In the article, on the basis of new documents and materials, the most important questions of insurgent’s activity, namely their operative-tactical devices are clarified. The new strategy and tactics are proved to concern practically all spheres of the insurgent’s life. The article provides sufficient grounds for the confirmation that the bases, methods, and principles of their strategy and tactics were developed by the insurgents themselves on the basis of their own experience and were corrected and finished off in accordance with the struggle conditions. It is found out, that under the conditions, when the Soviet repressive system used a whole complex of special secret-service tricks, the successfully developed by the insurgents and constantly corrected strategy and tactics allowed them to struggle against the establishment of the Soviet administration on the West Ukrainian lands throughout almost ten years.

**Key words:** strategy, tactics, underground, program, Karpatskyi krai, MD-4 «Hoverlia», OUN, UPA.
The statement of the problem. The strategy and tactics played a particularly great role in the activity of the insurgent and underground formations, because it was due to the successfully developed struggle principles that they managed to maintain the viability of their organizations and for long to resist the invaders. The UPA put on a high level the development of the strategy and tactics, their introduction into the activity of the insurgents, and the control over its observance, which influenced all spheres of life (organizational, personal, etc.). The reality dictated its rules and, with the struggle conditions changing, the strategy and tactics had to be corrected in accordance with the circumstances taking place. It was due to the successfully developed principles of strategy and tactics that the insurgents could ensure the vitality of their work and life, activity of their units, and, in particular, a long resistance to the invaders.

The analysis of researches. Studying of the strategy and tactics in the activity of insurgent structures of MD-4 «Hoverlia» has not been subjected to a complex research in scientific works. Separate aspects of this generalized problem were studied in the works of several contemporary Ukrainian researchers. In particular, the question of the use of various forms of armed actions has been raised in the generalizing works on the history of Ukrainian liberation movement by A. Kentiy, Yu. Kryuchuk, A. Rusachenko (Kentiy, 1999a; Kentiy, 1999b; Kryuchuk, 2003; Rusachenko, 2002). Certain aspects of secret activity have been considered in a number of works of the author of this article (Ilnytskyi, 2013a; Ilnytskyi, 2013b). A considerable attention to the illumination of the preparation and carrying out of propaganda raid activities as one of strategic forms of struggle has been paid by V. Vyatrovych and R. Zabily (Vyatrovych, 2004; Zabily, 2006). The underground’s development of tactical schemes «Dazhboh», «Oleh», and «Orlyk» have been considered by D. Vedeneyev and Bystrykhin (Vedeneyev, Bystrykhin, 2007), and Olexandr Ishchuk (Ishchuk, 2011). The transformation of the Ukrainian insurgents’ strategy and tactics has been traced by the working group studying the history of the OUN and UPA in their collective monograph (OUN and UPA, 2005). However, this aspect has not yet received a separate clarification.

The absence of complex works devoted to different directions of this activity predetermines the urgency of the specified researches. The article’s purpose is to reveal the basic operative-tactical devices of the insurgents of MD-4 «Hoverlia» (1944 – 1949).
time, the UPA departments suffered most serious losses, which induced the OUN and UPA command to turn to new tactics. In May, 1945, the reorganization of the UPA came to the end. By the way, TS-21 (Tactical Sector – 21) «Hutsulshchyna», in the fights during IV – V, 1945 disintegrated, but within the following summer the UPA departments gathered again, though, in a much smaller quantity. At the same time, the UPA departments on the territory of TS-24 «Makivka» sustained losses, therefore the command was necessitated to make a reorganization. In 1944 the UPA departments acted mainly as kurins, very often as groups (regiments), and in exceptional cases as bodies of troops (divisions). By the way, thanks to favorable mountain-woody area, in «Hoverlia» the UPA departments most frequently operated as kurins. However, the severe conditions of the new occupational regime, as also the approaching winter forced the UPA command in the end of 1944 – beginning of 1945 to change the tactics and to begin acting in smaller structural links (BSA SSU. F. 13. C. 372. V. 75. S. 92 reverse). Hitherto, in all territories companies were the most effective fighting units in 1944 – 1945, which could temporarily join into kurins for the period of carrying out of various operations. But afterwards the UPA units of TS-24 «Makivka» started operating mainly in platoons: «In the hearth of the struggle, in the heat of insurgent battles, the tactics of small units (section, subsection, group) is formed, in other words, guerrilla group tactics» (BSA SSU. F. 13. C. 376. V. 62. S. 125).

