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UKRAINE AND THE SOVIET EXPORT OF THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION TO EUROPE IN 1919

Summary. *The aim of the research* is to determine the role of Ukraine in disrupting the plans of the Russian Bilshovyks, concerning the export of the communist revolution to Central and Western Europe and the Balkans in 1919. **The research methodology** is based on: the general scientific methods (analytical and synthetic, inductive and deductive); the general historical – (historical-comparative, problem-chronological, retrospective, synchronistic, diachronic). **The scientific novelty** consists in the fact that for the first time in the newest Ukrainian historiography there has been analyzed the attempt disruption of the Russian Bilshovyks to export the communist revolution to Europe across the territory of Ukraine in 1919. **Conclusions.** In 1919 there was a real threat of the Russian Bilshovyk troops invasion to Central and Western Europe, as well as the Balkans. Hungary was to be their first victim. The preparation for the invasion was carried out under the slogans of «an international assistance», given to the Hungarian proletariat. There was no common border between Russia and the countries of Central and Western Europe, so the success of the military operations depended on the circumstance – how quickly the Russian troops would pass across Ukraine, which was seized by the national revolution, and

would break through to Hungary. This attempt failed. The massive anti-Bilshovyk uprisings in Ukraine, a stubborn resistance of the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), the refusal of the government of the West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) to conclude an agreement with the Bilshovyks, A. Denikin's attack on Ukrainian lands was diverted by the significant Soviet military forces. It made the invasion plans for Hungary via Bukovyna into an impracticable project. As a result, the export of the communist revolution from Russia to Europe failed. So, the main obstacle on the path of communism to Europe was Ukraine, which stopped the Russian communist invasion in 1919.

Key words: European revolution, Hungarian revolution, export of revolution, Ukrainian People's Republic, West Ukrainian People's Republic, M. Grygoriev's rebellion.

УКРАЇНА І РАДЯНСЬКИЙ ЕКСПОРТ КОМУНІСТИЧНОЇ РЕВОЛЮЦІЇ В ЄВРОПУ 1919 р.

Анотація. *Мета дослідження* – визначити роль України у зриві планів російських більшовиків щодо експорту комуністичної революції в Центральну, Західну Європу та на Балкани у 1919 р. **Методологія дослідження** спирається на: загальнонаукові методи (аналітичний і синтетичний, індуктивний і дедуктивний); загальноісторичні (історико-порівняльний, проблемно-хронологічний, ретроспективний, синхроністичний, діахронічний). **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що вперше в новітній українській історіографії зроблена спроба комплексного аналізу причин провалу спроби більшовицької Росії здійснити в 1919 р. через територію України експорт комуністичної революції в Європу. **Висновки.** У 1919 р. існувала реальна загроза вторгнення в Центральну, Західну Європу і на Балкани російських більшовицьких військ. Першою їх жертвою мала стати Угорщина. Підготовка до вторгнення здійснювалася під гаслами «інтернаціональної допомоги» угорському пролетаріату. Спільного кордону між Росією і країнами Центральної і Західної Європи не існувало, тому успіх військових операцій залежав від того, наскільки швидко російські війська пройдуть через охоплену національною революцією Україну і прорвуться в Угорщину. Але масові антибільшовицькі повстання в Україні, впертий опір армії Української Народної Республіки (УНР), відмова уряду Західно-Української Народної Республіки (ЗУНР) пропустити більшовицькі війська через Галичину до Буковини, наступ військ А. Денікіна на Сході України перетворили план вторгнення в Угорщину на нездійснений проект. Як наслідок, експорт комуністичної революції з Росії в Європу захлинувся. Отже, Україна 1919 р. стала головною перепорою на шляху російського комуністичного вторгнення на Захід.

Ключові слова: Європейська комуністична революція, Угорська революція, експорт революції, Українська Народна Республіка, Західно-Українська Народна Республіка, повстання М. Григор'єва.

