THE VOLYN TRAGEDY IN UKRAINE AND POLAND’S PUBLIC DISCOURSE

Summary. The purpose of the article is to reveal the significant changes in the public discourse on the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation in the Second World War, to identify differences in the functioning of collective memory about those events in Ukrainian and Polish societies. The research methodology was the classical principles of historicism, structure, science, verification, author’s objectivity and the use of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and special historical (historical-genetic, historical-systemic, historical-typological) methods. The research novelty of the article is a holis - tic awareness of the Volyn discourse features over the last decade and disclosure of the influencing mechanisms on the memory about the teasing pages of the past. Conclusions. Contemporary stereo - typical perceptions and dominant discursive practices around the Volyn tragedy that have taken root in Ukrainian and Polish societies over the last decade are an ideological construct that undergoes changes driven by the influences of politicians, public figures, professional historians and publicists. It is important to form a coherent vision of the events of the mid-20th century in Poland, which have become an important element of historical memory. An important component of understanding the topic is its use in modern domestic (especially in Poland) and foreign (in the Ukrainian-Russian war) policy.

In turn, Andrzej Duda, reiterating his earlier thesis that the future cannot be completely detached from history, but «truth in relations between peoples is fundamental» (Duda, 2017), said: «We need to build our relations on truth. Just recognize it. There can be no revenge, although there is pain. I believe that time that heals wounds will heal those terrible wounds that are kept in many hearts -on one side and on the other. But we must build our good relationship on historical truth. This is the most important thing» (Duda, 2018).
The problem is that both versions, Ukrainian and Polish, have a right to exist and have their basis. Finally, some of Ukrainian and Polish participants of the «Volyn discussion» pay attention to this, pointing out that in Poland the UPA is remembered as a criminal organization that committed the genocide of the Polish population of Galicia andVolhynia in 1943 -1944, but in Ukraine memory about the UPA is linked to a heroic anti-Soviet guerrilla struggle. In doing so, both versions are true, each showing a fragment of the story, and each one is the most important (Masewicz, 2017). This, according to the well-known Polish specialist on Ukrainian studies Bogumiła Berdychowska, poses a fundamental problem with Ukrainian and the Polish views on anti-Polish UPA campaign. Something very significant for Polish history -in the case of Ukraine is not so important (for the Ukrainians the 20th century was too rich in tragic experience) (Berdychowska, 2018;Zaczarczyszyn, 2018, p. 59). As Polish expert Adam Balcer remarked: «We must carry out a historical dialogue, but we cannot say that we have a monopoly on the truth, we are right, and the other side must accept our point of view» (Balcer, 2017). The language of ultimatums is spoken by the modern ruling party cannot have any success. After all, the statements made in the programmatic material of Senator-historian Jan Żaryn about that, first of all, «there is no Polish people without Lviv», and second, «the formation of Ukrainian identity is impossible without the realization that the Volyn tragedy is a genocide of the Polish people» (Żaryn, 2015), could have caused nothing but irritation. It is no coincidence that from time to time from participants of the Volyn discourses (for example, from Janusz Kurtika -the chairman of the INP (the Institute of National Remembrance) we hear opinions to recognize the right of both sides to have their truth. Iza Chruslińska about that said the following: «Regarding history, I think the Poles and the Ukrainians should accept a formula: every nation has the right to its own understanding of history. And we must not have a common understanding: we must admit that the Ukrainians have the right to their historical memory and the Poles to their own one» (Chruslińska, 2018b).
