

UDK 94(477)«1939/1945»:321
DOI: 10.24919/2519-058x.11.170716

Yurii NIKOLAIETS

Doctor of Historical Sciences, Full Professor, Leading Researcher of Department of National Minorities Institute of Political and ethno-national studies named after I. F. Kuras of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 8 generala Almazova Street, Kyiv, Ukraine, postal code 01011 (nikolaets-yu@ukr.net)

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1986-9956>

ResearcherID: B-8801-2019 (<http://www.researcherid.com/rid/B-8801-2019>)

Юрій НІКОЛАЄЦЬ

доктор історичних наук, професор, провідний науковий співробітник відділу національних меншин Інституту політичних та етнонаціональних досліджень імені В. О. Кураса Академії наук України, вулиця генерала Алмазова, 8, м. Київ, індекс 01011, Україна (nikolaets-yu@ukr.net)

Бібліографічний опис статті: Nikolaiets, Yu. (2019). Historical memory about Second World war in the context of threads of government in Ukraine. *Shkhidnoievropeiskyi Istorychnyi Visnyk [East European Historical Bulletin]*, 11, 225–240. doi: 10.24919/2519-058x.11.170716

**HISTORICAL MEMORY ABOUT SECOND WORLD WAR
IN THE CONTEXT OF THREATS OF GOVERNMENT IN UKRAINE**

Summary. *The aim of the research* – the character of the Second World war historical memory formation in Ukrainian society and its influence on the process of the state building in Ukraine was determined. **The research methodology is based** on the principles of historicism, the objectivity of systematic, scientific, as well as the use of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, scientific abstraction) and special-historical (historical-genetic, historical-typological, historical-system) methods and methods of political science (behavioral, cultural, anthropological). **The scientific novelty** is that for the first time in Ukrainian historiography, on the basis of analysis of the content of scientific and individual journalistic publications, the means of forming historical memory of the Second World War in Ukrainian society are determined, the influence of formation of such historical memory on the process of modern Ukrainian state formation is determined. **Conclusions.** On the eve of and during the Second World War, the attainment of the goals by the belligerent parties involved massive manipulation of ethnic values, historical memory. Founded on the basis of mobilization of people in the war, such manipulations inevitably influenced the nature of the organization of propaganda campaigns, and eventually and coverage of the researchers of the events of the war. Formed predominantly in the winner's camp, the results of manipulations by the consciousness of citizens for a long time «traveled» with scientific works in the form of dies. Their generation was most often driven by ideas about civil obligations, the assessment of the goals and nature of the fighting and the role of individual countries in its rebellion, as well as the allied relations between the countries participating in the war. In view of this, the assessments of the Ukrainian population's participation in the Second World War were largely conditioned by the inclusion of its lands in different states (and, consequently, the difference in the assessment of civil obligations), the change in the alliance's priorities of the USSR and Germany during the war and the specifics of the views of senior management. It is these states about the goals and objectives of ethnopolitics. The policy of memory of the Second World War until recently was used by the Russian Federation as an obstacle to the development of Ukrainian statehood, as well as a means of mobilizing part of

Russian citizens to conduct hostilities in Ukraine. In addition, in Ukraine, the memory of the war as a tragedy of mankind, which must be avoided in the future, is being formed.

Reforming the policy of memory in relation to the Second World War in Ukraine is taking place in the framework of European integration and integration into the world community. Instead, in Russia, the policy of memory is increasingly associated with the sacrifice of Victory, with the simultaneous rejection of any alternative assessments of events of the time that was characteristic of the Soviet Union. Ukraine gradually departs from the Soviet modeling of historical memory of the Second World War. Instead, the RF is actively using manipulations with historical memory to strengthen its position in the informational confrontation with Ukraine and to unite its own people around the idea of «Russian peace».

Key words: historical memory, Ukraine, the Second World war, hybrid war, the policy of memory.

ІСТОРИЧНА ПАМ'ЯТЬ ПРО ДРУГУ СВІТОВУ ВІЙНУ У КОНТЕКСТІ ЗАГРОЗ ДЕРЖАВОТВОРЕННЮ В УКРАЇНІ

Анотація. *Мета дослідження* – визначити характер формування історичної пам'яті про Другу світову війну в українському суспільстві та його вплив на процес державотворення в Україні. *Методологія дослідження* заснована на принципах історизму, об'єктивності системності, науковості, а також на використанні загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, наукова абстракція) та спеціально-історичних (історико-генетичний, історико-типологічний, історико-системний) методів і методів політичної науки (біхевіористичний, культурологічний, антропологічний). **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що вперше в українській історіографії на основі аналізу контенту наукових та окремих публіцистичних публікацій визначено засоби формування історичної пам'яті про Другу світову війну в українському суспільстві, визначено вплив формування такої історичної пам'яті на процес сучасного українського державотворення. **Висновки.** Напередодні та у ході Другої світової війни досягнення цілей воюючими сторонами передбачало масштабні маніпуляції етнічними цінностями, історичною пам'яттю. Закладені в основі мобілізації людей на війну, подібні маніпуляції неминуче впливали на характер організації пропагандистських кампаній, а з часом і на висвітлення дослідниками подій війни. Сформовані переважно у таборі переможців результати маніпуляцій свідомістю громадян тривалий час «мандрували» науковими працями у вигляді штампів. Їх породження найчастіше зумовлювалося уявленнями про громадянські обов'язки, оцінками цілей і характеру бойових дій та ролі окремих країн у її розпалюванні, а також союзницьких стосунків між країнами-учасниками війни. З огляду на це оцінки участі населення України у Другій світовій війні багато в чому зумовлювалися включенням її земель до складу різних держав (і, відповідно, різницею оцінок громадянських обов'язків), зміною союзницьких пріоритетів СРСР та Німеччини у ході війни та специфікою уявлень вищого керівництва саме цих держав про цілі і завдання етнополітики. Політика пам'яті про Другу світову війну і досі використовується Російською Федерацією як перешкода на шляху розбудови Української державності, так і засіб мобілізації частини громадян Росії на ведення бойових дій в Україні. Водночас, в Україні формується пам'ять про війну як про трагедію людства, яку необхідно уникати у майбутньому.

Переформатування політики пам'яті щодо Другої світової війни в Україні відбувається у руслі євроінтеграції та інтеграції до світового співтовариства. Натомість в РФ політика пам'яті все більше пов'язується із сакралізацією Перемоги із одночасним відкиданням будь-яких альтернативних оцінок тогочасних подій, що було характерним ще для Радянського Союзу. Україна поступово відходить від радянського моделювання історичної пам'яті про Другу світову війну. Натомість РФ активно використовує маніпуляції із історичною пам'яттю як для посилення своєї позиції у інформаційному протистоянні із Україною, так і для згуртування власного населення навколо ідеї «руського міра».

Ключові слова: історична пам'ять, Україна, Друга світова війна, гібридна війна, політика пам'яті.

