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THE PERSONALITY OF BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKY IN THE SCIENTIFIC DISCUSSION OF THE MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORIANS

The article analyzes the views of the Russian researchers of the early modern Ukrainian history on the figure of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who represent two historiographical directions – traditionalists and modernizers. It is proved that the first wing covers the lion's share of the scientific segment and dominates, forming an appropriate image of the Russian historiography in the world. It seeks to preserve the old great-state basis, the role of which fulfills the concept of «all-Russian culture», «reunification of Ukraine with Russia», «united state», as well as the denial of independence of the Ukrainian historical process. Instead, the modernization wing, the main representative of which is the St. Petersburg's researcher T. Taiirova-Yakovleva, is focused on revision of a great-state model of the early modern Ukrainian history. The modernizing image of the latter offers a volumetric vision of the Hetmanate's history, which fully fits into the latest trends in the scientific development of the relevant issues, echoing in the basic approaches with the Ukrainian and Polish historiographies.

Key words: Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Russian historiography, traditionalists, modernizers, historians.

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ОСОБИСТІТЬ БОГДАНА ХМЕЛЬНИЦЬКОГО В НАУКОВОМУ ДИСКУРСІ СУЧАСНИХ РОСІЙСЬКИХ ІСТОРИКІВ

У статті проаналізовано погляди російських дослідників ранньомодерної української історії щодо постаті Богдана Хмельницького, які представляють два історіографічні напрями – традиціоналістів та модернізаторів. Доведено, що перше крило охоплює ліву частину наукового сегмента й домінує, формуючи у світі відповідний образ російської історіографії. Воно прагне зберегти стару великодержавницьку основу, роль якої виконують концепції «загальноросійської культури», «возз'єднання України з Росією», «єдиної держави», а також заперечення самостійності українського історичного процесу. Натомість модернізаторське крило, головним представником якого є петербурзька дослідниця Т. Таїрова-Яковлева, орієнтоване на ревізію великодержавницької моделі ранньомодерної української історії. Модернізаторський образ останньої «пропонує об'ємне бачення історії Гетьманщини, яке цілком вписується в новітні тренди наукового освоєння відповідної проблематики, перегукуючись в базових підходах з українською та польською історіографіями.

Водночас між традиціоналістським та модернізаторським образами існують і точки дотику. Обидва табори подають Б. Хмельницького як позитивну постать, що зробила величезний внесок в історію, відзначають особисті таланти гетьмана як політика, організатора й полководця. Гетьман постає правителем зі власними стратегіями, а московський вибір – як одна із альтернатив. Реальний обсяг влади Б. Хмельницького, глибокі розбіжності між його політичним курсом та політикою Москви, проблема турецького протекторату, визнання того, що і після Переяслава 1654 р. розглядався варіант переходу під опіку Туреччини, – усе це зближувало модернізаторський і традиціоналістський образи, хоча кожен із цих напрямів містив низку різноманітних його інтерпретацій.

Ключові слова: Богдан Хмельницький, російська історіографія, традиціоналісти, модернізатори, історики.

Problem statement. It is not accepted to exacerbate attention on the question of B. Khmelnytsky's personal talents in contemporary Russian historiography. Today, there are no incentives to speak specifically about the Polish, and especially the Ukrainian historians. Similarly, there is a lack of controversies in Russia, similar to Frantsev in the Polish historiography, with his sharply critical arrows towards the Hetman which played the role of a kind of stimulator to once more address this or the other component of the image of Hetman. A definitely positive and insatiable image of B. Khmelnytsky in the Russian intellectual tradition did its job too, taking away the need for additional explanations. On the one hand, there is no need to specifically emphasize the features of Hetman's character and to assess the extent of his military, diplomatic and organizational talents. Moreover, it is actively engaged in the Ukrainian and Polish historiography and does not contradict the Russian conceptualizations. On the other hand, on the fact that B. Khmelnytsky was a remarkable figure, the representatives of the both camps came together: both traditionalists and modernizers. Such a state of affairs created conditions for overthrows in assessing the personal talents of Hetman between the Russian, Polish and Ukrainian historians. However, with all the similarity of the characteristics given to B. Khmelnytsky, there are nuances, certain emphases and projections, which stem from the difference in conceptual approaches to the assessment of this figure and the Ukrainian National Liberation War of the middle of the XVII century in general.

