The purpose of the study is to elucidate the structure principles and activities of the security units which served for the leader of the overseas part of Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists (hereinafter – ZCh OUN), Stepan Bandera. Another task of this publication is to analyze planned and committed attempts on his life. The methodology of the research is based on a combination of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and special-historical (historical-genetic, historical-typological, historical-systematic) methods with the principles of historicism, systemicity, scientism and verification. The scientific novelty of the study is that for the first time in Ukrainian liberation movement historiography the structure and peculiarities of the functioning of the ZCh OUN leader’s security guards have been clarified, on the basis of previously unknown archival documents. The coverage of this topic not only supplements the biographical research devoted to Stepan Bandera but also considers the recondite episodes of the ZCh OUN Security Service (hereinafter – SB) activity. Conclusion. The analysis of Stepan Bandera security guards’ activity reveals both its advantages and disadvantages acquired during its advance. It was ascertained that the security unit was a part of the SB ZCh OUN. The first guard-commander was Mykhailo Banias – «Grytsko», he headed several junior guards. After him, the previously mentioned post was temporarily occupied by: Andriy Pelenychka – «Plevak», Yaroslav Bychkovych and Myron Karpynets. Vasyl Zbrozhyk – «Gayokha» was the last Bandera’s security guard supervisor, Vasyl Shushko was his last personal guardian, Vasyl Skolozdra was his driver and Dmytro Myskiv was his family security guard. Notwithstanding certain specialization pattern, the security guards functions were not quite clear and often duplicated. During 15 years of work, the SB ZCh OUN had succeeded in neutralizing more than five assassinations attempts on Stepan Bandera. Nevertheless, given the inadequacy of forces and capabilities, the confrontation between SB and KGB (Committee for State Security of the Soviet Union) could not have lasted for too long.

Key words: security, Security Service, OUN Overseas Security Service, KGB agents, assassinations, public trial, provocations.
Problem statement. Despite the considerable scientific attention of historians to Stepan Bandera’s outstanding figure, a large amount of the OUN leader’s lifetime episodes remain under-researched up until now. The functioning of his personal security guards, who were a part of the OUN Overseas Security Service (hereinafter referred to as the SB ZCh OUN), is one of those less clarified subjects. The recognition of that direction of OUN Overseas Security Service activities complements the general vision of the security services development of the Ukrainian liberation movement in exile.

The publication’s purpose. The purpose of the article is to analyze the organizational peculiarities of Stepan Bandera security. Moreover, the measures which were taken to prevent attacks on him and analysis of the terrorist act committed by the KGB agent, Bohdan Stashynsky.

The analysis of sources and recent researches. We may identify the books of the SB ZCh OUN referent Stepan Mudryk – «Mechnyk» (1993, 1996, 1999) as the publications that partly cover the subject. They review Stepan Bandera’s security staff, the ways attacks on him were neutralized and also analyze the causes of the ZCh OUN leader assassination. The similar issues are raised in the books written by Ruslan Chastiy (2007) and Mykola Posivnych (2008). To a large extent, they rely on the already mentioned Stepan Mudrik research. The historian from Munich – Reinhard Heydenreuter (2007) – has published a study of the preparation and assassination of Stepan Bandera. The research basis is contained in the memoirs of Vasyl Shushko (2000, 2004, 2005), who was a security guard, as well as in the collection of documents edited by Volodymyr Viatrovych, Sergiy Kokin, Volodymyr Serhiyuch and Natalia Serdiuk (2009).

Statement of the basic material. The first measures to protect the OUN leaders were taken from the very beginning of the OUN establishment. Depending on the necessity and possibilities, they ranged from one guard to a division of 50 soldiers. The aforementioned boiwka (group of soldiers), in case of a necessity, attempted to delay the enemy’s attack, giving their leader an opportunity to escape from the hostile environment. The protection of the OUN underground leadership was mainly executed by the Security Service (SB). The Security Service was responsible for the security of Stepan Bandera, an OUN leader, who had been released from the concentration camp Sachsenhausen, and settled in Munich (Bayern, Germany) together with his family.

