
Abstract. The purpose of the research is to find out the organizational and functional features of the intelligence structures of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists foreign centers (1945 – 1950-ies), according to their tasks in the context of the interbloc and socio-political confrontation in the post-war World (during the Cold War). The methodology of the research is based on the principles of historicism and Ukrainocentrism, certain general scientific (analysis, synthesis, systematization) and special-historical (historical-comparative, historical-genetic) methods have been used, which made it possible to investigate the creation and activities of intelligence units of foreign centers of the
Ukrainian Nationalist Organization in connection with the historical events and processes that took place from the mid–1940-ies to the end of the 1950-ies. The scientific novelty consists in the fact of the very research on the creation of special intelligence units within the structure of foreign centers of the Ukrainian nationalists during the post–war period, their cooperation with Western special services, and the peculiarities of its personnel with the experience of secret anti–Soviet activities in the USSR.

The Conclusions. The intelligence activity of foreign centers of the Ukrainian nationalists was one of the least explored aspects of the nationalist movement and the history of national intelligence services. Intelligence training was carried out at the NATO’s Special Intelligence Centers. The main way to conduct reconnaissance was to send specially trained teams of emissaries and couriers across the border. According to the strategy of preparation for a possible global conflict with the USSR and the Communist bloc, the intelligence officers were tasked with gathering information about the armed forces and the military-industrial potential of the USSR, the secret anti-communist armed activities, the socio–political situation in the USSR and in the Soviet Union.

Key words: Intelligence, counterintelligence, special operations, the Ukrainian Nationalists Movement, foreign centers of the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), the Cold War, the NATO Special Services, the USSR Special Services.

The Problem Statement. In the post-war period, along with the existence of the anti-Soviet resistance movement in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Nationals’ Political Centers abroad emerged, which were aimed at the Soviet power overthrow and Ukraine’s state independence restoring primarily, while using all the means available to them at that time.

Among them of utmost importance were the intelligence, counterintelligence, special units’ operational and combat activities, which were introduced in the structure of foreign Organizations of Ukrainian Nationalists (first of all, OUN S. Bandera’s Foreign Units,
A. Melnyk’s Ukrainian Nationalist Party (PUNO), the Foreign Mission of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council). In addition to trying to support the military-political activities of the OUN’s armed underground in Western Ukraine, and (from August 1950-ies) to create a long-term perspective – the global war beginning between the NATO bloc and the Warsaw Pact Organization), their own illegal positions to undermine the Soviet power in the Ukrainian SSR, the Ukrainian Nationalists Movement (Ruh Ukrainskyh Natsionalistiv) intelligence units’ organization and activity were determined by the need to counter the intelligence and subordinated nationalists, the Ukrainian Nationalists Movement cooperation and its special forces with the foreign countries’ intelligence (on the territory and under the control of which they were located) on the backdrop of the Cold War unfolding and the inter-bloc confrontation in the world; of particular importance, which was acquired by reconnaissance and subversive and information-psychological confrontation in the conditions of gradual formation of missile-nuclear parity.

The Ukrainian Nationalists Movement (Rukh Ukrainskyh Natsionalistiv) of foreign units’ organizational and functional bases of the intelligence activities in-depth study will contribute to further researches on the Ukrainian military history current problems, as well as the past national and foreign special services.

The Analysis of Recent Researches. For the first time, the Ukrainian Nationalists Movement (Rukh Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv) special units’ of foreign centers research began with the operational and official purpose in the closed departmental publications conducted by the KGB officers of the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR, whose works retained their original significance to some extent (Burdyn, Khamaziuk 1955, Shulzenko, Khamaziuk, Danko 1963). S. Mudryk remains the leading diaspora researcher of the problem (Mechnik, 1919 – 2004), one of the OUN Security Service intelligence leaders (SS), who in a number of books described the organization, forms and methods of activity, the personnel selection and the OUN special forces personnel training during the period of the “Cold War” with a focus on confrontation with the USSR special services (Mechnyk. 1980; Mechnyk, 1989; Mudryk–Mechnyk, 1994).

