THE POST-GREAT WAR SETTLEMENT OF 1919 AND UKRAINE

Abstract. The aim of the research is to answer the question why the Ukrainian national state did not obtain the international support and assistance after the Great War, though a national self-determination was one of the guiding principles of the new international settlement. The research methodology is based on the global history approach and a study of primary sources, such as the documents of Paris Peace Conference, a diplomatic correspondence, and the works of the participants and contemporaries of the Conference. The scientific novelty of the article consists in developing and upgrading the previous conclusion concerning the Great Power’s position on Ukraine in 1919, based on a set of new available primary sources and the global history approach. The research puts discussions and decisions of Paris Peace Conference on Ukraine into a wider international context and considers the interests of different international actors, not only Ukraine, to avoid a national bias.

The Conclusions. The author argues that the Ukrainian nation state did not fit in the Principal Powers’ strategic considerations of the post-war period, namely, addressing the Bolshevik westward expansion, restoring Russia’s legitimate authority and unity, and a shaping of the European security system. Moreover, after the Bolsheviks’ rule was established in the Ukrainian territory of the former Russian Empire, Great Powers did not believe that Ukrainian national institutions were viable. Secondly, the territorial conflicts between the new states, including Poland and Ukraine, demonstrated that the principle of a national self-determination was hardly implemented, and it did not ensure the primary goals of the post-Great War settlement. Though the Principal Powers sought to find a fair solution to the Eastern Galician issue, finally their strategic considerations prevailed over the principle of a national self-determination.

Key words: Post-Great war settlement, 1919, Paris Peace Conference, national self-determination, Ukraine, Dyrectoria, Eastern Galicia.
The Problem Statement. On January 18, 1919, the Peace Conference was opened in Paris to make peace and to establish a new, more just and secure world order. Like other nations that had emerged at the territories of the disintegrated empires, the two Ukrainian republics, founded at the territories of the former Russian Empire and Austria-Hungary, sent their representatives to Paris to obtain international recognition and the Great Powers’ support. Just three days after the official opening of the Conference, they solemnly proclaimed their unification into a single Ukrainian national state – the Ukrainian People’s Republic. Most of all, the Ukrainians believed in the principle of a national self-determination, proclaimed by the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and adopted by the Entente Powers. However, the Ukrainian national state did not obtain any international support and assistance.

The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches. The research is based on a study of the documents of Paris Peace Conference, such as the proceedings of the Supreme War Council, the Council of Ten, the Council of Four, and the Council of Foreign Ministers, and diplomatic correspondence, and the works of the participants and contemporaries of the Conference.

In the numerous academic works, related to the post-Great War regulation and published internationally, the case of Ukraine was largely neglected or presented briefly in the context of the Russian and Polish issues (Alston, 2006; Listikov, 2011; Biskupski, 2015). The contemporary Ukrainian historians studied mostly the Ukrainian diplomatic activities in Paris (Datškov, 2009, 2016; Holovchenko, 2017; Mashevskyi, 2017, 2018), and usually from Ukraine’s national perspective. However, the international context of 1919 is extremely important, as it provides a background for better understanding of the Great Power’s position on Ukraine (Gorodnia, 2019, Turchenko, Turchenko, 2019).

The Publication’s Purpose. This paper focuses on answering the question why the Ukrainian national state did not obtain the international support and assurance after the Great War though a national self-determination was one of the guiding principles of the new international settlement. The author seeks to develop and upgrade previous conclusions on the issue, and to shift the discussion above the Ukrainian-speaking academic environment.

This research is based on the global history approach, which offers to put the issue of the Great Powers’ decisions on Ukraine into a wider international context and consider the
interests of different international actors, not only Ukraine, to avoid a national bias. The paper investigates into the discussions and decisions of Paris Peace Conference on Ukraine during its major stage, in January – June 1919, and it focuses on Ukraine as a single unit, contrary to the often applied regional approach.