Stepan Mudryk recalled the establishment of the SB ZCh OUN subdivision in October
1945: «It was a closed sector to which were called the most entrusted people with the experience needed for the purpose (Mudryk, 1996: 10) …. Those were the modest people with a great faith in the Ukrainian truth and Ukrainian state, who lived at that time in very difficult material shortages» (Viedienieciev, Lysenko, 2009: 141).

At the time, the SB ZCh OUN network was divided into three sectors. One of them, the «internal activities», was led by Ivan Kashuba – «Chad», who was, among the other tasks, responsible for the protection of the ZCh OUN leadership (Viedienieciev, Lysenko, 2009: 141). Stepan Bandera was the most prominently guarded person. A specially appointed commandant, who had several inferior soldier assistants, was responsible for protection of Stepan Bandera. Initially, this position was occupied by Mykhailo Banias – «Grytsko» (HDA SBU. F. 6. Spr. 56232. Ark. 59). His life was almost unknown. He was born on November 2, 1914 in Kolodnytsia village of Stryi county. «Grytsko» had been a part of the OUN underground from his adolescence. He participated in battles with Hungarians for Carpatho-Ukraine. In the autumn of 1939, he remained in the underground and was a part of the boiwka (Homziak, Prodanyk, 2015: 339). Later he participated in the protection of the OUN propaganda subdivision head in Lviv region, Mykola Levytskyi – «Zhubera» (Moroz, 2014). After departing for Germany in autumn 1945, Mykhailo Banias supervised the security of Bandera. According to the version of Myron Matvieiko – «Usmikh», who was a SB leader arrested by KGB, the reason for Banias dismissal from the post was scandalous. Ostensibly, Bandera tried to rape his guard’s wife (HDA SBU. F. 6. Spr. 56232. Ark. 43). However, more likely Matvieiko had made up that story, trying to please his investigators.

The next supervisor of Bandera’s guards was an Adjutant Andriy Pelenychka – «Plevak» (Stepan Bandera u dokumentakh, 2009: 88), and his successor was an interpreter Yaroslav Bychkovych. In 1950, Yaroslav Bychkovych was replaced by a former runner Myron Karpynets. At the time, Bandera was actually left without security guards. When the US military arrested Karpynets for illegal weapons possession, the OUN commander remained absolutely unprotected. That is why, as a means of self-defense, Bandera had always carried a pistol (HDA SBU. F. 6. Spr. 56232. Ark. 57–58).

Eventually, the situation with Bandera’s security staff had improved as Vasyl Zbrozhyk – «Gayokha», «Zenko», «Vladko», became his security supervisor. He was born in 1925 in Vasyliv Velykyi village which was a part of Ulguvek commune of Tomashiv county of Lublin Voivodeship. His father had gone to work and stayed in Canada back in the 1920s (Vasyl Zbrozhyk, 1998: 14–15). Starting from 1943 Zbrozhyk had been in the OUN underground. He was a member of the SB boiwka, which was led by Volodymyr Melnychuk – «Yasen». After the «Wisla» campaign in 1947, Zbrozhyk moved to Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship. According to his combat mission assigned to him by Leon Lapinskyi – «Zenon», a head of SB Zakerzonia, on August 14, 1950, he led a group of couriers to West Germany (Halagida, 2005: 100). After that, he illegally crossed the border with Poland and regularly delivered underground mail, literature and radio stations. At the same time, Zbrozhyk’s mother, wife and daughter remained in Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship. In 1953, he was arrested by the German police and sent to jail for several months. As a result, he had contracted tuberculosis and was no longer able to work as a leader in courier groups. After that, he became a head of Bandera’s security stuff. He had several inferior security guards and his own office in Munich on Zeppelin Strasse street, № 67. According to the KGB appearance description from December 12, 1956, Vasyl Zbrozhyk was as follows: «tall, thin, with oval face, black wavy hair, black eyes, long nose and small mustache, had two golden teeth in the right upper jaw and a small scar on the back side of his
neck, wore glasses in the dark yellow frame and a massive ring with a large square stone on his left hand» (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 909. Ark. 132–133).