V. Sydor, acting commander of the UPA-West, ordered to the staffs and commanders of the Sectors to act in accordance with the instruction (№1/45, issued in February 1945), which prescribed the following: a) to purge subsections for the purpose of elimination of weak and unreliable persons; to start operating in platoons which in cases of necessity should unite in a larger departments; at the same time, tasks were set to squads which, if necessary, could operate independently; c) to liquidate low vitality units (gendarmerie, military intelligence, etc.); d) to liquidate a number of higher command posts, such as kurin and company commanders, who were appointed to command the existing viable units (platoons) or to conduct political work; e) to make raids into foreign and undeveloped territories; f) to conduct not purely fighting, but also propaganda-fighting operations. The new name «Sector» for a military unit was introduced which should not be merged with a territorial unit. Thus, the order was issued that in operations platoons should be used, which – in time of need – could unite into larger departments (BSA SSU. F. 13. C. 372. V. 23. S. 102). Besides, the transition to actions by small groups was also stipulated by the practical experience of military collisions with the repressive bodies. As is clear, in time of open clashes between the UPA departments with the Bolsheviks the large UPA departments were easily found out, encircled and destroyed by the latter’s forces of greater strength. As a result of the big losses among the personal and commandment structures in the fights with the NKVD armies, the UPA forces were forbidden to operate in formations with the strength of companies and kurins, and the existing formations had to be deployed by the OUN networks in the following submission: each district leader who served 10 – 15 villages, was obliged to settle one UPA company divided in squads and sections with 10 – 15 riflemen in each in every served inhabited locality. Besides, through settlement chiefs he was obliged to provide them with victuals and clothes, to help them in building concealments, whereas the company commander had to supervise his unit’s fighting condition and re-staffing (BSA SSU. F. 13. C. 372. V. 1. S. 63). The soldiers had to store up the foodstuff by themselves. Each responsible appointed to several villages had to collect products from them. The settlement (stanychni) and areal (kushchovi) chiefs were to collect foodstuffs in villages (SALR. F. 5001. D. 6. C. 52. S. 58; BSA SSU. F. 13. C. 372. V. 9. S. 30).
Besides, the division of UPA departments for the winter period, which during the summer period again were again united for carrying out of large-scale fighting operations, was practiced as well. The plan to organize in villages reserve departments headed by commandants (village militaries) was one of tactical-strategic tasks. By the analogy to the operating ones, companies were divided into platoons, which were divided into squads, which number in different villages depended on the quantity of males suitable to carry out military service. The companies’ riflemen passed independent military trainings (BSA SSU. F. 13. C. 372. V. 1. X. 1–3). Therefore, in the second half of 1945 – first half of 1946 the operations were carried out mainly by separate platoons. So, in «Robert’s» order dd. November 2nd, 1945 it was noticed that according to instructions of February, 1945 (military instructions) the accent once again was made and attention drawn to the fact that kurins and companies were annihilated as military units. For this reason, it was necessary to translate all UPA departments into functioning in platoons which – in case of necessity – could connect into bigger military units, applying terrorist and disturbing methods of struggle.

That is, since 1946, the Ukrainian liberation-revolutionary movement began to pass from the form of mass insurgent struggle to the form of deep underground struggle. This change of tactics had the following features: the UPA departments were consistently and according to circumstances in separate areas were disbanded, and their members, commanders and riflemen, were translated to the organizational and/or underground networks; the everyday life and work of the undergrounds was deeply conspirated, contrarily to the conditions under which the mass expansion of the UPA actions, which overall purpose was not to allow the enemy to expand its power beyond the region and its and districts, was taking place. At that time the political-propaganda and political organizational work was put forward. In Drohobych and Stanislaviv regions the last UPA departments were disbanded in the end of 1949 by the order of the UPA commander-in-chief. After that, the armed underground became the basic form of struggle of the Ukrainian liberation-revolutionary movement. It operated with the preservation of the strictest conspiracy (BSA SSU. F.13. C. 372. V. 9. S. 138).