**The Statement of the Basic Material.** At the end of the Great War, the Ukrainian authorities faced a very complex situation. After the government of Ukrainian Central Rada signed the separate Brest-Lytovsk treaty with the Quadruple Alliance, the Entente nations broke any relations with Ukraine, which they established in November 1917 – January 1918. The territory of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and, since April 1918, the Ukrainian State was occupied by the German and Austrian troops, and the Entente nations regarded the Ukrainian national state as their satellite. They did not recognize independence of Ukraine and considered it a result of German’s intrigues to disintegrate Russia. To escape the negative consequences of the cooperation with Germany and its allies, on November 14, 1918, Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky proclaimed a new course for Ukraine to enter the federation with Russia after the victory over the Bolsheviks. The decision was caused by the Ukrainian diplomats’ contacts with the Entente representatives and their information that the victorious nations supported Russia’s revival and encouraged Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky to cooperate with the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces (Doroshenko, 2002, p. 408; Shemet, 1920, p. 75).

After Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky issued Federation Declaration, the Entente Powers seemed to favour cooperation with him in order to establish a strong legitimate government in Russia and to stop the Bolshevik expansion, which was expected to recommence after the end of the Great War and the withdrawal of German troops from Ukraine. In late November and December 1918, P. Skoropadsky was supported by the Allies’ Ministers at Jassy (Jaşi), Romania, via a series of joint telegrams they sent to Paris and to other capitals. They believed that the present system of government in Ukraine “should be supported as it represented the only organization, which could at present be utilized against Bolshevism” (FRUS, 1918, Russia, Vol. 2, 1932, p. 702). Besides, it provided opportunities for the reestablishment of order and the reorganization of Russia.

Indeed, the new course enabled P. Skoropadsky to establish relations with General Anton Denikin and other leaders of the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces for the joint efforts against the Bolsheviks. The Ministers supported Skoropadsky’s request for the immediate sending of Allies’ delegates to Kyiv and their battalions to Kyiv and Odessa, and the immediate occupation of the railroad to Odessa at the points of Zhmerynka and Birzula. They also sent their special delegate, the French Consul in Odessa Emil Henot, to Kyiv (FRUS, 1918, Russia, Vol. 2, 1932, p. 701).

On December 12, the U.S. Acting Secretary of State Frank Polk wrote that the Allied Powers other than the United States had issued a statement suggesting that the order in Ukraine should be restored by lending friendly support and assistance to the Hetman’s government. In his understanding, British and French troops were sent to Sevastopol and Odessa for this purpose (FRUS, 1918, Russia, Vol. 2, 1932, p. 703).

In the middle of December 1918, an Allied military mission (mostly of French and Greek troops) arrived at the ports of Odessa, Mykolaiv and Kherson to provide assistance to the local anti-Bolshevik forces. The Ukrainian authorities were expected to cooperate with the White Voluntary Army of General Denikin and to create joint anti-Bolshevik military forces. However, by the time of the Allies arrival, the Hetman had been overthrown in an uprising organized by the Dyrectoria, which was a proponent of Ukraine’s independence.
The Dyrectoria, which managed to create a large army under Symon Petliura’s command and proclaimed reestablishment of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, sought its participation in the post-war Peace Conference to obtain international recognition and support. On December 29, 1918, Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian People’s Republic issued the law to send an Extraordinary Diplomatic Mission to Paris to be a delegation on the Peace Congress (The Central State Archive of Supreme Authorities and Governments of Ukraine, f. 3696, d. 1, c. 6, pp. 2, 3). After proclamation of unification of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and Western Ukrainian Republic, they composed a united delegation to Paris. However, the Ukrainian representatives were not admitted to the Conference.

According to Volodymyr Vynnychenko, the only argument and the only tool of the Ukrainian delegation were the Fourteen Points by Woodrow Wilson, specifically those concerning a national self-determination (Vynnychenko, 1920, p. 410). Indeed, three articles of the Fourteen Points related to the Ukrainians directly or indirectly, namely, VI on Russia, X on Austria-Hungary and XIII on Poland. However, they did not promise any support to the Ukrainian independent state. Such provision related only to Poland, which should “include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish population” (Wilson, 1918). In the case of Russia, the reference to “the independent determination” related to the Russian Bolshevik authorities, but not the nations of the former Russian Empire. The analysis of the Fourteen Points also reveals the fact that they provided the Ukrainians of the former Austria-Hungary with better opportunities for their national self-determination than the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire, who were not provided with such opportunities. The issues discussions, related to the Ukrainians, at the Peace Conference corresponded to these Fourteen Points’ provisions.