Vasyl Shushko was the last personal guard of Bandera. He was born on April 19, 1922 in Babynschi village of Borshchiv district of Ternopil region. He joined the OUN network while studying at Zalishchynky trade school. In 1940, he became a head of the OUN Youth sub-district. Nevertheless, owing to war, Vasyl was sent to Germany as a forced labourer. After the war, in the camp for displaced people in Augsburg (Austria), he had re-established his connections with the OUN underground once again (Shushko, 2004: 5). In 1949, Shushko passed the military training led by the ZCh OUN in the forest near Deggendorf. The underground members with a great combat experience were the trainers there: Colonel Yevgen Pobigushchyi – «Ren», commander of the raiding hundred of soldiers «Gromenko» and others (Shushko, 2000: 93–34). On recalling his training, Shushko wrote: «The guard should be able to perform different tasks. Therefore, I studied at various courses: for turner, bricklayer, carpenter and even firefighter. In order to obtain a decent education, I entered the political economy studies in the University of Munich, using the help of Ukrainian professors in exile. I also studied the civil law» (Mandzii, 2004: 4). During 1952, Shushko had been preparing to depart to Ukraine as an emissary. However, unexpectedly he had fallen ill and was treated for tuberculosis. When Shushko had recovered, he became a personal guardian of Stepan Bandera (Shushko, 2005: 6).

Vasyl Skolozdra – «Grabenko», was a personal driver and a security guard of the OUN leader (HDA SBU. F. 2. Spr. 2874. Ark. 208). He was born on November 13, 1919 in Veryn village, Mykolayiv district, Lviv region. Starting from his youth he took part in the OUN underground movement. In autumn 1939, Skolozdra traveled to Poland. In the spring of 1941, he returned to Western Ukraine under an alias «Solovei», holding a position of a junior officer and heading 300 soldiers unit. Since September 1943, he commanded a hundred of soldiers in UPA troops of the Khmelnytskyi detachment of the «Zagrava» (Volyn) Military District, and from September 1945 – a tactical subdivision №14 «Asphalt». On January 22, 1946, he received a title of the UPA junior officer, and on September 5, 1946, he was awarded the Bronze Cross of Combat Merit. Since the summer of 1946 – a sergeant of special assignments at the Lviv regional network «Buh-2». He served as a guardian of the UPA commander Roman Shukhevych. During August-September of 1948, «Grabenko» Skolozdra had been performing runner’s functions connecting with the leadership of the ZCh OUN. From 1949 he lived in Munich and worked as Bandera’s security guard. To rescue his family from persecution by the Soviet authorities, Skolozdra changed his surname to Ninovskyi. Since then he had been relentlessly following Bandera everywhere. He was next to the leader at business meetings, visits to shops and during his rest in the family circle. He accompanied his leader to the office or apartment. He came inside first and, only after assuring that it was safe inside, made a sign that Bendera could come in (Farion, 2008: 4). Beginning from 1950, «Ninovskyi» drove his chief in a new black «Opel Captain» (Dzhuhalo, 1973: 11).

Dmytro Myskiv was a security guard of the Bandera’s family (HDA SBU. F. 2. Spr. 2874. Ark. 275). He was born on November 9, 1907 in Gaivorona village, Tereblya district, Ternopil region. Since 1948 he was a member of the 300 soldiers unit called «Lisovi Chorty» and also headed the «Plast» cells in West Germany. As an entrusted person, Myskiv always accompanied the family of the ZCh OUN leader. For example, on October 12–14, 1959, together with Bandera, his wife Yaroslava, daughters Lesya and Natalia, he made a tourist trip to the Alps. In addition to that, Myskiv was depicted with them in a photo in Venice (Faizulin,
The main task of the Bandera’s security guards was to prevent attempts on his life. The number of assassination attempts was so considerable, that residents of the house № 67 on Zeppelin Strasse street were protesting, due to the repeated explosions on the ground floor. For security reasons, they rented for the ZCh OUN leader a house in Braybrook on Ammersee lake.

On January 3, 1947, the SB discovered a Soviet agent in Bandera’s environment – it was a runner, Theodor Moroz aliased as «Yaroslav» (Viedienieiev, Bystrukhin, 2007: 226, 474). During the interrogation, the agent admitted that his recruitment took place in Kyiv (HDA SBU. F. 6. Spr. 56232. Ark. 34). The main task, which was assigned to him by the MGB staff, was Bandera's assassination (Mudryk, 1993: 11). His terrorist attack committing should have been looked like a «conflict settling» between the OUN overseas cell leaders (Haidenroiter, 2007: 216).