The analysis of sources and recent researches. The main conceptual outline of the Russian image of B. Khmelnytsky remained unchanged throughout the scientific period of the development of the Russian historiography. According to the researches which have already carried out (Brekhunenko, 2003: 605–652), the image of B. Khmelnytsky in the Russian historiography was clearly positive, although with this or those features. In fact, only P. Butsinsky, who accused Khmelnytsky of treachery in the post-Pereiaslav's times of the ideals of the Ukrainian-Moscow union (Brekhunenko, 2003: 628), made a dissonance. But the author of the notorious «The origin of the Ukrainian separatism» – the Russian emigrant historian M. Ulyanov – he angrily called the Ukrainian Hetman «dvurushnym» politician who, «gathering in 1654 to Pereiaslav in council, didn't take off the Turkish coat, wearing a Moscow fur coat over it» (Ulyanov, 1996: 28).

As V. Maslak reasonably shown (Maslak, 2007: 184–182), in Russia under the influence of sudden changes in political, ideological and intellectual circumstances, provoked the fall of the «iron curtain» that separated the Russian intellectuals from the free world, there was a values split among the Russian researchers of the early modern Ukrainian history. There were two main camps – traditionalists and modernizers. The main line of traditionalists is to «adapt the orthodox Soviet concept to new scientific realities without a revision of its basic postulates, most of which, for its part, its roots reach into the thickness of the Russian historiography of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At the same time for the most part, the most odious provisions that sharply contradict accepted today in the scientific community the ideas about the system of evidence and research results are under the pressure from the latest scientific developments and haven't been already defended without obvious reputation damage to the author of the text» (Maslak, 2007: 202–203).

Instead, the modernization wing, the main representative of which is the St. Petersburg's researcher T. Taiirova-Yakovleva, is focused on revision of a great-state model of the early modern Ukrainian history. The modernizing image of the latter «offers a volumetric vision of the Hetmanate's history, which fully fits into the latest trends in the scientific development of the relevant issues, echoing in the basic approaches with the Ukrainian and Polish historiog-

raphies. The starting point for rapprochement was the recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian historical process, which put to the orbit the representation of the Hetmanate as an organic expression of the natural self-development of the Ukrainian world, as well as focus on the genesis and the implementation of the state idea, the appearance of a new Ukrainian elite, its worldview imperatives, political concepts, the problem of the Hetmanate's legitimating in the conditions of the stereotypes of the early modern era, strategies for achieving and preserving self-sufficiency» (Maslak, 2007: 251).

The purpose of the article is to highlight the main directions of contemporary Russian historical science – of the traditionalists and modernizers, about the interpretation of the figure of B. Khmelnytsky.

Statement of the basic material. It is well-known that for the traditionalists, the military, diplomatic and organizational talents of the Ukrainian hetman appear through the prism of his steps aimed at rapprochement with Moscow and the formation of the Pereiaslav-Moscow system. Conversely, the modernizers considered the personality of B. Khmelnytsky in the context of his state-building functions. In 1995 T. Taiirova-Yakovleva declared the statement – «the formation of the Hetmanate was the main political result of Khmelnytsky's period, and its main social consequence was the appearance of a large number of comrades» (Yakovleva, 1995: 56), to this day it serves as a criterion for placing accents during the analysis of Hetman's activity.

The Russian historiography never knew the demonization of B. Khmelnytsky and the invective in his address, like those that he was not cheap, for example, F. Ravita-Havronsky. Therefore, the Russian historians had no need to respond to the previous tradition of hanging different labels on the hetman, because such a tradition simply did not exist. Unlike the Polish society, the Russian society was deprived of the influence of attempts to affirm in him a hostile attitude towards B. Khmelnytsky. If modern Polish historians had to speak about the charges of Hetman, for example, in drunkenness, cruelty or stormy temperament, then for the Russian colleagues, such a problem simply did not exist. That's why when someone threw a word on this topic, then it was without any consequences, for generalizations. In particular, T. Taiirova-Yakovleva noticed that B. Khmelnytsky in anger «might have killed Vyhovsky, on hearing that he had a desire to become a hetman» (Yakovleva, 1996: 77). While speaking about the features of the hetman's way of life, she noted that he had «a difficult independent character, the disease that made him (at the end of life – Yu. S.) more irritable» (Yakovleva, 1998: 58). However, this did not prevent the researcher to highly estimate Bohdan, having raised him, as we shall see below, to the rank of geniuses. Or elsewhere, the researcher, referring to sources of the Polish origin, wrote that after the execution of «beautiful Olena» by son Timosh Hetman «had been drinking vodka throughout the campaign until the battle under Berestechko» but she still admitted that «the strongest side of Bohdan was the ability to capture himself in the most difficult situations» (Taiirova-Yakovleva, 2011: 88). Similarly, O. Yevlakhov mentioned about the fact that hetman, «when he was drunk, he called himself the Russian autocrat», but he had been highly assessing Bohdan as a political strategist (Yevlakhova, 2006: 83). It is significant that in the traditionalist camp, even such soft mentions of the negative features of Hetman's character that can be interpreted as a desire to avoid casting any shadow on the figure of such an ideologically advantageous hetman for them, are not even recorded.