The problem statement. After World War I and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and German empires, a series of the democratic revolutions took place in Europe. A number of new independent states emerged. All of them found themselves in the difficult socio-economic conditions caused by the deep economic crisis, unemployment and hunger. The result was the activation of the local pro-communist forces who, with the Soviet Russia assistance, sought to establish Bilshovyk orders in their countries. In turn, the Soviet Russia planned a military campaign to the West and aimed at implementing the project of the European Communist Revolution. The Soviet Russia carried out its campaign under the demagogic slogans of «the liberation of peoples from the yoke of capital», «international assistance to the proletariat of brotherly countries» and the creation of a European federation of socialist states. These were elements of a «hybrid war» that the Soviet Russia began to use in relation to different countries in 1917 and continued to do so later. In the suggested article, the attempt to export the Bilshovyk revolution to the West in 1919 is characterized not only as a purely military operation, but also as a multifaceted «hybrid» political project.

The analysis of recent researches and publications. The issue of preparing and attempting to realize the export of the Communist revolution to Europe by the Bilshovyks in

1919 has not received a comprehensive coverage in the historical publications. The general approaches of the Bilshovyk leadership of Russia to the issue of the revolution export were analyzed in the monograph by Yu. Felshtynskiy, published in 1992 (Felshtynskiy, 1992) and in a short article by H. Yefimenko, published in the «Encyclopedia of Ukrainian History» (Yefimenko, 2005, pp. 22–24). In a recently published article by I. Farenii «The Peasant Revolution in the Theoretical Views and Political Practices of Ulyanov-Lenin», F. Engels was quoted, who believed that the coming Russian Revolution would accelerate the European Proletarian Revolution (Farenii, 2019, p. 60).

Some aspects of the problem, related to Ukraine's role in the failure of the Bilshovyk plan for the revolutionary march to the West were reflected in an article by a Russian author A. Kuryenyshchev (Kuryenyshchev, 2001). In modern Ukrainian historiography, this problem has not been specifically analyzed. Some of its aspects were analyzed only by the representatives of Ukrainian emigration and some researchers – the witnesses and active participants of the events (Stakhiv, 1957; Mazepa, 1950; Vynnychenko, 1990; Antonov-Ovseenko, 1932). The publications of these authors contain a wealth of the documentary material that cannot be found in other sources. But the authors draw attention mainly to the military political aspects of the Bilshovyk export of the revolution to Europe. The problem did not get the complex coverage.

Statement of the basic material. After the end of World War I, the situation in Hungary, where the socio-economic crisis was combined with the foreign policy, was particularly dramatic. As a result of the revolution, on October 31, 1918, the government led by Earl Caroli separated Hungary from Austria and, using the liberal slogans, attempted to keep under control the lands of the former Hungarian kingdom, inhabited by the Croats, the Slovaks, the Carpathian Ukrainians, the Slovenians, the Romanians and etc. But this attempt failed. On March 20, 1919, the Entente made an ultimatum demand: by March 23 to withdraw its troops from the designated lands and let Romanian troops pass into the territory of Eastern Hungary (Transylvania), and on the land of Transcarpathian Ukraine – Czechoslovak troops (Avetisyan, 1989, pp. 56–57; Stakhiv, 1957, pp. 88–89).

In a state of hopelessness, on March 21, 1919, Caroli voluntarily transferred the entirety of power into the hands of the Hungarian Social Democrats, who together with the Communists, formed a joint government and proclaimed the Hungarian Soviet socialist republic. The actual head of the Hungarian Soviet government was a Communist Bela Kun, who, together with Hungarian prisoners of war, returned to his homeland from the Bilshovyk Russia in November 1918.

While staying in Moscow, Bela Kun repeatedly met Volodymyr Lenin, the Russian Bilshovyk leader. Bela Kun became his fervent supporter and planned to carry out the communist transformations in Hungary in accordance with Russian experience, in particular, with the use of «a red terror». To do this, he needed a solid power. That is why he immediately appealed to the Soviet People's Commissar for the Soviet military and economic assistance. The Government of the Soviet Hungary offered the Soviet Russia «a defensive and offensive alliance against all enemies of the proletariat» (Yozha A. & Milei, 1977, p. 264; Fomin, 1983, p. 124).