In early 1948, the captain of the Armia Krajowa, Zhabski, arrived in Germany from Poland. It was enclosed, owing to the inspection performed by the SB ZCh OUN, that in fact that person was a Ukrainian from Peremyshl region by the name Volodymyr Stelmashchuk (Mudryk, 1993: 11). Several emigrants recognized his identity. It was promptly clarified that Stelmashchuk-Zhabski led a sabotage and terrorist group consisting of the MGB agents. SB agents detected that they often rode a car and a motorcycle near Sankingw village near the forest on Starnberg lake shore, where Bandera lived at those times (Rozvidka i proty rozvidka, 1958: 110–114). The aforementioned circumstance demanded to take an immediate action against Stelmashchuk-Zhabski. Bandera’s security guards had blocked the road to the suspicious car in which they caught four young people. They were warned: «We know what you want here. Soon you and your boss, who lives with a fake name, will get acquainted with us more closely». After those events, the Stelmashchuk’s group disappeared from Munich (Mudryk, 1993: 55–56). Two years later, the SB learned that the MGB bodies had been preparing a new attempt on Bandera’s life in Prague. Therefore, they significantly strengthened the security and changed his place of residence again (Posivnych, 2008: 63).

The ZCh OUN leader protection remained an important SB task. In the autumn of 1952 two agents, Czech Gorst Lehuda and German Lehman, arrived to Munich from the MGB base in Karlshorst (East Berlin), their task was to liquidate Bandera (Mudryk, 1993: 11). Nevertheless, they were detected and arrested by the SB agents. After their interrogation, the Soviet agents were handed over to the German police (Mudryk, 1999: 65).

A year later, an MDB agent – German Stephan Lipgolts, arrived to Munich with the same task, he was a native of Stara Oleksandrivka village of Rozhyshche district, Volyn region (Posivnych, 2008: 65). He tried to enter Ukrainian emigration environment and gather information about the life style and places for Bandera to stay. However, he was instantaneously revealed the SB agents who took him under observation. Only in 1957, the MGB agent understood that circumstance and left Germany (Chastyi, 2007: 352).

At the same time an event directly related to the further Bandera death had occurred. On the staircase of the editorial board building of the «Ukrainskyi samostiinyk» magazine in Munich on October 12, 1957, the KGB agent Bohdan Stashynsky killed a leader of «dviihari», Lev Rebet, using a special gas device (Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada, 2009: 20). Medical expertise claimed a heart disease to be the cause of death (Patryliak, 2011: 626). It was quite meaningful that right before his death, Lev wanted to resign from his political activities and emigrate to the United States. In order to have an opportunity at first to financially
support his family, he had been learning to become a turner. However, at the last moment, he was persuaded by his wife, Daryna, not to leave Munich (Posivnych, Brelius, 2013: 63).

At the end of 1957, the SB agents learned that Nykyfor Gorbatiuk, an emigrant from Podillya (who arrived in 1923), had been interested in the Bandera’s family for a long time. In the past he was a member of different groups for immigrants such as «Ostrianytsa», «Hulaia», and also «Vilne Cozatztvo». He stayed in touch with his old friend, a former colonel Sukhoruchko, who lived in the Czech Republic. In October 1958 Gorbatiuk disappeared from Munich.

In early 1959, an immigrant, Vintsyk, who was interested in Stepan Bandera’s children, had been taken under an observation by the SB agents. As a representative of a Czech firm, he arrived in a car, with a number plate «W 418651», from Vienna to Munich. Vinitsuk discovered a school address where Andrii, a 13-year-old Bandera’s son, had been studying. The last time he came to Munich on March 26, 1959, he was arrested by the German police owing to information provided by the SB (Chastyi, 2007: 353–357).