The Ukrainian Nationalists Movement (Rukh Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv) foreign units’ intelligence work was covered in numerous works written by civilian scientists and the KGB intelligence officers of the USSR, who were specialists in counter-propaganda and “the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism critics”, which determined the historiography issue’s lacuna tendency (Dmytruk, 1980; Levenko, 1981; Rymarenko, 1968; Rzhezach, Tsurkan, 1988; Topolchuk, 1962; Troschchynskyi, 1983; Cherednychenko, 1978; Chubenko, Tumarkin 1978). The memoirs written by the OUN foreign units’ emissaries-intelligence officers, who were captured in the USSR and used in the operative games with the special services of the NATO states in 1951 – 1960 were published as the information and psychological confrontation attributes (Matviienko, 1962; Yaremko, Zhylavyi, Stefiuk, 1962). The issue raised in the article is one of the least explored areas of the National Special Services history and the Ukrainian Nationalists Movement (see: Viedienieiev, 2005; Viedienieiev, Lisov, 2016) and requires the impartial study based on the documentary legacy of the special services.

The purpose of the article is to investigate the foreign OUN centers intelligence structures’ organizational and functional peculiarities, determined by their tasks in the two socio-political worlds confrontation situation in the post-war world, based on the political and operational situation of the inter-bloc confrontation era in the post-war world (“the Cold War”).
The Statement of the Basic Material. After World War II, the Ukrainian foreign units were created in connection with the displacement of a large number of fighters for independent sovereign Ukraine beyond the boundaries of ethnic lands and the need for their unification. The basis of the Ukrainian military doctrine of the post-war period was proclaimed “the struggle for the Ukrainian Independent Sovereign State, and in the future – defense by the armed forces and protection of the Ukrainian state and its sovereign life” (Karyi, 1952, p. 11). At that time, the military doctrine was aimed at offensive war rather than defensive war and recognized various forms of war: guerrilla (partisan war), insurgent war, underground war, regular war, etc., and denied civil war, which was “based on the class struggle, interests of different parties, or groups fighting for power in the country itself” (Karyi, 1952, p. 11).

According to the special instruction issued by R. Shukhevych, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council Chairman, newly created in 1944, the armed underground, which arose from the ideological splicing of the OUN and the UPA, continued the activity in the territory of Ukraine (Seheda, 2012, p. 231). In 1947 the Ukrainian National Council was established with a structural unit of the Military Resource of the Executive Body, M. Kapustianskyi became the first head (Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva, 1994, p. 957). Military Resource – the Ministry of Defense analogue, said the continuation of the UNR Ministry of Defense activity of, initiated by S. Petliura (Z nakaziv resortu viiskovykh sprav, 1958, pp. 4–6). At the same time, there is a definition of functional orientation and organizational construction of special units, the foundations of which were laid in the time of war. At the initial stage (in September 1944 – August 1945), the OUN Special Forces (B) acted as “Foreign Intelligence” under the direction of Ye. Vretsona, and also performed counterintelligence and security functions. It was superseded by the Security Service Referee (State sectoral archive of Security Service of Ukraine – SSASSU, f. 3, d. 186, c. 1, p. 11).

A wide range of tasks in the field of intelligence and counterintelligence activities was determined by the OUN Foreign Units Conference VI (May 1953). Among them in the field of intelligence work were the task of collecting information about Ukraine by processing radio messages, the Soviet and foreign press, data on soviet science, obtaining information about the Soviet army, maintaining ties with the underground forces in Ukraine, training of the “revolutionary action” organizers, military training nationalists in special courses and in the armies of other countries, developing tactics for guerrilla-insurgent actions, etc. (SSASSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 8, pp. 110–111; pp. 299–303). The purpose of such work was to promote a political, economic, social crisis in the USSR, which would result in increased centrifugal forces and a multinational state would collapse, hence, Ukraine would withdraw from the federation (Seheda, 2012, p. 287).

Taking everything into consideration, the Security Service of the OUN Foreign Units main tasks were the following: to collect diverse information about the situation in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), to support the nationalist underground in Ukraine, to protect their environment from the intelligence and subversive activity of the Soviet Union’s intelligence services, and to create their own positions in other Ukrainian organizations abroad, counter-propaganda work (Albom skhem, 196,8 p. 8; SSASSU, f. 13, c. 490, pp. 248–249).

The OUN Foreign units had an extensive structure of cells(there were more than 3 thousand active participants by 1968). The leading core was the Foreign Units Wire (Munich), which included, in particular, the Security Service Referee and other special units.
There is information about the Security Service’s existence in the first postwar years in the “Intelligence Abstract”, the creation was initiated by M. Lebed in February 1946. Its structure consisted of the following departments:

“The Anti-Bolshevik Peoples and Political Information Department”, which the main goal was to acquire intelligence on the territory of the leading European states in order to determine their readiness to start a war against the USSR, to explore the possibilities of cooperation with the anti-Communist forces of the Baltic States and Eastern Europe in the interests of the fight against the USSR;

“The Bolsheviks and their Vassals Department”, which in kept touch with the underground forces in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), the “People’s Democracy” countries in the OUN’s and foreign’s intelligence interests;

“The Boyivka (Fighting) Department”, which paramount aim was to counteract the reconnaissance and subversion of the enemy, destruct their agents, protect the Wire’s (Provod) members.