The severe winter conditions in 1944 – 1945, and active operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs departments led to a reduction of UPA departments in 40 %, and by the spring of 1945 the OUN had to liquidate its agents responsible for economy at the expense of its cadres to strengthen the work in other spheres. Considerable losses made the OUN in 1947 to dismiss the UPA to fill up the OUN cadres. The quantitative structure of the OUN staff in Karpathsky krai became scanty (BSA SSU. F. 13. C. 372. V. 9. S. 19). In separate territories the OUN and UPA force were well preserved and, therefore, for example, the head of Drohobych district leadership of the OUN I. Lavriv had no intention to dismiss the UPA as there was no need to fill up and strengthen the OUN responsible agents (BSA SSU. F. 13. C. 372. V. 9. S. 19). In case of strengthening of repressions it was supposed to shorten their quantity to 15 – 20 and even less. The rest should become legalized and conduct a life of those sympathizing with the power. The others had gone in a deep underground: to make bunkers, to store up products, weapons, and means for printing of the nationalist literature. After this «purge», which took place both among rank-and-file soldier and among officers, in the UPA only efficient riflemen and volunteers should have remained. R. Shukhevych said, that by July 20th, 1945, that is, by the closing date of giving up to the law established by the USSR government, this «purge» was already finished. From the UPA some 20 – 25 % of its staff were sent to voluntarily give themselves up to the Soviet justice (BSA SSU. F. 13. C. 372. V. 2. S. 2–3). No doubt, that viewing of the human structure of its all of departments allowed
the OUN’s authorities to provide viability to the whole organization. Years of struggle undermined the health of a great number of riflemen, although, at the same time, in the guerrilla ranks there also were ordinary time-servers, who had but the idea of self-preservation, various agents, and even criminals. The dismissal from such a ballast was expected to provide organization and mobility, to raise fighting spirit and, accordingly, to increase the possibility of a successes in the opposition with the Bolsheviks. The governmental campaigns declaring the appearance in court with the purpose to give up considerably helped in this context. A part of the departments’ administrative boards was transferred into the areal network or sent to strengthen the weaker administrative-territorial links (for example, D. Vitovskyi-«Zmiyuka» – together with «Zhuravel’s» kurin – was sent into TS-24 «Makivka» for reorganization and strengthening of the nationalists in this territory). After that, a special accent was concentrated on the preservation of the riflemen of UPA departments. So, in UPA-West «Hoverlia» order 1/46 (of January 20th, 1946) the following was underlined: 1. It is warned against a) engagement and organization of fights in winter period, that is against full-day or several days long fights with the enemy lest they were compulsorily induced or caused buy the position’s hopelessness. Even such a ratio of losses as 35: 225 in our favour, is for us – to an certain – decisive, but not for the enemy: b) non-coordination of sectors and military units in time and space during distant raiding, for example, as it was with raid «Dzvony» («Bells»), made by a whole kurin, which followed the road towards the returning and pursued «Zhuravli» («Cranes») (BSA SSU. F. 13. C. 376. V. 62. S. 159).

