

UDC 94(477+438)«1939/1945»:323.12  
DOI: 10.24919/2519-058x.12.177547

**Oksana KALISHCHUK**

*PhD hab. (History), Associate Professor, Professor of Department of Archeology, Ukraine's History of Lesya Ukrainka Eastern European National University, 24 Shopena Street, Lutsk, Ukraine, postal code 43000 (kaliszczuk.oksana@gmail.com)*

**ORCID:** <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1272-7920>

**ResearcherID:** E-4566-2019 (<http://www.researcherid.com/rid/E-4566-2019>)

**Оксана КАЛИЩУК**

*доктор історичних наук, доцент, професор кафедри археології, давньої та середньовічної історії України Східноєвропейського національного університету імені Лесі Українки, вул. Шопена, 24, Луцьк, Україна, індекс 43000 (kaliszczuk.oksana@gmail.com)*

**Бібліографічний опис статті:** Kalishchuk, O. (2019). The Volyn tragedy in Ukraine and Poland's public discourse. *Skhidnoievropeiskyi Istorychnyi Visnyk [East Europe Historical Bulletin]*, 12, 212–227. doi: 10.24919/2519-058x.12.177547

## THE VOLYN TRAGEDY IN UKRAINE AND POLAND'S PUBLIC DISCOURSE

**Summary.** *The purpose of the article is to reveal the significant changes in the public discourse on the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation in the Second World War; to identify differences in the functioning of collective memory about those events in Ukrainian and Polish societies. The research methodology was the classical principles of historicism, structure, science, verification, author's objectivity and the use of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and special historical (historical-genetic, historical-systemic, historical-typological) methods. The research novelty of the article is a holistic awareness of the Volyn discourse features over the last decade and disclosure of the influencing mechanisms on the memory about the teasing pages of the past. Conclusions.* Contemporary stereotypical perceptions and dominant discursive practices around the Volyn tragedy that have taken root in Ukrainian and Polish societies over the last decade are an ideological construct that undergoes changes driven by the influences of politicians, public figures, professional historians and publicists. It is important to form a coherent vision of the events of the mid-20th century in Poland, which have become an important element of historical memory. An important component of understanding the topic is its use in modern domestic (especially in Poland) and foreign (in the Ukrainian-Russian war) policy.

**Key words:** *the Volyn tragedy, Halychyna and Volyn (Galicia and Volhynia), 1943 – 1944, memory policy, historical memory.*

## ВОЛИНСЬКА ТРАГЕДІЯ У СУСПІЛЬНОМУ ДИСКУРСІ УКРАЇНИ І ПОЛЬЩІ

**Анотація.** *Метою дослідження є розкрити сутнісні зміни суспільного дискурсу щодо українсько-польського протистояння у роки Другої світової війни, виявити відмінності функціонування колективної пам'яті про ті події в українському та польському суспільствах. Методологією дослідження стали класичні принципи історизму, системності, науковості, верифікації, авторської об'єктивності та використання загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, узагальнення) та спеціально-історичних (історико-генетичний, історико-системний, історико-типологічний) методів. Наукова новизна статті полягає у цілісному осмисленні особливостей волинського*

дискурсу впродовж останнього десятиліття та розкритті механізмів впливу на пам'ятання дражливих сторінок минулого. **Висновки.** Сучасні стереотипні уявлення та домінуючі дискурсивні практики навколо волинської трагедії, які усталилися в українському та польському суспільствах впродовж останнього десятиліття є ідеологічним конструктом, який піддається змінам, які зумовлені впливами політиків, громадських діячів, фахових істориків та публіцистів. Важливим є формування узгодженого бачення подій середини 20 ст. у Польщі, які стали важливим елементом історичної пам'яті. Важливою складовою розуміння теми є її використання у сучасній внутрішній (особливо у Польщі) та зовнішній (у рамках українсько-російської війни) політиці.

**Ключові слова:** Волинська трагедія, Галичина і Волинь, 1943 – 1944, політика пам'яті, історична пам'ять.

**The problem statement.** It seems well-worn to say that the dramatic Volyn events affect the socio-political life of our states and their relations till now. The theme of the Volyn tragedy periodically flares up, creating tension in relations between Kyiv and Warsaw. And the thesis about the existence of their own truth about the bloody common past on both sides of the Ukrainian-Polish border seems not less trivial. One doesn't write about the memory conflict between Ukraine and Poland only if he or she is too lazy to do it.

**Analysis of the recent research.** The issues of cooperation and coexistence of Ukraine and Poland over the last decade, including historical disputes, have been considered in the works of O. Kalishchuk (Kalishchuk, 2013, 2016, 2018), A. Kyrydon (Kyrydon, 2016), K. Krakowska (Krakowska, 2017), T. Stryjek (Stryjek, 2017), L. Khakhula (Khakhula, 2014).

**The purpose of the article** is to show the differences and dynamics of public discourse on the Volyn events in Ukraine and Poland. The results may also be useful for successful Ukrainian and Polish diplomacy. The practical application of the acquired knowledge may be reflected in the focus on the national elite on Ukraine's acquisition of a worthy place in the community of developed societies with the protection of its own interests.

**Statement of the basic material.** Here, one should refer to the warnings of an American researcher Timothy Snyder, who stresses the impossibility of the absolute truth from one side in such disputes. After all, both the Ukrainians and the Poles, who claim that they are entirely right about the Volyn events and it doesn't need to listen to the other side, are mistaken (Snyder, 2016). The question is: how to get out of this impasse. In his speech to the Verkhovna Rada on February 19, 2019, Donald Tusk stated: «The foundations of a united Europe are reconciliation instead of revenge, solidarity not self-interest, historical truth not propaganda» (Tusk, 2019a).

It seems false that there are no differences in the view of the Volyn events from the standpoint of truth. The problem is that the sides understand it differently, moreover, the concern is that it is, as Jacek Kuroń has identified, inconvenient (Kuroń, 2012, pp. 174–184); and according to prof. Yaroslav Hrytsak the truth is terrible (Hrytsak, 2018).

In our opinion, the speeches of the Presidents of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland (July 2018) confirmed it. Petro Poroshenko claimed: «The events in Chełm Land, like a number of other tragic conflicts between the Ukrainians and the Poles in the Second World War, require careful historical research. And these studies should be carried out jointly by historians and scholars, jointly by Ukrainian and Polish, based on a sincere desire to establish historical truth about the causes, the course and consequences of the conflict, no matter how much it hurts. Our nations have earned the right to know the truth. But politicians do not have to deal with this truth. Historians and scholars have to do it. And it is what we agreed and we will never let these pages of our history be politicized» (Poroshenko, 2018).

In turn, Andrzej Duda, reiterating his earlier thesis that the future cannot be completely detached from history, but «truth in relations between peoples is fundamental» (Duda, 2017), said: «We need to build our relations on truth. Just recognize it. There can be no revenge, although there is pain. I believe that time that heals wounds will heal those terrible wounds that are kept in many hearts – on one side and on the other. But we must build our good relationship on historical truth. This is the most important thing» (Duda, 2018).