In the opposite interpretation, it is futile to rely on the effectiveness of resolving disputes through commissions of historians or forums of intellectuals (moreover, the sides' historical approaches are now codified). The «Volyn» theme only expresses how much historical narration and historical consciousness are an element of the functioning of new and next generations. Although, from time to time, in the context of the Volyn debate, the tempting argument about the need to «leave history to historians» is heard. It should be noted that the common Ukrainian-Polish past since the emergence of democratic Poland in 1989 and the proclamation of Ukraine's independence in 1991 were neither solely an academic issue nor a simple or minor subject of political dialogue. Modern politics cannot be formed without understanding own past and the history of neighbouring states and peoples, because they remind about themselves. The caveat of American historian Timothy Snyder, a professor at Yale University, should be noted here as to the impossibility of historical judgement emergence, on the basis of which all other states and their societies agree to recognize Poland is that how it defines itself (Snyder, 2019). Academic environment was legally subordinated to politicians by the last steps of official Warsaw. Amendments to the Law on the Institute of National Memory was adopted on 1 February 2018 (it was called the «anti-Bandera law» in Ukraine) , which, among other things, provide for criminal responsibility for denying crimes of Ukrainian nationalists against citizens of the II Republic of Poland, have become a way of coercion on historians and political dictate. The devastating consequences of adopting this legal act, despite the decision of the Constitutional Court of Poland of 17 January 2019 to recognize the provisions on «Ukrainian nationalists» and «Eastern Małopolska» as contradicting the Polish Constitution (Domagalski, 2019), are also fixed by the Ukrainian (Babakova, 2018 ), and Polish (Protestujemu; Motyka, 2018) authors.
«The law of 29 April 2016 abolished the previous procedure for the appointment of the INP Chairman that provided for a significant participation of the scientific environment of historians in favour of an order; an exclusive control was given to politicians, that is, the majority in both houses of the parliament, who nominates seven members of the Council and then approves the candidate elected by this body, and the president who nominates the other two members» (Stryjek, 2017, p. 104).
The aforementioned amendments revealed another threatening trend. The essence of the «Bandera Amendment» is not even in the criminal responsibility of those who «publicly and contrary to the facts deny the crimes», but in that to record the crimes of Ukrainian nationalists alongside the communist and Nazi crimes in the public consciousness (Ustawa, 2018). «In the discussion art. 1 was neglected where to the paragraph 1a, which defines the sphere of the INP's activities, after the Nazi and communist crimes, among other crimes, which may be described as crimes against peace and humanity or war crimes, such information was added: «crimes of Ukrainian nationalists and members of Ukrainian formations who have collaborated with the Third Reich» (Hnatiuk, 2018).
Here Paweł Kowal's remark about it should also be remembered. He points out that this thesis underpins the foundations of Poland's historical policy that emphasizes the exceptionalism of the two totalitarianisms in the negative sense which, from the standpoint of international law, are the aggressors against Poland and, accordingly, the root cause of all other crimes. The addition of other factors weakens the Polish position -the question of the occupier's responsibility for impunity in the occupied territories raises (Kowal, 2018).
The tendency that we have been observing for decades (Kalishchuk, 2013, p. 274), started in kresy environment, supported by right-wing politicians like Jarosław Kalinowski, now has fixed in law. In the Polish segment of the Volyn (and not only) discussion, we can sometimes find such statements as: «Usually, when we talk about the genocide of the Poles in the East, we mean the Soviet occupation of the Eastern Kresy in 1939 -1941 and since 1944 the Katyn crime and the OUN-UPA crimes» (Piętka, 2012, pp. 34-47), «to paraphrase the words of rotmistrz Piletski (who compared Auschwitz with the torture chambers of UB), we can say that «Katyn despite Volyn was a toy» (Makowiecki, 2013 ), «Volyn -the Katyn lie of the ІІІ Republic of Poland» (Ziemkiewicz, 2016, p. 34-36) or «the monsters from Volyn. Even the Germans were struck by their crimes» (Rodak, 2018), «we will start the Polish case as Hitler -Jewish one» (Maciejwski, 2016, p. 17). Finally, in 2014 in Cieszanów, Podkarpackie Voivodeship, Lubaczow County a monument was opened to honour the victims of the town and the Gmina, who died in 1939 -1947. The victims were killed by German, Soviet, and Ukrainian nationalists. Here one can only point out the substitution of concepts mentioned by Grzegorz Motyka -the sign of equality between members of the OUN-UPA and the Nazis and Communists (Soviet) gives the impression that the Poles were dealing with something like external invasion and Ukrainian occupation of Kresy (Motyka, 2011, p. 465).