This was the very issue, what the leadership of the Soviet Russia expected from the Hungarian Communists. So the answer came immediately. The welcoming telegram of the VIIIth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bilshovyks) (RCP(b), signed on March 22, 1919 by V. Lenin, stated that «the working class of Russia is rushing to your rescue» (Lenin, 1973, p. 181). The very next day, on March 23, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Russia

troops I. Vatsetis sent a letter to V. Lenin, in which he suggested establishing a common front between Hungary and the Soviet Russia across the territory of Bukovyna (Direktivny Glavnogo komandovaniya Krasnoy Armii, 1969, p. 219).

Bukovyna until November 1918 was the part of the Austrian kingdom, had the status of the Crown region, and after the collapse in November 1918, Austria-Hungary was occupied by Romania.

What were the benefits of the «Bukovyna variant» of the revolution's export to Central and Western Europe? What were the problems for this plan to be implemented? First of all, one should keep in mind that Bukovyna borders on Transylvania – the north-western region of modern Romania. In contrast to Bukovyna, which belonged to Austria, this region was the part of the Hungarian kingdom until 1918. One of the most important conditions for Romania's entry into World War I on the Entente side was the annexation of Transylvania. After the victory of the Entente in the war and the disintegration of Austria-Hungary, Romania considered Transylvania its own territory, although this status was secured by the Trianon Peace Treaty only in 1920. Hungary also resisted establishing of Romanian orders here. In the imagination of the Russian Bilshovyk leadership, it was this circumstance that made the route across Bukovyna and Transylvania optimal for a revolutionary march to the West.

There was another direction for the invasion of the Soviet troops into Hungary – across the former Bessarabian province, which until 1917 was part of the Russian Empire, and in January 1918 was occupied by Romania. In order to break through Hungary, it was necessary to pass across the Romanian-controlled ethnic lands of Ukraine and the Romanian territory itself. Moreover, crossing Romania – was a direct path to the Balkans, whose population, according to the Bilshovyk leadership, was ready, like Romania, to adopt the revolutionary slogans (Antonov-Ovseenko, 1932, pp. 16, 17, 57 ; Stakhiv, 1957, p. 90).

There were great difficulties in implementing both of these plans. The problem, first of all, was that Russia had no common border with Romania. There was Ukraine between Russia and Romania. Therefore, before breaking through Hungary across Bukovyna or Bessarabia, the Bilshovyk troops had to cross Ukraine. There was no other way. After all, at the end of March 1919, when the local communists were defeated in Hungary, the Russian Bilshovyks did not yet manage to establish a full control over the Dnieper Ukraine. Thus, the future of the plan to export the Communist revolution to Europe depended largely on Ukraine, and from the attitude of its population to Russian Bilshovysm.

It should be recalled how the Bilshovyk control over Ukraine took place in the first half of 1919. After the collapse of the Hetman P. Skoropadskyi regime in the Dnieper region in late 1918, the Ukrainian People's Republic, headed by the Directory, was restored. Immediately afterwards, the UNR became the target of an armed aggression by the Soviet Russia, operating under the puppet guise of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (UkrSSR) led by the Bilshovyk government, formed in Moscow. However, the Bilshovyks denied the involvement of the Russian troops in the hostilities in Ukraine. They cynically stated that the Ukrainian Red Army fought against the Directory. The Ukrainian Red Army was subordinate to the government of the UkrSSR, which was «wholly independent» of the Russian Soviet People's Commissar. This tactic was used by the Bilshovyks in relation to other countries, which later the Bilshovyks sought to take control.