Though the research groups, established by France, Great Britain and the United States to prepare for the post-War regulation, indeed used the concept of a national self-determination, the substance of the concept lacked precision. As a result, during the Peace Conference, the Great Powers used its different interpretations to suit their own purposes and to argue their points better, which hampered their collective decision-making. Besides, it quickly became clear that a national self-determination could not be taken as the sole guiding principle of the world settlement. Moreover, it was not clarified how to apply it as a practical political concept (Prott, 2014, p. 744).

The explanation why Ukraine was not suggested as a participant of the Conference is provided with the Skeleton Draft of Peace Treaty with an Appendix of the Powers to be its signatories, prepared by the U.S. research group Inquiry in December 1918. The document contained the major criteria for the admission to the Peace Congress. Besides being a belligerent nation, its government had to be recognized by the United States and the Allies. The government had to possess control over the situation in the country. It had to be a legitimate power and to have an authority to represent the views of the whole society, given by the Constitutional Assembly. Finally, it had to be a power able to implement the decisions of the Congress (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 1, 1942, p. 306). The Ukrainian authorities lacked all these characteristics.

Ukraine’s peace treaty with Germany and its Allies in Brest-Lytovsk, and the victorious powers’ support of Russia’s unity were also important factors. The Ukrainian People’s Republic was considered a part of Russia, which had been one of the major Entente Powers during the war. For that reason, the victorious nations, foremost France and the U.S., rejected the independence of nations of the former Russian Empire and promoted the idea
of the Russian Federation. However, what they needed most of all was stable and legitimate
governments to implement the resolutions of the Peace Conference.

The information about the army under S. Petliura’s command was very contradictory in
the European capitals and in Washington. For example, in some telegrams from Romania,
S. Petliura was called a Bolshevik or supported by the Bolsheviks (FRUS, 1918, Russia,
Vol. 2, 1932, pp. 704–706). At the meeting on January, 16, 1919 in Paris, the British Prime
Minister David Lloyd George stated that in Ukraine, where the Allies “had supposed a firm
Government had been established... an adventurer with a few thousand men had overturned
it with the greatest ease” (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 3, 1943, p. 582). According to the information he
obtained, the insurrection had a Bolshevik character, and its success made it clear that “the
Ukraine was not the stronghold against Bolshevism” that it had been imagined.

Similar information was provided by the former Danish Minister in Petrograd Harald
de Scavenius at the meeting on January 21. In his words, “the Bolsheviks tolerated Petliura,
because the troops supporting him were largely Bolshevik. The result of his rule had been
identical with that of Bolshevik rule in Great Russia” (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 3, 1943, p. 640).

As the Allied and Associated Powers did not understand the character of the Dyrectoria,
they did not trust the Ukrainian authorities, especially as they obtained negative information
about them from the Russians and the Poles. As Marshal Foch stated at the meeting of the
Council of Four on March 19, 1919, he was not sure on what terms the Allies were with the
Ukrainians, “were the latter friends or enemies” (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 411).

After the Ukrainian delegation was not admitted to the Conference, it stayed in Paris and
communicated with the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers by means
of notes and memoranda, and unofficial meetings. The Great Powers regarded two Ukrainian
states, founded at the territories of the former Russian Empire and Austria–Hungary, as parts
of the Russian and Austrian legacies, and therefore, as parts of the Russian and Polish issues.

In 1919, the Russian problem included two major issues. Firstly, it was the restoration
of peace and legitimate government in Russia. The Great War was not considered ended
while Russia remained at war. Secondly, it was a question of dealing with the Bolsheviks.
The Bolsheviks’ westward expansion was the major danger to the fragile armistice with
Germany. Besides destabilization of a domestic situation in different countries under the
slogan of “world revolution”, there was a possibility that the Russian Soviet and German
Socialist governments would cooperate and the hostilities would recommence. In Marshal
Foch’s opinion, the Allies could lose the war if they did not find the appropriate decision to
the Russian problem. That would happen if Germany managed the problem according to its
own interests, or if anarchy disseminated further (Seymour, 1944, с. 259).