The referrals’ structure acquired more functional branching gradually. According to the Ministry of State Security (MGB), the Soviet Union, there were the following intelligence and information orientation divisions: the Foreign Sector (the courier communication with Ukraine); Foreign Intelligence Referral Reported directly to the Provider Security Council in May 1951 (Burdyn, Khamaziuk, 1955, p. 95).

The Territorial Communications Referral (“K – Z”) was an important unit of the OUN Foreign Special Purpose Units. The Territorial Communications Referral maintained contacts with the underground forces in Ukraine, picked up and trained the intelligence emissaries in cooperation with the foreign intelligence, organized the USSR citizens survey who were abroad on the political, social, economic and military aspects of state life (Albom skhem, 1968, p. 8; Sbornyk materyalov, 1974, pp. 35–36).

The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council Leaders asked the Americans to help the Ukrainian agents learn the military affairs, foreign languages, acquire basic knowledge of the radio engineering, prepare them for work in the Red Cross, as well as provide necessary documents, personal weapons, money, typewriters, medicines, medical supplies, clothing, food, and suicide poisoning. In addition, the agents were in need of the secret radio stations in order to communicate in Ukraine

Due to the OUN foreign units referent M. Matviyenko, who was the German special service agent firstly, and since 1951 became the Soviet special service agent, (Bukhalo, 2017), the existence of a special secret headquarters for the preparation of the rally at the Territorial Communications and such special unit as “Bohon” became known: The preparation for Throwing Nationalist Armed Groups in the USSR during Special Period (Matviienko, 1962, p. 22).

Since the end of the 1950-ies, after the underground forces’ existence illusion disappearance in the USSR and the contacts revival between the Soviet Union and foreign countries (tourism, visits to relatives abroad, business trips, cultural exchange), the emergence of ideological opposition to the regime (dissident movement), the sub-Soviet affairs and the organization of work in the USSR. These units were supposed to organize the study of Soviet citizens during their stay abroad, to transfer nationalist literature to the USSR, to take care of establishing contacts with the ideological and political opposition in Ukraine (Albom skhem, 1968, p. 8; Sbornyk materyalov, 1974, p. 36). Moreover, special units also emerged in individual nationalist organizations controlled by the Foreign Units. There was an intelligence agency

In addition, there were also special units in the structure of the Foreign Mission of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council. Among them, the leading was the Political and Information Service, a special unit with broad competence. At the end of 1945, the Political and Information Service was created at the initiative of the future Chairman of the Board of Referees of the Ukrainian Chief Liberation Council V. Okhrimovych at the plenary (he also headed this unit). The concept of “universal liberation policy” was promoted, the Ukrainian emigration was called for to contribute to the deepening crisis in the USSR, and the western countries were to provide moral, material and military support to the national-liberation movements of the peoples, involving the national movements in the Soviet Union to the above-mentioned purpose (Stetsko, 1976, р. 135). The Political and Information Service implemented numerous tasks from propaganda to conducting intelligence in the environment of other political associations on emigration, preparation in cooperation with the US intelligence of emissaries for exile to the USSR, recruiting Soviet citizens abroad, counter-intelligence protection (Burdyn, Khamaziuk, 1955, р. 127). The publishing house “Proloh” existing at the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council was aimed at studying and analyzing the materials of the open Soviet sources.

In particular, the information about the anti-Soviet emigration political groups’ activities was collected (Banderivtsiv, Melnykivtsiv, the Ukrainian Radical Democrats, the People’s Democrats, the Ukrainian National Council, the Central Leadership of Ukrainian Emigration, as well as Polish, Russian and Georgian Emigration, Kuban and Don lands) inspecting their decomposition from the inside (SSASSU, f. 5, c. 445, v. 4, pp. 21–24).

Furthermore, special units were also created by the Ukrainian Nationalists’ Leader A. Melnyk, the headquarters of which was located in Munich and there were numerous territorial offices situated in Germany, France, the USA, Canada. At the beginning of 1946, the PUN organized in Munich its Regional Office to guide the underground melnykivtsi units in Ukraine (“Odynku” (Loners) headed by Ya. Hayvans). By the end of that year, A. Melnyk contacted with the intelligence services of the United States, Germany, and Italy. The department was tasked with establishing reliable channels of bilateral communication with the leaders of Melnyk underground units in the USSR; exploring opportunities for “Odynku” (Loners) participants’ withdrawal and legalization in Western Ukraine; selection of places for illegal printers and radio stations in Ukraine; the spread of the influence of the OUN (M) in the eastern regions of the USSR.