The Polish side's attempt to define clearly the Volyn events, which «is required by the memory of the victims» complicates and exacerbates the situation (Marecki, 2018, p. 1). The victimization of national histories has led to the desire to receive the exclusive role of the victim and, accordingly, the black and white interpretation in the coordinates of «the victim -the executioner» and the relevant victimization of «their own» and the demonization of «someone else». The English historian Norman Davies expressed the following opinion: «It is unacceptable for only one side to claim the status of sole victim of the Volyn massacre […] remember that at the beginning of the Second World War these lands were multinational: the Poles, the Ukrainians and the Jews lived there. Each of these groups has experienced terrible things. One cannot isolate one of them and speak only about its own grievance» (Lichnerowicz, 2013).
With the entire seemingly paradox of this situation, it is necessary to recognize the understandability of this state of affairs. After all, we are dealing with historical memory, which, unlike, let's say, historical science, is a simplified / stereotyped collective perception of the facts of the past by members of the national community (Artiuch, 2013, p. 3). At the same time, in our context, particular importance is given to the understanding of historical memory, expressed by Yevhen Sverstiuk, as primarily painful points (Istorychna pamiat, 2008, p. 14). Volyn' 43 became the most painful memory of the common Ukrainian-Polish past.
The generally accepted view is that the tragic events in Volyn, Eastern Galicia, Chełm Land and Podlasie in the Second World War are deeply rooted in the public consciousness and historical memory of the Poles (unlike the Ukrainians). In the end, this point of view has a logical explanation.
«For example, in the Polish People's Republic until 1989 it was possible to write about Volyn, Joseph Pilsudski, and even about Symon Petliura, but in Soviet Ukraine it didn't happen. It was not possible to have a research on these issues. In addition, Poland had a strong political emigration, including a scientific one, which has dealt with these topics. For this reason, the Volyn tragedy existed in the Polish public consciousness in one way or another. But it didn't exist in Ukrainian minds!» (Hud, 2018a).
The Polish authorities claim that the public has always worried about the events of Volyn, and interpret the memory of the Volyn tragedy as a permanent factor in «Polish historical consciousness». Despite the general practice of historical narratives censoring by the communist government, «memory cleansing» was not fully effective. After all, its results in Soviet Ukraine and in socialist Poland were truly different. In the Ukrainian historical narrative these events were absent, but in the Polish literature of socialist realism, the image of the UPA as thugs and the Nazi servants (though with emphasis on their actions in Beskydy and East Lublin, not in Volyn) existed. Moreover, as noted by Eleonora Narvselius, in Polish textbooks of that period, the UPA was called criminal gangs driven by the ancient hatred of the Poles (Narvselius, 2015). However, the results of sociological surveys give reason to doubt the possibility of simplifying complex mechanisms (Kalishchuk, 2018, p. 105).
This only confirms the understanding of the variability of the category of historical memory, when each new situation inevitably entails correction of this «memory» and, accordingly, the national identity of its carriers (Yakovenko, 2005). There is every reason to believe that the topic of Volyn'43 is now trying to fit into the general trend of the genocide and the Holocaust studies to use similar approaches to popularize knowledge about the events of the

The Volyn tragedy in Ukraine and Poland's public discourse
Ukrainian-Polish confrontation in the Second World War in Volyn, Eastern Galicia, Chełm Land and Podlasie. Significant use in the media (or by definition of Volodymyr Viatrovych -«tabloidization» (Viatrovych, 2016), which influences the social actualization of topics of the historical past, is recognized by both Ukrainian (Khakhula, 2014, pp. 22-23) and Polish (Fomina, 2013, p.51) researchers. Obviously, awareness level of the history by our peoples in general and about the Second World War, in particular, is higher among the Poles, but they receive this knowledge mainly from the tabloids and they are one-sided. What is more, we can now claim the widespread use of cinema (documentary, art, and animation), theatre, music for the dissemination of knowledge. And here it should be remembered that all this is only an interpretation of historical knowledge, although it has a huge emotional impact.