Problem statement. State-building is a complex long-term process aimed at creating and building a state, which, among other things, includes the formation of a policy of memory. The policy of memory is focused on the definition of historical events as the dominant and the

characteristics of such events in accordance with the goals and objectives arising from the need for consolidation of society. The process of historical memory formation in the modern world is closely linked with interstate relations and quite often represents an arena of confrontation around the assessments of historical facts, events, phenomena, etc. The influence of the policy of memory on patriotic education determines the social significance of such confrontation.

The geopolitical location of Ukraine on bipartite civilizations has determined the severity of the confrontation between European and Russian identities due to a number of political and economic factors. A significant place in the preservation and transfer of historical memory has taken place in relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which inevitably influenced the process of state building of both countries. The peculiarities of the historical development of Russia and Ukraine have caused the Russian Federation to pay special attention to the policy in the sphere of Ukrainian historical memory formation.

After the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine began to build its own policy of memory, proceeding from the goals of the state's national security. At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet Union was painfully perceived in the territory of the Russian Federation. Part of the senior leadership of this state considered the collapse of the Soviet Union as one of the most tragic pages of the twentieth century history. The strengthening of imperial ambitions of the Kremlin has determined the growth of various forms of pressure on Ukraine by the Russian Federation. One of the means of such pressure was the so-called historical policy, focused on the formation of pro-Russian views in Ukrainian society.

The Second World War takes in Russian historical consciousness an extremely important place. Therefore, the «battle for brains» in this fundamental question had not only an «abstract» character, but always had a political significance (Senyavskiy, Senyavskaya, 2009, p. 301).

The analysis of sources and recent researches. As a source of research, the content of publications that was published, the authors of which covered the events of the Second World War, influencing the formation of historical memory of the Ukrainian population. In addition, the source of the research was the legal acts in the sphere of state policy of memory, adopted in Ukraine and the Russian Federation, as well as the materials of statistical research, the content of public statements by politicians, and individual publications in the periodical. Which to some extent reflect whether they influenced the formation of historical memory in Ukrainian society.

The publication's purpose. The historical memory formation about the Second World War character in Ukrainian society and its influence on the State-building process in Ukraine.

Statement of the basic material. An important means of external influence on Ukrainian society was the formation of historical memory of the Second World War with the use of appropriate content. It was on the basis of the «analysis» of the events of this war that the «proof» of the spread of «popular opposition to the enemy» (without analyzing the causes and nature of the collaboration). Other examples are «the sudden attack of Germany and the USSR», «betrayal by the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists of the interests of their own people» in the framework of Soviet discourse, or «the split of Ukrainian society» as a result of the «fascisation of Ukraine» within the framework of Russian-centric discourse.

Specifics of the Second World War as «the place of memory», the process of formation of collective memory of war, etc. provided a wide field for manipulations with historical memory. According to P. Nora, «places of memory» are «remnants» of the past, but besides «memory places» – are «an extreme form in which there is a comorbid consciousness in history that simultaneously ignores and needs it». P. Nora noted that «places of memory»

are a past that is lost by us, but still lives in the consciousness of a social group, but may disappear forever, namely, the «memory of location» will turn into a story that will no longer be supported collective memory (Nora, 1999, p. 26).

The myth making from the history of the Second World War in the context of the long neglect of the so-called oral history during the period of the USSR's existence was including various things. The attempts to unbiased analysis of the events of that time in the writings of Ukrainian post-Soviet historians, adjusting the assessments of the events of the war depending on the interests of the political elite at various times. In addition, the efforts of political technologists to artificially create «the places of memory» were closely intertwined in the discourse on the Second World War and had a significant impact on Ukrainian society.

The Second World War was the most massive military conflict that mankind knew – has caused enormous human casualties, material losses, as well as a territorial division of the world in favor of the winners. The ability of the Second World War, as a place of memory, to preserve the memory of large groups of people proved to be extremely stable. At the same time, ambiguous perception (both objectively formed and artificially imposed) of parts of events and phenomena associated with the war has formed a vast field for manipulation with historical memory.

Perhaps the most critical change was the formation of a memory of the war in the USSR, whose army acted as an ally of the Wehrmacht in the war against Poland, with great difficulty won in the Soviet-Finnish war, and then suffered many devastating defeats in the beginning of the German-Soviet war. Moreover, the use of parts of the Red Army during 1939 – 1941 was determined by secret Soviet-German agreements.

The analysis of military action by theaters during the Second World War was common in Western historiography. However, Soviet historians tried to falsify the participation of the USSR in the war during the 1939 – 1941, when the Soviet Union was actually an ally of Germany. Recognition of this fact would be contrary to the formation of ideas about the USSR as a consistent fighter against fascism. In addition, the emphasis of Soviet historiography on the German-Soviet confrontation was to suppress close cooperation not only at the beginning of the Second World War, but at also during the 1920s – 1930s when there were several powerful training centers for the German army in the USSR.

The presence of the USSR in the camp of winners dictated the need for the formation of memory not about German-Soviet cooperation, but about the German-Soviet confrontation. This was one of the important reasons for the definition of the German-Soviet war as the «Great Patriotic War», with the formation of the memory of the Second World War through the prism of determining the causes and analysis of hostilities as «Great Patriotic War». The consequences of the confrontation were predominantly given in the context of the analysis of the victory over fascism or Nazism, which contributed to focusing attention on the German-Soviet war and pushed aside the opposition to other theaters of hostilities. In the Soviet historiography, the USSR's stay in the victor's camp was as great as just the myth about «victory in the war with Germany» and «economic victory of socialism» despite the large-scale assistance of the Allies to the anti-Hitler coalition.

At the same time, thanks to the ideological confrontation of the 1980s and 1990s, the USSR, and then its descendant – the Russian Federation) – found themselves in moral isolation, manifested in the deliberate diminution of the role of the Soviet Armed Forces in the events of 1939 – 1945 (Lysenko, 2011, p. 10). Therefore, for the Soviet leadership in principle it was important to form an idea of the German-Soviet front as a one-on-one confrontation in the

war, where the Red Army played a decisive role in winning the Victory. As early as March 1943, US ambassador to Moscow U. Stanley noted at a press conference that the Russian authorities want to hide the receipt of assistance from the outside apparently in order to convince their people that the Red Army is fighting alone. Perhaps such a mythologization was needed not only to «explain the past» (to prove the necessity of existence and advantages of the command economy, collective farms, etc.), but also in order to mobilize the population of the country for the future. At least until the death of Stalin, the question of the possibility of a new world war was considered, and only after it, the Soviet leaders declared the readiness and opportunity to negotiate with the capitalist countries on all contentious issues.