The attack of the Russian Soviet troops was quite rapid, and at the end of March 1919 under the control of the UNR government there remained only a narrow strip of Ukrainian land in the west of Podilsk, Volyn and Kherson provinces. Podillia and the former Kherson region

along the Dniester River bordered on Bessarabia, which was occupied by Romania. It was crossing the Dniester River that the Russian Bilshovyks planned their armed breakthrough into Bessarabia and Romania, and crossing them – to Hungary and other countries of Central and Western Europe, as well as the Balkans.

As for Bukovyna, it was the most convenient to break through it across the territory of Western Ukraine. After the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, headed by the State Secretariat, was proclaimed there. The former border between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire became the border between the UNR and ZUNR. On January 22, 1919, the Act of Union of these two Ukrainian states took place. ZUNR was declared to be the Western Region of the UPR (ZO UNR). The new state quickly became the target for aggression by neighboring Poland, which in late 1918 also regained its independence and claimed Western Ukrainian lands.

Thus, in order to break through the Soviet Hungary across Bukovyna, the Russian Bilshovyks first had to overcome the resistance of the UNR and ZUNR troops. This meant that the Soviet Russia was entering into an open military conflict with Romania and Poland, with the mighty Entente behind them.

Such a perspective did not suit either Russia or Hungary. They attempted to achieve a peaceful pass to Hungary by the Russian Bilshovyk troops across the territories, controlled by the troops of the UNR, ZUNR and the Romanian Kingdom.

Volodymyr Vynnychenko wrote about one of the peaceful export variants of the Communist revolution to Europe in his book «The Renaissance of the Nation». It should be mentioned that he was the head of the Directory – «the first» by the influence figure in the leadership of the UNR. In February 1919, V. Vynnychenko resigned and went abroad (Soldatenko, 2005, p. 129). As V. Vynnychenko recalled, he was addressed by the Hungarian Soviet government representatives and proposed to reorganize the Directory Authority in Ukraine, making it more «communist», and independent of Russia. At the same time, the Hungarians agreed on the role of the mediators in the negotiations between Moscow and the Ukrainian leftist socialists in the matter of forming in Ukraine a «true Ukrainian national Soviet government». This government should have eliminated the UPR Directory, the State Secretariat of the ZUNR, should have approved the Soviet regime and bring the ZUNR – Ukrainian Halychyna Army (UHA) military units to their side. As a result, a solid communist front was created that included Hungary, Halychyna, the Dnieper Ukraine, and Russia (Vynnychenko, 1990, pp. 322, 325–326; Soldatenko, 2005, pp. 129–130).

V. Vynnychenko, who supported the idea of the European Communist Revolution, readily accepted the proposals of the Hungarian Communists. But in basis of the agreement he put forward the following conditions: the recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, which was planned to be established on the basis of the UNR; the creation of the Ukrainian national Soviet government; the defensive-offensive military union of the Soviet republics; the attack on Halychyna in order to free it from the Poles (Vynnychenko, 1990, pp. 325–326).

According to V. Vynnychenko, the Hungarians gladly agreed with the proposals of the Ukrainian side. In his belief, Bela Kun government did not even assume that V. Lenin could be against the proposals of the Ukrainian side. He was convinced that the future of not only the communist regime in Hungary but also the fate of the European Communist Revolution depended on the implementation of this project. «Perhaps, indeed, this moment», V. Vynnychenko writes, «would be decisive in the struggle of socialism against capitalism

around the world» (Vynnychenko, 1990, p. 326). In accordance with his estimation, this proposal was also agreed in Western Ukraine, «whose government was ready to agree with anyone not to allow the victory of the Poles and to keep Halychyna in Ukrainian hands» (Vynnychenko, 1990, pp. 325–326). But the negotiations on V. Vynnychenko's conditions ended in failure. Why this happened, V. Vynnychenko does not write. He only points out that he is aware of the «great resistance» to this idea by H. Rakovskyi and H. Pyatakov, the central figures in the puppet government of the UkrSSR pro-Moscow government (Vynnychenko, 1990, p. 323).

