protection of Military Equipment of the Red Army in War Time"	03.03.1942
Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union "On Procedure of Involvement of Citizens in Labor Service in Wartime"	10.08.1942
Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR "On the Imposition of Martial Law at Sea and River Transport"	9.05.1943
Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR "On Invalidation of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council on Proclamation of Martial Law in Specific Localities of the USSR"	25.09.1945

In the summer of 1942, there was a critical situation due to the entrapment of a large group of the Soviet troops near Kharkiv that caused the crushing defeat of the South-Western front, losses of military hardware and ammunition. To increase the manufacture of military goods, the Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union No. 1353 as of 10.08.1942 "On Procedure of Involvement of Citizens in Labor Service in Wartime" was adopted. From the perspective of the development of historical studies, the fact that a similar resolution was in force in the time of the Civil War is of interest. Thus, the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense had adopted the Resolution "On Natural, Labor and Cartage Duty" as of November 19, 1919 whereby all male citizens aged from 35 to 50 and females aged from 18 to 40 had been subjected to the labor duty for storage, loading and unloading of fuel.

With a view to extend martial law to the transport sector, which played important role in providing the front with necessary supplies, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR as of May 9, 1943 "On the Imposition of Martial Law at Sea and River

Transport” was adopted (Sbornikzakonov, 1956, pp. 213–215). Thus, all 14 shipping lines, 51 sea ports, 27 ship repair factories and other enterprises of the industry were mobilized to resist the enemy. In the course of the war, about 200 ships of the North-West River Shipping Line were mobilized to the Navy and re-equipped into combat ships, auxiliary hospital and ambulance vessels. More than two-thirds of the combat ships of Ladoga warship flotilla consisted of the re-equipped troopships of the North-Westbasin and near 500 ships were assembled in Tuapse port to muster defense of Novorossiysk. Detached forces of ships of mobilized and rapidly armed tug-boats, passenger ships, boats and barges managed to develop a wide variety of activities in a short time: to assist military units, to get troops cross rivers, to contribute to the evacuation of the population and valuable objects. Another part of the Navy vessels was directly engaged in the naval operations to provide such embattled bases as Odesa, Sevastopol, Kerch with service ammunition or to maintain the evacuation of wounded and civilians. Based on the above document, the river fleet of the USSR transferred to the military river flotillas and partially provided transport support for all internal waterways of the Soviet Union. According to the Decree, all employees were equated to mobilized soldiers and subjected to the requirements of military discipline prohibiting arbitrary dismissal from work and stipulating strict responsibilities.

A distinctive feature of the history of the development of the state of emergency during the German-Soviet War was the fact of operating of the Supreme Council of the USSR and its Presidium – the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR, as well as people’s commissars and agencies, republican and local authorities. In practice, such a situation caused the doubling of activities of the mentioned authorities; however, GKO carried out defense management through ongoing public authorities. The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR made major decisions of the wartime concerning the state building, formation of new government agencies, organization and structure of the armed forces, ratification of the international agreements, military activities. At the same time, it worth noting that Chairman of the Supreme Council of the USSR, some members of the Council of People’s Commissars formed a part of Politburo and GKO, so practically they managed to agree upon the decision-making mechanism.

The institution of representatives, special committees, councils and commissions, which were functioning almost in 60 cities of the country to solve the most important problems, to accomplish mobilization plans, to organized the evacuation of people and enterprises, were formed under GKO. Such committees were composed of the secretary of regional committee or municipal TsK VKP(b) as chairman, chairmen of the relevant executive committees, representatives of a military command, head of the NKVD office and the others. In some cases, it was established special committees, for example, emergency control body – Defense Committee of Leningrad under the leadership of A. A. Zhdanov, which was formed on July 1, 1941. Similar bodies were created in other cities but entitled differently – defense headquarter, Committee for Defense Affairs, Committee for Defense Activity etc.; however, in that historical period, a form of defense committees, which were subsequently generalized and fixed in the GKO decrees, were created. According to V. A. Hrynevych, after the liberation of Ukraine, the experience of activities of the Defense Committees was used when establishing the People’s Commissariat of Defense of the Ukrainian SSR, which was entrusted to control the formation of military reserves, to provide the deployed troops with food and to maintain their military training (Hrynevych, 1991, p. 33).

The concepts “martial law” and “state of siege” differ in the content; for example, A. E. Lunev considers the state of siege as a type of martial law the imposition of which

is associated with some factors as well as special specific conditions (Lunev, 1961, p. 58). During the German-Soviet War, the following cities were in the state of siege: from August 8, 1941 – Odesa, from October 20, 1941 – Moscow, from October 26 – Tula, from October 29 – the Crimea. The Decree of GKO as of October 19, 1941 “On the Imposition of the State of Siege in Moscow and Surroundings Areas” marked that from October 20, 1941, street traffic from 24.00 till 5.00 was forbidden, and strict measures for order maintenance in the city and suburban areas were introduced. Violators of the regime were allowed to be held liable with subsequent case referral to the Military Tribunal, and provocateurs, spies, enemy agents, who call for disorderly conduct – to execute on the spot.

The study of the state of emergency shows that in Moscow such its form as the state of siege was introduced by the GKO decree and in other cities – by the decree of local Defense Committees. In early August of 1941, Odesa was entirely ringed by Hitler’s army and thus, the Decree of the Defense Committee “On the Introduction of the State of Siege” was adopted on August 8, 1941.

In general, one can determine that the special state is a form of martial law with exceptional restrictions on the rights of citizens, their involvement in defense activity, bans on moving from one workplace to another and restrictions on travel and correspondence. In O. V. Cherepanova’s opinion, the imposition of the state of emergency played a critical role in the national defense, military training and patriotic education of the young population and its training for military service (Cherepanova, 2005, p. 41). The annulment of martial law in the USSR after war termination was gradual. The first step was the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR as of July 7, 1945 “On Amnesty in Connection with the Victory over Hitler’s Germany”, which canceled all unset administrative fines and unenforced administrative penalties stipulated by para. “a” of Art. 4 of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR as of June 22, 1941 “On Martial Law”. Martial law was abolished in most parts of the country by the adoption of the Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR as of September 25, 1945 “On Invalidation of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council on Proclamation of Martial Law in Specific Localities of the USSR”.

The Conclusions. The imposition of the state of emergency was a crucial element in the rebuilding of the government system and public administration of the USSR under the conditions of martial law, and its practical implementation was the creation of GKO on June 30, 1941, which generated a new government system. The authority body adopted regulatory acts that became the laws of wartime and were subjected to obligatory and unconditional execution. The restructuring of the governance system for the state of emergency during the German-Soviet War (1941 – 1945) was conducted at two stages: 1) a change within the central authorities; 2) a change within the regional ones. At the country level, in the early days of the war, it was established the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR subsequently transformed in the State Defense Committee (GKO) with exclusive powers in all area of the domestic social and political life, economy, agriculture and transport sector. The activities of the regional authorities under the conditions of the state of emergency were performed according to the GKO decrees and aimed at solving the assigned tasks.

Historical events related to the retreat of the Red Army, heavy loses of troops and property as well as the need to run mobilization, defense training of the population, change of working conditions, strengthening of the protection of military facilities, responsibility for spreading

rumors causing anxiety of the population and responsibility for avoidance of mobilization influenced the content of the adopted GKO decrees.

The issue of imposition of different forms of the state of emergency was solved by the local Defense Committees which were formed to stand against the Nazi invaders. They were obliged to maintain order in the cities, to involve the population in defense activities, to form new military units and to secure the manufacture of military goods.

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