In general, Hetman's personality in contemporary Russian historiography is emphasized positively. In both camps he is clearly interpreted as a prominent man of the early modern era.

In particular, for H. Sanin, Hetman – «outstanding political figure», «folk hero, a leader glorified in the dumas, a politician and a diplomat», and «the results of his state activity for the centuries have determined the life of Ukraine and Russia» (Sanin, 2006: 72). For T. Taiirova-Yakovleva B. Khmelnytsky – a «political genius», who «belongs to the most prominent people of the XVII century» (Tairov-Yakovlev, 1995: 76). «His speech was fascinated – the researcher concluded. – Of course, a person who redefined the entire political map of the Eastern Europe and was able to make obey hundreds of thousands of rebel peasants, had extraordinary abilities» (Taiirova-Yakovleva, 2011: 49).

The key element that specifies the greatness of B. Khmelnytsky is the hetman's power as a politician. For the traditionalist camp, the criterion is the fact of the formation of the Pereiaslav-Moscow system in 1654. All other manifestations of successful political and military strategies are threading on this rod. For example, M. Rohozhyn and H. Sanin associate their thesis about B. Khmelnytsky as a prominent figure with the following logical series: «But until 1648, when the liberation war of the Ukrainian people had already begun, and in Russia, and in Ukraine, there was an awareness of historical community of destiny and understanding of the necessity of state unity with Russia. These sentiments prevailed in the Ukrainian people and gradually began to penetrate the circle of the Cossack elite and upper sectors of the Ukrainian clergy. Bohdan Mykhailovych Khmelnytsky was well versed in all this complicated confusion of internal disagreements, wars and diplomacy» (Rohozhyn, Sanin, 2005: 334). Elsewhere, H. Sanin himself emphasized that B. Khmelnytsky was «truly a state mind and a political thinker» (Sanin, 2006: 65). Of course, this mind was embodied in the idea of the Ukrainian-Moscow combination.

The main feature of B. Khmelnytsky-politician H. Sanin proclaims, as already mentioned above, the loyalty to the oath, which serves as the main argument in relation to the arbitrariness and the final choice of hetman in favor of «reunion of Ukraine with Russia» and the opposition of the other hetman-traitors to B. Khmelnytsky. «As it does not seem to be paradoxical, – the researcher wrote, «but in those years (1620 – 1630's, Yu. S.) such a feature of Khmelnytsky's character as a loyalty to this word and oath (as opposed to Mazepa) manifested himself, which allowed him to become a prominent political figure of his time» (Sanin, 2006: 72). To strengthen the pathos, the researcher noted that B. Khmelnytsky remained loyal to the King of Rich Pospolyta, and generally dared to rebel after receiving a veiled permit by Vladyslav IV: «Thus, Khmelnytsky had been serving the king of faith and truth for 32 years, even when he was forced to raise an uprising for the rights of the Ukrainian people, sought to achieve these rights in the beginning, preserving loyalty to the oath and unity with Rich Pospolyta» (Sanin, 2006: 74). And so the decision to «move under the high royal hand» was conscious and final. Only H. Sanin does not take into account that B. Khmelnytsky did not value «faithfulness» to Jan Kazimir, and even in April 1649 he spoke to the Moscow ambassadors that «we did not choose the king, and did not crown, and did not kiss the cross. ... and by the will of God we became free from them» (Reunion of Ukraine with Russia, 1953: 152). For contrast, T. Taiirova-Yakovleva uses this plot to conceptualization of the image of B. Khmelnytsky (Taiirova-Yakovleva, 2011: 75).