The problem is that both versions, Ukrainian and Polish, have a right to exist and have their basis. Finally, some of Ukrainian and Polish participants of the «Volyn discussion» pay attention to this, pointing out that in Poland the UPA is remembered as a criminal organization that committed the genocide of the Polish population of Galicia and Volhynia in 1943 – 1944, but in Ukraine memory about the UPA is linked to a heroic anti-Soviet guerrilla struggle. In doing so, both versions are true, each showing a fragment of the story, and each one is the most important (Masewicz, 2017). This, according to the well-known Polish specialist on Ukrainian studies Bogumiła Berdychowska, poses a fundamental problem with Ukrainian and the Polish views on anti-Polish UPA campaign. Something very significant for Polish history – in the case of Ukraine is not so important (for the Ukrainians the 20th century was too rich in tragic experience) (Berdychowska, 2018; Zaczarczyszyn, 2018, p. 59). As Polish expert Adam Balcer remarked: «We must carry out a historical dialogue, but we cannot say that we have a monopoly on the truth, we are right, and the other side must accept our point of view» (Balcer, 2017). The language of ultimatums is spoken by the modern ruling party cannot have any success. After all, the statements made in the programmatic material of Senator-historian Jan Żaryn about that, first of all, «there is no Polish people without Lviv», and second, «the formation of Ukrainian identity is impossible without the realization that the Volyn tragedy is a genocide of the Polish people» (Żaryn, 2015), could have caused nothing but irritation. It is no coincidence that from time to time from participants of the Volyn discourses (for example, from Janusz Kurtika – the chairman of the INP (the Institute of National Remembrance) we hear opinions to recognize the right of both sides to have their truth. Iza Chruslińska about that said the following: «Regarding history, I think the Poles and the Ukrainians should accept a formula: every nation has the right to its own understanding of history. And we must not have a common understanding: we must admit that the Ukrainians have the right to their historical memory and the Poles to their own one» (Chruslińska, 2018b).

In the opposite interpretation, it is futile to rely on the effectiveness of resolving disputes through commissions of historians or forums of intellectuals (moreover, the sides' historical approaches are now codified). The «Volyn» theme only expresses how much historical narration and historical consciousness are an element of the functioning of new and next generations. Although, from time to time, in the context of the Volyn debate, the tempting argument about the need to «leave history to historians» is heard. It should be noted that the common Ukrainian-Polish past since the emergence of democratic Poland in 1989 and the proclamation of Ukraine's independence in 1991 were neither solely an academic issue nor a simple or minor subject of political dialogue. Modern politics cannot be formed without understanding own past and the history of neighbouring states and peoples, because they remind about themselves. The caveat of American historian Timothy Snyder, a professor at Yale University, should be noted here as to the impossibility of historical judgement emergence, on the basis of which all other states and their societies agree to recognize Poland is that how it defines itself (Snyder, 2019). Academic environment was legally subordinated

to politicians by the last steps of official Warsaw. Amendments to the Law on the Institute of National Memory was adopted on 1 February 2018 (it was called the «anti-Bandera law» in Ukraine), which, among other things, provide for criminal responsibility for denying crimes of Ukrainian nationalists against citizens of the II Republic of Poland, have become a way of coercion on historians and political dictate. The devastating consequences of adopting this legal act, despite the decision of the Constitutional Court of Poland of 17 January 2019 to recognize the provisions on «Ukrainian nationalists» and «Eastern Małopolska» as contradicting the Polish Constitution (Domagalski, 2019), are also fixed by the Ukrainian (Babakova, 2018), and Polish (Protestujem; Motyka, 2018) authors.

«The law of 29 April 2016 abolished the previous procedure for the appointment of the INP Chairman that provided for a significant participation of the scientific environment of historians in favour of an order; an exclusive control was given to politicians, that is, the majority in both houses of the parliament, who nominates seven members of the Council and then approves the candidate elected by this body, and the president who nominates the other two members» (Stryjek, 2017, p. 104).

The aforementioned amendments revealed another threatening trend. The essence of the «Bandera Amendment» is not even in the criminal responsibility of those who «publicly and contrary to the facts deny the crimes», but in that to record the crimes of Ukrainian nationalists alongside the communist and Nazi crimes in the public consciousness (Ustawa, 2018).

«In the discussion art. 1 was neglected where to the paragraph 1a, which defines the sphere of the INP's activities, after the Nazi and communist crimes, among other crimes, which may be described as crimes against peace and humanity or war crimes, such information was added: «crimes of Ukrainian nationalists and members of Ukrainian formations who have collaborated with the Third Reich» (Hnatiuk, 2018).

Here Paweł Kowal's remark about it should also be remembered. He points out that this thesis underpins the foundations of Poland's historical policy that emphasizes the exceptionalism of the two totalitarianisms in the negative sense which, from the standpoint of international law, are the aggressors against Poland and, accordingly, the root cause of all other crimes. The addition of other factors weakens the Polish position – the question of the occupier's responsibility for impunity in the occupied territories raises (Kowal, 2018).

The tendency that we have been observing for decades (Kalishchuk, 2013, p. 274), started in kresy environment, supported by right-wing politicians like Jarosław Kalinowski, now has fixed in law. In the Polish segment of the Volyn (and not only) discussion, we can sometimes find such statements as: «Usually, when we talk about the genocide of the Poles in the East, we mean the Soviet occupation of the Eastern Kresy in 1939 – 1941 and since 1944 the Katyn crime and the OUN–UPA crimes» (Piętka, 2012, pp. 34–47), «to paraphrase the words of rotmistrz Piletski (who compared Auschwitz with the torture chambers of UB), we can say that «Katyn despite Volyn was a toy» (Makowiecki, 2013), «Volyn – the Katyn lie of the III Republic of Poland» (Ziemkiewicz, 2016, p. 34–36) or «the monsters from Volyn. Even the Germans were struck by their crimes» (Rodak, 2018), «we will start the Polish case as Hitler – Jewish one» (Maciejewski, 2016, p. 17). Finally, in 2014 in Cieszanów, Podkarpackie Voivodeship, Lubaczow County a monument was opened to honour the victims of the town and the Gmina, who died in 1939 – 1947. The victims were killed by German, Soviet, and Ukrainian nationalists. Here one can only point out the substitution of concepts mentioned by Grzegorz Motyka – the sign of equality between members of the OUN-UPA and the Nazis

and Communists (Soviet) gives the impression that the Poles were dealing with something like external invasion and Ukrainian occupation of Kresy (Motyka, 2011, p. 465).

The Polish side's attempt to define clearly the Volyn events, which «is required by the memory of the victims» complicates and exacerbates the situation (Marecki, 2018, p. 1). The victimization of national histories has led to the desire to receive the exclusive role of the victim and, accordingly, the black and white interpretation in the coordinates of «the victim – the executioner» and the relevant victimization of «their own» and the demonization of «someone else». The English historian Norman Davies expressed the following opinion: «It is unacceptable for only one side to claim the status of sole victim of the Volyn massacre [...] remember that at the beginning of the Second World War these lands were multinational: the Poles, the Ukrainians and the Jews lived there. Each of these groups has experienced terrible things. One cannot isolate one of them and speak only about its own grievance» (Lichnerowicz, 2013).


With the entire seemingly paradox of this situation, it is necessary to recognize the understandability of this state of affairs. After all, we are dealing with historical memory, which, unlike, let's say, historical science, is a simplified / stereotyped collective perception of the facts of the past by members of the national community (Artiuch, 2013, p. 3). At the same time, in our context, particular importance is given to the understanding of historical memory, expressed by Yevhen Sverstiuk, as primarily painful points (Istorychna pamiat, 2008, p. 14). Volyn' 43 became the most painful memory of the common Ukrainian-Polish past.

The generally accepted view is that the tragic events in Volyn, Eastern Galicia, Chełm Land and Podlasie in the Second World War are deeply rooted in the public consciousness and historical memory of the Poles (unlike the Ukrainians). In the end, this point of view has a logical explanation.