What is more important is change in the priorities and important events of the past. In Poland, Volyn'43 has become one of the main topics on which the Polish national consciousness is built (until recently such key themes in the historical discourse have been Katyn, the heroics of the anti-communist struggle of the Poles, ending with the Solidarity).
This contrasts with the Ukrainian situation. Today we are observing the locality of knowledge about the Volyn events (Western Ukraine) or their functioning in the context of the pro-Soviet narrative of the OUN and UPA using the latter by Russian Federation in a mass information attack (Eastern Ukraine). This is confirmed by a sociological survey of the Ukrainian Institute of the Future, conducted on 21 -28 November, 2017 (Romanenko, 2017). Analyzing the regional differences in estimates, it should be emphasized that the percentage of those who chose the answer that the UPA had fought for independence but also had committed crimes against civilians does not differ significantly in the regional context. The main differences have shown the more straightforward answers, that is, the fight for independence or the crimes against civilians -the West tends to choose the first answer more often, the East and the South -the second one (Romanenko, 2017).
The unanimity of the Polish society in assessing Volyn events as the «Volyn crime», «genocide» and the transfer of all responsibility to members of the OUN and UPA fighters is now evident and distorted (Ukrainian media wrote about the spread of this tendency on the 60th anniversary of Volyn'43) (Uroku, 2003, p. 7). The stereotypical image of a «Ukrainiancutthroat», that is a part of the traditional historical points of view of the Poles, depicted since Have you heard about the crimes that took place in Volyn in 1943? the time of Henryk Adam Aleksander Pius Sienkiewicz, successfully nourished in the times of the Polish People's Republic by spreading the perception of the Ukrainian as a primitive peasant who can only «stabs lachy (the Poles)», quite comfortably and painlessly transformed into the image of the «Ukrainian nationalist» responsible for the Volyn tragedy (Kalishchuk, 2016, p. 80). The supremacy of Polish socio-political discourse over the Ukrainian is also ensured by its support by the Polish state institutions. Polish politicians make official statements demanding Ukraine plead guilty to the events that took place in Volyn in 1943. If, ten years ago, a relatively small number of Polish scholars and politicians used the term «genocide» towards to the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation in the Second World War, then, since 2013, it has become increasingly heard in public space (Kyrydon, 2016, p. 61), and has been legally enshrined in the decisions of the Senate of 7 July 2016 and the Sejm of 22 July 2016. In doing so, a unanimous vote in favour of these resolutions emphasized that there is no alternative vision (only one deputy M. Swiencicki abstained in the Sejm).
Again, this contrasts with the situation in Ukraine. Over the Vistula, the historical awareness of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict has a national dimension, and the memory of these events is actively influenced by the state institutions. Over the Dnieper River it has a local scale -the development of programs aimed at research and memorialization was seen as a problem for five modern regions in the conflict area, or by neglecting Lviv or Lutsk.
No matter how we avoid it, however, we must admit some fundamental differences in the perception of the Volyn events in Ukrainian and Polish societies, which, in our view, underlie contemporary historical disputes between the two nations. It is crucial for Ukrainian panelists to explain the causes of what happened in the Second World War. The Polish public discourse, with few exceptions, is concentrated only on the events of 1943 -1944; in Poland, the Volyn tragedy is seen as an independent phenomenon, without historical context. As Yaroslav Hrytsak noted: «The problem is also that the historical memory of the Poles is declining, it does not extend beyond the period of the Second World War. When the Poles talk about Volyn, they do not want to talk about what happened before the Volyn tragedy, what happened in 1918Volyn tragedy, what happened in -1919Volyn tragedy, what happened in , in 1938, and so on. And so it looks like this massacre is from nowhere, just because it was Ukrainian nationalists. This is a very dangerous phenomenon» (Volyn asymetriya).