H. Sanin noticed the undisguised idealization of Hetman even in the traditionalist camp. During the discussion of the report of the researcher A. Vinogradov criticized the author for excessive varnishing of the figure of B. Khmelnytsky, which makes the latter appear to be such a «knight without fear and reproach». It was emphasized that «to approach him (B. Khmelnytsky – Yu. S.) from this point of view (in opposition to Mazepa) is unlikely to

be useful only from moralizing traditions» (Sanin, 2006: 94). The researcher rightly objects to H. Sanin ignoring the information that contradicts his concept. In particular, B. Khmelnytsky informed the Crimean Khan Islam-Hiray about anti-Turkish and anti-Tartar plans of Vladislav IV, who, for its part, refutes the thesis of loyalty to the oath. A. Vinogradov rightly proposes to write B. Khmelnytsky's personal virtues in the context of behavioral strategies of other Ukrainian hetmans, but he doesn't notice that he falls into politicized judgments. Here is the same reason that forced H. Sanin to do the great-state approaches. The actions of the Hetmanate rulers are valued through the rigid Russian great-state prism, as a result of which hetmans in the eyes of A. Vinogradov «have been losing» the right to a strategy for all the early modern rulers (including the Moscow tsar), because these latter in the execution of hetmans contradicted the intimate interests of Moscow. It is about a policy of maneuvering, shrewd foreign-policy combinations, a game of ambitions, a change of overlords in search of a better position, a better prospect for a led state, etc. «Nevertheless, if we look carefully at all Ukrainian hetmans, – A. Vinogradov remarked, – we will see that their policies have a certain falsehood, a tendency toward political maneuver, the desire to sit at the same time on several chairs, and the end of most of these characters, these hetmans are known, with the exception of Khmelnytsky» (Sanin, 2006: 94).

To the honor of H. Sanin, he admitted that, with a purely ideological purpose, consciously healed the problem of loyalty to oath of B. Khmelnytsky: «Yes, I agree that in my presentation Bohdan Khmelnytsky now turned out to be a knight without fear and reproach. But I explain this to the task that was set before me: to compare the personality traits of Zinovii-Bohdan Mikhailovich Khmelnytsky and Ivan Stepanovych Mazepa. And it seemed to me that I overestimated the moral features of Khmelnytsky and opposed them to the moral features of Ivan Stepanovych Mazepa» (Sanin, 2006: 96). Consequently, the author admits quite legitimate manipulation for the sake of a pre-set ideological goal. In other words, the research credo of the scientist quite allowed the placement of a vision from above and its illustration on arbitrarily selected material. Such an approach led H. Sanin to a very strange conclusion that B. Khmelnytsky «used the methods of honest and open diplomacy and war for the sake of achieving high political goals» (Sanin, 2006: 72). Therefore, the Ukrainian hetman appears to be just the unique ruler of all time and nations, because diplomacy, by its very nature, involves trickery, maneuvering, dual play and the ability to squeeze political or military decisions in one way or another. H. Sanin recognized it by himself (Sanin, 2006: 97).

Instead, the modernization camp did not resort to grotesque panhiryky to B. Khmelnytsky. Typologically, like the Polish and Ukrainian historians, the greatness of B. Khmelnytsky is not looking in line with the geopolitical interests of one of the neighbors, but in the ability to give advice to external and internal political problems for the approval of the Hetmanate. It is put at the forefront the Hetman's pragmatism, ability, taking into account the multi-vector factors, to work out a favorable strategy for advancing his interests, the main of which was the development of the Hetmanate. S. Antonenko noted that «the Ukrainian hetman from the very beginning of the war proved to be a pragmatic politician», and «in his foreign policy he remained a cunning old Cossack» (Antonenko, 1999: 68). T. Taiirova-Yakovleva notes the flexibility of B. Khmelnytsky's strategies, which resulted from his remarkable talent as a politician and administrator: «To achieve this goal, before the opposition Bohdan sometimes had to pretend a «simple Cossack», before Moscow he had to act as a leader of the oppressed Orthodox, and before the Poles he had to be a Polish nobleman, who by his will contacted the rebels» (Taiirova-Yakovleva, 2011: 92).