«For example, in the Polish People's Republic until 1989 it was possible to write about Volyn, Joseph Pilsudski, and even about Symon Petliura, but in Soviet Ukraine it didn't happen. It was not possible to have a research on these issues. In addition, Poland had a strong political emigration, including a scientific one, which has dealt with these topics. For this reason, the Volyn tragedy existed in the Polish public consciousness in one way or another. But it didn't exist in Ukrainian minds!» (Hud, 2018a).

The Polish authorities claim that the public has always worried about the events of Volyn, and interpret the memory of the Volyn tragedy as a permanent factor in «Polish historical consciousness». Despite the general practice of historical narratives censoring by the communist government, «memory cleansing» was not fully effective. After all, its results in Soviet Ukraine and in socialist Poland were truly different. In the Ukrainian historical narrative these events were absent, but in the Polish literature of socialist realism, the image of the UPA as thugs and the Nazi servants (though with emphasis on their actions in Beskydy and East Lublin, not in Volyn) existed. Moreover, as noted by Eleonora Narvselius, in Polish textbooks of that period, the UPA was called criminal gangs driven by the ancient hatred of the Poles (Narvselius, 2015). However, the results of sociological surveys give reason to doubt the possibility of simplifying complex mechanisms (Kalishchuk, 2018, p. 105).

This only confirms the understanding of the variability of the category of historical memory, when each new situation inevitably entails correction of this «memory» and, accordingly, the national identity of its carriers (Yakovenko, 2005). There is every reason to believe that the topic of Volyn'43 is now trying to fit into the general trend of the genocide and the Holocaust studies to use similar approaches to popularize knowledge about the events of the




Ukrainian-Polish confrontation in the Second World War in Volyn, Eastern Galicia, Chełm Land and Podlasie. Significant use in the media (or by definition of Volodymyr Viatrovych – «tabloidization» (Viatrovych, 2016), which influences the social actualization of topics of the historical past, is recognized by both Ukrainian (Khakhula, 2014, pp. 22–23) and Polish (Fomina, 2013, p.51) researchers. Obviously, awareness level of the history by our peoples in general and about the Second World War, in particular, is higher among the Poles, but they receive this knowledge mainly from the tabloids and they are one-sided. What is more, we can now claim the widespread use of cinema (documentary, art, and animation), theatre, music for the dissemination of knowledge. And here it should be remembered that all this is only an interpretation of historical knowledge, although it has a huge emotional impact.

What is more important is change in the priorities and important events of the past. In Poland, Volyn'43 has become one of the main topics on which the Polish national consciousness is built (until recently such key themes in the historical discourse have been Katyn, the heroics of the anti-communist struggle of the Poles, ending with the Solidarity).

This contrasts with the Ukrainian situation. Today we are observing the locality of knowledge about the Volyn events (Western Ukraine) or their functioning in the context of the pro-Soviet narrative of the OUN and UPA using the latter by Russian Federation in a mass information attack (Eastern Ukraine). This is confirmed by a sociological survey of the Ukrainian Institute of the Future, conducted on 21 – 28 November, 2017 (Romanenko, 2017).

Analyzing the regional differences in estimates, it should be emphasized that the percentage of those who chose the answer that the UPA had fought for independence but also had committed crimes against civilians does not differ significantly in the regional context. The main differences have shown the more straightforward answers, that is, the fight for independence or the crimes against civilians – the West tends to choose the first answer more often, the East and the South – the second one (Romanenko, 2017).

The unanimity of the Polish society in assessing Volyn events as the «Volyn crime», «genocide» and the transfer of all responsibility to members of the OUN and UPA fighters is now evident and distorted (Ukrainian media wrote about the spread of this tendency on the 60th anniversary of Volyn'43) (Uroku, 2003, p. 7). The stereotypical image of a «Ukrainian-cutthroat», that is a part of the traditional historical points of view of the Poles, depicted since



the time of Henryk Adam Aleksander Pius Sienkiewicz, successfully nourished in the times of the Polish People's Republic by spreading the perception of the Ukrainian as a primitive peasant who can only «stabs lachy (the Poles)», quite comfortably and painlessly transformed into the image of the «Ukrainian nationalist» responsible for the Volyn tragedy (Kalishchuk, 2016, p. 80). The supremacy of Polish socio-political discourse over the Ukrainian is also ensured by its support by the Polish state institutions. Polish politicians make official statements demanding Ukraine plead guilty to the events that took place in Volyn in 1943. If, ten years ago, a relatively small number of Polish scholars and politicians used the term «genocide» towards to the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation in the Second World War, then, since 2013, it has become increasingly heard in public space (Kyrydon, 2016, p. 61), and has been legally enshrined in the decisions of the Senate of 7 July 2016 and the Sejm of 22 July 2016. In doing so, a unanimous vote in favour of these resolutions emphasized that there is no alternative vision (only one deputy M. Swiencicki abstained in the Sejm).

Again, this contrasts with the situation in Ukraine. Over the Vistula, the historical awareness of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict has a national dimension, and the memory of these events is actively influenced by the state institutions. Over the Dnieper River it has a local scale – the development of programs aimed at research and memorialization was seen as a problem for five modern regions in the conflict area, or by neglecting Lviv or Lutsk.

No matter how we avoid it, however, we must admit some fundamental differences in the perception of the Volyn events in Ukrainian and Polish societies, which, in our view, underlie contemporary historical disputes between the two nations. It is crucial for Ukrainian panelists to explain the causes of what happened in the Second World War. The Polish public discourse, with few exceptions, is concentrated only on the events of 1943 – 1944; in Poland, the Volyn tragedy is seen as an independent phenomenon, without historical context. As Yaroslav Hrytsak noted: «The problem is also that the historical memory of the Poles is declining, it does not extend beyond the period of the Second World War. When the Poles talk about Volyn, they do not want to talk about what happened before the Volyn tragedy, what happened in 1918 – 1919, in 1938, and so on. And so it looks like this massacre is from nowhere, just because it was Ukrainian nationalists. This is a very dangerous phenomenon» (Volyn asymetriya).

The problem of historical reconciliation was its limitation to a narrow circle of political and intellectual elite, and consequently a lack of serious influence on the main part of the population, which inevitably resulted in superficiality. All the more so, at this time the leading positions in the discourse around the Volyn events were occupied by «Kresy environments» (which someone describe as «chauvinistic» (Romaszewski-Guzy, 2016, pp. 33–35)), they became the main expert and at the same time a public controller for actions of the authorities. They not only radicalized the rhetoric and steadily increased the degree of tension, but eventually, with the growth of public support for the right-wing forces and their rise to power, they gradually shifted from margins to the centre of social life (Kowal N., 2018). If earlier, as Polish expert Pawel Kowal points out, these environments had ambitions mainly related to honouring victims, lobbying educational or scientific projects that would tell about the crimes of Ukrainian nationalists in Volyn and strengthen the memory about them in the society, nowadays, the «Kresy environments» are clearly expressing political ambitions, trying to influence contemporary politics, and are having success in this sphere (Kowal, 2018). Obviously, the recent growth of interest in the activities of the Polish self-defense can be linked with it. It is not only about numerous publications on this subject (Koprowski, 2018, pp. XLVI–XLVIII; Koreś, 2018; Masierak, 2018, p. 56–59; Stańczyk, 2016, p. XVI–XVIII; Zychowicz, 2018, p. 6–9; Józwiak, 2018), but also the appearance on the tomb of an unknown soldier (Grób Nieznanego Żołnierza w Warszawie) in 2017, for the initiative of the Minister of National Defense Antoni Macierewicz, the plaques with the names of the areas where «the biggest crimes» were committed and those ones whose residents organized the best resistance during the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation in the Second World War. So we can talk not only about honoring the victims of the conflict, but also about the «Kresy environments» as such. What is more, there are the reasons for claiming to attempt to record the history of Polish self-defense in the legend of «cursed soldiers» (żołnierze wyklęte). An example is the personality of Henryk Czybulski (Błazejowska, 2016), a commander of Polish self-defense in Przebraż who, among other things, is known to Ukrainians for his attacks (and along with Soviet guerrilla units) on nearby Ukrainian villages.