At the beginning of the Conference, the Principal Powers had two different approaches
to the Russian problem. One of them was presented by Great Britain, and supported by the
United States. Another approach was promoted by France and supported by Italy.

The leaders of Great Britain and the United States doubted that the Bolsheviks’ advance
could be checked by arms and were inclined to reach some kind of compromise between
different Russian political groups, including the Bolsheviks. On January 3, 1919, the British
government initiated to invite representatives of various Russian governments, including the
Soviet government, to Paris to explain their position and to discuss conditions of a permanent
settlement after they suspend hostilities at all fronts for the duration of the peace negotiations
(FRUS, 1919, Russia, 1937, p. 3). The initiative was a response to the peace proposal of the
Russian Bolshevik government, dated December 23, 1918 (FRUS, 1919, Russia, 1937, p. 1).
After the discussion on January 21–22, the leaders of the Principal Powers decided that the representatives of different Russian factions would meet their emissaries at the Island of Prinkipo in the Marmora Sea on February, 15. As a precondition for the meeting, their troops had to refrain from aggressive actions outside their own territory.

Only the Moscow Bolshevik government did accept the proposal to participate in the Prinkipo Conference (FRUS, 1919, Russia, 1937, pp. 39–42). However, it did not stop its offensive at the fronts. Moreover, until February 15 the Bolshevik Red Army had made the heaviest attacks. According to General Alby’s report on February 15, in Ukraine they advanced rapidly and had taken Kyiv, Kharkiv, Ekaterynoslav, a large part of Donetsk region. The Ukrainian national contingents had mostly dispersed or gone over to the Bolsheviks, and the Dyrectoria was about to take refuge in Galicia (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 12).

Other parties, including the Ukrainians, did not accept the Prinkipo proposal. The note from the Head of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission to Paris H. Sydorenko, dated February 10, stated: “The Ukrainian Government cannot take part in the conference ... unless the Bolshevik Government of Russia cease its military operations against the Republic of Ukraine... and also ... remove all its military forces from the Ukrainian front” (FRUS, 1919, Russia, 1937, pp. 69–70).

The rejection of the Prinkipo Conference by national governments and Russian anti-Bolshevik forces caused a negative reaction of the Principal Powers. On February 14, they had to admit that the Prinkipo proposal failed, and began to consider other options of dealing with the Bolsheviks. The British government increased its assistance to Russian anti-Bolshevik forces, especially under the command of General Denikin and Admiral Kolchak (Gorodnia, 2019, p. 66).

From the very beginning, the French government agreed on the Prinkipo proposal reluctantly, only to save the Allies’ unity. It maintained two views on the Russian policy. The first approach suggested uniting all anti-Bolshevik forces available to supply them with money, arms and military support and to organize their joint army to fight with the Bolsheviks. The second approach proposed establishing a strong barrier, or “cordon sanitaire” between Russia and Europe.

The Entente troops, which arrived at the Ukrainian ports to provide assistance to the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces, had to deal with the Dyrectoria as the de facto government of Ukraine. After some hesitations, the French military command (General Philippe d'Anselme and Colonel Henry Freydenberg) began to negotiate unofficially with the representatives of the Dyrectoria in Odessa, and later in Birzula. The negotiations lasted from the middle of January until the end of March 1919. In February 1919, when the Ukrainian army retreated under the Bolsheviks’ attacks and lost a significant part of its territory, the French requirements included establishing the protectorate of France over Ukraine (Gorodnia, 2017, p. 92). The Ukrainian army desperately needed assistance, therefore, after sharp political debate the demand was accepted on February 17 (Khrystiuk, 1922, pp. 102–103.).

On February 25, the Chief Commander of the Allied Forces Marshal Foch proposed a plan of warfare against Russian Bolshevism, which, however, was not accepted. According to it, the necessary troops could be obtained by mobilizing the Finns, the Poles, the Czechs, the Romanians, the Greeks, and the available Russian pro-Ally elements. Then, they should be placed under a joint command. He also proposed to constitute a chain of independent states of the Finns, the Estonians, the Poles, the Czechs and the Greeks to enable the Allies to impose their demands on the Bolsheviks (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, pp. 123–124).
In fact, the matter of negotiations between the French military command and the Dyrectoria correlated with the proposal. The command was interested only in the Ukrainian army as one of anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia. However, a support of the Ukrainian national state was not considered. According to H. Freydenberg, the question had to be decided at Paris Peace Conference (Margolin, 1934, p. 124).