In this context, it is important that the participation of the USSR in the war against Germany in the world was generally perceived as a «Russian war against the Germans» (Vert, 1967, p. 774; Deyton, 2000, p. 688). This was one of the factors contributing to the glorification of the participation of Russians in the war, which, accordingly, influenced the formation of ideas about the resistance of the enemy of the peoples of the USSR, headed by the «great Russian people». It was the German-Soviet war, and not as predicted by the Soviet-German strain, led to the rejection of the idea of confronting world capitalism through a victorious war on the enemy's territory.

The conditional motives caused by defeats on the front lines of the war forced the appeal of the ideological weapon, Pan-Slavism, which, in particular, was based on a thesis on the exclusiveness of the historical development of the Slavic peoples, which had been tested in the time of the Russian Empire existence.

In August 1941, the First All-Slavic Congress was held in Moscow. Among its organizers were many outstanding writers, scholars, artists from the Slavic states and the republics of the USSR. The congress called for a Slavic cultural association and cooperation. At the same time, Pan-Slavism was also a means of increasing influence in the postwar Central and Southeastern Europe. But the ideas of pan-Slavism, however, looked rather pale at the background of the Polish government's struggle to emigrate or participate in the war on Germany's side. Therefore, against the backdrop of Pan-Slavism, the glorification of the Russian factor gradually became increasingly apparent and the need to unite all forces to repel the enemy. However, there were other reasons that forced the Soviet leadership to resort to such a glorification (Messendzher, 1957, p. 679; Zelmayer, 1957, p. 539).

One of these reasons was the ambiguous position of the USSR population to engage in hostilities against Germany and its allies. Investigating the attitude of the population towards the war led to the fact that in the Ukrainian scientific discourse the definition of the confrontation between Germany and the USSR in 1941 – 1945 as a «German-Soviet» rather than «the Great Patriotic War» began to become more widespread. The reason was the conclusions of scientific studies on the number of deserters from the Red Army, the positive perception of the part of the citizens of the German invasion, the spread of cooperation (Hrynevych, 1992, p. 16; Nikolaiets, 1997, p. 169–175; Nikolaiets, 1998, p. 61; Nikolaiets, 2004, p. 334). The topic of collaboration was one of the most painful both for the former Soviet and for the modern Russian leadership. Nevertheless, even Russian researchers were forced to admit that the longer the war was delayed, the more a tumultuous new revolt against the outdated civil war was felt – a spontaneous protest against Bolshevism (Zubov, 2009, p. 154).

However, the resistance to Moscow leadership was not only limited to the «protest against Bolshevism». During the war, the opposition to Russian chauvinism, imperial principles of the construction and existence of the USSR was clearly demonstrated. Already on June 30, 1941 in

Lviv was proclaimed the renovation of the Ukrainian state. This step of the OUN was a challenge to the German occupation authorities and led to the arrest of leading members of this organization. In this way, Hitler demonstrated that the renovation of Ukrainian statehood was not among his plans. Solidarity with A. Hitler in this matter also revealed the Moscow leadership. As T. Gunchak noted, in Russia the denigration of all past and present competitions of Ukrainians to be free in their independent state is a matter of state policy (Hunchak, 2011, p. 17).

At the same time, during the Second World War, not only the struggle for the restoration of Ukrainian statehood was a threat to the existence of the Soviet empire. The fierce struggle also differed from the confrontation with the Polish Army Krayova, which, unlike the UPA, received international support. The activity of the underground detachments was on the territory of the Baltic States, and the fighters of the Muslim groups fought against the Red Army, motivated by pre-war Soviet politics in the field of religion. At the same time, for the Soviet leadership, the struggle of the Russian liberation army, which was the most numerous among the armed units of the collaborators, was a massive threat. The glorification of the participation of the Russians in the war was also caused by the defeat at the beginning of the German-Soviet war. The appeal to the victories of «Russian weapons» in the years of the Russian empire seemed to be a very compulsory step in view of the very essence of the Bolshevik coup and the events of the Civil War. Therefore, the Stalinist leadership began to selectively update the historical memory associated with the history of the Russian Empire. The process of glorifying the participation of Russians in the war went so far in Soviet times and was so positively perceived by the post-Soviet Russian society that the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin, allowed himself to assert the possibility of winning the victory without the participation of the Ukrainian population.

At the same time, modern Ukrainian researchers emphasize that the Soviets from the very beginning did not have much Russian experience: it was an exclusively international «machine for building a new world», for which any nations and ethnic groups are only material for such a construction (Horbulyn, Vlasiuk, & Kononenko, 2015, p. 132).

G. Kissinger, who served as US Secretary during the 1960 – 1970s in his study «The World Order. Reflecting on the nature of the nations in the historical context», evaluating the expansionist plans of the Russian leadership, noted that Russia's policy «for centuries was guided by its own special rhythm, carrying out a continuous expansion on the lands that covered almost every climate and civilization, and interrupted from time to time, except from the need to adjust its internal structure according to the scale of the tasks – and only in order to return again as a tide that breaks down the shore. The circumstances changed from Peter the Great to Vladimir Putin, but the rhythm remained unchanged» (Kissindzher, 2017, p. 320).

As is well known, the mechanism of formation of historical consciousness has a pronounced social character. The national factor is the prompt factor here, which usually serves as an expression of the interests of the social. Actual historical memory and is the basis for the historical consciousness of a community (Masnenko, 2002, p. 54).

The collapse of the USSR opened the way for the involvement of post-Soviet historians to reassess the events of the war. At the same time, the halo of «winners» in the war did not want to refuse the leadership and political and scientific elites of the Russian Federation, which had a significant imprint on the formation of Russian or Russian-centric discourse on the war. Moreover, the formation of historical memory of the Second World War turned into one of the means of spreading the «Russian peace» – the cultural-historical idea of the international, intergovernmental and intercontinental community, united involvement

in, and the commitment to Russian language and culture. Russian historian and ethnologist V. Tishkov frankly said that it is «Russian and Russian-language Russian or Soviet culture that unite and construct this world alongside historical peace» (Tishkov, 2007). Thus, the importance of the role of Soviet historical memory for the design and spread of the «Russian peace» was confirmed. Moreover, in Russia in the «image of war» there is cultivated such an important element as «the image of the enemy» (Senyavskiy, Senyavskaya, 2009, p. 308).

Scientific discussions around the definition of the role of the USSR in fueling the Second World War and the spread of cooperation were much more painful for Russian society than for the Ukrainian one. The half-nature of the political and economic reforms of the 1990s led to the fact that, at the turn of the millennia, the Russian ruling circles once again outweighed the authoritarian tendencies that, among other things, were outlining the encouragement of nationalist ideas. This was due to the fact that the memory of the war again became an official propaganda, and the «archival revolution» was replaced by the repeated rigid secrecy of a number of documents, some of which at that time were already published. With such a change in the «state order», the authors showed off, which justified the policy of the Stalinist leadership, including in the pre-war period. In addition, the apparent shortage of skilled specialists and qualitative research on the history of war has affected, as a result of which the lacuna, which was formed in the literature, began to be filled with unprofessional studies of various levels and works of journalistic nature (Mints, 2011, p. 5).