Therefore, it should be understood that the Volyn theme exists in the Polish public consciousness as an element of the «Kresy» myth (Halchak, 2013, pp. 106–110) with the relevant ideology. As A. Tykhomirov noted, the presence of such discourse in mass-produced editions is interesting and symptomatic: on the one hand, it emphasizes the interest in the topic of «Kresy», on the other – attests to the functioning of previous, romanticized clichés with minimal revision (Tichomirov, 2013). Nowadays, Polish political historicism is largely based on the sentiments and emotions of the so-called Kresy people, former inhabitants of the Ukrainian (Lithuanian and Belarusian) lands, who frequently objectively or subjectively performed colonial functions. «In that narration, the Polish Kresy was represented as lost Arcadia, the territory of the Polish civilization mission, the peaceful coexistence of peoples under Polish rule, and later it was shown as the torment places of the Poles, who were murdered by horrible ungrateful neighbours» (Balcer, 2017, pp. 23–29).

Despite all attempts of the «liberal» part of Polish society to avoid exacerbation, it now seems that this degree of social tension has reached such indicators that the Polish state and Polish politicians cannot control because public steps to reduce it are tantamount to political suicide. During a discussion «Przepraszam za Wołyń» in Wrocław a Polish journalist, writer and activist of the Solidarity Leszek Budrewicz noted the following: «...the film Volyn despite its negative connotation, is a definite result for the generation of people, who grew up

on the legend of the negative image of the UPA rather than on the study of the white spot of history» (Kulchevych, 2017).

It is difficult for Polish society to handle with the truth about the relationship with the Ukrainians. Thus, one of the moral authorities, Jacek Kuroń, noted that discussing the causes of the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation, one should address a fundamental issue that is difficult to get through to the Polish consciousness, namely: Poland did not allow the independence of Ukraine in the 20th century twice (for the first time as a result of the victory in 1918 over the UHA (Ukrainian Galician Army), and secondly as a result of the Ryha Peace Treaty) (Kuroń, 2003, p. 37). French historian Daniel Beauvois wrote on Ukrainian-Polish relations: «Poles hardly ever were able to change their old habits. I've had to recognize Polish habits as merely colonial» (Beauvois, 2006). The interpretation of the Volyn tragedy as a result of Polish colonialism, the characterization of Ukrainians as second-class citizens in the Second World War is rather an exception in Polish society (Kukiz, 2012, pp. 96–100).

Eventually, this is also recognized by Izabella Chruślińska, a representative of the Giedroyc environment. «It is difficult for the Poles to perceive the truth about the relationship. We do not agree to name the so-called «Polish presence in the east» a colonization policy, we are offended when the presence of the Second Polish Republic after the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918 – 1919 is called the «occupation» of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia (this is how the Polish presence in these territories is determined by some Ukrainian historians and figures), although in interpretations of some prominent Polish historians, such as Professor Roman Vapinski, Ryszard Torzetcki, and French Professor Daniel Beauvois, this is beyond doubt – especially in setting of colonial policy of so-called «Eastern Kresy» of the First Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth period and the period of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth» (Chruślińska, 2018a).

Public discourse in Poland on the historical past is built around the myth of the people-victim. Hence the typical clichés and emphases placed by Polish historians and publicists in assessing the Volyn events when they speak about the anti-Polish action of Ukrainian nationalists / Ukrainians as genocide, whereas similar crimes of the Polish underground are the acts of retribution; when the OUN and the UPA are the criminal fascist organizations and the AK (the Home Army) are patriotic underground units fighting for their own land, etc. and these organizations cannot be compared.


Polish public figure, philosopher, sociologist, Dr. Krzysztof Wojciechowski, drew attention to the fundamental difference between the Ukrainian-Polish and Polish-German dialogues: «I see a great difference in the attitude of Poles to their western and eastern neighbours. The Poles are open-minded, ready to cooperate to the Germans, and behave with the Ukrainians, the Belarusians, or the Russians as with lower people. I believe that because of the perception of self-worth. Nations can cooperate effectively when they have the same level of self-worth. If there is no equality between them, then there will be troubles» (Wojciechowski, 2016).

It is not by chance the conviction began to emerge in the expert environment that in building relations with Kyiv, Warsaw should get rid of, on the one hand, superiority on the eastern border partners, and, on the other hand, Poland should forget about «Ukrainophilia» – the constant justification of Ukraine (Konończuk, 2018).

This caveat seems very important to explain why the model of Polish-German reconciliation with its formula of «we forgive and ask for forgiveness», offered from the beginning of the Ukrainian-Polish understanding process have not worked. There has been a gradual derogation from this formula in Ukrainian-Polish relations. At that time, then an

INP chairman Lukash Kaminsky spoke about the words being appropriate, but they should sound at the moment when both sides know what the crimes are about and confess them (Volyn. Dva pohlady).

Katarzyna Krakowska draws attention to how the Volyn events theme is used to build the image of Ukrainians as a new enemy, an imminent threat (used by nationalist movements to increase their own power) (Krakowska, 2017, pp. 183–205). As a result, the «language of enmity» and the Volyn context in various anti-Ukrainian provocations are increasingly evident in public space. It is enough to cite the recent cases. Since 4 February 2019 mobile action has continued in the Polish capital for a week, in which in Warsaw the car is plying with the trailer, on which the banner with the inscription is placed: «The Ukrainian genocide was committed against the citizens of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by the OUN-UPA members in 1939 – 1947. We remember. Volyn and Eastern Malopolska» (Po Warszawi). In September 2018 a billboard with a similar inscription was posted on the A4 motorway leading from Wrocław to Katowice. Notably, the description stated that «we, the Poles, have a duty not only to inform our compatriots, but also to make sure that Ukrainians who come to our country know that their grandfathers did not fight in the Polish-Ukrainian war and they were not heroes, first of all, that Poland has never been an occupier of Ukraine...» (U Polshchi). The same posters appeared in Wrocław, Opole, near Olsztyn. In Lublin, in March 2018, unknown people left inscriptions about the murders in Volyn on Ukrainian-language billboard: «Wołyń! Pamiętamy» (Volyn! We remember). According to Wyborcza Kraków, on the night of 9 February 2018, anti-Ukrainian inscriptions «UA – von» and «Ukraina do gazu» («UA» – «VON») were found in a tunnel under the railway tracks near Brogi and Otwinowski Streets. Interestingly, that the authors of the study «Ukrainian minority in Poland and the migrants from Ukraine to Poland. Discourse Analysis» associate the rapid growth of such cases with the annexation of Crimea and with the outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine and, accordingly, the hybrid war waged by Russia against Ukraine and Europe (Mniejszość, 2018, p. 11). To avoid accusations of biased fact-finding, we provide official statistics from the Prosecutor's Office in Poland regarding attacks against the Ukrainians (Długosz, 2019).