The “Odynku” (Loners) structure included, inter alia, intelligence departments (headed by F.Omentsynskyi), communication department (headed by M. Belychuk) and “boyivka” department (fighters) (headed by S. Kogut). Moreover, the cooperation with foreign intelligence in the field of psychological warfare against the USSR was promoted (SSASSU, f. 13, c. 372, vol. 102, p. 151).

The Ukrainian Nationalists “Provod” (PUN) organizational units, which were left in Ukraine, were trying to be used for intelligence activities. The illegal crossing points were set up in Szczecin, Krakow and the villages of Wólka Orlowska (Poland), Bohumyn, Gustopece (Czechoslovakia) in order to send agents and emissaries to the USSR. In January 1947, with the assistance of the US Special Services in Stamberg, a two-month school of radio-based agents, headed by the US intelligence officer O. Holley, was opened. Dovbenko, PUN arrested emissary, who was brought to the USSR under the guise of a repatriate, testified at...
interrogation that M. Beleychuk had sent him to an American intelligence officer to study in a Munich intelligence school. Along with 45 other “melnykvtsi” he was taught intelligence information gathering methods, sabotage and shooting. Detained in 1947 during the defeat of the OUN fight, a native of Solotvyna, R. Bohuslavets, removed to Ukraine via channels of repatriation, reported that he had been selected and sent to the American intelligence unit in Munich by the mentioned PUN member M. Beleychuk for training in Munich. (Burdyn, Khamaziuk, 1955, pp. 95–100).

After the 5th Great OUN Solidarity Meeting (August 1954), the referral’s activity on “the study of the current situation in Ukraine” (A. Zhukovskyi) began to unfold. The above-mentioned division had two divisions: the first specialized in the nationalist literature exile into the USSR through Germany and the Scandinavian countries, and the second – through the countries of Central Europe. In addition, the referral conducted information gathering by interviewing Soviet citizens abroad and analyzing the media (SSASSU, f. 16, op. 1, c. 1, p. 17; Albom skhem, 1968, p. 10).

There were several ways to train officers in emigration: the military faculties’ creation at universities, work in the ex-combatants’ formations with combat experience, training and instruction through printed matter, go into foreign countries’ armies’ service (Seheda, 2012, p. 218). The considerable amount of intelligence work and active cooperation with the special services of foreign countries interested in the mass deportation of the agency to the USSR contributed to the foreign centers and the Ukrainian emigration representatives’ wide involvement as a whole in training at the NATO special educational establishments. Among the educational institutions undergoing reconnaissance and sabotage training, Ukrainian immigrants could be distinguished as follows:

• The American Intelligence School in Kaufbeuren (Germany). The teachers were the US intelligence services’ staff members. The study groups consisted of 5–7 people and accrued knowledge of radio, mine and blasting skills, mastered weapons and hand-to-hand combat for 6–7 months;
• The US Special Command Special School 7712. Since 1946, it operated in the West German cities of Mittenwald and Oberammergau. M. Omelyanovich-Pavlenko, a former UNR Army General was the Chief. The school trained the qualified agents, who were “displaced” for the US intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. The main subjects were Military Affairs, History and Geography of the USSR, Eastern European states;
• The American Intelligence School in Regensburg (Germany, since 1947) was aimed at six-month training for the Political Migrant Agency of the peoples of the USSR. Captain Dublov, Head of the Counter-Intelligence Division in Regensburg, was the Chief;
• The American Special School in Starnberg (Germany, since 1946). The school trained agents-radists. The Chief was a former officer of the SS “Galicia” Division, Vartseba;
• The American Reconnaissance and Diversionary School in Madrid, Toledo (Spain, since 1946). The teachers trained staff members of the OUN (B), who were studying undercover of students at the University of Madrid. Major subjects were Insurgency Organization, Subversive Propaganda, Sabotage and Diversion in cities and in transports;
• The English Intelligence School near Hanover (Germany). The OUN Members headed by S. Bandera mastered reconnaissance, ciphers, mystery, topography, small arms in the guise of military personnel of the United Kingdom Armed Forces for 1–3 months;
• The London Intelligence School. The OUN (B) members were trained as the paratroopers under the cover of the Polish documents for 2–3 months on conspiratorial apartments;
The American Intelligence School in Munich (Germany). The school educated the OUN (M) intelligence members the following subjects: Military Affairs, Topography, Immersion Methods in the Enemy Official Structures (Burdyn, Khamaziuk, 1955, pp. 104–106).