Order 9/44 of November 25th, 1944 already recommended not to use the full force for blowing upon the enemy. As was underlined, weakness of commanders caused desertion, escape from independent activity, and transition under the strong command. As a result, some areas were decapitated, the others, on the contrary, overloaded with cadres. The tendency of striving homeward and individual concealment was noticeable. The desertions of whole squads and even platoons to native places took place. As a matter of fact, this problem was predetermined also by an insufficient quantity of political-education officers. In particular, at the conference of Karpatyskyi krai chieftains on October 22nd, 1945, near the village of Sukil of Kozakiv village council (now in the structure of Bolekhiv town council of Ivano-Frankivsk region), M. Tverdokhlib asserted that the worst state of political-education work was in TS-21 (BSA SSU. F. 6. C. 33286fp. V. 1. 6. S. 211). To prove that he used arguments that in TS-21 of «Hutsulshchyna» in the spring of 1945 50 % of insurgents ran away and 25 % deserted, in TS-23 10 – 15 % of insurgents deserted. The second critical moment came after July 20th, 1945, when the UPA leaders considered that the Bolsheviks would strike a powerful blow upon the UPA, and it was the cause of a still larger desertion. At the same time, M. Tverdokhlib summarized that those killed and arrested UPA members were substituted by 60 % of capable and approximately 40 % weak participants (BSA SSU. F. 6. C. 33286fp. V. 1. S. 213).

The reduction in strength, however, raised the fighting ability, and, in addition, the need in a widely branched economic network, which thitherto had been extremely necessary for the maintenance of huge UPA departments, became no longer relevant. A network of carefully disguised stores was created, in which all the necessary for the UPA departments was kept (Chyzhevskyi, 1948: 110). At the same time, larger departments remained in the areas where the geographical conditions (woods, mountains) and possibilities for material-food maintenance were more favorable.

These structural transformations did not pass by the attention of special secret-service bodies, which noticed that after the defeat of the large departments during 1944 – 1945, the
UPA military units were rearranged and divided into smaller groups, passed to the deep underground, and did not show considerable activity without a sensible need for it. Historian V. Chyzhevskiy left interesting memoirs concerning the opposition of the Ukrainian liberation movement to the Soviet totalitarian system. Writing about the winter of 1944 – 1945, the scholar remarked: «The expectation of the Bolsheviks that the winter would expel the UPA from woods and would help them to destroy it did not come true. The winter occurred exceptionally warm and almost snowless, so that it made the Bolsheviks say, that «even God is a Banderite, because he gave the Banderites a cozy winter». However, the units already got used to winter conditions in the woods» (Chyzhevskiy, 1948: 100). With the coming of the summer small groups and singles concentrated into bigger units and left the settlements, where they had been during the winter period, went into large forests and began activating their operations (ambushing the repressive bodies and agents, attacks on security departments, military men, collective farms, and enterprises, destruction of premises of village councils and documentary bases) (SALR. F. 5001. D. 6. C. 57. S. 128). Historian Yu. Kyrychuk singled out such basic tactical forms used by the UPA: ambush, attack, act of terrorism, sabotage, raid, exit from the encirclement (Kyrychuk, 2003: 141). As a matter of fact, first lieutenant V. Andrusiak-«Rizun» published the book «How to win» (Part one, June, 1945), in which he described the basic tactical tricks of the behaviour of orderlies, maneuvering of squads, stations of platoons and companies, disposition of raiding groups, camping of platoons in the woods, defence in the wood and break-through from the encirclement, attacks on villages, and fights in localities (BSA SSU. F. 13. C. 376. V. 68. S. 70–75 reverse).

In connection with the change of the invader, the primary goals of UPA departments were such: 1) not to allow the creation of the Soviet administrative objects and to destroy the existing ones; 2) to create opposition against the building of economic objects (collective farms, state farms, MTS, etc.); 3) to protect local population from various repressions, evictions, and any advance of the Soviet repressive bodies; 4) to support the spread of schooling, material aid to teachers, to recommend to reject ideological dogmas in training of children; 5) to exert influence on the local administrative institutions.