Developing in parallel with the restoration and development of the Ukrainian state, Ukrainian historiography was simultaneously compelled to respond to the challenges of time. One of them was a change both in the study and in the conduct of the policy of memory, which took place against the backdrop of the development of the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Estimates of the Second World War events gradually arose as a factor in the formation of the national and civil identities of Russia and Ukraine.

In the Ukrainian discourse on the war, there remained a place for pluralism, de-ideologized position and unbiased assessments. However, this kind of formation of the discourse on the war was vulnerable to information influences that pursued the protection of Russian interests in Ukraine. Back in the late 1980s, the Communist Party of Ukraine, relying on the memory of the Second World War, which was formed in the USSR, revived the accusations against political opponents in the form of allegations of «rehabilitation of the Bandera», «the refusal to build a communist society with a return to the non-socialist path of development». Moreover, the association of the national revival of Ukraine, first of all with nationalism and chauvinism, took place under the influence of the All-Union leadership. Responsible employees of the Communist Party, opposed the activities of the National Movement of Ukraine, emphasized the support of any informal non-governmental organizations if their activities were aimed at supporting perestroikam (rebuilding), and not nationalism, chauvinism and extremism (Gribenko, 1989).

The long absence of parades in honor of Victory, Russian scientists explained as the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War. Western countries allegedly imposed Russia a defeated role and encouraged an increase in the number of claims to Russia both from the countries of the former socialist camp and from the states that were formed in the post-Soviet space. In such conditions, Russia's interests, according to some Russian researchers, largely consisted in maintaining, as much as possible, the work of those elements of the system of international relations, which guaranteed the security. And this system was created precisely in the Soviet era and, mainly as a consequence of the Second World War (Senyavskiy, Senyavskaya, 2009, p. 300).

Significant intensification of the efforts of the Russian Federation, aimed at using the historical memory of the Second World War for the implementation of domestic and foreign policy goals, has taken place since the late 1990's. Ukraine has become an important object of realizing such goals. The most vulnerable in this situation was the East Ukrainian population and, first of all, the Donbas, encumbered, in the words of L. Nagornyi, «Soviet Identity». The analysis of the mass media reports of Donbass suggests the active participation of a large part of the analytical publications in the formation of images of historical memory used within mobilization technologies to support the local electorate of political forces that are positioned as defenders of the interests of the region (Marchenko, 2010). Gradually, in a political struggle with competitors, pro-Russian forces began to actively use the theses of «split» of Ukraine. One of the personages of such «split» was to remind of the events of the Second World War.

In the 2004 election campaign, the markers of «split» for the first time took shape in the political-technological scheme, a chain of associations that linked the political opponent to a specific region and at the same time unacceptable for the Donbas: Western Ukraine – OUN-UPA (Bandera) – Ukrainian nationalism – fascism – V. Yushchenko.

On April 21, 2008, at a meeting of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, President of Ukraine V. Yushchenko clearly pointed out the main threats in the information sphere: «The greatest threat to national security is the information expansion of foreign countries. Due to this information and psychological campaigns on various issues are held in the information space of Ukraine» (Zhmakyna, 2008). The Head of State stressed that the subject of these influences is primarily the themes of national unity, territorial integrity, language, religion and culture, European and Euro-Atlantic integration. And already on July 8, 2009, the Presidential Decree approved the Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine. The document stressed that one of the main real and potential threats to Ukraine's information security is the dissemination of distorted, inaccurate, and biased information in the global information space that is detrimental to the national interests of Ukraine (Pro doktrynu, 2009).

Perhaps it is precisely because during the period of 2005 – 2009, Russian and pro-Russian media criticized Yushchenko in the context of analyzing the events of the Second World War for the so-called «rewriting» of history «with the imposition of» ideals of Western Ukraine «and fascist stereotypes». The last thesis was exaggerated in connection with the so-called artificial transformation of «Ukrainian national fascists into fighters for independence» (Ivanov, 2010b). S. Bandera contacted with representatives of Germany and the anti-Soviet activities of the OUN and UPA were subjected to criticism. Critical remarks were also made to the address of Ukrainian integral nationalism, the main provisions of which were declared identical to the ideas of the German National Socialists (Ivanov, 2010a).

A significant resonance in the Ukrainian society caused the appointment of V. Yushchenko the title of Hero of Ukraine, S. Bandera. On the pages of the pro-Russian media, it was argued that the awarding of S. Bander's title to the Hero of Ukraine «fully subscribed to the course of the revival of fascism by President V. Yushchenko» (Polskyi shlahbaum). There were even suggestions on bringing V. Yushchenko to court in this regard (Gordeeva, 2010). Assigning the title of Hero of Ukraine to S. Bandera was assessed as the next step of the President «to deepen the split of Ukraine» (Dubovoy, 2010). In the meantime, Russian and pro-Russian authors, on the pages of their publications, welcomed the decision of the Donetsk Regional Administrative Court of April 2, 2010, as well as the decision of the Donetsk Appeal Administrative Court of June 23, 2010 on the recognition of the illegal decree of President of

Ukraine V. Yushchenko on the appointment of S. Bandera's title «Hero of Ukraine» (Butenko, 2010).

In some cases, collaborating with the Nazis, all Western Ukrainians were accused in stressing that during the reign of V. Yushchenko the heroes who fought in the Red Army were not paid any attention, while the society was imbued with the cult of S. Bandera and R. Shukhevych. This, according to the authors of the articles, questioned «the whole history of the war against Germany». In the wake of such allegations, there were also publications, the authors of which protested against the «fascisation of the Donbas», indicating that the announcement by the city councils of Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk in the territories under their jurisdiction on the days of May 8 and 9, the days of sorrow for those who died in the Second World War, testify to that they are enemies of great victory (Sychev, 2013).

With the process of «fascisation» of the Donbas, they also tried to link the activities of the OUN on the territory of the region during the Second World War. Moreover, condemning the cooperation of the collaborators with «Germany located in Europe», the «European choice» of modern Ukraine was criticized with a focus on negative images of such cooperation. Statements that «the Ukrainian people fought against Ukrainian nationalism, which was inflicted by the German invaders», accompanied the capture of the «nationally conscious» Ukrainians and that the «heroization of the defeated» UPA soldiers remains only a continuation of «Gebbels' propaganda» (Kornilov, 2013). The pro-Russian authorship of cooperation was called the testimony of the civilizational split of Ukraine through the position of the Western-Ukrainian population, for which the supporters of the OUN and the UPA fighters remain the fighters for Ukraine's independence (Ivanov, & Romanko, 2013).