In the current realities of the hybrid war being waged against Ukraine and Europe by Russia, its role in the Ukrainian-Polish memory conflict cannot be underestimated. In the end, it is worth pointing out the high-ranking politicians' understanding of this. For example, President of the Republic of Poland Bronisław Komorowski during his visit to Lutsk stated: «It is worth remembering that the Ukrainian-Polish conflicts are always used by somebody third, someone, who also has been threatening our independence and our freedom» (Wystąpienie prezydenta RP, 2015, p 2). Programmatic in the «reset» of relations was the declaration of President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko: «History has taught well that when Ukrainians and Poles quarrel, someone else wins. We are sure that we will not allow this situation» (Ukraina and Polshcha). And it is not fundamental whether the accusations fall on Russia as a state, or whether some Russian politicians are suspected in historical discussion initiating. The steps to escalate the conflict between Ukrainians and Poles in the context of the activities of special bodies of the Russian Federation should be considered more. The presence of Russian propaganda and provocation is confirmed by both Ukrainian and Polish analysts (Bornio, 2016, p. 83–100), revealing an understanding of all danger by a part of society. The words of ex-ambassador of Poland to Ukraine, PAUCI (Foundation of Polish-American-Ukrainian cooperation) leader Jan Piętko warned about the danger of Russia's attempts to restore animosity between Ukrainians and Poles on the painful topics of a common, bloody, historical past; both countries have different opinions about it (Rosija).

Undoubtedly, radical right-wing elements have been in the past, are at present, and will be in the future in both societies which promote intolerance to all other ethnic groups. In fact, they «were activated», «are activated» and «will be activated» by third parties seeking to destabilize our societies. And the question is rather about organizing a proper, decent, systematic counteraction to such acts from the outside.

**Conclusions.** The analysis of the Volyn discourse in Ukraine and Poland over the last decades allows us to confirm its radicalization and its increasing interconnection with modern domestic and foreign policy. Finally, Donald Tusk's notable remark on Pope John Paul II's references as the safest route of appeals for unification in Poland should be recalled (Tusk, 2019b). Equally, to assert the rightness of those experts in Ukrainian-Polish relations who say that the nature of the discussion on the Volyn tragedy demonstrates a small chance of understanding and reconciliation between Ukrainian and Polish societies in the near term (Hud, 2018b, p. 376). At the same time, one need to express a firm belief that without hard daily work on a difficult past, it is impossible to expect to build a successful future for Ukraine and Poland.

**Acknowledgments.** I express sincere gratitude to all members of the editorial board for consultations provided during the preparation of the article for printing.

**Funding.** The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

**Artiukh, V.** (2013). «Shcho take istorychna pamiat?» [What is historical memory]. *Humanizm. Transhumanizm. Posthumanizm: materialy dopovidei ta vystupiv Mizhnarodnoi naukovy-teoretychnoi konferentsii*, m. Sumy, 19–20 kvitnia 2013 r. Sumy: SumDU, 3–9. [in Ukrainian].

**Babakova, O.** (2018). *Zakon rozbratu: yak Zakon «Pro Instytut natsionalnoi pamiaty (INP)» rozsvaryv Varshavu z Kyievom ta Yerusalymom* [The Law of Discord: How is Law on the Institute of National Remembrance can dissolve Warsaw with Kyiv and Jerusalem]. URL: <http://naszwybir.pl/zakon-rozbratu-yak-zakon-pro-instytut-natsionalnoyi-pam-yati-inp-rozsvaryv-varshavu-z-kyievom-ta-yerusalymom/> [in Ukrainian].

**Balcer, A.** (2017). Kresentymentalizm [Kresentymentalizm]. *Nowa Europa Wschodnia* 3/4, 23–29. [in Polish].

**Beauvois, D.** (2006). Kresomania [Kresomania]. *Tygodnik Powszechny: katolickie pismo społeczno-kulturalne* Marzec 24, dod. 15. URL: <https://www.tygodnikpowszechny.pl/kresomania-130828?language=pl> [in Polish]

**Berdychowska, B.** (2018). *Obecnie jest niemożliwe, aby ukraiński inteligent nie wiedział kim byli Gombrowicz, Miłosz czy Borowski [It is currently impossible for a Ukrainian intellectual not to know who Gombrowicz, Miłosz or Borowski were]* URL: <https://www.eastbook.eu/2018/01/31/berdychowska-obecnie-jest-niemozliwe-aby-ukrainiski-inteligent-nie-wiedzial-kim-byli-gombrowicz-milosz-czy-borowski/> [in Polish].

**Błażejewska, S.** (2016). Niesłusznie zapomniany bohater: Henryk Cybulski «Harry» (1910 – 1971) [Unjustly forgotten hero: Henryk Cybulski «Harry»]. *Wykłęci: ogólnopolski kwartalnik poświęcony żołnierzom wyklętym*, 3, 135–138; 4, 155–161. [in Polish].

**Bornio, J.** (2016). Kwestia Rzezi Wołyńskiej w kontekście kryzysu ukraińskiego – między rosyjską propagandą, ukraińskim poszukiwaniem tożsamości narodowej a polską racją stanu [The issue of the Volhynian Slaughter in the context of Ukrainian crisis – between Russian propaganda, Ukrainian seeking for the national identity and Polish raison d'État]. *Rocznik Europeistyczny*, 2, 83–100. [in Polish].

**Chruślińska, I.** (2018a). *Iak buduvaty dialog z Ukrainoiu [How to build a dialogue with Ukraine]*. URL: <https://zbruc.eu/node/85302> [in Ukrainian]

**Chruślińska, I.** (2018b). *Ukraina ta Polshcha maiut pravo na rizne rozuminnia istorii – polska hromadska diiachka Iza Khruslinska [Ukraine and Poland have the right for different understanding of history – Polish public figure Iza Hruslinska]*. URL: <https://hromadske.ua/posts/iza-hruslinska-pro-ukrainsko-polski-vidnosini> [in Ukrainian].

**Długosz, D.** (2019). *Nienawiść po polsku. Nad Wisłą rośnie liczba przestępstw wobec Ukraińców o muzułmanów [Polish Hatred. On the Vistula, the number of crimes against Ukrainians and Muslims is increasing]*. URL: <https://www.newsweek.pl/polska/spoleczenstwo/nienawisc-po-polsku-nad-wisla-rośnie-liczba-przestępstw-wobec-ukrainców-i-muzułmanów/wqrbf40> [in Polish].

**Domagalski, M.** (2019). *TK o ustawie o IPN: przepisy dotyczące zbrodni «ukraińskich nacjonalistów» wymagają poprawienia [Constitutional Tribunal on the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance: the provisions regarding the crimes of «Ukrainian nationalists» need to be corrected]*. URL: <https://rp.pl/Prawo-karne/190119438-TK-o-ustawie-o-IPN-przepisy-dotyczące-zbrodni-ukraińskich-nacjonalistów-wymagają-poprawienia.html> [in Polish].

**Duda, A.** (2017). *Polacy ocenią, czy jestem odważnym prezydentem [Poles will assess whether I am a brave president]*. URL: <http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wypowiedzi-prezydenta-rp/wywiady/art,126,polacy-ocenia-czy-jestem-odważnym-prezydentem.html> [in Polish].

**Duda, A.** (2018). *Wystąpienie Prezydenta RP podczas wizyty na Wołyniu [Address by the President of the Republic of Poland during a visit to Volhynia]*. URL: <https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wypowiedzi-prezydenta-rp/wystapienia/art,468,wystapienie-prezydenta-rp-podczas-wizyty-na-wołyniu.html> [in Polish].