On October 2, 1959, a KGB agent, Stanislav Zazhytsky, got in touch with SB staff (Mudryk, 1993: 37–38). On his own initiative, he confessed that there was an instruction recently issued in Moscow for a liquidation of Yaroslav Stetsko and Stepan Lenkavsky, and the SB leader Ivan Kashub was demanded to be seized and brought to East Germany. As for Bandera’s case, Zazhytsky informed that his assassination had been already carefully prepared and would be committed in a couple of days. The latest technical means would be used to execute that assassination (Chastyi, 2007: 353–357).

After a meeting on the issue had been held in Munich, the OUN leadership decided to temporarily relocate Bandera to Spain. Notwithstanding the OUN leadership arguments, Bandera disagreed to move to Spain (Hunas, 2017: 4). Stepan Bandera did not like to feel danger and be in a constant presence of security guards (HDA SBU. F. 6. Spr. 56232. Ark. 59). In September 1959, he categorically refused to increase the security measures against the assassination threat. Regardless that refusal, the SB staff had still taken certain actions. They checked all Bandera security guards and created a detailed day schedule with locations he needed to be and transport he should use (Flys, 2008: 4).

At the time, another attempt on his life was committed. On the streets of Munich while he was riding in his car, an oncoming car unexpectedly crushed at a full speed into his vehicle and then quickly disappeared. An instant before the collision, his driver Vasyl Skolozdra turned the steering wheel to the right and took a blow on himself. In that situation Bandera remained intact but his driver was hospitalized with broken ribs and a loss of blood (Farion, 2008: 4).

However, on October 15, 1959, Bandera neglected his safety again. He had a lunch and, without informing his guards, he used his own car to go to the market together with his secretary, Yevgeniya Matvieiko. He tasted plums there and bought some tomatoes for fermentation. After that, he brought «Ms. Genia» to the ZCh OUN Bureau on Zeppelinshtrasse street, № 67 and without leaving the car, unexpectedly drove to Kraitmarshtrasse street, where he rented an apartment (Flys, 2008: 4).

Right at that time, the KGB agent Stashynsky had been already waiting for him to show up on the staircase. The same as in Lev Rebet assassination case, the terrorist attack was carried out by a gas device wrapped in a newspaper. At first, investigators considered a crack in the skull, which was a result of a fall, to be a cause of Bandera’s death. Then their conclusion was changed according to the followed expertise reports. His sudden death was

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explained to be caused by a paralysis of the heart as a consequence of rheumatism (Chastyi, 2007: 358–359).

The KGB tried to use that situation for their own benefit. They started rumors which circulated in the emigration environment. Those rumors allegedly supposed that the Bandera assassination had been committed by the Minister of Refugees of the Federal Republic of Germany, Theodor Oberländer (Viedienieiev, Bystrukhin, 2007: 157). On October 20, 1959, the «Red Star» newspaper wrote on that matter, and two days later – «Komsomolskaya Pravda» (Mudryk, 1993: 71).

After Bandera’s death Stepan Lenkavsky was selected to become a new head of the ZCh OUN network (HDA SBU. F. 13. Spr. 372. T. 101. Ark. 278–279). He immediately implemented a series of measures to enhance security. He forbade couriers to dispatch to Ukraine and increased the SB influence. In November – December 1960, the SB leader Ivan Kashuba conducted a review of the ZCh OUN leading staff. However, a new leader Mykhailo Hnypiuk – «Bovch», soon replaced Kashuba, even though he continued to play an important role in SB (HDA SBU. F. 13. Spr. 372. T. 102. Ark. 84).

During October 8–19, 1962, a public trial on Bohdan Stashynsky took place in Karlsruhe town. The day before, he and his German wife escaped to West Berlin and surrendered themselves to the Americans. All of the Ukrainian emigration members were observing that resonant case. The broadcasts of the court hearings were conducted in Ukrainian on the «Voice of America» radio station (November 18, 1961), The «Voice of the USA» (November 20, 1961) and «Svoboda» (November 22, 1961) (ASzRU. F. 13. Spr. 376. T. 6. Ark. 198–208).