In 2013, after the adoption by the Polish Sejm of the decision to recognize the Volyn events of 1943, «ethnic cleansing with signs of genocide» in the press of the Donbas, attention was intensified to cover the assessment of relevant events. In the vast majority of publications, the traitors of 1943 relied solely on the «Ukrainian fascists» who fought in the UPA. Gradually, in the coverage and appraisal of the actions of Ukrainian insurgents in Russian-centered discourse, more and more visible manipulations became apparent regarding the impact of the UPA on the course of events. On the one hand, the emphasis was placed on the fact that they fought «on the side of the fascists», as well as the fighters of the «Nachtigall» and «Roland» battalions, and the scale of this struggle seems to confirm the massive support of Germany's actions. However, the role of the USSR's actions of 1939 – 1941 was suppressed, which caused a sharp increase in the influence of the OUN. On this occasion, T. Snyder spoke eloquently. He noted that «Ukrainian nationalism was one of the consequences of the war in Eastern Europe. In the interwar Poland, Ukrainian nationalism was a small force ... and Ukrainian nationalists were released from Polish prisons precisely because in 1939 Germany captured Poland. When in 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union, by joint effort, seized Poland by destroying the Polish state, they thus destroyed all the legal political parties, among them the legal Ukrainian parties that at that time were much more influential than the Ukrainian nationalists» (Snyder, 2017).

In the context of the analysis of the events of the war, pro-Russian mass media also covered the activities of the «modern embodiment of Ukrainian fascism» – «Svoboda» (Liberty) (Mikhaylova, 2013a). Western Ukrainians were predominantly positioned as «national patriots» led by the «neo-Nazi» «Svoboda» (Liberty) party (Dmitrievskiy, 2013), which raises the possibility of «normalizing relations» with Russia (Semenov, 2013). Attention is drawn to the fact that in some publications, even one of the elements of Ukrainian national clothes – embroidery, was called a means of «propaganda of fascism», since on the eve of the

Victory Day there was a voyage march on which young people carried portraits of S. Bandera and R. Shukhevych (Gordeeva, 2013).

In publications posted during 2013 in the «Donetsk Crige» newspaper, Galicia was generally called the basis of fascism in Ukraine, which in many cases «lives on its own laws without recognizing public holidays», and «the unity of the state is destroyed by fascist ideology, controlled by fascists of the masses – media, school, church» (Poskrebyshch, 2013). It was amazed that in Ukraine, the «neo-Nazi groups» had full freedom of action, and the work of the parliament was discredited by the presence of a «frankly fascist party» (Mikhaylova, 2013b).

With the growth of contradictions between Russia and Ukraine in conditions where the supreme leadership of the Russian Federation did not leave hopes for the realization of their own imperial ambitions, in Russian historiography, actions directed against the Soviet regime, increasingly began to be branded exclusively as actions of the «fascists» regardless of the ethnicity of individuals who did them. Against this backdrop pushes the idea of «fascising Ukraine» and through the implementation of the course on European integration. Restriction of Russian influence, European integration was introduced at the beginning of the implementation of the plans of «Russian spring» precisely because of the prism of the spread of fascism in Ukraine. According to T. Snyder, Russian foreign policy was based on dividing the history of the USSR into two parts: a good part that is Russian, and a bad one that is Ukrainian. The researcher explained that Russia's task was to impose on the broad sections of society the idea that «liberation is a Russian, a collaboration is a Ukrainian» (Snyder, 2017).

At the end of February 2014, Russia began to increase its military presence in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in spite of agreements with Ukraine, and in early March, contrary to international law, Russian troops blocked Ukrainian military units (Pogransluzhba Ukrainy, 2014). In substantiating its actions, the Russian side has repeatedly pointed to the need to protect Russians living in Ukraine from «Ucrofascists».

In such conditions, the memory of the Second World War was also used in the Ukrainian-centric discourse. In the Ukrainian media, the Russian Federation initially was characterized as «unlawful increase in the number of troops in the Crimea», but gradually the characteristic changed to «military aggression of Russia», «imperial ambitions of the Kremlin», «an attempt to annex the Ukrainian territories». Moreover, increasingly, V. Putin's actions and statements began to be compared with Hitler's actions (Semenov, 2014). Unofficially, the name of the Russian president was increasingly distorted by saying that he was «Putler» and thus creating the preconditions for identifying Russia's actions with the actions of fascist Germany.

Continued to use the theme of «fascisation» of Ukraine in their interests and Russian propagandists. In the first half of 2014, the Ukrainian leadership seemed to be a «junta» that illegally seized power or «fascists», the struggle with which allegedly continues the traditions of Soviet warriors since the Second World War. Such a character was also reported by the media of the terrorist entities of the DPR/LNR. During 2014, a large part of such reports contained topics on combating fascism for the unity of the population in countering the spread of the «brown plague» and «nationalism». Such propaganda, among other things, was aimed at ensuring the success of the infiltration of Russian agents of various levels and military mercenaries into the Ukrainian territory and their further active efforts to destabilize the situation in Ukraine.

Evaluating the relationship between Russian actions and Ukrainian nationalism, T. Snyder noted that «Ukrainian nationalists and nationalism were the cause of the Holodomor of 1932 – 1933; Ukrainian nationalism was one of the causes of the terror of 1937 – 1948 in the USSR.

Ukrainian nationalism was one of Stalin's reasons for mass deportations of the inhabitants of Soviet Ukraine after the Second World War. And Ukrainian nationalism was the reason for Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014» (Snayder, 2017).

Under the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the conflict of Russian and Ukrainian-centric discourses intensified. The use of the formed images of historical memory of the Second World War became even more important. In Ukraine, for example, billboards with the inscription «We won against Hitler, we will win against Putin», were also distributed. At the same time, a similar slogan was followed by a number of Ukrainian civil society organizations (with the same slogan at one time opponents of the Putin regime in Moscow). Researchers focused on the participation and huge losses of Ukrainians in the war. Yes, it was argued that among those who raised the flag of Victory over the Reichstag along with Georgian M. Cantarius and Russian M. Yegorov was Ukrainian O. Berest. And they ensured their advancement under the enemy's fire by the gunmen of the department of the native of Zaporozhye region Sergeant P. Shcherbiny. It was a response to Russian propaganda, which sought to focus on Ukrainian collaborators, thus justifying allegedly an armed invasion of Russia to confront «Ukrainian fascists».

In order to ensure the effectiveness of the neurosemantic hypertexts, which included the most significant for those subjected to suggestion, words and phrases by Russian secret services widely used surveys of the Ukrainian population through print media and the Internet. More often such a survey included answers to certain questions, excluding the possibility of expressing alternatives to suggested thoughts or judgments. And because of the difficulties of their own re-education, those who are more prone to such psychocoding have become the elderly with Soviet identity.