Maneuvering, avoiding intensive fights, and breaking through from encirclements, the UPA departments tried to cause as many losses to the enemy as possible (Chyzhevskiy, 1948: 94–95). In the autumn of 1945 the UPA departments made a number of offensives on railways and, first of all, on trains carrying out the spanned contingent, property, etc. As to the tactical devices used by the UPA, a branchy enough information is present in an extract from the report of the Department of Fighting Banditism (DFB) of the NKVD of the Ukr.SSR (for the III quarter of 1945), which stated that in July – September, 1945 a change of the UPA tactics took place. Instead of mass subversive and terrorist actions the insurgents took to individual forms of struggle and small group terror, diversions, «disturbing operations», directed to the failure of the basic economic-political actions of the Soviet power, destruction of the Soviet party active, and persons actively co-operating with the Soviet power. An increase in the display of arms from the UPA side in the field of agriculture, such as attempts to undermine the bread supply to the state, hampering grain thrashing, destruction of agricultural machines (tractors, threshers, etc.), arsons of corn-fields and corn stores of «Zahotzerno» was admitted as a characteristic feature of the specified summer-autumnal period. A substantial growth of armed displays in the way of murders by the fighting groups of those who came to the Soviets to give themselves up and their families became another characteristic sign of that period became. The third such feature was a significant number of armed displays connected...
with the purge of the OUN and UPA (BSA SSU. F. 13. C. 372. V. 49. S. 79). In particular, by his order – P. 2. of the UPA-West «Makivka» – the commander admitted the next: «In connection with harvesting of the new crop the Bolsheviks would try to force out from Ukraine as much bread as possible in order to divert its people’s attention from the struggle for liberation by lowering its vitality to an abnormal vegetative level. With that in view, I order: a) to inform the population that they should tighten the process of harvest gathering, to obstruct grain thrashing, to hide grain, to break deliveries, as the performance of Stalin’s norms is a new hunger, ruins, and a tendency to a compulsory «collective-farm building». b) to destroy the crop in state farms and «part-time farms» whether at the root, in sheaves, or in stacks. For complication the export of bread from Ukraine to destroy automobiles, harvesters, threshers, separators, state elevators, receiving centers and their equipment. II... The enemy should be beaten everywhere at day and at night by means of ambushes, attacks, assassinations. We should operate in platoons, platoon halves, and squads, holding a continuous communication with the chieftains so that in case of need they could quickly amalgamate into a company» (BSA SSU. F. 13. C. 376. V. 62. S. 225). Despite a reduction of the strength of the departments, their strategy and tactics improved. The commanders learned to carry out effective operations by small groups.

Except intensive fighting activities, in September – October, 1945 the UPA departments made a number of propaganda raids (for example, a school-supporting action in September, 1945 and one on November 7th, 1945, – against celebrating of the anniversary of October revolution). The purpose of carrying out of school actions was the elimination from educational institutions or, at least, reduction of the Bolshevist ideology influence on training of children. Each action was accompanied not only by performances of propagandists, but also by distribution of a significant amount of printed matter (leaflets, appeals, responses, and the like) (Chyzhevskyi, 1948: 123–124). From the spring of 1946 the UPA ceased performing fighting operations, and from the summer of 1946 it started gathering the deserters to prepare them for the coming winter of 1947. According to the instruction of June, 1947, the UPA was dismissed, and its staff was to become responsible workers for State Security and propaganda issues (BSA SSU. F. 13. D. 372. V. 9. S. 29). However, even after demobilization of the UPA departments, the commanders of sectors remained in the districts, so that they could later be used for the performance of concrete organizational work. The rest UPA members were included into the organization for some or other kind of work (State Security combat units, protection of the leaders, responsible for certain works, communication, etc.). At the same time, these actions were undertaken with the observance of severe conspiracy. The demobilized received the information about their new appointments without any explanations (BSA SSU. F. 2-N. D. 57 (1953). C. 1. V. 1. S. 124). So, after the disbandment of UPA departments its military functions were, in fact, taken up by the OUN network. Since 1946, the Ukrainian liberation movement started to pass from the form of mass insurgent struggle to the form of a deep underground struggle. The change of tactics brought about the possibility for the commanders and riflemen of the disbanded UPA departments to pass to an organizational network according to the situation and necessity, the conspiracy of all vital spheres and activity was secured (the main accent was made on preventing of strengthening of the Soviet power in territory). Then the following tasks were set: «1. At any price, to retain our underground organization in the Ukrainian lands within the USSR and, in conformity with the necessary possibilities, develop it furthermore; 2. Through the underground organization and, also, by all other means, to conduct the explanatory propaganda activities among the Ukrainian peo-
ple and the peoples of all USSR; 3. To organize a resistance of the Ukrainian and, as far as it was possible, the other peoples of the USSR against the Bolshevist robbers and exploiters in all spheres of life; 4. To conduct fighting and armed operations necessary to prevent the invaders to fix on our lands, what they wanted to do, and not to allow the Muscovite-Bolshevik thieves and all their hired men to do their evil deeds in relation to the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian liberation movement all the time with impunity» (BSA SSU. F. 13. C. 372. V. 9. S. 138–139).