Another approach of dealing with the Bolsheviks, which was promoted by France, suggested establishing a strong barrier, or “cordon sanitaire”, to separate Russia from Europe, especially Germany. The key component of the barrier was a strong Poland. As early as January 12, 1919, at the meeting of the Supreme War Council, Marshal Foch initiated to strengthen Poland to separate Germany and Russia, and to stop the Bolsheviks’ expansion to the West. However, on W. Wilson’s proposal, the decision was postponed until the Allied and Associated Powers agreed on a general policy on Russia (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 3, 1943, р. 472).

After the Prinkipo proposal failed, the French government enforced its politics of setting up a barrier between Russia and Europe, and increased its support to Poland, particularly in the Polish-Ukrainian military conflict for Eastern Galicia, a territory of the former Austria-Hungary.

The Supreme Council of the Conference began discussing the Eastern Galician issue on January 21, 1919, when Colonel House received a letter from the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland I. Paderewski. In the letter, he asked the Principal Powers to send a collective note to the Ukrainian Dyrectoria with a demand to stop military operations in Eastern Galicia and to evacuate Boryslav oil district. He also asked to send the Inter-Allied Commission to Warsaw to study the situation and to provide Poland with assistance in the form of weapons and ammunition (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 3, 1943, p. 663).

During the discussion of I. Paderewski’s letter, Marshal Foch proposed sending Polish “Blue” army under the command of General Haller, which was formed in France from Polish volunteers and former prisoners of war, to Russian Poland to defend it against the Bolsheviks. However, the proposal was not accepted. According to British delegates, it was difficult to get the Poles to accept a restricted program and to limit their actions to the protection of indisputable Polish territory against invasion from outside. Instead, the Polish government used the interval between the cessation of war and the decisions of the Peace Conference to claim districts outside Russian Poland, to which in many cases they had little right (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 3, 1943, pp. 673–674).

From the very beginning, while dealing with the Eastern Galician problem, the Great Powers had to address several important issues: firstly, to end the Polish-Ukrainian war; secondly, to provide the Eastern Galician population with the opportunities to realize their rights for a national self-determination; thirdly, to stop the Bolsheviks’ westward expansion, fourthly, to keep the Germans from resumption of military actions and, finally, to prevent establishment of cooperation between the Russian Bolsheviks and German Socialists, who possessed power after Wilhelm II’s abdication. We will focus on the key arguments that determined the Principal Powers’ decisions on the multifaceted problem.

First of all, Eastern Galicia was considered a part of Polish (not Ukrainian) issue. In late January, the Council of Ten established two commissions for Polish Affairs. One of them, the Inter-Allied Committee for Poland, headed by Joseph Noulens, was sent to Warsaw to study the situation and to provide the Polish government with advice. It had to warn the government against adopting an aggressive policy towards the neighbouring peoples and to make efforts to bring the current hostilities to an end (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 3, 1943, p. 839).
The second commission, namely the Committee for Polish Affairs under the presidency of Jules Cambon, had to work in Paris.

On February 15, the same day when the failure of the Prinkipo proposal was admitted, the president of the Conference G. Clemenceau informed the Council of Ten that the Germans attacked the Poles on a wide front. The Inter-Allied Committee of Warsaw requested to send General Haller’s division to Poland with the shortest possible delay (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 65). On February 21, the Principal Powers officially recognized I. Paderewski’s government. At the next meetings, they discussed the ways of transporting Haller’s Army to Poland. On March 11, they decided to appoint French General Paul-Prosper Henrys as the Chief of the Staff to the President of the Polish Republic to take command over the Polish military forces (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 317).

In Eastern Galicia, on February 24 the truce between Poland and Ukraine was reached under the mediation of the Inter-Allied Commission, headed by General Joseph Barthélemy. The demarcation line (“the line of Barthélemy”) left Lemberg (Lviv) and Drohobycz oil fields to Poland. The Ukrainians held it as inadequate to the military situation, and broke the truce agreement in four days after it was signed. In the middle of March, the Ukrainian army seized the railroad Lemberg–Przemysl. It was expected that Lemberg would fall soon. According to J. Noulens’ dispatches, “the very existence of Poland was in question” (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 380).