And in 2018, in the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation «Nazism – a dangerous challenge to human rights, democracy and the rule of law» it was argued that «in February 2014 and the coming to power in Ukraine of nationalist forces, the course of Historical revisionism has become crucial for the official policy of Kyiv. The deliberate distortion of the events of the Second World War, the justification of the Nazi assassin, the humiliation of the value of the feat of the Soviet people in defeating Nazi Germany, the indulgence of modern manifestations of xenophobia, nationalism and neo-Nazism – all this is an integral part of modern historical politics, which is embodied in the area's leadership. «The authors of this document stressed that» in the context of the current Russiophobic course as moral benchmarks, apologists of Ukrainian nationalism are being imposed on society». Among such apologists again was S. Banker, R. Shukhevych, Y. Stetsk and A. Melnyk. At the same time, the authors of the report strongly disapproved the fact that the images of the UPA soldiers are used in Ukraine with the parallel of their struggle with the Soviet authorities, just as now the Ukrainian servicemen oppose the «Russian aggression» in the Donbass (Doklad MID Rossii, 2015).

The accusation of «neo-Nazism» against the current leadership of Ukraine was an important means of aggression against Ukraine in the information war that aggravated under the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the Donbass. Expressions like the replacement of historical memory with «neo-Nazism» have become quite common in Russian-centered discourse (Gulevich, 2016). At the same time, in the Ukrainian media, despite the absence of a section on neo-Nazism in the Russian Federation in the above-mentioned report of the Russian Foreign Ministry, repeatedly argued the participation of Russian neo-Nazis (for example, soldiers of the Kornilovtsy battalion) in the war on the Donbass on the side of the terrorist groups «DNR/LNR» (Na vostoke voyuyut, 2014).

Another burst of accusations of the Ukrainian leadership in the «fascisation» in Russian mass media took place also in connection with the providing of Tomos on autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. It was argued that the Ukrainian delegation gave a tribute to Tomasa's «Bandera songs». A correspondent for the Russian Channel named after the signing by Tomos of the Ecumenical Patriarch Vorpholomy in Istanbul in January 2019 of the representatives of the administration of the President of Ukraine «Bandera Nazis» (Chervonenko, V. & Khomenko, 2019).

In this context, there was a kind of confrontation in the field of rulemaking. On May 5, 2014, the President of the Russian Federation signed the federal law «On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation» approved by the State Duma, which introduced a criminal liability for encroachments on historical memory regarding events that took place during the Second World War. The federal law introduced a criminal liability for the rejection of the facts established by the verdict of the International Tribunal for the trial and the punishment of the main war criminals of the European countries, the approval of the crimes specified by the sentence, as well as for the dissemination of knowingly false information about the activities of the USSR during the Second World War (Federalnyy zakon, 05.05.2014).

In November 2017, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a law on amending the Law of Ukraine «On the Status of War Veterans, Guarantees of Their Social Protection», according to which the reference to «the Great Patriotic War» was deleted from the text of the document, instead of which the term «Second World war». The Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned such a decision, stressing that it is a manifestation of the policy of the Kiev authorities, aimed at forcibly wiping out the historical past of their country (Sosnina, 2017). However, already on December 6, the Verkhovna Rada adopted as a basis and in general the draft Law «On Amendments to the Law» On the Status of War Veterans, Guarantees of Their Social Protection «on strengthening the social protection of the participants in the struggle for Ukraine's independence in the twentieth century». The law provided the status of a participant in hostilities to persons who participated in all forms of armed struggle for Ukraine's independence in the twentieth century as part of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army of Ataman Taras Borovets (Bulbs), the Polissya Sich, the Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army (UNPA) the armed fugitives of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and in accordance with the Law of Ukraine «On the Legal Status and Honoring the Memory of the Independence Fighters of Ukraine in the 20th Century, recognized as fighters for the independence of Ukraine in the 20th century» (Verkhovna Rada, 2008). In the previous version of the article from March 13, 2018, it was allowed to provide the status of a participant in hostilities «to the soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army who participated in hostilities against the Nazi invaders in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine in 1941 – 1944 that did not commit crimes against peace and human beings and rehabilitated in accordance with the Law of Ukraine «On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression in Ukraine».

In spite of this in a conversation with P. Nora one of the Russian correspondents asked him to determine the effectiveness of measures of modern Russian leadership in the form of an intensive information campaign that propagates memory tones associated with the Second World War (for example, St. George's ribbons). In response, the researcher stressed that such actions, in his opinion, to create a «place of memory» is impossible (Nora, 2010). However, it was possible to justify the aggressive policy in the eyes of a large part of the population of the Russian Federation and mobilize a part of the citizens for a war against Ukraine.

Conclusions. Thus, even before and during the Second World War, the attainment of the goals by the belligerents involved large-scale manipulation of ethnic values, historical memory. Founded in the basis of mobilization of people in the war, such manipulations inevitably influenced the nature of the organization of propaganda campaigns, and eventually and coverage of the researchers of the events of the war. Formed predominantly in the winner's camp, the results of manipulations by the consciousness of citizens for a long time «traveled» with scientific works in the form of dies. Their generation was most often driven by ideas about civil obligations, the assessment of the goals and nature of the fighting and the role of individual countries in its rebellion, as well as the allied relations between the countries participating in the war.

The policy of memory of the Second World War until recently was used by the Russian Federation as an obstacle to the development of Ukrainian statehood, as well as a means of mobilizing part of Russian citizens to conduct hostilities in Ukraine. In addition, in Ukraine, the memory of the war as a tragedy of mankind, which must be avoided in the future, is being formed.

It should be noted that the reformation of the policy of memory in relation to the Second World War in Ukraine takes place in the framework of European integration and integration into the world community. Instead, in Russia, the policy of memory is increasingly associated with the sacrifice of Victory, with the simultaneous rejection of any alternative assessments of events of the time that was characteristic of the Soviet Union.

In future studies, it is necessary to determine the duration of how long the Ukrainian society will retain the powerful influence of the events of the Second World War on the formation of the historical memory of the population. In addition, it is necessary to determine the effectiveness of such an impact on different population groups. At the same time, it is necessary to develop a set of measures that would accelerate the formation of the perception of the holiday of 9 May in Ukrainian society not as much as Victory Day, but as a Day of Conciliation. This would contribute to the formation of a belief in the unpredictability of the war as a means of resolving conflict situations.

Acknowledgments. I appreciate the help of management of the Institute of Political and ethno-national studies named after I. F. Kuras of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and truly grateful for their support and interest in my research.

Funding. The research was funded with the assistance of O.A. Rafalsky, Director of the Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Butenko, Ye. (2010). V «donetskom» dele Bandery segodnya postavit tochku Vysshiiy adminsud [In the «Donetsk» Bandera case the end would be put today at the High Administrative Court]. URL: <http://www.salon.donetsk.ua/rubrics/11886.php> [in Russian].

Chervonenko, V. & Khomenko, S. (2019). Avtokefaliya, banderovtsy i ssory s zhurnalistami: kak Yepifaniyu dali Tomos [Autocephaly, Bandera and quarrels with journalists: how Epiphanius was given by Tomos]. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-russian-46780864> [in Russian].