The longest period of time the UPA departments UPA operated in MD-4 «Hoverlia», although those were but subunits of small strength, which underwent constant reductions through perpetual fighting operations. So, in TS-21 of «Hutsulshchyna» the Bohun department (commander Mykola Kharuk-«Vykhor») operated until the summer of 1949, whereas in TS-24 «Makivka» the company «Bassein» kept up operating until the summer of 1949 (commander Vasyl Gudzyk-«Orikh»). The transition of several companies of riflemen from TS Lemko» into TS-24 «Makivka» in the summer of 1947 became a substantial strengthening of the insurgent forces. Therefore, in the end of 1947, five companies, each from 30 to 50 riflemen strong, operated within TS-24 «Makivka». In general, during 1948, the majority of the departments in MD-4 «Hoverlia» were disbanded, and up to the summer of 1949 only the aforementioned links actively operated (Sodol, 1994: 58). On August 29th, 1949 the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council made a decision of demobilization, on which basis the Supreme Military Headquarters of the UPA gave out the order P. 2 of September, 3rd: «1. By the end of 1949 partly to stop the activity of all the sections and staffs of the UPA. 2. To transfer the right of rewarding of the members of Ukrainian Liberation Movement from the UPA staffs to the underground cells with equal rights. 3. To transfer the right of nominating for higher ranks of the members of Ukrainian Liberation Movement from the UPA staffs to the underground cells with equal rights. 4. To preserve the necessary offices of the Supreme Military Headquarters of the UPA (organizational-personal) for conducting evidence of the nominated and awarded, as also for the nomination for the rank of starshyna of those members of UPA who were not nominated till the end of 1949 for technical reasons» (Sodol, 1994: 59).

For the purpose of debugging of optimum interaction, accurate submission and mutual relations between the OUN and the UPA in Karpatskyi krai, the leader of the regional leadership Y. Melnyk-«Robert» issued the order on September, 1945, according to which all the insurgent formations, deployed on corresponding territories were subject also to the local OUN leaderships, along with their submission to the military command. Hence, the commanders had to make a double report – to the staff of MD «Hoverlia» and to the district OUN leadership. Nevertheless, the UPA departments continued to fulfil orders, instructions, and training materials of the higher military command. A department’s commander independently supervised over his fighting unit, solved the questions of reorganization, personnel rotation, and promotion of riflemen to higher military ranks, encouragement and punishment, but, notwithstanding that, he had to co-ordinate all his actions with the conductor the OUN of the corresponding territory, which was responsible for the political situation. At the same time, as researcher A. Kentiy asserts, such a tendency assisted the strengthening of the relations between the OUN and the UPA and, also, the returning to underground-guerrilla actions. In his opinion, «the UPA was increasing gaining the features of the local, instead of the all-Ukrainian character» (OUN and UPA, 2005: 370).

The conclusions. So, strategy and tactics concerned all spheres of the insurgent life without exceptions. The bases, methods, and principles of their strategy and tactics the insurgents
developed on the grounds of their own experience, correcting and completing them according to the struggle conditions. In parallel with the already developed strategy and tactics bases, there was an accurate requirement concerning the observance of the basic, fundamental rules. The working out, implementation, and control over the observance of strategy and tactics provided the underground’s viability. All that assisted in the preservation of human and material resources and, eventually, in the duration of the struggle.

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DALO – Державний архів Львівської області.


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