We consider the events, described by V. Vynnychenko, as a real fact. This is recognized by a number of researchers. In particular, in his book «The Second Soviet Republic in Ukraine», M. Stakhiv reproduces the text of V. Vynnychenko. But M. Stakhiv rejects V. Vynnychenko's attempts to find any significant differences in the attitude to the Ukrainian issue by V. Lenin and his supporters in Ukraine. According to him, «there was no difference between Lenin and Pyatakov in the Ukrainian case» (Stakhiv, 1957, pp. 112–113). M. Stakhiv reminds that Moscow formally recognized the independence of the UkrSSR, its defensive-offensive and economic union with it. The Bilshovyks declared a voluntary association of the UkrSSR with Soviet Russia on the basis of a «socialist federation». Theoretically, this should have meant that Ukraine was quite equal with Russia. «Only in fact», M. Stakhiv rightly points out, «there was no republic, no union, no government, only a government doll, headed by a foreigner – H. Rakovskyi, the Bulgarian-Romanian in nationality» (Stakhiv, 1957, p. 113).

In fact, Moscow rejected the recognition of Ukraine's real independence. V. Lenin did not even dare to use this project as a purely tactical technique – a tool for organizing a revolutionary march to the West. The Soviet republics that formed on the lands of the former Russian Empire, including the USSR, were considered as the Soviet territorial administrative structures rather than the national sovereign states. The Soviet state in the post-imperial space represented the Bilshovyks as a unitary socialist republic. The Federation was allowed, but as a temporary form. «As one of the transitional forms on the way to a full unification,» the party allowed «a federal unification of the states, organized by the Soviet type.» It was written in the RCP programme (b), adopted at the Party's 7th Congress at the end of March 1919. (Programma RKP(b), 1957, p. 201). The Bilshovyks did not make any exceptions for Ukraine.

There is no doubt that the Hungarian Communists, V. Vynnychenko negotiated with, knew about this strategy of the Russian Bilshovyks. M. Stakhiv believes that in the negotiations with V. Vynnychenko they acted as Moscow satellites quite deliberately. And the ultimate goal of this venture was a complete control over all of Ukraine, a military breakthrough across Bessarabia and Bukovyna to Hungary, and from there to Central and Western Europe as well as the Balkans. The UNR Directory and the ZUNR State Secretariat, which still controlled part of the Dnieper Ukraine and Western Ukraine, stood in the way of realizing these intentions (Stakhiv, 1957, p. 338). For Moscow aggressive Bilshovysm there were no moral obstacles, so when discussing this «peaceful» plan, the Bilshovyks simultaneously prepared to march to Europe (Sytnyk, 2017, p. 76). They were well aware that the success of the Hungarian Revolution depended on the final defeat of the UNR army and whether the Soviet troops would break through Bessarabia and Bukovyna. However, the resistance of the UNR army continued for a month before, at the end of April 1919, it was forced to retreat across the Zbruch river within the territory of ZUNR. The Soviet troops approached to the Dniester, on the left bank of which the territory of Bessarabia began.

The Bilshovyks' success in the fight against the army of the UNR coincided with the proclamation of the Bavarian Soviet Republic. Although it lasted less than a month – from

April 6 to May 3, 1919, in Moscow and Budapest, the event was seen as a manifestation of the progressive European revolution that must be supported. Regarding the main Romanian forces in Bessarabia, they were then deployed to the West to fight the Soviet Hungarian troops for control of Transylvania. These events were perceived by the Bilshovyks as an auspicious moment for forcing the Dniester River and breaking through the Romanian-occupied territory of Bessarabia.