Deyton, L. (2000). *Vtoraya mirovaya: oshibki, promakhi, poteri* [The Second World war: mistakes, misses and loses]. Moskva: Eksmo-Press, 688 p. [in Russian].

Dmitrievskiy, A. (2013). Durman natsionalisticheskikh illyuziy [Datura of nationalistic illusions]. *Donetskiy kryazh – Ridge of Donetsk, 12–18 maya*. [in Russian].

Doklad MID Rossii. Neonatsizm – opasnyy vyzov pravam cheloveka, demokratii i verkhovenstvu prava [Neo-Nazism is a dangerous challenge to human rights, democracy and the rule of law]. URL: http://www.mid.ru/diverse/-/asset_publisher/8bWtTfQKqtaS/content/id/1278647 [in Russian].

Dubovoy, G. (2010). Ukraintsy szhigayut pasporta [Ukrainians burn passports]. URL: <http://www.salon.donetsk.ua/rubrics/11053.php> [in Russian].

- Federalnyy zakon** O vnesenii izmeneniy v otdelnye zakonodatelnye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 05.05.2014, № 128-FZ [On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, 05.05.2014, № 128-FZ]. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/38395> [in Russian].
- Gordeeva, L.** (2010). Garanta s Banderoy – k sudu! [Warranty with Bandera – to court!]. *Donetskiy kryazh – Ridge of Donetsk, 2 maya*. [in Russian].
- Gordeeva, L.** (2013). Fashizm na Ukraine: ugroza ili realnost [Fascism in Ukraine: threat or reality]. *Donetskiy kryazh – Ridge of Donetsk, 26 iyunya – 04 iyulya*. [in Russian].
- Gribenko, Ye.** (1989). Narodnoe dvizhenie Luganshchiny [Popular movement of Lugansk region]. *Voroshilovgradskaya pravda – The truth of Voroshilovgrad, 2 dekabrya*. [in Russian].
- Gulevich, V.** (2016). Ukraina: neonatsizm vmesto istoricheskoy pamyati [Ukraine: neo-Nazism instead of historical memory]. URL: <https://odnarodyna.org/content/ukraina-neonacizm-vmesto-istoricheskoy-pamyati> [in Russian].
- Horbulyn, V. P., Vlasiuk, O. S. & Kononenko, S. V.** (2015). *Ukraina i Rosiia: dev'iatyi val chy kytaiska stina [Ukraine and Russia: the ninth shaft or the Chinese wall]*. Kyiv: NISD, 132 p. [in Ukrainian].
- Hrynevych, V.** (1992). UPA i Chervona Armiia, Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia i natsionalno-vyzvolna borotba v Ukraini u 1940 – 1950-kh rr. [UPA and the Red Army, Ukrainian Insurgent Army and national liberation struggle in Ukraine in the 1940 – 1950's.]. *Materialy Vseukrainskoi naukovoï konferentsii, 25–26 serpnia*, (pp 194–200). Kyiv. [in Ukrainian].
- Hrynevych, V.** (1994). *Natsionalni problemy v Chervonii Armii v period vyzvolennia Ukrainy vid nimetsko-fashyistskykh zaharbnykiv (hruden 1942–zhovten 1944 pr.) [National problems in the Red Army during the liberation of Ukraine from the Nazi invaders (December 1942 – October 1944)] (Extended abstract of Candidate's thesis)*. Kyiv, 16 p. [in Ukrainian].
- Hunchak, T.** (2011). *Kliuchovi problemy istoriografii u Druhii svitovii viini [Key Problems of Historiography in the Second World War]*. Kyiv: Ukrainska vydavnycha spilka im. Yu. Lypy, 225 p. [in Ukrainian].
- Ivanov, A. & Romanko, O.** (2013). Otnoshenie k kolaboratsionizmu – svidelstvo tsivilizatsionnogo raskola Ukrainy [Attitude towards collaborationism - evidence of the civilizational split of Ukraine]. *Donetskiy kryazh – Ridge of Donetsk, 10–16 maya*. [in Russian].
- Ivanov, A.** (2010a). Bandero-evropeyskaya nesovmestimost [Bandero-European incompatibility]. *Donetskiy kryazh – Ridge of Donetsk, 5 noyabrya*. [in Russian].
- Ivanov, A.** (2010b). Nikotin natsionalizma i Tabachnik [Nicotine Nationalism and Tabachnik]. *Donetskiy kryazh – Ridge of Donetsk, 19–25 marta*. URL: <http://www.odnako.org/blogs/nikotin-natsionalizma-i-tabachnik/comments/page-2/#70136> [in Russian].
- Kissindzher, H.** (2017). *Svitovi poriadok. Rozdumy pro kharakter natsii v istorychnomu konteksti [The world order. Reflections on the nature of nations in the historical context]*. Kyiv: Nash format, 320 p. [in Ukrainian].
- Kornilov, V.** (2013). Fashistskaya «ukrainizatsiya» Donbassa: po materialam okkupatsionnoy pressy [Fascist «Ukrainization» of Donbass: on the materials of the occupation press]. URL: <http://kornilov.name/fashistskaya-ukrainizatsiya-donbassa-po-materialam-okkupatsionnoy-pressyi/> [in Russian].
- Lysenko, O. Ye.** (2011). Istoriopysannia Druhoi svitovoi viiny yak samostiina subdystsiplina [Historical descriptions of the Second World War as an independent subdiscipline]. In V. A. Smolii (Ed.), *Ukraina v Druhii svitovii viini: pohliad z XXI st.* (Vol. 1, pp. 9–42). Kyiv: Naukova dumka. [in Ukrainian].
- Marchenko, T.** (2010). Donbassu vygodna provintsialnost [Donbas profitable provincialism]. URL: <http://www.salon.donetsk.ua/rubrics/12044.php> [in Russian].
- Masenko, V. V.** (2002). Istorychna pam'iat yak osnova formuvannia natsionalnoi svidomosti [Historical memory as the basis for the formation of national consciousness]. *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal – Ukrainian Historical Journal, 5*, 49–62. [in Ukrainian].
- Messendzher, Ch.** (1957). *Entsiklopediya voyn XX veka [The encyclopedia of the XX century wars]*. Moskva: Eksmo-Press, 520 p. [in Russian].
- Mikhaylova, Ye.** (2013a). Volyn: krovavoe leto 1943-go i demagogiya 2013 goda [Volyn: the bloody summer of 1943 and the demagoguery of 2013]. *Donetskiy kryazh – Ridge of Donetsk, 26 iyulya – avgusta*. [in Russian].

Mikhaylova, Ye. (2013b). Internatsionalist protiv neofashistov [Internationalist vs neo-fascists]. *Donetskiy kryazh – Ridge of Donetsk, 21–2 iyunya*. [in Russian].

Mints, M. (Ed.). (2011). *Nachalo Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny: sovremennaya istoriografiya: sbornik obzorov i referatov [The beginning of the Great Patriotic War: modern historiography: Digest of reviews and articles]*. Moskva: Tsentr sotsialno naucho-informatsionnykh issledovaniy; otdel istorii, 160 p. [in Russian].