In an attempt to prevent a flurry of criticism, in 1961, on the KGB command, the Canadian Slavic Committee in Toronto published a book «The Truth About Who Really Assasinated Stepan Bandera. Black Acts of the Galen’s Intelligence». It provided a «version» of the KGB agent Stefan Lippolts that the attack supposedly involved the Galen’s intelligence services, Oberlender and a guard Dmytro Myskiv but Stashynsky’s case was a fabrication made by Western intelligence services (Kipiani, 2012). On October 13, 1962, the KGB agents organized a «press conference» in East Berlin. On that pretended conference Stefan Lippolts again claimed that Bandera was poisoned by Dmytro Myskiv, who was supposedly executed by SB agents. Thy provocation brought an immediate reaction from the zCh OUN side made in the newspaper «Path of Victory». It was clearly stated that at the time of Bandera’s death Myskiv had been in Rome. He had learned about the event over the phone and on the same day traveled back to Munich by a high-speed train (ASzRU. F. 13. Spr. 376. T. 6. Ark. 195–197). Apparently, that KGB provocation undermined health of an already aged Myskiv (Hordasevych, 2009: 33). He died on March 27, 1960 in Munich and was solemnly buried at the Waldfriedhof Cemetery, along with other prominent OUN figures (Kravchenko, 2013: 4).

The further life of Bandera’s murderer, Bohdan Stashynsky, was quite good. The Federal Court recognized the Soviet Union authorities and its current leader, Mykyta Khrushchov, to be the main culprit that caused the crime. Therefore, as a crime executor, Stashynsky received only 8 years of imprisonment. Nevertheless, due to the fact that he had been cooperating with the US intelligence, he did not served his term till the end. After only four years of «cooperation», by the Americans assistance, Stashynsky settled under a new name in the Republic of South Africa and married a woman from Durban city (Ex – KGB agent).

The Bandera’s guard – Mykhailo Banias, emigrated to Canada and settled in Winnipeg in 1948. He was a member of the society of former UPA soldiers in Canada. In particular, on November 4, 1983, he participated in the Presidium of the Congress of Ukrainian Cana-

Vasyl Skolozdra emigrated to the United States, where he engaged into an active social work among the Ukrainian emigration members. He died on November 3, 1987 in Miami (Farion, 2008: 4).

Vasyl Shushko – «Zbrozhek», started his own business after Bandera’s death. He successfully constructed the buildings of the Olympic Center in Munich. At the same time, he studied for a doctoral program at the Ukrainian Free University. Afterwards, he emigrated to Canada. In 1992, together with his German wife, Marianna Shushko, he visited his native village. He donated money for creation of a new iconostasis in the Babynets Church of the Holy Trinity. From his donations were built: a chapel of The Intercession of the Theotokos and a figure of the Mother of God in the center of the village. In 2000, in Lviv, Shushko published a book of memoirs «Task completed» (Klochynska, 2003: 5). He always believed that Ukraine would become a strong and prosperous state. He stated: «All the difficulties are a temporary phenomenon. The main thing is that we have got what we have been fighting for centuries – our freedom». Vasyl Shushko died on April 18, 2006 in Munich (Vidiishov u zasvity, 2006: 15). According to his last will, his body was taken to his native village and buried near the graves of his parents (Kostiv-Huska, 2007: 11).

In conclusion, the analysis of Stepan Bandera security staff activities demonstrates that both its advantages and disadvantages. Its emergence commenced immediately after the OUN leader had been released from the German concentration camp. It was a part of the Security Service of the ZCh OUN, which was responsible for the protection of leading personnel. The ZCh OUN Security Service was engaged in issues of conspiracy, selection of guards and their checking. The number of Bandera guards and their professional level depended on many circumstances. In general, there were just a few guards protecting Bandera. They were recruited from the former couriers and adjutants who were trusted by Bandera. The others were employed from the OUN officers who had an experience of guarding the underground leaders in Ukraine. It is known that there were certain qualifications of Stepan Bandera’s guards: a guard-commander, a personal driver and a family guard. However, their functions were not clear and often duplicated. The main task of the ZCh OUN leader’s security guards was to protect their leader from attempts on his life. Nevertheless, the confrontation with the purposeful measures of the mighty KGB could not last too long. All in all, Stepan Bandera was killed by Soviet agent Bohdan Stashynsky. That assassination affected not only the further development of the SB ZCh OUN but also the entire Ukrainian liberation movement.

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