The Volyn tragedy in Ukraine and Poland's public discourse
The problem of historical reconciliation was its limitation to a narrow circle of political and intellectual elite, and consequently a lack of serious influence on the main part of the population, which inevitably resulted in superficiality. All the more so, at this time the leading positions in the discourse around the Volyn events were occupied by «Kresy environments» (which someone describe as «chauvinistic» (Romaszewski-Guzy, 2016, pp. 33-35)), they became the main expert and at the same time a public controller for actions of the authorities. They not only radicalized the rhetoric and steadily increased the degree of tension, but eventually, with the growth of public support for the right-wing forces and their rise to power, they gradually shifted from margins to the centre of social life (Kowal N., 2018). If earlier, as Polish expert Pawel Kowal points out, these environments had ambitions mainly related to honouring victims, lobbying educational or scientific projects that would tell about the crimes of Ukrainian nationalists in Volyn and strengthen the memory about them in the society, nowadays, the «Kresy environments» are clearly expressing political ambitions, trying to influence contemporary politics, and are having success in this sphere (Kowal, 2018). Obviously, the recent growth of interest in the activities of the Polish self-defense can be linked with it. It is not only about numerous publications on this subject (Koprowski, 2018, pp. XLVI-XLVIII;Koreś, 2018;Masierak, 2018, p. 56-59;Stańczyk, 2016, p. XVI-XVIII;Zychowicz, 2018, p. 6-9;Jóźwiak, 2018), but also the appearance on the tomb of an unknown soldier (Grób Nieznanego Żołnierza w Warszawie) in 2017, for the initiative of the Minister of National Defense Antoni Macierewicz, the plaques with the names of the areas where «the biggest crimes» were committed and those ones whose residents organized the best resistance during the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation in the Second World War. So we can talk not only about honoring the victims of the conflict, but also about the «Kresy environments» as such. What is more, there are the reasons for claiming to attempt to record the history of Polish self-defense in the legend of «cursed soldiers» (żołnierze wyklęte). An example is the personality of Henryk Czybulski (Błażejowska, 2016), a commander of Polish self-defense in Przebraż who, among other things, is known to Ukrainians for his attacks (and along with Soviet guerrilla units) on nearby Ukrainian villages.
Therefore, it should be understood that the Volyn theme exists in the Polish public consciousness as an element of the «Kresy» myth (Halchak, 2013, pp. 106-110) with the relevant ideology. As A. Tykhomirov noted, the presence of such discourse in mass-produced editions is interesting and symptomatic: on the one hand, it emphasizes the interest in the topic of «Kresy», on the other -attests to the functioning of previous, romanticized cliches with minimal revision (Tichomirov, 2013). Nowadays, Polish political historicism is largely based on the sentiments and emotions of the so-called Kresy people, former inhabitants of the Ukrainian (Lithuanian and Belarusian) lands, who frequently objectively or subjectively performed colonial functions. «In that narration, the Polish Kresy was represented as lost Arcadia, the territory of the Polish civilization mission, the peaceful coexistence of peoples under Polish rule, and later it was shown as the torment places of the Poles, who were murdered by horrible ungrateful neighbours» (Balcer, 2017, pp. 23-29).
Despite all attempts of the «liberal» part of Polish society to avoid exacerbation, it now seems that this degree of social tension has reached such indicators that the Polish state and Polish politicians cannot control because public steps to reduce it are tantamount to political suicide. During a discussion «Przepraszam za Wołyń» in Wroclaw a Polish journalist, writer and activist of the Solidarity Leszek Budrewicz noted the following: «…the film Volyn despite its negative connotation, is a definite result for the generation of people, who grew up on the legend of the negative image of the UPA rather than on the study of the white spot of history» (Kulchevych, 2017).