At the meeting of the Supreme War Council on 17 March, Marshal Foch proposed to transfer the Polish troops from France and Odessa to Lemberg immediately to defend the city from the Ukrainian army, and to strengthen them by the Romanian army. According to him, the scheme meant not only the continuation of the policy of “the creation of an independent Poland, and its support when threatened”, but also a creation of a nucleus of resistance against the Bolsheviks and a constitution of the most solid barrier against Bolshevism in Poland and Romania (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 383).

D. Lloyd George argued that Haller’s army had to defend Poland, however, no decision was reached that Lemberg should belong to Poland. He favoured using all sources of persuasion to bring about the temporary settlement of the dispute between the Poles and the Ukrainians in the same way as it had been done in the case of Teschen (between the Poles and the Czechs). In his words, S. Petliura was fighting against the Bolsheviks, but “now it was proposed to destroy him” (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 382). According to his information, the Bolsheviks were gaining ground everywhere in Ukraine, and were pressing on towards Odessa. As a result, the grain district fell into their hands. Finally, the Supreme War Council decided to enjoin, through the Warsaw Commission, the Ukrainian government to accept an armistice (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, pp. 385–386).

On March 19, the Council of Ten discussed two main options in dealing with the Ukrainians, namely, the use of force or all moral authority of the mediating Powers to impose their terms of armistice. Marshal Foch could not find any explanation to the phenomenon of the Ukrainian successful offensive in Eastern Galicia, except that the Ukrainians were in agreement with the Bolsheviks. D. Lloyd George, instead, suggested that the Ukrainian troops attacking Lemberg were composed of the local population, who fought to establish their independence. In his opinion, the majority of the population in Eastern Galicia was Ukrainian, and the country should, therefore, be attributed to them, unless very cogent reasons to the contrary existed (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, pp. 410–411). J. Cambon argued that not only the ethnological principle had to be taken into account, but also economic and strategic requirements that the
new Polish State were capable of life (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 414). President Wilson also considered necessary to satisfy the economic and strategic needs of Poland, its frontiers with Germany being his major argument (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, p. 419).

The Inter-Allied Commission in Warsaw recommended military action against the Ukrainians. However, the Council of Ten finally approved Dr. R. Lord’s suggestions to use diplomatic means, and to transfer the case under the direct authority of the Supreme Council of the Conference. It was agreed to build the truce upon the existing military status quo. That meant that the city of Lemberg and the Lemberg–Przemysl railway should be secured for Poland, and the Ukrainians should keep the oilfields that were in their hands (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, 1943, pp. 407–408).

The Ukrainian delegates in Paris met the decision enthusiastically, and accepted the conditions of the truce on March 22. The Polish government did not reply to the proposal, because it accepted only the armistice based on ‘the line of Barthélémy’. G. Sydorenko believed that it was the first victory of Ukraine at the Conference that happened because America took charge of the initiative of recognizing Ukraine (CSASAGU, f. 3696, d. 2, c. 280, p. 147).

Meanwhile, the successful Bolshevik offensive threatened the Allies’ troops in southern Ukraine. On March 25 and 27, the Council of Four discussed the question of their evacuation, and decided to support Romania, which was threatened by the Bolsheviks, instead of keeping Odessa. On April 4, British-French protocol was signed, according to which the French government rejected the agreement with the Dyrectoria and renewed relations with the leaders of the Volunteer Army. The Ukrainian army having lost its territory (of the former Russian Empire), the French militaries lost any interest in cooperation with it.

However, the Ukrainian diplomats in Paris believed that France decided to support Ukraine against the Bolsheviks in Eastern Galicia instead of the Black Sea coast. In May, they asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France to send a military mission to the territories under Ukrainian control to provide assistance to the Ukrainian army. The issue was discussed until late summer, but the mission was never sent (Margolin, 1934, pp. 145–147).