**Fomina, J. et al.** (2013). *Polska – Ukraina, Polacy – Ukraińcy: spojrzenie przez granicę [Poland – Ukraine, Poles – Ukrainians: a look across the border]*. Warszawa: Fundacja Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 51 p. [in Polish]

**Halchak, B.** (2013). *Polyski mif pro «skhidni kresy» v polsko-ukrainskykh vidnosynakh [The Polish myth of «Eastern Kresy» in Polish-Ukrainian relations]*. *Istorychnyi arkhiv. Naukovi studii*, 11, 106–110. [in Ukrainian].

**Hnatiuk, O.** (2018). *Kto sieje wiatr, ten zbiera burzę [Whoever sows the wind collects the storm]*. URL: <https://upmp.news/pl/pl-in-polish/pl-suspilstvo-pl/kto-sieje-wiatr-ten-zbiera-burze-ola-hnatiuk/> [in Polish].

**Hrytsak, J.** (2018). *Vdavaty, shcho vynna lyshe odna storona – tsynizm abo naivnist [It is a cynicism or naivety to pretend that only one side is guilty]*. URL: [https://zik.ua/news/2018/07/11/yaroslav\\_grytsak\\_pro\\_volyn1943\\_vdavaty\\_shcho\\_vynna\\_lyshe\\_odna\\_storona\\_\\_tsynizm\\_1363707](https://zik.ua/news/2018/07/11/yaroslav_grytsak_pro_volyn1943_vdavaty_shcho_vynna_lyshe_odna_storona__tsynizm_1363707) [in Ukrainian]

- Hud, B.** (2018a). *Pro Volyn i dorohy, shcho pryvely do nei, hovorimo, opyraiuchys vykliuchno na dokumenty* [We talk about Volyn and the roads that led to it, relying solely on documents]. URL: <http://obserwatoriamiedzynarodowy.pl/2018/12/11/profes> [in Ukrainian].
- Hud, B.** (2018b). *Ukraińcy i Polacy na Naddnieprzu, Wołyniu i w Galicji Wschodniej w XIX i pierwszej połowie XX wieku* [Ukrainians and Poles in Naddnieprz, Volhyn and Eastern Galicia in the 19th and first half of the 20th century]. Warszawa: Pracownia Wydawnicza, 446 p. [in Polish].
- Istorychna pamiat** (2008). *Istorychna pamiat yak pole zmahany za identychnist* [Historical memory as a field of struggle for identity]: materiały «kruhloho stolu» 22 kvitnia 2008 r. Kyiv: NISD, 14 p. [in Ukrainian].
- Józwiak, K.** (2018). *Wołyńskie reduty: Jak Polacy bronili się przed Ukraińcami* [Volhynian redoubts: How Poles defended themselves against Ukrainians]. URL: <https://www.rp.pl/Rzecz-o-historii/307079887-Wolynskie-reduty-Jak-Polacy-bronili-sie-przed-Ukrajncami.html> [in Polish].
- Kalishchuk, J.** (2016). *U tini Volyni? Istoriia vs pamiat* [In the Shade Volhyn? Historu vs memory]. Lviv: NAS, I. Krypiakevych Institute of Ukrainian, 162 p. [in Ukrainian].
- Kalishchuk, O.** (2013). *Ukrainsko-polske protystoiannia na Volyni ta v Halychyni u roky Druhoi svitovoi viiny: naukovyi i suspilnyi dyskursy* [Ukrainian-Polish conflict in Volhynia and Galicia during the Second World War: scientific and public discourses]. Lviv: NAS, I. Krypiakevych Institute of Ukrainian, 510 p. [in Ukrainian].
- Kalishchuk, O.** (2018). *Volyn'43 u istorychnii pamiaty suchasnykh poliakiw: sotsiologichnyi vymir* [Volyn'43 in the historical memory of modern Poles: a sociological dimension]. Materiały X Volynskoi Vseukrainskoi istoryko-kraieznavchoi konferentsii, m. Zhytomyr, 16–17 lystopada 2018 r.: Zb. nauk. pr. Zhytomyr: Polissia, 105 p. [in Ukrainian].
- Khakhula, L.** (2014). *Polski suspilni nastroi shchodo Ukrainy ta ukraintiv u 1991 – 2014 rr.* [Polish public opinion towards Ukraine and Ukrainians in 1991 – 2014]. *Sotsialno-ekonomichni problemy suchasnoho periodu Ukrainy*, 2, 19–26. [in Ukrainian].
- Konończuk, W.** (2018). *Czas na doktrynę postgiedroyciowską wobec Ukrainy* [Time for postGiedroyc doctrine towards Ukraine]. *Nowa Europa Wschodnia* 1, 23–32. [in Polish].
- Koprowski, M. A.** (2018). *Czasami świadkowie przeżyli* [Sometimes the witnesses survived]. *Najwyższy Czas!: pismo konserwatywno-liberalne*, 17/18, XLVI–XLVIII [in Polish].
- Koreś, D., & Żuczowski, M.** (2018). *Samoobrona na Wołyniu i 27 Dywizja Piechoty Armii Krajowej* [Self-defense in Volhyn and the 27th Infantry Division of the Home Army]. Warszawa: Edipresse Kolekcje: Bellona, 62 p. [in Polish].
- Koval, N.** (2018). *Okrim istorychnykh superechok: yake maibutnie dlia polsko-ukrainskykh vidnosyn? Polskiy pohliad* [In addition to historical discussion: what is the future for Polish-Ukrainian relations, the Polish view]. URL: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueos/ukraine/14974.pdf> [in Ukrainian].
- Kowal, P.** (2016). *«Z Ukrainą trzeba podjąć dialog na zasadach z XXI w., a nie ciągle pobrzękiwać szabelką»* [«Dialogue with Ukraine must be on the principles of the 21st century, and not constantly buzzing with a saber»]. URL: <https://polskatimes.pl/pawel-kowal-z-ukraina-trzeba-podjac-dialog-na-zasadach-z-xxi-w-a-nie-ciagle-pobrzekiwac-szabelka/ar/10130984> [in Polish].
- Kowal, P.** (2018). *Nie można traktować na równi zbrodni nazistowskich, sowieckich i ukraińskich* [You cannot treat Nazi, Soviet and Ukrainian crimes equally]. URL: <http://wiesz.com.pl/2018/02/08/pawel-kowal-nie-mozna-traktowac-na-rowni-zbrodni-nazistowskich-sowieckich-i-ukrainskich/> [in Polish].
- Krakowska, K.** (2017). *Rola rzezi wołyńskiej w budowaniu narracji na temat Ukraińców w polskim Internecie* [The role of Volhynia massacre in building a narrative about Ukrainians on the Polish Internet]. *Zoon Politykon*, 8, 183–205. [in Polish].
- Kukiz, P.** (2012). *Wołyń to rezultat polskiego kolonializmu* [Volyn is the result of Polish colonialism]. *Kwarta: pismo historyczno-społeczne*, 3, 96–100. [in Polish].
- Kulchevych, O.** (2017). *«Przepraszam za Wołyń»? – albo variatsii na temu ukrainsko-polskoho prymyrennia* [«Sorry for Volyn»? – or variants of Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation]. *Nashe slovo, January 15* [in Ukrainian].
- Kuroń, J.** (2003). *Trudna droga do pojednania: Rozmowa DIALOG-u z Jackiem Kurońem na temat stosunków polsko-ukraińskich* [A difficult path to reconciliation: DIALOG's conversation with

Jacek Kuroń on Polish-Ukrainian relations]. *Dialog. Deutsch-Polnishes Magazin / Magazyn Polsko-Niemiecki*, 64, 37. [in Polish].

**Kuroń, J.** (2012) *Poliaky ta ukraintsi: vazhkyi dialoh [Poles and Ukrainians: a difficult dialogue]*. Kyiv: Duch i litera Дух і літера, 264 p. [in Ukrainian].