Na vostokey voyuyut russkie neonatsisty [In the east, Russian neo-Nazis are fighting]. URL: <http://hadashot.kiev.ua/content/na-vostokey-voyuyut-russkie-neonacisty> [in Russian].

Nikolaiets, Yu. O. (1997). Dezertyrstvo iz lav Chervonoi Armii v Ukraini na pochatkovykh etapakh Velykoi Vitchyznianoï viiny [Desertion from the ranks of the Red Army in Ukraine at the initial stages of the Great Patriotic War]. *Z arkhiviv VUChK, HPU, NKVD, KHB – From the archives of The All-Russian emergency commission, The Governmental Political Administration, The National Commissariat of Internal Relations, The Committee of Governmental Security Control, 1–2*, 169–175. [in Ukrainian].

Nikolaiets, Yu. O. (1998). *Moralnyi stan Chervonoi Armii v Ukraini v pershyi period viiny proty nimetsko-fashyistskykh zaharbynykiv. Dezertyrstvo ta borotba z nym [The mental state of soldiers of the Red Army in Ukraine in the wars 1st period against German-Fascist invaders]*. Kyiv: Mizhnarodna finansova ahentsiia, 61 p. [in Ukrainian].

Nikolaiets, Yu. O. (2004). *Moralno-politychnyi stan naselennia Ukrainy u pershyi period Velykoi Vitchyznianoï viiny [Moral-political status of the population of Ukraine in the first period of the Great Patriotic War]*. Vinnytsia: Kh-ART, 334 p. [in Ukrainian].

Nora, P. (1999). Problematika mest pamyati. [Problems of memory]. *Frantsiya-pamyat* (pp. 17–50). Sankt-Peterburg: Izdatelstvo Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. [in Russian].

Nora, P. (2010). Istoriki ponyali, chto zakony – ochen opasnaya veshch [Historians understand that laws are a very dangerous thing]. URL: <http://urokiistorii.ru/article/1049> [in Russian].

Pogransluzhba Ukrainy obnarodovala khronologiyu nepravomernykh deystviy rossiyskoy storony v Krymu [The Frontier Service of Ukraine published a chronology of illegal actions of the Russian side in the Crimea]. URL: http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/pogransluzhba-ukrainy-obnarodovala-khronologiyu-nepravomernykh-deystviy-rossiyskoy-storony-v-krymu-140230_.html [in Russian].

Polskiy shlagbaum dlya lvovskikh banderovtsev [Polish barrier for Lviv Bandera]. URL: <http://dkr.com.ua/index.php?new=13336> [in Russian].

Poskrebyshch, V. (2013). Fashizm pora ostanovit! [Fascism is time to stop!]. *Donetskiy kryazh – Ridge of Donetsk, 14–20 iyunya*. [in Russian].

Pro doktrynu informatsiinoi bezpeky Ukrainy. Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy vid 8 lypnia 2009 r. № 514/2009 [About the doctrine of information security of Ukraine. The decree of the President of Ukraine from 2009 № 514/2009]. URL: <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/514/2009> [in Ukrainian].

Semenov, I. (2014). Vykhod iz krymskoy lovushki [Out of the Crimean trap]. URL: <http://glavcom.ua/articles/18018.html> [in Russian].

Semenov, S. (2013). My i sosedi v zerkale kontrastov [We and the neighbors in the mirror of contrasts]. *Donetskiy kryazh – Ridge of Donetsk, 5–11 aprelya*. [in Russian].

Senyavskiy, A. S. & Senyavskaya, Ye. S. (2009). Vtoraya mirovaya voyna istoricheskaya pamyat: obraz proshlogo v kontekste sovremennoy geopolitiki [World War II and historical memory: the image of the past in the context of modern geopolitics]. *Vestnik MGIMO. Spetsialnyy vypusk – Messenger of Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Special edition*, 299–310. [in Russian].

Snayder, T. (2017). Tselyu Vtoroy mirovoy voyny, s tochki zreniya Gitlera, byl zakhvat Ukrainy [The purpose of the Second World War, in terms of Hitler, was the seizure of Ukraine URL: <https://fakty.ua/240338-timoti-snajder-celyu-vtoroj-mirovoj-voyny-s-tochki-zreniya-gitlera-byi-zahvat-ukrainy> [in Russian].

Sosnina, I. (n. d.) MID RF nazval «stiraniem istoricheskogo proshlogo» okonchatelnuyu otmenu «Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny» v Ukraine [Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the «abolition of the historical past» the definitive abolition of the «Great Patriotic War» in Ukraine]. URL: <https://kp.ua/politics/592480-myd-rf-nazval-styranyem-ystorycheskoho-proshloho-okonchatelnuyu-otmenu-velykoi-otechestvennoi-voyny-v-ukrayne> [in Russian].

Sychev, I. (2013). Vragi Pobedy i ikh pokroviteli [Enemies of Victory and their patrons]. *Donetskiy kryazh – Ridge of Donetsk, 17–23 maya*. [in Russian].

Tishkov, V. (2007). Russkiy mir: smysl i strategii [Russian Peace: Meaning and Strategies]. URL: http://sr.fondedin.ru/new/fullnews_arch_to.php?archive=1185275035&id=1185274651&subaction=showfull [in Russian].

Verkhovna Rada zrivniala u pravakh biitsiv OUN-UPA z uchasnykamy boiovykh dii [Ukrainian Law, The Verkhovna Rada has equalled the rights of fighters of the OUN-UPA with the combatants]. URL: <https://nv.ua/ukr/ukraine/politics/verkhovna-rada-zrivnjala-u-pravakh-bijtsiv-oun-upa-z-uchasnikami-bojovikh-dij-2511849.html> [in Ukrainian].

Vert, A. (1967). *Rossiia v voyne 1941 – 1945 gg.* [Russia in the war of 1941 – 1945]. Moscow: Progress, 774 p. [in Russian].

Zelmayer. (1957). *Mirovaya vojna 1939 – 1945* [World war 1939 – 1945] (pp. 122–132). Moskva: Izdatelstvo inostranoy literatury. [in Russian].

Zhmakyna, Yu. (2008). Prezydent Ukrainy zasterihaie: informatsiina ekspansiia inozemnykh derzhav ye naibilshoiu zahroziu natsionalnii bezpetsi Ukrainy [The President of Ukraine warns: information expansion of foreign countries is the greatest threat to the national security of Ukraine]. URL: <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/1113131.html> [in Ukrainian].

Zubov, A. B. (2009). *Istoriya Rossii. XX vek. 1894 – 1939* [The history of Russia in the XX century. 1894 – 1939]. Moskva: Astrel, 829 p. [in Russian].

*The article was received on February 20, 2019.
Article recommended for publishing 10/06/2019.*