On May 1 and 2, 1919, the Radnarkom of the Soviet Russia and the Radnarkom of the UkrSSR issued an ultimatum demand to liberate the territory of Bessarabia from the Romanian troops within 48 hours and to transfer power to the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Bessarabia. This «puppet» government was formed in Odesa on May 6. It issued the Manifesto on the formation of the Bessarabian Soviet Republic, which was to become the part of the Soviet Russia (Mazepa, 1950, p. 190). The Romanian government did not respond to the ultimatum. The Bilshovyk command accelerated the preparations for the military operations in Bessarabia. On May 2, the People's Commissar of Military Affairs of the UkrSSR, without waiting for the ultimatum to end, ordered the formation of the 1st Bessarabian Division from the local Bessarabians in Odesa. In the nearest future this division was supposed to be deployed into the army (Grazhdanskaya voyna na Ukraine, 1967, p. 5). The 4th and 6th Ukrainian Divisions and two International Brigades were formed as well (Fomin, 1983, p. 128). One of the first to appear in the Romanian front was the brigade under the command of M. Grigoriev, who was recently distinguished by seizing Kherson, Mykolayiv and Odesa. They also hoped for a massive pro-communist uprising in Bessarabia.

However, neither in Bessarabia nor in Romania did the population support the Bilshovyk invasion. More over, the additional Romanian troops were deployed from the Hungarian Front (from Transylvania) to Bessarabia. But most importantly, M. Grigoriev failed to comply with the order to attack Romania and on May 9, 1919, three days before the planned forcing by the leading Soviet units of the Dniester River, he began the anti-Bilshovyk uprising. There were 15,000 soldiers under his command. In his Universal, he declared the members of the Bilshovyk government of the UkrSSR, headed by H. Rakovskiy the adventurers and speculators (Mazepa, 1950, p. 199). The rebels seized Katerynoslav, Cherkasy, Oleksandrivsk, Kremenchuk, Mykolaiv, Kherson.

Despite the threat from the rear, the Bilshovyk command did not abandon the idea of attacking Romania. The Soviet military machine, aimed at attacking Europe, continued functioning. On May 12, the Dniester River was forced. On May 22, the Soviet troops approached Chisinau, and on May 29, they seized the city of Bender. At this stage, deprived of any help, the Soviet attack in Bessarabia stopped (Antonov-Ovseenko, 1932, p. 48).

The great forces were diverted to suppress M. Grigoriev's uprising and other anti-Soviet uprisings (Horak, 1998, p. 90). In particular, against the insurgents there were sent the military units, formed from the ethnic Hungarians, the so-called «internationalists» (Melnikova & Kulinich, 1983, p. 108). They were trained to be sent to Hungary. I. Mazepa considers M. Grigoriev's uprising finally to disrupt the Bilshovyk plans to export the Communist revolution to the West (Mazepa, 1950, p. 190).

The important events took place further north of Bessarabia, on the former border of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires, which after the Act of Union on January 22, 1919 became the administrative border between the UNR and ZUNR. As it was mentioned above, under pressure from the Bilshovyk troops, at the end of April 1919 the remnants of the UNR army were forced to move across the Zbruch river to Halychyna, in ZUNR territory. Under

such conditions, the Bilshovyk leadership of Russia intensified the interest in Bukovyna, across which from Halychyna there was the direct, shortest route to Hungary. On May 3, 1919, the ultimatum to Romania was signed by H. Rakovskyi, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the UkrSSR. The Romanian government was informed of leaving the territory of Bukovyna within 24 hours. Romania did not respond to this ultimatum.

The logical step of the Bilshovyks would be to start the military campaign in Bukovyna. But this operation was impossible without the consent of the ZUNR government. At the same time, the Bilshovyks did not dare to fight at the same time with the ZUNR and UNR troops, because this (even with the favourable development of events for them) would delay their invasion to Hungary. Therefore, it was urgently needed to communicate with the ZUNR government immediately. For this reason, on April 16, V. Antonov-Ovseyenko, the Commander of the Ukrainian Front, describing the prospects of a revolutionary campaign in Europe, in the telegram to V. Lenin and L. Trotskyi concluded: «Everything depends on peace with Poland and Halychyna» (Antonov-Ovseenko, 1932, p. 57).