In April, the Council of Four agreed to establish an Inter-Allied Armistice Commission and addressed a telegram to I. Paderewski to persuade him to reach agreement with the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 5, 1946, p. 785. The Commission began its work at the end of April under the presidency of General Louis Botha. The Polish delegates and Ukrainian representatives were invited to several meetings of the Commission, though separately. The Ukrainian representatives accepted the terms of the armistice as they had been formulated by the Commission, with several minor objections. The Polish delegates, including I. Paderewski, referred to the struggle of Poland against Bolshevism in the eastern frontier, and a constant fear of a German attack from the west, and considered it necessary to build up a continuous eastern front which would allow a junction of the Polish and Romanian troops (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 5, 1946, p. 786).

On April 26, the president of the Commission on Polish Affairs J. Cambon reported to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Poland’s boundaries. It considered several options, including the establishment of an independent state in Eastern Galicia or an autonomous state under the control of the League of Nations, and the partition of Eastern Galicia between Poland and Ukraine. However, the Commission suggested that any of these options might result in the extension of the Russian frontier to the Carpathians, because Russia would undoubtedly extend its grip upon a weak Slav State. It was proposed to consider the political advantage of establishing a common frontier between Poland and Romania while securing a local autonomy
for Eastern Galicia. The U.S. Secretary of State R. Lansing agreed and recommended considering the question not only from the ethnic, economic and strategic point of view, but also from all other standpoints (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, p. 625).

On May 12, the Armistice Commission submitted an unofficial draft of the armistice agreement to the contending parties. The Ukrainians accepted it and the Poles rejected. On May 15, Haller’s army launched the general offensive at the Ukrainian front, in spite of the fact that, while being in Paris, I. Paderewski promised President Wilson to prevent Haller’s army from taking any part in the warfare against the Ukrainians (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, 1946, p. 196).

Since May 17 till June 5, the Council of Four discussed the military operations of the Haller’s army in Eastern Galicia and the measures to stop them. W. Wilson proposed to withdraw the representatives of Poland from the Peace Conference if it continued fighting (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 5, 1946, pp. 676–677). D. Lloyd George advocated the stoppage of food and munitions to Poland as a means of bringing the fighting to an end (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 5, 1946, p. 706). Two telegrams were sent to the Head of the Polish State General Pilsudski to warn him about the negative consequences of Haller’s offensive in Eastern Galicia to Poland. However, the leaders of the Principal Powers considered important not to suggest even a superficial idea that I. Paderewski was not being supported.

In I. Paderewski’s telegram to President Wilson, which was discussed by the Council of Four on May 19, he blamed the Ukrainians for the violation of the truce, and argued that any resistance of the government to satisfy the demands would cause a revolution in Poland. Though he was ready to resign, he believed that the action would not improve the situation (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 5, 1946, p. 713).

According to General Botha’s recommendations, on May 21 the Ukrainian delegates (G. Sydorchenko, V. Paneyko, M. Lozynsky, and D. Witowsky) were invited to speak at the meeting of the Council of Four. It was the only time that the representatives of Ukraine were heard by the Supreme Council of the Conference. Their major arguments were the principle of self-determination and the fight with Bolshevism. They also claimed for a complete national independence for a united Ukrainian State (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 5, 1946, pp. 776–779).

The same day, in discussion with British representatives, French General Le Rond argued that the continuous front, from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea, was essential for Poland’s safety against Bolshevism and there was a gap in the line, namely, the Ukrainian front, where communications were passing through between Lenin in Russia and Bela Kun in Hungary. If the Poles overthrew I. Paderewski and no other government could be established, the only alternatives were either to starve the Poles or to force them to become the Bolsheviks. President Wilson also believed that any extreme measures against Poland would lead to the downfall of the Paderewski government, and Poland would become Bolshevik and anarchic (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 5, 1946, pp. 780–781).

As a result of the discussion, on May 27 a telegram from the President of the Conference was sent to General Pilsudski, and its copy to General Haller, to stop the offensive in Eastern Galicia (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, 1946, pp. 70–71). The Supreme Council warned General Pilsudski that the Principal Allied and Associated Governments would not furnish Poland with supplies or assistance any longer if the Polish authorities were not willing to accept the guidance and decisions of the Conference (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, 1946, pp. 63–64). On May 28 General Pilsudski answered by a letter that offensive against the Ukrainians was General Haller’s complete responsibility and a result of the Diet’s support (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, 1946, p. 129). The same day G. Clemenceau informed the Council of Four that the Polish offensive against
the Ukrainians was successful (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, 1946, p. 83). The Council agreed to see
I. Paderewski on the subject at once. However, he returned to Paris to discuss the issue only on
June 5.