It is difficult for Polish society to handle with the truth about the relationship with the Ukrainians. Thus, one of the moral authorities, Jacek Kuroń, noted that discussing the causes of the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation, one should address a fundamental issue that is difficult to get through to the Polish consciousness, namely: Poland did not allow the independence of Ukraine in the 20th century twice (for the first time as a result of the victory in 1918 over the UHA (Ukrainian Galician Army), and secondly as a result of the Ryha Peace Treaty) (Kuroń, 2003, p. 37). French historian Daniel Beauvois wrote on Ukrainian-Polish relations: «Poles hardly ever were able to change their old habits. I've had to recognize Polish habits as merely colonial» (Beauvois, 2006). The interpretation of the Volyn tragedy as a result of Polish colonialism, the characterization of Ukrainians as second-class citizens in the Second World War is rather an exception in Polish society (Kukiz, 2012, pp. 96-100).
Eventually, this is also recognized by Izabella Chruślińska, a representative of the Giedroyc environment. «It is difficult for the Poles to perceive the truth about the relationship. We do not agree to name the so-called «Polish presence in the east» a colonization policy, we are offended when the presence of the Second Polish Republic after the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918 -1919 is called the «occupation» of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia (this is how the Polish presence in these territories is determined by some Ukrainian historians and figures), although in interpretations of some prominent Polish historians, such as Professor Roman Vapinski, Ryszard Torzetcki, and French Professor Daniel Beauvois, this is beyond doubt -especially in setting of colonial policy of so-called «Eastern Kresy» of the First Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth period and the period of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth» (Chruślińska, 2018a).
Public discourse in Poland on the historical past is built around the myth of the peoplevictim. Hence the typical clichés and emphases placed by Polish historians and publicists in assessing the Volyn events when they speak about the anti-Polish action of Ukrainian nationalists / Ukrainians as genocide, whereas similar crimes of the Polish underground are the acts of retribution; when the OUN and the UPA are the criminal fascist organizations and the AK (the Home Army) are patriotic underground units fighting for their own land, etc. and these organizations cannot be compared.
Polish public figure, philosopher, sociologist, Dr. Krzysztof Wojciechowski, drew attention to the fundamental difference between the Ukrainian-Polish and Polish-German dialogues: «I see a great difference in the attitude of Poles to their western and eastern neighbours. The Poles are open-minded, ready to cooperate to the Germans, and behave with the Ukrainians, the Belarusians, or the Russians as with lower people. I believe that because of the perception of self-worth. Nations can cooperate effectively when they have the same level of self-worth. If there is no equality between them, then there will be troubles» (Wojciechowski, 2016).
It is not by chance the conviction began to emerge in the expert environment that in building relations with Kyiv, Warsaw should get rid of, on the one hand, superiority on the eastern border partners, and, on the other hand, Poland should forget about «Ukrainophilia»the constant justification of Ukraine (Konończuk, 2018).
This caveat seems very important to explain why the model of Polish-German reconciliation with its formula of «we forgive and ask for forgiveness», offered from the beginning of the Ukrainian-Polish understanding process have not worked. There has been a gradual derogation from this formula in Ukrainian-Polish relations. At that time, then an INP chairman Lukash Kaminsky spoke about the words being appropriate, but they should sound at the moment when both sides know what the crimes are about and confess them (Volyn. Dva pohlady).