It is quite clear that the backbone of the special units of foreign centers composed of the OUN and UPA Movement the intelligence and counterintelligence structures’ employees in Ukraine, persons who had considerable experience of operational and operational-combat work, conspiracy, or received special training in the respective educational institutions of foreign countries. Such features of the biography provided not only certain experience and qualifications, but also moral and psychological properties, in particular, extremely hostile attitude towards the Soviet regime. Almost all of those involved in special tasks in Ukraine had been further trained in the above-mentioned educational institutions.

The emigrants, who had specific combat experience were involved in intelligence training purposefully. For example, in 1946 – 1947, OUN intelligence leaders in Rome selected 24 UPA and “Galicia” personnel to study at the intelligence school in Madrid. Along with this, the source of recruiting cadets special schools become properly prepared in general and physical relations, patriotic educated youth of the diaspora, who did not participate in military-political events in Ukraine. Preference was given to the “Plast” pupils, which gave not only versatile physical training but also appropriate education. It is known, for example, that at the beginning of 1948 12 High School graduates – the Ukrainians, were selected to study in special schools in Austria (SSASSU, f. 3, d. 186, c. 1, pp. 77–78).

Hence, on the 1st of November in 1948, 41 emissaries of foreign centers were transferred by air or across the border with Poland and Czechoslovakia to the territory of the USSR, who received tasks, in particular, from the USA and England intelligence concerning the collection of the information on the armed forces and the military-industrial complex of the USSR. Two of them died, 35 were detained, 4 were taken to KGB operational development (SSASSU, f. 13, c. 372, vol. 102, p. 109; vol. 42, pp. 221, 347).

In 1951 – 1953, 27 OUN emissaries who cooperated with the British intelligence and 6 from the CIA were neutralized in the USSR and Poland (10 of them were killed, five went to cooperate with Soviet security agencies and were involved in radio games with foreign services and overseas OUN centers). In total, 74 illegals among the Ukrainian nationalists – the foreign intelligence agents, who were abandoned from abroad – were exposed in the post-war period in Ukraine (SSASSU, f. 16, d. 9, c. 53, pp. 77–78).

The range of intelligence tasks was also wide. In addition to collecting information about the underground units and trying to attract its leaders in the competition in the political environment of the diaspora, the intelligence officers received tasks from the intelligence services-curators, dictated by the context of the preparation for the war against the USSR: gathering information about the industrial sites, railways, nuclear facilities and uranium mines, Donbass mines, air defense system, airfields, military bases, ports, eastern Ukraine’s industry, radar air defense network in the Carpathian Mountains and sites suitable for landing in raids from war, the mood of the population, etc (SSASSU, f. 6, c. 51997, p. 37; f. 5, c. 445, vol. 2, pp. 136–138; f. 13, c. 372, v. 40, pp. 100–101).

The Conclusions. During the 1945 – 1950-ies, under the influence of the Cold War atmosphere, specialized structures with the intelligence functions stood out as part of the foreign centers of the Ukrainian Nationalists, who worked together with the special services of the USSR opponents to prepare for the future struggle for the independence of Ukraine. According to the authors, the reconnaissance activities of the foreign centers in the period
under review can be divided into two stages. The first of them lasted from 1945 to 1959. Its main features were:

• direct penetration of foreign centers emissaries (graduates of foreign intelligence special schools, and usually agents of the latter) into Ukraine and other USSR states of Eastern Europe illegally;
• attempts to establish the underground units, establish support from the foreign centers, use the opportunities of the Liberation Movement for intelligence and subversive activities;
• attempts to obtain the information necessary to conduct hostilities against the Soviet Union and to establish positions there for sabotage and terrorist activity in a special period.

Later on, the Ukrainian Nationalists’ foreign centers abandoned attempts to directly create reconnaissance positions on the basis of the underground units, the illegal aliens of armed groups’ deportation to the USSR. Hence the emphasis of the new intelligence activities’ tactics consisted in the following:

• the legal communication channels and media usage in order to collect diverse information on defense capabilities and socio-political processes in the USSR and in the Soviet Union as a whole;
• the organizational units’ nationalist underground and stable channels of communication restoration in the USSR between OUN foreign centers and their associates in Ukraine;
• broadcasting the undermining propaganda in order to destabilize the Soviet system;
• initiating or supporting the ideological and political opposition to the communist regime with the aim of eroding the latter, reconnecting with the former OUN and UPA Movement members.

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