As a result, Moscow initiated the Soviet ceasefire note, signed by H. Rakovskyi. The ZUNR State Secretariat did not answer. At that time, V. Antonov-Ovseyenko, the Commander of the Armed Forces of the UkrSSR, took the initiative. The informal negotiations were initiated between the command of the Bilshovyk units, stationed in the ZUNR border territories and the representatives of the UHA (Ukrainian Army of Halychyna) in Stanislav. The Soviet conditions were transmitted through the parliamentarians. The Bilshovyks promised to help Halychyna inhabitants with the weapons and military equipment. As it is known, starting in mid-April of 1919 the units of the Haller army (France) began to arrive in Halychyna to help the local Poles. ZUNR was internationally isolated and felt a dire need for the most necessary to continue war. This determined the conditions of the Bilshovyks, similar to surrender. They were formulated in Moscow and passed on to Halychyna representatives by V. Antonov-Ovseyenko and his parliamentarians. The conditions included the following points:

1. A complete split of ZUNR with UNR. The liquidation of the UNR army in Halychyna and the transfer of its weapons and property to the Bilshovyks;
2. The reorganization of the UHA by removing anti-Bolshevik officers from its membership;
3. The permission for the Bilshovyk troops to pass for the operations in Bukovyna against the Romanian troops (Antonov-Ovseenko, 1932, p. 292).

There is little information on the reaction of some ZUNRs on this issue. Antonov-Ovseyenko wrote in his memoirs that the UHA delegation even travelled to Kyiv. Initially, the parties allegedly agreed on a «common front against the common enemies», but then Halychyna representatives stated that there was no common point of view among the UHA soldiers (Antonov-Ovseenko, 1932, p. 292; Mazepa, 1950, p. 191).

We do not know all the details of the negotiations, but it is hard to imagine that the UHA leadership went to any separate contacts that the ZUNR government would not have known about. M. Stakhiv said that in fact the UHA commanders did not negotiate with the Bilshovyk parliamentarians at all, but sent their proposals to the State Secretariat. But there were no answers from it. Then one of the Commanders got through with the Head of State's Secretariat, S. Holubovych, and asked him how they should treat the visits of the Bilshovyk parliamentarians. The Head replied that the ZUNR government had decided not to enter into negotiations with either V. Lenin or H. Rakovskyi, and that no H. Rakovskyi's suggestions would be answered. (Stakhiv, 1957, p. 338).

However, the Bilshovyks continued seeking for the agreement with the UHA and the ZUNR government. On May 16, 1919, the Minister in the government of the UNR, as I. Mazepa states, V. Antonov-Ovseyenko and the members of the Soviet People's Commissar: V. Zatonskyi and O. Zatonskyi arrived at the border town of Volochysk (on the Soviet side of the border) (Mazepa, 1950, p. 191). The Commander of the UHA was informed of the appearance of the Soviet delegation by the parliamentarians. The uninvited guests appeared in the dislocation area of the UHA. But the Commander did not accept the parliamentarians, and ordered his adjutant to reply: «Go back! We don't talk to the bandits!» (Stakhiv, 1957, p. 117).

There was another important circumstance that made the Bilshovyk campaign impossible in Hungary – the situation in the Soviet Southern Front in eastern Ukraine. For the Bilshovyks, it became critical. Breaking through the Soviet defense, the troops of the White Guards of the Volunteer Army (Bilohvardiitsi) began to advance from the Don to Donbass in late May. On May 27, they seized Luhansk and continued their rapid advance into Ukraine. At the same time, the uprising of the 3rd Dnieper Division under the command of N. Makhno began. The Division fought in the structure of the Soviet troops against the Denikins. N. Makhno left the front and with his supporters began an insurgent raid in the Soviet rear (Belash & Belash, 1993, pp. 226–232). The Denikin Front and the rebels were diverting more and more the Soviet forces. Under these circumstances, the Bilshovyks were not up to the march to Hungary. On May 25, the People's Commissar for the Naval Affairs of Ukraine M. Podvoyskyi informed V. Lenin that to help the Red troops in Donbass, the military units, planned to be used for the breakthrough in Hungary, were removed from the Ukrainian Front (Melnikova & Kulnich, 1983, p. 108). The Denikinis became a major threat to the Bilshovyk regime in Russia. On July 3, 1919, V. Lenin called out: «All to fight Denikin!»