**Kyrydon, A.** (2016). Volyn, 1943: utverdzhennia sytuatyvnykh kodiv pamiaty [Volyn, 1943; adopting, the situational codes of memory]. *Intermarum: istoriia, polityka, kultura*, 3, 48–67. [in Ukrainian].

**Lichnerowicz, A., & Piechowicz, Z.** (2013). *Prof. Davies o rzezi wołyńskiej: Ludobójstwo to kwestia polityczna. Selekcja: me jesteśmy ofiarami ludobójstwa, inne nie [Professor Davies on the Volyn slaughter: Genocide is a political issue. Selection: we are not the victims of genocide, others are not]*. URL: [http://www.tokfm.pl/Tokfm/1,103454,14103376,Prof.\\_Davies\\_o\\_rzezi\\_wołyńskiej\\_Ludobojstwo\\_to\\_kwestia.html](http://www.tokfm.pl/Tokfm/1,103454,14103376,Prof._Davies_o_rzezi_wołyńskiej_Ludobojstwo_to_kwestia.html) [in Polish].

**Maciejewski, J. A.** (2016). Rozwiążemy sprawę polską tak jak Hitler żydowską [We will solve the Polish case just like the Jewish Hitler]. *Gazeta Polska, Lipiec*, 6, 17. [in Polish].

**Makowiecki, L.** (2013). Wołyń 1943. Historia pewnej ballady... [Wołyń 1943. A story of a ballad...]. URL: <https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/161610-wolyn-1943-historia-pewnej-ballady> [in Polish].

**Marecki, J.** (2018). Zabito ich podwójnie [They were killed twice]. *Nasz Dziennik (wyd. zasadnicze) Lipiec 11 (nr 158). Dodatek Historyczny IPN «Moja Niepodległa»*, 1. [in Polish].

**Masewicz, M.** (2017). *W Polsce zbrodniarze, na Ukrainie bohaterowie. «Obie te wersje pamięci są prawdziwe» [Criminals in Poland, heroes in Ukraine. «Both of these versions of memory are real»]*. URL: <https://fakty.tvn24.pl/fakty-o-swiecie,61/w-polsce-zbrodniarze-na-ukrainie-bohaterowie-historia-upa,788816.html> [in Polish].

**Masierak, L.** (2018). Wołyńska twierdza [Volyn fortress]. *Tygodnik Solidarność: czasopismo NSZZ Solidarność*, 22, 56–59. [in Polish].

**Mniejszość ukraińska i migranci z Ukrainy w Polsce** (2018). *Mniejszość ukraińska i migranci z Ukrainy w Polsce. Analiza dyskursu: Praca zbiorowa [Ukrainian minority and migrants from Ukraine in Poland. Discourse analysis: Collective work]*. Warszawa: Tyrsa, 87 p. [in Polish].

**Motyka, G.** (2011). *Od rzezi wołyńskiej do akcji «Wisła»: konflikt polsko-ukraiński 1943 – 1947 [From the Volyn slaughter to the «Wisła» campaign: the Polish-Ukrainian conflict 1943 – 1947]*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 524 p. [in Polish].

**Motyka, G.** (2018). Nieustający polsko-ukraiński spór o historię [A Persistent Polish-Ukrainian Conflict over History]. *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, 1, 31–40. [in Polish].

**Narvselius, E.** (2015). *Tragic Past, Agreeable Heritage: Post-Soviet Intellectual Discussions on the Polish Legacy in Western Ukraine*. University of Pittsburg, Carl Beck Papers, 76 p. [in English].

Piętka, B. (2012). Zapomniane ludobójstwo [Forgotten Genocide]. *Wołyń i Polesie*, 73, 34–47. [in Polish].

**Po Varshavi yizdyt baner pro «ukraïnskyi henotsyd na Volyni [A banner about «Ukrainian genocide» in Volyn is plying through Warsaw]**. URL: <https://www.nasze-slowo.pl/news/u-varshavi-startuvava-mobilna-kampaniya-pro-vbivstvo-polyakiv-ukrayintsyami/> [in Ukrainian].

**Poroshenko, P.** (2018). *Vystup Prezydenta pid chas vidkryttia Memorialu pamiat ukraïntsv, yaki zahynuly vid ruk polskykh «selianskykh bataloniv» ta pidrozdiliv Armii Kraiovoi u 1944 rotsi u s. Sahryni [President's speech during the memorial opening honouring Ukrainians who died at the hands of Polish «peasant battalions» and the units of the Army Krajova (home Army) in the village of Sahryniu in 1944]*. URL: <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/vistup-prezidenta-pid-chas-vidkrit-tya-memorialu-pamyati-ukra-48562> [in Ukrainian].

**Protestujemy przeciwko przyjętej przez Sejm ustawie o IPN [We protest against the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance adopted by the Sejm]**. URL <http://wyborcza.pl/7,95891,22970880,protestujemy-przeciwko-przyjetej-przez-sejm-ustawie-o-ipn.html> [in Polish].

**Rodak, W.** (2018). Bestie z Wołynia. Ich zbrodnie przerażały nawet Niemców [Beasts from Volhynia. Their crimes even terrified the Germans]. *Nasza Historia. Lipiec/Sierpień* [in Polish].

**Romanenko, Y.** (2017). *Kak ukraïntsy smotriat na otnosheniya mezhdU Ukraïnoj i Polshoi [How Ukrainians look at the relations between Ukraine and Poland]*. URL: <https://hvyly.net/analytics/politics/kak-ukraïntsy-smotryat-na-otnosheniya-mezhdU-ukraïnoy-i-polshoi.html> [in Russian].

**Romaszewska-Guzy, A.** (2016). Wołyń to nasz kościotrup w szafie [Volyn is our skeleton in the wardrobe]. *Wprost*, 25, 33–35. [in Polish].

**Rosiia robytyme vse, shchob rozsvaryty poliakiv i ukrainsiv – polskyi hromadskiy diiach Yan Pieklo** [Russia will do everything to break Poles and Ukrainians up – Polish public figure Jan Piekło]. URL: <http://www.ukrainian.voanews.com/content/russia-wants-to-make-poles-and-ukrainians-enemies/2523094.html> [in Ukrainian].

**Snyder, T.** (2016). *Gdy na Ukrainie wojna, lepiej ws. zbrodni wołyńskiej oddzielić historię od polityki* [When the war in Ukraine, it is better to separate history from politics regarding the Volyn crime]. URL: <https://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/opinie/artykuly/532748,snyder-gdy-na-ukrainie-wojna-lepiej-ws-zbrodni-wozynskiej-oddzielic-historie-od-polityki.html> [in Polish].

**Snyder, T.** (2019) *Nikt nie uwierzy w niewinność Polski* [Nobody will believe in Poland's innocence]. URL: <https://magazyn.wp.pl/artyk2019ul/timothy-snyder-nykt-nie-uwierzy-w-niewinnosc-polski> [in Polish].

**Stańczyk, T.** (2016). Polska samoobrona [Polish Self-defense]. *Do Rzeczy: tygodnik Lisickiego, dod. Wołyń '43: Ukraińskie ludobójstwo Polaków, 41, XVI–XVIII.* [in Polish].

**Stryjek, T.** (2017). Hipertrofia polityki pamięci w III RP i jej konsekwencje od roku 2015 [Hypertrophy of memory policy in the Third Polish Republic and its consequences from 2015]. *Zoon Politykon, 8, 87–125.* [in Polish].