I. Paderewski claimed the whole territory of Galicia for Poland. He tried to convince the
Supreme Council that the Ukrainian-speaking population of Galicia was not Ukrainians, but
“the Ruthenians in Galicia”, who had a government other than the Dyrectoria (FRUS, PPC,
Vol. 6, 1946, p. 196). He also argued that in case of any essential changes in what had been
already granted to Poland, he would immediately resign, and there would be a revolution
in Poland (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, 1946, pp. 197–198). D. Lloyd George accused Poland in
imperialism and oppressing other nations. However, after sharp debates he finally admitted that
he and I. Paderewski had been very good friends and he only wanted the Poles to not annex
foreign population. As for the Ukrainians, in his words, he saw a Ukrainian only once. “It is the
last Ukrainian I have seen, and I am not sure that I want to see any more” (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6,
1946, p. 200).

When the Polish offensive in Eastern Galicia stopped, a quite different strategic situation
had been established. On June 12, the Council of Four discussed a line between Poland and
Ukraine. As far as the situation in Eastern Galicia was considered similar to Upper Silesia, the
same course was suggested to adopt, namely, to hold a plebiscite (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, 1946,

The Foreign Ministers discussed the settlement in Eastern Galicia at the meetings of June
18 and 25. Finally, it was decided to authorize Polish troops, including Haller’s army, to extend
their operations up to the River Zbrucz (a border with the former Russian Empire) and to
establish a temporary Polish civil government in Eastern Galicia. The government had to
preserve the autonomy of the territory and the political, religious and personal liberties of the
inhabitants as far as possible. In some period, not fixed in the resolution, plebiscite had to be
held in Eastern Galicia for the ultimate self-determination of the inhabitants as to their political
the decisions on June 25 and 27.

The Supreme Council of the Conference returned to the Eastern Galician issue in September
1919. Meanwhile, a catastrophic situation at the fronts made S. Petliura to seek for cooperation
with Poland at the expense of Eastern Galicia (Lozovyi, 2018, pp. 153–154). On November
21, the Principal Powers approved a compromise decision to grant Poland a 25-year mandate
in Eastern Galicia and to provide the Ukrainian population with a wide political and cultural
autonomy. However, in 1923 Eastern Galicia was included into Poland and its autonomy was
never implemented.

The Conclusions. First of all, the Conference did not consider the Ukrainian issue as a
separate integral case. It was considered as a part of Russian and Austrian–Hungarian legacies
and, therefore, integrated into other issues, mostly Russian and Polish ones. Secondly, the
Entente Powers and the United States never raised the question of Ukraine’s recognition and
support.

The post-Great War international environment was not favourable for the Ukrainian nation
state. It did not fit in the strategic considerations of the Principal Powers that included addressing
the Bolshevik westward expansion and the possibility of Germany resuming hostilities against
the victorious nations. The leaders of the Principal Powers trusted the Prime Minister of Poland
I. Paderewski and did their best to save his government. At the same time, they did not trust the
Ukrainian leaders, and they did not believe that the Ukrainian national institutions were viable.
Though the Principal Powers sought to find a fair solution to the Eastern Galician issue, their strategic considerations prevailed over the principle of a national self-determination.

Finally, the territorial conflicts between the new states with heterogeneous ethnic composition, including Poland and Ukraine, demonstrated that the principle of a national self-determination was hardly implemented. Moreover, its implementation did not ensure the primary goals of the post-Great War settlement, namely, lasting peace, international stability and the Principal Powers’ national security.

Prospects for a further research include a study of primary sources related to the negotiations between the Ukrainian diplomats and the Principal Powers’ delegates in Paris in May-August 1919, particularly concerning the possibilities of Petliura-Denikin cooperation, and the purchase of the military stocks from the U. S. Liquidation Commission.

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