At this time, the government and the army of the UNR returned from Halychyna to the Dnieper Ukraine in the area of Kamianets-Podilskyi and began to oust the Bilshovyk troops from the region. On July 17, another major event took place. Under pressure, made by the Polish troops, the UHA and the ZUNR government crossed to the right bank of the Zbruch river. The UHA merged with the UNR army. In mid-August 1919 the number of the united Ukrainian army was more than 80 thousand people (Kovalchuk, 2006, p. 47). It began its march deep into Naddnipryanschyna.

At the same time, the internal situation in Hungary was complicated. Without waiting for help from Russia, the Hungarian Communists lost support in their country as well. The internal contradictions grew. After all, the government without communists was formed in late July. On August 1, 1919, the Soviet power in Hungary was ultimately defeated. On August 4, the Romanian troops entered Budapest. The attempt of the Soviet export of the communist revolution from Russia to Europe ended in failure.

Conclusions. The analysis of the historical sources and research involved in this article give grounds to draw the conclusions that after the defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I, the Bilshovyk leadership of Russia, headed by V. Lenin, planned a «revolutionary march» to Central and Western Europe, and also to the Balkans for the purpose of establishing the communist orders there. A convenient opportunity for the invasion was the revolution in Hungary, which led the Communists to power in this country. The closest bridgehead for preparing the «export of revolution» to Europe across Hungary was Ukraine, and the convenient «corridors» for this purpose were Bessarabia and Bukovyna. But Ukraine did not become a bridgehead for the deployment of a «revolutionary campaign» to the West. On the contrary, a number of circumstances made it an insurmountable obstacle to the Bilshovyk intentions of exporting the revolution to Europe.

Firstly, the UNR Army resistance and the massive anti-Bilshovyk uprisings of the Ukrainians of Naddnipryanschyna – the peasants, mainly. If in May 1919, during the attempt to break through Bessarabia and Romania into southern and central Europe, the peasant uprisings hadn't broken out in the Soviet rear in Ukraine, in particular, led by M. Grigoriev, the Soviet invasion would not have stopped under Chisinau. The attacks of the Bilshovyks would have continued in the western and southern directions and would have strengthened the communist order in Romania, the Balkans and Hungary.

Secondly, the position of the ZUNR government. If the State Secretariat of the ZUNR had agreed to reconciliation with the Bilshovyks, it would have helped them to send their troops across Bukovyna to Hungary, and then – Western Europe. It didn't happen.

Thirdly, the defeat of the Bilshovyks in the Southern Front. If at the end of May 1919 N. Makhno had not raised the anti-Bilshovyk uprising and thus had not helped A. Denikin to break through the Southern Front in Donbass, the forces balance of in the East of Ukraine would have remained in favour of the Bilshovyks. This would contribute to the success of the Soviet export of the Communist revolution to Europe.

Thus, an armed resistance by the UNR army and the peasant uprisings in the south and east of Ukraine thwarted the Soviet campaign into Bessarabia, and the ZUNR government's principled position made it impossible for the Bilshovyk invasion of Hungary across Bukovyna. The export of the communist revolution from the Bilshovyk Russia to Europe was stopped.

Therefore, there is the reason to conclude that in the first half of 1919 Ukraine made a significant contribution to the salvation of Europe from the Bilshovyk invasion.

The authors of this article realize that the Bilshovyk plans failure is not limited to the Ukrainian factor. In the system of international relations after World War I, other factors also failed to disrupt the Russian Bilshovysm in the West. This problem is of a pan-European nature and deserves a more thorough study, in particular involving the works of European and American authors and sources of a foreign origin.

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