Katarzyna Krakowska draws attention to how the Volyn events theme is used to build the image of Ukrainians as a new enemy, an imminent threat (used by nationalist movements to increase their own power) (Krakowska, 2017, pp. 183-205). As a result, the «language of enmity» and the Volyn context in various anti-Ukrainian provocations are increasingly evident in public space. It is enough to cite the recent cases. Since 4 February 2019 mobile action has continued in the Polish capital for a week, in which in Warsaw the car is plying with the trailer, on which the banner with the inscription is placed: «The Ukrainian genocide was committed against the citizens of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by the OUN-UPA members in 1939 -1947. We remember. Volyn andEastern Malopolska» (Po Warszawi). In September 2018 a billboard with a similar inscription was posted on the A4 motorway leading from Wroclaw to Katowice. Notably, the description stated that «we, the Poles, have a duty not only to inform our compatriots, but also to make sure that Ukrainians who come to our country know that their grandfathers did not fight in the Polish-Ukrainian war and they were not heroes, first of all, that Poland has never been an occupier of Ukraine...» (U Polshchi). The same posters appeared in Wroclaw, Opole, near Olsztyn. In Lublin, in March 2018, unknown people left inscriptions about the murders in Volyn on Ukrainian-language billboard: «Wołyń! Pamiętamy» (Volyn! We remember). According to Wyborcza Kraków, on the night of 9 February 2018, anti-Ukrainian inscriptions «UA -von» and «Ukraina do gazu» («UA» -«VON») were found in a tunnel under the railway tracks near Brogi and Otwinowski Streets. Interestingly, that the authors of the study «Ukrainian minority in Poland and the migrants from Ukraine to Poland. Discourse Analysis» associate the rapid growth of such cases with the annexation of Crimea and with the outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine and, accordingly, the hybrid war waged by Russia against Ukraine and Europe (Mniejszość, 2018, p. 11). To avoid accusations of biased fact-finding, we provide official statistics from the Prosecutor's Office in Poland regarding attacks against the Ukrainians (Długosz, 2019).
In the current realities of the hybrid war being waged against Ukraine and Europe by Russia, its role in the Ukrainian-Polish memory conflict cannot be underestimated. In the end, it is worth pointing out the high-ranking politicians' understanding of this. For example, President of the Republic of Poland Bronisław Komorowski during his visit to Lutsk stated: «It is worth remembering that the Ukrainian-Polish conflicts are always used by somebody third, someone, who also has been threatening our independence and our freedom» (Wystąpienie prezydenta RP, 2015, p 2). Programmatic in the «reset» of relations was the declaration of President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko: «History has taught well that when Ukrainians and Poles quarrel, someone else wins. We are sure that we will not allow this situation» (Ukraina and Polshcha). And it is not fundamental whether the accusations fall on Russia as a state, or whether some Russian politicians are suspected in historical discussion initiating. The steps to escalate the conflict between Ukrainians and Poles in the context of the activities of special bodies of the Russian Federation should be considered more. The presence of Russian propaganda and provocation is confirmed by both Ukrainian and Polish analysts (Bornio, 2016, p. 83-100), revealing an understanding of all danger by a part of society. The words of ex-ambassador of Poland to Ukraine, PAUCI (Foundation of Polish-American-Ukrainian cooperation) leader Jan Piękło warned about the danger of Russia's attempts to restore animosity between Ukrainians and Poles on the painful topics of a common, bloody, historical past; both countries have different opinions about it (Rosija).
Undoubtedly, radical right-wing elements have been in the past, are at present, and will be in the future in both societies which promote intolerance to all other ethnic groups. In fact, they «were activated», «are activated» and «will be activated» by third parties seeking to destabilize our societies. And the question is rather about organizing a proper, decent, systematic counteraction to such acts from the outside.
Conclusions. The analysis of the Volyn discourse in Ukraine and Poland over the last decades allows us to confirm its radicalization and its increasing interconnection with modern domestic and foreign policy. Finally, Donald Tusk's notable remark on Pope John Paul II's references as the safest route of appeals for unification in Poland should be recalled (Tusk, 2019b). Equally, to assert the rightness of those experts in Ukrainian-Polish relations who say that the nature of the discussion on the Volyn tragedy demonstrates a small chance of understanding and reconciliation between Ukrainian and Polish societies in the near term (Hud, 2018b, p. 376). At the same time, one need to express a firm belief that without hard daily work on a difficult past, it is impossible to expect to build a successful future for Ukraine and Poland.
Acknowledgments. I express sincere gratitude to all members of the editorial board for consultations provided during the preparation of the article for printing.