**Tichomirov, M.** (2013). «Kresy» kak symptom: zametky na poliakh polskyykh zhurnalov [«Kresy» as a symptom: notes in the Polish magazines]. URL: <http://www.historians.in.ua/index.php/en/avtorska-kolonka/834-andrei-tykhomyrov-kresy-kak-symptom-zametky-na-poliakh-polskyykh-zhurnalov> [in Russian].

**Tusk, D.** (2019a). «Nemaie Yevropy bez Ukrainy»: tekst istorychnoi promovy Tuska u Verkhovniy radi [«There is no Europe without Ukraine»: text of Tusk's historic speech in the Verkhovna Rada]. URL: <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2019/02/19/7093023/> [in Ukrainian].

**Tusk, D.** (2019b). «Liubyty Polshchu i Ukrainu – tse yak liubyty svoiu mamu i zakokhatys u divchynu». *Lektsiia Donalda Tuska u Lvivskomu universyteti* [«Liubyty Polshchu i Ukrainu – tse yak liubyty svoiu mamu i zakokhatys u divchynu» Lecture of Donald Tusk in Lviv University]. URL: [https://zaxid.net/lyubiti\\_polshhu\\_i\\_ukrayinu\\_\\_tse\\_yak\\_lyubiti\\_svoyu\\_mamu\\_i\\_zakohatis\\_u\\_divchinu\\_n1476093](https://zaxid.net/lyubiti_polshhu_i_ukrayinu__tse_yak_lyubiti_svoyu_mamu_i_zakohatis_u_divchinu_n1476093) [in Ukrainian].

**U Polshchi na trasi pomistyly baner pro Volyn** [In Poland, a banner about Volyn was placed on the track]. URL: <https://www.nasze-slowo.pl/news/u-polshchi-na-trasi/> [in Ukrainian].

**Ukraina ta Polshcha hotovi do konstruktynoho dialohu z pytan mynuloho – Petro Poroshenko ta Andzhei Dudy** [Ukraine and Poland are ready for a constructive dialogue on the issues of the past – Petro Poroshenko and Andrzej Duda]. URL: <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/ukrayina-ta-polsha-gotovi-do-konstruktivnogo-dialogu-z-pitan-36498> [in Ukrainian].

**Ustawa z dnia 26 stycznia 2018 r. o zmianie ustawy o Instytucie Pamięci Narodowej – Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, ustawy o grobach i cmentarzach wojskowych, ustawy o muzeach oraz ustawy o odpowiedzialności podmiotów zbiorowych za czyny zabronione pod groźbą kary** [Act of 26 January 2018 amending the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance - Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation, the Act on military graves and cemeteries, the Act on museums and the Act on the responsibility of collective entities for offenses under pain of punishment]. URL: [https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/proc8.nsf/ustawy/771\\_u.htm](https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/proc8.nsf/ustawy/771_u.htm) [in Polish].

**Viatrovych, V.** (2016). *Tabloidyziatsiia istorii. Rol media u vysvitlenni polsko-ukrainskoi viiny 1942 – 1947 rokov* [Tabloidization of history. The role of the media in the coverage of the Polish Ukrainian War of 1942 – 1947]. URL: <https://zbruc.eu/node/53685> [in Ukrainian].

**Vidnosyny Ukrainy i Polshchi: monopolii na pravdu buty ne mozhe** [Relations between Ukraine and Poland: there can be no monopoly on the truth]. URL: <https://www.dw.com/uk/vidnosyni-ukrainy-i-polshchi-monopolii-na-pravdu-buty-ne-mozhe/a-41409517> [in Ukrainian].

**Volyn. Dva pohliady** [Volyn. Two views]. URL: [https://www.ukrinform.com/rubric-other-news/1862867-volin\\_dva\\_poglyadi\\_2073494.html](https://www.ukrinform.com/rubric-other-news/1862867-volin_dva_poglyadi_2073494.html) [in Ukrainian].

**Volyn: asymetriia pamiatei. 8 istorykiv pro rishennia polskoho parlamentu** [Volyn: memory asymmetry. 8 historians on the decision of the Polish Parliament]. URL: <https://hromadske.ua/posts/volyn-asymetriia-pamiatei-8-istorykiv-pro-rishennia-polskoho-parlamentu> [in Ukrainian].

**Wojciechowski, K.** (2016). *Bida, shcho stosovno nimtsiv poliaky pochuvaiutsia rivnymi, a shchodo ukrainsiv – vyshchymy* [The trouble is that the Poles feel themselves equal to the Germans and higher than the Ukrainians]. URL: <http://www.polukr.net/uk/blog/2016/12/29155/> [in Ukrainian].

**Wystąpienie prezydenta RP Bronisława Komorowskiego** (2015). Wystąpienie prezydenta RP Bronisława Komorowskiego na uroczystościach w Łucku [Speech of the President of the Republic of Poland Bronisław Komorowski at the celebrations in Lutsk]. *Kurier Galicyjski*, 13–14, 2. [in Polish].

**Yakovenko, N.** (2005). *Nova doba – novi pidruchnyky. Pro potrebu diskusii nad pidruchnykamy z istorii Ukrainy* [New era – new textbooks. About the need for discussion over history textbooks in Ukraine]. URL: <http://www.novadoba.org.ua/data/metod/yjakovenko.rtf> [in Ukrainian].

«**UA – VON**»: u Krakovi na stinakh ziavylisia antyukrainski hasla [«UA – VON (away)»: anti-Ukrainian slogans appeared on the walls in Krakow. Polish public moods towards Ukraine and Ukrainians in 1991 – 2014]. URL: from <https://www.nasze-slowo.pl/news/ua-von-u-krakovi-na-stinakh-z-javilisja-antiukrainski-gasla/> [in Ukrainian].

«**Uroky natsionalnoi hidnosti**» (2003) [«National Dignity Lessons»]. *Postup, Lypen 10–16*, 7. [in Ukrainian].

«**Volyn! Pamiataiemo**»: u Liublani nevidomi zipsuly ukrainomovnyi bilbord [«Volyn! Remember»: in Lublin, unidentified people spoiled Ukrainian-language billboard]. URL: <https://www.nasze-slowo.pl/news/takij-napis-zjavisvsja-na-bilbordah-u-lublani/> [in Ukrainian].

**Zacharczyszn, L.** (2018). Kształtowanie się ukraińskiej tożsamości [Formation of Ukrainian identity]. In *W jakiej Europie chcemy żyć? V Międzynarodowy Forum Europejskie Europa z widokiem na przyszłość. Wybrane*. (pp. 57–62). Gdańsk: Europejski Centrum Solidarności. URL: [https://www.ecs.gda.pl/library/File/nauka/e-booki/EZNP\\_2017.pdf](https://www.ecs.gda.pl/library/File/nauka/e-booki/EZNP_2017.pdf) [in Polish].

**Ziemkiewicz, R. A.** (2016). Wołyń – kłamstwo katyńskie III RP [Wołyń - the Katyn lie of the Third Polish Republic]. *Do Rzeczy: tygodnik Lisickiego*, 28, 34–36. [in Polish].

**Zychowicz, P.** (2018). obrońcy Polaków [Polish defenders]. *Historia. Do Rzeczy*, 7, 6–9. [in Polish].

**Żaryn, J.** (2015). «Przeprowadzimy ofensywę historyczną» [«We will conduct a historical offensive»]. URL: <http://www.prawy.pl/z-kraju/11096-senator-jan-zaryn-przeprowadzimy-ofensywe-historyczna> [in Polish].

*The article was received on March 24, 2019.  
Article recommended for publishing 27/08/2019.*