Such characteristics resonate with the estimations of the Ukrainian and Polish researchers who in one voice have marked the political talent of Hetman, which allowed him in extremely unfavorable foreign policy conditions to protect the Hetmanate from destruction. It is enough to mention the thesis of Y. Kachmarchyk that «Khmelnysky proved that he was alien to any doctrinal bias and was able to effectively use the principles of political pragmatism» (Kachmarchyk, 1996: 123). At the same time, the Polish historians Y. Kachmarchyk, H. Litvin, M. Nahelsky were more generous in epithets concerning B. Khmelnytsky's able steps in the international arena, as it had already been mentioned.

Instead T. Taiirova-Yakovleva, in contrast to them, placed the main emphasis on B. Khmelnytsky's ability to cope with the Ukrainian society, stirred up by the National Liberation War. If the contemporary Polish image (and the Ukrainian) of B. Khmelnytsky is much depleted on this component, then the Russian modernizer, on the contrary, understands it. T. Taiirova-Yakovleva appealed to him repeatedly, which very strongly prompted the need to understand the causes of the civil war that covered the Hetmanate after the death of B. Khmelnytsky and fruitful study of which the researcher at one time advocated a path to the leadership in modern Russian historiography of early modern Ukrainian history.

T. Taiirova-Yakovleva departed from the ancient Russian tradition (which rather resembled the ideologue) to assert the fundamental commonality of the interests of B. Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks. As in previous times, such a position in the form of a thesis on the authority of hetman in the masses is extrapolated to the modern historiographic space by the traditionalists in order to provide the Pereiaslav Council in 1654 with a wide range of support in the Ukrainian society (Zaborovsky, 1997: 42). The researcher seeks to present the realities in which Hetman had to act, rebuilding the state. And her assessment of B. Khmelnytsky's skills on the internal front was no less compliant than the enthusiastic words of the Polish scholars regarding the skillful foreign policy strategies of hetman. Interpreting the intra-Ukrainian problems that the Ukrainian Hetman faced in 1648 (sharp contradictions between revered, registered, gentry and clergy), the researcher did not stint: «It was necessary to be a real political genius so that, being among the three fires, not only to stay survive, to keep power, but also to unite all the advanced forces of society and lead them behind himself» (Taiirova-Yakovleva, 2011: 67). According to her «none of his successors (even P. Doroshenko) could be good in such a cleverly managing Cossack mass, as Bohdan did» (Taiirova-Yakovleva, 2011: 49). It was this talent that allowed B. Khmelnytsky to avoid large-scale rebellions of comrades and devastating serfs' intrigues, and the riots that arose, suppressed by an iron hand without excessive damage to their authorities and Hetmanate in general.

As a result, the verdict of T. Taiirova-Yakovleva regarding the talents of Hetman is very clear, he is closely interwoven with the current trends in the Ukrainian and Polish historiography: «A strange genius politician and diplomat allowed Bohdan Khmelnytsky to create a strong team of adherent people, who in a short time built, albeit unrealistic, but effective administrative and judicial system, united disparate «detachments» of the rebels in the victorious army, conducted complex diplomatic work, built what lasted nearly one hundred and fifty years» (Taiirova-Yakovleva, 2011: 118).

Only one important aspect did not fall into the field of view of the Russian historians in the context of representing the personality traits of B. Khmelnytsky – the ability of the commander. In the mentioned component, the Russian historiography falls out of the general trend. If in Poland and Ukraine the conceptualization of the issue of military talents of Hetman is given to the attention (especially the first one), then in Russia this is said to be

very concise. This is due to the lack of a purely research interest in the military history of B. Khmelnytsky's time: it is undoubtedly dominated by the Polish historians. At the same time, given the specifics of the approaches of the majority of the Russian researchers to representing the image of hetman, one cannot ignore the influence (even psychological) of the fact that the role of the military component in the great-state explanation is insignificant, we can say, marginal.

Conclusions. Thus, the specificity of the modern interpretation of the figure of B. Khmelnytsky in the Russian historiography consists in elaboration of two fundamentally different models – traditionalist and modernizing. The first is the genetic heir to the Soviet concept, based on the spirit and the letter «Tez» from 1954. The second breaks with the Soviet historiographical tradition, offering a version that is as far removed from the Russian great-state and close to modern Ukrainian and Polish interpretations.

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